


TSING HUA LECTURES ON ETHICS

BY

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TO THE MEMORY
OF
MARIAH DEXTER
WHO DURING MANY YEARS
WAS FOR ME
IN
LOCO PARENTIS

PREFACE

THE lectures of this little volume were delivered before the students of the High School of Tsing Hua College, Peking, China, during the fall of 1917, when I was temporarily professor of psychology and lecturer on ethics in that institution. Each was presented without manuscript and then committed to writing while the matter was still fresh in mind. Very naturally, the original form of spoken discourse has been preserved. They represent the main viewpoints and the gist of arguments which have constituted the content of a course in ethics at Hamline University during ten successive years.

In making the final preparations for the press, I have tried to give credit wherever credit was due, as the various footnotes amply testify. It is not unlikely, however, that shades of thought suggested by lecture courses which I took during my own student days, and impressions gained from a rather wide reading in various fields have not been sufficiently accounted for. I hope, however, that I have committed no serious breach in the courtesy of acknowledgment.

GREGORY DEXTER WALCOTT.

HAMLIN UNIVERSITY,
January 28, 1919.

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TSING HUA LECTURES ON ETHICS

I

THE POINT OF VIEW IN ETHICS¹

CONFUCIUS, whose name adorns the annals of your people, is known throughout the civilized world as a teacher of ethics. I could not hope to improve upon some of his excellent and famous instruction, nor shall I attempt to do so. None the less, there are changes that take place in the world about us which make a review of ethical teaching advisable from time to time, and new discussions of these old themes can not prove harmful to the subject, even though no new values may be added. It is in the attitude, then, of one who wishes to engage in a free, frank discussion of some of these vital questions that I stand before you to-day.

At the very outset, however, I need to indicate that I regard this particular lecture as a kind of introduction to the course as a whole. All that I

¹This lecture was printed first in *The Tsing Hua Journal*, November, 1917. It is reproduced in practically its original form.

plan to do at this time is to survey the field, suggest various points of view, and provide a kind of guiding thread to aid us in following through all the rest of the lectures of this series. With this understanding of my purpose to-day, I will proceed.

It is not easy for me to decide just where to begin. One could begin almost anywhere and ultimately present about the same material. I think, however, that it will be best to start with the meaning of the term "ethics" as it has figured historically in the western world. That will put us into touch with the historical situation and afford a basis for any comparisons that may be necessary later.

The term "ethics" entered the English language from the Greek. Among the Greeks, some twenty-five hundred years ago, there was the term $\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$, plural $\eta\theta\epsilon\alpha$, which meant custom, traditional forms of behavior, manners, or social habits. It was so used rather generally in the time of Plato and Aristotle. But Cicero, who was very familiar with the Greek language and who did more than any other man to make the Greek philosophical ideas intelligible to his countrymen, used the Latin term *mos*, plural *mores*, as an exact equivalent for the Greek. Now, since the Latin language was especially used by scholars throughout medieval times and until very recently, customary forms of behavior,

or social habits, were presented in European thought by means of derivatives from the Latin *mores*. Consequently, such terms as morality, moral philosophy, etc., have been very prominent in English and other European languages. With the Renaissance, however, there came a renewed knowledge of the Greek language and Greek thought, and in consequence this word "ethics" took its place in modern languages beside its Latin equivalent.

Sooner or later, however, this association of the two terms raised the inevitable question as to whether they mean the same or are really different in their connotation. Professor Palmer of Harvard University, who is himself a leading teacher in this field, has suggested that we should distinguish between the two by making ethics stand for the theoretical part of the whole field and morality for the applied or practical side.² This is, of course, an interesting way of dealing with the matter, but such a distinction seems to me to be no more than that which is so frequently introduced into the field of any science, viz., the theoretical or pure science and the applied or practical science. This does not mean that there are two things, as two kinds of physics, a pure physics and an applied physics, although because of the methods of treatment they do become somewhat different. But in the field of ethics, while we do have to recognize a more theoretical side and an applied side,

² *The Field of Ethics*, p. 206.

I do not think that we can always distinguish consistently between the terms "ethics" and "morality" in this way. Consequently, I shall use the two words rather indifferently throughout this course of lectures. Ethics, then, as the customs or habits of a people will be our general theme, but I shall not hesitate to use the term morality, whenever it is the more convenient, as its practical equivalent.

Another matter of more or less historical importance needs consideration next. It is pointed out by not a few writers that in the ancient Greek world the emphasis in ethical discussions was upon such concepts as "virtue" and the "good," indeed, the "highest good," while in the modern western world the tendency has been to stress "duty" and "perfection."³ Among the Greeks, Socrates was pre-eminently a teacher of ethics, but he conducted his discussions quite largely under the head of virtue. "Virtue is knowledge," was his famous fundamental position. If one would be virtuous, one should possess oneself of knowledge, such knowledge, in part, as was at that time becoming rather common in Greece, but more particularly such knowledge as comes from self-examination and an appreciation of the concept. But aside from Socrates' peculiar emphasis, the Greek word, ἀρετή, meant manliness, the possession of a manly character, such as had been more or less evident in the great heroes of old. It meant

³ Seth, *Ethical Principles*, 6th Ed., p. 14f.

practically the same for the Greeks as the corresponding term "virtus" did for the Romans. The first part of this word is the same as the Latin word for man, viz., "vir." Virtue for the old Romans meant manliness, and that was practically the meaning of the Greek term which has been translated into the English language as "virtue."

But, as I have said, the Greeks did not merely discuss virtue, but also the "good." What is that thing in life which we can regard as good, indeed, as the highest good? What is that for which it would be worth a man's time to strive throughout his entire life, or what is that superlatively good thing which this world or the next holds out to a man? Of course it is not my purpose in this particular lecture to deal with such a discussion in detail. I am merely trying to show you what the *motif* of Greek ethical discussions was, that this may stand as a contrast to the modern emphasis, which, as I have stated, has been largely on duty and perfection.

It is very easy to see, I think, why there was this change in emphasis, and also that there is a real connection between the two. The leaders in the Church, as that institution developed, gradually worked out what they thought was the highest good, and then they set that before the people to be realized in as full measure as possible. For the people, obedience, duty was at the front, and in the performance of their duty their highest good would be real-

ized. There is, therefore, no great difference between the ancient and the more modern way of dealing with this matter. In my discussions, however, I shall incline more to the Greek emphasis, although I think not to the utter neglect of the later historical development.

Now, having proceeded thus far upon my way in an endeavor to indicate the general point of view from which I shall try to present ethics in this course, another question arises. Do I plan to treat the subject from the angle of some particular group? Hobhouse, a prominent English writer, very well points out that all ethics thus far in the world have been of the group variety.⁴ If we fix our attention upon the Fiji Islanders and consider them apart from all influences upon them from any other part of the world, we shall have to admit that what is right for them is what the group thinks is right, and what is wrong for them is what the group thinks is wrong. At the present day in France, the thing that is superlatively right is for a man to leave his ordinary occupation, shoulder his musket, and take his place in the trenches to repel the invader of his country, and the thing which is eternally wrong is for a man, who may be fit, to neglect or evade that duty. And so for all the countries of the world. The thing which is right, then, is that which the group deter-

⁴*Morals in Evolution*, 1st Ed., Pt. II, pp. 264-274, and *passim*.

mines is right, and the thing which is wrong is what the group thinks is wrong. Still further, Hobhouse points out, and he is not alone in this thought, the world is gradually moving away from group morality to a universal morality, to a condition of affairs when all the peoples of the world will have the same customs, think alike on ethical matters, and have about the same morality. There is, undoubtedly, much truth in this view, but what I wish to suggest is that even when such a oneness of culture should be realized there would still be group morality, although, of course, the group then would be the entire world.

Now, I am certainly not planning to present ethics to you from the angle of any particular group, whether that of some nation as a whole, or of some small group within a given nation. Least of all would I be rash enough to attempt to present the subject to you from the view-point of your own great teacher, for I assume that you know more about his teaching than I do or perhaps ever shall. I shall, however, try to present a method of dealing with ethical problems which will be rather universal in its application, one which I think will prove helpful here in your own land or in any other land to which you may go, and which will also prove to be equally useful, if the time ever should come when all the races of the earth shall have about the same culture and think about the same on ethical topics. It is a

method which has a universalism that functions from within out, rather than being a method which has a universalism in some sense foisted upon it from without. The development of this point, however, awaits the later lectures.

Another matter that demands our attention in this introductory lecture is this: Shall the ethics which I propose to present be of the heteronomous sort or of the autonomous sort? I realize full well that these are rather formidable terms. Perhaps cold chills are now running down your spinal column at the mere mention of them. Let me hasten to explain them. I first ran upon these terms used in this way in a little book from the pen of Professor Wundt, the eminent psychologist and philosopher of Leipzig University.⁵ The essential thought is this: A heteronomous type of ethics is one in which the course of conduct is forced upon the individual by some external authority, while autonomous ethics is the kind according to which the individual thinks out the matter for himself. Let me present each of these types briefly, but sufficiently for the present purpose.

There are at least two forms of the heteronomous type of ethics; one in the field of politics and the other in religion. When we look back into the history of the race, we find systems of government appearing, and in most of the older ones we find that

⁵ *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 3te. Auflage, pp. 420-453.

the law emanated from the head of the state. What is right is what the head determines to be right. It is for the people to obey. The laws on the statute books are placed there largely by the king, emperor, ruler, or whatever his official designation might happen to be. Unless the people obey the royal mandates, their lives are as nothing. Morality, under such conditions, consists in realizing the will of the ruler; the opinions and feelings of the individual count for naught.

Very largely the same thing is true when we turn to the field of religion. I do not care to undertake at this time any lengthy discussion of this topic. This much, however, may be said. There have been many religions in which ethics has been fully as external as in the case of the state as a whole. Not infrequently the machinery of religion has assumed the form of the state, and that form, too, which is ordinarily spoken of as characteristic of an oriental despotism. The kind of ethics under such circumstances partakes largely of the type already described in connection with the state. The approved course of conduct is imposed upon the individual from without. It is not for him to reason why, but rather for him to do, even though he should die. The will of the deity as interpreted by the earthly representative must be obeyed with absolute fidelity. There is no freedom for individual thought or initi-

ative. The life of the devotee must be lost in that of his divine master, as the life of the citizen must be the expression of the will of the earthly ruler.

When, however, we turn to the autonomous type, we find the situation much different, although here, too, we may discern at least two varieties. The individual's conduct is, indeed, the result of his own reflection, but he may examine carefully some system of the heteronomous type and decide that that is the best for him. He thus, in a sense, reënacts the measures provided for his guidance either in the state or in some religious body, and so he obeys in all respects, but his obedience is freely given. There is nothing irksome in it for him. In consequence of his reflection, he has come to identify his will with the will of the earthly ruler or of the deity. His tasks are in a sense self-imposed, and he moves freely within his self-prescribed limits. Not a few such individuals are to be found to-day within many states more or less autocratic, and within religions of practically the same sort.

With the other variety of the autonomous type, the situation is decidedly different. Here the individual's conduct is the expression of profound reflection, and oftentimes the way he stakes out for himself does not meet the approval of the powers that be, whether political or religious. . None the less, such an individual feels that he must go that way, no matter what the consequences to himself

may be. He thinks through his own problems, he legislates for himself, and holds himself rigidly to the course which his deepest convictions demand. This is the autonomous type *par excellence*.

Now, it is very easy to see from this brief discussion that this distinction is the same as that between autocratic and democratic forms of government in general. The deepest interpretation of the gigantic struggle going on in Europe to-day is that it is a desperate encounter between these two types of government. Fundamentally that struggle is a political one. It is true that economic questions are very much involved with the issue, but the deepest analysis shows two diametrically opposed theories of the state. It is the same kind of conflict as that which took place in the religious world at the time of the German Reformation. If you ask me, then, from what angle I plan to present ethics to you, I need merely say that, coming as I do from the oldest of the existing large republics, I could hardly do anything else than present the subject to you from the autonomous angle. This type has had not a few representatives in the earlier history of European civilization, but that number has been steadily increasing as the centuries have brought what we call modern openness of mind, freedom of thought, and freedom of action. The autonomous type of ethics, then, is the type which I shall try to explain and emphasize throughout this all too brief course.

There are, now, but a few things that I need to add to make my position fairly plain, and to give the course its proper setting. Am I intending to discuss ethics from the angle of philosophy, or do I regard the subject as a science? Still further, what relation does ethics have to sociology? These are questions which have been up for discussion many a time during the last quarter of a century, but especially prominent is the problem as to whether ethics is a science or not. Let us see what may be said briefly in connection with each of these topics.

In regard to the first of these three questions, I may say that there has always been a close relation between philosophy and ethics. As I have already indicated, Socrates was profoundly ethical in his teaching, and the emphasis which he gave to moral philosophy remained as a fundamental motive with his great pupil, Plato. Plato, however, gave no specific work on ethics. His reflections are scattered through his dialogues, but there can be no question of the closeness of relation between his ethical views and his philosophical background. This is especially true, too, of the teaching of Aristotle. He wrote a special treatise on ethics, but the connection between his ethical views and his fundamental metaphysical or philosophical background is very apparent. So, too, when we consider the men of the so-called ethical period of Greek philosophy. There is a decided relation between their metaphysical

views and their ethics, although the metaphysical part was not especially attractive to them. The same is true when we follow down the course of philosophic thought throughout the centuries of European development. Each great philosopher has tended to crown his system with a work on ethics. This was eminently true of Spinoza, whose one great work is entitled "Ethica," but in the early part of that work he gives the metaphysical background for his ethics. Equally true, too, is this in the case of Herbert Spencer, although the system he worked out is decidedly different from Spinoza's. In the preface of his "Data of Ethics," Spencer indicates that he regards his whole synthetic philosophy as but the background for his ethical views. Fearing that his health might not permit him to complete the entire scheme of thought as he had sketched it in his mind, he gave his ethical thought about midway among his publications, so that the world might at least realize what he had planned, even if he should be unable to carry through his plan in its entirety. Fortunately his health did ultimately enable him to complete his work.

Now, from all this, it must be apparent that there is a close and vital connection between ethics and philosophy. The real question is, what kind of philosophy? There are philosophies and philosophies. I shall not risk wearying you with even a brief sketch of them. This much, however, let me

say. There is a philosophy growing up in the western world to-day which is by no means complete, but which none the less gives promise of great usefulness as it becomes better developed.⁶ Between ethics, as I shall try to treat the subject, and this newer philosophy there will be an inner harmony, for this philosophy itself makes use of ethical material as an integral part of itself. To anticipate a bit, I will say that this philosophy is in close relation with the mass of material accumulated by all the various sciences during the last three or four hundred years. I could not, if I wished, develop ethics, as I view the subject, without feeling and perhaps indicating here and there the closeness of relation of the subject to this newer and to me very promising philosophy. Ultimately, I believe that this type of philosophy will be crowned with a better, a more adequate, and a more satisfying type of ethics than the western world up to the present has yet possessed. It is not my purpose, however, to go into this matter in detail. It must suffice for me to state what I feel is the proper relation between these two subjects and pass on.

But what shall I say of ethics and science? I have already rather definitely indicated my position by what I have just said about this newer philosophy. It is interesting for me to note here, too, the changes of views within this field. When I was a student in

⁶It is the body of rather realistic-scientific thought that I refer to here.

college, as you are now, an eminent writer on ethics, in the first edition of his work, insisted that ethics must be regarded strictly as a part of philosophy.⁷ In a later edition of this same work, however, he argues vigorously that ethics must be regarded as a science. Evidently new light had dawned upon him. In my own case, beginning with a rather strong opposition to ethics as a part of philosophy, I have become convinced that there is a close relation, but depending upon the kind of philosophy.

Now, in any science, analysis is a fundamental method of procedure. This, I take it, can and must be applied to the field of ethics. In other sciences, some unit is reached as the result of such analysis. In physics the fundamental unit is the molecule, while in the older chemistry the unit is the atom; in physical-chemistry the unit is the electron, while in biology the unit is the cell, and in neurology the neurone is the smallest and simplest unit within that particular field. So in ethics, rigorous analysis yields a unit, viz., the moral idea or ideal. The field is the whole range of human history. What exactly have been the moral ideas entertained by men in different periods of the world's history, and how have they changed from age to age? What, too, are the principles underlying such changes? How do the units become broken up, how do old ideas give way to

⁷ Seth, *A Study of Ethical Principles*, p. 3. Cf. 8th Ed. p. 3, and *passim*.

the new, how do old and new coalesce into new programs for action? These are only a few of the questions one has to consider as one seeks to develop ethics in a scientific manner. The task is undoubtedly a more difficult one than in some other fields, but the difficulty of the undertaking is no legitimate argument against the possibility of attaining ultimately a fairly well developed science which may be ranged by the side of other sciences, as psychology, which deal with the various aspects of human mental phenomena. Ethics as a science, then, I am inclined to insist upon.

There are, however, various objections which are frequently urged against such a program. I can take time for only two of these. It is said that it is impossible to use experiment in such a field, and further that one could not make predictions. These are regarded in some quarters as fatal objections. But let us see.

There is no science which is more generally regarded as such, and which is regarded as more exact than astronomy, but certainly one can not experiment in a strict sense in that field. To experiment, we have to control the conditions. In the field of astronomy, however, we can not exercise such control. Observations may be made under certain special conditions which nature herself provides, but that is far different from a nice experiment in the chemical laboratory where all the elements are well known and

all the conditions are under careful control. Now, of course, it would hardly be permissible to experiment in some fields of ethics, but actually the race has experimented with almost all forms of conduct, and all that we have to do is to ransack history to see what the conditions were and how the experiment turned out. President Schurman of Cornell University has said that the only way in which ethics can be made scientific is to make the subject historical.⁸ Here is a recognition of this same experiment field. Then, too, the various nations are experimenting all the time. Some measure is up for discussion. There are opinions both adverse and favorable which are expressed freely. Ultimately the measure is enacted into law. If it does not prove to be of value to the community, it is sooner or later repealed and some other measure substituted for it. This is real experimentation.

So, too, the objection to ethics as a science on the ground that one can not make predictions is not particularly strong. All predictions, even in the most exact sciences, are based on the assumption that conditions in the future will be as in the past. We say that such or such an event will occur, if all the conditions of the past are repeated. As a matter of fact, conditions never are twice alike in every respect. There is a sufficient likeness, however, to warrant our expecting in a given case approximately

⁸ *The Ethical Import of Darwinism*, p. 31.

the same results as in the past. May we not take the same attitude in ethics? It seems to be true that at many times and in many places in the past, if a man violated the sanctity of another man's home, his life paid the penalty. We may predict exactly the same thing to-day, in so far as conditions happen to be the same. It is of course true, that many conditions of modern life are different from what they were many centuries ago. There are many and varied legal methods of dealing with such cases and there are many and varied ideas entertained in our complex modern societies. But, I repeat, where the conditions to-day are about what they were several centuries ago, and where the parties concerned are on about the same plane of social development as in the past, we may predict with a high degree of certainty what the results will be in such matters when the causes are the same as in the past. No serious objection, then, may be advanced against ethics as a science on the score that predictions can not be made. The basis for making predictions in this field is the same as in other fields.

And now we come to the last question which I have raised with reference to the angle from which I propose to discuss ethics. Does the subject have any vital relation to sociology? I need not stop long in answering this query. There is no subject in our modern field of thought that has a closer relation to all things human than sociology has. There is

no human activity which this subject does not touch in some way more or less completely. Then, too, sociology is in many respects akin to that new type of philosophy toward which I have already indicated that I am partial. There is hardly a science which does not contribute to a greater or less extent to make sociology what it is. This subject, too, has at times in the past been called the philosophy of history. With the close relation to history which I have already indicated that ethics sustains, it is unavoidable that it should have a very close and a very definite relation to sociology. What that relation is, however, will be presented in future lectures, especially the one to be given two weeks from to-day.

And now my surveying of the field is complete for to-day. I have indicated that the term "ethics" meant originally customs, the habits of a people, and that it means practically the same as the term "morality"; I have also suggested that I shall lay more stress upon the old Greek *motif* of the "good" and "virtue," rather than upon "duty" and "perfection," although the latter will not be entirely overlooked. Then, too, I have suggested that I do not plan to present a purely group morality, although I recognize the group as the basis of ethical requirements. My aim will be to show how a method of dealing with ethical problems may be outlined which would function in any group, or in the world as a whole when the population and culture become more nearly

homogeneous than they are at present, and I shall emphasize, too, an autonomous rather than a heteronomous type of ethics. I hold, too, that ethics has a fundamental relation to philosophy, and I shall treat the subject from the angle of a rather new kind of philosophy which is developing in America and to some extent in Europe; I also regard ethics as a science and as closely connected with sociology.

I realize full well that where there are so many possible points of view and so many fields of thought to take into consideration, it will be exceedingly difficult to thread a perfectly consistent course. None the less, as a celebrated French writer has said, "Je prend mon bien, où je le trouve," I take my good, wherever I find it. So I plan to make use in various ways of all these fields that I have so hastily touched upon to-day, and I shall attempt to fuse all that I select from them into something which shall be of value for you.

II

THE PRECISE FIELD OF ETHICS

IN my lecture two weeks ago, I suggested, more or less completely, the various angles from which ethics may be viewed, and indicated, too, rather incidentally, the numerous fields from which I shall appropriate material, to a greater or less extent, for the succeeding lectures of this series. I also pointed out the particular aspects of the subject that I am inclined to stress. My task to-day is to trace ethics to its lair. Let us see if we can reach this goal.

Professor Palmer of Harvard University, to whom I referred in the introductory lecture, published a little book several years ago under the title of "The Field of Ethics." In this book, the author compares ethics with philosophy, with science, with law, with religion, and with several other subjects, discusses their likenesses and differences, and in this way reaches what he regards as the special field of ethics. I do not care to repeat what Professor Palmer has so well done. None the less, for our special purpose, it is necessary to find out, if we can, just those particular activities with which ethics is primarily con-

cerned. This, I think I can do most quickly, if I make use of some generalizations which are current among philosophers and sociologists, and which, at any rate, will give us a valuable bird's eye view and show at once where such activities are generally catalogued.

Professor Höffding of the University of Copenhagen, whom Professor James has called "one of the most learned of living philosophers,"¹ has pointed out that all the problems, with which philosophers have wrestled for more than twenty-five hundred years, can be brought under four main heads, viz., the Problem of Knowledge, the Problem of Being, the Problem of Worth, and the Problem of Consciousness. It is not my purpose, of course, to deal with these problems in detail, but such a grouping as this gives us a survey of the entire field, and the third group shows us our special province, for, as Professor Höffding proceeds to explain, the topic "worth" includes both ethics and religion. Still further, this term "worth" is equivalent to the term "value" which stands in the center of ethical discussions to-day, and when we analyze carefully we find that value points to the field of purpose, and this, in turn, lands us at once in the midst of teleology, where many of the severest intellectual battles of the past, in philosophy, theology, and science have been waged with

¹ Höffding, *The Problems of Philosophy*, Preface.

varying and oftentimes inconclusive results.² I can not, of course, take the time for an elaborate discussion of this matter, but I must say a word or two with reference to it.

Back among the Greeks, Democritus, who was one of the great systematizers of Greek thought, worked out his system with a fundamental emphasis upon a purposeless universe. When we analyze with proper care, he maintained, we reach the conclusion that the world is as it is because of a kind of necessity, a blind unthinking law, a kind of fate. We do not find purpose as an integral, fundamental principle. Plato and Aristotle, on the other hand, insisted that the deepest interpretation of the world which thought reveals is that purpose is inextricably interwoven with the nature of things. Account for it as we may, we may not avoid the concept of purpose in our efforts to explain the origin and succession of events in the world, both human and otherwise. With the development of the Church, it was rather natural that this purposeful interpretation should have been in the foreground, and this is what we find, for the most part, throughout medieval Europe. But with the reintroduction of the fundamental teaching of Democritus early in the seventeenth century, very naturally a purposeless universe came to the front again for not a little discussion. Still further, since the development of the sciences during the last three

² Cooley, *The Principles of Science*, p. 163.

hundred years has been in rather close relation to the fundamental viewpoint of Democritus, it is not surprising that science has not been very hospitable toward the concept of purpose. About two years ago, however, Professor Warren of Princeton University published an extended article in one of the philosophical journals upon this very matter.³ He maintained in substance that we have a classical treatment of the concept of causation in the work of David Hume, but that purpose has never had such an exhaustive examination. This, however, Professor Warren attempts, and reaches the conclusion that while science takes the teaching of Hume in his development of the concept of causality, the concept of purpose, as it has generally been used, has no legitimate place within the field of science. This, as is quite evident from what I said in the former lecture, would put us into a kind of dilemma, if the older interpretation of purpose were the only one. For, as I pointed out there, I am inclined to regard ethics as a science, and to be estopped from the use of the concept of purpose would be to terminate my course of lectures before I had fairly begun. Happily, however, the writer referred to has eliminated from the concept of purpose its old-time "anthropomorphic accretions" and indicates that in its reduced connotation it may well be employed for certain scien-

³ *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, Vol. XIII, pp. 5-26, 57-72.

tific aims. Since, too, this transformation of the term is, in general, such as I have been accustomed to make use of, I can all the more readily enlist it in conjunction with our present task.

I may also add that we, at this time, are not particularly concerned with the reasons which have led Professor Warren to make the changes which he has deemed necessary in the concept of purpose. His discussion involves not a little of metaphysics, and we wisely hold ourselves aloof from that subject as much as possible at present. Science restricts itself to rather narrow limits, although it does have its metaphysical ground principles. We are not so much interested just now in the metaphysical aspects of ethics, or in an extended discussion of the term purpose, important though they may be in themselves, as we are in the data of ethics and the possibility of something like a scientific treatment. We need first to get our material and to sift it with as great care as possible. Whatever metaphysical implications there may be in the subject or in some of the terms tentatively used can be threshed out then. Consequently, when we scrutinize the field of behavior within limits that are not too far apart, and use the term divested of some of its earlier meanings, we find what can very well be called purpose. Let us see.

The little fishes swimming hither and thither within their watery deep make continual use of their mouths. Thus they aerate their system and get their neces-

sary food supply. How much consciousness may be involved in the process, I will not attempt to say. None the less there is very evidently a purpose which is subserved by their almost ceaseless activities. The fox and the wolf pounce upon their unsuspecting victims, while the lion and the bear stalk their prey each in its own way. So, too, human beings have their purposes, their ends which they seek in a variety of ways. I may not say, perhaps, that the universe is purposeful through and through.⁴ Our knowledge is as yet too meager for such an unequivocal assertion. When we consider the boundless stretches of space about us and the comparatively few things which we feel that we know, our knowledge seems to be far too limited for us to say that the universe is purposeful in its limitless extent. To make such an assertion, would be to go considerably beyond our evidence. But when we consider human activities and the activities of the lower orders of life, something which we can call purpose is very evident, and to that extent we may say that the universe is purposeful. We ourselves are a part of the uni-

⁴The article by Professor Warren which I have referred to, I read only in part when it first appeared. When I went to China and prepared this lecture, the article was not accessible to me, so that I depended entirely upon my memory of what little I had read. Upon returning to America, I read the entire discussion and found myself more fully in agreement with it than I had supposed. Several slight changes had to be made in a couple of paragraphs, but this particular paragraph remains as it was originally presented.

verse, and to the extent that we have purposes, may we say that the universe itself has purpose in it.

Here, then, is the result of this part of our investigation. Problems of worth are problems with which the philosophers deal, and problems of worth are problems of value, and these problems consist in the proper discrimination among purposeful activities. The field of purposeful activity, then, is the field of ethics from the point of view of the philosophers. But, as I have indicated, the sociologists have generalizations which are almost as wide-ranging as those of the philosophers. If we turn to them, we may find some additional light thrown upon our problem as a whole.

One such generalization is rather old and will not be of so much service to us as one that I shall present later. Since, however, it gives us a fine, sweeping view of the field, I think that it is a good one to give in connection with the philosophical one just presented. It will be of value, also, in later discussions. According to not a few sociologists, all the activities of men may be put into four groups. There are the economic activities, the political activities, the moral and religious activities, and the cultural activities. These make provision for the entire range of human activities, for the term "cultural" includes everything that would not naturally come under the other three heads. It is used, therefore, not in that fine Bostonese sense with its peculiar intonation, but

rather as writers on primitive society use the word "culture." With them it means the entire range of human activities, while here it means the same minus the other three sets of activities. Thus we see that the moral activities are dealt with by sociologists in close relation with the religious, and that they have a definite place for consideration among the other various activities. But, as I have indicated, such a grouping does not help us very much when we desire to determine what the nature of the ethical activities is. We learn simply that they are a part of the total human activities. We, however, desire to learn more, and this desire will be met, I think, by using another way of dealing with society, as I suggested a moment ago.

In his book on "Inductive Sociology," Professor Giddings of Columbia University has suggested that, if we wish to know any community at all adequately, there are four things which we need especially to consider, viz., the "social population," the "social mind," the "social organization," and the "social welfare."⁵ The interpretation to be placed upon each of these is as follows: By the social population is meant the general physical characteristics of a people in any community or country. If we want to know as much as possible about any given people, we need to be-

⁵ These main topics I have taken from the source indicated, but I have developed them in my own way, although influenced, of course, by the writer mentioned.

gin with a study of their physical selves. This might not be of so great importance in China, where, as I understand, in some communities at least, the population is very homogeneous, but in America, where the population is composed of people from almost all parts of the world, such a study is of prime importance. And, indeed, I believe that even in some of the especially homogeneous parts of China, if we should find out the stature of the people, the size and shape of their heads, their facial angles, and various other physical characteristics, we should know that population far better than it is generally known to-day. Then, too, by the social mind, in any community, no mind independent of the individual minds is meant, although some writers seem to imply something of that sort, but the common stock of ideas, the ways the people of that community have of reacting to their environment, their beliefs, their thought habits, and general outlook upon the world. This surely is of importance, if we would know a people through and through. Then, further, there is the social organization, for every community tends to have some form of government, and in addition there are usually business organizations, chambers of commerce, and enterprises of a similar nature too numerous to mention, all of which show us the people banded together in one form or another to accomplish some definite purpose; and, lastly, there is the social welfare to be considered, for which all the various organizations to

a greater or less extent really exist. There are, also, the varying amounts of wealth possessed by different groups within the community. How large a part of the people, we would have to ask, constitutes the so-called wealthy class, how many make up the fairly well-to-do middle class, and how many are living in poverty and squalor? What about schools, hospitals, foundling asylums, and various sanitary undertakings, all of which point directly to a consideration of the welfare of the community? Whenever we might make such a careful study of any community as this brief outline implies, we could then say that we knew that community very thoroughly.

Now, very naturally, what we call ethics or morality finds a place under this last head, and it is here that Professor Giddings definitely places the ethical activities of a community, and I think that it must be apparent to all that such treatment throws a flood of light upon our problem. Not only do we have here an all-inclusive survey of human activities, including the moral, but also a definite characterization of those moral activities so that they are qualitatively discriminated from other activities.

If we combine, now, the results of these two major investigations, the philosophical and the sociological, we shall find that we are not far from the special field of ethics. From the philosophical generalization, we found that ethics has to do with purposive activity, while from the sociological angle we have

found that they are those activities which are particularly concerned with social welfare. If we were to make a definition at this point, it would run about as follows: Ethics has to do with consciously purposive activities which aim at social welfare; they are those activities in any community which are definitely aimed at the welfare of that group.

From all this discussion, it must be evident that what we are especially concerned with in this field are those acts which are commonly called altruistic. They are the more self-sacrificing acts, the so-called unselfish relations which people in any community have to a greater or less extent toward one another. This is not a new thing, as I intimated at the beginning of the lecture two weeks ago, but something rather old, and the question which naturally arises here is as to whether such activities are forced upon a community from outside itself, or whether they are an integral, a vital part of the life of any community, and where we may look for their origin. It is to a consideration of this problem that we must turn next.

The length of time during which the human race has been here upon this earth has been variously estimated. These estimates run all the way from a few thousand years to one hundred thousand, five hundred thousand, or even a million and a half years or more. During all this long stretch of time, there have been two fundamental impulses playing their

respective parts, viz., the desire for food and the relations of the sexes to each other. With the first of these, I doubt if we shall find anything essentially altruistic. This is a tyrannous impulse. Self-preservation is frequently styled the first law of life. It is of course true that there are many considerations coming from the midst of modern society which operate to modify this impulse, but when taken by itself, as we must take it in such an investigation as this, we can not find in it much that is altruistic. When a man has reached his last mouthful of meat, his last crust of bread, and feels the pangs of hunger strong within him, he is not apt to give evidence of much altruism. Still further, the way such cases are handled in modern courts of law points to a recognition of the tyranny of this impulse as a more or less sufficient excuse in even rather violent misdemeanors. In a New York City paper several years ago, I read of a man who threw a couple of Indian clubs through the plate glass windows of the dining-room of the Waldorf-Astoria hotel to the consternation of the men and women who were dining there. Of course the man was arrested and when brought before the judge the next morning the following story was elicited from him: He had been out of work for several weeks, his wife and children were starving, and he himself had had nothing to eat for several days. Since he had some skill in the use of Indian clubs, he had gone to a few of the *cafés* on the

West Side to get what pennies he could by giving exhibitions with his clubs. He had had but little success, and on his way home he passed this hotel, and there the sight of food and the wealth and good cheer of the diners was too much for him. He lost his head and hurled his clubs through the windows. The judge, because of the legal requirements, imposed a light sentence upon the man, but at the same time instructed a court official, as the prisoner was being led away to a cell, to take him a steaming hot meal. I have also gathered a number of similar instances, where because of hunger men have gone counter to ordinary civilized behavior and have either not been punished at all, or have received the minimum penalty. In all such cases, it is evident that hunger by itself knows no laws, and the presiding legal officials regard human life as of more importance than mere things. From this impulse, then, I doubt if we can find the source of altruism. What can we say with reference to the other impulse regarded as fundamental?

The relations between men and women from very early times have been exceedingly complex. There has been much selfishness, brutality, and mere animalism characterizing individual members of both groups into which the race is divided by sex, but here, too, not a little activity of another sort has been in evidence. When we see, as has often happened, a mother sacrificing herself for her child, and the fath-

er sacrificing himself for wife or child or both, we find ourselves in the presence of another principle which has come to be known as altruism.⁶ Indeed, we are then at the very headwaters of such activity. Of course, we have to consider that there have been many variations in this field. The family has not always been constituted in the simple way suggested here, nor have the relations within the family always been ideal, but when we reflect upon the matter throughout the world and throughout the almost endless periods of history, this field seems to afford the best environment for the genesis and development of what we to-day call altruism.

There is also another principle, which seems to me to be a secondary one, but which has been emphasized by Kropotkin, the Russian writer, viz., coöperation.⁷ This undoubtedly has played a large part in the development of altruism. For big undertakings in primitive times men had to join with one another. This is very evident in connection with the community life in the late Stone Age in England and on the Continent, and the same was true in the valleys of the Nile and of the Euphrates.⁸ When man joined with man in erecting some great stone structure or in building a river embankment, he was not working simply for his own welfare. Undoubtedly his own

⁶ Cf. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, pp. 76, 268-269.

⁷ *Mutual Aid*.

⁸ Breasted, *Ancient Times; A History of the Early World*, p. 27; Moore, *History of Religions*, p. 145.

welfare was wrapped up with the welfare of the community, but as he toiled along with his fellows there was a common end, a social aim that was bigger than what the individual could accomplish for himself. As a subsidiary principle, then, coöperation has played an important part in the development of social life and of altruistic activities.

It is thus evident, I think, that altruism is not something foisted upon a community from outside itself, but instead something without which a community could not exist. What would a community be like, if we can imagine such a group for but a moment, in which nobody ever did anything for anybody else? Each individual, we will say, is working first, last, and all the time simply for himself. How could such a community hold together? Where would be the chemical affinity, so to speak, the social bond, the cement by which these units could be bound together into a social whole? It is really unthinkable. Altruism, then, is a native principle. It is not something injected into society from some outside source, but it is the *sine qua non* for any society. Without it, there would be no society at all.

Here, then, we are very near the precise field of ethics. Purposive activity aiming at social welfare is the general field, but one further qualification must be added. Unless there is a definite, conscious aim on the part of the individual for the social welfare, the quality of the social act is not so high. That is,

over and above the outcome of definite acts which do make for social welfare, there must be the conscious willing on the part of the actor, or else the act itself falls below par. Undoubtedly it is exceedingly difficult to get at a man's motives, and yet to disregard motives would be to ignore the teaching of history.

Hobhouse of the University of London, in his work on "Morals in Evolution," has taken several sets of moral ideas and has traced them from the earliest periods of human history down to the present. One of these sets of moral ideas is concerned with "law and justice." It is very evident, as he presents the matter, that in primitive society the motive of an act was not considered. The all important thing was to find the perpetrator of an act. For example, in the field of homicide, the motive of the guilty man was not introduced into the consideration of the crime. If A killed B, then A's life was forfeit. Even if men were working together hewing wood and one man's ax flew off the handle and killed his companion, there was no discussion as to whether the man's motives were murderous or not. He actually committed the deed, therefore his life must pay the penalty. But with the changing conditions in human society which we interpret as progress there came a time when just such distinctions were made. Even as early as the time of Draco, in Greece, different courts for different kinds of homicide were established.⁹

⁹ Botsford, *A History of Greece*, p. 47.

There were courts for cold-blooded, deliberate murder, and also other courts for accidental homicide, and for what perhaps we may call justifiable homicide. The same distinctions are made to-day in western civilized society. From a total disregard of the motive, society has turned to the closest scrutiny of motives and to a careful adjustment of penalties to correspond to the degree of guilt and individual responsibility. Not to do this in our consideration of ethical problems would be to disregard the deepest consciousness of the race as it has sought to establish even-handed justice within its borders.

It is true that oftentimes, because of the complexity of modern society and the intricacies of legal development, we become impatient of the results obtained. Not infrequently, the confessed wrong-doer escapes the expected requital for his misdeeds, because of some technicality of the law. There is a doubt of some sort or an apparent unfairness in the procedure, or a question raised as to the sanity of the accused man, and in consequence the confessed culprit goes scot-free, or passes the remainder of his days in some luxurious private or semi-private institution for the insane. At such times there is a tendency to decry the search for motives and to demand a rougher, ruder method of dealing with the situation. The same is true in cases of mob rule or mob law, as it is called. Not a little injustice has been done in this way. But in all such cases, we should

try to hold ourselves true to the development of the race consciousness. Not to seek for motives and then to abide by the results, is to put ourselves on the plane of primitive savages; to seek the motive of an act is to align ourselves with the highest and best that has been thought and achieved in this field.

But what shall we say, then, in the case of acts that apparently make for social welfare, although we do not know what the motive was? We shall need to regard them temporarily as ethical, and indeed as permanently ethical, so far as they constitute a valuable element in society, but the value of the act, so far as the actor is concerned, varies with the motive. If, for example, a wealthy man gives a large public building to the city in which he lives, that is of value to the community, and credit to that extent will be freely extended to the donor. If, however, the gift was made to win public favor and so prevent any investigation as to the methods by which the wealth was obtained, then the ethical value of the gift falls below par, if the motive ever becomes known. So, too, a group within a given community, as Tammany Hall in New York City, may be never so altruistic within its own limits, illustrating pure group morality, but if, as in this case, such altruistic activities are designed primarily to fasten the clutch of that organization upon the treasure of that city, the seeming altruism is not of a strictly ethical sort. It is more nearly real selfishness and so unethical.

But let me suggest here, too, that the ordinary distinction between selfish and unselfish does not hold absolutely. Paradoxical as it may seem to be, if one would be thoroughly selfish in the ordinary sense, he must be altruistic, and to be altruistic in a large way, one must be apparently at any rate selfish. If a man were strictly selfish, he would be working first, last, and all the time for his own welfare. But even to gain his selfish ends he would have to be more or less apparently altruistic. For to disregard absolutely the claims of others upon himself would lead ultimately to social ostracism and so to the non-realization of his desired good. On the other hand, one might be consumed with the desire to serve one's fellowmen, so much so, indeed, that one would neglect all preparatory training. To follow such a course, however, would make it impossible for the individual to contribute his greatest service. Only as he submits himself to a long course of training, for ten or fifteen years it might be, during which time he would appear to the superficial observer to be extremely selfish, could he render his fullest and richest service to the community or country to which he happened to belong. Selfishness and unselfishness are not mutually exclusive terms; they are paradoxically complementary. But in the use of either to characterize an individual, we would need to know the motive; only so could we judge accurately of the ethical value of an act or series of acts.

There is one further question that arises in this connection. Suppose a man should spend his entire life endeavoring to benefit his fellowmen, but in the end should fail of ever having done a thing which could be rated as real social service. Could we call such a man ethical? In view of the discussion thus far, I should be compelled to call him ethical, but I would immediately raise a question as to his mental ability. I do not think that it is at all probable that a normal man who aimed at social welfare would be utterly defeated in the attempt. The chances are that his successes would rather outweigh his failures.

And so we have come to the end of our discussions for to-day. It is sometimes said that a man's religion consists in his relation to his god, while his ethics consists in his relations to his fellows. This last statement seems to me to be too broad. It makes ethics synonymous with sociology. We may indeed say that everything that is ethical is social, although we may not say that everything that is social is ethical. As we have seen, the ethical finds its place in the discussions of the philosopher under the head of worth which means purposeful activity, while with the sociologist the same activities are provided for under the head of social welfare. But even so, if we would properly appreciate the teachings of history, we must search out the motives of acts so far as possible. Consciously purposive activity, then, aimed at social welfare on the whole and in the long

run is what we can call ethical in the midst of complex human society. It is not something foreign to society, something imposed upon society from without, but rather something which is fundamental, indeed, vital. Society could not exist without it.

At our next hour, two weeks from to-day, I shall try to show how these various discussions may be applied by each of you to the particular community in which you happen to live, and so give a practical turn to it all.

III

TWOFOLD MORALITY

IN the lecture two weeks ago, I said that ethics is concerned especially with consciously purposive activities which aim at social welfare. This indicates, as it seems to me, the precise field of ethics. There is, however, a broader definition which I sometimes find it convenient to use, but which I could not present at the last hour without perhaps dividing your attention too much. It includes the more precise definition, and so can not be regarded as in any sense out of harmony with what I said on the earlier occasion. Since I shall need to make use of it to a limited extent in the present lecture and possibly in later lectures, I will present it briefly now.

From this broader point of view, then, ethics may be said to be the life of a man as he seeks to realize some ideal, or, to give the matter a somewhat more scientific cast, we may say that ethics is the science which results from the application of the scientific method to the lives of men as they have sought to realize ideals. At once, perhaps, you may feel inclined to object. Suppose there were a robber chieftain, you may suggest, who has the ideal of being the

most successful leader possible of a gang of robbers. Could he be regarded as ethical? From the point of view of this broad definition, I should be compelled to answer "Yes." So, too, if you should suggest some individual who might be aiming all the time at his own welfare. In so far as personal advantage and aggrandizement might be the ideal which such an individual was constantly trying to realize, I should have to call him ethical. The same would be true in an almost innumerable array of cases which might readily occur to you. In so far as the individuals considered might be striving to realize ideals, we should need to call them ethical.

Such a view, however, seems to be wholly at variance with the major argument in the last lecture, where the thoroughly selfish man, in so far as one can be thoroughly selfish, was regarded as unethical, and only those working definitely for social welfare were characterized as truly ethical. But a different principle puts in its appearance at once, a principle which we may regard as belonging especially within the field of comparative ethics. It would seem to be true, as we look over the entire course of social evolution, that there has been what we may call a struggle for existence among ideals, or we might also say a kind of survival of the fittest of ideals.¹ Such ideals, then, as the two I called to your attention a moment ago, belong to earlier stages of

¹ Cf. Seth, *Ethical Principles*, 8th Ed., p. 11.

social development, but they have been gradually relegated to the rear as society has marched ever onward and upward toward higher and better things. The ideals which aim at social welfare instead of the welfare of any mere individual are the ideals which seem to be more worthy to survive. It was from this later, more appreciative standpoint that I put the emphasis where I did two weeks ago. When any one seeks to realize some ideal, he is to that extent ethical, but it may be that his ideal was long ago outlawed, and so in a very true sense can no longer be regarded as ethical from the advanced position reached by society.

But what, may we ask, is an ideal? I used the term in the first lecture of the series, but it hardly seemed to be advisable to take time to indicate its essential features then. Now, however, I must give a few suggestions as to its meaning, and to do this I must have recourse to modern psychology. An ideal involves the imagination, and this phase of our mental life is generally treated under two main heads, viz., the reproductive imagination and the constructive imagination.² The first of these may be illustrated as follows: You may be reading some book which describes an African or South American forest, and I will assume that you have never visited either of those continents, but as you read you have an image of a forest accompanying the description. This is due to

²Titchener, *An Outline of Psychology*, pp. 295-298.

your actual experience of forests here in your native land. The trees with their wide spreading branches, the leaves and the various odors, all more or less blurred, come trooping along in consequence of the suggestions you get from your reading. There is no attempt on your part to make the imagery definite, nor is there any selection. You have a more or less vague forest feeling as a setting for what you read. The other kind of imagination, however, is different in that elements are selected from various experiences. We will say that a man wishes to write a description of a storm at sea, although he has never experienced one. This is, of course, rather hazardous, and yet not impossible. Such a writer, we will say, has been to sea but never in a storm, has stood upon the sea-shore and watched the waves driven by the gale roll dangerously near his feet; he has also been in many a tempest on land, beheld the vivid flashes of lightning, and cowered at the deafening crashes of thunder. From all these experiences he selects many elements and constructs a fairly good description of a storm at sea. Notice particularly that there are no new elements furnished by the mind itself; simply a selection from various past experiences. Or, again, we will say that a man plans a building such as your new library or gymnasium. From the numerous buildings with which he is acquainted in different parts of the world and in different periods of history, he selects certain elements and puts them together

in his plans, and ultimately the structure takes shape here upon your campus. The same is true of our ideals. We do not construct the materials, but from our own past experiences and from the experiences of the race, as history reveals them to us, we make our selection and fuse it all into a mental construct or symbol which we try to realize throughout life. Such is an ideal, and ethics deals with these ideals and the measure of realization attained by individuals and the race throughout all history. Let us turn, now, to our specific topic for the day, a twofold morality.

To present this matter to you as I wish, I find it necessary to direct your attention first to a consideration of civilizations, and indeed to social evolution as a whole. Lewis H. Morgan, in his book on "Ancient Society," has indicated that to deal satisfactorily with society we must make distinctions within its limits.³ He has suggested, and his suggestion has been followed by other writers, that we should divide humanity throughout its long history into savagery, barbarism, and civilization. The dividing line between the first and second of these is the domestication of animals and the making of pottery, while the dividing line between the second and third is the possession of a phonetic alphabet and the art of writing. But we should not deceive ourselves into thinking that when civilization has been reached, all the earlier stages of society passed away at once.

³ *Ancient Society*, pp. 3-18.

The earlier and the intermediate remain along with the latest. In Central Australia to-day, we can find men and women almost as primitive as the earliest in the race,⁴ and in other parts of the world, as in Arabia, we can find good examples of the barbarous stage of human development. But still further, in every civilized community, we find suggestions of the three. Every child born into any civilized community represents to a certain extent the savage stage, while the child of ten or twelve years is more or less of a barbarian, and then as he grows to maturity, if he is fortunate, he becomes more or less civilized. But aside from such a minute analysis of a civilized community, let us consider civilizations as such.

There are at least two ways of viewing any civilization. We may select certain features as the leading characteristics and say that they represent the civilization of a particular people. In this way, too, we may make comparisons among civilizations. By selecting several features of the life in America, my homeland, I could say that they fairly well represent American civilization. I might also select similar features from the life in Europe and say that they represent European civilization. Or, indeed, I might make a selection from the life here in China and say that those features represent Chinese civili-

⁴ Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*.

zation. But more or less vagueness generally attaches to our use of the term in this way. It is a very good shorthand symbol, very convenient at times, but not infrequently the vagueness and the broad generality of the term keep us from the clearest thinking in this field. Consequently, I wish to suggest another way of dealing with the entire problem.

If we focus our attention upon a single community in any country, we can say very truthfully that that community represents the civilization of the whole, or that it is the civilization of the whole in miniature. I suggested in the first lecture that every science analyzes until it reaches a rather simple unit, and then the task of the scientists within that special field is to find the principles in accordance with which the units combine into the wholes which were first observed in that field. Now, I am not saying that the study of civilizations is a science, although it might well be, but I am suggesting that a community within any country may be taken as the unit of the civilization of that country. If we fix our attention upon America for a moment, we find many cities, large and small. Any one of them, indeed, might be taken as the unit of American civilization. We might, of course, make various groups, as the census officials do. There are the very large cities, as New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, and others that would be in a group by themselves; then there are

the cities of about 200,000 or 300,000 inhabitants, those of 100,000, and those of 50,000, or 25,000, and others of 10,000, or 5,000, and many smaller. But while there are differences among these cities, in that the larger ones have a somewhat more complex life, more elaborateness, more luxury, and so on, the resemblances among them all would far outweigh the differences. Each one is really America in miniature.

The same thing is true here in your own country. There are your large cities, as Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, Hankow, Canton, and others that will readily occur to you; then there are those of 500,000 inhabitants, those of 300,000 or 200,000, and the smaller ones as in the case of America. These are all typical of Chinese civilization. To know any one of them in detail, would be to know the civilization of China very thoroughly. Of course there are differences among them, but if all the cities of the world could be spread out before us and we should mix them up and then try to group them according to their likenesses, we should probably put all the Chinese ones together because of their real resemblances in spite of some differences. Each and every one is really China in miniature.

Thus, I think we can say that a community is the unit of any civilization, and to fix our attention upon a single community, to analyze it, and so come to know it through and through means to grasp the es-

sential problems of that community, and at the same time of the entire country to which it belongs. If, then, we can make such a study and find out the meaning of a twofold morality for that particular community, we shall be in a position to appreciate the same for the country as a whole. It is to such an analysis that I wish to turn next. Since, however, I have been in your country for so short a time, I think that it will be best for me to present a preliminary study of an American community, and then point out as complete a parallel as I can with some one of your own communities. You can yourselves, also, as I proceed, fill in the outline very definitely from your own knowledge of the various cities and towns here in China.

Let us take, then, a city of 5,000 or 10,000 inhabitants in America, right in the Mississippi valley, the very heart of the country, and apply such methods of study as I suggested in the last lecture. I may not take the time to follow them all out in detail, but if we consider the social population, and then the economic, the political, the moral and religious, and the cultural activities, we shall know enough about such a community for our present purpose.

If, now, we fix our attention upon the physical characteristics of the population in a city of 5,000 inhabitants in the Middle West of America, we shall find that it is rather heterogeneous. There are the

descendents of the earlier settlers running back several generations, and various residents from other parts of the country, north, east, south, and west. It is not unlikely, too, that we shall find in the population some who went away at an earlier time to other parts of the country or to foreign lands, but have recently returned. There are, also, in rather large numbers proportionally, representatives from Ireland, Germany, Italy, Greece, and from nearly all the other countries of Europe, with here and there an immigrant from still more remote parts of the world. It is a decidedly cosmopolitan population racially, and still more cosmopolitan with its ideas and customs from so many parts of the world.

As to the economic activities in such a community, I need merely say that there are the wholesale merchants who do business in a large way, the various retail merchants, the banks, the milling or mining operations as the case may be, the clerks of several sorts, the teamsters, the day laborers so called, and the women who labor in their homes. With regard to the political activities, we should have to recognize at least two great parties, more or less opposed to each other when the election season is on, but for the most part able to live rather amicably with each other during the greater part of the year. There is a complete assortment of city officials, as the mayor and his advisers who are generally called aldermen, the police, and the judiciary composed of the city

court and a county or superior court. Then, too, there are the political bosses, usually holding no official position, but exercising a potent, perhaps we should rather say a baleful, influence throughout the community by means of their henchmen located in the several wards and districts. As to the moral and religious activities, we need to note that there is a church in America for every 450 people.⁵ That would mean about ten churches in a community of 5,000 inhabitants, and that number is often found. These for the most part represent different denominations, as they are called, with their divergent beliefs, although careful analysis shows that they have not a little in common. At times, however, their differences are magnified to a position of supreme importance. All these have their respective ideals of conduct which are presented and emphasized from week to week. Not infrequently, what one church prohibits another allows without any question. Still, taken as a whole, these institutions constitute a kind of moral censorship for the entire community with varying degrees of success. Then there are the cultural activities which can be thought of as represented by the fraternal societies, the library, reading clubs, debating societies, the school system, and a rather large number of other more or less similar organizations of which the activities could not properly be ranged under any one of the

⁵ Cf. Giddings, *The Principles of Sociology*, p. 190.

other groups considered. While much more might be said, this is sufficient, I think, to give a fair idea of a typical unit of American civilization to-day. What kind of parallel can we make for a Chinese community?

In the first place, the social population of a Chinese city of 5,000 or 10,000 inhabitants, somewhere in the central portion of the country, would be decidedly more homogeneous than the community we have just now considered. None the less I am inclined to believe that in addition to the descendants of the earlier generations there would be found a few who had come to dwell there from other parts of the country, north, east, south, or west. There probably would be none or very few people resident there from other parts of the world. But to fix our attention upon such a definite body of people will aid not a little in our effort to deal with the ethical problem for the country as a whole.

As to the economic activities, I can merely say that, if we should make our way along the main street and some of the side streets, we would note the various stores dealing with nearly all sorts of commodities. There are the butchers, the bakers, and the grocers, the cabinet makers, the blacksmiths and the wheelwrights, the grinders of grains of different sorts, the haberdashers and the undertakers, and in addition the donkey drivers and the ricksha men, the carriers of water and other day laborers.

The political life at present is undoubtedly in a ferment. Very likely there is an official at the head of the city either elected or appointed by the central government; there are political parties, too, in the making with their bosses and active workers of different grades. There are, also, the several government officials, as postal clerks, and in case our typical city were near the railroad, there would be the officials in charge of the business at the station. In regard to the moral and religious activities, we will assume that there are representatives in rather large numbers of the ancient Confucian faith, but also not a few Buddhists, perhaps some Mohammedans, and possibly some who are of the prevailing faith in Europe and America. These various groups have their ethical programs which they are able to carry through with greater or less success. And finally there are the cultural activities consisting of the festivities in celebration of the founding of the Republic, the New Year celebrations, and not a few organizations and social groups with activities which could not be placed under any one of the other heads.

Such, then, would be our typical community, and what I have failed to bring out because of my brief residence here, you can fill in from your own knowledge of many actual communities which you have been in throughout the country. Any such community as this constitutes, as I have said, Chinese

civilization in miniature, and what we may find true of it, we may infer as true in varying degrees of the country as a whole.

Now, with our attention focused upon a community of this sort, analyzed in this way, let us observe a contrast that we are sure to find there, viz., a contrast between the social consciousness and the individual consciousness. If, for example, a robber band should make a raid upon the community, break into and loot the bank, and perhaps kill one or two of the officials, the people as a whole would be a unit, very likely, in condemning the act. That would be their social consciousness reacting against this relic of barbarism. The entire community would be thinking alike, and perhaps the entire male population would set out in pursuit of the bandits. If, however, a man should not treat his wife kindly, or if the wife should be unfaithful to her husband, possibly the whole community would not think alike with reference to the matter. There might be a division of opinion, and each group according to its size would be either the social consciousness or an opposing consciousness more or less individual. If for the moment we assume that the community we are considering was particularly favored by and favorable to the Manchu dynasty before the Republic was established, any individual within it who might express an opinion against that dynasty and in favor of

a revolution would feel the weight of the displeasure of the consciousness of the entire community. On the other hand, if we assume such a community as existing under the present form of government and as favorable to it, any individual who might express a desire for the return of the Manchus to power would be in a dangerous minority. In every such community, and in practically every group within the community, there are more or less radical differences of opinion; there is an opposition between the consciousness of the group as a whole and an individual here and there within the group.

This relation, too, may be brought out in still another way. All of you here in Tsing Hua have a social consciousness. You are distinct from the community immediately about you. You have an environment peculiarly your own, you think somewhat alike, there are rather definite socializing tendencies within the walls of this compound. This is especially evident when you engage in athletic contests with some other institution. You then present a solid front against your opponents. But within the institution there are other consciousnesses more or less independent and individual. The Senior class has a consciousness all its own, so has the Junior class, and so on down the list. This is very evident when you have your class contests. Then it is the class supremacy, the class conscious-

ness that seems to be most important. Or, again, some individual member of any one of these classes may oppose some contemplated class action. He thinks that he has a better plan or a better idea than that favored by the majority of his classmates. Perhaps he is right, and by dint of much argument and perhaps some coaxing he gets the rest of the class to adopt his plan or idea, and then what had been almost purely a bit of individual consciousness becomes a part of the social consciousness of the entire group. Other illustrations, almost limitless in number, we need not consider at present. We are more interested in the significance of this background for our topic of a "two-fold morality," than in the opposition itself, which none the less has been of vital importance throughout the history of civilization.⁶

Let us think, now, for a moment of some boy born into such a community as I have analyzed. He is trained very carefully by his parents, instructed in all the traditions of his particular family and in the history and traditions of his city and of his

⁶ Cf. Deniker, *The Races of Man*, pp. 157, 497; Robinson, *The New History*, p. 236; Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 224; Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid*, pp. xvi, 293-300; James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, p. 3; Münsterberg, *Psychology, General and Applied*, pp. 226-227; Johnson, *God in Evolution*, p. 203; Ross, *Social Psychology*, p. 192; Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 325; Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 484; Angell, *Chapters from Modern Psychology*, pp. 212-214; Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*, p. 45.

country to a limited extent. He follows his father in his religious faith or lack of such faith, enters his father's business, and becomes the head of that business at his father's death. His father's friends and business acquaintances are his, and in every respect possible he is like his father in act, thought, and relations in general. Could such a young man be called ethical? Undoubtedly we would have to term him ethical, although perhaps he never definitely entertained an ideal. But he has the traditional morality of that community, and more or less implicitly, and indeed to a certain extent explicitly, his father's life has been the ideal which he has striven to realize in as full measure as possible. This is one type of morality, the traditional type, a real genuine type. Its various details, however, I can not elaborate further for lack of time.

There is, also, another type which I am inclined to call the variant type which manifests itself in many ways. We will assume that a young fellow, born into such a community as we are considering, goes away from home to school. Perhaps he goes to America for college and university training, and when he returns to his native city he insists upon introducing into his mode of life certain features which he thinks are good because he has seen their good results elsewhere. But the large majority of the people in that community severely disapprove such a deviation from the ways of the fathers.

What the outcome of the struggle will be, only a great variety of circumstances will determine. Perhaps the good results flowing into this young man's life from the innovations, provided he is allowed to follow his new program, will be so apparent and so seemingly valuable that a large number of his fellow-townsmen will imitate him, and thus what was at first only a part of his individual consciousness will become a part of the social consciousness and he will be hailed as a public benefactor. On the other hand, it may be that the community will object so strenuously to the innovation that the young man will either have to abandon his new mode of living or be excluded from the community altogether. Possibly, when excluded, he will slowly gather a small group of imitators in some other environment, and then the good results will become so apparent to the old community that it will change its attitude, adopt the new methods and hail the exile as an ethical pioneer. Of course, it might be that the thing which the young man wished to introduce into his own life and into the life of the community was something which had been tried earlier with bad results. For any one to attempt to reintroduce this would be to fly in the face of the experience of the group. The young man would be privileged to do so, from one point of view, but it would be ethical only to the extent that that way of life was ethical at an earlier period. If it were something which

the community had wisely set its ban upon, then any attempt to revive that form of living would represent a backward step.

But I have said enough, I think, to indicate what I mean by a "twofold morality." It is the contrast between the old, traditional morality, and the morality which results from individual initiative and the desire to appropriate what is good in the world outside of one's own particular community. It is on the inventive, experimental side of life, and may be productive of good, although there is undoubtedly a chance that it may prove detrimental. But nothing venture, nothing have. The attitude of mind of an individual who thus sets himself in opposition to the social consciousness is exceedingly valuable, although fraught with dangers. And further, if the opposition be the result of a conscious purpose to do the community good, to add to the social welfare, then we should have to term it exceedingly ethical, and appraise highly the life of the individual who displays it.

But now I wish to suggest one other thing in this connection. Oftentimes when an individual sets himself in opposition to the social consciousness, he says that he does so because of his conscience. He has sunk the plummet down deep into his own soul, as he says, and has found there the absolute truth. But there is danger in such an attitude of mind. It is so easy for any one to get decidedly tangled up

in the intricacies of his own inner consciousness. He needs an objective reference. A definition of conscience given by Paulsen meets this need. Conscience, he maintained, is the consciousness of custom.⁷ It is easy to see this in such a community as we have been considering. If the ordinary person does as the social consciousness dictates, he has an easy conscience, but if he goes counter to that social consciousness, his conscience troubles him. But how can this view harmonize with the attitude of the individual who opposes the social consciousness and yet says that he has a quiet conscience? Such a one, we may well suppose, might conceive of a more ideal society than the one to which he belonged physically and be guiding his conduct by the social consciousness of that ideal group. In this way, he would have a conscience in the same sense as Paulsen's definition implies, but be decidedly different from his fellow-townsmen in his conduct. Such an objective reference, although, of course, the result of the individual's own thinking, would be of no little value to him. His conscience would be the consciousness of custom, but a consciousness of the customs of a more ideal group. The ideal states of Plato, Campanelli, Sir Thomas More, Edward Bellamy, and others, have been, in a sense, such objective references.

One other way of illustrating this whole matter and I shall be through. In any species of animals

⁷ Paulsen, *A System of Ethics*, Tr. Thilly, p. 363.

there are certain modes of living which are more or less peculiar to that species. We might call them the social habits of that species, although ordinarily they are termed instincts. To behave in such rather definite ways is best for that species. Indeed, the species has developed and maintained itself by strict adherence to such habits. To live in any other way would be to court death and the extinction of the group. But all this is well enough so long as the environment remains unchanged. Instincts are then sufficient for the welfare of that group. As soon, however, as the environment changes, the animals must change their behavior more or less radically or they will not survive. The price of survival so long as the environment remains unchanged, is the faithful adherence to what we might call their traditional ways of living, but when the environment changes, the price of survival is a change in modes of behavior. Fixed environment means fixed modes of behavior, but changed environment means changed modes of behavior. In a sense, we might say that it is ethical for such creatures to abide by traditional ways of living so long as the old environment remains, but unethical, if the surroundings change.

Let me suggest now, if you will, an application of this entire discussion to you yourselves and your national life. For many centuries your people have had certain rather definite courses of conduct which you have regarded as the ideal ways of living. These

social habits have been inculcated by your great ethical teachers and leaders. And this was good so long as your environment remained practically unchanged. Very likely that was the best way for you. But a changed environment, such as we can not fail to recognize in the world as a whole to-day, makes it dangerous for your people to persist in the old ways. You yourselves, as students from all parts of China, and with plans for several years of study in America or elsewhere, constitute a kind of opposition to the old social consciousness. I doubt not but that some of you in your old city or town environment have been more or less single individuals in opposition to the old-time conservative attitude of mind of your fellow-townsmen. It was no small struggle through which you passed in your opposition to the old, but in making such a struggle you put yourselves on the side of the more progressive type of morality. Still further, as you get the training at your disposal here and then obtain all that you can from further years of travel and study abroad, with the specific purpose of returning to your native land and to your particular city or town to contribute to the welfare of that community and to the welfare of China as a whole, you will be exemplifying the higher type of ethics which I have been presenting to you to-day all too hurriedly. There is always this contrast between the old and the new. The old was good in its particular day and

generation, but it is a new world with which we are forced to deal to-day. The new world environment makes your individual programs essential to the welfare of China, and in so far as you may help to establish a part of the new as a substitute for some of the old will you be in a high degree moral. You are actually, and to a greater extent potentially, representative of a high type of ethics.

IV

THE PROBLEM OF PROGRESS

I N the preceding lectures I have rather generally assumed progress, although I have not used the term more than once or twice. My position, in what I have said, has been like that of most people at the present day, who assume progress as a reality, without, however, attempting to indicate just what that progress consists in. But notwithstanding this rather general acceptance of progress, occasionally a different note is sounded, and then we are forced to give a reason for the faith that is within us, if we can.

“Ages of progress!” exclaims Mr. Andrew Lang in his preface to Fitzgerald’s translation of Omar Khayyám’s “Rubáiyát.”

“Ages of progress! These eight hundred years
Hath Europe shuddered with her hopes or fears,
And now!—She listens in the wilderness
To *thee*, and half believeth what she hears!”

For a thousand years, more or less, is what Mr. Lang meant, Europe had been following certain rather definite ideals; ideals of self-denial and of

self-subordination; ideals which for the most part consisted in postponing present pleasures and immediate personal welfare for the sake of a greater good, a greater happiness to be realized in the future, either in this world or in the next, and then the philosophy of this Persian sage came to the attention of one or another, and they paused, perhaps somewhat aghast, at the thought that possibly they had been on the wrong track. "Why mourn over dead yesterdays," sang the poet, "if to-day be sweet?" Why wait until the morrow, he further suggests, when the morrow may never come? Seize the pleasures of the moment, before it be too late.

"The Bird of Time has but a little way
To fly—and Lo! the Bird is on the Wing."

Make the most of the present, insists the singer, for it is only the present that you are sure of. Neglect no single opportunity for present pleasure with a view to some future good, for, indeed, there may be no future at all for you. And the question which came to many a one was this: "Have we, as a people, been following a mirage? Have we, as so many have fondly dreamed, been progressing from better toward the best, or have we wretchedly failed in our interpretation of life, and should we at once right about face?" And this was no simple query over which they pondered more or less anxiously.

Then, too, one of the professors under whom I studied several years ago, definitely raised this question of progress in one of his lectures. I had always taken the matter for granted. For many years progress had seemed to me to be axiomatic, but some of the material presented on that occasion showed at least the possibility of a serious doubt. Immediately, therefore, I set myself at work to see whether or not progress could be proved, and it is some of the results of that investigation, together with various other reflections, that I am about to present to you to-day.

And at the very outset, let me say that I do not believe that we can prove progress in the deductive sense of that term. There is an inductive as well as a deductive meaning of the term "prove," but unfortunately we generally have only the deductive sense prominently in mind. We become acquainted with this meaning in our study of mathematics, especially geometry. In that study, we have a proposition stated for us in a beautifully concise form, and then, by using the knowledge gained in the demonstration of other equally concise propositions, we proceed step by step until we reach the proper conclusion, and then with a feeling of great satisfaction we add the cabalistic letters, Q. E. D. How convincing it all is! How certain we feel about that conclusion! We have proved it absolutely, we think. And this, as I have suggested, is the deductive mean-

ing of the term "prove" which is usually uppermost in our minds when that word is mentioned. The inductive sense, however, is rather naturally quite different. In this case, we gather a lot of data, we carefully sift the material, determine what the facts are, balance one fact over against another, weigh various statements, and then we put our thought into propositional form. We have then a certain degree of subjective assurance with reference to the opinion we have formed. We believe it, and we have good reasons for our belief. This, also, as I have intimated, is real proving, but it must be evident to all that the attitude of the mind is considerably different from that which comes from the other process. Here we have varying degrees of subjective assurance, while there we felt a dead certainty.

Now, as I said, I do not think that we can prove progress in the deductive sense of that term, but there is not a little evidence which may be presented to give us a fairly high degree of subjective assurance, and it is this which I wish to present to you to-day. And I shall need to consider, too, to make the argument most effective, what may be called cosmic progress, social progress, and then moral progress, or rather the part which morality has played in social progress. Let us see what may be said in connection with each topic.

I hesitate somewhat about introducing cosmic

progress, since the subject is so vast and our time so limited. None the less, I feel that it is necessary to say just a word or two with reference to that subject. Mr. Spencer, in his "First Principles," has suggested that there was originally in the universe, where our solar system now exists, nothing but a kind of fire-mist, a rather homogeneous stuff in unstable equilibrium. At length a differentiating or integrating process was set up within this stuff, and this meant a dissipation of energy and a corresponding loss of motion. Ultimately the solar system, as we know it, came to be in consequence of this process. Then, later, there was a comparatively long period of fairly stable equilibrium, or balance of the integrating and the disintegrating forces, to be followed, according to Mr. Spencer, by a period of dissolution which would result ultimately in the complete resolution of this entire solar system back into the original fire-mist. From fire-mist to fire-mist, according to this theory, is the ceaseless round of cosmic evolution and dissolution, and the question which arises is, How much progress can we discern in such a constant ebb and flow of cosmic stuff, either in this part of the universe or elsewhere? If in any such cycle of transformations everything should ultimately return to exactly the same conditions as prevailed before the process began, how much progress could we legitimately assume? And this question, as it seems to me, we can not answer

very definitely. In fact, I doubt if we can secure any considerable degree of subjective assurance with reference to the entire cycle. There is, however, change, and that much I wish to emphasize, for it is in line with one of the deepest interpretations ever yet made of the universe as a whole.

Among the ancient Greeks, there were two fundamental interpretations of the world set over against each other. In fact, it has been asserted by competent students that all the thinking in Europe during the last twenty-five hundred years harmonizes with either the one or the other of these two views. They are ordinarily spoken of as Being and Becoming. On the one hand, the world was thought of as being eternally the same, yesterday, to-day, and forever. There is no such thing as change in the whole vast universe. Static immobility reigns supreme. On the other hand, the world was thought of as being in constant flux. There is nothing stable but the law of change itself. As between these two views, we can not decide absolutely. We can not give a deductive proof for either. This much, however, may be said. In different periods of the developing life in Europe, one or the other of these views has been stressed. In the medieval period, the emphasis was on static immobility, while in our modern age the constant changing character of the world is at the front. Now, this very shifting back and forth of opinion agrees with the interpretation of change more than it does with

that of static immobility, so that to that extent the former may be regarded as more nearly adequate, but the weight of argument is not very great.

Thus we see that whether we turn to the ancient Greek world, or listen to an eminent modern thinker, we find a decided emphasis upon a changing world, but we may not say with any high degree of certainty that such changes mean progress. I have introduced the matter just to give a suggestion of the difficulties with which we have to contend when we attempt to deal with the problem of cosmic progress. Change, from many points of view, there certainly seems to be, but whether this means progress or not, when we take a wide survey, we can not assert with any appreciable degree of subjective assurance. Let us turn, then, from this rather unprofitable field of speculation to the realm of social progress, and see what may be said when we hold ourselves within rather narrow limits.

That there are numerous changes in our ordinary life and in the world immediately about us is very evident to all. Summer follows winter and winter summer; rain follows snow or snow rain. There is sunshine and then shadow, heat and cold, pain and pleasure. There is youth, middle life, and old age. One generation, too, follows another with almost frightful rapidity. What is there that is fixed or upon which we may depend in such a world? And let me say here, too, that I am not raising in this con-

nection the question of worth. The youth, now become a man, perhaps would have been better off, had he never beheld "the light that never was on sea or land" "fade into the light of common day," but actually just this transformation takes place with all. It may be that the primitive savage, however mythical he may at times seem to be, with his simple life, lack of nerves, minimum of curiosity and maximum of contentment, was better off than the modern man vainly trying to "look pleased" with a mass of "undigested securities" and colossal liabilities, but as a matter of fact the modern man with his nerves, almost insatiable curiosity, and at time worthless securities is the reality, while the happy savage is wrapped about with an almost impenetrable fog of centuries. But the worth of the process, as I have said, I am not considering at this time. All that I am suggesting is that changes, within fairly narrow limits, are undeniable. What interpretation may we place upon them?

When we survey the entire field of social evolution, as it is called, we find the situation about the same as I have just briefly suggested. We may not deny the changes that have taken place and that are taking place practically everywhere in the world to-day, and when we look just beneath the surface we find that this change has been and is from a simple to a more complex mode of life. Undoubtedly life was sufficiently complex for the primitive savage. With his

particular mental endowment, it was a serious problem which he faced when he tried to construct his bow and arrows, when he sought to clothe himself and to provide himself with proper shelter. But however complex life may have seemed to him, it is certainly true that early civilization presented still more complex problems for men to solve, while later civilizations have increased in complexity with an almost geometrical ratio. It was but a little world that primitive man viewed, and the early civilizations in the Nile valley and in the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates were comparatively on a small scale. Their problems were undoubtedly complex for those times, but simple compared with what the modern man faces. Even the world of the Greeks and Romans, for the most part centered about the Mediterranean, was simple in comparison with what we call our modern civilization, the limits of which are the limits of the world itself.

This difference is brought vividly before us, when we view, as I did this last summer, some of the rather primitive settlements of the North American Indians, and then meet, as I did later upon the Pacific, a modern business man from South Africa, who is constantly studying the map of the world. This man is a banker, and indicated that in any given transaction he habitually has before his mind the trade and exchange conditions in the great business centers of the world. Before he can commit himself

in an important transaction, he has to consider the situation in New York City, London, Paris, San Francisco, Yokohama, Shanghai, Hongkong, Calcutta, Melbourne, and the principal cities of South America as well as those of South Africa. What an intricate web of human affairs such a man has to deal with, and there are very many more of the same sort in all these large centers. Never before in the history of the world was there such intricacy of business and of communication among men. When we turn our attention away from some particular place which we might analyze for some special purpose, as I suggested two weeks ago, and consider the pattern of human life as it is being woven in the world as a whole at the present day, we get a complexity far beyond anything which the world has previously seen. And this very complexity is evidence of progress.

In the field of biology, as pointed out by the late Professor Minot of Harvard University, the more complex structure may be regarded as the higher. "The primary object," he said, "of all differentiation is physiological. The higher organism, with its complex physiological relations, is something really higher in structure than the lower organism. The term 'higher' in biology implies a much more complex interrelation of the parts, a much more complex relation of the organism to the outside world; and above all it implies in the highest animals a complex intelligence of which only a rudimentary prophecy

exists in the lowest forms of life.”¹ Of course, this is a more or less arbitrary ruling, and yet since complexity is used in biology as a criterion of the higher, why may we not use it in a similar way as a test of higher in comparison with a lower in the field of social evolution? This seems to me to be advisable, and in consequence we get a definite meaning for the term “progress,” for we may say that a distinct change from a simpler to a more complex state of society is from a lower to a higher, or, as common thought would put it, that would be progress. Thus we have changes in society, and throughout the untold centuries such changes have been in the main from a rather simple form of social life to a more and more complex form, and this change we may definitely, although more or less arbitrarily, regard as from a lower to a higher, and such a change we may properly call progress.

Another method of dealing with the problem is to see what leading students of society have said with reference to it. Our time is all too short to present the evidence in detail, but a few selected opinions will undoubtedly help to produce not a little subjective assurance as to social progress.

Mr. Spencer has laid emphasis upon social progress. He has indicated, however, that progress has

¹ *Age, Growth, and Death*, p. 154. Cf. Ostwald, *Natural Philosophy*, Tr. Seltzer, p. 176; Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, Tr. Mitchell, p. 104; Conn, *Biology*, p. 385; Johnson, *God in Evolution*, p. 175.

not been a continuously uniform upward movement.² In line with his rhythmical interpretation of the universe, his thought was that human progress has been like the advance of the tide upon the seashore. A big wave rolls high upon the sand and then recedes; this is followed by another and another until ultimately high tide is reached. But none the less he regards it as real progress, and as a criterion he suggests the changes in the methods of production. Originally there was mere hand production; this gave way to animal production which in turn was succeeded by machine production.³ If we contrast the early hand weaving with the product of even the hand loom, but more particularly with the volume of work yielded by a modern power loom, the real progress achieved is very apparent.

Mr. Lester Ward, who during his lifetime was regarded as one of the great leaders of sociological thought in America, has suggested that the progress of the race, when viewed from certain angles, is not so apparent as we are generally inclined to think. "There is what we call human progress," he says, which "is but a rhythmic and only partial success in rendering a worse condition a trifle better,"⁴ but none the less he terms it progress. Still further, he presents several tests to aid in judging of progress.

² *First Principles*, Sections 85-88.

³ *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. III, pp. 362, 608-609.

⁴ *Outlines of Sociology*, p. 33.

“In every community,” he says in substance, “no sooner are the simpler questions settled than new and more complex ones arise, but this very elevation of public discussion is itself evidence of progress.” And again he says, “The greater valuation placed upon human life to-day is one of the best tests of progress. The gradual abolition of the so-called code of honor by the more advanced nations also looks in the same direction. So, too, the dying out of the spirit of martyrdom, which is by some regarded as evidence of degeneration, is on the contrary good evidence of an increased value set upon human life and so points toward progress.” He also adds that a change from a “pain economy to a pleasure economy” signifies progress, and most of all a “growing sense of good” in the world is a sure mark of progress.⁵

Professor Robinson of Columbia University, in his little book on “The New History,” says that only within the last three or four hundred years have men been conscious of progress, and only within the last fifty or seventy-five years have they realized that they could direct progress and have they been definitely trying to reach such a goal.⁶ Still, in all that he says in this connection the assumption of progress is very pronounced. Professor Giddings, too, of this same institution, said in a lecture several years ago that “race maintenance and evolution with

⁵ *Outlines of Sociology*, pp. 157-158, 205-207.

⁶ P. 251.

diminishing cost of life, with increasing power, freedom, and happiness of the individual person—that is progress.”⁷ This I regard as an especially significant statement, but I do not care to comment upon it at length just now. I shall recur to it later in connection with moral progress. This much, however, I may call attention to now. Both Professor Giddings and Lester Ward lay emphasis upon the value placed upon human life as a criterion of progress. Where two such men agree, we may well heed the point of their agreement.

Such statements as these, taken in conjunction with the test of complexity, add not a little, I suspect, to our subjective assurance as to human progress. We do not get a deductive demonstration, but considering the difficulties involved in the problem, the result is not altogether unsatisfactory.

Still another suggestive way of dealing with this matter is as follows: Several years ago, Professor Giddings, with whom you should feel fairly well acquainted by this time because of my frequent references to him, assigned the following task to a student: He wanted that student to go through English history, period by period, and century by century, and to find out what men's desires were; what their ambitions were, and what means they used to satisfy their desires and to gain their ambitions. This seemed

⁷ Columbia University *Lectures on Science, Philosophy, and Art*. 1907-1908. Lecture on *Sociology*, p. 36.

like a big undertaking, but the student set himself resolutely to work and when he had finished there stood out upon his results, unmistakably and clearly, the one word "Progress." It had often been disputed whether one could prove progress in the case of any nation. There could be no doubt about the English people when this young man had completed his task. In the earlier periods the principle that might makes right was at the front. The lower, coarser desires were much in evidence, and men were but little scrupulous as to the means they used to satisfy their desires and to gain their ambitions. As the centuries passed, however, "sweet reasonableness," as it has been called, became more and more prominent. Men were ready to arbitrate at least some of their differences; the finer emotions and desires were much more in evidence than in the earlier periods. Undoubtedly the English people had progressed throughout the long centuries of their history.⁸ And what was true of them no doubt would be shown to be true in varying degrees of other peoples, provided the same method should be applied. It certainly would be a highly desirable thing to have all the peoples of the world tested in this way, to the extent that their history might be available. Could it be done, we should have a fairly good demonstration of the progress which has characterized the world up to the present.

⁸This is in substance as the point was presented in a classroom lecture.

One other way of testing progress within the social body as a whole, and I shall be through with this part of our work to-day. Social control may well be used as a test of progress. The difference between children and adults is especially marked in the matter of control. A child of five or six years of age believes almost everything that is told him, and he will do practically anything that he is urged to do, but when he becomes a man he has an accumulation of experiences upon which he reflects before he takes any serious step. And what is true of the individual, has been true in a very real sense of the race. Mr. Lewis H. Morgan, in his book on "Ancient Society," has said that the Semitic peoples and the Aryan peoples, using the term "Aryan" in the older sense, were the first peoples to emerge from barbarism and to establish real civilization.⁹ In addition to the reasons which he assigns for this step, we might well assume that these two peoples had come to exercise a somewhat greater control over themselves than was true of the other peoples. Social control, then, would thus be an index of progress. At any rate, in almost any present day civilized community the most flagrant infractions of the law are treated promptly and energetically. Then, too, if we should compare two communities of about the same size and should find that one of them has a strong police force and very little crime, while the other has a weak police force

⁹ Pp. 39-45.

and much crime, we would be apt to call the former more highly developed because of the greater control exercised. But still further, any diminution in the need for a police force would also be interpreted as an evidence of progress. While I have not the statistics at hand, I will venture the opinion that not more than one per cent. of the population of the United States comes into collision with the laws annually. That would mean about a million cases. I doubt very much if there are a million people in that country who need to be controlled by the law. The other 99,000,000 are self-controlled, and this in itself would be evidence of very great progress.¹⁰

Still further, the control which men have exercised over their fellows in the centuries past has not been an altogether bad thing. Oftentimes we are shocked at man's inhumanity toward man in the centuries gone, but Mr. Spencer has insisted that that was not an unmixed evil.¹¹ Just because men were compelled to work long hours, under the whip it may be, were they disciplined to shoulder the duties and responsibilities of later civilized society. So, too, it

¹⁰ This is simply a guess which a careful investigation might not confirm in every respect. None the less, even if there were ten or twenty millions who annually came into conflict with the law, the remaining eighty or ninety millions who keep free from judicial entanglements would be a sufficiently large proportion of the entire population to make an impressive argument for social, indeed, self-control as an index of social progress.

¹¹ *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. II, p. 665; Vol. III, p. 465.

is frequently pointed out that the rather apparent tyranny of the Church in Europe during the medieval period was not without its value. The barbarians who had overrun the older civilization needed such control, and, while we not infrequently are inclined to criticize the methods used in the process, the net result may be regarded as good. The same may be said within certain limits of the control which in times past the more advanced nations have exercised over less well developed nations. Undoubtedly there has been not a little exploitation, but with that exception such control has been of not a little value. Within the last three years, however, a higher thought has come to the front, none other, indeed, than that it is not best for any nation to interfere with the internal life of another. Each nation should be allowed to work out its own salvation without pernicious interference from any other nation. Other nations, of course, may aid to the extent of their ability and inclination, but the policy of "Hands Off" points the way to higher things. This is the policy which is rapidly taking shape in the consciousness of the world because of the present European conflict, and any nation that holds by the old ideal of exploitation in the face of the events of the last three years will sooner or later find itself in serious conflict with that consciousness.

And now the question arises as to what may be meant by moral progress, or what part morality has

played in this social progress. And here I think that I can do no better than to take that statement quoted from Professor Giddings a few minutes ago and, considering it section by section, try to determine what has been the moral element in the entire social process. "Race maintenance and evolution," he said, "with diminishing cost of life, with increasing power, freedom, and happiness of the individual person—that is progress."

Nature has been pictured for us by Huxley as "red in tooth and claw." The waste of life, especially human life, was frightful throughout the early ages. Much of this waste was due to disease, and not infrequently disease was believed to be due to the anger of some god or malevolent spirit. The methods for an attempted cure were crude in the extreme. Any individual, then, who opposed the social consciousness in the treatment of disease and sought to introduce more rational methods was to that extent a moral hero. Nor was such a person's position always an enviable one. It is frequently dangerous to oppose a people's superstitions. Then, too, any one in more recent times who has spent months or years in the quest of some serum to cure a malignant disease, sometimes criticized by the unthinking masses for his apparent waste of time, has been to that extent a moral hero. Of course it might be urged that any one who might discover such a serum could use it upon himself and so get the desired immunity. By

doing so, however, he would be selfish and not altruistic. But very seldom, if ever, has a man sought such a cure for himself alone. It has been the welfare of others, of humanity as a whole, which has inspired him and kept him patiently at his work. So, too, in the case of vivisectionists. Such men have been convinced that not a little valuable knowledge may be obtained for the welfare of the race from careful study of the lower animals, and in spite of popular clamor they have held true to their purpose. All such efforts have aimed at lessening human mortality and so are in line with the growing valuation of life. This is indeed an evidence of social progress, but every step of the way was a moral step, involving the opposition between the individual consciousness and the social consciousness which I presented at the last hour.

If we consider, next, the "increasing power" of the individual, we shall find the case much the same. In early times, if any man gave evidence of special power, either physical or mental, he aroused the jealousy of the rulers and his life was in danger. "Saul has slain his thousands, but David his ten thousands," sang the women as they went out to meet David returning from a victory over the foe. And Saul was angry and sought how he might slay the victor. This, of course, is but one of almost innumerable similar cases throughout the history of the race. As the centuries passed, however, the situation changed

somewhat, but the change has been due in no small measure to what such men have actually contributed to the common good. They and the people have been too strong for the rulers. But not infrequently the suspicions of the people have been strong against such men of power, and with good reason, too, in many cases. Gradually, however, as some of these men have held steadily on their way and have actually contributed largely to the social good, has the opposition lessened somewhat. There is more scope and opportunity for the exercise of their powers to-day than ever before. And right here, we may well suggest, is a specially valuable field for them to work. The "great man theory" of history is in rather ill repute to-day, but in so far as men with a large endowment of mind and heart shall give themselves more and more freely for the welfare of the communities in which they live, will they disarm still further the suspicions of the common people and become still more influential factors in social progress as a whole.

When we turn to the "increasing freedom" of the individual, we find a long series of steps taken toward the end realized in modern civilization. There is freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, freedom of religious worship, freedom of thought, freedom of movement from place to place, and various other steps too numerous to mention. All of these mark definite social progress, but each at first involved a moral

attitude. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe, the blood of multitudes of the best people was shed for one or another of these issues. In each case there was an opposition to the social consciousness, an opposition which the succeeding centuries has shown was of great value for social welfare, and consequently, in accordance with the test that I have emphasized, highly moral. And to-day, each of the groups involved in the great conflict in Europe proclaims that it is fighting for freedom. The Central Powers maintain that they are fighting for the "freedom of the seas," while the Entente Powers declare that they are fighting for the right of each state, whether great or small, to live its own life and to make its own peculiar contribution to the civilization of the world. When we consider that many of the previously neutral states have joined the Entente Allies during the past year, we may conclude that the world has rather definitely decided which group has the better argument on its side. From the point of view that I presented two weeks ago, we shall have to concede that the Central Powers, in so far as they are trying to realize an ideal, are ethical, but their ideal is out of date. It belongs five thousand years in the past. It is an anachronism in our modern world, and we may well hope that the more democratic group will speedily prevail.

With reference to the "increasing happiness" of the individual, I need say but little. The introduc-

tion of these other elements through much travail of the human spirit could not fail to add immeasurably to the individual and collective happiness of the world. We need to note, however, that the recognition of each individual's right to the "pursuit of happiness" is a modern achievement, the result of definite opposition on the part of not a few individuals to the social consciousness that had long prevailed. It constituted a real moral issue, and those who struggled for it were moral heroes. Their contribution to the social welfare of the race is of no mean value.

But one might well ask, "Have all the important issues been disposed of?" and the answer would be a strong denial. We are very far indeed from such an Utopian condition. I have already called attention to the issue which is in the balance in Europe to-day, and there are many more that vitally concern both the nations there and elsewhere in the world. They are more or less in the discussion stage now, but when settled they too will contribute not a little to the advancement of the race. There is the problem of capital and labor. It took real moral courage for a laborer years ago to oppose the social consciousness with respect to capital, and it takes moral courage for any laborer to-day to oppose his fellows in any plan they may have for their relief; it also takes moral courage of the same sort for any capitalist to oppose his fellow capitalists in any sug-

gested measure for reform. It took moral courage for individuals here and there, when competition was the approved method for conducting business, to advocate a change to what we call combination or co-operation to-day. Then, too, there is the temperance question which has advanced so rapidly during the last three years. When individuals at first began to oppose the social consciousness with reference to liquor, their position was hardly an enviable one. The opposition which they met was oftentimes of the bitterest kind. None the less, to-day, with victory casting its shadow before them, they are being recognized as real moral heroes, and we may well believe that their contribution to the social welfare of the world will be by no means an inconsiderable one. Then, too, there is the question of woman suffrage, white slavery, the social evil so called, and a large number of other issues, each of which constitutes a real moral issue, and we may rest assured that when they shall have been settled the social welfare will have been increased not a little. Morality, as it is frequently said, creates values, while the social consciousness conserves them, and that creating process is largely one of opposition to the conserving attitude of the social group as a whole.

And now I am through for to-day. Have I proved progress to your satisfaction? I am sure that I have not proved it in a deductive way, and, as I indicated at the beginning, I did not expect to prove cosmic

progress, if there is anything of that sort. Still I hope that I have made it clear that change is one of the most fundamental aspects of the world as a whole, and that in the field of human affairs a change from simple relations to more complex relations may be interpreted as from a lower to a higher plane, and this may be designated properly as progress, following the example of the biologist in his special field. We have seen, too, that several prominent writers have expressed their belief in real social progress, and also that control is a fair test of that kind of progress. But throughout the entire course of human progress there have been many definite issues involving an opposition between the individual consciousness and the social consciousness, and those very issues have been the index of a high type of morality.

V

THE ETHICAL IDEAL

IN the opening lecture of this series, I indicated that the Greek emphasis in the field of ethics was upon "virtue" and the "good," indeed, the "highest good." I also intimated that before the end of the series I should find it necessary to deal with the Greek point of view somewhat at length. It is that aspect of the entire subject that I plan to deal with more or less incidentally to-day. In the third lecture, also, I presented rather briefly the essential features of an ideal, indeed, of an ethical ideal, and gave the impression that I would have more to say on that topic before concluding the series. I had thought at first of dealing simply with the content of the ethical ideal, but on further reflection it has seemed to be wiser to include some of the wider aspects and implications, since to confine ourselves to the content would narrow too much the range of our discussions. I may add, further, that the ideal may be treated either from an historical angle or from a constructive one, but it is the historical aspect that I plan to present on this occasion, while I shall postpone the construc-

tive treatment until two weeks from to-day. The ethical ideal, then, from an historical angle is our topic for this hour.

When we begin to speak of ideals, not a few people become decidedly critical. "Don't talk to us about ideals," they say. "Give us practice, give us conduct in the concrete. Ideals are too visionary altogether. They mean nothing in the practical affairs of life." So great a discrepancy has often appeared between ideals and the realization of them, or between promise and fulfillment, we might say, that it seems better to many to dispense with ideals altogether. But when there is such a disharmony, generally the reason is either that the individual no longer believes firmly in the ideal he is credited with holding, and so allows himself more liberty in his conduct than his assumed ideal provides for, or the thing which subjects him to criticism is an element which that individual has never brought definitely within the scope of his ideal. In either of these cases there might be a wide divergence between ideal and conduct, between theory and practice. I heard of a man several years ago who was very successful in business, and also a prominent member of a church. His activities during the week, however, did not square very well with his professions on Sunday. So great was this disharmony that one of his associates asked him on one occasion how he could be so pious on Sunday and yet be so unscrupulous, as he was reported

to be, in some of his business transactions. "Why," he replied, "there is no difficulty there. When I was a young man, I firmly determined never to let my religion interfere with my business." He had what have been called "thought-tight compartments" in his mind. The actions complained of, he had never brought in under the real sway of his apparent ideal. And, too, we must admit that it is exceedingly difficult for any one to have a perfectly consistent scheme of life which would make provision for all the varying experiences that come. Perhaps only the highest and best philosophers have ever been successful in constructing such logical systems and then holding themselves rigidly to them. Still further, as implied a moment ago, one may come to a different understanding of one's original ideal, and seeing that some parts of it are not so obligatory as at first thought, such a one may allow his conduct to diverge somewhat from the strict realization which that ideal demands. But aside from such discrepancies, there is generally a fairly close agreement between what a man thinks and what he does. We note first the various activities, which perhaps seem strange to us, but when we learn of the thought back of the acts, a real harmony between thought and act is very apparent.

Down in Central Australia, as I indicated to two of my classes this morning, there are men almost as primitive as in the earliest days of the race. One

group of them is known as the "witchetty grub" group.¹ At certain seasons of the year, these men go apart from their usual habitation and subject themselves to various practices more or less in imitation of the witchetty grubs which constitute their food supply. They think that their acts will increase their food supply that season. So, too, when we consider the field of magic, which has been very widespread in early times and which continues in many parts of the world even at the present day. There is what is called "sympathetic magic," which means that if you can get possession of something that was once a part of an individual whom you wish to influence, as a lock of his hair or finger nail parings, you can work your will upon him.² Or if you have an enemy who is larger than you are, or who is at a distance where you can not get hold of him, you can make a wax image of him, and then by sticking pins or a knife into the image, or by melting it, you can work him harm. This is called "imitative magic." Then, again, it may seem very strange to us to see a man drive a nail into a tree without doing anything further. Upon inquiry, however, we learn that he thought that he could get rid of a toothache in that manner. This might be called "transference magic." Then, too, off to the southwest of us in

¹ Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, pp. 170-179.

² Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, 1st Ed., Pt. II, pp. 16-23.

India, they treat some diseases as follows: If a man happens to be sick of the jaundice, he goes to the medicine man of the tribe who repeats a few magical phrases, anoints the sick man with yellow clay, and then commands him to bathe. The thought is that the disease will disappear with the disappearance of the clay.³ Furthermore, there are people who, when they have an enemy, hang themselves at the door of his house, thinking that their ghost will haunt him.⁴ We probably would hardly care to get even with an enemy in that way. But none the less there is the thought and the consequent act. Many other similar incidents might be mentioned, all indicating that there is a real connection between what people think and what they do. The discrepancy comes, as I have said, when the individual no longer cherishes the ideal in its original form, or perhaps has never brought all his actions to the touchstone of the ideal. Consequently, the protest against ideals and the emphasis upon mere conduct are not so thoroughly justified as might at first appear.

But to come closer to the main topic of the hour. I may not at this time deal at length with all the ethical ideals which men have cherished and have sought to realize. I may, however, present the three leading ideals among the Greeks, which have been in-

³ Leuba, *A Psychological Study of Religion*, pp. 163-164.

⁴ Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, Vol. II, p. 234.

fluent in various ways throughout the centuries of European history. In this way, too, I shall be dealing with the Greek conception of virtue and of the good.

When we attempt to deal with ethical reflection among the Greeks, we are practically compelled to consider Socrates. In the earlier periods of Greek history, there were many isolated expressions about conduct, especially in the poems of Homer and in the sayings of the Gnostic poets, but there was no systematic treatment of ethics until after Socrates' day. He himself was a curious individual. He was many-sided, and because of the variety of his interests and the range of his discussions his pupils interpreted him in many ways. These pupils, too, were a composite lot. There were Aristippus, Plato, Antisthenes, the aged Euripides, Chærephon, the gay and youthful Alcibiades, and many others who found Socrates interesting and entertaining, and, due to their own characteristics in large measure, they were inclined to interpret him very differently. And it was this difference in interpretation which produced the three leading Greek schools of ethics. Let us see.

As I indicated a moment ago, one of the young men in the group surrounding Socrates was Aristippus. He had been brought up in the city of Cyrene on the northern coast of Africa. He belonged to a wealthy family and had known all the luxury and pleasure that the age afforded. Since he had heard of

Socrates, probably through Protagoras, the greatest of the Sophists, he decided to go to Athens to see and hear the great teacher for himself. He did not, however, think it necessary to change from his early mode of life. Certain aspects of Socrates' life seemed to give him warrant for continuing his easy-going, pleasure-loving ways. After his master's death, he returned to Cyrene and established a school of his own which became known as the Cyrenaic school. The central principle which he emphasized was pleasure. In choosing among several possible courses of action the amount of probable pleasure should alone decide. Technically this kind of ethical theorizing is known as Hedonism. It is the same sort as that which I briefly suggested two weeks ago in the quotations from Omar Khayyám. Later, we find this general type of thought presented by Epicurus who taught at Athens from 306 to 271 B. C. Epicurus, however, felt the need, to a certain extent, of a philosophical background which he secured by appropriating the general world-view of Democritus, which I briefly referred to in an earlier lecture. He also changed the teaching of Aristippus to the extent that he laid emphasis upon the pleasures of a lifetime rather than of the fleeting moment, and also stressed the pleasures of the mind rather than those of the body. None the less, it was pleasure which served him as a criterion of conduct. The most pleasure on the whole and in the long run was the

highest good for him, and for a man to incorporate the greatest amount of pleasure into his life was to be truly manly and thoroughly virtuous. Not to follow such a course was to fail in virtue. These are the essential features of this system, and all, indeed, that we need to consider at this time. I may add, however, that if we regard the philosophic background obtained from Democritus as a naturalistic type, which would certainly be a fair way of characterizing it, then it is not surprising that this kind of ethical theorizing should have been revived in European thought during the last three or four centuries, since there have been not a few naturalistic interpretations of the world in recent years in Europe and America.

Now, this type of ethical theory or kind of ethical ideal has been characterized as individualistic or egoistic in the ancient world, and on that account, since it was an ideal, we should need to regard it as ethical, but since it emphasized the pleasure of the individual, we should need to rate it rather low, in consequence of the stress that I have laid on social welfare as the test of what is strictly ethical. In the modern world, however, it has been largely altruistic, and on that account it would rise in the scale of ideals. None the less it has various other defects. It is a one-sided view of life. A human being is more than a mere pleasure-loving animal. Then, too, as we consider the entire development of animal life up

to and including mankind, there has gradually arisen that which within the limits of humanity we call reason. This has been of incalculable value in the genesis and further elaboration of civilization, and if so, why should one not make use of it in the field which we call ethical? To make pleasure alone the criterion of conduct is to neglect one of the most potent factors in the advancement of the race. This, as it seems to me, is one of the strongest arguments against pure hedonism. It is also true, as pointed out by many writers, that hedonism has not been able to dispense with the use of reason, although such procedure was contradictory of its fundamental principle. The historical course of this type of ethical theory has been toward a larger and larger appropriation of its opposite principle, viz., reason. It was only in this way that Epicurus could emphasize the pleasures of a lifetime rather than the pleasures of the moment. Pleasure in and of itself gave no warrant for any such discrimination. The hedonistic principle, pure and simple, is tyrannous; it is immediate. We may not calculate before and after. It is the immediate moment that is superlatively urgent. Pleasure as such knows nothing else. Here, then, is one of the classical types of ethical theorizing in the western world, or, in other words, an ethical ideal which not a few, first and last, have sought to realize. Let us consider next its historical foil.

Another man who listened to Socrates and caught

an inspiration from the master for his own life's program was Antisthenes, whom I mentioned but a moment or two ago. This man was especially impressed by Socrates' complete self-mastery, his indifference to heat and cold, hunger and thirst. It is reported of him that he wore practically the same kind of clothing both in summer and in winter. When he went on a military expedition one winter he walked barefoot over the snow and ice as if walking through the streets of Athens in the summertime. Thus Antisthenes, when he began to teach by himself, laid emphasis upon indifference to the smiles or frowns of Fortune. He went so far, indeed, that he manifested a similar indifference to the refinements of civilized life. Life according to nature became his fundamental tenet, which meant at times an almost total disregard of the amenities and niceties of life. So much opposed, too, was Antisthenes to the view of the Hedonists that he is reported to have said that he "would rather be insane than pleased." This type of ethical interpretation was taken up by Zeno of Citium, a city on the Island of Cyprus. He taught in Athens from about the year 300 to 264 B. C. He did not, however, hold absolutely by the teaching of the group which Antisthenes had started. His thought was modified somewhat by other views. He, also, as Epicurus had done, developed a world-view as a background for his teaching. For him the whole universe was permeated by reason and some of

this reason was in each and every human being. He used the expression, "Life according to nature," which had been emphasized by the preceding group, but with an entirely different meaning. Life according to nature meant for Zeno a life according to one's rational nature. This was the highest and best in each man, and if one would be virtuous, if one would reach the highest good possible, one would let this reason expand and become more and more dominant in one's entire life. Everything else was of but little worth. The passions, feelings, desires, and emotions should all be rooted out so that reason, pure and simple, might flow through a man and his life become exclusively a life of reason.

In its general features, this ideal had not a little to recommend it. It was decidedly altruistic and stressed particularly the brotherhood of all men. Its influence was decisive in the final abolishment of slavery in the old Roman Empire, and modern international law, when it began under Grotius, had the world-view of this type of thought as its foundation. None the less, like Hedonism, this is but a one-sided interpretation of life. If we think of the latter as being better in the course of human social development, then reason has more to recommend it to favorable consideration than Hedonism has. But it is a psychological impossibility for any human being to lead a life of pure reason. If there is one thing more than another that modern psychology emphasizes, it

is the unity of the mental life. It is not a "faculty" psychology which is at the front to-day. Instead, every complete state of consciousness is thought of as having an awareness suffusing it, a feeling of agreeable or disagreeable, and a suggestion of activity. We could not, if we would, live a life of pure reason. Still further, as various writers point out, the historical development of this type of ethical theorizing, which is usually called "Rigorism" or "Rationalism," has been away from the extreme form in which it originated. The tendency has been, with exceptions here and there, to make some provision for the feelings. Reason continued to give the form to the ethical life, but the rich human content was recognized as coming from the feelings. It was only so, as not a few discovered, that life could receive a satisfactory evaluation.

Here, then, we have two of the great historical ethical ideals worked out among the Greeks, which, as is apparent, were originally diametrically opposed to each other. None the less, neither maintained itself strictly in its primitive form. Each tended to lean more or less toward its opposite, or perhaps we would better say, its complement. We are not, however, confined to these two. There is another ideal which came from the Greek philosophical workshop, and to a consideration of that we will turn at once.

It has been said, and not without a large measure of truth, that there have been four superlatively

great minds in the European world, viz., Plato and Aristotle in the ancient world, and Kant and Hegel in the modern world. The first two have given their ethical views in connection with their far-reaching philosophies. In brief, they are as follows: Plato had his peculiar view of the world as a whole. He thought of a world of Being from which the souls of men come at birth, and to which they return at death. The body is the prison-house of the soul, and the highest good for any individual is to be freed from the body and to return to the world whence it came. This for Plato was the *summum bonum par excellence*. But he also conceived of another *summum bonum*, if we may disregard the paradox, and in discussing it he dealt with the two concepts of pleasure and of reason which we have just considered. In his dialogue, "The Philebus," the main discussion deals with the problem whether pleasure or reason may be taken as a sufficient guide for life, and the upshot of the devious turns which the argument takes is that neither may be taken in that way. Instead, the victor in the contest is harmony or due proportion, but none the less reason is said to be nearer the victor than pleasure. Indeed, it is maintained that reason is ten thousand times nearer the victor than pleasure, while the latter is put at the foot of the list of several other elements which enter into the complete life. Again, in his "Republic," where he gives his theory of the state, Plato gives us the suggestion of a reason-

controlled life as the ideal. In this work, political theory, psychology, and ethics are closely interwoven, but the outcome of the discussion is that righteousness or justice, which constitutes the leading motive, may be expected only in that state in which there are wise rulers, a courageous and well trained soldiery, and an industrious artisan class. These classes in the state are analogous to the virtues of wisdom, courage, and self-control or temperance in the individual, which are based respectively upon the rational soul, the spirited part, and the desiring part of the self. While I may not take the time to present Plato's thought in detail, the opinion stands out very prominently in the discussions throughout this dialogue that reason should be the controlling factor in the state, and that when the life of the state is regulated in this way there will be righteousness or justice within its borders. In brief, then, we may say that this secondary ideal or *summum bonum* presented by Plato is not a life of reason nor is it a life of pleasure, but rather a reason-controlled life, a life, indeed, in which pleasure among other elements is admitted, but always under rational control.

When we consider Aristotle's teaching, we find a good deal like the teaching of his master, but there are also variations. Aristotle, no less than Plato, had two *summa bona*, but developed in a different manner. Aristotle laid emphasis upon pure reason in man. This it is which especially distinguishes men

from all creatures in the animal world. Consequently, the highest good in a strict sense is for a man to give himself up unreservedly to pure thought. In so far as reason functions in the individual without any hindrance from the rest of the self, will that person be living the highest, indeed, the divine life. But no human being can lead such a life all the time, and most people lead such a life practically not at all. Consequently, Aristotle developed a secondary *summum bonum*. He arranged a list of virtues, such as Courage, Temperance, Liberality, Good Temper, and so on, each of which stands as a mean between an excess and a deficiency. Courage is the mean between cowardice and foolhardiness, liberality between stinginess and prodigality, good temper between a lack of proper spirit and irascibility, and so on through the list. All these means are determined by the reason. This is quite clear, although Aristotle did not indicate in the works that have come down to us just how the reason operates within this field. Thus we have again a reason-controlled life set forth as an ideal. A life of pure reason was Aristotle's highest good in the strict interpretation of that term, but he also emphasized a reason-controlled life as the best attainable for most people all of the time, and even for the select few for most of the time.

Of course, we may not accept such a view simply upon the authority of the philosophers who fashioned it, viz., Plato and Aristotle, but what about

the inherent reasonableness of such an ideal? We have seen that the other two great historical ideals were not able to maintain themselves in their extreme positions. Each tended to lean in the direction of its opposite, and this very leaning is toward the middle position struck out by both Plato and Aristotle, two of the master minds in the entire field of European thought. For myself, I frankly confess that the general form of this middle course seems to be the highest that we have yet been able to evolve. A reason-controlled life. Not a life of pure reason, and not a life of pleasure pure and simple, or perhaps not so simple, but a life controlled by the reason, but making provision for pleasure and other elements as the occasion might offer.

This particular type of ethical theorizing has been known as Eudæmonism, but unfortunately that term has sometimes been confused with Hedonism and sometimes treated as equivalent to Happiness. Neither of these interpretations, however, does justice to the view. It certainly is not pleasure in the sense meant by Aristippus, nor is it happiness in the shallow sense often implied by that term. Consequently, some writers suggest that we should return to the original meaning of the Greek term, which was "good fortune" or "welfare." This was its meaning in the time of Homer, and it was frequently used in this sense in the time of Plato and Aristotle. If we follow this suggestion, we can call it the welfare

theory, and indeed we should not be far wrong, if we should add the word "social," for both Plato and Aristotle laid emphasis upon the life of the individual within the state. This was apparent in what I presented from Plato's Republic, and with Aristotle a consideration of the state and the development of the ethical life of the individual went hand in hand. These were but two branches of a single subject. A reason-controlled life for the individual, and the individual, too, in the state, warranting our calling it a life directed toward social welfare, would come very close to a proper interpretation of this highest of ideals as presented by these two famous Greek thinkers.⁵

There is still another field of thought which, I think, will contribute somewhat to our general discussion. Just as in the second lecture I turned first to philosophy and then to sociology to determine the field of ethics, so I am now inclined to turn to sociology to gain such additional light as we may upon ideals of human conduct. And here I shall refer again to the teaching of Professor Giddings of Columbia University, if you will permit me to do so. I make these frequent quotations from his works because he has helped me to see into some of these mat-

⁵The works which have contributed to my discussion of these Greek ideals are too numerous to mention. Seth's *Study of Ethical Principles* was the ground-breaker, but that could not be regarded as responsible for all I have said, whether good or bad.

ters better than many others whose works I have become acquainted with.

In his work on "Inductive Sociology," Professor Giddings has said that there have been four great ideals of conduct in the history of the race.⁶ The first of these is that of the "Forceful" man. Such a man has been tall, strong of limb, and powerful. He was Saul, towering head and shoulders above the other men of his day. Such a man always stood as a bulwark of defense in time of need; he did valiant deeds in war and was successful in the chase. He is the soldier and the sailor of to-day, the policeman, the fireman, and many others whose brawn and courage are at a premium. He is the football hero on many a college gridiron. But when the war was over, when the chase was at an end, another type of individual came to the front as the hero, but it was a heroism of a different kind. When all had gathered around the festive board, the new hero was the one who could tell the most interesting story, sing the best song, or make the best speech. This is the "Convivial" type, represented to-day by the jolly, happy-go-lucky, hail-fellow-well-met; it is the type of the successful after dinner speaker. No doubt you have all been present at banquets in honor of some football team, and the fellow who was the mainstay of the team on the field, now stutters and stammers, grows red and pale alternately, stands first on

⁶Pp. 82-83.

one foot and then on the other, and can hardly say three intelligible sentences. But then some little fellow, rather insignificant in appearance, who perhaps hardly knows a touchdown from a home run, delights the whole company with his ready wit. He becomes the hero of this new situation.

But there came a time in the early community when some of the wiseacres perceived that these happy-go-lucky fellows often became a drag upon the community, and consequently there developed the "Austere" type, or we might say the Puritan type. This type did not begin in old New England. His ancestors are much farther back in the past. These long-faced individuals perceived that when there was a drought and famine, these gay young singers, story tellers, and genial ne'er-do-wells had to be supported by the rest of the community. Consequently, maxims of prudence multiplied, and many rather innocent forms of amusement were placed under the ban. This type is still with us, but it is too familiar to need further illustration. The fourth and last type which Professor Giddings discusses is what he calls the "Rationally Conscientious" type. This is a kind of resultant from the other three. Individuals of this type are inclined to keep themselves in good physical condition through proper exercise, but they do not carry their devotion to athletics in any form to an excess; they are courageous when real courage is demanded, but they are never foolhardy. They also

enter into the various rounds of social activities, but do not go too far; they avoid making fools of themselves in the pleasures in which they indulge. They do not attempt to lead lives of pure reason, but all proposed courses of action are brought to the bar of reason. They have a deep sense of duty, and often shoulder heavy loads of responsibility, but they do not let duty play the part of the tyrant in their lives. They recognize their limitations, play their part in our complex social life to the extent of their ability, and leave the appraisal of their deeds to posterity. They are rationally conscientious, but not conscientious beyond the bounds of reason.

If we compare this fourth type with the ideal of the reason-controlled life, we shall find that the two are practically the same. Thus philosophy and sociology are virtually agreed as to the form of human conduct which will function best in rather high grade society. The different ideals of the sociologist are adjusted to the different levels which are always found in any community, but in so far as intelligence increases in a given community will there be a tendency for the rationally conscientious type to increase. Somewhat the same may be said with reference to the ideal presented from Plato and Aristotle. Since that is the reason-controlled life, the number of its representatives will increase with the increase of trained reason among any people. We may not say that these two ideals, one from philosophy and

the other from sociology, are the superlatively best among men, but they seem to be the best on the formal side yet developed within the race.

At the next hour, I shall attempt to give somewhat in detail the constructive side of the ideal. This will involve dwelling upon the content which we individually would be inclined to give to the bare form of the ideal presented at this time.

VI

THE ETHICAL IDEAL

(Concluded)

DURING the last hour we were together, I presented the ethical ideal, for the most part, from an historical angle. I sketched the three leading ideals among the Greeks, and indicated that the "reason-controlled life" might be regarded as the highest that we know on the formal side. I also said that on this occasion I should need to deal with the content side of the ideal. That is our leading problem for to-day. None the less, in the first few minutes of the hour, I shall need to consider a matter to which I referred in the first lecture. I suggested then that there would be a universality attaching to the ideal that I was planning to present, and it is this aspect of the entire discussion that I wish to deal with now.

Very frequently in ethical discussions the assertion is made or implied that the requirements decided upon are obligatory upon all men. With the growth of evolutionary thought, however, it has become increasingly difficult to universalize in the old way. As

we saw in one of the earlier lectures of this series, there are different degrees of social development in the world taken as a whole. When we take a wide-ranging view, we find that culture shades off from the kind of life lived by the residents of the Back Bay district of Boston to the decidedly primitive modes of life that characterize the Fiji Islanders. And indeed, as we have seen, even within the limits of the same community there are pronounced differences in culture. Still further, one of the most assured results of modern psychological research, as pointed out by Professor Angell of the University of Chicago, are the fundamental differences among men.¹ How could we, then, insist that whatever regulations we lay down for ourselves should be equally binding upon all sorts and conditions of men? As I indicated in the third lecture of this course, an ethical ideal is a complex mental construct which we fashion by fusing together the especially good features selected from our own past experience and from the experience of the race, in so far as history presents it to us. How could such a complex thing be the ideal of all people? The difficulty which this question raises is a logical one, and it is really a logical difficulty which underlies all that I have just said, but although I may weary you with an excursion into the field of logic, I must say a word or two about it.

There is a principle in logic known as the "inten-

¹ *Chapters from Modern Psychology*, pp. 155-173.

sion and extension of terms." There is the meaning which a term has, and there are also the objects meant by it, but in a series of terms the increase of the intension or meaning results in the decrease of the extension or number of objects meant. If I say "man," I mean all the objects in the world that have the physical characteristics which distinguish man from the merely animal world. If, however, I say "white man," I have increased the meaning of my term, but I have at the same time reduced the number of objects to which the term would apply. Still further, the term "Englishman" would apply to a much smaller number of individuals, and "Oxford graduate," because it would have a still greater meaning, would apply only to a rather small, select group. If, now, I begin with the term "Oxford graduate," and then proceed to "Englishman," "white man," and "man," I continually decrease the meaning of the term, but increase the number of objects designated. Since this is true, if we are to have an ideal, as I suggested a moment ago, that shall be obligatory upon the entire race, either that ideal will have but little content, so as to meet the actual condition of very primitive people, and such an ideal would be of almost no value, or else with a complex ideal we should have to wait until all people might reach a high plane of culture. There is, too, a third alternative, but I will deal with that later.

Of course, it might be objected to the second al-

ternative which I have presented that even if all the people in the world should ultimately reach the same high plane of cultural development, they would not, therefore, necessarily be the same in their outlook upon life. This depends in part upon the way we define the term "same." If we are exceedingly nice in our interpretation, we may find that there is no such thing as sameness at all. Any object we may notice is not exactly the same from moment to moment, and our states of consciousness are notoriously never twice alike in every detail. For, indeed, if they should be alike in every other respect, there would still be a difference in the time of their occurrence. If, however, we are less finical in our interpretation and are willing to admit approximations, there will be a decidedly good basis for assuming considerable likeness in the views of people who are upon about the same plane of culture. A dozen students who attend the same preparatory school and then pass through the same college and university, taking practically the same courses of study, will have a very similar way of viewing the world and of reacting to the problems which they face in life. Of course, they will not think exactly alike in every respect, but there will be more unanimity of opinion among them than there would be between them and the simplest savages. This is evident, too, in the case of any nation, as I indicated in another connection earlier in this series of lectures. The people of any country are

more alike in their thinking and general outlook upon life, than are the peoples of different countries. So, if the time should ever come, although I do not think that it will come very soon, when all the peoples of the world should be upon the same plane of culture, we might expect that the complex ideal of conduct developed by them would have practically the same binding force upon all, but with the world as it is to-day, how can anything but the simplest requirements be laid upon all alike? This is a serious question, but I think that the third alternative which I suggested a moment ago will answer it, and give the degree of universality which I think is the only kind possible.

If we should construct an ethical ideal, as I suggested a moment ago, by selecting from the good in the entire world as history reveals it, we would, of course, have a very complex thing, but would there not be elements in it which people on other planes of development would recognize as their own and so feel binding upon themselves? To that extent the ideal would be theirs also. Among the simplest savages, there is a certain amount of kindness shown to the nearest kin.² Could we ourselves leave such an element out of the ideal which we might construct as our own? To that extent, then, would the savage have a stake in our ethical claim. So, too, when we

² Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, 1st Ed., Pt. I, p. 348; McDougall, *Social Psychology*, p. 69.

turn to the barbarous plane.³ If you and I should ever enter the tent of an Arab sheik, our lives would be safe, even though we might be total strangers to him. A certain amount of kindness and of consideration is shown to strangers even by the barbarians. Could we omit hospitality from our own ideal? To that extent, also, would our ideal be the ideal of the barbarian. In the early civilizations of Egypt and of Babylonia there was a certain amount of emphasis placed upon the binding character of contracts, and an effort was made to mete out even-handed justice.⁴ These are elements in the ideal of the most highly civilized peoples in the world to-day. It must be evident, then, I think, that such an ideal as I have been working toward in this course can be regarded as the ideal of the most highly developed people in the world at the present time, but also, in part at any rate, the ideal of people in the past and in the present who may not be upon the highest cultural plane, but who might, none the less, perceive in our ideal some things which they themselves approve. To that extent the ideal of the most cultured, constructed as I have in part suggested and as I intend to suggest further, would be the ideal of all. It would be the ideal in its fullness for the people who might deliberately construct it, and it would be the

³Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, 1st Ed., Pt. I, p. 348.

⁴Hobhouse, *Ibid.*, pp. 84-85, 179-190.

ideal potentially of all people who might be developing in the same direction, although it would be theirs actually only to the extent that they might see in it elements which they were accustomed to approve in their own particular environment. Let us turn, now, to the special content of such an ideal, but always from the angle of the formal treatment presented at the last hour.

In attempting to deal with the content side of the ideal, as I have it in mind, I think that it will help, if I present the matter, as I have been accustomed to for several years, with reference to my other students in America. Later I will treat the ideal from what I conceive to be your special angle. For a few minutes, then, please consider yourselves a group of American students, and I will proceed as I usually do with them.

When we seek to do justice to the ethical ideal in its entirety, we find it necessary to consider both the physical and the spiritual aspects, using the term "spiritual" in a broad sense. The old Romans had a saying, *mens sana sano in corpore*, a sound mind in a sound body. That was practically the ideal, too, of the Greeks taken as a whole. If we desire to have a well rounded ideal to-day, we can do no better than to follow their example and give attention to these two sides of our complete self. What shall I say, then, with reference to our physical development? It is true, of course, that there have been many indi-

viduals, frail in body and racked with pain, who have made valuable contributions to the welfare of the world, but we must always regard them as the exceptions. Other things being equal, we may expect a desirable development of the spiritual side of our lives, using that term, as I have said, in a broad sense, in correlation with a good physical foundation. We have already seen that an increasing valuation placed upon human life is one of the leading criteria of social progress. Not to give sufficient attention to our physical selves is to fail of the proper appreciation of this growing valuation placed upon life. Then, too, the "rationally conscientious" ideal, which we found at the last hour is practically identical with the "reason-controlled" life, points in this same direction. To despise the body, or to neglect the body would be a cardinal flaw in one's ideal.

Let me say a word, too, at this point with reference to the instincts. Very frequently writers on ethics distinguish between instinctive morality and a higher or rational sort. Such a distinction, however, opens the way for a wrong attitude toward the instincts. If the more rational type of conduct is higher, why may we not neglect the instinctive altogether? Such an attitude of mind seems at times actually to occur. But the instincts constituted the highest type of behavior at an early period in the development of the race, and we could not dispense with them entirely at present. When one distin-

guishes, however, between instinctive morality and rational morality, as just indicated, some individuals either refuse altogether to follow their instincts, or else feel that they are abandoning or violating their higher ideal, if, perchance, instinctive activity should at any time gain the right of way. But the ideal, as I am developing it, takes the instincts up into itself. There are times when the instincts should not be restrained and we should not feel on such occasions that our ideal has been in any sense lowered. The rational element in the ideal makes provision for them, although it is true that they should be under proper control. To let our instincts run away with us would be to fail in a just appreciation of the ideal, but to disregard them altogether would also mean to fail in like manner. Like a trained pointer, they should always be at heel, except at such times as reason might permit them to function.

When, now, we turn from the physical aspect of the ideal to the spiritual side, what shall we select for the content of the ideal? Here I think that we can do no better than to consider that list of virtues from the teaching of Aristotle which I touched upon at the last hour. He gives in that list twelve virtues, some of which perhaps we might not be inclined to introduce into the ideal, and yet I doubt if we could very well avoid including many of them. In considering them, however, we should need to test them individual-

ly in accordance with the principle of social welfare. Would such or such an element make for the social welfare? If it would, then we might feel wholly justified in introducing it; if not, we should need to reject it. Let us consider several of these elements one by one and see to what extent we might feel inclined to follow Aristotle in this list.⁵

The first virtue which Aristotle mentions is "courage." Could we very well omit such an element from the ideal which we intend to construct for ourselves? Very likely not many of us will have opportunities to display courage as would the "forceful man" whom I discussed at the last hour, but could we fail to include this element? Certainly we would not think of introducing its opposite "cowardice." But courage is not always closely connected with the physical self, although we usually think of it in that way. There is also what we may call spiritual courage. This is often termed "moral courage," but it seems to me that we might better call it spiritual courage which leads to specific moral activity. Since I have already emphasized the opposition between the individual consciousness and the social consciousness, I could not fail to include in the ideal such spiritual courage. It takes just this kind of courage to oppose the group with which one happens to be connected, and yet such opposition, as we have seen, is a very neces-

⁵ Welldon, *The Ethics of Aristotle*, pp. 48-53, and *passim*. Cf. Wallace, *Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle*, p. 100.

sary factor in social progress. I suspect that we would all be inclined to add this element.

Then there is "temperance" which Aristotle presents. Rather unfortunately, this term is associated in America almost exclusively with abstinence from alcoholic liquors. It undoubtedly means that but more besides. It suggests temperance in eating, in action, in thought, and in word. Another term which is frequently used as an equivalent for "temperance" in translating Aristotle at this point is "self-control." This at once brings us into line with the fundamental character of the ideal as outlined at our last hour together. A reason-controlled life would naturally suggest control in these other matters just mentioned.

Another element which appears in the list furnished by this Greek philosopher is "liberality." Whenever this term is mentioned, we naturally think of those who are blessed with an abundance of the good things of this life, and consequently we are inclined to apply it to them rather than to ourselves. But liberality is not restricted in its meaning to the large giver. It is more the attitude of mind that is meant. When there is an appeal made to our purse-strings, we should calculate the extent of our resources and give accordingly. The free, generous spirit back of, or evidenced by, the act is the essential. But a word of caution is needed here. When appeals are made to us, as they so frequently are,

by the beggars on the street, it does not follow that we should always give. Liberality would not necessarily be evidenced in that way. Students of society tell us that it is far better to investigate the case, find out the cause of the poverty, and then remedy the conditions, rather than to confirm the beggar in his ways by the modicum we toss him.

There is, also, another meaning lurking in this term "liberality." The root idea is freedom, which may well be interpreted as freedom from prejudice, from narrowness, and from mere tradition, or in other words a liberal attitude of mind. Several years ago I heard culture defined as "the ability to recognize and the disposition to approve that which is excellent wherever found." With proper changes in the terminology, that definition might well be used in connection with liberality. We are liberal in our thought when we have the ability to recognize good thinking in another, even though we may not agree with the conclusions, and when we have the disposition to approve that thought as good solid thinking, without necessarily being inclined to accept it *in toto* or to follow out all its implications. There has been altogether too much narrowness in the world in this respect. We should not attempt to browbeat one another in our thinking, nor be ready to convince with the club. We have reached a high plane of ethical development when we can introduce into our ideal liberality in this sense.

Aristotle also suggests "right ambition" and "good temper." Not infrequently, we are cautioned against having any ambition at all. But an individual without any ambition would be a very neutral factor in society. He would belong in the ranks of the "hoboes" and so-called "weary Willies." Social progress has not come about through such individuals. What Aristotle warns against is seeking to aggrandize ourselves at the expense of our neighbors, using them as tools for our own welfare, exploiting them for our own personal advantage. Right ambition, however, means taking one's own proper measure, and then seeking to realize the highest and best of which that individual is capable in the interests of society as a whole. As for "good temper," not much need be said. Its value as a virtue is quite obvious. We certainly would not care to introduce its opposite, a quarrelsome, surly, sour temper into our ideal. None the less, an exhibition of temper, provided the occasion might demand it, would not be out of harmony with the ideal. It is said that Dr. Arnold, the famous headmaster of Rugby, used to declare that he never felt sure of the stability of a boy's character until that boy hated a lie. One might, indeed, avoid lying, or even discountenance it in another, but until a boy showed his hostility to a lie by an actual manifestation of temper, the good old doctor did not think him fully established in his ways.

There is also "friendly civility" in this list. You

can readily enough see what is meant by this. You know the man with a cheery greeting, a friendly smile, and a warm, hearty grasp of the hand. Such a one makes friends wherever he goes. The lack of such an element on some occasions makes us value it all the more when we do encounter it. Last summer, in a large hotel in Tokyo, Japan, I saw a man wearing a uniform which I thought I recognized. The color alone was strange. In what I thought was a friendly manner, I said to the man wearing it, "I think that I know that uniform, all but the color." "It is the regular color," was his reply. That is all the information I received from him. Later, I learned that the color of the uniform he was wearing is the regulation color for full dress in summer time. I suspect, however, that no one of you would say that he gave evidence of friendly civility.

Aristotle also includes in his list "sincerity" and "modesty." The former of these two words almost sums up in itself all the other virtues. It means honesty of purpose, genuineness, lack of deceit, frankness, nothing underhanded, without guile. It has in it the essence of gentle breeding. It might well serve as the foundation for the other virtues. When this is lacking, we may regard the other virtues mentioned in the list with suspicion; when this is present, we may have more confidence in the rest. As to "modesty," we may say that it means strictly that we should respect the privacy of others just as we

wish them to respect our privacy. It may also be taken in the sense of being unassuming, rather than boastful and showing an overweening confidence in our own ability. It does not, however, mean excessive humility, whether of the Uriah Heep type or not. One should take a just estimate of one's self. We should not think too highly of ourselves, nor should we belittle ourselves. Modesty in this sense suggests having a due regard for one's place among men. It avoids servile flattery and self-depreciation, just as it gives no place to pride of intellect and swaggering boastfulness.

The last virtue that Aristotle insists upon, passing over several others, is "just resentment." There are some people who seem never to get angry at any thing. They impress us as having a "cotton string for a backbone," as one speaker has put it. There are occasions, however, when hot indignation should flash forth. Such explosions are good for the individual himself and for the one who happens to be their target. They clear the atmosphere as a thunder storm does in summer. There have been times during the last three years when my own nation seemed to be lacking in just resentment. Happily that time is now past, and sooner or later, the sooner the better, the nation that trifled with the dignity of the United States and trampled upon her self-respect will learn that the just resentment of a peace-loving nation may not be scorned with impunity.

Here, then, are the virtues which Aristotle emphasized.⁶ I do not suggest that we should incorporate them all into our ideal simply because of the eminence of this Greek thinker. As I have suggested before, we need to scrutinize them very carefully one by one and then select in accordance with the principle of social welfare. I feel very confident, however, that if we do deal with the list in this way, we shall not omit them all from the ideal which we construct for ourselves.

At this point in my discussion of this problem with my students in America, I suggest that we turn to the teaching of the Hebrew people. There has been a tendency in recent years in the West to neglect this side. The historical reason for such aloofness would not be far to seek. But such an attitude is unscientific. One of the first steps in any scientific enterprise is analysis. If, then, we analyze European and American civilization, we shall find a large element in it contributed by the Hebrews, in addition to what has been inherited from the Greeks and the Romans. To neglect this would be to fail in our attempt to construct an ethical ideal at least in the spirit of science.

Even a cursory survey of the Hebrew teaching reveals certain requirements called the "Command-

⁶In the discussion, I have not confined myself closely to Aristotle's teaching. I have simply taken the several virtues from his list and have presented them in my own way, but not, I think, out of harmony with his general thought.

ments." Thou shalt do no murder, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not bear false witness, thou shalt not covet, and so on through the list. These regulations grew up out of the Hebrew life. They were regarded as essential for social welfare. In so far as such requirements make for social welfare to-day, and they certainly seem to tend in that direction, they might very well be introduced into our ideal. The test, also, in connection with this list is the same as that already applied in connection with the teaching of the Greek philosopher. Then, too, there is the teaching of Jesus of Nazareth, the greatest among the Jews. Much of his teaching has become incorporated into the social consciousness of the western world. We may not say, however, that all that he taught is incorporated at the present day. He taught that if a man should smite you on the right cheek, you should turn your left cheek to him. Certainly the nations of the West do not follow that teaching. Whether they ever will follow that particular injunction, we can not say. Possibly many elements of his teaching, not yet accepted in the West, will be incorporated ultimately into the social consciousness of that part of the world. It may be, too, that some of his teaching, already a part of the western mind, will be sloughed off later. The whole matter is in flux. The foundation principle, however, for incorporating or rejecting any of his teaching is whether or not in the long run it would or would not

make for social welfare. Much of it seems to contribute richly to that end; much of it has never yet been tried on any large scale. The real test is still to come.

When, now, I have developed the ideal for my other students thus far, I have always suggested to them to look even farther afield. If they should ever find in the teaching of Brahman sage or Buddhist saint anything that seems to promise well for social welfare, that also might be included in their ideal. Still further, I have said to them that if they should make themselves acquainted with the teaching of Confucius, Mencius, Laotze, or others of your great leaders of thought, and should find there elements that appealed to them as likely to enrich the lives of men, they should also without any hesitation incorporate such material into their ideal, subject, of course, to such limitations as contradictions or a difference in geographical location might impose. Whatever definitely makes for social welfare, on the whole and in the long run, and wherever found among men, may properly be regarded as promising material for the content of the ethical ideal.⁷

⁷In addition to the elements discussed here, there is, of course, the vast field of European thought from the time of Aristotle to the present. I have not attempted to deal with that here for lack of time allowed the original lecture. The method of constructing the ideal I regard as of prime importance. The points considered in the lecture are not in any sense restrictive; they are simply suggestive and illustrative.

Here, then, is the ideal toward which I have been working as our goal throughout this course. There is the formal side, as I presented it at our last meeting, and here are specific elements, or virtues, gleaned from some of the best sources. Does it, or would it work? This question we shall need to consider at the next hour, but just now I wish to present the matter, as I said, from your point of view as Chinese students.

Here, as in the previous case, we need to give attention to both the physical and the spiritual sides. Is there anything that I said about the proper care of the body which you would be inclined to change? I feel very sure that you take the same attitude toward this matter that my students in the West do. Your athletic contests and the noble gymnasium nearing completion upon your campus make me confident that you would agree entirely with what I have said about proper attention to the physical foundation for your mental and spiritual development. So, too, with what I said about the instincts. You need to incorporate them into your ideal. This does not mean, of course, that you should let them run away with you. They constitute a part of the ideal as a whole, but always subject to rational control. When, however, I turn to the remainder of the content, I feel that you should proceed in a different way. If I am not very much mistaken, you should begin with the teaching of your own great

men. They have been accustomed to emphasize "filial piety," "benevolence," "the doctrine of the mean," "the golden rule," and so on.⁸ These would seem to be good, but I would suggest that you should not incorporate them into your ideal simply upon the basis of tradition. Scrutinize them carefully. Oftentimes, a thing that is good, if over-emphasized, becomes more or less harmful. None the less, as it seems to me, you should begin here. Then I would suggest that you look farther afield. Take the same list of virtues that I have discussed from Aristotle and decide whether any or all of them could find a place in your ideal. Then, too, turn to the Hebrews and to the teaching of the Nazarene and examine what you find with great care. Use the test which I have made fundamental, viz., social welfare. You may even go still farther in your quest. If anywhere within the limits of human history you find anything which seems to you to be good, or that you think would make for social welfare, then incorporate it, subject, as I have said, to the possibility of there being a contradiction, or that the geographical situation would dictate otherwise. In this way, your ideal would approximate to the ideal which students in the western world not infrequently set before themselves.

Last winter, when I decided to come here for this year, I reflected as to what I might make my chief

⁸Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, 1st Ed., Pt. II, pp. 161-178; Moore, *History of Religions*, pp. 30-64.

emphasis, and I have just now given you the thought which I ultimately reached. It seems to me that you should avoid being swept clean out of your own orbit, in your effort to familiarize yourselves with western ideas and to incorporate western principles into your own lives. Begin with the best that you have here, but begin with it in a critical way. Then use the same critical method on western thought and culture. Last summer, I had a conversation with a man in Washington, D. C., who has been in this part of the world a great deal, and I was glad to find him expressing himself in much the same way as I have just now. We were speaking with reference to Japan. He said that Japan has almost lost her national identity in consequence of the avidity with which she has appropriated western thought and life. Some of them are sorry for this and they are trying at present to utilize more of their own earlier type of life. He said further that he hoped that the Chinese would not make the same mistake. That harmonized wholly with my own thought. You are Chinese with a long history behind you. Be Chinese, but in a critical way; appropriate from the West, but appropriate in a critical way. Dovetail the new into the old; let the new and the old coalesce. It will be a slow process, but do not get discouraged. The richest results will come, if you use the proper method.

The late Professor James of Harvard University brings out a vital distinction in the matter of memory

in his great work on "Psychology." He distinguishes between a "total recall" and a "focalized recall."⁹ When one tries to describe some event and seeks to include all, even the most trivial incidents, the result will be a long drawn out, rambling account. If, however, one picks out the really salient points and combines them skilfully, there will be a unity and force to the account wholly lacking in the other kind. To remember, we must forget. I think that you will admit that the kind of ideal I have constructed for you aims to be of the selective type. Do not take material simply upon the authority of this or that teacher, but estimate the value of the work critically. Put into your ideal the best you can find anywhere in the world, but begin with what has characterized your own people for so long a time. Do not misunderstand me. I am not arguing against the incorporation of western ideas into your ideal. Far from it. My presence here, and the presence of other American teachers, both point toward your appropriation of western thought. This college itself in a unique way aims at just this result. What I mean is that you should begin with your own culture, but subject to a rigorous criticism, and, further, the critical scrutiny which I suggest that you apply to the teaching of your own great men, I also urge that you apply to the teaching of the West.

I frequently like to think of the whole matter in
⁹*Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 569-581.

an historical way. Fully five thousand years ago, your remote ancestors journeyed from the interior of Asia to the valley of the Yellow river and began the civilization which you know now.¹⁰ At a somewhat later time and apparently not very remote from the same region, the early ancestors of the Indo-European peoples, most of them, journeyed in a westerly direction to Europe and ultimately to America.¹¹ During all these intervening centuries, there has been considerable intercourse between these two races, more, indeed, as some scholars think to-day, than was formerly believed.¹² But however extensive those past relations were, they were almost as nothing when compared with the situation to-day. The East and the West are meeting in this present age as never before in the history of the world. You are studying western civilization just as we of the West are studying eastern civilization. You find things that are good and no doubt things that are bad, just as we find things good in your civilization and some things that seem to be bad. Both you of the East and we of the West need to evaluate what we find in a critical, but friendly spirit. As I have told my other students in the West to study you and upon the basis of their study to incorporate into their own ideal whatever

¹⁰ Moore, *History of Religions*, pp. 1-2.

¹¹ Cf. Breasted, *Ancient Times; A History of the Early World*, p. 171.

¹² Cf. Breasted, *op. cit.*, pp. 438, 462; Robinson, *History of Western Europe*, p. 347.

good things they find, so I suggest to you to study the West in the same way and to incorporate into your ideal, based fundamentally upon your own civilization, whatever good you find. In this way, both the East and the West will come to see "eye to eye, and face to face." Our ideals will grow to be more and more alike, and we shall be able, both East and West, to join forces in friendly coöperation for the greater welfare of the world as a whole.

VII

THE REALIZATION OF THE IDEAL

THE first lecture of this series was a kind of conjurer's hat, as perhaps some of you have already inferred. I have been able to take a number of ideas from it and to develop them somewhat at length in the succeeding lectures, in much the same way that a conjurer takes many wonderful things from a high silk hat, and the reason, too, has been about the same. The sleight-of-hand performer takes out of the hat what he put there in the first place, and I have been able to develop these various ideas from the first lecture, because I put them in there originally with a view to their utility later in the series as a whole. You may recall that I characterized the opening lecture as a kind of guiding thread for the entire course, and it has been that in a very true sense throughout our various discussions.

Now, among the other matters which I briefly called your attention to at that time and which I have developed more or less completely since, was the difference between a pure or theoretical science and an applied or practical science. I also suggested

that there is a similar difference between an ethical ideal and the realization of that ideal. An ideal, as I have been presenting it, is really a theoretical construct, a system of principles elicited in much the same way as the theoretical principles of any science, but if there were no practical application of those principles, our time would be wasted in the consideration of them. In the last two lectures, we dealt with the ideal on its more theoretical side, while to-day we have before us the problem of the realization of that ideal. This involves a consideration of the environment, both what we might call an ideal environment and the actual environment. Still further, within each of these there are physical and social features to which we shall need to address ourselves in turn.

I have hesitated not a little with reference to presenting even the suggestion of an ideal environment. There is so much of vagueness and uncertainty which lurks in the term at best, there is so little that is definite which we can command in our efforts to develop even the outlines of an ideal environment, and there is so little likelihood that any of us will ever live in the midst of wholly ideal conditions, that possibly our time would be spent better in some other way. None the less, a few words in this connection seem to be necessary.

And first, what might we say with reference to an ideal physical environment? This much, at any rate.

There is but the one world, that in which we are living, that constitutes the physical theater for our physical development. No matter what might or might not be true elsewhere in the universe, this particular planet is the field of our operations. There are, however, differences in healthfulness and general suitability for our individual needs in different parts of the world. If we were wholly free to choose, and I am assuming ideal conditions, we would go to that part of the world which might happen to be the best for us to live in. This would apparently be limited by the desire of others who might be cherishing the same ideal and who might wish to be in the same place. But, as we have already seen, people differ not a little, and the locality that might be best adapted to the needs of one might not be suitable for another. Consequently, while there would still be some limitations imposed by reason of others seeking the same place as ourselves, we need not consider that difficulty further. The best part of the world, from an hygienic angle, so far as we individually are concerned, is what we would seek for ourselves, provided we were wholly free to choose. Beyond this, however, I do not care to go. Every other consideration would constitute a limitation and bring us face to face with the actual environment, and that we shall discuss later. Let us turn, next, to the social elements within such an assumed ideal environment.

That there would be society of some sort, we can hardly question. Aristotle characterized man as a "social animal," and this has been assumed throughout the construction of the ideal. Then, too, I have laid emphasis upon altruism from the very beginning of our discussions, and social welfare has been the criterion for the admission of specific elements into the ideal. Outside of society altogether, off on some desert island, one could hardly expect to realize such an ideal as I have been developing. There would also be, very likely, family life. I have already indicated that the ideal takes the instincts up into itself, and one of these, as we saw early in this series, concerns the relations between the sexes. In no other way, it would seem, could such virtues as we have introduced into the ideal be realized to a greater degree than within the family circle. I have already spoken of the community as the unit of civilization, and in a very true sense we can regard the family as the unit of the community. There is a very vital relation between these two. The character of the life within the family determines very largely what the life of the larger unit will be. The really difficult question here is as to the kind of family.

When we survey social evolution, as historians and other students of society present it to us, we find two main types of the family. Of course there have been and are several other kinds, but these two stand out most prominently in the history of the race.

These are the matriarchal, as it is called, and the patriarchal.¹ The former is a misnomer. While the term means "the rule of the mother," actually it designates that type of the family in which descent was reckoned on the mother's side. The rule, in so far as we might use that term at all, was in the hands of the mother's brothers and other male relatives. The general features of this kind of family were as follows: A woman, when she married, did not go to a new home which her husband had provided for her, nor did she go to his father's home. On the contrary, she remained in her own old home. Her husband lived with her for a longer or shorter period and then went away, perhaps to return later, and perhaps not. The children were cared for by the mother and her male relatives. They took the mother's name, and property descended to them through their mother.

There are not a few traces of this kind of family in literature and in customs surviving until the present day. In the German folklore, we often read of a gay young prince who leaves home to see the world. Sooner or later he meets a charming princess, and since they are mutually pleased, they marry, but live at her home. Not infrequently, the new husband succeeds his wife's father as ruler of that city

¹ Bachofen, *Das Mutterrecht*, Preface and Introduction; Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, 1st Ed., Pt. I, pp. 160-161; Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 94.

or country. A suggestion of the same sort, too, comes to us from the literature of the Hebrews. Jacob went back to the land of Ur of the Chaldees to obtain a wife. In fact, he gained two, but he lived for many years at their father's home. This entire story represents a transition stage from the one main type to the other, but there is an unmistakable trace of the earlier type present in it. I also understand that there are some traces of the same sort here in China, while over in Japan the evidences are still more convincing. In Japan, as is well known, if there happens to be no son in the family, the parents try to induce some suitable young man to marry a daughter of the house, take her family name, and live at her home. In this way, the old family name will be preserved, and this seems to be the primary motive for the arrangement, but the suggestion of the matriarchal family may not be disregarded.² Similar traces are to be found elsewhere in the world. This is, as I said, one of the great types of the family, reaching back through the barbarous stage of social development even to the period of savagery.

The other type of the family, the patriarchal, is better known generally, and seems to have been fully developed before the dawn of history in a strict sense. As students of society tell us, the peoples who first emerged from barbarism and established a real civilization had the patriarchal type of the

² Hall, *Things Japanese*, 5th Ed., p. 312.

family, and it has persisted, with some modifications, until the present day.³ One of these modifications is the strict "pair-marriage," as the late Professor Sumner of Yale University termed it.⁴ This seems to be the mode of the family among civilized peoples, to use a statistical form of expression. This term means the unit in any investigation which occurs most frequently. While there has been much experimenting in this field in the past, and while there is not a little experimenting in our own day, beyond any question the "pair-marriage" has been and is the most frequent sort within civilized society, and we may not expect any very radical changes within the near future. I am not saying that this type is the absolutely best. It may be that what I have termed "experimenting" will yield some valuable new element or will result in the elimination of some feature long cherished, but because of what we may call social inertia that form which has been the mode for so long a time will continue as the leading type rather indefinitely.

Another problem, however, which we confront at this point is with reference to the children in such a family. We need to note that we are considering an ideal environment for the realization of such an ideal as I have been sketching during these several weeks. As I have said, there could hardly be a better environ-

³ Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, 1st Ed., Pt. I, p. 178.

⁴ *Folkways*, pp. 375-376.

ment for the realization of such virtues as I dwelt upon at the last hour than the family, and I meant the complete family. This would be especially true in the case of the parents themselves who might prize such an ideal, and some of its essential features could be fairly well inculcated in the lives of the children even in their earliest years. Each rising generation, then, would be well prepared along altruistic and social service lines to play a valuable part in the life of the community as a whole. But the vital question is with reference to the size of such a family. Students of society inform us that there should be three or four children, on the average, in each family, if the population is to be maintained and guaranteed a healthy growth. Many a family, however, has ten, twelve, or more children, while others have but one or two, or none. This minimum size of the family, if universal, would mean a diminishing population or the ultimate extinction of the community, while the larger number increases the economic burden almost beyond endurance and not infrequently is characterized by a consequent inferiority in quality. The ideal family, then, as the best environment for the realization of the ideal, would seem to be the one with the more nearly average number of children.

At this point, however, we are confronted with the fact that some individuals apparently feel so keenly the call to social service that they neglect entirely to establish a home for themselves. The various monks

and nuns of different religions in various parts of the world are of this sort. They forget, it would seem, that their plan enables them to minister only to their own generation. If they had developed an ideal family environment, they would be able to contribute as well to future generations. The actual conditions in America, to go no farther afield, are very instructive in this matter. One branch of the Church there permits its leading workers to establish homes for themselves. The number of prominent men and women who have developed from those homes is amazing. There have been and are eminent jurists, physicians, educators, literary men, and chief magistrates who have contributed an incalculable amount of good to the life of the nation as a whole. These people came from homes which would never have existed, if the other, the single generation, policy had been followed. Their value in the total life of the country can not be fully estimated.

Another kindred topic which we must notice in this connection is the childless home. Not infrequently the home is established, but children do not appear to complete the ideal, and the reason would seem to be design. This introduces us to the problem of "race suicide," as it is called. Of course, no precise rules may be laid down in such a matter, but an attitude of antagonism to the presence of children in the home would seem to be reprehensible. Every individual in the community enjoys to a cer-

tain extent what others have toiled for and have risked life and health to obtain. Not to share in this labor, is to show one's self lacking in the sense of social responsibility. We may not say, as yet, what the final significance of life is, and since the race has progressed through much travail of mind and of body, but none the less has progressed, if the discussion in an earlier lecture was sound, it would seem as if the argument for a medium sized family of children is strong. In no other way can an ideal social environment for the realization of the ideal be secured.

What other organizations there might be in such an environment as we are dealing with here, it is hard to say. Very likely there would be a state. At first blush it might seem that if all the individuals in the community should cherish the kind of ideal that I have been developing, there would be no need of a state. We have already seen that as people become more highly civilized, the need of state interference in their daily mode of life diminishes. None the less, there are certain ends which individuals desire that can be obtained only through coöperation. We may not expect the state, therefore, to disappear altogether, but what its form would be we can not outline with any great definiteness. There have been many ideal states sketched throughout the past, but no one of them has ever been realized in every detail. The most famous one, without doubt, was the state

as conceived by Plato. The discussion at the beginning of his "Republic" is concerned with "righteousness" or "justice." In none of the existing states, the argument runs, could a righteous life be lived, but if there ever should be a state, such as Plato then proceeded to outline, its inhabitants could live just and righteous lives. The problem, as presented in that discussion, was practically the same as that we are facing in this part of the lecture. But no such state as Plato conceived ever existed, and perhaps there never will be. To speculate about an ideal of that sort is undoubtedly interesting, but we can hardly grasp the conditions of existence sufficiently to guarantee any close correlation between the form of the state, as we think it, and its realization. We might, of course, select elements from the various states that have existed in the past, and from those that exist to-day, and make a fusion in accordance with the principle followed in constructing the ethical ideal, but we could not even then be sure that an environment so conceived would prove to be the best. Very naturally we would assume that such would be the case. This specific problem, however, belongs properly in the field of political science. None the less, this much may be said. Since I have laid emphasis upon the autonomous type of ethics, it would seem as if that kind of state which should allow the maximum of individual freedom and initiative would come closest to furnishing the desirable

environment for the realization of our ideal, while any other form might prevent even the sketching of such an ideal.

What other organizations an ideal environment might possess, it is very difficult to say. In many actual communities throughout the past there have been religious organizations, and there are not a few in many parts of the world to-day. Many of these are known as churches. Whether such institutions would be necessary in an ideal community, we can not say in an absolute sense, but judging from the past, which alone may guide us, we may assume that they would be present. Institutions of this sort, when viewed historically, have exhibited a decidedly conservative character, and this has not been altogether without value. Every community, as I have indicated before, needs a conservative element in it, but if the members of a religious organization cherished individually the kind of ideal that I have been constructing, the character of that organization, taken as a whole, would probably not be extremely conservative. None the less, we should not assume that it would be necessarily excessively radical. The rational element in our ideal would preclude that. Such a lack of conservatism, however, might not be the best thing for the community, unless some other agency within its limits should function as the necessary balance wheel. In the West, the law is generally rather conservative and might be a sufficient brake

upon radical tendencies. At any rate, there would be little reason to lament, if religious organizations, as factors contributing to a presumably ideal environment, should be somewhat less conservative than in the past. The deficiency would undoubtedly be made good in some other way.

With reference to still other organizations in an ideal community, I do not care to take the time to speculate. That there would be not a few, I think entirely probable. In the analysis of a typical community, presented in the third lecture of this series, we saw that there were many organizations, and I suspect that even in an ideal society most of them would be necessary, although they would be modified not a little, if practically all the people cherished the ethical ideal which I have outlined. But further speculation would not be worth while. As I said in the first place, there is so much vagueness attending our thought when we try to determine the specific elements in an ideal environment, that we would better turn without more delay to a consideration of the actual environment within which alone we may hope to realize so much of the ideal as we shall ever know.

Here, as in the preceding discussion, we must deal with the physical elements in the environment, and also with the social relations. When, then, we consider the physical side, we must ask ourselves to what extent it is favorable for our own physical well be-

ing. To neglect to make ourselves acquainted with the dangers that may lurk there is to fail in a proper valuation of human life. If, after investigation, we become convinced that our actual environment is not suited to our needs, then we should move. If it is impossible for us to move, then we should seek to apply all the resources of science to improve the conditions. Almost any part of the world may be made habitable for men through the application of scientific research. One of the most striking examples of this is the Panama Canal zone. Before the United States Government undertook the construction of that waterway, that region was regarded as one of the most unhealthful in the world, but by the liberal use of scientific knowledge it has become noted for its healthfulness. By using all the resources of science, we may live in the vicinity of the North Pole, beneath the surface of the ocean in the submarine, or fly through the air on the aeroplane. Almost any part of the world becomes habitable in this way. If, however, it is impossible for us to make a full application of science to our particular environment, we must expect nature to work out her rather harsh laws in our case. Of course, we may be exceptions, in the sense that we were mistaken in our survey of the situation, and in spite of the apparent unsuitability of the region where we live, we may continue to a ripe old age, but the possibility of our being exempt should not warp our judgment and influence our ac-

tion. It would be unethical for us to assume that attitude of mind. Not until we have rid the community where we live of all flies, mosquitoes, other harmful insects, and dangerous vermin of whatever sorts, could we feel that we had fulfilled our whole duty. If such a program should be absolutely impossible, then, and not till then, could we calmly let nature take her course.

With regard to the social features of our actual environment, we may assume that there would be a home, but it might be maimed. Father or mother or both might be dead, and some of the influences which might otherwise have facilitated the growth of those virtues which we have incorporated into our ideal would be lacking. Under such circumstances, however, a more intimate contact with the rest of society might be developed with perhaps an even more pronounced tendency toward social service. Or, again, the family might be broken through the action of the divorce court and the children be entrusted to one parent for all the time, or placed in charge of one parent for a part of the time, and of the other for the remainder of the time. Still again, the family might have come to honor within the community. The father or a brother might have done valiant service on the battlefield, or have lost his life in the defense of his country. In consequence of such distinguished service not a little honor would attach to that family. This might breed pride and an over-

valuation of one's importance instead of the modest estimate of one's self discussed at the last hour. Or, indeed, the reverse might be true. Some member of the family might commit a crime, and while in civilized lands we do not recognize the principle of collective responsibility, the social consciousness not infrequently burdens the culprit's family with not a little of his odium. Still further, the family might become rich overnight through some turn of Fortune's wheel, and in consequence relations become established which might not be favorable for the realization of the ideal in the form originally held, or, indeed, the reverse might be true in that the family, once in affluence, might be reduced to poverty and so be deprived of those associations which seemed to be essential factors for realizing the ideal. The state, too, in which one actually lives may not look with favor upon such a freely developing life, and one would, therefore, need to move to a more liberal community, or else struggle to change the existing political conditions, or, again, effect some more or less satisfactory *modus vivendi* with the "powers that be." The same, too, might be true of one's religious life. These, of course, are only a few of the features which constitute actual elements in the environment where those, who might cherish an ideal of the kind that I have been developing, live. What are the possibilities for ethical achievement within such limits?

It is in connection with actual conditions more or

less like these that there has developed at different times in the past what is technically known as casuistry. I do not care to discuss this at present in a strictly technical way. A few points, however, need consideration. In general, we may say that when in any community certain principles have been evolved which are regarded as absolute, and then, somewhat later, other principles are developed which seem to have an equal absoluteness, or, indeed, the environment has changed very decidedly, it becomes extremely difficult to determine how those principles may be reconciled with one another, or to what extent one may still hope to realize the ideal already cherished for a long time. To make the matter somewhat more concrete, let us consider a few typical examples.

A young man, we will say, in a country like the United States where the question of abstinence from alcoholic liquors is at the front, has advocated temperance and is known rather widely as a temperance worker. After the passage of a law against the liquor traffic in the town where he lives, the proprietor of the drug store in which he works decides to sell liquor quietly in violation of the law, and insists that this shall be a part of the young man's duties. We will assume, further, that the young man has a wife and several children to support. What should he do? Or, again, a member of the national legislature in some country where there is a liberal form of government has a bill which he wishes to have passed.

His constituents are anxious to have the measure become law, and if he does not succeed in getting it through, he probably will not be reëlected. To get the measure passed, however, he must agree to vote for another bill which he regards as vicious. What should he do? Or, consider the situation here in your own country in connection with the warfare against the opium trade. A mandate, we will say, has been sent from Peking to the governor of a province to suppress entirely the cultivation of the poppy. When, however, he attempts to obey, his former friends and the violent element in the community threaten his life. What should he do? I was reading recently what one such official actually did. He sent a notice throughout his county, calling upon all to obey the law, and declared that he would make a tour of inspection in June and if any one should be found with poppies in his possession he would be severely punished. But this particular governor knew very well, when he sent out the notice, that the poppy crop would be gathered and disposed of before the month of June.⁵ Yet again, we might assume that a woman has good reason for believing that her husband is untrue to her. She thinks of a divorce, but shrinks from the notoriety of a divorce suit. Then, too, there are her children. What should she do? These are but a few of the actual crises which

⁵ Ross, *The Changing Chinese*, p. 159.

come in the lives of real human beings. How may the ideal be dealt with under such circumstances?

The one suggestion which I wish to make is that on all occasions of stress we should think through the various aspects of our ideal anew. Much of our life goes on rather automatically, as many writers have pointed out. We make some great decision, or introduce some special element into our ideal, and then other lesser decisions or particular courses of conduct follow naturally. But there come, not infrequently, supreme crises which seem to tear everything up by the roots. There is our ideal, but over against it an actual situation which seems to make the ideal absolutely impossible of realization. What should we do then? On such occasions we should review our ideal with great care. It may be that some of the elements, introduced at an earlier time, are not so important as we at first thought. The absoluteness of some of them may have diminished with the broadening and deepening of our experiences. We may find that some of the elements may properly be eliminated or modified, and that is precisely what the rational principle, introduced into the ideal in our formal treatment of it, would dictate. It might be, however, that after a very thorough examination of all the features of the ideal we should find it impossible to make any modification. Under such circumstances, we should have to stand firm, even though it might involve the sacrifice of life itself. But what-

ever might be the result, a rigorous review of the ideal is the first essential step when we face a real crisis. Even though the outcome of our reflection should ultimately be judged wrong, we would have been right in our method.

Oftentimes, however, there have been people who have been more rigid with themselves than this discussion would imply. Unable to realize their ideal in its original fair proportions, because of changes in their circumstances, they have tended to beat their lives out in vain efforts to realize the unrealizable. Such a course is not in harmony with the rational element in the ideal, and it is also unethical through its lack of respect for life itself. Others under similar circumstances become discouraged and fail to realize the measure of success still open to them. A number of years ago, I heard Professor Simmel at the University of Berlin say, "When difficulties multiply about you, enlarge your ego and so overcome." That is good advice within certain limits, but sometimes the difficulties are too great, and a modification of the ideal rather than the "will to victory" is the rational course. The late Professor James of Harvard University gives an illustration in his little book on "The Will to Believe, etc.," which is in line with the advice of Professor Simmel. He suggests there the case of a man clambering over the mountains and ultimately reaching a ledge from which he can not return and beyond which he can not go be-

cause of a yawning chasm which he did not notice at first. What should he do? James says that if the man should say to himself, "That is a terribly wide chasm. I never jumped so far in my life. I am sure that I can not clear it, but it is my only chance and I might as well try," it is very likely that he would plunge to the bottom. If, however, he should measure the distance carefully with his eye and say, "That is certainly rather wide, but I always was a good jumper. I feel sure that I can clear it. It is my only chance but I think that I can make it," and then should gather himself for a great effort, the chances are that he would land on the other side.⁶ Now this is an interesting illustration and the main truth emphasized is good, but it is also true that if the chasm were really too wide, no matter how much a man might gird up his spirits with encouraging remarks, and even if he had the jumping ability of a kangaroo he could not clear the chasm. Under various difficult circumstances, then, as I have said, not a few people become absolutely discouraged and do not achieve what is still within their power. The ideal, as I have developed it, makes provision for such cases. There ought not to be any absolute discouragement. If certain elements in the ideal are no longer realizable, then emphasize other elements still within the limits of the ideal, or incorporate new elements and realize them to the extent possible. The best possible under

⁶P. 59. Not quoted *verbatim*.

the circumstances would be a fair brief interpretation of this ideal.

This does not mean, as some might infer, that the ideal, as developed, is mere opportunism. It is, indeed, somewhat opportunistic, but not unwarrantably so. An illustration from one of Emerson's essays fits this case very well.⁷ There we are told of a ship putting out to sea against a strong head wind. First in one direction it tacks and then in another, and the course seems exceedingly crooked. As the ship gets farther and farther away, however, the devious windings become less apparent and we become assured that the skipper is laying an approximately straight course for a definite goal. So when we re-interpret our ideal in a crisis and perhaps modify it, that does not mean complete opportunism. Far better to modify in this way and realize the modified form, than to realize nothing through complete discouragement or to waste one's life through attempting the impossible.

Not infrequently, too, the failure of one's individual hopes and plans, or the perception of such failure in the case of others, has led to that interpretation of the world which we call pessimism. This means that the world we live in is the worst possible world, which is a judgment which runs far beyond the evidence. We do not possess the material for such an absolute statement as to the nature of the world, any

⁷ *Self-Reliance*.

more than we have the material to assert that it is the best possible world, which would be optimism. We may say, however, that the world is becoming better. When we applied the several tests for social progress in the fourth lecture of this course, we found sufficient warrant for believing in the reality of progress. There has been both social and moral progress. Such actual betterment, it is maintained, points toward meliorism, a world-view less ambitious than either of the other two, but more in accord with the facts. We may contribute toward such betterment, as well as share in it, if we make proper use of the rational element in the ideal and modify it as the actual conditions seem to demand. If we find it impossible to make any modification, we may actually realize less, or eliminate ourselves altogether from the field of human activities.

Here, then, is the ethical ideal as I have developed it in the last two lectures. There is the formal aspect expressed by the term "a reason-controlled life," and there are the various elements which we consider as possible content. Here, too, are some suggestions with reference to the realization of such an ideal within an assumed ideal environment and some of the difficulties we often face within our actual environment. As I said a few moments ago, a fair interpretation of it in its entirety is the best possible under the circumstances. Difficulties should not lead to absolute discouragement, although they

may necessitate a change in some of the elements, nor should changes in our environment result in our breaking under the strain. Revaluation and perhaps modification in accordance with our fundamental rational principle should be our guiding thread. Thus interpreted, the ideal is capable of wide application and of a large, rich realization, although not always as we might have anticipated.

VIII

IMPLICATIONS AND RETROSPECT

TO-DAY we come to the end of our discussions together, for which I suspect that some of you are profoundly thankful. And I do not know that I blame you very much. It has been necessary in the development of some of our topics to introduce material that was more or less unfamiliar to some of you, and to use methods of thought for which some of you, perhaps, are not yet quite ready. None the less, I feel sure that many of you, if not all, will sooner or later become very expert in just such matters, and, indeed, will wrestle successfully with even more difficult and more abstruse subjects than these that I have tried to elucidate for you. If this should prove to be the case, and if, too, our work together should serve to prepare you somewhat for such mental activities, then our various discussions will not have been wholly in vain.

In the second lecture of the course, we sought especially the precise field of ethics, and, to aid us in our quest, we turned to the fields of philosophy and sociology to see what light those subjects might

throw upon our problem. In philosophy, we found that some writers bring all problems under four heads, and that one of these is designated "The Problem of Worth." Under this general topic, we found two sub-divisions, viz., ethics and religion. In the province of sociology, also, we found that all human activities may be put into four groups and that one of these groups provides for moral and religious activities. Such an intimate association of these two subjects, when viewed by leading thinkers in these two fields, suggests a close and vital relation between them. The same suggestion, too, is evident in a couple of definitions which I have picked up at different times. In one of the earlier lectures, I referred to Professor Höfding of the University of Copenhagen and his grouping of philosophical problems. He has also defined ethics as that which creates values, while religion conserves those values, and the late Professor Pfeiderer of the University of Berlin has said in one of his publications that "Religion contains the ideal ground of morality, and morality the real manifestation of religion."¹ That there is, therefore, a close relation between these two fields, we may not doubt. Thus far, I have not dwelt upon religion, for our main concern has been with ethics as such; nor may I now give an exhaustive treatment of

¹Höfding, *The Philosophy of Religion*, Tr. Meyer, pp. 6, 323, 374; Pfeiderer, *Philosophy and Development of Religion*, Vol. I, p. 66.

that subject, because of lack of time, if for no other reason. None the less, there are a few things that I wish to present so as to render our discussions as a whole somewhat more complete.

When the topic of religion is introduced, people are apt to do either of two things. They may shrug their shoulders and turn their backs upon the matter altogether, or they may become overearnest in their discussions. There is a saying in America that nothing will start a quarrel more quickly than to introduce the subject of politics or religion. I do not, however, care to quarrel with you. You are more numerous than I, and I am a stranger in a strange land, but there are a few things which grow rather naturally out of our various discussions during these several months, and which will add not a little, I suspect, to the value of our work as a whole. Still further, if we approach the subject in a scientific way, as I intend to, we shall keep cool enough, I think, to avoid any unpleasant features.

In the first lecture of this series, I said that one of the initial steps toward any definite science is analysis, and if we apply analysis to what we ordinarily call religion, we generally find at least four main aspects.² There is, first, a more or less definite world-view which constitutes the background for all the other features. Secondly, there is an attempt

² Cf. Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, Vol. II, p. 584.

made to solve some of the most serious problems of life from the angle of that background, such problems, indeed, as the origin of life and human destiny. Next, there is a greater or less manifestation of emotion, according to the temperament of the individual, in consequence of his satisfactory solution of his problems, and lastly, there are activities of one sort or another which the individual feels are expected from him by reason of the relation which he assumes exists between himself and his general world-view or background. This last point, of course, presents us at once with the field of ethics, and shows, too, how that subject is knit up with religion as a whole.

I may not, as is quite obvious, deal with all these matters in this last lecture, nor has it been my desire to do so, but the first of these elements of religion, the background or world-view, suggests the line of thought that I especially wish to pursue. But when we speak of world-views and backgrounds, we find ourselves within the precincts of philosophy.³ For a number of years, I have been accustomed to define philosophy as "the attempt to interpret one's experiences consistently," and I have frequently said, too, that "religion is an attempt to interpret one's experiences," but, historically, there has been less emphasis on consistency in this latter field. This for-

³ Since delivering these lectures, I have read Cornford's *From Religion to Philosophy* and have found myself in general agreement with his main thesis, although his detailed analysis was, of course, new to me.

mula, however, as is quite evident, applies particularly to the background. Still further, in dealing with this aspect of the subject, we shall find the same opposition between the individual consciousness and the social consciousness that I have already dwelt upon in connection with ethics. This will afford additional evidence of a close relation between religion as a whole and ethics, which alone gives us warrant for dealing with this subject at all in this series of lectures.

When we try to envisage a primitive community, we generally find that it was a comparatively homogeneous group, as I have suggested in another connection earlier in this course, and, usually, there was about the same interpretation of the world entertained by all in the group. Such a general view of the world, which was, of course, rather nebulous, constituted the background for the religious life of the people, in so far as they could be said to have a religion at all, and the serious problems of that community were solved with reference to it. Sooner or later, however, a different interpretation originated in the mind of some member of the group, and, if the new view were not so extremely different from the old that its originator would be expelled from the community, the opposition between the new and the old would gradually become less pronounced, until ultimately there would be more or less of a coalescence of the old and new into an old-new or new-old

world-view which would thus be a substitute background for the religious life of the entire community.⁴ Still later, some other new view might be developed and pass through a similar process of modification to coalescence with the modified old view, and thus become a new substitute background for the slowly developing religious life of the community. And such a process as this, all too hastily sketched, has gone on in various communities throughout the world and in various periods of the world's history.

Perhaps the best illustrations of this process are to be found in the changing conditions among the Greeks and in the variations evident throughout European history. In the early days among the Greeks, with which you are all more or less familiar, there

⁴The tendency of many writers to stress the oneness of thought and feeling in a primitive community I can not altogether accept. If we apply the principle of the Normal Curve to any early group, we would expect a half or more representing the majority view, but a quarter or less looking backward to what had been approved at an earlier time, while another quarter or less would be at least open-minded, to use a modern phrase, toward things that were new. The probable physiological development of the individuals in such a community would point toward this conclusion. It is highly improbable that there were no dull, sluggish, more or less ape-like individuals in the primitive community, and equally improbable that there were none who varied physiologically, and in particular neurologically, in the direction of a higher type. This principle is being applied to school children to-day with surprisingly rich results. We should not fail to use it in our attempt to understand primitive society. Cf. the references indicating variation on page 67.

were the gods who were assumed to live on Mt. Olympus, and the Greeks' thought with reference to them was knit up with a particular interpretation of the world. As the centuries passed, however, the views entertained with reference to the world and the deities changed very considerably. Æschylus, we find, maintained that the supreme deity no longer lived on Olympus. In this poet's thought, deity had grown until he was conceived of as ruling the entire world.⁵ Indeed, the deity filled the heaven of heavens and merely allowed himself to be called Zeus. Still later, there were the wide-ranging views of Plato and Aristotle, who first developed the conception of an immaterial deity.⁶ There was a vast difference between the earlier and the later views, but the old views entertained by the early religionists became modified somewhat, while the later philosophic thought made at least some provision for the earlier religious life. Later still, the world-view known as neo-Platonism, which developed in the third and fourth centuries A. D., took up into itself most of the best elements worked out by the earlier Greeks and gradually became the background or framework for the religion which gained the dominance in the European world. Still further, in the period of the Renaissance and in so-called modern times, there have been many new world-views developed which have been

⁵ Botsford, *A History of Greece*, p. 160.

⁶ Moore, *History of Religions*, p. 501.

used by their authors, or by others more interested in this phase of the problem, as substitutes for the older background of the religious life. And at the present day, there is not a little confusion of thought in consequence of the variety of world-views and the modifications taking place, which aim, at least some of them do, at securing a consistent background for the religious life. But I must not follow out this line of thought any farther.

It must be evident to all, however, that the conception of deity, as already hinted, is closely bound up with a world-view. Here, too, throughout the past, there has been a great variety of thinking, and not a little opposition, too, has been evident between the individual consciousness and the social consciousness. Generally, in this field, men's minds have tended in two opposite directions. They have either thought of deity in a very general way, as widely extended, pure being, unlimited, eternal, all powerful, vast, filling the entire world, and in various other similar ways, or they have tended to particularize him and to conceive of him under the form of man. In primitive times, this was very frequent and has come to be known as anthropomorphism, i.e., conceiving deity according to human form. This tendency, however, has not been confined to the earliest times, nor to any one part of the world, for we find it among the Greeks, among the Jews, among the Buddhists, and even here among yourselves. In fact,

you have both tendencies in evidence here. Your great deity is Heaven, stretching far and wide, sometimes regarded in an impersonal way and sometimes in a personal way. But it was also customary in the days of the Empire to conceive of each emperor of the reigning dynasty as taking a place beside Heaven and Earth when they had ceased to rule here. Still further, no longer ago than in 1906, you elevated your great ethical teacher, Confucius, to a place of equality with Heaven and Earth.⁷ Here, then, you have both of these tendencies illustrated in connection with your own State religion. I may add, too, that this particularizing tendency comes closest to our work in the field of ethics.

But let us view the matter from yet another angle. Not infrequently in the past there has been a great deal of emphasis within religious circles upon the knowledge which the various worshipers possessed of deity. "We know, we know," has been the oft-recurring burden of their thought. Sometimes, indeed, it would seem as if they felt that they had described a circle about their deity and consequently knew him through and through. Far better is it, as it seems to me, to use the figure of the parabola. This curve sweeps down from the infinite stretches of space, and then sweeps away again into equally unknown regions. Only a part of this curve comes within the range of our experience. We know deity

⁷ Moore, *History of Religions*, pp. 22-24.

in part, perhaps we may say, but there is a great deal more that is beyond our ken. Or, to put the thought in still another form, we might say that men have been accustomed to put into their concept of deity the best that has been worked out in human life, and they still do the same thing, but whereas in the past that concept has all too frequently been assumed to be complete, we would do better to-day to make provision for a plus something, which the later, fuller experiences of the race might more nearly determine.

I suspect, however, that at this point some of you notice a similarity between what I have just said about the nature of a concept of deity and what I have said previously about the character of an ethical ideal. In our earlier work, I said that we form our ethical ideal by putting into our mental construct the various elements which make for social welfare, and here I have indicated that our concept of deity consists of the best wrought out in human life. These two statements mean practically the same on the content side, for what is most useful to social welfare may well be considered as the best kinds of activities that have been developed throughout the past. Possibly you say that this likeness is due to the fact that the same thinker has been busy with both fields of thought. This may be a sufficient explanation, but I am inclined to think that there is something more vital involved. But be that as it

may, another problem with reference to deity confronts us immediately, viz., as to whether there is any reality corresponding to the concept of deity, be that concept never more perfect than you or I might construct it. Among the ancient Greeks, there was the idea of a mermaid, which implied a creature with the head and face of a human being, but the body of a fish. They also easily conceived of a centaur which meant a creature with the body of a horse, but the head and shoulders of a man. But was there a real creature corresponding, actually existing in the external world? This, in its main features, is the problem with which the philosopher of Königsberg, Immanuel Kant, wrestled long and valiantly. I may not take you into all the mazes of his thought, but one or two of his conclusions are right in point.

Kant maintained that we never obtain any knowledge of Deity, and he was able to convince himself of the truth of this position by reason of his very precise definition of knowledge. None the less, he said that there are multitudes of people who are ready to stake their lives upon the reality of God's existence, and this, he declared, is far better than mere knowledge. Again he said, "I may not say that it is morally certain that God exists," but "I may say that I am morally certain that God exists."⁸ These two statements, at first glance, do not seem very far apart, but upon careful analysis we find

⁸ *Critique of Pure Reason*, Tr. Müller, p. 665.

that they are fundamentally different. There is a difference here like that which I pointed out in an earlier lecture between inductive and deductive thinking. As I indicated then, inductive thinking yields varying degrees of subjective assurance, while deductive gives an apparent absoluteness or finality to our thought. So with the philosopher Kant, in the statements just quoted, there is an evident leaning toward induction. To assert that God exists is to imply a demonstration, which Kant had previously shown was impossible, but he felt that he might claim a certain amount of subjective assurance with reference to such existence.

But let us go a step farther with the problem. Could Deity be less than humanity? What I mean is this: Could there be a real Deity for the human race who lacked such qualities as the race has slowly wrought out and has come to cherish? Just to raise the question is sufficient to elicit a denial. It might be argued, however, that Deity is so far on beyond humanity, has such superlative and transcendent qualities and virtues in Himself that the best wrought out in the history of the race is as nothing in comparison. The great leader of the Roman Church, Augustine, was wont to say that "all the virtues of the heathen are but splendid vices." In the same way we might assume that Deity is so superior to humanity, so different, that the best concept which the human mind can construct upon the basis of race

experience is totally inadequate. But again I raise the question, Could a Being of such a sort be Deity for the human race? Not infrequently in philosophical circles men argue as to whether we could ever know another world or universe which had no relation whatever to the one in which we live.⁹ The conclusion reached has generally been a negative one. In the same way I maintain that a Deity to be such for humanity must have in Himself the qualities and virtues men have developed and have come to value, no matter what additional attributes, to fill out the plus something, He might also possess.

But what is the upshot of such a discussion? Just this. I have indicated that there is a close relation between the ethical ideal which we form for ourselves and our concept of Deity, and if the discussion which I have just presented has any real force, and I think that it has, then whether we take the position of the religious man and seek to realize in ourselves such qualities as we conceive of in Deity, or whether we confine our attention to the ethical ideal, as some are inclined to do, and realize that to the fullest extent, we shall in either case be realizing Deity, and the only kind of Deity, too, that could be such for us. More than this, I have no time for at present.

Another rather important line of thought for us to consider in this connection is concerned with the

⁹ Cf. Marvin, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, pp. 270, 410.

conservation of values. I quoted, earlier in the hour, from Höffding to the effect that ethics creates values, while religion conserves those values, and the question naturally arises as to how completely values may be conserved.

There is the ideal with which we have been dealing during these several weeks, and there is the problem of realizing it as I discussed the matter at the last hour. But even though we might realize the ideal rather fully, how much of a permanent possession is it likely to be? Will the conservation of its values coincide simply with the span of our brief lifetime? In answer to such a question it is sometimes said that the values wrought out by one generation will be taken up by the next and so on indefinitely. We may believe, therefore, in a kind of race immortality, as it is called. But what about the conservation or preservation of values, in case our entire solar system should be resolved back into its original form? At this point, we touch again the problem of cosmic values to which I called your attention several weeks ago. If when the entire cycle, as it is called, is complete, there should be nothing left over, nothing permanent as a result, what could we say about the value of the entire process? Obviously, I can not deal with this problem adequately at this time. There are, however, two lines of argument that I wish to present briefly.

We may approach this problem from the angle of some of the most recent results in the field of physical-chemistry. Let us assume for the moment, if you will, that there was an original cosmic energy, which we will not try to define very rigidly, and let us assume, further, that there was a kind of differentiation or variation taking place in it. One of the results of that variation we will call matter, as that term is generally used, and we will say that another variation is what we ordinarily call organic matter. That there is a difference between these two is very evident, but what that difference is we may not say with certainty at present. Still further, let us assume that the life cycle of any bit of the organic matter results in the freeing of what we might call a finer energy from its contact with its coarser accompaniment. What remains is merely matter, and that, according to very recent physical discoveries, may perhaps be resolved back into the original coarse energy to undergo the process of variation again, to become organic matter and the finer energy be freed again, and so on, until we may at least think of the entire original coarse energy being completely transformed into the finer energy.¹⁰ There are difficulties with such a view, but I may not deal with them now.

¹⁰ For a view which has some elements in common with this which I have sketched, Cf. Bixby, *After Death—What?* in *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. CXXXVIII, p. 945.

There is, also, a likeness between this view and one worked out by the philosopher Schelling about a century ago.

According to Schelling, the great task that any philosopher faces is this: If he should start with the assumption that there was at first nothing but matter in the universe, how could he explain the presence of spirit later? Or, if he should begin with the view that originally there was nothing but spirit, how could he explain the existence of matter at a later time more or less closely correlated with it? Schelling's own solution of the puzzle was to assume that originally there was only slumbering spirit, not real matter and not real spirit, but that gradually this almost nameless something began to awake, and it is awake to the extent that the race is conscious to-day, and the goal of the process is for the entire universe to become awake. There would, therefore, no longer be even the semblance of matter in the universe, but all would be spirit.¹¹ Now, as I said, there are decided resemblances between this outline of Schelling's thought and the other view that I have so briefly sketched, but in that sketch I have tried to keep close to some of the newer, but apparently assured results of scientific investigations. I may not, how-

¹¹ Rand, *Modern Classical Philosophers*, pp. 536-537, 544, 560; Cf. Höffding, *History of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 165-166.

ever, dwell longer upon this suggestive treatment of our problem.

The other suggestion that I wish to give grows out of the problem of the rationality of the universe. If there be no conservation of values in this broad sense which we are now considering, then it would seem as if the universe were irrational at the core, but as a matter of fact the universe does not seem to be wholly irrational. It is good logic to say that the universe is either rational or irrational, and if the universe, in its inmost nature, were irrational, what could you and I do about it? Yesterday might be the day after to-morrow, or the North Pole might be parallel with the Equator, or various other absurdities might be true. But within the limits of our experience the universe does not seem to be entirely irrational.

We must consider at this point, however, the various meanings of the term rational. There are at least three which we can distinguish.¹² Rational may signify an ordered whole. When we look out upon the world, we find not a little that is suggestive of a cosmos rather than a chaos. The scientist assumes that this is true throughout, although this assumption runs far beyond our actual experience. It is a bit of scientific faith that is often referred to. But within the limits of our experience there certainly

¹² Cf. Cooley, *The Principles of Science*, pp. 203-217.

seems to be a real order. One of the best illustrations of this is furnished by the discovery of the planet Neptune. In 1845 and 1846 respectively, the astronomer Adams, an Englishman, and Leverrier, a Frenchman, reached the conclusion independently that the irregularities in the movements of the planet Uranus could not be explained except upon the hypothesis that there was another planet belonging to the system which no one had ever yet seen.¹³ Upon the basis of nice mathematical calculations, they then turned their telescopes toward a certain part of the heavens and found the new planet. And not merely once did they find it, which might have been an accident, but again and again, and they also instructed others how to find it. Certainly there would seem to be order in this part of the universe at least.

But rational may also mean the possession of reasoning powers. We may not be quite so ambitious as the ancients were who assumed a kind of reason which they thought permeated the entire universe and of which each individual possessed a portion, but we may say that there is reason of a certain sort in the universe, since we ourselves are a part of the universe and we do reason at least a little sometimes. To that extent, beyond any question, the universe is rational.

Still another interpretation of this term, when applied to the universe, is that there is meaning of some

¹³ Newcomb, *Popular Astronomy*, pp. 367-368.

sort in the universe within, at least, the limits of our experience, and this leads us to expect other meanings which are at present beyond our experience. This significance lies very near the first one. The scientist regards the universe as a fairly consistent series of coexistences and sequences. When we say that the universe is rational in the sense of an ordered whole, it is more the static, the coexistential aspect that is at the front, but when we say that it has meaning, it is more the dynamic, the sequential aspect with which we have to deal. There are happenings of many sorts, and from our observation of them we gather their meaning, that is, we understand within certain limits why they have occurred as they have and what results to expect.

Now the assumption of rationality in this last sense has been rather general in the race. Suppose every single individual in the primitive world had gone on the assumption that there was no meaning in the world. Is it likely that such an attitude of mind would have yielded the accumulation of knowledge which we possess to-day? If every individual from the earliest times to the present had actually thought that no explanation of events could possibly be given, from what source could knowledge have come? Of course, there might have been some accidental meanings obtained, as undoubtedly there were, but even these would have been of but little value to people who positively discounted any large, rich

meaning in the world by their general attitude. One of the best cases in point is that of the so-called Sceptics among the Greeks. They maintained that it is absolutely impossible to obtain any knowledge of the world, and one of the clearest evidences of their skepticism is their failure to make any addition to the store of human knowledge. Why should they have added anything, when they assumed that knowledge was impossible? The best refutation of their skepticism, however, is the vast accumulation of what we call knowledge from their day until the present.

Here, then, are the several connotations of the term rational, and it is this last one which is most important for our particular discussion. It is this one, too, which presents us with two alternative positions. It may be that values do not persist beyond the limits of an individual's own lifetime, or if they persist in the race, then not beyond the dissolution of our solar system. This would seem to make the universe irrational, in the sense of having no real meaning, in spite of a superficial rationality. But the accumulation of meanings which the centuries have brought makes it difficult to accept such a *reductio ad absurdum*. The growing volume of meanings would seem to point toward still other richer meanings, indeed, toward a universe full of meaning rather than toward a meaningless one. The former position tends to cut the nerve of hope and to paralyze all effort, while the latter is more of a

live wire. To assume that there is no meaning naturally results in our finding none, while to assume that there is meaning, even though we may not know what the meaning is, nerves us to supreme effort. On the one hand, we would stand facing a blank wall, while on the other we would find ourselves aligned with the race as it has struggled and achieved. I may not, however, dwell longer upon these themes.

At this point, I wish to give a brief résumé of our course as a whole. Several years ago, I heard of a rather prominent man who gave a lecture before a thousand or fifteen hundred young women in one of the large women's colleges in America. At the end of his address, as the story goes, he began and gave the entire lecture over again, evidently fascinated by his audience. I do not know that I could blame him very much, nor do I hesitate to admit that I, too, have been more or less fascinated by my audience here. But let me hasten to dispel any apprehensions you may feel. I do not intend to repeat the entire course in the few minutes that remain. It is quite obvious that that would be impossible. None the less, I do want to bring together into immediate relation some of the most important points which I have been developing, so that you may have a kind of bird's-eye view of the entire series.

In the first lecture, when we were getting somewhat

acquainted with one another, I called your attention to the distinction between autonomous and heteronomous ethics and said that my chief emphasis would be upon the former, and I think that I have fairly well fulfilled my promise. We also saw in the same lecture somewhat of the nature of science, and I indicated that the type of ethics that I was planning to present would have much in common with the scientific spirit at least. Furthermore, I suggested that I intended to make use of material from the fields of both philosophy and sociology. In the second lecture, we sought the precise field of ethics and found that fundamentally the subject is concerned with altruistic activities. I also gave a definition of ethics to the effect that it deals with those activities which are consciously directed toward social welfare. We saw, too, that the motive of conduct must be considered, if we are to remain true to the historical development of the subject. We then passed to a consideration in the third lecture of twofold morality. To appreciate this, it became necessary to analyze a community of four or five thousand people, and to consider, also, the opposition between the individual consciousness and the social consciousness. When this preliminary work was completed, it became evident that the topic referred to the older, more traditional morality in a community, and a newer sort due to the reflection of some individual or small group of individuals within the larger whole.

Such a divergence from the accepted views always involves an element of danger, but not infrequently those who take the step become pioneers in the field of morality. In the fourth lecture, we gave attention to the problem of progress. This, we saw, was threefold. There was cosmic progress, which we only glanced at, and social and moral progress. In social progress, we learned that we might use complexity as a test of higher in contrast with lower planes of civilization, just as the biologist uses such a test in his special field. Then, too, the growing valuation of human life and social control we found constitute especially important criteria. As to moral progress, we saw that practically every step toward what we call social progress was originally a moral issue, and that we have there but a further illustration of the opposition between the individual consciousness and the social consciousness.

When we had gained such a survey of the field as these lectures afforded, we passed, in the fifth and sixth, to a consideration of the ethical ideal as such, first on its formal side, and then in regard to its content. We dealt, somewhat in detail, with the three great ideals of the Greeks. There was the ideal of a life of pleasure on the one hand and a life of reason set over against it. The middle course of a reason-controlled life, developed by Plato and Aristotle, seemed by far the best. This seemed to receive confirmation, also, from the sociologist's emphasis upon

the rationally conscientious life. With reference to the content of the ideal, I suggested such a list of virtues as we get from Aristotle, the teaching of the Hebrews, the reflections of the Indian sages, and the moral precepts of your own great men, but all elements, I insisted, were to be tested by the principle of the social welfare on the whole and in the long run. Then in the lecture at the last hour, we considered the realization of the ideal, and saw some of the vagueness that attaches to the thought of an ideal environment and some of the difficulties which might interfere with our program in our actual environment. None the less, we should not permit ourselves to become discouraged overmuch, since, as I indicated, the best possible under the circumstances would be a fair estimate of what the ideal demands from us. Finally, in the first part of the hour today, I have tried, all too briefly, to indicate some of the larger reaches of thought which our various discussions imply. Science holds itself within rather narrow limits, and ethics, as a science, also remains within fairly determinable boundaries, but just as other sciences lead out into the wider fields of philosophy and metaphysics, so ethics has far-reaching implications. To deal with these adequately, however, would require much more time than we have at our disposal, and the body of thought would constitute an altogether different kind of course.

And now we are through. I wish, however, to ex-

press to you my appreciation of your good attendance, which, as I understand, was required, and to say that I hope that some of the discussions may linger with you for many a day, and be of real service to you in your individual lives.

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