



MANUAL
OF
SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY,
AND
CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

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PREFACE.

It is proper for me to state that this Manual is intended, first of all, for the use of students under my instruction; and that the brief treatment which is here given to many topics is only meant to prepare the way for ample discussion in the class-room.

This primary design of the book is also my apology for quoting several Latin sentences without translation; for re-translating a few passages of the New Testament; for giving in some instances the Greek original of an important word or clause; for referring to theological works in foreign languages; and for calling attention to published articles or minor treatises of my own, which exhibit a little more fully than does this Manual, the considerations that favor some of the views here presented.

The same circumstance has had more or less influence upon the manner in which certain difficult questions are treated; since my aim in teaching is to secure candid and thorough study on the part of those under my care, rather than to give them, in a dogmatic spirit, the results of my own investigation.

Whether a Manual of Theology and Ethics, prepared in this way, will be of any service to ministers of the gospel,

teachers of Bible-classes, or other thoughtful Christians, must depend in a great measure upon the care with which they examine the biblical passages referred to in the volume. For, if the work has any merit, this merit will be found in its orderly statement of the evidence which goes to prove that the Scriptures are a trustworthy revelation of the divine will; and in its orderly presentation of the blessed truths which are taught by the Scriptures. In other words, the treatment of nearly every topic is biblical, rather than philosophical, and will be found useful in proportion to the care with which the Bible is consulted.

ALVAH HOVEY.

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MANUAL OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

INTRODUCTION.

I. DEFINITIONS.

IN its primary and strict sense, *Theology* is the science of God; that is, an orderly exposition of the evidences of the existence and perfection of God. Used in this sense, it is the name of one Division of Systematic Theology, and is often called Theology Proper. But the term is also used as a substitute for the expression, Systematic Theology, and will be so employed in this Manual.¹

*Systematic Theology is a scientific exposition of the various doctrines of the Christian religion, showing their true character, their proper foundations, and their mutual inter-dependence.*²

It pre-supposes a knowledge of Biblical Theology; it includes Theology Proper and Apologetic Theology in part; and it provides materials for both Polemical and Comparative Theology.

Religion, equivalent to *religio*, from *relegere* or *religare*, is, *first*, piety, or a reverent and dutiful spirit towards God, manifested in conduct; and, *secondly*, the means by which this spirit is originated, sustained, and expressed, or the facts, principles, rites, and duties which are believed, observed,

¹ Suicer's "Thesaurus," sub voce *ἑσολογία*; Turretin (F.) "Theologia," &c. I. l. i. q. i.; Gerhard (J.) "Loci Theologici," I. Proem.; Fleming (W.) "Vocabulary of Philosophy," s. v. Theology; Herzog "Real-Encyklopädie," s. v. "Theologie;" Thomas Aquinas, "Summa," Pt. I. q. i. art. 2. "A Deo docetur, Deum docet, et ad Deum ducit."

² "Bib. Sac." I. 178-217, 332-367, 552-578, 726-735; "Am. Bib. Repos." for 1845, 457 sq.; "Chr. Rev." xx. 492-506; xxi. 66-82; Hagenbach (K. R.) "Theologische Encyklopädie;" Herzog "Real-Encyklopädie," s. v. "Dogmatik."

or performed by him who has this spirit. In the definition of systematic theology, given above, it has of course the second meaning.¹

Biblical Theology is used to signify a critical exposition of the religious doctrines taught by the successive writers of the Bible, or, in other words, a history of the development of religious doctrine among the Jews. It does not assume the inspiration of the Scriptures, nor the substantial unity of their teaching.²

Apologetic Theology is a scientific exposition of the evidences of Christianity. It pre-supposes a good knowledge of the Bible, and of the History of the Christian religion, if not of systematic theology. But it may be included in systematic theology, as defined above, since the "foundations" of belief in the doctrines of the Christian religion are to be examined in systematic theology.³

Polemical Theology is distinguished from Apologetic, by being, on the one hand, more aggressive, and, on the other, more denominational. It is not a defence of the Christian religion as a whole, but rather an attack upon certain alleged perversions of it.⁴

Comparative Theology is an exposition of the points of agreement and of difference between the great systems of religious belief and worship which prevail among men, with a

¹ Cicero (M. T.) "De Nat. Deor." ii. 28; Lactantius (F.) "Inst. Div." iv. 28; Müller (J. G.) in "Studien und Kritiken" for 1835; Herzog "Real-Encyclopädie," s. v. "Religion;" Bib. Sac. ix. 374-417; "Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie und Kirche," viii. S. 715 ff.; x. S. 718 ff.; xi. S. 254 ff.; Redsløb (G. M.) "Zur Etymologie des Wortes Religio," in St. u. Kr. 1841, 43.

² Herzog "Real-Encyk." s. v. ii. S. 219 sq.; Reuss (E.) "History of Christian Theology in the Apostolic Age;" Schmid (C. F.) "Theology of the N. T.;" Messner (H.) "Die Lehre der Apostel;" Weiss (B.) "Theologie des N. T.;" Oehler (G. F.) "Theology of the Old Test.;" Schultz (H.) "Alttestamentliche Theologie;" "Presby. Quarterly, and Princeton Rev." for 1877, 5 sq.

³ Ebrard (J. H. A.) "Apologetik, oder Wissenschaftliche Rechtfertigung des Christenthums;" and works noticed in Part Second.

⁴ All controversial works of Roman Catholics against Protestants, Pedobaptists against Baptists, Unitarians against Trinitarians, and *vice versa*, are embraced in this great branch of theology.

view to ascertaining their origin, credibility, and influence. This science is yet in its infancy.¹

In this treatise, all the doctrines of the Christian religion are supposed to be drawn from the Scriptures, and set forth in their logical order, so that they may stand before the mind as a system of religious truth. Yet many facts here put together are revealed but in part, and therefore their agreement with one another can be seen but in part. A perfect system presupposes perfect knowledge in him who describes it.

By limiting the doctrines of Christian Theology to those which are either plainly taught, or implied, by the Scriptures, we (*a*) pay suitable respect to the Word of God; (*b*) guard ourselves from the danger of interpreting that Word into harmony with our independent speculations; (*c*) habituate our minds to a method of discussing Christian doctrines, safe in itself and adapted to the pulpit; (*d*) obtain the clearest and deepest views of religious truth; and (*e*) derive the greatest spiritual benefit from our studies.

The possibility of showing the mutual consistency and inter-dependence of the doctrines of the Christian religion may be said to depend, still further, (*a*) upon their truth, for truth is always self-consistent; (*b*) upon the proportion of the revealed to the unrevealed doctrines of the system; (*c*) upon the clearness with which the connection between different parts of the system is revealed; and (*d*) upon the kind of affinity which exists between natural and revealed religion.

Some degree of prominence must be given to the special theological questions of the day, though it is necessary to guard against the mistake of supposing that the leading questions of to-day will be such to the end of time. One is more apt to lay undue stress upon that which now agitates society than to withhold from it fit attention.

¹ Clarke (J. F.) "The Ten Great Religions;" Moffat (J. C.) "A Comparative History of Religions;" Hardwick (C.) "Christ and other Masters;" Müller (Max) "Chips from a German Workshop;" Legge (J.) "The Chinese Classics;" Bigandet (P.) "The Life or Legend of Gaudama;" Johnson (S.) "Oriental Religions."

II. ASSUMPTIONS.

The normal action of the mind must be trusted. For a denial of the general veracity of our mental action nullifies itself; because we indorse the action by accepting the denial, since the denial itself is a mental act.¹

Evidence is that which tends to produce belief in the mind to which it is offered; unless it would be better to say, it is that which tends to produce knowledge or belief in the mind.

The value of evidence is always, therefore, to be measured by the power which it has to originate knowledge, or to produce belief in the mind of man. There is no other standard of its value known to mortals. Even God approaches men as those who can and must judge for themselves. He never demands faith without sufficient evidence.

Evidence may be divided into several classes, as that which is afforded (*a*) by primitive beliefs, judgments, and intuitions; (*b*) by distinct perception or recollection; and (*c*) by testimony or analogy.²

Probable evidence rests upon testimony or analogy. Some persons reduce these to one, namely, Analogy. But this is scarcely correct; for the human mind seems to be naturally pre-disposed to accept the testimony of a fellow-man.³

Probable evidence may be indubitable, satisfactory, or weak. Its force is determined by its effect on the mind, and is found to be of every degree, from just above zero to moral demonstration.

¹ Compare the remarks of Hamilton (W.) in "Philosophy of Common Sense," p. 21 sq. (Edition by Wight.)

² McCosh (J.) "Intuitions of the Human Mind." He speaks of Primitive Cognitions, as of Body, Spirit, Substance, Power; of Prim. Beliefs, as of Space, Time, The Infinite; and of Prim. Judgments, as to Identity or Difference, the Whole and its Parts, &c.

³ Gambier (J. E.) "Guide to the Study of Moral Evidence;" Butler (J.) "Analogy," Pt. II. 67 sq.; Hopkins (M.) "Lowell Lectures on the Evidences of Christianity," 23 sq.; Greenleaf (S.) "A Treatise on the Law of Evidence," Pt. I. cc. I., III., IV.; Jahrbücher, 1867, 583 sq.; Chlebes (W.) "Über das Verhältniss von Glauben und Wissen," in St. a. Kr. 1846, S. 905 ff.

As the judgment goes with the stronger probable evidence, so the conduct should obey the judgment and honor the evidence. Probability is the guide of life; and the soundest mind is the one that can best perceive the force of probable evidence.

III. CAUTIONS.

Human reason is finite, and therefore unable to comprehend what is infinite. Indeed, it is unable to comprehend in full many objects that are strictly finite, as, for example, the ocean.¹

Yet it can know, in part, that which is truly infinite as well as that which is indefinitely great. For a reality which is, in some respects, infinite and undefinable may be, in other respects, definable. Thus, an infinite mind may be known as mind; that is, as intelligent, voluntary, benevolent, &c., but not directly as infinite. It can be classified as mind, but not comprehended as unlimited in power, knowledge, benevolence.

Moreover, human reason may have convincing evidence that something infinite exists, though it has never comprehended the infinite; just as it may have convincing evidence that many things exist which, though not strictly infinite, are known to transcend human knowledge.

There is need of special caution in treating of the relations of the infinite and the finite; for one of the terms is never fully known. Consider, for example, the fact that two points in space, though but an inch apart, may be made to

¹ Mansel (H. L.) "Limits of Religious Thought," and "Philosophy of the Conditioned;" Spencer (H.) "First Principles of a New System of Philosophy," Pt. I.; McCosh (J.) "The Intuitions of the Human Mind;" Young (J.) "The Province of Reason;" Rogers (H.) "Reason and Faith," "The Eclipse of Faith," "Defence of the Eclipse of Faith;" Calderwood (H.) "Philosophy of the Infinite;" "Bib. Sac." VI. p. 673 sq.; "Am. Theol. Rev." for 1860, p. 1 sq.—both articles by Prof. H. B. Smith; "Am. Presb. Rev." for 1870, p. 1 sq., by Prof. H. N. Day; Boyle (R.) "On Things Above Reason," and "On the Veneration which Man's Intellect owes to God;" Hamilton (W.) "Philosophical Testimonies to the Limitation of our Knowledge from the Limitation of our Faculties" in "Phil. Discussions," p. 591 sq.

approach each other forever without meeting. Here finite distance is matched with infinite motion in time, and seems to be its equal. So, too, finite wills seem to act freely, and even capriciously, under an infinite will, yet without obstructing its action.

The study of theology is, throughout, a study of the relations of finite beings to an infinite Being; and therefore great caution is necessary. Better leave many blanks in the system than go beyond the warrant of facts.

IV. QUALIFICATIONS.

Mental: soundness of judgment and power of systematic thought. For the questions to be considered are numerous and difficult; the evidence to be weighed is manifold and easily perverted; and a mistake at one point is sure to bring in darkness or error at other points. Good sense, rather than genius, is needed in the study of theology.¹

Moral: fairness of mind and deep reverence for truth. The doctrines of the Bible should be examined with perfect candor. Indifference is impossible; but docility and a love of truth that overcomes prejudice are within the reach of every honest student. "Non pigebit me, sicubi haesito, quærere; nec pudebit, sicubi erro, discere. Quisque audit hoc vel legit, ubi pariter certus est, pergat mecum; ubi pariter hæsitat, quærat mecum; ubi errorem suum cognoscit, redeat ad me; ubi meum, revocet me." (Aug. De Trin. I, 2.)

Religious: faith, love, humility, docility, fruits of the presence of the Spirit of God in the soul. The importance of these is admitted by nearly all theologians. "The Scriptures," says Andrew Fuller, "exhibit a beauty and a life utterly incomprehensible to an unholy mind." "We must love divine things in order to know them," says Pascal. Says Bernard of Clairvaux, "Tantum Deus cognoscitur quantum

¹ Goddard (C.) "The Mental Condition necessary to due Inquiry into Religious Evidence;" "Duties of a Theologian," in "Bib. Repos." for 1839, p. 347 sq.

diligitur; orando facilius quam disputando et dignius Deus cognoscitur et invenitur;" and Anselm, "Credo ut intelligam" (cf. "Cur Deus Homo?" c. 25). See JOHN vii. 17; 1 COR. ii. 15; Ps. xxv. 9; cxix. 18.¹

Educational: knowledge of biblical interpretation and acquaintance with mental philosophy, with physical science, and with the history of religious thought. The first of these, interpretation, is far more important than either of the others. Hollaz mentions these conditions as pre-requisite to sound interpretation: (a) "Invocatio Dei, patris luminum; (b) Notitia idiomatis quo sacra Scriptura legitur; (c) Attenta consideratio phrasium, scopi, antecedentium et consequentium; (d) Depulsio præconceptarum opinionum et pravorum affectuum."

V. BENEFITS.

The study of theology ought to improve and satisfy the *mind* of the student. For the mind was made for the apprehension of truth as evidently as the lungs were made for the reception of air. Moreover, related truths belong to a system; they stand together and support each other. Hence a knowledge of their relations is required by the mind.²

Says Lücke: "I am of the opinion that the scientific interest which calls for systematic theology is for the most part different from that which calls for historical or critical theology. It is the systematic interest, and not the subordinate interest in the organic arrangement of given historical

¹ Edwards (B. B.) "Influence of Eminent Piety on the Intellectual Powers," in "Christian Rev." for 1840, p. 1 sq.; Luthardt (C. E.) "Die Lehre vom freien Willen," S. 388 sq.; Augustini (A.) Opera, Vol. II. p. 453, ep. 120, ed. J. P. Migne; Anselm "Cur Deus Homo," I. 2; Leathes (S.) "The Witness of the Old Test. to Christ," p. 140; Müller (J.) "The Christian Doctrine of Sin," I. p. 178 9.

² Shedd (W. G. T.) "The Method and Influence of Theological Studies," "Discourses and Essays," p. 7 sq.; Sears (B.) "An Educated Ministry," in "Chr. Rev.," Vol. XVIII. p. 567 sq.; Robinson (E. G.) "Doctrine and Life," in "Chr. Rev." for 1859, p. 161 sq.; Hovey (A.) "The Study of Doctrinal Theology Useful to Pastors," in "Chr. Rev." 1863, p. 646 sq.; "The Christian Pastor; his Work, and the Needful Preparation;" Chalmers (T.) "Institutes of Theology," I. p. 353 sq.; Bonifas "The Relative Value of Christian Doctrine," in "Theological Eclectic" for 1870; Wayland (F.) "The Apostolic Ministry."

material, the interest in so representing the doctrines of Christian faith and action in their absolute truth that all doubt and contradiction and internal incoherence of Christian thinking may vanish away."¹

It should also purify and protect the *conscience*. For the doctrines of Christianity are sacred: perversion of them is a great sin; and therefore no teacher can innocently neglect the best knowledge of them within his reach. To teach them positively, and so effectively, without doing violence to conscience, he must study them thoroughly, with the best helps within his reach.

It should, at the same time, deepen, as well as test, his *religious life*. Some of the truths, plainly taught in the Scriptures, and claiming the attention of a student of theology, are fitted to try his faith and humility severely. But, if he bears the trial, a great blessing follows. "Light is sown for the righteous." Christian knowledge is favorable to deep piety. Ignorance is not the mother of real devotion.

It should make his *preaching more truthful and comprehensive*. A man should preach what he intelligently believes. Beyond that he cannot go with safety to himself or to others. Not only in reaching the impenitent, but also and especially in edifying Christians, does a knowledge of theology serve a minister of the gospel.

It should both *augment and improve his influence over others for their good*. A minister's success is equal to the balance of good over evil in his influence, whether that influence be direct or indirect. A right, as well as a deep impression is to be made.²

¹ Nitzsch (C. I.) "Praktische Theologie," III. I. S. 90 sq.

² "Sunt qui scire volunt eo tantum fine ut sciant, et turpis curiositas est; et sunt qui scire volunt ut sciantur ipsi, et turpis vanitas est; et sunt item qui scire volunt ut scientiam suam vendant, verbi causâ, pro pecuniâ, pro honoribus, et turpis quæstus est. Sed sunt quoque qui scire volunt ut ædificent, et charitas est; et item qui scire volunt ut ædificentur, et prudentia est." Again: "Ut legeret intelligendi fecit cupiditas; ut intelligeret oratio impetravit; ut impetraret vitæ sanctitas promeruit. Sic cupiat, sic oret, sic vivat qui se proficere velit." St. Bernard, Sermo XXXVI. super Cant. p. 604.

VI. TOPICS.

- I. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.
- II. THE BIBLE FROM GOD.
- III. THE PERFECTION OF GOD.
- IV. THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
- V. THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
- VI. CHRISTIAN CHURCHES AND ORDINANCES.
- VII. THE DOCTRINE OF THE LAST THINGS.

Whether this arrangement of topics is the best possible must be left for the present undecided. Against it, one objection may be raised, to wit, that the first and third topics belong naturally together; but, in response, it may be said, that the second topic is in its place, because it presupposes the first, and is pre-supposed by the third.

The arrangement of topics given above is practically followed by nearly all theologians, and is adopted formally by many; for example, Turretin, Hodge, Müller, Wardlaw, and others.

Calvin, Marheinecke, Martensen, and others, regard all Christian truth as embraced in the Doctrines of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The baptismal formula, and the early creeds may have suggested this view; but it gives no suitable and sufficient place to Anthropology.

Liebner, Thomasius, Fuller, and others, would have the person and work of Christ embrace all Christian truth. This view, however, tends to subordinate unduly the work of the Father and of the Holy Spirit, and to make the incarnation of the Word indispensable, even apart from sin.

Oosterzee and, partly, Augustine, make the Kingdom of God the ruling idea of all theological truth. I. God: The King. II. Man: The Subject. III. Christ: The Founder of the Kingdom. IV. Redemption: The Character of the Kingdom. V. The Way of Salvation: The Law of the Kingdom. VI. The Church: Its Training School. VII. The Completion of the Kingdom.

Hase, in "Hutterus Redivivus," makes Reconciliation, through Christ, the regulative idea. I. The Sources: Bible (and Nature). II. The Object: God. III. The Subject: Man. IV. The Means: Christ, &c. V. The Result: Reconciliation.

VII. WRITERS ON SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

The following contains the names of a few men who discussed particular doctrines only; but most of those mentioned treated in their works of all the doctrines which they included in theology.

1. ATHANASIUS was born in Alexandria about A.D. 300, and died there in A.D. 373.

His doctrinal writings are the following: 1. A Discourse respecting the Incarnation and the Logos. 2. An Exposition of his Faith in the Trinity. 3. A Letter on the Decrees of the Nicene Council. 4. A Letter on the Doctrine of Dionysius, Bishop of Alexandria. 5. Four Orations against the Arians. 6. A Letter to Serapion. 7. Another to Epictetus; and 8. A Treatise, in two books, against Apollinaris. All these works relate to the Divinity of Christ, or to the doctrine of the Trinity, in some of its aspects. Athanasius is a clear, logical, and earnest writer. No one of the Greek fathers is worthy of so careful study as a theologian.

2. AUGUSTINE was born Nov. 13, 353, and died Aug. 26, 430. His doctrinal works are very numerous; and, apart from his *De Civitate Dei*, a work even more comprehensive and doctrinal than Edwards's "History of Redemption," may be arranged in three classes. 1. Those which relate to the Trinity, in opposition to the Arians and Manichæans. 2. Those which relate to Anthropology, in opposition to the Pelagians; and, 3. Those which relate to the polity and purity of the Church in opposition to the Donatists.

These works evince fair scholarship, great depth and acuteness of thought, a vigorous imagination, and oftentimes fervid piety.

3. JOHN of DAMASCUS was born somewhat prior to A.D. 700, at Damascus. The time of his death is unknown; but it was between A.D. 754 and 787.

His principal Treatise was entitled, "An Exposition of the Orthodox Faith." It is the earliest work on systematic theology, but not strictly original. It is composed largely of quotations from the fathers of the Church, with connecting and explanatory remarks.

4. ANSELM of CANTERBURY was born in A.D. 1033, at Aosta, of Piedmont, and died A.D. 1109.

His theological writings were as follows: 1. *Monologium de Divinitatis essentia.* 2. *Proslogion de Dei existentia.*¹ 3. *De fide Trinitatis et de incarnatione Verbi.* 4. *Cur Deus Homo?*² The second contains his famous *a priori* demonstration of the existence of God, and the fourth is the earliest elaborate statement of the *commercial* theory of the Atonement.

5. PETER of LOMBARDY was born near Novara, in Lombardy, about A.D. 1100, and died, according to some authorities, in A.D. 1160; according to others, in A.D. 1164. His great work in theology was entitled *Sententiarum Libri Quatuor*. It resembles somewhat the Treatise of John of Damascus, but evinces much greater acuteness. It quotes from the fathers, and attempts to reconcile their conflicting views.

"The Sentences" was for a long time used as a text-book on theology in Catholic universities. Teachers lectured upon it, as they did on the works of Aristotle.

6. THOMAS AQUINAS was born in A.D. 1227, at Aquino, in Campania, and died in A.D. 1274. His principal work was entitled *Summa Theologica*, and divided into three parts. In Part First, he treats of the Being and Attributes of God, of Predestination, Providence, and the Trinity; of Angels; of the Creation of our World; and of Man,—his nature, primitive state, the origin of evil, free will, the penalty of sin, &c.

¹ Translated in the "Bib. Sacra," Vol. VIII.

² Translated in the "Bib. Sacra," Vol. XI, XII.

In Part Second, he treats of the powers of the human soul, the nature and extent of moral law, and indeed of all questions in Christian Ethics. In Part Third, he treats of the Person and Work of Christ, and of the Sacraments. Aquinas belonged to the Augustinian school of theologians.

7. MELANCTHON (P.) was born at Brettin, in Baden, Feb. 16, 1497; spent most of his life at Wittenberg, as professor in the University, and died April 19, 1560. His chief theological work was entitled *Loci Communes*. It grew out of lectures on the Epistle to the Romans; and passing lightly over the doctrines of God, the Trinity, the Creation, and the Person of Christ,—doctrines which had hitherto occupied the principal place in systematic theology,—he gave the body of his work to the doctrine of Redemption. Depravity, the will, regeneration, justification, and similar themes, were fully discussed. In the first edition, he reproduced the Augustinian system; but he afterwards adopted a substantially Arminian view.

8. CALVIN (J.) was born in Picardy, at Noyon, July 10, 1509, and died in Geneva, May 19, 1564.

His commentaries are theological as well as exegetical. But he also wrote a treatise on Christian Doctrine, entitled *Institutio Christianæ Religionis*. The great features of his system are well understood.

9. HUTTER (L.) was born in January, 1563, at Nellingen, near Ulm, and died at Wittenberg, Oct. 23, 1616.

His theological works are the following: 1. *Libri Christianæ Concordiæ Explicatio*. 2. *Compendium locorum Theologicorum*, to take the place of Melancthon's *Loci Communes*, on account of the "crypto—Calvinism" of the latter.¹ *Loci Communes Theologici*, more copious than the preceding. All these are Lutheran authorities.

10. GERHARD (J.) was born at Quedlinburg, Oct. 17, 1582, and died at Jena, Aug. 20, 1637.

His theological works are: 1. *Doctrina Catholica et Evan-*

¹ Reproduced by Hase, "Hutterus Redivivus," translated into English, and published in Philadelphia, 1868.

gelica, 3 vols. 2. *Loci Communes Theologici*, 9 vols. This work may be considered a thesaurus of Lutheran theology.

11. GROTIUS (H.) was born at Delft, in Holland, in 1553, passed most of his life in Holland and France, was a very distinguished scholar and writer, and died Aug. 29, 1645.

Two of his works deserve notice. 1. His treatise, *De veritate Religionis Christianæ*, a comprehensive and learned treatise on the truth of Christianity; and, 2, his *Defensio fidei Catholicæ de satisfactione Christi adversus F. Socinum*. The Grotian theory of the Atonement is nearly equivalent to what is now called the Rectoral view. Grotius was a decided Arminian.

12. EPISCOPIUS (S.) was born at Amsterdam, in January, 1583, where also he died in 1643.

His theological works were: 1. *Confessio seu declaratio sententiæ pastorum Remonstrantium*. 2. *Institutiones Theologicæ*, — lectures at Amsterdam, to his students. 3. *Responsio ad quæstiones Theologicas*, 64. Episcopus hesitated as to the divinity of Christ, and esteemed the doctrine of his supernatural birth of no consequence.

13. QUENSTEDT (J. A.) was born at Quedlinburg, in the year 1617, and died at Wittenberg, May 22, 1688.

His chief work was entitled, *Theologia Didactico-polemica, sive systema Theologicum*, in 2 vols. It is learned, comprehensive, logical, though less attractive in style than the work of Turretin.

14. TURRETIN (F.) was born in Geneva, Oct. 17, 1623, where also he died, Sept. 28, 1687.

His chief work is entitled, *Institutio Theologiæ Elencticæ*. The first two volumes are very able, and for the most part correct.

15. BUDDEUS (J. F.) was born at Anclam, June 25, 1667, and died at Jena, Nov. 19, 1729.

Of his writings we mention the following: 1. *Institutiones Theologiæ Moralis*. 2. *Theses de Atheismo et Superstitione*. 3. *Institutiones Theologiæ Dogmaticæ*, — a valuable treatise.

16. STAFFER (J. F.) was born at Brougg, in 1708, and died at Diesbach, of Berne, in 1775.

His theological works were: 1. *Institutiones Theologiæ Polemicæ*, five volumes. The first volume of this work is a masterpiece of its kind. 2. "Grounds of the True Religion," twelve volumes. 3. "Christian Ethics," six volumes. Some of these works are diffuse, but they all evince logical power.

17. MOSHEIM (J. L.) was born at Lubec, Oct. 9, 1694, and died at Göttingen, Sept. 9, 1755.

He is chiefly remembered as an Ecclesiastical historian; but he wrote also on systematic theology. 1. His "Ethics of the Holy Scriptures," in five volumes; and, 2, "Elements of Dogmatic Theology." The style of this latter work is remarkably perspicuous; and one who has but a slight knowledge of Latin can read it without difficulty.

18. MELCHIOR CANUS was born at Tarraco, Spain, about A.D. 1500, and died in 1560.

His chief theological work was entitled, *Loci Theologici*, in twelve books. It treats of the sources of Christian doctrines, namely, Scripture and Tradition, the Arrangement of these doctrines, and the proper Method of discussion.

19. BELLARMIN (R.) was born in Tuscany, Oct. 4, 1542, and died at Rome, Sept. 27, 1621.

His work, entitled, *Disputationes de Controversiis Christianæ fidei adv. hujus temporis hæreticos*, discusses all points then in debate between the Roman Catholics and the Protestants. It is not intentionally unjust to the Protestants; and it lays open the papal system without disguise.

20. JANSENIUS (O.) was born, Oct. 28, 1585, at Accoy, near Leerdam, North Holland, and died May 6, 1638.

His principal work was entitled, *Augustinus seu doctrina St. Augustini de humanæ naturæ sanitate, ægritudine, medicina, adversus Pelagianos, &c.* It is a work of great ability, and sets forth the Augustinian theology with precision and vigor. He is said to have read the writings of Augustine against the Pelagians twenty times, and the rest of his writings ten times through.

21. BUNYAN (J.) was born in 1628, at Elstow, near Bedford, and died Aug. 31, 1688.

Of his writings, the following may be mentioned as theological in substance, if not in form: 1. "Justification by an Imputed Righteousness." 2. "The Work of Christ as an Advocate." 3. "Saved by Grace." 4. "The Law and Grace unfolded." 5. "Some Gospel Truths opened; Divine and Human Nature of Christ." 6. "Defence of the Doctrine of Justification by Faith." 7. "Election and Reprobation."

22. GILL (J.) was born at Kettering, Nov. 23, 1697, and died at Horsleydown, Oct. 14, 1771. He is chiefly known as a commentator, and was very familiar with Rabbinical works. His "Body of Divinity" is a highly Calvinistic work, evincing considerable ability.

23. FULLER (A.) was born Feb. 6, 1754, at Wicken, and died at Kettering, May, 7, 1815.

His works, like those of Bunyan, are for the most part theological. The following, however, may be specified: 1. "Letters on Systematic Divinity." 2. "The Gospel its own Witness." 3. "The Gospel worthy of all Acceptation." 4. "The Calvinistic and Socinian Systems compared." 5. "Dialogues, &c., between Crispus and Gaius." 6. "Conversations between Peter, James, and John." The writings of Fuller are remarkably clear, discriminating, and sound.

24. DAGG (J. L.) "Manual of Theology and of Church Polity," a sound and useful work. The second part is especially valuable.

25. RIDGELY, THOMAS, was born in London, about A.D. 1667, and died March 27, 1734.

His chief work is entitled, "A Body of Divinity," &c., and consists of Lectures on the Assembly's Larger Catechism. It is carefully written, and evinces much ability and piety.

26. DICK (J.) was born in Aberdeen, Oct. 10, 1764, and died Jan. 25, 1833.

His "Theology" is a work of considerable value.

27. CHALMERS, THOMAS, was born in East Anstruther, a village of Fife, March 17, 1780, and died at Edinburgh, May 31, 1847.

Of his works, we may specify: 1. "Christian Revelation."

2. "Institutes of Theology." This latter work gives the matured views of Chalmers on theology.

28. EDWARDS (J.) was born at East Windsor, Ct., Oct. 5, 1703, and died at Princeton, N. J., March 22, 1758.

Of his numerous writings, we mention the following: 1. "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will." 2. "The Great Doctrine of Original Sin defended." 3. "The History of Redemption." 4. "Nature of True Virtue." 5. "Concerning Religious Affections." 6. "Qualifications for Full Communion in the Visible Church." Edwards is a very powerful writer; acute, exhaustive, spiritual.

29. BELLAMY, JOSEPH, was born at New Cheshire, Ct., in 1719, and died at Bethlehem, Ct., March 6, 1790.

Of his works, the following deserve special notice: 1. "True Religion Delineated." 2. "The Wisdom of God in the Permission of Sin" (four sermons). 3. "Theron, Paulinus, and Aspasio, on Love, Faith, Assurance," &c. Bellamy was a powerful preacher, a vigorous writer, and a sound theologian.

30. HOPKINS (S.) was born at Waterbury, Ct., Sept. 19, 1721, and died in Newport, R. I., Dec. 20, 1803.

His theological views are contained in a work entitled, "A System of Doctrines contained in Divine Revelation," &c. He was a clear thinker and able writer, though not an attractive preacher. Hopkinsianism.

31. WOODS (L.) His theological works are distinguished for good sense, great caution for the most part, and perspicuity of style.

32. FINNEY (C. G.) "Lectures on Systematic Theology," valuable for the view which they give of their author's opinions; but somewhat logical, dry, and wanting in references to Scripture.

33. TAYLOR (N. W.) 1. "Lectures on Moral Government." 2. "Revealed Theology." These volumes give, of course, a definite statement of Dr. Taylor's system. They are ably, though somewhat diffusely written.

34. BRECKINRIDGE (R. J.) "Christianity Objectively Con-

sidered, and Christianity Subjectively Considered." Old School; verbose, but not without vigor.

35. HODGE (A. A.) "Outlines of Theology," a compact exhibition of the Princeton theology.

36. BAIRD (E. J.) "The Elohim Revealed in the Creation and Redemption of Man." Augustinian.

37. WESLEY (J.) was born at Epworth, June 17, 1703, and died March 2, 1791.

The following works deserve examination: 1. "Predestination calmly Considered." 2. "Thoughts on Imputed Righteousness." 3. "What is an Arminian?" 4. "Serious Thoughts on the Perseverance of the Saints." 5. "Plain Account of Christian Perfection." 6. "A Treatise on Baptism." 7. "Doctrine of Original Sin."

The following may also be noted; some of them are of great ability:—

38. HODGE (C.) "Systematic Theology;" a comprehensive and able discussion of nearly all the topics belonging to Systematic Theology.

39. WARDLAW (R.) "Systematic Theology;" also an able and valuable work, distinguished for its reverent use of the Scriptures.

40. STORR and FLATT. "An Elementary Course of Biblical Theology."

41. VAN OOSTERZEE (J. J.) "Christian Dogmatics;" comprehensive and evangelical.

42. MARTENSEN (H.) "Christian Dogmatics;" fresh and interesting.

43. REUSS (E.) "History of Christian Theology in the Apostolic Age."

44. SCHMID (C. F.) "Biblical Theology of the New Testament."

45. WEISS (B.) "Lehrbuch der Biblischen Theologie des Neuen Testaments." Very useful.

46. MESSNER (H.) "Die Lehre der Apostel." Valuable.

47. OEHLER (G. F.) "Theology of the Old Testament."

48. SCHULTZ (H.) "Alttestamentliche Theologie."

49. THOMASIIUS (G.) "Christi Person und Werk."
50. PHILIPPI (F. A.) "Kirchliche Glaubenslehre."
51. SCHLEIERMACHER (F.) "Der Christliche Glaube."
52. EBRARD (J. H. A.) "Christliche Dogmatik." Reformed.
53. HEPPE (H.) "Die Dogmatik der Evangelisch-reformirten Kirche." Reformed.
54. LUTHARDT (C. E.) "Kompendium der Dogmatik." Brief and clear.
55. SCHENKEL (D.) "Die Christliche Dogmatik vom Standpunkte des Gewissens aus dargestellt."
56. BIEDERMANN (A. E.) "Christliche Dogmatik." Skeptical.
57. KAHNIS (K. A.) "Lutherische Dogmatik." Historical and Systematic.
58. HOFMANN (J. C. K.) "Der Schriftbeweis." Original.
59. PERRONE (J.) "Prælectiones Theologicæ." Catholic.
60. HEINRICH (J. B.) "Dogmatische Theologie," Catholic.
61. WINER (G. B.) "A Comparative View of the Doctrines and Confessions of the Various Communities of Christendom."
62. NIEMEYER (H. A.) *Collectio Confessionum in Ecclesiis Reformatis publicatarum.*
63. HASE (C. A.) *Libri Symbolici Ecclesiæ Evangelicæ.*
64. RICHTER (A. L.) *Canones et Decreta Concilii Tridentini.*
65. MÖHLER (J. A.) "Symbolism;" that is, of the Doctrines in controversy between Roman Catholics and Protestants.
66. GUERICKE (H. E. F.) "Allgemeine Christliche Symbolik," &c.
67. HOFMANN (R.) "Symbolik," &c.
68. DENZINGER (H.) *Encheiridion Symbolorum et Definitionum quæ de Rebus Fidei et Morum a Conciliis Occumenicis et Summis Pontificibus emanarunt.*

PART FIRST.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

THE word, God, is now used to denote a supreme Being, or Mind, — a Mind on which all other beings and things are dependent. The Perfection of this Being will be considered in Part Third, where the testimony of Scripture can be adduced with more effect. It is wiser to question Nature as to the existence of a supreme Being than as to the existence of a God who is absolutely perfect; for it is possible that Nature may not reveal to us the infinitely holy and benevolent God of the Bible as clearly as it does a supreme Mind; and it is certainly better to prove less than we might than to attempt proving more than we can.

Before considering the reasons which justify our belief in the existence of a supreme Being, it may be well to mention some of the leading forms of belief which are entertained by men who deny the existence of a personal God. It will not, however, be necessary to refute the arguments which they bring forward in support of their opinions; for this will be virtually done in stating the reasons for theism.¹

(1.) *Materialism.* To state the doctrine of materialism as its advocates would do at the present time may be difficult; but the following is an attempt: Matter is self-existent and the source of all things. Through the law of "natural selection," or of the "survival of the fittest," molecules that are centres of force, acting and reacting upon one another

¹ Hodge (C.) "Sys. Theol." pp. 245-334; Buchanan (J.) "On Atheism;" Laudenbach (F. C.) "Eine liberale Polemik gegen Atheismus;" Dabney (R. L.) "The Sensualistic Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century;" "Boston Lectures," 1870: "Christianity and Skepticism;" Rogers (H.) "The Eclipse of Faith;" "Defence of the Eclipse of Faith;" "Reason and Faith and Essays."

through the ages of eternity, have built the cosmos. Order, life, sensation, instinct, reason, conscience, devotion, are the products of atoms originally without life, order, or intelligence. Behold creatures infinitely wiser than their Creator!

(2.) *Pantheism*. If this word be interpreted strictly, it means that "the universe is God, and God is the universe." But this general statement has been explained by three distinct theories: (a) That of Materialistic Pantheism, which has been sufficiently described above. (b) That of Idealistic Pantheism, which supposes the all-including Entity to be spiritual. And (c) that of Dualistic Pantheism, which ascribes to the One and All both thought and extension.

With these theories in mind we proceed to consider the reasons which justify our belief in the existence of a supreme Mind, the cause of all other existence. For we believe with Christlieb, that "the idea of God develops itself (along with those of our own personality and the Cosmos) through contact with the outer world of *necessity*, from the inward predisposition of our mental and moral constitution."

The reasons which may be alleged in support of theism may be set forth in various ways; and the following propositions are given as one of these ways, and one that is suggested by the habits of scientific men at the present time:—

1. *It is more reasonable to suppose that there is but one original and self-existent Being or Force, than to suppose that there are more than one.*

In support of this statement it may be remarked, (a) that the tendency of scientific speculation is towards unity of source for all things. Many students of Nature believe that source to be matter, including force; others believe it to be spirit, or intelligent force; and others still believe it to be something which possesses the properties of both matter and spirit. Prof. Huxley intimates that "the existing world lay potentially in the cosmic vapor; and that a sufficient intelligence could, from a knowledge of the properties of the molecules of that vapor, have predicted, say the state of the Fauna of Britain in 1869, with as much certainty as one can

say what will happen to the vapor of the breath in a cold winter's day." ¹ Mr. Wallace (A. R.) holds that "the whole universe is not merely dependent on, but actually *is*, the *Will* of higher intelligences, or one supreme Intelligence." ² And Stuart (B.) says, "The one substance, with two sets of properties,—two sides, the physical and the mental, a *double-faced unity*,—would appear to comply with all the exigencies of the case, not confounding the persons nor dividing the substance." ³

(b) That the tendency of philosophical and religious thought is also towards unity of source for all things. All pantheistic theories illustrate this tendency, that of Spinoza in particular. Says Romanes (G. J.), "Just as we are by the laws of thought compelled to lodge the attribute of self-existence somewhere, so we are by the same laws precluded from lodging it in more than one substance." ⁴ Even Dr. Hickok, in his "Rational Cosmology," seems on the verge of Pantheism, so completely does he resolve everything into force, and force into the action of God. Still, it would be unjust not to add, that he is positively a theist instead of a pantheist. And Herbert Spencer uses the following language: "We are no more able to form a circumscribed idea of Cause than of Space or Time; and we are consequently obliged to think of the Cause which transcends the limits of our thought, as positive though indefinite. Just in the same manner that, in conceiving any bounded space, there arises the nascent consciousness of space outside the bounds; so, when we think of any definite cause, there arises a nascent consciousness of a cause behind it; and in the one case, as in the other, this nascent consciousness is in substance like that which suggests it, though without form. The momentum of thought inevitably carries us beyond conditioned ex-

¹ Hodge (C.) "Syst. Theol." I. p. 281.

² Wallace (A. R.) "Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection," p. 368.

³ This language ought perhaps to be accredited to Prof. Bain, though it is adopted by Stuart.

⁴ "Christian Prayer and General Laws," p. 113.

istence to unconditioned existence; and this ever persists in us, as the body of a thought to which we can give no shape." ("First Principles," p. 93, cf. JOB, iv. 12 sq).

2. *It is more reasonable to suppose that Matter is a product of Mind than to suppose that Mind is a product of Matter.*

For (a) mind is known to be a self-acting force, while matter is not. Mind can be said to originate motion, while matter can only receive and transmit it.¹ We admit that mind is not known by consciousness to be, in the strict sense of the word, *creative*; but it is known to be active: and primary action is a sort of creation,— it is something *originated*.

(b) It is easier to believe that a higher principle originates a lower one than to believe that a lower principle or power originates a higher one. A free cause may produce what is less than itself; but it is difficult to think that any cause can originate what is greater than itself. A self-acting force may be supposed to put forth only a part of its energy, but not to put forth more energy than it actually possesses.

(c) To suppose matter, the one original and originating power, is to suppose an infinite series of changes in finite and dependent objects; and this is a supposition wholly unsatisfactory to reason. Says Prof. Whewell, "On the hypothesis of an infinite series, we pass from effect to cause, and from that to a higher cause, in search of something on which the mind can rest; but, if we do nothing but repeat this process, there is no use in it. Our question is not answered, but evaded. The mind cannot acquiesce in the destiny thus presented to it, of being referred from event to event along an interminable vista of causation and time: it takes refuge in the assumption of a *First Cause*, from an employment inconsistent with its own nature." (See Bib. Sac. VI. 613 sq.; VII. 613 sq.)

Moreover, the development hypothesis leads to another difficulty. If we suppose the universe to be uncreated and eternal in substance, and to be passing, by a constant pro-

¹ Ulrici (B.) "Gott und die Natur," S. 506 sq.; Princeton Theol. Essays, First Series, "Cause and Effect," p. 694 sq.

cess, however slow, from inanimate nature to animate, and from the lower forms of animal life to the higher, why has it not made *greater* progress? Or, if further progress is impossible, why was not the present stage reached *æons* before it was reached? The movement has been in a line, not in a circle; and each stage of it has required but a limited period of time, however long that limited period may have been. Hence, the periods requisite to bring the universe to its present stage of development must have been repeated a countless number of times in the eternity past; and we must have existed *æons* ago, as well as now.

3. *It is more reasonable to suppose that the wonderful order of the material universe is due to the action of a Supreme Mind than to suppose it due to the action of forces coöperating together without purpose.*¹

For (a) such order is what might be expected from the action of a supreme mind; since all that is known of mind leads us to think of it as able and likely to produce a cosmos, if it produced a universe at all. Any expansion or proof of this statement would be superfluous; for it is supported by the best of all evidence, that of consciousness; by the clearest of all knowledge, that of one's own mental action in one's most rational moments.

(b) The same cannot be said of matter. For it is not known to think or foresee or plan. It appears to be blind, unconscious, and without freedom, exercising its force with no reference to an order which it cannot appreciate, a beauty which it cannot admire, or a moral excellence which it can-

¹ Ulrici (B.) "Gott und die Natur," S. 505 sq.; Whewell (W.) "Astronomy and General Physics treated in Reference to Natural Theology;" Buckland (W.) "Geology and Mineralogy considered in Reference to Natural Theology;" Prout (W.) "Chemistry, Mineralogy, and the Function of Digestion considered in Reference to Natural Theology;" Babbage (C.) "The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise;" Trendelenburg (A.) "Logische Untersuchungen," Bd. II. "Der Zweck;" Spencer (H.) "First Principles of a New System of Philosophy;" Burr (E. F.) "Ecce Cælum" and "Pater Mundi;" Cooke (J. P.) "Religion and Chemistry;" Liefchild (J. R.) "The Higher Ministry of Nature viewed in the Light of Modern Science."

not love. If, therefore, its properties sometimes tend to order, instead of confusion, we spontaneously ask: How came it to have these properties, together with the motion necessary to secure their working toward a desirable end? In other words, so far as it is known to us, matter is not rational, and cannot be supposed to obey the laws of reason, unless it is under the control of an agent distinct from itself.

Hence, it is not surprising that the writers of Genesis, of Job, of the nineteenth Psalm, and of the Epistle to the Romans, attributed the order of the cosmos to a supreme Being. Many pagan philosophers did the same. Says Thomas Aquinas, "We see that some things without knowledge, to wit, natural bodies, work toward an end; for either always or generally, they operate in the same way to secure that which is best. And from this it is evident that they come to that end, not by accident, but by intention. But things without knowledge do not tend towards an end, unless they are directed by some one who has knowledge, as an arrow by the archer. There is, then, some intelligent being by whom all natural objects are arranged with a view to some end; and this being we call God." Trendelenburg remarks, "that, so far as design is realized in the world, thought, as its ground, has preceded it."¹ The same view is defended by Sir William Hamilton, who maintains, that, in the order of nature, final causes precede efficient causes.

But against it an objection has been raised, namely, that there are some things in the cosmos which appear to work evil, rather than good; and these are best accounted for by supposing the universe to be a result of the action or interaction of blind forces.

In reply to this, it may be said, 1, That, on the whole, a *maximum* of good with a *minimum* of evil, is secured by the order which prevails in the cosmos. 2. That many things which at first sight appear to result in evil are found, upon further examination, to bring to pass more good than evil.

¹ "Summa," I. 2; "Logische Untersuchungen," II. 28.

3. That the known sinfulness of man is to be taken into account as a modifying circumstance, not only as working evil, but as calling for punishment. And, 4, that, as human intelligence increases, the adaptation of all things in Nature to some good end is likely to be regarded as more and more probable.

4. *It is more reasonable to suppose that the vegetable world is a product of Mind, organizing Matter, than to suppose it a product of Matter organizing itself.*¹

It is admitted by all, that the existence of vegetables was preceded by that of inorganic matter, and that the appearance of the former constituted an era in the history of the world. But how was this new and higher kind of being originated?

If the cosmos was created by a Supreme Intelligence, there is no difficulty in accounting for the introduction of mundane Flora as soon as the world was in a condition to perpetuate the same. But if protoplasm is a result of chemical action; if the phenomena of vegetable structure and growth are due to fortuitous combinations of lifeless molecules, it is surprising that these combinations happened to take place at the very juncture which called for them.

Should one suggest that they may have taken place before, but had perished for want of a suitable habitat, we reply that they appear to have a suitable habitat now, yet there is no evidence of their taking place. In fact, spontaneous generation has never been proved, and the best physicists do not think that it ever will be proved.

Matter, it has been said, is measured by weight; energy by work; and intelligence by adaptation. But neither weight nor work is sufficient to account for the vegetable world:

¹ Roget (P. M.) "Animal and Vegetable Physiology considered in Reference to Natural Theology;" McCosh and Dickie, "Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation;" Beale (I. S.) "Protoplasm; or, Life, Matter, and Mind;" also, "Theories of Life: their Influence on Religious Thought;" Sterling (J. H.) "As Regards Protoplasm in Relation to Prof. Huxley's "Essay on the Physical Basis of Life."

for in it are to be seen evidences of exquisite adaptation. Mind accounts for this adaptation; matter does not.

Three points are worthy of particular attention, namely: (a) The amazing difference between the phenomena of vegetable life and those of chemical action. (b) The fact, admitted by nearly all naturalists, that living organism is never born of that which is lifeless. And (c) that adaptation is manifest, not only in the time when vegetable life was originated, but also in the endlessly diversified forms which it displays.

5. *It is more reasonable to suppose that the animal world is a product of Mind imparting a higher organizing principle to vegetable elements, than to suppose it a product of vegetable forces acting alone.*¹

The transition from vegetable to animal life seems to us less marked than that from inorganic Nature to organic. Yet animal life must be pronounced different *in kind* from vegetable life. It affords indications of conscious feeling, if not of consecutive thought. In many of the nobler animals, a certain kind of intelligence is manifested; very different, indeed, from that possessed by man, yet worthy of admiration as compared with floral life. Taken as a whole, the Fauna which inhabit this earth have an existence far richer and more varied than that of vegetables,—so much higher, it may be truly said, that we can pronounce the latter to be related to the former as means are related to ends.

The argument for design in Nature can be studied with great advantage in the structure of the numberless varieties of animals that fill the earth. For (a) the particular organs of every animal are adapted to one another; so that from a single bone of an unknown animal its entire construction and

¹ Agassiz (L.) "Essay on Classification," &c.; Kirby (W.) "The Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God as manifested in the Creation of Animals;" Miller (H.) "Footprints of the Creator;" Durkheim (H.) "Théologie de la Nature;" Beale (L. S.) "Bioplasm: An Introduction to the Study of Physiology and Medicine," p. 207; Ragg (T.) "Creation's Testimony to its God;" Bib. Sac. XXXIII. pp. 448-493 "The Divine Method of Producing Living Species."

habits of life may sometimes be inferred. (b) The whole structure of an animal is adapted to the climate, soil, and products of the region to which it belongs. (c) The means of self-defence, self-preservation, and reproduction are adapted to the place where an animal is expected to live. Thus "the whole vegetable and animal world has been constructed on one comprehensive plan. As there is a relation of one organ of a given plant or animal to all others and to the whole, so the whole race of plants and the whole race of animals are related."¹

With reference to the evidences of design in the animal world, Prof. Agassiz says, "I know those who hold it to be very unscientific to believe that thinking is not something inherent in matter, and that there is an essential difference between inorganic and living and thinking beings. I shall not be prevented by any such pretensions of a false philosophy from expressing my conviction that, as long as it cannot be shown that matter or physical forces do actually reason, I shall consider any manifestation of thought as evidence of the existence of a thinking Being as the author of such thought, and shall look upon an intelligent and intelligible connection between the facts of Nature as direct proof of the existence of a thinking God, as certainly as man exhibits the power of thinking when he recognizes their natural relation."²

6. *It is more reasonable to suppose that man as a rational being is a product of Mind, giving a higher principle of life to animal being, than to suppose him a product of mere vital forces acting without reason.*³

¹ Hodge (C.) "Systematic Theology," I. p. 222.

² "Contributions to the Natural History of the United States," p. 10.

³ Hill (T.) Bib. Sac. XXXI. pp. 593-614; XXXII. 1-18; 303-319; Wright (G. F.) XXXIII. 657-694, "Objections to Darwinism and the Rejoinders of its Advocates;" Darwin (C.) "On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection," 6th ed.; "The Variation of Plants and Animals under Domestication;" "Descent of Man," 2d ed.; Lyell (C.) "Principles of Geology," 11th ed.; Dana (J. D.) "Manual of Geology," 2d ed.; Agassiz (L.) "Contributions to the Natural History of the United States," Vol. I.; Argyll (Duke of) "The Reign of Law;" "Primeval Man;" Art. in Contemporary Rev. Vol. XXVI. pp. 352-376;

If we look at human reason, and compare it with the intelligence of any other being on earth, the interval between the two will be found immeasurable. Much as may be said in praise of instinct or animal sagacity, it appears to be different in kind from the understanding of man; and the biblical narrative, which permits us to regard the physical nature of man as perhaps akin to that of other animals, is perfectly right in tracing his spiritual nature to a higher source. It cannot be fairly accounted for as a chance improvement on merely animal intelligence. Even the size of the human brain, and especially of that portion of it which seems to be the organ of reason, is so much greater than that of beings endowed with instinct merely, as to render any natural development of the one from the other extremely improbable.

No one can expect to set forth in words the whole difference between reason and instinct;¹ but this, at least, may be said, that reason is master of principles, of general concepts, and of language,—her most noble servant; while instinct is a stranger to all these: that reason is reflective, inventive, inquisitive, and ever growing; while instinct is perceptive, executive, and artistic, in a high degree, but within narrow limits: that reason seeks to explore the universe, and look into eternity in search of causes and motives; while instinct gives no sign of interest in anything much beyond the range of experience through sensation. Human reason may need the counsel which Raphael is represented as giving to Adam,—

“Solicit not thy thoughts with matters hid;
 Leave them to God above; Him serve and fear!
 Heaven is for thee too high
 To know what passes there. Be lowly wise;
 Think only what concerns thee and thy being;

Dawson (J. W.) “The Story of the Earth and Man;” “Nature and the Bible;” “North British Review,” Vol. XLVI. pp. 277–318; Southall (J. C.) “The Recent Origin of Man, as illustrated by Geology and the Modern Science of Prehistoric Archæology;” Dana (J. D.) “Man’s Zoölogical Position,” and “On Cephalization,” New Englander, 1867, p. 283 sq. and 495 sq.

¹ Chadbourne (P. A.) “Instinct in Animals and Men;” Paine (M.) “The Soul and Instinct;” Bascom (J.) “Instinct,” in the “Bib. Sacra” for 1871, p. 654 sq.

Dream not of other worlds, — what creatures there
Live, in what state, condition, or degree;
Contented that thus far hath been revealed
Not of earth only, but of highest heaven;”¹

but instinct is in no danger of rash excursions in pursuit of knowledge without limits. Indeed, the interval which separates man from the lower animals appears to be almost as wide as that which separates the living vegetable from the lifeless stone. Any satisfactory explanation of the appearance of man on earth must include the action of a Supreme Mind as the cause of his rational nature.²

7. *It is more reasonable to suppose that man, as a moral being, is a product of a Supreme Mind, itself moral, than to suppose him a product of vital forces that have no moral insight.*

For it is to be observed, (a) that man, by his constitution, is a moral being. His power to recognize in action a moral quality is not a result of education, but an original endowment or possession, for it is universal and indestructible. It may be perverted, but it cannot be annihilated; for if it were, man would be no longer man. (b) That the cognition of right or wrong in action is not resolvable into any other function of the mind. This is admitted by the ablest writers on moral science, and is as certain as any other fact of mental analysis. See the various works on Moral Philosophy. (c) That this cognition cannot be accounted for as the effect, or product of any action possible to merely vital forces. The weakest part of Darwin's work on the “Descent of Man,” is that in which he attempts to explain the origin of conscience or moral judgment, and it is surprising that any careful student of nature or of mind should be satisfied with it.

¹ “Paradise Lost,” VIII. C. 167. sq.

² Said Tyndall (J.) in 1868: “The passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable;” See Bell (C.) “The Hand, its Mechanism and Vital Endowments, as evincing Design;” Murphy (J. J.) “Habit and Intelligence in their Connection with the Laws of Matter and Force;” Bain (A.) “Mind and Body;” Mivart (St. G.) “On the Genesis of Species;” Potter (A.) “Nature, Man, and the Bible, witnessing to God and to Religious Truth.”

It may be added, 1, that the consciousness of moral obligation involves a belief in a law outside of ourselves to which our conduct ought to be adjusted. 2. That with this consciousness of obligation, and belief in a moral law, is connected an instinctive and profound conviction that there is, back of that law, a "Power, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness." And, 3, that this Power cannot be regarded as destitute of reason and moral character: it must be a Supreme Mind, to whom all created beings are accountable.

This argument for the existence of God was recognized as conclusive by Immanuel Kant and by Sir Wm. Hamilton. The former relied upon it solely, while the latter associated with it the mental law by which motive is seen to precede action, or final causes to go before efficient causes. In other words, by the normal action of reason and conscience, man is constrained to believe in the existence of God. "Conscience," says Ullman, "in its deepest nature, i.e., considered as an original power in man which can never be entirely destroyed, is not so much productive as receptive; not origina- tive so much as acquiescent; not commanding, but rather acting in obedience to a law higher than itself. This truth is attested by the common consciousness of all men: it finds its expression in the fact that the dictates of conscience have, at all times, been acknowledged to be the voice of a Lawgiver and a Judge who is above man." [*Sinlessness of Christ*, p. 32.]

8. *It is more reasonable to believe that man, as a religious being, is a product of a Supreme Mind, than to believe him a product of mere vital forces.*¹

As it is impossible to imagine a moral being who is not also rational, since moral judgment is itself an act of the highest intelligence, so, likewise, it is impossible to imagine a religious being who is not at the same time moral, since homage to the Supreme Ruler is the first *duty*, as well as the

¹ Gould (S. B.) "Origin and Development of Religious Belief"; Max Müller, "Science of Religion"; Hardwick (C.) "Christ and other Masters"; Leathes, (S.) "The Religion of the Christ," Lec. 1.

greatest privilege, of such a being. In considering the religious nature of man, it is, therefore, proper to bear in mind:—

(a) That he has a deep feeling of dependence. Schleiermacher regarded this sense of dependence as the distinctively religious element or action of man's nature. This may have been due to his strong leaning to Pantheism; certainly, it was a very imperfect estimate of what belongs to the religious nature of man; yet it contained a part of the truth.

(b) That he has a vague but inextinguishable sense of accountability. This is often conceded by men who reject the authority of God; and a simple assertion of this truth, by one who believes it, has a wonderful power over the consciences of evil men. They feel that there ought to be, and that there must be, a holy Sovereign who will punish sin.

(c) That he has a tendency to worship, and a certain longing for communion with a Supreme Being. This appears in all branches of the human race. The rudest and the most cultivated manifest the same tendency. They feel the need of God, and if they do not worship the true God, they are quite likely to bow down in superstitious fear before a false god. If, like Comte, they deny the Lord that made them, their religious nature is apt to avenge its wrongs by leading them to worship a creature, instead of the Creator.

“With the first development of consciousness,” says Mansel (p. 120), “there grows up as part of it the innate feeling that our life, natural and spiritual, is not in our own power to sustain or prolong; that there is One above us on whom we are dependent, whose existence we learn and whose presence we realize by the same instinct of prayer.” This sense of dependence, it may be added, is supposed by many German theologians to be the specifically *religious* element of human nature, and to be in itself an adequate proof of the existence of God.

If, then, we can trust the action of our own souls, there is reason to believe in the existence of God.

9. *It is more reasonable to suppose that the Biblical writers were enlightened, as they claim to have been, by a Supreme Mind, than to suppose that they were either deceivers or self-deceived.*

Yet these are the only hypotheses conceivable. The first meets all the conditions of the problem, and fairly accounts for the existence of the Scriptures; but neither of the others can be said to do this. For the writings themselves bear witness, in a remarkable manner, to the general good sense and clear rationality of their authors. Considering the period when they were written, the people for whom they were first written, the number and training of the probable writers, and the substance of religious and historical teaching which they contain, they must be considered preëminently reasonable, and it is absurd to look upon their authors as self-deceived. Nor is it less absurd to look upon them as deceivers. If deceivers, they were the worst of men; but these writings could not have been produced by such men.

10. *It is more reasonable to suppose that a Supreme Being, the Creator of religious beings, would give them a spiritual constitution that could be satisfied forever with Him as an object of worship, than to suppose that he would give them a spiritual nature that could not be satisfied thus.*

Hence, if the nature of man requires perfection in the object of worship, it is reasonable to suppose that the Supreme Being is perfect. It is only by considering this demand of man's religious nature that one can infer the absolute and infinite being of God from the things that he has made. For the created universe cannot be proved to be infinite; nor can a finite effect, considered merely as a product of force, be said to prove the existence of an infinite cause.

But the arguments for the existence of God have generally been brought under the following heads:—

(1) *The à priori argument.* This is founded upon certain necessary conceptions or beliefs of the mind, and is supposed by some to be demonstrative, though it is not.

(a) Anselm says, that "God, as we believe, is something than which nothing greater can be thought. When the fool hears this he understands it; and whatever is understood is in the intellect. But surely that, than which nothing greater can be thought, cannot be in the intellect alone; for if it is

in the intellect alone, it can be thought to be also in reality, which is greater." Subtle, but inconclusive; for by it the idea of a thing is confounded with a belief in its existence.¹

(b) Des Cartes says, "a perfect being is possible; otherwise it belongs to the nature of being to be imperfect, and the perfection of being would consist in its imperfection; which is absurd. But if a perfect being is possible, it is actual; for any being hereafter brought into existence would not be perfect." No more conclusive than the foregoing; for that which is abstractly or conceptually possible, is confounded with that which is practically possible.²

(c) Dr. Samuel Clarke says, that "the ideas of eternity and infinity are necessary to the mind; but eternity and infinity are attributes or modes of existence; hence they must inhere in some being who is eternal and infinite." Unsatisfactory, — because we do not conceive of eternity and infinity as being, necessarily, attributes of a real being.³

(d) Cousin teaches, that "truth, beauty, and goodness are attributes, not substances. But attributes belong to a subject; hence absolute truth, beauty, and goodness, of which we necessarily have a conception, must belong to an Absolute Being."⁴ Inconclusive, — because our minds do not affirm the necessary existence of absolute truth, beauty, and goodness, though the conception of them may be necessary. For "the sphere of thought is far wider (as well as narrower) than the sphere of reality; and no inference is valid from the correctest thinking of an object to its actual existence."

That the *à priori* argument has been satisfactory to so many able thinkers shows that a belief in the existence of God is congenial to the human mind.

(2) *The Cosmological Argument.* The substance of this

¹ Anselm, "Proslogion" c. II; Thomas Aquinas, Pars I. Quæstio 2;

² "Bib. Sac." VIII. p. 532; also p. 529.

³ Clarke (S.) "Discourse on the Being and Attributes of God," p. 16; Cudworth (R.) "Intellectual System of the Universe," II. p. 141; Waterland (D.) Works, III. p. 323.

⁴ Cousin "Lectures on The True, The Beautiful, and The Good," p. 359.

may be thus given. Something must be self-existent and eternal, to wit,—either God or the world. But the world, as it is, is evidently mutable and dependent. It must, therefore, be the last link thus far in an infinite series of dependent worlds, which is absurd, since the series would depend on nothing; or it must be dependent on God, which is reasonable. Hence there is a God. This argument is by no means demonstrative; yet some force may be conceded to it, as showing the existence of God to be probable.

(3) *The Teleological Argument.* It may be thus stated: Indications or evidences of design point back to a designer; an end sought, to a mind seeking it. The world affords inconceivably numerous evidences of design or adaptation, and, therefore, justifies our belief in the existence of a wise author and ruler. This argument is simple, comprehensive, and valid. The marks of order and adaptation which appear on every hand, and fill with delight the most careful observer, cannot be rationally attributed to any other source than a Supreme Mind.

(4) *The Anthropological Argument.* This embraces three particulars: (a) the sense of dependence; (b) the sense of accountability; and (c) the tendency to worship. This, also, appears to justify a belief in the existence of God, and indeed, as has been shown, of a God absolutely perfect.

(5) *The Christological Argument.* This rests upon the following pillars: (a) the Bible as an existing phenomenon which must be accounted for; (b) the fulfilment of Prophecy in so many instances; (c) the evidence of well attested miracles; (d) the evidence of the supernatural Person of Christ; and (e) the influence of the Christian religion in the world.¹

¹ Besides the works already referred to, the following may be named as worthy of being consulted. Cudworth (R.) "Intellectual System of the Universe," II. p. 141 sq.; Stillingfleet (E.) "Origines Sacræ," b. III. ch. I.; Dodge (E.) "Evidences of Christianity," Introduction; Nitzsch (C. I.) s. v. "Gott" in Herzog Real-Encyklopädie; Peabody (A. P.) "Christianity the Religion of Nature"; Chadbourne (P. A.) "Natural Theology"; Duke of Argyll, "The Reign of Law," and the "Primeval Man"; Princeton Review, 1870, p. 55 sq., A Review of "The Reign of Law"; and a great number of works on Natural Theology in the English and other languages.

PART SECOND.

THE BIBLE FROM GOD.

Before looking at the various reasons, which go to prove that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament were written by men divinely inspired, and have, therefore, divine authority, it is proper to show that a supernatural revelation of God's will is neither impossible, incredible, nor improbable.¹

(a) *It is not impossible*: for the Creator of nature and of man must be able, if he please, to act upon the nature which he made, whether it be matter or spirit, and to secure thereby new effects in the same. If there is a personal Creator, it is surely absurd to deny that he can deal in a sovereign way with his creation.

(b) *It is not incredible*: for if God is able to make a revelation of his will to men, by some means additional to the forces and laws of nature, it is surely possible, from a moral point of view, that he should do this. It would require superhuman knowledge to justify any one in saying, that no circumstances would warrant such a revelation.

And, (c), *It is not improbable* : for

1. *Thoughtful men* feel their need of a supernatural revelation. Without it, their spiritual wants seem to be overlooked in comparison with those of the body. They are conscious of needing clearer light than nature affords, especially in view of their sinful state.

2. *Most men* are predisposed to believe in the reality of revelations from God. And as this predisposition exists in the best as well as in the worst of mankind, it should be regarded as constitutional and therefore indicative of the probability of a supernatural revelation.

¹ Krauss (A. E.), "Die Lehre von der Offenbarung;" Butler (J.), "The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature," Part Second.

3. *All men* need such a revelation in order to accomplish the design of their moral and religious nature. For whatever may be said of the knowledge within their reach, they will not avail themselves of it in their actual condition without the addition of supernatural light and grace. If then there is any reason to believe that God is merciful, and not simply just, there is reason to believe that he has made, or will make, a special disclosure of his will.

Assuming, then, that a supernatural revelation of religious truth is not antecedently improbable, it may be remarked that such a revelation may be made, either by a direct communication of the needed truth to every person of our race, or by a communication, properly authenticated, for the use of all. The latter method is believed to have been chosen by the Most High.

But against this method three objections have been raised, —

(a) *That it does not treat all men alike.* For some have the revelation, and others have it not. If the revelation is needed by any, it is needed by all, and should be given to all alike. But this objection, reduced to its principle, assumes that God is under some kind of obligation to do as much for one sinner as he does for another. And, if this principle is correct, men in all lands, and in all times, should have the same or equivalent privileges. But no one can make it even probable that they do have them.¹

(b) *That it does not afford the means of salvation to all.* For knowledge of the truth is a means of salvation, and it is plainly incompatible with the goodness of God to make salvation depend on knowledge that is not given to all. But to this it may be replied, — 1, that there would be no wrong done to sinners if they were left to suffer the just penalty for their sins; 2, that grace, or undeserved favor to one, does not originate a claim to it on the part of another; and,

¹ Says Augustine: "Cur non omnes docet Deus? Quia omnes quos docet, misericordiâ docet: quos autem non docet, iudicio non docet," De Predest. Sancto. c. 8; Butler (J.) "Analogy," Part II. ch. 3 and 6.

3, that salvation does not depend absolutely on a knowledge of truth supernaturally revealed, — the light of nature is sufficient, if sinners would use it.

(c) *That it necessitates miracles as the only sufficient vouchers for the truth of the revelation.* And miracles are antecedently improbable. God cannot be supposed to work them, unless it be for a great moral end, otherwise unattainable. But in answer to this it may be said, — 1, that, for aught we know, the other method would require something of a miraculous nature to certify the truth in question to every separate mind; and, 2, that a supernatural event in the world of sense is entirely congruous with such an event in the world of mind, and therefore not, in the case supposed, improbable.

I. THE NEW TESTAMENT SCRIPTURES ARE WORTHY OF FULL CONFIDENCE AS HISTORICAL RECORDS.

This statement is meant to affirm the general correctness of the New Testament writings, but not the absence of all minor inaccuracies. They are perfectly credible, as compared with the best works of history, though it is not now affirmed that they are wholly free from unintentional errors. Whether the latter be also true, will be considered in the sequel.

The trustworthiness of primary, historical records mainly depends, (a) on the opportunities which the writers had to learn the truth; (b) on their disposition to learn and declare the truth; and (c) on their powers of observation and of memory.

To what extent were these conditions fulfilled in the writers of the New Testament? Had they suitable opportunities to learn the truth? Had they good powers of observation and recollection? Had they a disposition to learn and to make known the truth?

In answer to these questions it can be shown, —

I. *That as a historical religion Christianity took its rise with the public ministry of Jesus Christ in Palestine near the end of the third decade of our era.*

For, in the first place, there are no traces whatever of the existence of this religion *before* that date, and in the second

place, one hundred years *later*, it had already spread itself over large provinces of the Roman Empire. And by the testimony of Pliny the Younger,¹ in Pontus A. D. 103, we learn, that some had abandoned Christianity as long as twenty years before, that is, in A. D. 83; while Tacitus² asserts that Christ suffered death in Judea under Pontius Pilate, who was procurator ten years,—from about A. D. 26 to A. D. 36.³ Moreover, all the early Christian writers, who speak of this point, agree in testifying that Christ was crucified at that time.

II. *That the several books of the New Testament were written before the close of the first century.*⁴

Indeed, most of them were written between A. D. 50 and A. D. 80; that is, within fifty years after the death of Christ. For—

(1) *The testimony of early Christian writers places the origin of these books in the first century.* In this respect they all agree. There is not, within my knowledge, a single passage in any Christian writer of the second, third, or fourth centuries after Christ, which puts the date of any book of the New Testament after the year of our Lord 100. This is strong evidence.

(2) *Christian writers of the second century quote from a*

¹ Epist. X. 97, cf. X. 98.

² Annals XV. 44, cf. Sueton. Vit. Neron. § 16, and Vit. Claud. § 25; also Juven. Sat. I. 155, 157, and Euseb. H. E. IV. 9.

³ "Ergo abolendo rumori Nero subdidit reos, quæsitissimis pœnis, adfecit, quos, per flagitia invisos, vulgus Christianos adpellabat. Auctor nominis ejus Christus, Tiberio imperitante, per Procuratorem Pontium Pilatum supplicio adfectus erat; repressaque in præsens exitiabilis superstitio rursus erumpebat, non modo per Judæam, originem ejus mali, sed per urbem etiam, quo cuncta undique atrocia aut pudenda confluunt celebranturque."

⁴ Lardner (N.) "Credibility of the Gospel History"; Norton (A.) "On the Genuineness of the Four Gospels"; Tischendorf (C.) "When were our Four Gospels Written?"; Tregelles (S. P.) "Canon Muritorianus," etc.; Westcott (B. F.) "History of the Canon of the New Test."; "Introduction to the Study of the Four Gospels"; Gaussen (L.) "The Canon of the Scriptures"; Olshausen (F.) "Die Echtheit der vier Canon. Evangelien"; Sanday (W.) "The Gospels in the second Century"; Horne (T. H.) "Introduction to the Critical study of the Scriptures," last edition; Rawlinson (G.) "Historical Evidences," Lects. VI., VII., VIII.

large part of these books as authoritative. This, they would be unlikely to do, if the books were written in their own time; and this, they do not do, in the case of books which are known to have been produced in the second century.¹

(3) *These writers of the second century show in their style the formative influence of the New Testament.* The influence of the Septuagint alone is hardly sufficient to account for their style, though it must be borne in mind when weighing the present argument.

(4) *The early adversaries of Christianity, heretical and heathen, appealed to the New Testament writings as authoritative.* The investigations of the last twenty years have added much to the value of this kind of evidence, and it cannot now be overlooked by those who seem most ready to reject the New Testament.

(5) *They purport to have been written before the close of the first century.* Their writers speak, as eye-witnesses, of the ministry of Christ, or as those who were personally acquainted with such witnesses. The only portions which may be esteemed totally silent as to their date, are the Second and Third Epistles of John; and these must have been written by the beloved disciple, or by one who purposely and skilfully copied his style. They do therefore, also, in a certain sense, claim to have been written before A.D. 100.

(6) *The style of the New Testament Scriptures indicates their origin in the first century of our era.* Christianity made its appearance in Judea during the fourth decade of that century. It came with new and mighty power, breathing fresh life into the people. And the New Testament writings must have been originated in just such a creative epoch. There is an air of freshness, freedom, and reality about their

¹ See the writers named in the preceding note, and the following :—

Gieseler (J. C. L.) "Historisch, kritische Versuch über die Entstehung, . . . der schriftlichen Evangelien"; Thiersch (M. J.) "Versuch zur Herstellung des historischen Standpunktes"; Bleek (F.) "Einleitung in das N. T."; Guericke (H. E. F.) "Gesamtgeschichte des N. T."; Reuss (E.) "Histoire du Canon des Saintes Ecritures dans l'Eglise Chretienne"; Hug (J. L.) "Introduction to the N. T."; Credner (K. A.) "Geschichte des Neutestamentlichen Canon."

language, which forbids us to think of them as the fruit of critical research.

(7) *The references to persons and events of that age prove them to have been written in the first century.* These references are singularly numerous, natural, incautious, and yet accurate. No writer of the second century could have made them, except by inspiration; and no inspired man would have made his writings appear to be of an earlier date than they were.

These reasons are believed to be perfectly conclusive.

There is abundant evidence in the New Testament itself, that its writers were familiar with Palestine in the time of Christ. This evidence will be confirmed by all that is to be given in support of the next statement.

III. *That the books of the New Testament were written either by apostles of Christ, or by associates of apostles.*

For:—(1) *The early Christian writers affirm this.* Their testimony is positive and unanimous as to the four Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, thirteen Epistles of Paul, one of Peter, and one of John, comprising eight-ninths of the New Testament; and, in the main, though with some hesitation on the part of certain writers, they bear witness to the same fact respecting the other books of the New Testament.

We cannot exhibit the evidence in detail, but must refer to works on the canon of the New Testament, and introductions to its various books. See the writers cited above.

(2) *Many of the New Testament Scriptures claim, either directly or indirectly, to have been written by apostles or their associates.* This is true of the third and fourth Gospels, of the Acts, of thirteen Epistles of Paul; of the Epistles of James, Peter, and Jude; and of the Apocalypse; while the First Epistle of John purports to have been written by one who had been an eye-witness of our Saviour's ministry, and who could speak with apostolic authority. Such evidence is not to be rejected without careful scrutiny. Nothing short of statements in the writings which could not have been made by the pretended authors, or statements of those who first

received the writings, is sufficient to nullify this testimony. But such statements do not exist.

(3) *The contents and style of the New Testament books prove that they were written by apostles or their associates.* In support of this statement we appeal (a) to the simplicity, vividness, particularity, and objectiveness of the narrative parts; for these qualities point to writers who were under the extraordinary personal influence of Christ. (b) To the freshness and power of thought which characterize these writings, — qualities which may be accounted for by their writers' acquaintance with Christ, and in no other way so well, if at all. (c) To the silence of history in respect to any other men able to produce them. The authors of these books could hardly have passed away, without leaving other traces of their influence. For they were *many*, — not one, — and *remarkable*, not common men; and they wrote with comparative independence of one another.

It is simply absurd to suppose the New Testament Scriptures written by certain unknown men outside of the apostolic circle, — by persons in the first or second century, who have left no other traces of their existence. These writers, if not apostles, must have been peers of the apostles in influence. Where did they live and labor that their names were never known to the ages that followed? The four great letters ascribed to Paul must, as even Baur admits, have been written by him.¹ But if these were written by Paul, the other nine must have been also. No man who could have produced them can be supposed capable of ascribing them falsely to the apostles; nor, indeed, can any one else be reasonably supposed to have come so near the apostle in thought and style.

Of modern opponents ² to this view of the authorship of the New Testament, two persons may be named as most

¹ Compare Farrar (F. W.) "The Witness of History to Christ," p. 76.

² Of their writings, the following may be mentioned: Riggenbach (C. J.) "Zeugnisse für das Evangelium Johannis"; Hilgenfeld (A.) "Der Kanon und die Kritik des N. T."; Davidson (S.) "Introduction to the New Test." last

conspicuous, viz.: D. F. Strauss and F. C. Baur. The former attempted to resolve the gospel narratives into popular "myths" or legends; and the latter, to find their origin in the "spirit of the age." Both were pantheists, denying the possibility of miracles. And both have been answered by such scholars as Neander, Ullmann, Ebrard, Schaff, Meyer, Godet, Fisher, Pressensé, Luthardt,¹ and others, too numerous to mention.

After the severest scrutiny, the evidence will be found ample and conclusive as to *nearly all* the New Testament writings; and were those of a *slightly* doubtful origin set aside, the theological system would itself remain unchanged. But there is no adequate reason for believing that any book of the New Testament is unworthy of its place in the canon.

IV. *That these writers were manifestly competent, upright, and, therefore, trustworthy.*²

(a) *They were competent.* For (1) They were men of good judgment. They do not write like enthusiasts or fanatics, but like men of sound sense and practical aim. (2) They were men of more than average intelligence. This is evident from their writings, which are greatly superior in freshness, force of thought, and perspicuity of style, to any similar productions of that age. (3) The facts which they relate are, for the most part, such as could be fairly attested by the

edition; De Wette (W. M. L.) "An Historical Critical Introduction to the Canonical Books of the N. T." in many respects valuable, translated by F. Frothingham.

¹ Neander (A.) "Life of Christ," and "Planting and Training of the Ap. Church"; Ullmann (C.) "Historisch oder Mythisch?"; Ebrard (J. H. A.) "Kritik der Evangelischen Geschichte"; Fisher (G. P.) "Essays on the Supernatural Origin of Christianity"; Luthardt (C. E.) "Authorship of the Fourth Gospel"; Sears (E. H.) "The Fourth Gospel, the Heart of Christ"; Sanday (W.) "The Fourth Gospel: Was John its Author?" Alexander (W. L.) "Christ and Christianity."

² Greenleaf (S.) "Harmony of the Gospels; Introductory Essay"; West (G.) "On the Resurrection of Christ"; Macpherson (R.) "The Resurrection of Jesus Christ," etc.; Lyttleton (L.) "On the Conversion of the Apostle Paul"; Paley (W.) "Horæ Paulinæ"; Smith (J.) "The Voyage and Shipwreck of St. Paul," etc.; Paley (W.) "A View of the Evidences of Christianity;" See also Blunt (J. J.) "Undesigned Coincidences in the writings of both the Old and New Testaments"; Birks (T. R.) "Horæ Evangelicæ"; "Horæ Apostolicæ."

senses. They could be seen or heard, or verified by taste or smell. Scientific training, or philosophical, was not needed to qualify men to bear witness to such events as are related by the evangelists.

(b) *They were upright.* This may be inferred 1, From the tone of sincerity and earnestness which pervades all their writings. 2, From the spirituality of the religious doctrines which are inculcated. 3, From the character of the motives which are appealed to. 4, From the purity and perfection of the moral principles which are taught. 5, From the style of narrative which is employed,—a style which is distinguished, (a) For *simplicity*: It seems to be a completely natural, unadorned expression of what was believed to be true. If the composition of the Gospels is a work of art, it is art so perfect as to seem like nature. (b) For *positiveness*: The writers keep to the facts like men under oath, making almost no inferences or conjectures. This is strikingly manifest in the first three Gospels and in the Acts of the Apostles. (c) For *frankness*: Nothing seems to be kept back because it was of doubtful wisdom. The hard sayings of Christ, the apparent contradictions of his language, the sins and errors of his disciples,—all appear in the record without preface or apology.¹ (d) For *minuteness*: The narratives are particular, circumstantial, life-like, giving names of persons, places, diseases, and the like, as would be natural in the account of an eye-witness. (e) For *objectiveness*: The writers go through their work as if they had taken no part in it, and had nothing at stake in the matter. One could scarcely infer from their language that they had forsaken all for Christ, and were ready to lay down their lives for his sake. They never eulogize his character, and rarely his teaching. They scarcely allude to many questions which awaken the utmost curiosity in men addicted to religious speculation. "In its grand, childlike, and holy simplicity, the narrative passes by such questions of the intellect, just as a child

¹ Compare Farrar (F. W.) "The Witness of History to Christ," p. 76; a striking passage.

moves among the riddles of nature and of life, as if they existed not." 6, From the perfection of Christ's character, — a character which must have been real. For so unique and perfect, so truly human and yet manifestly divine is this character, that we cannot suppose it to be an ideal creation. The four distinct records are diverse, yet harmonious. So marked are the differences, even in relating the same events, that some have rashly inferred contradiction; yet so deep and pervading is the harmony, that others have inferred transcription. It is impossible to suppose the life and character of Christ an *ideal* originated by *one* of the Evangelists, since this view would not account for the freedom and *diversity* in the narratives; and it is equally impossible to suppose the *ideal* originated by more than one of them, since the *unity* of impression would not be accounted for. But if there was such a person as Jesus Christ, whose history the Gospels contain, we have no difficulty whatever in accounting for the wonderful *harmony in diversity* which they exhibit; since we have, as it were, four portraits of the same original, though taken by different artists and from different points of view. All this will be yet more evident, if our four canonical Gospels be compared with the Apocryphal Gospels, referred to above.¹

7, From the lack of motive to write as they did, if they were dishonest. Well may Dryden ask concerning the sacred writers, and especially those of the New Testament,

"How, or why,
Should all conspire to cheat us with a lie?
Unmasked their pains, ungrateful their advice,
Starving their gains, and martyrdom their price."

There are many good remarks on this topic in Lord Lyttleton's treatise on "The Conversion of St. Paul." If the

¹ Da Costa (I.) "The Four Witnesses"; Westcott (B. F.) "Introduction to the Study of the Four Gospels"; Neander (A.) "Life of Christ"; Ellicott (C. J.) "Life of Christ"; Andrews (S. J.) "The Life of our Lord upon the Earth"; Young (J.) "The Christ of History"; Lange (J. P.) "Life of Jesus"; Farrar (F. W.) "Life of Christ"; Seeley (J. R.) "Ecce Homo"; Parker (J.) "Ecce Deus"; Alexander (W. L.) "Christ and Christianity"; Keim (T.) "The History of Jesus of Nazara."

writers of the New Testament bore false witness in respect to the life and teachings of Christ, they did it with no prospect of personal gain in this life, or in that which is to come.

(c) *They were trustworthy.* This follows from their competency and uprightness. As competent, they were able to utter the truth; as upright, they were sure to do it.

But we cannot, it is said, determine the character of witnesses, without subjecting them to cross-examination. Says Greenleaf on Evidence, i. 138, "It is found indispensable, as a test of truth, and to the proper administration of justice, that every living witness should, if possible, be subjected to the ordeal of a cross-examination, that it may appear what were his powers of perception; his opportunities for observation; his attentiveness in observing; the strength of his recollection; and his disposition to speak the truth."

This is doubtless a correct statement, in respect to living witnesses. But the comment of J. H. Newman is also correct: "It has been said, that no testimony can fairly be trusted, which has not passed the ordeal of a legal examination. Yet, calculated as that mode of examination undoubtedly is, to elicit truth, surely truth may be elicited by other ways also. Independent and circumstantial writers may confirm a fact as satisfactorily as witnesses in court. They may be questioned and cross-questioned, and, moreover, brought up for re-examination in any succeeding age."¹

Our examination of the New Testament records has been of this nature; and the result is plain, — *a conviction of their historical trustworthiness.* They are entitled to full credence, when stating clearly matters of fact; and a discovery now and then of minor, unintentional errors would not invalidate this conclusion. The result now reached may appear small, and the process of reaching it slow; but it is all-important for the investigation which is to follow.

II. THESE WRITINGS PROVE THAT JESUS CHRIST WAS AN INFALLIBLE TEACHER.

By an "infallible teacher" is meant one who teaches truth

¹ "Essays on Miracles," p. 74.

without any mixture of error; or one whose instruction, in whatever form it may be given, will prove, if rightly apprehended, to be wholly correct. Such a teacher need not be strictly omniscient; but if he is not omniscient, he must clearly perceive the limits of his knowledge, and confine his teaching within those limits. The teaching of prophets and apostles could only be infallible by restricting it to what the Holy Spirit moved them to say.

A teacher from God may be presumed to know the work entrusted to him. If he defines his work, it will be safe to make his definition the basis of study in attempting to ascertain the nature of that work. And it would plainly be unsafe to ascribe to him any attribute or authority which he disclaims. Our discussion of the point now in question may, therefore, begin with a survey of the claims put forth by Jesus Christ as a Teacher. Taking his own words for our guide, What did he know, and how did he teach?

1 *What did he claim to know?*

(a) He claimed to know heavenly things directly. — John viii. 38; iii. 11–13.

(b) He claimed to know the Father fully and exclusively. — Matt. xi. 27; John vii. 28–29; viii. 55; vi. 46; x. 15; xvii. 25–26.

(c) He claimed to be one with the Father. — John x. 30–38; xvii. 10–22. And, by claiming this unity, he virtually declared his teaching divine.

(d) He claimed that his words were his Father's words. — John vii. 16; viii. 28; xii. 49; xiv. 10–24; xvii. 8.

(e) He claimed that his words were immutably true. — Mark xiii. 31; John xiv. 6.

This, in brief, was the claim of Christ; and it amounts to a claim of infallibility, or entire correctness in his teaching. Did his *manner* correspond with this verbal claim?

2. *How did he teach?*

(a) He spoke almost always in the first person singular, with language of great authority. There are but two or three exceptions to the former part of this statement on record.

(b) He spoke as if he were the final and perfect Teacher. — Matt. v. 17 sq.; xix. 8, 9.

(c) He represented salvation as depending on the treatment of his words. — Mark viii. 38; Luke ix. 26; John xii. 47; xiv. 23; xv. 7.

(d) He always spoke as one perfectly master of his theme and of the occasion, — never confessing that he was mistaken on any point, and never seeming to work his way up from a lower to a higher view. He always looked down upon his subject.¹

This, in brief, was the manner of Christ; and, on any fair interpretation of it, it was in perfect harmony with his claim to infallibility. It may, therefore, be said that his whole spirit and bearing as a teacher support, in a measure, his definite claim. Or, if any one prefer another form of statement, the two were in such perfect accord as to constitute a double claim to infallibility. They make it almost certain that his sense of perfect knowledge as to all that he taught was constant, natural, and controlling.

And the following circumstances justify our assent to the correctness of this claim.

I. *His immediate disciples were convinced of its rightfulness.* They were intimately associated with him for a period of nearly three years. They did not always understand his words, nor were they always satisfied with his course of action. Some of them appear to have been critical and unsympathetic. Yet, (1) *They ascribe to him perfect knowledge.* — Matt. ix. 4: "And Jesus, knowing their thoughts, said," etc., (cf. Mark ii. 8; John ii. 24, 25; Acts i. 24; Rev. ii. 23; John xvi. 30; xxi. 17; vi. 64; xviii. 4). (2) *They declare him to be full of truth, and the source of truth.* — John i. 14: "And dwelt among us full of grace and truth," (cf. i. 16). (3) *They preach his doctrine as pre-eminently the truth.* — 2 Cor. iv. 2 sq.: "By manifestation of the truth commending ourselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God," (cf.

¹ See Parker (J.) "The Paraclete," p. 63 sq., for a similar thought.

Gal. ii. 5; Eph. iv. 21; 2 Tim. ii. 15). And certainly the fact that Jesus Christ convinced his most intimate friends of the rightfulness of his claims is some confirmation of them. Yet they might be mistaken; and their belief is not therefore of itself decisive.

II. *His moral character appears to have been perfect.*¹ In support of this statement we appeal:—

(a) To his estimate of himself, (1) As meek and lowly in heart.—Matt. xi. 29; (cf. xxvi. 42; John v. 30; vi. 38; iv. 34; vii. 18). (2) As doing always his Father's will.—John viii. 29–46; xv. 10.

(b) To his disciples' estimate of him.—1 Pet. ii. 22; "Who did no sin."—Ro. xv. 3; Phil. ii. 8; 2 Cor. v. 21; Heb. iv. 15; vii. 26; 1 John ii. 29; iii. 7; Acts. iii. 14; vii. 52; xxii. 14; 1 Cor. i. 2; John v. 23; and the like. And his disciples were not likely to mistake the character of Christ in this respect. Had he been proud or unsubmitive, he would have betrayed this spirit to his followers; they would have felt its presence, and would not have been able to think of him as without sin.

(c) To the total impression made by the record of his life. The value of this as evidence cannot easily be over-rated. It does not depend on minute points of criticism which only a scholar can understand. It depends upon the broader features and general tone of the narratives, and can be appreciated by every upright mind. The eye of an unlearned but thoughtful reader is almost sure to take in the great features of the picture, and judge them correctly.²

Reference may also be made, at this point, to the impression which his bearing made upon Judas, Pilate, and the wife of Pilate, all of whom appear to have been assured of the moral integrity of Jesus.—Matt. xxvii. 4; 24, 19.

¹ Ullmann (C.) "The Sinlessness of Jesus an Evidence for Christianity" Bushnell (H.) "The Character of Jesus forbidding his possible classification with Men"; Schaff (P.) "The Person of Christ"; Dorner (J. A.) "The Sinless Perfection of Christ" in *Am. Presby. and Theol. Rev.* for 1863; Seeley (J. R.) "Ecce Homo"; Parker (J.) "Ecce Deus"; Hovey (A.) "Madison Avenue Lectures," p. 12 sq.; Row (C. A.) "The Jesus of the Evangelists."

² Leathes (S.) "Witness of the Old Test. to Christ," pp. 172–173.

It may also be remarked that the evangelists do not appear to have chosen their materials with any special view to proving the moral perfection of Christ.—See Matt. xix. 17; viii. 28–34; Mark xi. 12–14; Luke xxiv. 28.

III. *His doctrines agree with his claim to infallibility.*¹

(1) *In their simplicity.* A child can understand them. What he says of God's care and love, of man's duty and happiness, is perfectly direct and intelligible. To love God with all the heart; to forsake all for Christ; to be watchful, prayerful, obedient, humble; to love one's neighbor as one's self, even if that neighbor be a stranger or a foe; to be loyal subjects, faithful husbands, bountiful givers; in a word, to be like Christ himself in love to God and man,—all this is set forth in the clearest speech imaginable. The chief thought, the essential doctrine, is placed before the mind in its naked verity and beauty.

(2) *In their self-consistency.* This is no less remarkable. Every man knows how hard it is to state one truth of a system correctly, without putting it in connection with several others. The human mind is not many-sided and comprehensive enough to hold all the relations, and see all the phases, of a truth at once, so that a wrong statement of it would be next to impossible. But the mind of Christ did this. His various teachings are in deepest harmony with one another. His views of God and of man, of piety and of morality, of life here and judgment hereafter, are always self-consistent.

(3) *In their moral purity.* This is absolute. A higher standard cannot even be conceived. There is no real virtue which they do not inculcate in its best form, and no vice which they do not condemn in its earliest germ. Says Dr. Peabody, of the ethical teaching of Jesus, "Who can add to it? Who can take from it? What imaginable case of

¹ Erskine (R.) "Internal Evidence of the Truth of Christianity"; Jenyns (S.) "On the Internal Evidence of the Christian Religion"; Harris (S.) "The Demands of Infidelity satisfied by Christianity," Bib. Sac. XIII. pp. 272–314; Peabody (A. P.) "Immutable Morality," Address at Brown University; Bayne (P.) "The Testimony of Christ to Christianity."

obligation does it not meet? In what imaginable case is departure from it safe? We can conceive of no other principles than those which it embodies."

(4) *In their comprehensiveness.* This is wonderful. The precepts of Christ are principles. They apply to innumerable instances. They expand as we study them. Sometimes one of them is seen to comprise all duty. Such, for example, is the golden rule, properly understood; and the same may be said of the first commandment of the law.

(5) *In their practicalness.* They were uttered for the purpose of leading men to God and duty; not as theoretical views interesting to the philosopher and student, but as precepts of life, for the good of the suffering and the guilty. Jesus was not a philosopher, but a Saviour; and all the principles which he taught had a direct bearing upon the salvation of men.

(6) *In their good influence.* This was marked even during his life; but it has increased with the lapse of years, and is now probably greater than ever before. A large part of the intelligence and virtue, not to say piety, which now blesses mankind, is due to the religion of Christ; and no small part of the power of his religion for good may be traced to the doctrines which he taught. In a sense, all of it may be traced to them.

IV. *Many predictions made by him have been fulfilled.* Not every one who utters a true prophecy is infallible in all his speech: but a knowledge of future events, concealed from human view, is good evidence that God is with him who possesses it; and a permanent possession of such knowledge is evidence of the permanent presence of God with the possessor.

Now (1) *Christ predicted his own death.* — Matt. xii. 40: "For as Jonah was three days and three nights in the belly of the fish, so shall the Son of Man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth" (cf. xvi. 21–23; xvii. 22, 23; xx. 17–19, 22, 23; xxvi. 1, 2; Mark x. 38, 39; Luke ix. 44; xii. 50; xiii. 33; xvii. 22, 25; John ii. 19–22; xii. 7, 23, 32–34).

(2) *He predicted his disciples' conduct.* — Mark xiv. 18–21: “One of you that eateth with me will betray me,” sq. (cf. John xiii. 11, 18–26; Matt. xxvi. 31–34; Mark xiv. 72.)

(3) *He predicted other events affecting them.* — John xxi. 18: “But when thou art old, thou shalt stretch forth thy hands, and another shall gird thee, and shall carry thee whither thou wouldst not” (cf. Matt. xx. 23; Mark xiv. 13–16; Matt. x. 17–22; John xv. 20).

(4) *He also foretold the destruction of Jerusalem.* — Matt. xxiv. 2: “Verily I say unto you, there shall not be left here one stone upon another that shall not be thrown down” (cf. xxiv. 4, 5, 23–26; Mark xiii. 14; Luke xxi. 12, 16, 20, sq.).

Now, in view of all the circumstances, the exact fulfilment of these predictions is a good reason for believing that all his teaching was true.

To this it is objected by some, that one of his predictions has failed; for he foretold his own return to earth before the generation then living had passed away. — Matt. xxiv. 34. In reply to this objection, it may be remarked, (1) That the word *γενεά* may possibly be equivalent to *γένος*, and signify a particular race or kind of men. This is maintained by Dorner, Storr, Auberlen, Alford, and others.¹ (2) That the reference is not to a visible return of Christ, but to the destruction of Jerusalem, — a type of the final overthrow of the wicked. — Bengel, Robinson, and others.

V. GREAT MIRACLES WERE WROUGHT BY HIM. Miracles are changes in nature, which must be ascribed to supernatural agency; or events in the world of sense, which, according to sound principles of reason, should be ascribed to extraordinary action on the part of God.²

¹ Grimm (C. L. W.) “Lexicon Græco Latinum in Libros N. T.” s. v. *γενεά* 2. “b. translate; *genus hominum ingenitii, studiis, moribus sibi simillimorum, et quidem malo sensu peruersum genus*; Matt. xvii. 17; Mark ix. 19; Luke ix. 41; xvi. 8.” See Bib. Sac. VII. pp. 452–478; IX. pp. 329–354, 449–467; Dorner (J. A.) “De Oratione Christi eschatologica, Matt. xxiv. 1–36, asseverata”; Robinson (E.) “The Coming of Christ as announced in Matt. xxiv. 29–31.” Bib. Sac. 1834.

² Hume (D.) “Of Miracles,” vol. II. of “Essays”; Powell (B.) “On the Study of the Evidences of Christianity,” in “Essays and Reviews”; Farmer (H.) “On

A supernatural revelation is, therefore, a miraculous revelation. But the revelation, if made to one person for the benefit of others, needs attestation or ratification; and this ratification must be (1) something addressed to other men, and (2) something which must in reason be referred to the source of the revelation. Healing the paralytic, in proof of authority to forgive his sins, is a case in point.

The miracles of Christ served a double purpose, (1) to reveal his character and spirit, in which light they are part of his teaching; and (2) to attest the truth of his claims, in which light they are equivalent to the seal or signature of God, indorsing his authority. — Ex. iv. 1-9; 2 Kings i. 10; Matt. xi. 3-5; Mark ii. 10, 11; John ii. 23; iii. 2; v. 36, 37; ix. 16, 30-33; x. 25, 38; xi. 4, 40, 42; xii. 30; xiv. 10, 11; xx. 30, 31; Acts ii. 22; x. 37-43; Heb. ii. 3, 4. In the former respect, as well as in the latter, they were superhuman, divine, and so confirmatory of his teaching. Thus, doctrine confirms miracle, and miracle, doctrine. Indeed, doctrine, miracle, life, resurrection, and the effect of all on the world, support one another.¹

But against the occurrence of miracles many objections have been pressed, of which the following deserve particular attention:—

Miracles”; Campbell (G.) “Treatise on Miracles”; Douglass (J.) “A Letter on the Criterion of Miracles”; Wardlaw (R.) “On Miracles”; Mozley (J. B.) “On Miracles”; Cumming (J.) “On our Lord’s Miracles”; Warrington (G.) “Can we believe in Miracles?” Hovey (A.) “The Miracles of Christ”; Westcott (B. F.) “Characteristics of the Gospel Miracles”; Bushnell (H.) “Nature and the Supernatural”; McCosh (J.) “The Supernatural in the Natural”; Mansel (H. L.) “On Miracles as Evidences of Christianity,” in “Aids to Faith”; Heurtley (C. A.) “Miracles,” in “Replies to Essays and Reviews”; Skinner (T. H.) “Miracles the Proof of Christianity” in *Am. Presb. and Theol. Rev.* for 1863, p. 177 sq.

¹ Steinmeyer (F. L.) “Die Wunderthaten des Herrn”; Westcott (B. F.) “Characteristics of the Gospel Miracles”; Trench (R. C.) “On Miracles”; Fisher (G. P.) “On the Christian Miracles” in “Essays on the Supernatural Origin of Christianity”; Fitzgerald (W.) “Miracles” in “Smith’s Dict. of the Bible,” *Am. ed.*; Seelye (J. H.) “Miracles,” in “Boston Lectures, Christianity and Skepticism”; Müller (J.) “Disputatio de Miraculorum Jesu Christi natura,” etc.; Köstlin (J.) “De Miraculorum quæ Jesus et primi ejus discipuli fecerunt natura et ratione.”

1. *Human testimony for miracles is nullified by man's predisposition to believe in them.* Says Lecky: "It is, however, the fundamental error of most writers on miracles, that they confine their attention to two points,—the possibility of the fact, and the nature of the evidence. There is a third element, which, in these questions, is of practical importance,—the predisposition of men in certain stages of society towards the miraculous, which is so strong, that miraculous stories are invariably circulated and credited, and which makes an amount of evidence that would be quite sufficient to establish a natural fact altogether inadequate to establish a supernatural one." The same thought is emphasized by David Hume in his famous attack upon the evidence for miracles, though with special reference to miracles which are said to have been wrought for religious ends.

But the tendency of mankind referred to has a double bearing. For it is not limited to men "in certain stages of society," but is almost universal. Indeed, the frequency with which persons who reject the testimony for the miracles of Christ accept the evidence which is offered for spiritual manifestations, and the like, has shown that skepticism and credulity often dwell together in the same mind. And the predisposition insisted upon by Hume and Lecky is, in reality, both an argument for caution in accepting the claim of any event to a supernatural character, and a reason for believing that miracles are included in God's plan of governing the human race.

For, speaking generally, the spurious presupposes the genuine; the counterfeit imitates the true. If God has inclined us, by a secret and well-nigh ineradicable tendency of our religious nature, to almost expect miracles in certain emergencies of human history, the ready assent given by multitudes to pretended miracles is at once explained; for nothing is more characteristic of man, in his present condition, than the habit of following blindly a constitutional bias of his nature. Yet nothing is more certain than the fact that every normal bias points first in the direction

of truth, and, if followed wisely and cautiously, will lead to truth.¹

2. *The observed uniformity of nature is incompatible with the occurrence of miracles at any time.* This may be called *the objection of the present day to miracles.* It was the chief pillar on which Hume's argument against the credibility of miracles rested. For he said, — (a) That our belief in the laws of nature rests on a "uniform, firm, unalterable experience." (b) That our belief in human testimony rests on a "variable experience." (c) That a miracle is an event "contrary to uniform experience, when the circumstances are the same." "That a dead man should come to life is a miracle, because that has never been observed in any age or country." (d) That the best human testimony in favor of miracles can only justify doubt. (e) That such testimony may be imagined as would justify examination and, perhaps, belief, if the miracle alleged had no connection with religion. But if it had such connection, no human testimony would deserve the least attention.

But this argument is unsound, (1) Because it ignores the moral government of God. (2) Because it confounds experience and testimony. (3) Because it fails to discriminate between different kinds of testimony. (4) Because it begs the question by the definition which it gives to the word "miracle." (5) Because it discriminates against miracles connected with religion, and so against religion itself.

It may be observed that Hume not only begs the question by defining a miracle, an event "that has never been observed in any age or country," but also renders a second miracle impossible; for a second event of the kind could not, by this definition, be a miracle, — that is, an event "that has never been observed in any age or country."

¹ See Butler (J.) "Analogy," Part II. ch. 7. "It is objected further, that, however it has happened, the fact is, that mankind have, in different ages, been strangely deluded with pretences to miracles and wonders. But it is by no means to be admitted, that they have been oftener, or are at all more liable to be deceived by these than by other pretences."

It may be remarked also, (*a*) that one of the chief ends for which miracles are said to have been wrought forbids their indefinite multiplication. Customary events are not the fittest credentials for an extraordinary messenger. (*b*) That the fact that few events are miraculous no more proves that none are miraculous than the fact that few mountains are volcanoes proves that none are volcanoes. (*c*) That man himself, within certain narrow limits, is free, having power to act upon the forces and sequences of material nature, — to disturb them, to resist them; to combine them, to guide them, to re-enforce them, — how much more, then, may God, the Infinite Mind, control, supplement, overpower, or supersede the forces of nature, to accomplish a high moral purpose! The introduction of new races proves that he does this.

3. *The true view of God's perfection is inconsistent with the occurrence of miracles at any time.* For, if God interposes to disturb the laws of nature, he repudiates his own work. A miracle, therefore, supposes imperfection in the work of God.

In reply to this, it may be remarked, —

(*a*) It is by no means self-evident that a world, independent of God, complete in itself, and needing no care or help in any emergency, would be a better world than one dependent on him, and needing his care and help. The oak is not necessarily better than the vine.¹ The greatest independence of the creature conceivable might not be the best thing for the universe, embracing both Creator and creatures. And, if a universe comprehends in itself created beings who are moral, and are to be trained by moral influences, it cannot be shown that a need of divine interposition, making natural forces bend to the exigencies of moral order, would be an imperfection.

¹ Butler (J.) "Analogy," Part II. ch. 3. "Just as if," says John Foster, "the order of nature had been constituted by some other and greater Being, and *intrusted* to the Almighty to be administered, under an obligation never to suspend, for a moment, the fixed laws." — "Christian Morals," p. 216.

(b) The Christian doctrine of miracles assigns them a place in the eternal plan of God. He is supposed to introduce them whenever, and only when, the highest order and good of the universe require them. "They are consequents palpable to the eye, but whose antecedents belong to the infinite laws of order which you cannot measure, since they are out of sight. The same consequents were never given before, because the same antecedents were never given."¹ Hence, moral law or reason, instead of mere physical force, bears rule in all worlds. "*Lex est perpetua voluntas Dei*," observes Zwingle. Once admit the existence of a personal Creator, all-wise and most-merciful, and this appears to be the only natural view of his relation to the universe.

(c) Miracles do not violate the essential order of nature, — *the law of cause and effect*. They only suppose that an invisible power, for an important end, sometimes directs, assists, or overcomes the forces of nature. The action of the human will does this on a small scale; and there can be no absurdity in supposing that the action of the divine will may do the same on a larger scale, for a sufficient reason. No force of nature is dishonored by being overcome by a greater force; and no one can doubt that moral order is a higher good than physical order.²

4. *The view that God is a blind force immanent in nature renders the idea of miracles absurd.* This statement is unanswerable. If there is no personal God, miracles are incredible. If nature is all, then the forces of nature will always have their way. Hence, Baur and Strauss, resting on their denial of any God but nature, were consistent in denying the possibility of miracles. Pantheism is *per se* a rejection of the Christian religion; but Pantheism is false, and inferences from it are worthless.

It should be recollected that the objections against mir-

¹ Sears (E. H.) "The Fourth Gospel, the Heart of Christ," p. 24.

² Chalmers (T.) "Institutes of Theology," I. p. 170, note; Channing (W. E.) "Dudleian Lecture on the Evidence of Revealed Religion," Works III. p. 105 sq.; Smith (H. B.) "Am. Presb. and Theol. Rev." for 1864, p. 143.

acles, if valid at all, are conclusive against a supernatural revelation of the divine will in any form, and that the occurrence of a single miracle establishes the worthlessness of these objections. If Christ really existed as a supernatural being, or if he rose from the dead, according to the Gospels, the objections which we have been reviewing have no force at all. In evidence of the fact that such a person as Jesus Christ lived in Palestine, and was crucified under Pontius Pilate, we may appeal to the entire New Testament, and, indeed, to the existence of Christianity. The fact is not now denied. In evidence of the fact that Jesus Christ was a supernatural being, we may appeal, in like manner, to the plain testimony of the Gospels and the other books of the New Testament. The fact can only be denied by mutilating the Gospels, by arbitrarily rejecting their testimony on certain points, while it is admitted on others. — See “Part V. ch. 1. The Deity of Christ.” In evidence of the resurrection of Christ from the dead, our appeal is also to the New Testament. This evidence has been most strenuously assailed, but without success; for it is invulnerable.

We hold, therefore, that all objections to occasional miracles for a high moral end are futile; but we concede the propriety of carefully scrutinizing the evidence for an alleged miracle before admitting its reality. For it is perfectly true that a miracle, viewed as a mere phenomenon of nature, is improbable. Were it not, it would be useless in connection with a supernatural word from God. “So far as a miracle, in itself, and apart from its relations to a special divine intention, is probable, just so far does it lose its usefulness as a sign of God’s interest in that word.”¹ What, then, can be said of the testimony offered by the evangelists to the wonderful works of Christ?

(1) The number of witnesses is ample. (2) Their integrity is above suspicion. (3) Their powers of observation and memory were excellent. (4) The phenomena which they

¹ Park, in Smith’s “Dict. of the Bible,” Am. ed.

attest were sensible. (5) Their testimony itself is positive. (6) Their testimony is independent. (7) Their testimony is substantially harmonious. (8) Their testimony makes the teaching of Christ grow naturally out of his miracles. (9) The aim of Christ's miracles was Godlike. (10) The references to attendant circumstances are numerous and accurate.

Now, it is perfectly evident that this testimony is decisive, provided miracles are not rationally impossible or absurd; for it is of the very best kind, and there is no rebutting testimony. No one who was present pretends to deny the events recorded by the evangelists; and only a person who was present could bear witness that such events did not then and there take place.

But, as we have seen, miracles are not absurd; they are not even, in all circumstances, improbable. Says Paley, "Miracles are no more improbable than these two propositions: (1) That a future state of existence should be destined by God for his human creation; and (2) That, being so destined, he should acquaint them with it." Says Mill, "The only antecedent improbability which can be ascribed to the miracle is the improbability that God would interfere with the regular course of events to perform it."¹

It appears, therefore, that if the welfare of his creatures can be promoted, on the whole, by miracles, God, as wise and benevolent, may be supposed to work them, and to work as many of them as will, in the highest degree, promote this end. Beyond that limit, he cannot be supposed to go; unless, indeed, his own glory may be conceived of as another end to be secured by miraculous interposition. Perhaps it is unnecessary for us to attempt any separation between these ends; they may exactly coincide: whatever tends to secure one of them may equally tend to secure the other.

Conclusion.—In view of the facts which we have thus drawn from trustworthy records of Christ's life, we must pronounce him INFALLIBLE, and receive all his words as

¹ See also Professor Harris (S.) in *Bib. Sac.* XIII. p. 279, and Professor Lewis (T.) "Divine Human in the Scriptures," p. 149.

true; for these facts cannot be reconciled with the hypothesis that he was either a *deceiver* or *self-deceived*. They are intelligible and credible only on the supposition that he was what he claimed to be,—a *humble, holy, INFALLIBLE Being*.

III. THESE RECORDS PROVE THAT CHRIST PROMISED THE INSPIRATION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT TO HIS APOSTLES, BY WHOM, WITH SOME OF THEIR ASSOCIATES, THE NEW TESTAMENT WAS WRITTEN.

In this statement the word "inspiration" is used as a theological term, to signify a work of the Spirit upon the mind, rather than upon the heart; upon the intellect, rather than upon the affections. In other words, it denotes a work of illumination, rather than a work of conviction or of sanctification.

The promise referred to in this statement may be found in John xiv. 15-17, 26; xv. 26, 27; xvi. 7-15; Acts i. 5, 8; Matt. x. 19, 20; Luke xii. 11, 12; and it may be said,—

(1) *To embrace several particulars.* Thus the Holy Spirit was promised,—(a) As one who would abide with the apostles as a permanent Helper (John xiv. 16); (b) as one who would recall to their minds the words of Christ (John xiv. 26); (c) as one who would make known to them truth not fully taught by Christ (John xvi. 12); (d) as one who would reveal future events to them (John xvi. 13); (e) as one who would guide them into the whole doctrine of Christ (John xiv. 26; xvi. 13; Acts v. 8); and (f) as one who would give them wisdom and utterance in times of danger (Matt. x. 19, 20; Luke xii. 11, 12).

(2) *To refer primarily to the apostles.* For, (a) It was addressed to them, with no express reference to a wider application (except in John xiv. 16; xvi. 8-11). (b) In certain particulars, it was obviously limited to them (John xiv. 26; xvi. 12). (c) In others, it referred to their special duties (John xv. 26; Acts i. 8). (d) In one case, it had in view their approaching trials (Matt. x. 19, 20; Luke xii. 11, 12). (e) In some of its phraseology, it pointed to a work of the Spirit which was specially needed by the apostles, that is, a work of divine illumination,—(a) by designating

the Spirit three several times as "the Spirit of the Truth" — a title nowhere else given to him; (*b*) by describing him as a Teacher of new truth; and, (*c*) by making him a Revealer of things to come. Diversities of gifts were needed by the church; and the gift which the apostles needed more than any others, at that time, or since, was extraordinary divine illumination.

It may be remarked, that certain expressions in the last discourse of Christ with his disciples are true of all Christians, because the conditions of discipleship were the same for them and for others.

Moreover, certain expressions in Matt. x. show that Christ adapted his words to the circumstances and needs of the apostles after his own death. Their temporary mission was typical of their permanent work.

It may also be remarked, that Paul was a "called apostle," and, therefore, entitled to a fulfilment of Christ's promise to the eleven. For, (*a*) he claimed to be an apostle (Rom. i. 1; 1 Cor. i. 1; ix. 1; and often). (*b*) His claim was recognized by other apostles (2 Pet. iii. 15, 16; 1 Pet. i. 12; Gal. ii. 6-9). (*c*) Miracles were wrought at his word (Acts xiv. 3; xix. 11, 12; xx. 9-12; xxviii. 3-6; 2 Cor. xii. 12).

That the promise in question was specially meant for the apostles may also be inferred from several other considerations; for example, —

(*a*) From their own interpretation of it (Acts ii. 16-33; iv. 8; v. 32; x. 19; xi. 12; xiii. 9; xv. 28; xvi. 6, 7; 1 Cor. ii. 10 sq.; Gal. i. 11, 12; Rev. i. 1 sq.; 1 Tim. iv. 1).

(*b*) From their professing to speak the word or command of God (1 Cor. ii. 13; 1 Thess. ii. 13; iv. 15; 2 Thess. iii. 1; 2 Cor. i. 18 sq.; Col. iii. 16; 1 John ii. 14; 1 Tim. i. 1; Titus i. 3; 1 Cor. vii. 25; Rom. xvi. 26; x. 17; Col. i. 25; 1 Pet. i. 23; Eph. iii. 3, 5, 8; Gal. i. 11, 12).

(*c*) From the authority with which they speak, — as if they knew the will of God. Thus Paul, in 1 Thess. iv. 2; 2 Thess. ii. 15; iii. 4, 6, 10, 12, 14; 1 Cor. vii. 17; v. 3-5; Gal. i. 8-9, claims inspired authority; which, however, as he intimates, only puts him on a level with the older apostles.

(d) From their recognition of the divine authority of the Old Testament, while putting their own teaching on the same plane with it (1 Pet. i. 10–12; 2 Pet. i. 19–21; 2 Tim. iii. 16–17; (cf. Rev. xxi. 14); Acts ii. 15 sq.; and Eph. ii. 20; Heb. ii. 4; 2 Pet. iii. 15, 16).

(e) From the plenitude of spiritual gifts which they possessed, enabling them to direct even inspired teachers (Acts viii. 26, 29; (cf. x. 19); xi. 28; xiii. 2; (cf. xvi. 6, 7); xx. 11; 1 Tim. iv. 14; Matt. xvi. 17; 1 John ii. 20; 1 Cor. xiv. 18, 36, 37).

It is, therefore, evident that the promise made by Christ to his disciples was intended primarily and, in part, *exclusively* for them. It is not then directly, and in all its language, applicable to Christians of every age. Yet all Christians may have the full benefit of it mediately; for all may have the assistance of the Spirit in studying the inspired truth of Scripture.

But our third proposition adds, "*by whom, with some of their associates, the New Testament was written.*" And in proof of this, it may be observed, that the best Christian scholars admit that all the books of the New Testament,—except the Gospels of Mark and Luke, the Acts of the Apostles, the Epistles of James and Jude, the Second Epistle of Peter, and the Epistle to the Hebrews,—were written by apostles, and that these were written by associates of apostles. We have proved that the former are inspired, by proving that their writers, the apostles, were inspired; but what shall be said of the latter?

1. *That the books written by associates of the apostles must have had, if necessary, the sanction of the apostles themselves.*¹

¹ See the Articles on Mark, Luke, James, and Jude, and on the books attributed to them, in Smith's "Dict. of the Bible;" McClintock and Strong, "Dictionary of Historical, Ecclesiastical, and Doctrinal Theology"; Fairbairn (F.) "Imperial Bible Dictionary"; Kitto (J.) "Bible Cyclopædia," ed. by W. L. Alexander; Winer (G. B.) "Biblisches Real-wörterbuch"; Herzog "Real-Encyclopædie"; Schenkel (D.) "Bibel-Lexicon"; Wetzer und Welte, "Kirchen-Lexicon"; "Nouvelle Encyclopédie Théologique; Dictionnaire des Prophéties, et des Miracles" (vols. xxiv. and xxv.).

They could have had that sanction by submitting them to the correction of the apostles ; for John, at least, lived twenty or thirty years after they were written. And early tradition asserts that they were, some of them, indorsed by apostles, — as Mark's by Peter, and Luke's by Paul. James and Jude were sons of Mary and brothers of Christ.

(1) Mark is reported by the early Christians to have been the amanuensis, or interpreter, of Peter (cf. 1 Peter v. 13), and to have based his Gospel on Peter's teaching. There is no reason to doubt the substantial truth of this early tradition. Moreover, the Gospel of Mark appears to have been written before the destruction of Jerusalem. But the apostle John survived that event almost thirty years ; and this Gospel could hardly have been circulated without his sanction : the use of it was, however, very early and unquestioned.

(2) Luke is reported by the early church to have been long a companion of Paul, and to have written the Third Gospel and the Acts during his life ; and therefore, we may surely assume, with the benefit of his supervision (cf. 1 Tim. v. 18 ; Luke x. 7). Moreover, both these were, without doubt, in circulation twenty years before the death of John, and must naturally have been approved by him.

(3) The Epistle to the Hebrews was probably written by the direction and under the eye of Paul (whether by Luke or by some one else we cannot tell), and was sent to those addressed as a letter from that apostle.

(4) The Epistle of James was probably written by James, a brother of Christ, who was pastor of the church at Jerusalem, and possessed apostolic influence.

(5) The author of the Epistle of Jude was probably a brother of Christ, and an associate of the apostles ; and his letter was in this case, we can hardly doubt, indorsed by them.

(6) The Second Epistle of Peter was probably written by the apostle : if not, it is spurious, — the work of some unknown writer, and wholly unworthy of a place in the canon. But there is too much evidence, both external and internal, of

its genuineness, to permit us to hesitate in receiving it as a part of the sacred record.

2. *That these associates of apostles, namely, Mark, Luke, James, and Jude,¹ were probably themselves inspired.* For (a) many associates of the apostles were inspired (Acts ii. 17, 18; xi. 27, 28; xxi. 9; I Cor. xi. 4; xiv. 24-34); and, therefore, (b) it is extremely probable that these men were thus qualified for their work. Indeed, it seems to us more probable that these writers were inspired than that they looked to the apostles for an indorsement of their writings. But, loving the truth and anxious to have it delivered to the people in its purity, it is unreasonable to suppose they would have neglected to submit their work to the superior knowledge of apostles, if they were not themselves conscious of divine illumination guarding them from error.

It has now been shown that the New Testament Scriptures were either written or sanctioned by men divinely inspired; it is, therefore, certain that they deserve our respect and confidence as a proper revelation from God. Nay, we may speak of them with propriety as the word of God.

Having reached this conclusion in respect to the New Testament Scriptures, we might proceed at once to make use of them in proving the divine authority of the Old Testament. But it will be better to notice, at this point, *certain objections which are sometimes urged against the conclusion stated above.*

1. Though the writers of the New Testament knew the will of God by the illumination of his Spirit, they may not in all cases have taught faithfully what they knew. Fear, flattery, or ambition may have led them to modify or withhold the truth. Indeed, this appears to have been done by Peter at Antioch, to the great grief of Paul (Gal. ii. 11 sq.).

In reply to this objection, we remark:—

(a) That the general character of the apostles forbids us to suppose that they deliberately taught what they knew to be erroneous. If this be not evident from the tone of their

¹ See Acts xii. 12, 25; xiii. 5, 13; xv. 37, 39; Col. iv. 10; I Tim. iv. 11; Philemon, 24; I Pet. v. 13, and Acts xvi. 10; xx. 5; xxi. 17; xxvii. 1; xxviii. 16.

writings and from what is known of their lives, nothing in the past can be evident.

(*b*) That it is, on the whole, easy and necessary to distinguish between the private conduct and the public teaching of inspired men. This distinction is as old as Augustine, — perhaps older; and no one should hesitate to apply it to the holy apostles, as well as to the ancient prophets. Perfection of character has never been supposed indispensable in order to correctness of teaching. Remember Balaam, Jonah, and even Moses.

(*c*) There is no evidence that Peter taught any thing inconsistent with the gospel except, in a certain sense, by his example. And it is even possible that he hoped to win over the brethren from Jerusalem to better views, by going with them for a time. His fear of displeasing them may have been accompanied by a hope of conciliating and gaining them.

(*d*) There is some evidence, in the use which Paul makes of the occurrence, that Peter admitted the justice of his fellow-apostle's remonstrance, and from that time onward acted in harmony with his own knowledge and conviction of duty.

(*e*) There is no evidence or probability that the Holy Spirit would have granted further assistance to any apostle who, in his teaching, had rejected the light of that Spirit, or that he would have suffered the other apostles to recognize such an one as their peer. We must, therefore, suppose that all apostatized, and yet persisted in claiming what they knew they had forfeited; or else that all proved faithful in their work, and enjoyed the promised illumination of the Spirit therein. The latter is the only reasonable view.

2. In certain instances the New Testament writers appear to have erred in their language through carelessness or passion. Thus, it has been said that Luke antedates the census or enrollment under Cyrenius (Luke ii. 2; Acts v. 37; Josephus Antt. xviii. i. 1); that Stephen exaggerates the time of Israel's bondage in Egypt (Acts vii. 6; Gen. xv. 13;

Ex. xii. 40; Gal. iii. 17), and ascribes an act to Abraham which was done by Jacob (Acts vii. 16); and that Paul spoke ignorantly and in wrath before the Sanhedrin (Acts xxiii. 5).

But, (*a*) Luke was probably correct in his statement about the time of the registration which he had in mind.¹ (*b*) Stephen probably called the whole period from Abraham's entrance into Canaan until the exodus (in round numbers 400 years, but more exactly 430 years, Ex. xii. 40) the period of servitude in Egypt, from its leading and characteristic portion.² (*c*) In Acts vii. 16, the language of Stephen may be explained as elliptical, but intelligible to his hearers, who knew traditionally what had not been placed in the sacred record; or an error may have crept into the text by transcription.³ (*d*) The words of Paul in Acts xxiii. 5: "I wist not, brethren, that he was high priest," may be understood, with Calvin, Alexander, Meyer, and others, as indignant irony.⁴

3. Paul is thought to admit that some of his teaching was not inspired, for example, 1 Cor. vii. 6, 12, 25, 40; 2 Cor. xi. 17; (cf. Rom. iii. 5; vi. 10; Gal. iii. 15.)

In reply, it must be said, that he makes no such admission. For, (*a*) In the first passage, he merely says that he is giving his readers a permission not a command. (*b*) In the second, he gives instruction on a point that Christ had not expressly noticed. (*c*) In the third, he says he has no command uttered by Christ to give them, but rather, and only, his apostolic advice. (*d*) In the fourth, he gives his advice again, adding, "and I suppose that I also have the Spirit of God." (*e*) In the fifth, he acknowledges that he has been compelled to answer fools according to their folly.

IV. BOTH CHRIST AND HIS INSPIRED APOSTLES INDORSED THE OLD TESTAMENT SCRIPTURES AS FROM GOD.

To establish the truth of this proposition, it must be shown

¹ Fairbairn (P.) "Hermeneutical Manual" et Appendix; Tholuck "Bib. Sac." I. 443: "New Englander" for 1870, Woolsey (T. D.)

² Hackett, Alexander, *et alii*.

³ See Hackett, and other commentators, especially the note of Wordsworth.

⁴ See particularly the note of Meyer.

that the Old Testament Scriptures existed in the time of Christ as a well known collection of sacred writings; for some of the books found in the Old Testament are not referred to separately, in the New Testament. Hence we remark:—

1. *That our present Old Testament Scriptures, the Apocrypha excluded, were all written some centuries before Christ.* In support of this statement, we can do no more than appeal to the standard Introductions to the Old Testament; for the presentation of this evidence in detail belongs to the biblical department of instruction.¹

2. *That they were well known at the time of his advent as a collection of sacred writings.* This might be proved by the words of our Saviour and his apostles; but it may also be proved by the testimony of uninspired men. In the preface of the "Wisdom of Jesus, the Son of Sirach," we have the words, "Since so many and great things have been given to us by the law and the prophets, and the books which followed after them, so that it is necessary to praise Israel for learning and wisdom, . . . my grandfather Jesus having applied himself for a long time to the reading of the law and the prophets and the other ancestral books, and having secured great skill in these, was moved also himself to compose something pertaining to learning and wisdom." A little below, the preface speaks once more of "the law and the prophets and the rest of the books."

Again: Josephus, in his work against Apion, remarks that the composition of the Jewish sacred books had not depended

¹ Horne (T. H.) "Introduction to the Critical Study and Knowledge of the Holy Scriptures," last ed.; Hävernick (H. A. C.) "Handbuch der Historisch-kritischen Einleitung in das Alte Testament"; Keil (C. F.) "Manual of Historico-Critical Introduction to the Canonical Scriptures of the O. T."; Bleek (F.) "Einleitung in das Alte Testament: translated also; DeWette (W. M. L.) "Einleitung in die Bücher des A. T." translated imperfectly; Stuart (M.) "Crit. and Hist. Defence of the Old Testament Canon"; and the articles on "Canon of the O. T." and on the several books of the O. T., in Herzog, Winer, Smith, Fairbairn's Kitto, Alexander, McClintock and Strong, and other dictionaries of the Bible.

upon every one's caprice, but upon "the prophets, who had learned the most exalted and most ancient things *according to the inspiration of God*, and had recorded the events occurring in their own times wisely as they happened;" and then (ch. viii.) proceeds thus: "For there are not among us myriads of discordant and conflicting books, but twenty-two only, containing a register of the entire time, *which are justly considered divine*; and, of these, five are of Moses. From the death of Moses until the reign of Artaxerxes, the king of the Persians, who succeeded Xerxes, the prophets subsequent to Moses recorded in thirteen books the things which were done in their own times; and the remaining four embrace hymns to God, and moral suggestions to men. And, from Artaxerxes to our own time, some have indeed been written; but they have not been thought worthy of like faith with those preceding them, because there was no strict succession of the prophets." He adds, in respect to the Sacred Scriptures, "Neither has any one ventured to add any thing, or change them; and it is innate in all Jews, straightway from their earliest origin, to consider these the doctrines of God,—to abide by them, and, if need be, gladly die for them."

The language of Josephus shows, (a) That the Jews had books which they did not consider inspired or sacred. (b) That a prophetic origin or approval was esteemed necessary to render a book sacred. (c) That they did not tamper with their sacred books. (d) That these books were regarded as a completed whole. (e) That none of them were written after the time of Artaxerxes (or Esther).

And it may be remarked, that his use and citation of the Old Testament are said to agree with the canon cited by him.

On the other hand, the words of Jesus, the son of Sirach, show very clearly that the Old Testament was divided into three parts, — the Law, the Prophets, and the Hagiographa. This division is recognized by Christ.

3. *That they were recognized collectively or severally by*

*Christ and his apostles as the word of God.*¹ In proof of this statement, we appeal, (1) To the words of Christ (Matt. xxi. 42; (cf. Mark xii. 10); Matt. xxii. 29; (cf. Mark xii. 24); Matt. xxvi. 54, 56; (cf. Mark xiv. 49); Luke iv. 21; xxiv. 46; John v. 39; vii. 38; x. 35; xiii. 18; xvii. 12; Matt. v. 17-19; vii. 12; xxii. 36-40; Luke xvi. 17; xxiv. 44; xi. 49). (2) To the words of the New Testament writers (Luke xxiv. 27, 32, 45; John ii. 22; xix. 24, 28, 36, 37; xx. 9; Acts i. 16; viii. 32, 35; xvii. 2; xviii. 28; Rom. iii. 2; 2 Tim. iii. 15-17). From these and similar passages, it is sufficiently evident that no one can reasonably accept the New Testament as God's word without accepting the Old Testament as being equally so.

In confirmation of this evidence, we remark, (1) That the Old Testament Scriptures have been found trustworthy as historical records. Indeed, they are distinguished for the impartiality with which they record the faults and sins and disasters of the chosen people, and its heroes. A divine conscience seems to hold them to the strict line of honest history and biography.² (2) That some of them have been proved to be inspired by the fulfilment of prophecy. We refer to the predictions respecting Babylon, Nineveh, Jerusalem, the Jewish nation, and the Messiah, with their fulfilment as described by sacred or profane historians. In the first ages of Christianity, great use was made of this argument.³ (3) That some of them were authenticated by the

¹ Lechler (D. G. V.) "The Old Testament in the Discourses of Jesus," *Chr. Rev.* vol. xxiv. pp. 368-390, 543-574; Fairbairn (P.) "Hermeneutical Manual of the N. T." p. 390 sq.; Davidson (S.) "Hermeneutics," "Quotations from the Old Test. in the N. T."

² Rawlinson (G.) "Historical Evidences of Christianity."

³ See Gifford (E. H.) "Voices of the Prophets"; Smith (R. P.) "Prophecy a Preparation for Christ," and "The Messianic Interpretation of the Prophecies of Isaiah"; Keith (A.) "On the Fulfilment of Prophecy"; Fairbairn (P.) "Prophecy: its Distinctive Nature, its Special Function, and Proper Interpretation"; Hofmann (J. C. K.) "Weissagung und Erfüllung"; Knobel (A.) "Der Prophetismus der Hebræer"; Tholuck (A.) "Die Propheten und ihre Weissagungen"; Davison (S.) "Discourses on Prophecy"; Patton (Wm.) "The Judgment of Jerusalem."

working of miracles. We refer, of course, to such miracles as were wrought at the word of Moses, Joshua, Elijah, Elisha, and others. The argument from miracles is less trustworthy and convincing when founded on those recorded in the Old Testament than it is when founded on those attested by the apostles; but the argument from the fulfilment of prophecy is far more extensive and important as related to the Old Testament than it is as related to the New. (4) That the doctrines of the Old Testament are such as must be referred to a divine source. In respect to God and his relation to man, as well as to all things visible and invisible, their teaching is superhuman.¹

The conclusion which has now been reached is this, — *that the sacred writers were moved and assisted by the Holy Spirit to put on record all which the Bible, apart from errors in the text, now contains.* As to the Old Testament, this is taught by the Saviour and his apostles; and, as to the New Testament, it is established by evidence previously given.

But it is important for us to consider more carefully the nature and extent of inspiration in the sacred writers.²

And, in doing this, we assert, —

¹ See also, "The Religion of the Christ," by Stanley Leathes, an excellent volume of the Bampton Lectures.

² See Dick (J.) "An Essay on the Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures," &c.; Parry (W.) "An Inquiry into the Nature and Extent of the Inspiration of the Apostles," &c.; Haldane (R.) "The Books of the Old and New Testaments proved to be Canonical, and their Verbal Inspiration Maintained and Established;" Carson (A.) "The Theories of Inspiration of the Rev. Daniel Wilson, Rev. Dr. Pye Smith, and the Rev. Dr. Dick proved to be Erroneous;" Gausson (I. R. L.) "Theopneusty; or, the Plenary Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures;" Bannerman (J.) "Inspiration: The Infallible Truth and Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures;" Garbett (E.) "God's Word Written; The Doctrine of the Inspiration of the Holy Scripture Explained and Defended;" Lee (W.) "The Inspiration of Holy Scripture; its Nature and Proof;" Woods (L.) "Inspiration of the Scriptures," Works Vol. I. Lects. IX. to XIV. incl.; Row (C. A.) "The Nature and Extent of Divine Inspiration, as stated by the writers, and deduced from the Facts of the N. T.;" Warrington (G.) "The Inspiration of Scripture; Its Limits and Effects;" Lewis (T.) "The Divine Human in the Scriptures;" Curtis (T. F.) "The Human Element in the Inspiration of the Sacred Scriptures;" Macnaught (J.) "The Doctrine of Inspiration," &c.; Rothe (R.) "Zur Dogmatik;"

V. THAT THE INSPIRATION OF THE APOSTLES AND PROPHETS WAS DIFFERENT IN KIND FROM THAT OF ORDINARY CHRISTIANS.

This is denied by many at the present time. They assert that inspiration has always been proportioned to the spiritual attainments of the subject, and hence that many good men at the present time have even a higher degree of inspiration from God than the ancient prophets or apostles. In opposition to this modern view, and in support of our proposition, we appeal, —

1. *To the impression which the Scriptures as a whole make on the reader's mind.* This is certainly unique, and generally favorable to the claims of the writers; and, when it is so, they are admitted to have had an inspiration altogether peculiar. If those claims are denied, the writers are supposed to have been deceivers or deceived.

2. *To the common belief of Christians in every age since the first.* The adherents of the Papacy claim for the Pope, not an *original* inspiration for the communication of new truth, but simply a *judicial* inspiration, enabling him to recognize and indorse old truth, — the teachings of Christ and his apostles.

3. *To the manifest superiority of the Sacred Scriptures to other religious writings of the same period.* From Peter to Clement, from Paul to Ignatius, from John to Polycarp, from James to the Shepherd of Hermas, the descent is steep and long.

4. *To the equality, at least, of the Sacred Scriptures to Christian writings in any age.* This seems to us very remarkable. It is not so with other branches of knowledge. Ancient works on moral science and political economy, not to speak of natural science, are now worthless, except for history.

Philippi (F. A.) "Kirchliche Glaubenslehre: Erstes Kapitel;" Turretin (F.) "De Scriptura," Vol. I. Loc. II. Quæstiones XVI., XVII.; Gerhard (J.) "Loci Theologici, Tom. I. Loc. I. De Scriptura Sacra;" Oosterzee (J. J. van) "Christian Dogmatics," I. p. 194 sq.; Herzog, R. E. s. v. "Inspiration;" Jalaguyer (P.) "L'Inspiration du N. T.;" Guizot (F. P. G.) "Meditations," I.; Schmidt (W.) "Zur Inspirationsfrage;" Dietzsch (A.) "Die Lehre von der Inspiration der Schrift," in *Stu. u. Kr.* 1869 S. 428 sq.

5. *To the knowledge of future events possessed by many, if not all, the writers.* In this it is perfectly plain that prophets and apostles differed from ordinary Christians. Indeed, the most eminent men of God, since the apostolic age, have been destitute of this knowledge, not being able even to understand some of the biblical prophecies which are to be fulfilled hereafter.

6. *To the miracles which attested the authority of apostles and prophets as teachers of truth.* This peculiar attestation points to something peculiar in their inspiration. Christ appealed to it, Paul relied upon it; and there is no evidence more suitable to convince the mind of a proper revelation from God.

But we are prepared to go yet further, and assert, —

VI. THAT THE INSPIRATION OF THE APOSTLES AND PROPHETS MADE THEM INFALLIBLE TEACHERS OF TRUTH.

And, by “infallible teachers,” we mean those who set forth by voice or pen the will of God in the best manner practicable, — whose teaching the reason of man has no right to modify or reject, but only to ascertain and obey. Rightly interpreted, their teaching is correct so far as it goes. Mr. Campbell very pertinently and forcibly remarks, “It is one thing to say that, because of human limits, what God can reveal of himself to man is to be held to be less than what God is; and it is quite another thing to say, that what God sees it good to reveal of himself to man he cannot truly and effectually reveal through man, — that the medium must more or less color and distort the light passing through it. This, consistently held, makes a revelation to man and a revelation through man impossible. If man cannot transmit light without distorting it, then neither can he receive light without misconceiving it.”¹

In support of this proposition, we appeal, —

1. *To their marvellous accuracy of statement in matters which can be tested.* This is most evident in respect to the New Testament. Of the hundreds of particulars referred to in

¹ Campbell (J. McLeod) “Thoughts on Revelation,” a suggestive work.

that volume, not one can be proved an error. This is a very bold statement, no doubt; and of course it refers to the writings as they came from the hands of inspired men, and not as we have them now in the best editions of the New Testament.

2. *To the remarkable originality and consistency of the Scriptures in their teaching.* For example, (1) In respect to the character of God — his personality, supremacy, righteousness, and benevolence; (2) In respect to the Moral Law; (3) In respect to the sinfulness of man; (4) In respect to the way of human salvation.

3. *To the divine authority which the apostles and prophets claimed for their teaching.* Nothing is more certain than that they professed to speak for God. The prophets of the Old Testament, and the apostles of the New, declared their word to be final, — a message from the living God, which all should hear and obey.

4. *To the supernatural evidence which proved their authority to speak for God.* This evidence consisted in the working of miracles and the fulfilment of predictions uttered by them (Deut. viii. 20–22; xiii. 1–3).

Yet it must be conceded that the evidence for infallible correctness in the expression of religious truth is much stronger than the evidence for such correctness in references to secular affairs. For not only are a vast majority of the passages in which *divine authority is expressly claimed* such as reveal or enforce religious truth, but the admitted object of divine communications from first to last is religious. Beyond question, then, the *teaching* of the Bible is almost wholly religious. All other instruction is ancillary to this.

Yet it is difficult to see how inaccurate representations of history can give just views of divine providence or of human character. And, therefore, upon examination, it will be almost impracticable to draw a line between secular and religious truth in the Bible. Indeed, all events that have found a place in the sacred record appear to have found it by virtue of their relation to the moral government of God.

Looking, then, at the claims of the sacred writers, and at the object for which they were inspired, the argument for their infallibility as teachers of religion is far stronger than that for infallibility in speaking of ordinary affairs; but looking at the way in which they teach,—that is, by frequent reference to ordinary affairs,—it is hard to see how mistakes in the latter will not vitiate the former. We are therefore led to *infer* the correctness of their references to secular matters from their divine authority in teaching religious truth.

As to the psychology, or human side, of inspiration, three remarks are submitted: (*a*) The words which they were to employ appear to have been sometimes given to the sacred writers by inspiration. Prophets and seers of visions were addressed through their spiritual senses. (*b*) The mental powers of the sacred writers were raised and cleared and guided, but not suspended, by inspiration. The action of their bodily senses may have been arrested in cases of ecstasy, but not the action of their mental and moral powers. (*c*) The apostles as well as the prophets received the truth by inspiration gradually, and as they needed it for their work, and not all at once.

These are the elements of our belief on the subject; and it will be seen that they point towards what is called *the theory of dynamical inspiration*. But no one of the prophets or sacred writers has attempted to describe the relation of his spirit to the Spirit of God in times of inspiration. Perhaps he could not. The words which Peter Bayne puts into the mouth of Elijah may be true:—

“ Ask not how I know;
No prophet knoweth how he knoweth God,
Or how he knows that God’s breath moveth him.
I know not how I live, yet cannot doubt
That here I am. The light that showeth God
Burns up both doubt and proof, as the full sun
Quencheth both moon and stars in blaze of day.”¹

¹ Days of Jezebel,” pp. 189, 190. Köster (A.) “Wie verhält sich in der heil. Schrift die Offenbarung Gottes zu der freien Geistesthätigkeit der heiligen Schriftsteller?” St. u. Kr. 1852, 875 ff.

The sources of knowledge open to the minds of inspired men may be specified as follows:—

1. *Revelation.* To this may be referred all their knowledge of future events, and much of the doctrinal truth which they taught.

2. *Observation.* To this may be traced the larger part of the history contained in the Old Testament and in the New; and the value of this part of the Bible depends, in a great measure, on the fact that the minds of inspired men were in a normal state.

3. *Experience.* To this may be traced much of the Psalms, as well as the Lamentations and Ecclesiastes. That the feelings which the sacred writers have expressed, for example, in the Psalms, were right in the circumstances may be inferred:—

(a) *From the general character of the Psalms.* The views which they express of God, of man, of sin, of righteousness, are manifestly of divine origin; and the religious emotions which they utter have called forth a response from the best Christians in every age.¹

(b) *From the quotations of the Psalms in the New Testament.* They are quoted very often, and in no case with any hint of their being marred by human imperfection.

(c) *From the want of any criteria by which the right and wrong sentiments supposed by some to be in them can be discriminated.* For the psalms are separate productions, every one complete in itself, and no one laying down rules by which others are to be judged. In every case the materials for correct interpretation are to be sought in the psalm itself.

4. *Study.* This was evidently a source of knowledge to some of the sacred writers. From the preface to Luke's Gospel, we learn that he obtained his accurate knowledge of our Saviour's history by careful investigation. He may have been inspired to collate and select the testimony; but he un-

¹ Chambers (T. W.) "The Psalter; A Witness to the Divine Origin of the Bible."

questionably obtained his information from others and by faithful inquiry. The same may be said of other sacred writers.

In view of what has now been stated, we claim that our theory of inspiration accounts for all the phenomena of the Bible better than any other, — for its varieties of style as well as numerous writers; for its verbal discrepancies, as well as essential harmony; for the personal feelings and tastes which are revealed by its writers; and for a thousand traces of high yet free spiritual action on their part. How any one can read the New Testament, the Book of Revelation excepted, and doubt whether its writers speak with conscious freedom, and also with conscious authority, passes our comprehension. The letters of Paul are intensely *natural* and equally *super-natural*: the Word was made flesh without losing its heavenly truth and power.

Before leaving the present topic, we must refer to a few objections to our view.¹

The Bible, it is said, cannot be the infallible word of God: —

I. *Because a belief in its infallibility leads to bibliolatry.* This is a mistake. The student of nature believes her testimony to be infallible, yet he is not led by this belief to pay religious homage to nature. And the same is true of those who accept the teaching of the Bible as infallible; they recognize the duty of worshipping God, and him only.

II. *Because this belief retards the progress of science.* Men, it is said, are rendered by it suspicious of the discoveries of science, and slow to give it their support. This is also a mistake. Believers in the truth of the Scriptures believe in the truth of nature also, and encourage the highest schools of learning. They may be slow to receive scientific views which appear to be inconsistent with what they suppose the Bible teaches; but they have no fear of true science, no desire to prevent men from studying the works of God in nature.

III. *Because infallibility in the original Scriptures requires*

¹ Birks (T. R.) "The Bible and Modern Thought."

for its complement infallibility in all copies, translations, and, some would say, interpretations of them. For otherwise, we are told, the benefit of infallibility is lost to all but the primitive readers. But this, again, is a mistake; for the errors from transcription, translation, &c., are such as can be detected, or at least estimated, and reduced to a *minimum*; while errors in the original revelation could not be measured.

IV. *Because it has much obscure language.* The object of a supernatural revelation is to make known important truth: hence words will be used, not to hide, but to express thought; and we have a right to expect the clearest language possible.

This objection is plausible, but unsound; for the obscure language of Scripture may be due (1) To a transcendent element in the objects or events referred to; (2) To its truth to nature and history; (3) To its adaptation to the first recipients; (4) To its adaptation to special ends, distinct from that of teaching; (5) Adaptation to man at every stage of human history; (6) Adaptation to man as under probation.

V. *Because it sometimes uses unsound arguments.* It is admitted by some that the leading ideas of Christianity were supernaturally revealed to the sacred writers; but the subordinate ideas, and the arguments used, are said to be the fruit of their unaided reason, and so not the word of God. This, however, is a mistake. Neither Christ, nor any one of his apostles, can be shown to have argued sophistically. Sometimes, indeed, an argument may not be stated in full; for example, Matt. xxii. 23, sq.; but it is never unsound. — See also Gal. iii. 16.

VI. *Because it admits to some extent false interpretation.* Many passages of the Old Testament, it is said, are incorrectly interpreted by writers of the New Testament: hence their words are not infallible. But it is to be observed (1) That the language of the Scriptures is confessedly obscure in many places; (2) That some of these are the very passages said to be misinterpreted in the New Testament;

and (3) That the New Testament writers believed in the divinity of the Old Testament, and interpreted it accordingly.¹

VII. *Because it teaches scientific errors.* In reply to this charge, it may be remarked, that all references to matters of science in the Bible are (1) Merely incidental and auxiliary; (2) Clothed in popular language; and, (3) Confirmed by consciousness, so far as they relate to the mind. Remembering these facts, we say that the Bible has not been shown to contain scientific errors. — Astronomy, geology, ethnology.

VIII. *Because it teaches historical errors.* On the supposed historical errors of the Bible, we remark, (1) They relate, for the most part, to matters of chronology, genealogy, numbers,² &c. (2) Transcribers are specially liable to mistakes in copying numbers, names, &c. (3) Different names for the same person, and different termini for the same period, are quite frequent. (4) Round numbers are often employed for specific. Making proper allowance for these facts, we deny that historical errors are found in the Bible.

IX. *Because it contains contradictory statements.* On this we remark, (1) That statements may be contradictory in words, but not in sense. "Answer not a fool," &c. (2) They may seem to be contradictory in sense when they are not: for example, the unity of God and the Trinity; Paul and James on justification. (3) They may be contradictory in sense, but not in moral bearing; for example, rest on the Sabbath, yet extra work for priests. Moses and Christ on divorce. Bearing in mind these facts, it will be impossible for us to find in the Bible any contradictions which mar its excellence.³

¹ Barrows (E. P.) "The Quotations of the N. T. in their relation to the question of Inspiration," *Bib. Sac.* xxx. pp. 305-322; Fairbairn (P.) "Hermeneutical Manual," Part Third; Scott (J.) "Principles of N. T. Quotation established and applied to Bible Science"; Reinke (L.) "Zur Erklärung des A. T." Bd. II. und IV.

² *Bib. Sac.* xxx. p. 323. sq., Gardner (F.) "The Chronological value of the Genealogy in Gen. V.," Reinke (L.) "Zur Erklärung des Alten Testaments" Bd. I.

³ Haley (J. W.) "An Examination of the Alleged Discrepancies of the Bible."

X. *Because it contains false prophecy.* There is none in the Bible uttered by those who are recognized as true prophets. But it is to be noted, (1) That, for obvious reasons, prophecy is more obscure than almost any other kind of writing; and (2) That it is sometimes expressly and sometimes tacitly conditional.

XI. *Because it teaches bad theology.* God, it is said, is represented in the Scriptures as changeful, jealous, revengeful, and, in a word, human. To this we reply, (1) It is due in part to the imperfection of human language and the limits of human thought. (2) It is also due in part to the end sought by the Bible, determining its style. (3) It is so modified by other representations, as to give a fair mind the right impression of God.

XII. *Because it teaches bad morality.* Deception, treachery, revenge, cruelty, lust, are said to be sanctioned by the approved or unproved conduct of good men. This charge rests on two mistakes: (1) A mistake as to the real character of certain acts; (2) A mistake as to the indorsement of other acts by the Bible.¹

In establishing the divine authority and inspiration of the Scriptures, we have established the truth of the Christian religion. Says Bishop Butler, "In the evidence of Christianity there seem to be several things of great weight, not reducible to the head, either of miracles, or the completion of prophecy, in the common acceptation of the words. But these two are its fundamental proofs. . . . Thus the evidence of Christianity will be a long series of things, reaching, as it seems, from the beginning of the world to the present time; of great variety and compass, taking in both the direct and the collateral proofs, and *making up, all of them together, one argument.*" And Davison on Prophecy, remarks: "If contrivance or accident could have given to Christianity *any* of its apparent testimonies, its miracles, its prophecies, its

¹ Hessey (J. A.) "Moral Difficulties of the Bible," First and Second Series; Reinke (L.) "Zur Erklärung des A. T." Bd. I.

morals, its propagation, or its founder, there could be no room to believe, or even imagine, that *all* these appearances of great credibility, could be *united together*, by any such means. If successful craft could have contrived its public miracles, or the pretence of them, it requires another reach of craft to adapt its prophecies to the same object. Further, it requires not only a different, but a totally opposite art to conceive and promulgate its admirable morals. Again, its propagation, in defiance of the powers and terrors of the world, implied still other qualities of action. Lastly, the model of the life of its founder is a work of such originality and wisdom, as could be the offspring only of consummate powers of invention, or rather never could have been *devised*, but must have come from real life. The hypothesis sinks under its incredibility. Each of these suppositions of contrivance being arbitrary and unsupported, the climax of them is an extravagance."

PART THIRD.

THE PERFECTION OF GOD.

Having considered some of the evidence which sustains our belief in the existence of a Supreme Being who is called God, and some of the evidence which justifies our confidence in the Bible as a revelation made by him, we are now to look at the evidence of his perfection, which is offered to us by the Bible and by nature — including the soul of man.

This should be done with profound reverence, — for the Maker of the universe is a being greater and better than we can ever hope to comprehend, — but, at the same time, with holy freedom, because he has made us in his own image, capable of knowing him in part.¹

Nor do we limit God by assigning to him certain distinguishable attributes, — for example, knowledge, goodness, power; for infinite power may be exercised for the worthiest object, as apprehended by perfect intelligence.²

MODES OF GOD'S EXISTENCE.

I. *Unity.* God exists as a single essence or substance. In this respect he is one; and there is no second being of the

¹ Calderwood (H.) "The Philosophy of the Infinite"; Porter (N.) "The Human Intellect," Pt. iii. c. 8. and Pt. iv. passim; McCosh (J.) "The Intuitions of the Human Mind"; Müller (J.) "The True Idea of God," Book iii. c. 4. in "The Christian Doctrine of Sin"; Nietzsche (C. I.) Article "Gott," sec. iii. "Eigenschaften," in Herzog, "Real-Encyclopädie"; Thomasius (G.) "Christi Person und Werk," Bd. i. secs. 7-17; Martensen (H.) "Dogmatics" sec. 46. sq.; Woods (L.) "Lectures," &c., vol. i. lec. xvi.; Oosterzee (J. J. van) "Christian Dogmatics," First Division, vol. i. p. 234 sq.; Charnock (S.) "On the Divine Attributes."

² Against Bruch (J. F.) "Die Lehre von den göttlichen Eigenschaften"; Mansel (H. L.) "The Limits of Religious Thought"; Spencer (H.) "First Principles of a New Philosophy"; Schleiermacher (F.) "Der Christliche Glaube."

same nature. Hence, Dualism, Tritheism, Polytheism, and Pantheism are all inconsistent with Theism. The unity of God is established by the testimony of Scripture (Deut. vi. 4; 2 Sam. vii. 22; Ps. lxxxvi. 10; Isa. xliii. 10; Matt. xix. 17; 1 Cor. viii. 6; Gal. iii. 20; 1 Tim. ii. 5;) and by that of human reason, — one God, or no God.

II. *Independence.* This is affirmed of God in respect (1) To his *existence*, which is underived and absolute. He is the Exister; he has life in himself (Ex. iii. 14; John v. 26). (2) To his *knowledge* (Heb. iv. 13, and passages under *Omniscience, infra*). (3) To his *action* (Gen. i. 1; Acts xvii. 24). (4) To his *happiness* (Eph. i. 11; 1 Tim. vi. 15, 16).

The independence of God is also included in the perfection of his being, which may be inferred from the constitution of the human soul.

III. *Immutability.*¹ In his being, God remains what he is. The idea of his nature is always fully realized, without change or development (J. Müller). He is forever the same in essence, in knowledge, in character, in purpose, in blessedness (Mal. iii. 6; James i. 17; Isa. xl. 28; Ps. cii. 28; Heb. i. 12; xiii. 6). The obvious meaning of these passages must not be denied on account of other expressions which speak of change in God; for the latter are *adaptations* of thought to our weakness.

This view is sustained by just inference from the perfection of God — “He cannot change for the better, because he is best; nor for the worse, because he would thereby cease to be perfect.”

Some have supposed that God is mutable in happiness and in action. But, as to the former, it may be said that omniscience precludes fluctuations of feeling. As to the latter, it may be said, that the mode of God’s action is above the grasp of our understanding. It may be without succession, in him.

¹ Dörner (J. A.) “Ueber die richtige Fassung des dogmatischen Begriffs der Unabveränderlichkeit Gottes,” *Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie*, Bde. I., II., III.

IV. *Eternity.* By this is meant existence without beginning or end.—(See Gen. xxi. 33; Deut. xxxii. 40; Ps. xc. 2; Isa. xli. 4; 1 Tim. i. 17; 2 Peter iii. 8; Rev. x. 6.) Thus far all theists are agreed.

But many also embrace the idea of timeless being in the word eternity as affirmed of God. And this appears to be suggested (1) by such passages as John iii. 13; viii. 58; James i. 17; (2) by the difficulty of seeing how temporal succession could be experienced by a self-existent being; and (3) by the imperfections or limitations which seem inseparable from existence in time.

On the other hand, it must be admitted that the Scriptures generally speak of God as if his life were divisible into periods,—for example, the past and the future,—and that the faculties of the human mind are absolutely unable to conceive of real existence independent of time. If God is a perfect being, however, he cannot grow wiser by growing older. Can he grow older without growing wiser?

V. *Omnipresence.* There is no point in the universe where God is not (1 Kings viii. 27; 2 Chron. vi. 18; Isa. xliii. 2; lxvi. 1; Jer. xxiii. 23; Amos ix. 2; Ps. cxxxix. 6–12; Acts xvii. 27, 28; Matt. xxviii. 20). In many places of Scripture God is represented as filling immensity; but in other places he is represented as simply *present* everywhere. The omnipresence of God is best understood in the light of his spirituality, to which we now pass.

VI. *Spirituality.* (1) *Positively:* God is a real being, and one that acts as well as exists. He is therefore something more than a condition of being, like space or time, and more than simple action—*actio purissima*; he is an agent, an actor, a *fons actionis*. Moreover, he is a living being; for spirit is always in a certain sense life (John vi. 63; Gen. i. 2; Luke viii. 55; 1 Cor. xv. 45; 2 Cor. iii. 6; Rev. xiii. 15). (2) *Negatively:* God is an immaterial being (Ps. cxxxix. 7; John iv. 24; Ex. xx. 4; Isa. xl. 25; Rom. i. 20; Col. i. 15; 1 Tim. i. 17). The language of Ps. cxxxix. 7, and of John iv. 24, appears to account for the omnipresence of God, by the

fact of his spirituality. And this is reasonable; because matter by its very properties presupposes the existence of space as a condition of its own existence; while spirit does not. There seems to be no evidence that spirit fills any part of space, or that the infinite Spirit is in any way dependent on space.

VII. *Personality.* God is a personal being, one who knows, feels, and wills. This is proved (1) By the direct testimony of Scripture. Every attribute and action of a personal being is ascribed to him. (2) By the indirect testimony of Scripture; which is to this effect, that man was made in the image of God, and man was personal the first day of his life. Besides, personal life is the highest life.

VIII. *Trinity.* God is a tri-personal being; for the Scriptures reveal (1) The deity of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, respectively (John i. 1; Acts v. 3, 4). (2) Their mutual knowledge and love (Matt. xi. 27; 1 Cor. ii. 10; Matt. iii. 17; John iii. 35; iv. 34; v. 30; Rom. viii. 27). (3) Their distinct, yet relative offices (1 Cor. xii. 4-6; Eph. ii. 18-20). Remarks. (a) A distinction is to be made between what is *above* and what is *against* human reason. (b) The words "person" and "personal" are modified by the essential unity of the Godhead, and only signify that the distinction is of a *personal nature*. (c) There is no manifest contradiction between an assertion that God is one in essence and an assertion that the Godhead is tri-personal. (d) The doctrine of the tri-personality of God assists us to comprehend in some measure his self-sufficiency and his love.¹

"God from eternity is love. But if love is communion, if its nature is self-surrender, he cannot exist without having an object to which he gives himself. If he were self-satisfied, self would rule in his nature; and he would be the principle of all egoism. He needs another self to whom he may give himself. But what self could satisfy him,—could be one

¹ Weisse (C. H.) "Zur Vertheidigung des Begriffes der immanenten Wesens-trinität," in St. u. Kr. 1841, 345 ff.; Köster (F.) "Nachweis der Spuren einer Trinitätslehre vor Christo," in St. u. Kr. 1846, 436 ff.

whom he could make a sharer of all his glory, and in whom his life could find its all? To be satisfied, love longs for an equal. As God has not his equal, he can, therefore, in an original and perfect way love only himself; but himself, not in his own, but in another self, — in a self which is like himself, and in concrete nature one with himself. This is the Son. But the Son, because spirit and equal with the Father, is, like the Father, love. Whom does the Son love? Whom, but the Father? The Father loves the Son, the Son the Father. Their love is mutual.

But it is a law that true mutual love unites in a third. One would be bound up in another, and lose itself in him, if in self-surrender it found its all in him. Both remain free in their perfect self-surrender, if a third, equally dear to both, comes in. The bond of friendship is consecrated, if the two friends seek a common end. And, the higher this end, the nobler and firmer the bond. However inward the mutual love of husband and wife, it tends to pass beyond them to a third, and, indeed, to a third like themselves, — personal, on which their common love may rest. First in the child, the peculiar family blessing, does the marriage life become complete. And the same law rules in divine love. The mutual love of the Father and the Son only becomes perfect self-communication in a third. And, since it is the highest love, it demands the highest object, — one that is no less than divine. Can it be the common, divine nature, in which their love rejoices? Love is only satisfied perfectly in an ego. And so the love of God is not without a third ego in the common concrete nature, — is not without the Holy Spirit.”¹

ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.²

In considering the attributes of God, it will be convenient to follow the ordinary analysis of man’s spiritual powers — intellect, conscience, sensibility, and will.

¹ Slightly condensed from Schöberlein (L.) “Die Grundlehren des Heiligtums entwickelt aus dem Princip der Liebe,” s. 22 sq.

² Jackson (T.) “A Treatise on the Divine Essence and attributes;” Macculloch (J.) “Proofs and Illustrations of the Attributes of God.”

I. *Omniscience.* God knows all objects and events that ever have been or ever will be, either actual or possible. His understanding is infinite. In proof of this statement, our appeal may be made (1) To the testimony of Scripture. (a) 1 Kings viii. 39; Ps. cxxxix. 2, 11, 12; Jer. xvi. 17; Luke xvi. 15; Rom. viii. 27; Heb. iv. 13. (b) Isa. xlii. 9; Ex. iii. 18 sq.; Jer. i. 5; Ps. cxxxix. 16; 1 Sam. xxiii. 10-13. (2) To the testimony of reason. For omniscience is presupposed by the perfection, and assured by the eternity and omnipresence of a personal being.

It may also be remarked, (a) That the knowledge of God is intuitive, independent, complete, and timeless; and, (b) That it is consistent (1) with a real though derived energy in physical causes; (2) with a real though limited freedom in voluntary causes; and (3) with purpose and election on the part of God. Cicero denied the second position thus: "If all future events are foreknown, they will occur as they are foreknown; and, if they will occur in this order, the order of events is certain to the foreknowing God; and, if the order of events is certain, the order of causes is certain; for nothing can take place which is not preceded by some efficient cause. But, if the order of the causes of all events is certain, all events come to pass by fate. If this be so, there is nothing in our power, and there is no choice of will." — ("De Fato et Divinatione," ii. 5-7).

And to his argument, Augustine thus replies: "It does not follow, that, if the order of all causes is certain to God, nothing depends on the choice of our will; for our *volitions themselves* are in the order of causes, which is certain to God, and foreknown by him, inasmuch as human volitions are the causes of human deeds. Hence, whoever knows all the causes of events cannot be ignorant of our volitions, as being also among those causes. So, then, we are by no means compelled, either, retaining the foreknowledge of God, to remove choice of will, or, retaining choice of will, to deny God's foreknowledge of future events; but we embrace both, — one, that we may believe well; the other, that we may

live well." — ("De Civ. Dei," v. 9, 10.) This reply may not be wholly satisfactory; yet it probably states the truth with sufficient accuracy.

II. *Righteousness.* This attribute of God answers to a perfect conscience in man, and is the source of moral law to all created moral beings. Some writers prefer to call it holiness; and the only objection to this is the circumstance that the term holiness appears to be used in certain passages of Scripture to denote the sum total of moral perfections in God, and is therefore equivalent to righteousness and benevolence.

In proof of God's righteousness, we appeal (1) To the Word of God, (*a*) Ps. xi. 7; xv. 1; xxxiii. 5; xlv. 8; Lev. xix. 2; Isa. vi. 3. (*b*) Deut. xxxii. 4; Ps. xcvi. 2; cxlv. 17; Rom. ii. 13; vii. 12. (2) To reason; for this attribute is comprehended in our idea of perfection. (3) To conscience; for we are often reminded by this inward monitor that God is displeased with sin. (4) To our religious instinct; which requires righteousness in the object of worship.

It may also be remarked, (*a*) That the *justice* of God is his righteousness, as expressed in moral government. (*b*) That righteousness cannot be sacrificed to benevolence. (*c*) That, from different points of view, the righteousness and benevolence of God may in all cases seek the same things, and, thus acting, neither of them be any check upon the other. (*d*) That the words, anger, fury, vengeance, &c., when applied to God, denote no effervescent passion, but an eternal and unchangeable hatred of moral evil. (*e*) That such expressions do not exaggerate God's hostility to sin.—(Lac. De Ira V. 9). And (*f*) That temporal calamities do not generally prove that those who suffer them are specially guilty in the sight of God (Job i.; Luke xiii. 2-5; John ix. 1-3; Heb. xii. 6.)

III. *Benevolence.* By this, we mean that God desires the welfare of his creatures, with a desire most powerful and most pure. In proof of this may be alleged (1) The testimony of Scripture (Ps. lvii. 11; cxlv. 9; ciii. 11-13; cxxxvi. 1-26; Isa. xlix. 14-16; Matt. v. 45; vii. 11; Luke xii. 7; John iii. 16; 1 John iv. 8, 18; 1 Tim. ii. 4; 2 Cor. xiii. 11;

Ezek. xviii. 23; xxxiii. 11). (2) The testimony of reason. The moral perfection of God, and the predominance of happiness over misery in the animal world, may be insisted upon in this connection.

It may now be remarked, (a) That the *grace* of God is his benevolence as exercised towards the guilty or the undeserving. (b) That the *mercy* of God is his benevolence, as exercised towards those who are miserable, as well as guilty. (c) That the *patience* of God is his benevolence, as exercised in forbearing to punish the guilty without delay. (d) That the *wisdom* of God is his omniscience, exercised with righteousness and benevolence in securing the best ends by the best means.

IV. *Omnipotence.* God can effect whatever power can effect, under the influence of perfect holiness and love.

In proof of this, we may appeal (1) To the testimony of Scripture (Matt. xix. 26; Luke i. 37; Eph. iii. 20; 2 Cor. vi. 18; Gen. xviii. 14; Jer. xxvii. 5; Isa. xl. 26; (cf. Job. xli. ;) Ps. cxxxvi. 4; Jer. xxxii. 17). (2) To the testimony of reason. The perfection of God, and the creation of the universe, suggest omnipotence in God.

The perfection of God may also be indicated by the following affirmations and negations:—

1. That he is a *living* Being or Spirit, having (a) a *perfect intellect*, which gives in action omniscience. (b) A *perfect conscience*, which gives in action absolute righteousness. (c) A *perfect sensibility*, which gives in action all right feeling and desire. (d) A *perfect will*, which does all that power can do, under the direction of perfect knowledge, holiness, and love.

2. That he is an *infinite* Being or Spirit, and so (a) *Independent* of any other being or force, — uncreated himself, and the creator of all else.¹ (b) *Unconditioned* by time or space,

¹ Mosheim says: “Deus est illa natura, quæ ipsa independens est, et ex qua reliqua omnia pendent”; and, from the independence of God, he proceeds to infer all his other perfections,—unity, spirituality, immensity, eternity, immutability; while from the dependence of all other things upon him are inferred his life, intelligence, and freedom.

which condition all finite being; that is, eternal and omnipresent. (c) *Unchangeable* in essence, in knowledge, in character, and in blessedness.

Query: Is conscience a separate faculty, or simply a peculiar exercise of intellect and feeling?¹

PURPOSE OF GOD.

The word "purpose" is often used to denote the resolve or determination of the mind to seek a particular object. But it cannot be wise for an omniscient Being to make any thing an end of action, unless it is known to be attainable; and, if it is known to be attainable, the means or mode of attaining it must also be known. Accordingly, the purpose of God, embracing both end and means, must comprehend whatever he has determined to do or to permit.²

This is evident from many portions of Scripture, (for example, Acts xv. 18; xvii. 26; Rom. viii. 28; ix. 11; Eph. i. 4, 11; 2 Thess. ii. 13; 2 Tim. i. 9; 1 Cor. ii. 7; Matt. xxv. 34; Acts ii. 23; iv. 27, 28; Ps. lxxvi. 11; Prov. xvi. 4, 9.)

From these and similar passages, it appears that the purpose of God (a) antedates creation; (b) springs from his own good pleasure; (c) embraces all the events of time; and, (d) goes into effect in every instance.

Contemplated from the divine side, such a purpose seems to be reasonable and necessary. How a perfect Being could undertake the work of creation without such a purpose is inconceivable.

But, contemplated from the human side, it appears, at first sight, to be inconsistent with moral freedom and accountability. Whether it is so or not depends, however, upon the

¹ See an elaborate and, in many respects, excellent analysis of the Divine Attributes, as attributes of *Being*, of *Knowledge*, and of *Will*, in Hase's "Huterus Redivivus."—Pt. II. sects. 58, 59, 60.

² Hodge (C.) "Systematic Theology," I. c. ix.; "The Decrees of God"; Balmer (Robt.) "Remarks on the Doctrine of the Divine Decrees," in "Theol. Tracts," iii. 207-17; Baird (S. J.) "The Eternal Plan," in "The Elohim Revealed," ch. II.; Chalmers (T.) "Institutes of Theology," vol. II. Pt. III. c. 3; "Predestination"; Oosterzee (J. J. van) "Christian Dogmatics," vol. II. p. 448 sq.; Princeton Theol. Essays, First Series, "The Decrees of God," 60 sq.

way in which the purpose is accomplished. It may interfere with human freedom no more than does perfect foreknowledge.

The same reply must be made to those who assert that such a purpose on the part of God renders the use of means needless and vain. For there is every reason to believe that this purpose is to be accomplished, in a great measure, by the use of means.

Says Canon Liddon, in a discourse on "Prayer, the Characteristic Action of Religion," "God orders all that happens to us, and, in virtue of his infinite knowledge, by eternal decrees. But he also says to us, in the plainest language, that he does answer prayer; and, that practically his dealings with us are governed, in matters of the greatest importance, as well as of the least, by the petitions which we address to him. What if prayers and actions, to us at the moment perfectly spontaneous, are eternally foreseen, and included within the all-embracing predestination of God, as factors and causes, working out that final result, which, beyond all dispute, is the product of his good pleasure? Whether I open my mouth, or lift my hand, is, before my doing it, strictly within the jurisdiction and power of my personal will; but, however I may decide, my decision, so absolutely free to me, will have been already incorporated by the all-seeing, all-controlling Being, as an integral part, however insignificant, of his one, all-embracing purpose, leading on to effects and causes beyond itself. Prayer, too, is only a foreseen action of man; which, together with its results, is embraced in the eternal predestination of God. . . . That which is to us a free self-determination may be not other than a foreseen element of his work." — Prayer-Gauge Debate, p. 300.

In considering the purpose of God as logically antecedent to his action *ad extra*, it is natural to inquire after the chief end sought by him in that action; for a reasonable being always acts with a view to the accomplishment of some end or ends which are deemed worthy.¹

¹ Edwards (J. Sen.) "A Dissertation concerning the End for which God created the World," "Theol. Tracts," II. 293 sq.; Martin (J.) "The Glory of God as the Great End of Moral Action," in "Theol. Tracts," III. 221-42; Baird (S. J.) "God's Object was to reveal himself," in the "Elohim Revealed," p. 84 sq.

The Scriptures suggest two distinguishable, if not opposite ends, for the attainment of which God undertook the work of creation and moral government, namely, the manifestation of his own glory, and the communication of good to his creatures.

Of the passages which suggest that the end for which God created the world was his own glory, the following may be cited: (Prov. xvi. 4; Rom. xi. 36; Col. i. 16; Heb. ii. 10; Isa. xlvi. 11; xliii. 6, 7; lx. 21; lxi. 3; Eph. i. 5; John xvii. 10; 2 Thess. i. 10-12; 1 Peter iv. 11; Rev. xiv. 6, 7; 1 Cor. vi. 20; x. 31; 1 Cor. i. 26-30; Eph. ii. 8-10.)

Of those which suggest that the end for which he created the world was the good of his creatures, the following deserve attention: (Ps. ciii. 9; Ezek. xviii. 32; xxxiii. 11; Lam. iii. 33; 2 Pet. iii. 9; John iii. 16; Eph. ii. 4; 1 John iv. 9, 10, 16; Gal. ii. 20; Eph. v. 20; Deut. vii. 7, 8; Ps. xxv. 8; xxxi. 17; xlv. 26; 1 Cor. iii. 22, 23; 2 Cor. iv. 15; Ps. cxxxvi. 4-9.)

It is possible to unite these ends, and suppose that the one supreme end and reason for God's action *ad extra* is the manifestation of his glory in the communication of good to other beings. And the fact that we become like him by being animated with love to others leads to a belief that his purpose to manifest his own glory is intrinsically the same as his purpose to create other beings, and impart to them the greatest possible good, and *vice versa*.

But is not the existence of evil, and especially of moral evil in the world, incompatible with this identification? By many, it is asserted to be so; by others, it is denied to be so; and, by still others, it is said that, owing to his limited knowledge, man is unable to determine whether it is so or not.¹

If a universe which contains in it a race of beings able to do wrong as well as to do right is on the whole better, notwithstanding the presence of sin, than a universe without

¹ Ballantyne (John) "On the Origin of Evil"; Bellamy (Jos.) "The Wisdom of God in the Permission of Sin"; Young (John) "Evil not of God"; Barnes (Alb.) "Sin and Suffering in the Universe," in the Am. Presby. Rev. 1869-70; Ernesti (H. F. T. L.) "Ursprung der Sünde."

such a race of beings, the question may be answered in the negative; and this view is required by the scriptural and rational doctrine of God's perfection.

It may then be said that God purposed to originate a universe which would contain beings who could do wrong as well as right, and to use none but moral means in preventing them from doing wrong. His purpose included a permission of moral evil in this sense only — that he would not effectively exclude it from the universe, but not in the sense that he authorized any one to commit sin, or left any moral being in doubt respecting his hatred of sin.

The doctrine of the *divine purpose* tends to fill the soul with adoring thoughts of God, and humble thoughts of self. Yet it is so apprehended by many as to make them feel that God is a "hard master." It should, therefore, be studied with the utmost reverence and trust, and taught with the greatest care, in order that misapprehension may, if possible, be prevented.

“And not alone the natures are foreseen
Within the mind that in itself is perfect,
But they together with their preservation.
For whatsoever thing this bow shoots forth
Falls foreordained unto an end foreseen,
Even as a shaft directed to its mark.”

Dante Paradiso, VIII. 100.

CREATION BY GOD THROUGH THE WORD.

The first act of God in carrying into effect his purpose was that of creation. And by the act of creation is meant an act that originated being, and thereby increased the sum total of force in existence. For while neither the essence nor the power of God was diminished by that act, new being and power, in some sense outside of himself, were brought into existence by it.

This statement is favored (1) By the language of Scripture. (a) John xvii. 5, 24; Eph. i. 4; (b) Matt. xix. 4; Mark xiii. 19; Rev. x. 6; Gen. i. 1; (c) Heb. xi. 3; Rom. iv. 17. Hence (a) there was a time when the worlds were not yet

founded; (*b*) their establishment was a work of God; and (*c*) the visible universe was not formed out of any thing previously existing. (2) By the absolute perfection of God. For the only alternative to it is pantheism or dualism; that is, (*a*) the doctrine that there is no reality except God, or an emanation from God; or (*b*) the doctrine that either matter or spirit, outside of God, is eternal and self-existent.

But, against this view of creation, two objections have been urged, (1) That it is unthinkable, and therefore cannot be true. But many things are credible which are nevertheless unthinkable. And (2) that it supposes a limit to the being of God, and thereby pronounces him finite. But this is a mistake. It rather declares his power and wisdom to be unlimited. No perfection of his nature is abridged by the view; though, if it be correct, he is not the sum total of being.

This first act of God was carried into effect by the agency of the eternal Word (John i. 3, 10; 1 Cor. viii. 6; Col. i. 16; Heb. i. 2, 3). The language of these passages does not mean that God, the Father, exerted through the Word, as a medium, power which did not belong to the Word himself; but that the Word represented and revealed the power of God, the Father, in this act. The acting personality was that of the Word; but he did not act by himself alone: his nature was one with the Father's, and his action was a perfect expression of the Father's nature and will.

Whether matter and spirit were created at the same instant, or at different times, the Scriptures do not affirm. It seems, however, to be intimated that the creation of angels was prior to that of men, and indeed to the present order of the material universe (Job xxxviii. 7; Gen. iii. 1, 24). But it is not, therefore, necessary to suppose that they were created before the substance of which the material universe has been formed was called into being. If creation may be divided into several acts, the following order of succession is probable:—

(*a*) The creation of matter in its primitive state; but what that state was has never been ascertained. Probably, however, matter was endowed at first with the properties which it

now possesses, and was put into such motion that subsequent changes have been, for the most part, natural results of the properties and motions thus given to it.

(*b*) The creation of vegetable and animal life-forces, as soon as the earth, or any other planet, was ready to receive and support them. The evidence in favor of successive creations has not, it seems to me, been met by any equal evidence in favor of progress from race to race by natural development and selection.

(*c*) The creation of men when the earth had been prepared for their reception. And, by men, are to be understood rational, moral, and religious beings, not essentially different from those who now inhabit the earth. The date of man's advent cannot be ascertained with certainty from any statements made by Scripture, or from any facts yet discovered by science.

(*R*) Just where the creation of angels should be placed must be left undecided.

PRESERVATION BY GOD THROUGH THE WORD.

All things created owe their continuance in being to the power of God. Two propositions are embraced in this statement: *first*, that all created things have a being or nature of their own. And, *second*, that this being or nature is forever dependent on God.

The statement is therefore opposed to either a pantheistic, dualistic, or deistic view of the relation which God holds to the world. For pantheism embraces the world in the idea of God, while dualism regards the world as uncreated and antagonistic to God; and deism pronounces the world, once created, perfect and self-sufficient. But the statement given above makes the world real, though created and dependent.¹

In proof of this statement, reference may be made to the following passages of Scripture: (Job x. 12; Ps. civ. 29, 30; Isa. xl. 26, 29; Neh. ix. 6; Acts xvii. 28; Heb. i. 3; Col. i.

¹ Hodge (C.) "Systematic Theology," 1, p. 278 sq.

17.) And from them it is evident that the sacred writers do not represent preservation as equivalent to a perpetual act of creation; but, on the other hand, they clearly distinguish it from simple oversight, care, or direction.

If it be objected that the view here given makes God the upholder of moral evil, since he upholds the evil-doer at the very instant and in the very act of evil-doing, it may be replied, (*a*) That God upholds what he has created, namely, the free moral agent; but he neither upholds, nor has he created, evil-doing. (*b*) That the nature of moral government appears to justify, if not to require, the very course which God pursues; for to give the sinner time to repent is to give him time which he may use in further sin. And (*c*) That God forbids wrong doing, and brings a vast amount of moral influence to bear against it.

The doctrine that all created beings are forever dependent on God for existence, having no absolute life of their own, not only agrees with a certain feeling of dependence which is instinctive in man, but also tends to unite the Christian's heart to God by a sense of unspeakable gratitude. He would not have it otherwise. He delights in the thought that underneath him are the everlasting arms.

PROVIDENCE OF GOD IN CHRIST.

The word "providence" means, primarily, foresight. But as human foresight is associated with plans and efforts to bring to pass certain results, the word "providence" has come to signify the *provision* which God makes for attaining the ends of his government, and so the care which he takes of all his people, indeed, of all his creatures.¹

¹ Baird (S. J.) "The Providential Administration," in "Elohim Revealed," p. 100 sq.; Calvin (J.) "Institutio Christianæ Religionis," Lib. I. c. 16; Davidson (A. D.) "Lectures Expository and Practical on the Book of Esther"; Flavel (J.) "Divine Conduct; or, the Mystery of Providence"; South (R.) I. VIII. "All Contingencies under God's Providence"; Bushnell (H.) "Sermons of the New Life," "Every Man's Life a Plan of God"; Hitchcock (E.) "Special Divine Interpositions in Nature," in Bib. Sac. XI. 776 sq.; Sherlock (W.) "A Dis-

Of course, therefore, his "providence" is but a part of his work in carrying into effect his "purpose;" and a large part of the scriptural testimony to the existence of his "purpose" is proof of his "providence." Provision rests upon a plan. "I believe," says Bacon, "that God. . . doth accomplish and fulfil his divine will in all things, great and small, singular and general, as fully and exactly by Providence as he could by miracle."

The providence of God embraces such particulars as these: (*a*) Direct action of his own in the hearts of men (Matt. xviii. 20; (cf. xxviii. 20); John xiv. 20, 21; Phil. iv. 13; (cf. I Cor. xii. 3); Rom. v. 5; Gal. v. 22; Phil. ii. 13). (*b*) Divine action blended with human, as in prayer (Rom. viii. 26; John xvi. 23; (cf. xiv. 13, 14; Prov. xvi. 1, 9; xx. 24; xxi. 1); Jer. x. 23). (*c*) Divine action adapted to the moral states of men (Gen. vi. 11-13; xviii. 20, 21; xix. 24; (cf. Ex. xix. 16 sq.); Josh. iii. 16; John iii. 10; Heb. ii. 4). (*d*) Divine power over-ruling and using the wickedness of men (Gen. i. 20; Ex. iii. 19-21. (cf. ix. 12); I Kings xxii. 22, 23; Ps. lxxvi. 11; Rom. ix. 17; Isa. x. 5, 7, 12, 15; (cf. Acts xvi. 22-39); Prov. xvi. 4; (cf. Waterland, Vol. V. p. 479 sq.). (*e*) Divine power, using good and evil angels (Ps. ciii. 20; Heb. i. 14; Matt. xviii. 10; Acts v. 19; 2 Sam. xxiv. 1; (cf. I Chron. xxi. 1). (*f*) Divine power, making use of irrational creatures and the elements of nature (Ex. viii. 12, 13, 16, 19; Josh. x. 11; Joel i. 4-12).

In administering his moral government providentially, God sometimes reveals its fundamental principles by laws adapted in form and detail to the condition of those addressed. Thus the laws of the Mosaic economy, in respect to domestic servitude, divorce for other cause than adultery, revenge for injury to kindred, and distinction of clean animals from unclean,

course concerning the Divine Providence"; Charnock (S.) "The Providence of God"; Spurgeon (C. H.) 2d Series, "God's Providence"; Zwingle (U.) "De Providentia Dei," 1530; Leibnitz (G. W.) "Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté d'homme et l'origine du Mal"; Lange (J. P.) in Herzog "Real-Enkyclopädie" s. v. "Vorsehung."

were adapted to the condition of the people as a theocracy for that time.

So close a connection unites all parts and events of the created universe that God's government must be providential over every part and event, or over nothing at all. Hence the propriety of distinguishing between a general and a special providence is doubtful. Perhaps it would be well to characterize the providence of God as special in the case of miracles, gracious in respect to Christians, and particular in all things.

While every event is to be regarded as strictly providential, it is not in all cases easy to ascertain the import of a particular event. But, the more momentous an event is to any person, the more emphatically does God appeal to him by it.

Yet this by no means justifies one in denying the care of God over small events and insignificant beings. Jerome greatly erred in saying, "It is absurd to draw down the majesty of God, so that he know at every moment how many gnats are born, how many die; what a multitude of bugs, fleas, and flies there may be in the earth; how many fishes swim in the water. We are not such foolish adulators of God as that, while we draw his power down to the lowest matters, we are injurious to ourselves, saying that there is the same Providence over rational and irrational beings." Just the view of heathen philosophers!—" *Magna dii curant, parva negligunt*" (Cic. de nat. deor. ii. 66). But the Christian view is well expressed by Ambrose, a contemporary of Jerome: "What architect neglects the care of his own work? Who deserts and neglects what he has thought proper himself to found? If it is unworthy of him to rule it, was it not more unworthy of him to make it?"

No other doctrine of the divine government satisfies the Christian heart half as well as the scriptural one,—that it is throughout providential; and it is strikingly suggested by the words of a pagan writer: "If God will, you are safe, though you swim on a straw."

DOCTRINE OF ANGELS.

It may be premised, (1) that the word "angels" is here used to denote an order of rational beings distinct from mankind; (2) that our knowledge of such beings is derived from the Bible alone; (3) that the Bible speaks of them because of their connection with men in certain relations and events; (4) that Satan and demons will be regarded as fallen angels; and (5) that other applications of the term "angels" will not be considered in this place.—See (a) (Gen. xvi. 7, 10, 13; xviii. 13 sq.); (b) (Eccl. v. 5; Isa. xlii. 19; Mal. iii. 1; 1 Sam. xi. 3); (c) (Ps. civ. 4).

I. *The NATURE of angels*; or, in other words, their *essence*, their *power*, and their *knowledge*.¹

(1) The *essence* or *substance* of angels. It has been commonly believed by Christians that angels are personal beings who exist without bodies. And, in support of this belief, reference is made, (a) To passages of Scripture which call them "spirits: (for example, Heb. i. 14; 1 Kings xxii. 21; Mark ix. 20, 25; Luke xxiv. 39; 1 Sam. xvi. 14, 16, 23; xviii. 10; xix. 9; Luke vii. 21; viii. 2; Acts xix. 12, 15; 1 Tim. iv. 1). (b) To passages which represent them as God's attendants and ministers (Luke i. 19; Gen. xxxii. 1, 2; Deut. xxxiii. 2; Ps. lxxviii. 18; Matt. xxiv. 16; xxvi. 53; Luke xv. 10). (c) To passages which represent them as superior to the known laws of matter (Acts xii. 7; Num. xxii. 23-27, 32, 33; 1 Chron. xxi. 14-16, 27). (d) To passages which represent them as taking possession of men (Matt. xii. 26-29; Luke

¹ See on the whole subject, Ode (J.) "Commentarius de Angelis," 1739; Twisten (A. D. C.) Dogmatik, II. 305-383, in Bib. Sac. I. 768-793, II. 108-140 Mayor (L.) "Scriptural Idea of Angels," in Am. Bib. Repos., Oct. 1838, XII 356-388; Stuart (M.) "Sketches of Angelology in the Old and New Test." Bib. Sac. I. 88-154; Whately (R.) "Scripture Revelations respecting Good and Evil Angels"; Timpson (.) "The Angels of God; their Nature, Character, Ranks," &c., 2d ed., London, 1847; Rawson (J.) "Nature and Ministry of the Holy Angels," N. Y. 1853; also articles in Herzog, Smith, Kitto, Fairbairn, McClintock and Strong; and Theologies; e. g. Hahn (G. L.) Die Theologie des N. T." s. 259 sq.

iv. 33, 35, 36, 41), and many others. Taken by themselves, these passages afford very considerable evidence that angels are bodiless.

But against this belief and evidence, the following arguments have been brought: (a) The words of Christ in Luke xx. 26, which are supposed to prove that angels have bodies similar to those of the glorified saints; for the saints after the resurrection are said to be "like angels." Yet the words of Christ, strictly interpreted, only prove that glorified saints will not marry, because they cannot die; and they cannot die because they are like angels, being sons of God. They may, then, be different from angels, in that they have immortal bodies; while they are like them in the particulars named by Christ.

(b) The words of Jude vv. 6-8, are supposed to attribute a carnal nature to certain angels, and indeed to have reference to the wickedness described in Gen. vi. 2, 4. And it is argued that the expression "sons of God" in the latter passage signifies angels. (1) Because the same expression denotes angels in other parts of the Bible; (for example Job i. 6; ii. 1; xxxix. 7; Ps. lxxxvii. 7; Luke xx. 36). But, it is replied, that pious men are virtually called "sons of God," in the Old Testament; (for example Ex. iv. 22; Deut. xiv. 1; xxxii. 5; Ps. lxxiii. 15; Hosea ii. 2); and that all Christians are represented as "sons of God" in the New Testament; (for example Gal. iii. 26; iv. 5, 6). (2) Because the manifest contrast between "sons of God" and "daughters of men" requires us to interpret the former of superhuman beings,—that is, angels. This contrast, however, is sufficiently marked by supposing the former to have been the pious descendants of Seth; while the latter were the ungodly descendants of Cain. (3) Because this passage, thus interpreted, explains the otherwise unintelligible reference in Jude. This may be admitted, and still the inquiry be raised whether it is not better to leave the reference in Jude obscure and doubtful than to suppose evil angels capable of

the unnatural offence ascribed to them by the proposed interpretation.¹

(c) Many passages of Scripture represent angels as appearing to men in visible forms (Gen. xviii. 19; Luke xxiv. 4; Acts i. 10). To this it may be replied, that in order to appear at all, they must assume a form of some kind, and a human form would be more suitable than any other. Besides, they are represented, also, as eating human food; and, if we infer that their corporeal appearance was normal, shall we not be constrained to infer that their eating of flesh, &c., was also normal?

(d) The existence of finite beings who are incorporeal is said to be absurd. Bodies are necessary to bring them under the laws of space. They must have a material *ποῦ σῶμα* and this must be a living body. But who knows this to be true? Our experience may be of little value in showing the possibilities of existence. With the same boldness, some say that an Infinite Being cannot know or will.²

On the whole, we think the weight of evidence in support of the belief that angels are incorporeal beings is greater than that which favors the opposite belief, — “Adhuc sub iudice lis est.”

2. The *power* of angels. This must be very great, as compared with that of men (Ps. ciii. 20; 2 Peter ii. 10; 2 Thess. i. 7; (cf. Gen. x. 9; Isa. ix. 5). Both of the words in the first passage refer properly to strength or power, — mighty in power, or strong in might. Both of the terms used to define the superiority of angels in the second passage denote power, in the proper sense of the word. And angels are described, in the third, as “the angels of his might,” meaning, those by whom the power of the Lord Jesus will be wielded, or, at least, fitly represented, at his appearing. The texts to be compared illustrate the use of the principal Hebrew term applied to angels in Ps. ciii. 20.

¹ See Hofmann, Baumgarten, Delitzsch, Kurtz, Knobel, Kalisch; and, on the other hand, Keil, Reinke, Vol. V., Calvin, and a great majority of interpreters.

² See Bib. Sac. Oct. 1876, p. 740 sq.

To these statements, and to others of a similar character found in Scripture, may be added the fact that God is often called "Jehovah of hosts," because the angels, as a great army, do his bidding; and, from the way in which this designation is applied, we naturally infer that the soldiers of the heavenly host are mighty and glorious, answering, in some slight degree, and far better than any earthly beings, to the greatness of God. The following passages are also worthy of notice, as they indicate the might of certain angels, if not of all (Rev. v. 2; x. 1; xviii. 21; xx. 1-3).

Yet the power of angels is strictly finite, and, therefore, as nothing in comparison with that of God. They are never represented as sharing in the work of creation; and they are always described as subject to God or to Christ. — (See Heb. i. 14; ii. 5; Jude 9.)

3. The *knowledge* of angels. That this is very great, as compared with that of men in the present life, may be inferred, (a) From the language of Christ, as preserved in Matt. xxiv. 36; Mark xiii. 32; for obviously this language is ascensive or climacteric, assuming a greater knowledge on the part of angels than on the part of men. The belief of the Jews in the time of David is probably indicated by the words of the wise woman of Tekoah to David (2 Sam. xiv. 17, 20); but we cannot appeal to that belief as certainly correct. (b) From the circumstance that they appear to have been for a long time at home with God (Deut. xxxiii. 2; Isa. vi. 3; Matt. xviii. 10; xxii. 30). We do not, it is true, know the time when the angels were created; but it is generally supposed that their creation preceded that of men, if not of the whole visible universe (Job xxxviii. 7). (c) From the devout interest or curiosity which they are said to feel in the work of divine grace (1 Peter i. 12; Luke ii. 13 sq.; Eph. iii. 10; 1 Tim. iii. 16; v. 21; (cf. Rev. v. 11, 12). (d) From instances of demoniac and satanic intelligence recorded in the gospels (Mark i. 24; Matt. v. 1 sq.; (cf. Acts xix. 15).

But it is evident from the same passages that the knowledge of angels is limited, and, in this respect, unlike that of God.

Indeed, it is by no means certain that either good or evil angels can know what are the thoughts of any man by direct intuition, though they may be marvellously sagacious in conjecturing human thoughts. Neither Gabriel nor Satan is to be supposed omniscient or omnipresent.

II. *The CHARACTER of angels.* The word character is here used as a synonyme for moral character, and in this respect they may be said to form two perfectly distinct classes. For, —

1. Many of them are *sinless*. This may be inferred (a) from the epithets applied to them by the sacred writers (Acts x. 22; 1 Tim. v. 21; 2 Cor. xi. 14; (cf. Deut. xxxiii. 2; Zech. xiv. 5). In the second passage referred to, they are called “elect angels”; probably because they hold some such relation to other angels as “the elect” among men do to other men. Elliott says, “With such passages as 2 Peter ii. 4, Jude 6, before us, it seems impossible to doubt that the ‘elect angels’ are those who kept their *first estate*, and who shall form part of that countless host (Jude 14; Dan. viii. 10) that shall attend the Lord’s second advent.” (b) From the place where they dwell (Luke i. 19; vii. 8, 9; Matt. xviii. 10; Mark xii. 25; Rev. v. 11). It is impossible to suppose that impure beings would be represented as having their home with God in heaven. (c) From the worship which they are said to pay unto God (Rev. v. 11; vii. 11 sq.; Isa. vi. 3). (d) From the offices which they are said to perform (Gen. xxviii. 12; Matt. xxvi. 53; Luke xxii. 43; xvi. 22; Heb. i. 14; (cf. Heb. xiii. 2).

As to the present character of this class of angels, the teaching of the Bible is sufficiently explicit. But the history of mankind naturally suggests to us many queries in respect to the history of holy angels; for example, were they ever in a state of probation? Were they once tried, as were our first parents, to see if they would remain obedient to God? An affirmative answer may be given, with some confidence, to this question; both because such a trial seems necessary in itself to the proper training of moral beings under God,

and also because certain angels appear to have fallen away from their allegiance to God. Are they now in a state of probation? Probably not; or, at least, in no other sense than a moral being is always under probation; in no other sense than glorified men will be under probation hereafter. Have they always been holy, or have they been recovered from a sinful state? There appears to be no evidence in the Bible, unless it be the use of the word "elect" in 1 Tim. v. 21, that any of the holy angels were ever guilty of sin; and this adjective is scarcely sufficient to justify us in supposing a fall and recovery of good angels. Is their stability in virtue due, in part, to either angelic or human apostasy? It may be. Beholding the ruin that has overtaken other offenders, they may have been forewarned, and, seeing the wonders of redemption, they may have learned to love more than they otherwise would. Is their blessedness due at all to the work of Christ? Probably, yea, certainly, it is; for they take a profound interest in his work and the glory of his kingdom; but it is unsafe to infer, from Eph. i. 10 and Col. i. 20, that they have any need of the atonement as a means of redemption. These passages, however, indicate the unity of God's moral government, and the reason why some knowledge of angels is given to men.

2. Many of them are *sinful*. This may be learned (*a*) From the *epithets* which are applied to them; (for example Matt. x. 1; Mark iii. 11; Luke ix. 42; Matt. xii. 45; Luke viii. 2; Acts xix. 12-16). (*b*) From the place where they are said to dwell; (for example 2 Peter ii. 4; Jude 6; Luke viii. 31; Matt. xxv. 41; Rev. xx. 7, 10). (*c*) From the work which they are said to perform; (for example Job i. 6-9; ii. 1 sq.; Zech. iii. 1, 2; 1 Sam. xvi. 14; xviii. 10; 1 Kings xxii. 21 sq.; Zech. xiii. 2; Rev. xii. 10; Matt. xiii. 39; Luke viii. 12; John viii. 44; xiii. 2; 1 Tim. iii. 7; 2 Tim. ii. 26; 1 Peter v. 8; Eph. vi. 11, 12; 1 Tim. iv. 1).

Several queries are also suggested by the language of Scripture in respect to evil spirits; for example, (*a*) Are demons, together with Satan, fallen angels? We have

assumed this to be the meaning of Scripture, and would refer to the following passages in support of our assumption: (2 Peter ii. 4; Jude 6.) But some have insisted that Satan was never a holy being, appealing to the following passages: (John viii. 44; 1 John iii. 8; Rev. xii. 9.) It is, however, incorrect to suppose that the phrase, "from the beginning," as used by John, refers to any other beginning than that spoken of in Gen. i. 1. The sinfulness of Satan antedates that of mankind. He has been known to our race in no other character than that of a tempter and seducer. To suppose that he was created morally evil is absurd; and to suppose that he is uncreated is to deny the supremacy of God. The only view consistent with biblical monotheism is that of his early apostacy; and, if he apostatized, so also did all his angels, — that is, the demons.

(*b*) Are they all doomed to eternal punishment? The Bible appears to render this certain (Matt. xxv. 41; 2 Peter ii. 4; Rev. xx. 2, 3, 10 (cf. Eph. i. 10, 21, 22; Col. i. 20; 1 Cor. xv. 25). The passages inclosed in parenthesis have been thought by some to predict a final restoration of all beings, including fallen angels, to the favor of God; but they do not seem to me to warrant such a view.

(*c*) Has the recovery of their forfeited state ever been possible? The Bible nowhere intimates that it has; while the most natural inference from the language of Peter and Jude is, that it has not. Many modern critics affirm that the language of Peter and Jude can only be reconciled with that of other parts of Scripture, by supposing that some of the apostate angels have been kept in close confinement since their fall, while others have been allowed to roam abroad and tempt mankind. But this view is precarious; and, even if it were correct, it would not prove that any offer of pardon has been made to the unconfined apostates. Besides, the Bible seems to assign the first place in evil to Satan, who is certainly represented, as in some sense, free to wander up and down the earth, tempting mankind. Perhaps tartarus is not so much a place as a state, and the confinement not so much local as moral and providential.

(*d*) In what did the peculiar enormity of their original sin consist? Any reply to this must be conjectural. It is evident, however, that one, at least, of the angels must have sinned without being tempted thereto by any living being; but it is improbable that this was the case with all. Hence, the enormity of their sin must be sought in something else. Perhaps it was in this, that they had greater knowledge of God than was possessed by Adam and Eve,—a knowledge due either to their longer life before sin, or to their closer relation to God, or to both these circumstances combined.

(*e*) Have we any right to say that their sin was greater than that of our first parents? Either their sin was greater, or some other circumstance rendered the course which was taken with men less appropriate for them. The government of God is always determined by sufficient reasons. It is holy and wise.

III. *The EMPLOYMENT of angels.*

1. Of *good* angels. This is indicated (*a*) By the *names* which are given to them in the sacred record: in Hebrew, מַלְאָכִים, properly an abstract noun, signifying execution, service, sending, but generally used as a concrete, meaning (1), messenger, and (2) messenger of God; in Greek, ἄγγελος, signifying also (1) messenger, and (2) messenger of God. It is to be observed that Hebrew names were often significant of the office or character of those to whom they were given. In this case, obviously, the name was derived from the office or employment,—that is, from the employment of this order of beings with reference to men. But it would be a hasty inference should we say that, because they are called angels, their time is mostly given to the work of bearing messages from God to his creatures. In respect to men only can their name justify such an inference. As known by men, they are God's messengers.

The same is proved (*b*) By the *actions* ascribed to them by the same authority.—See 1 Kings xix. 5; Matt. i. 20; ii. 13, 19; Luke i. 11 sq.; Acts v. 19; viii. 26; xii. 7; Heb. i. 14; Ps. xci. 12; Deut. xxxiii. 2; Ps. lxxviii. 18; Acts vii. 53;

Gal. iii. 19; Heb. ii. 2. From these passages we conclude that angels were often employed by Jehovah as his messengers to men, that they took some part in delivering the law on Sinai to Moses, and that they execute the will of God among men whenever he pleases, be that will gracious or retributive.

But it has been asserted with confidence (*a*) That particular men or nations or elements are intrusted to the care of particular angels, who are therefore called "guardian angels." (Matt. xviii. 10; Acts. xii. 15; Dan. x. 5 sq. 20, 21; xii. 1; Rev. vii. 1, 2; xiv. 8; xvi. 5; xix. 17.) In Matt. xviii. 10, it is said of believers in Christ that "their angels do always behold the face of my Father who is in heaven"; but this may only signify that the angels who are ministering spirits to Christians dwell in heaven as their home, and are permitted to see God face to face. It does not prove that a particular angel is put in charge of a particular believer; nor does it prove that angels spend most of their time in serving the heirs of salvation. In Acts xii. 15, an expression is used which implies a belief in the doctrine of "guardian angels," and also a belief that each man's angel appeared sometimes in the semblance of the person himself. But we do not know who the speakers were; they may not have been inspired persons; and nowhere else in the Bible is there any trace of this supposed imitation of the form or voice of particular men. — See Wetstein *ad loc.* and the note of Hackett. Owing to the dramatic and symbolical character of Revelation, it seems to be unsafe to rely upon the representations which it gives of angels as literally exact; and therefore the doctrine of tutelary angels is nowhere taught, unless it be in the book of Daniel.

In Dan. x. 21, a heavenly messenger addressing Daniel uses the expression, "Michael, your prince"; and in xii. 1 it is said that "in those days shall Michael stand up, the great prince which standeth for the children of thy people." Here, certainly, a particular angel may be meant, who was charged with the duty of guarding the interests of the chosen people; but whether he did this always, or only at a certain

crisis of their history, is not stated. More exactly, it is only stated that he did this at a certain crisis.

The doctrine of tutelary angels does not, therefore, seem to be clearly taught in the holy Scriptures.

(*b*) It has been supposed that the holy angels are, in some real sense, an organized community, kingdom, or army. — (See Luke ii. 13; Rev. xii. 7; xix. 14; 2 Peter ii. 11; 1 Thess. iv. 16; Jude 9; (cf. Luke i. 19; Rev. viii. 2, 6; Rom. viii. 38; 1 Pet. iii. 22; Eph. iii. 10; Col. ii. 10, 15; Eph. i. 21; Col. i. 16.) Also Eph. iii. 15; Heb. xii. 22, 23.)

From these passages it may be inferred (1) That holy angels do not live and act every one by himself, but rather in sublime order and concert. (2) That some of them are distinguished for wisdom and strength above their fellows, and are, therefore, under Christ, leaders of the celestial host. (3) That these leaders have different degrees of authority, according to their several ability. Hahn classifies them thus: (*a*) Archangels (especially Michael), or those who stand before God. (*b*) Primacies, ἀρχαί. Thrones, θρόνοι, or authorities, ἐξουσίαι. Powers, δυνάμεις. (*c*) Lordships, κυριότητες. (4) That something analagous to tribal or local divisions may exist among them. Yet this is by no means certain. (Eph. iii. 15).

(*c*) It has likewise been supposed that the holy angels are very numerous: (Matt. xxvi. 53; Heb. i. 14; xii. 22; Rev. v. 11; Dan. vii. 9, 10). The word of God, it will be seen, fully justifies the belief referred to. But whether the unfallen angels outnumber the fallen, we can not tell; though it would be pleasant to suppose that they do.

Remark (1) No religious veneration should be paid to angels: (Col. ii. 18; Rev. xix. 10; xxii. 8, 9.)

Remark (2) Neither should they be invoked as advocates of men before the throne of God; for there is one Mediator between God and men; and, besides, angels are not omnipresent.

Remark (3) The doctrine of angels, and especially of good angels, “renders more clear our conception of the all-surpass-

ing majesty of God, — of the divine greatness of the Lord, and of the glory of his yet future appearing. . . It raises man, by reminding him of his exalted rank and high destiny (Matt. xxii. 30). It shames the sinner, by asserting to him the possibility of a normal development of spiritual beings, and at the same time by showing to him their interest in the work of his conversion. It directs the Christian to a lofty source of consolation (Ps. xci. 11. 12); an excellent example (Matt. vi. 10), and a heart-cheering perspective" (Hebrew. xii. 22). Oosterzee.

We come now —

(2) To the *employment of evil* angels, which may be treated briefly, since it is, speaking generally, just the opposite of that to which good angels are devoted. The kind of activity characteristic of evil spirits is indicated, (1) By the *names* given to their chief, — namely, adversary, slanderer, and perhaps Apollyon (1 Chron. xxi. 1; Matt. iv. 1; ix. 34; 1 Peter v. 8; Rev. ix. 11; xii. 9, 10). His followers are like him, working toward the same end which he seeks. (2) By the *actions* ascribed to him or to them (1 Chron. xxi. 1; Job. i. 6 sq.; Luke viii. 12; John xiii. 2; 2 Cor. xi. 14; 1 Tim. iii. 7; iv. 1; 2 Tim. ii. 26; 1 Peter v. 8; Rev. xx. 1, 3). (3) By their *taking possession* of men.¹

We mention this separately, because it seems to have been limited to a brief period of time. From the accounts in the New Testament, we conclude (1) That evil spirits can so unite themselves to a human being as to control his bodily organs, causing dumbness or blindness (Matt. ix. 32; xii. 22; Luke xi. 14). (2) That they can thereby produce or aggravate disease, — as insanity, epilepsy, lunacy, emaciation (Matt. viii. 28; xvii. 15 sq.; Mark ix. 18; v. 3 sq.; Luke viii.

¹ See Farmer on "Demoniacs;" Owen, "Demonology of the New Testament," "Bib. Sac.," xix. 1 sq.; "Demoniacal Possessions of the New Testament," "Am. Presb. and Theol. Rev.," 1865, 495 sq.; Hovey on "The Miracles of Christ," ch. iv.; Smith's "Dict. of the Bible," article "Demon"; Kitto's "Cyc of Bib. Lit.," article "Demon"; Herzog, iii. 240, art. "Dämonische"; Kitto's "Jour.," iv. 1, vii. 394; "Meth. Quar. Rev.," x. 213; Appleton's Works, ii. 94.

28, 29; ix. 39). (3) That their presence was revealed by some peculiarity unknown to us at the present day. (4) That their usurped control over the bodily organs of men was not confined to those pre-eminently wicked (Mark ix. 14-28).

Remarks. (a) With reference to the demons, their removal was called a "casting-out" (Matt. viii. 16; x. 1, 8; Mark i. 34, 39); with reference to the demoniacs, a "healing" (Matt. xv. 28; Luke vi. 18; vii. 21). (b) Some of the Jews claimed to cast out demons (Matt. xii. 27; Josephus Antiqu. viii. 2, 5). Whether Christ indorsed the correctness of their claim is doubtful. (c) Evil angels are spoken of as a kingdom (Matt. xii. 26; Mark iii. 54; Luke xi. 18; Rev. xii. 7) with a ruler at their head (Matt. ix. 34; xii. 24; xxv. 41; Rev. xii. 7, 9; 2 Cor. xii. 7). This ruler is called, by way of eminence, The wicked one (Matt. v. 37; vi. 13; xiii. 19, 38; John xvii. 15; 1 John ii. 13, 14; iii. 12; v. 18, 19; Eph. vi. 16; 2 Thess. iii. 3; The satan (Matt. xii. 26); The devil (Matt. xiii. 39); The enemy (Matt. xiv. 25); The adversary (1 Tim. v. 14; 1 Peter v. 8); The accuser of the brethren (Rev. xii. 10); The spirit of error (1 John iv. 6); The ruler of this world (John xii. 31; xvi. 11); (cf. xiv. 30;) The god of this world (2 Cor. iv. 4); The old serpent (Rev. xii. 9; xx. 2); The great dragon (Rev. xii. 3, 4 sq.; xiii. 2, 4). "Army of fiends, fit body to fit head," Milton Par. Lost, iv. 953. This same prince of the demons is represented as ruling over mankind (1 John v. 19; John xiv. 30; xii. 31; xvi. 11; 2 Cor. iv. 4).

The language of these and other passages of the New Testament is very strong. Satan is even represented as having in some sense the power of death; which, however, cannot mean that he has power to take the lives of men at will, or that he is the one who does put an end to the natural lives of most men (Heb. ii. 14). It may be worthy of notice that Satan's subordinates also bear sway over men (Eph. vi. 12). To many minds the idea of such a kingdom is very awful. They prefer to think of evil spirits as acting without skill or concert; but this is not the doctrine of the New Testament.

There is wonderful order in their madness. Still, their power over men is limited. They can do nothing without man's consent; and their apparent victories lead only to a more complete overthrow.

Queries. (1) Are demons still permitted to take possession of men as in the time of Christ? We believe not; at any rate we are not aware of any evidence that would justify an affirmative answer to this question.

(2) If not, why were they permitted to do it then? Possibly that the lordship of Christ over the invisible world might be signally revealed, even in his humiliation. "The clearest revelation of heaven," says Macmillan, "is the necessary correlative of the clearest revelation of hell." Satan has been called *Dei Simius*, the ape of God; "He can only sow tares,—an imitation of wheat."

(3) Are the rappings, table-movings, &c., of modern times, the direct work of evil spirits? From the best evidence we have, it seems to us far more likely that they are of mundane origin.

(4) Have evil angels any special connection with pagan deities? (1 Cor. x. 20, 21; viii. 4.) No other connection than they have with all great manifestations of sin in the world.

(5) Will evil spirits resume their former modes of action at any future period? (Rev. xx. 8.) Possibly, yet with variations adapted to the weakness of man at the time.

PART FOURTH.

THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.

THE topics which belong to this part of theology are the unity of mankind, the essential elements of human nature, the endless existence of man, the moral constitution of man, and the sinfulness of man.

I. THE UNITY OF MANKIND.

It seems to us, on the whole, evident that all the races or varieties of mankind belong to one species. And in support of this view we appeal with a good degree of confidence:—

1 *To the Holy Scripture.*—Gen. i. 27; ii. 7, 15 sq.; vi. 7, 8; vii. 21; viii. 1, sq.; Acts xvii. 26; Rom. v. 12 sq.; 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22. These passages appear to be sufficiently plain; and we are aware of no good reason for doubting that their writers believed in the unity of the human race. The word *αἴμαρος* in Acts xvii. 26, is omitted by Lachmann, Tischendorf and Tregelles; but its absence does not weaken the value of the text for our argument.

2. *To the Anatomical Structure of Men.* This is nearly the same in all varieties of the human race. The differences between the highest and the lowest types of mankind are said by competent authorities to be less than the difference between varieties of the same species in some of the lower animals.

3. *To the Physiological Peculiarities of Men.* (1) All races are fruitful with one another. (2) The duration of pregnancy is the same in all. (3) The normal temperature of the body is the same. (4) The mean frequency of the pulse is the same. All these are facts of special importance to the argument.

4. *To the Pathological Characteristics of Men.* All varieties of men are liable to the same diseases in the same circum-

stances. This is not true of other animals. Again, the blood of a healthy man, injected into the veins of a feeble one, is far more invigorating than that of any other animal; just as the blood of a horse is better for another horse than is that of any animal of a different species. Besides, human blood is distinguishable by the aid of the microscope from that of any other animal.¹

5. *To the Duration of Human Life.* This is nearly the same in all varieties of mankind. The differences between different nations are slight, and probably due to the influences of climate and civilization, acting through long periods.

6. *To the Cardinal Powers of the Human Mind.* These are everywhere the same. The mental, moral, and religious capacities of the human spirit are identical in kind the world over. This is a great point.

Note. Just now the tendency of scientific speculation is favorable to the Darwinian hypothesis, of progress by natural selection, — a theory which makes far less of the distinction between different species than any other; but, whatever of truth may be represented by the hypothesis of Darwin, it is quite insufficient to account for the origin of the human spirit, and need not therefore occupy our time in a theological course.

¹ See Pritchard (J. C.) "Researches into the Physical History of Man," and "The Natural History of Man," both able works; Smith (T.) "The Unity of the Human Race," &c.; Hale (M.) "Primitive Origination of Man"; Caldwell (C.) "Thoughts on the Original Unity of the Human Race," adverse to its Unity; Cabell (J. L.) "The Testimony of Modern Science to the Unity of Mankind," a very good discussion; Quatrefages (A. de) "Unité de l'Espece Humaine," also "Histoire Naturelle Generale," "Revue des deux Mondes," Nov., Dec., 1868, 832 sq.; Ladevi-Roche (M.) "L'Unité des Races Humaines d'après des données de la Psychologie et de la Physiologie"; Whitney (W. D.) "Language, and the Study of Language"; Müller (M.) "Lectures on the Science of Language," series I. and II.; Bunsen (Chev.) "Philosophy of History," or Vols. II. and III. of "Christianity and Mankind"; Smith's (W.) "Dictionary of the Bible," in the article "Confusion of Tongues"; Burnouf (E.) "La Science des Religions," several articles in the "Revue des deux Mondes" of 1867 and 1868; Ehrenfeuchter (F.) "Entwicklungsgeschichte der Menschheit in Ethischen Beziehung"; Rauch (P. M.) "Die Einheit des Menschengeschlechtes"; Burgess (E.) "Antiquity and Unity of the Human Race"; Peschel (O.) "The Races of Man and their Geographical Distribution."

II. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF HUMAN NATURE.

It has long been a question with philosophers and theologians, whether the being of man comprises three elements, — body, soul, and spirit, — or only two, — body and spirit; and it is our purpose to notice in this section some of the arguments for each of the two views.

In confirmation of the former view, it is said,¹—

1. *That several passages of the New Testament teach it plainly*, — (namely, 1 Thess. v. 23; Heb. iv. 12; Phil. i. 27; Luke i. 47; 1 Cor. xv. 44). The first and clearest of these passages is translated by Ellicott, “May your spirit and soul and body be preserved whole, without blame, in the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ!” And he regards it as a “distinct enunciation of three component parts of the nature of man.” This is certainly the most obvious view of the apostle’s meaning; and it is adopted, with some differences of opinion as to the exact distinction between “spirit” and “soul,” by Alford, Ellicott, Olshausen, Meyer, and De Wette; though De Wette thinks the enumeration merely “rhetorical.”

In the second passage, the word of God is represented as “piercing, even to a dividing of soul and of spirit, of joints and of marrow,” — that is, cutting through soul and through spirit, through joints and through marrow. Here the spirit seems to be thought of as deeper than the soul, — as the innermost part of man’s nature. Tholuck defines “spirit” in this place as “the spirit according to its *eternal* side,” and “soul” as “the spirit according to its *natural* side.”

The third passage reads thus: “That ye stand in one spirit, with one soul, striving together for the faith of the gospel.” Here it would not be difficult to explain the use of

¹ Olshausen (H.) “Opuscula Theologica,” 1834, p. 143 sq.; Göschel (C. F.) “Der Mensch nach Leib, Seele und Geist diesselts und jenseits,” suggestive; Delitzsch (F.) “A System of Biblical Psychology”; Heard (J. B.) “The Tripartite Nature of Man”; Boardman (G. D.) “The Scriptural Anthropology,” in *Bap. Quar.*, vol. I., pp. 175–90, 324–40, 428–44; Usteri (L.) “Entwicklung des Paulinischen Lehrbegriffes,” *Anhang I. S.* 384 sq.; Schubert (G. H.) “Die Geschichte der Seele”; Planck (K. E.) “Seele und Geist”; Ulrici (H.) “Leib und Seele.”

“soul” in the second clause, without supposing it to signify a constituent part of human nature, in distinction from the “spirit.” Indeed, there is much reason to suppose that the word “spirit” signifies, in this place, the Holy Spirit, in whom alone Christians can expect to be truly united. — See Alford’s note on the passage.

The fourth reads as follows: “My soul doth magnify the Lord, and my spirit rejoiced in God my Saviour!” but it seems to us plain that the two terms, “soul” and “spirit,” may, in this case, refer to one and the same essential principle. And the last text reads: “It is sown a psychical body; it is raised a pneumatic body.” We suppose that the word “soul” often denotes the animal life; and hence, a psychical body is one adapted to animal life, while a spiritual body is one adapted to spirit life. The passage does not therefore establish the fact of a distinction between soul and spirit.

2. *That several doctrines of the New Testament are rendered more intelligible by it;* for example, that of hereditary depravity, that of regeneration, and that of eternal retribution. But we do not think any thing is gained in this respect by the tripartite theory of man’s nature. The other arguments adduced by trichotomists are equally inconclusive, and may be passed without further notice.

In confirmation of the second view, reference is made, —

1. *To the plain teaching of the New Testament:* as in Matt. x. 28; xxvi. 41 (cf. Mark xiv. 38); Luke xii. 22 sq.; Acts ii. 27; Rom. ii. 28, 29; 1 Cor. v. 3, 5; vi. 16 sq.; vii. 34; 2 Cor. vii. 1; Col. ii. 5; Heb. xii. 9; James ii. 26; 1 Peter ii. 11; iii. 18; iv. 6. For these and similar passages make it certain that the words, “soul and spirit,” may often be used interchangeably, — to denote the spiritual part of man in distinction from the bodily, and especially that human nature consists of two parts, body and soul, or flesh and spirit.¹

¹ Hahn (G. L.) “Die Theologie des Neuen Testaments,” sects. 149–154. Riddle (M. B.) “Lange on Romans” Am. Ed. “Excursus on Biblico-Psychological Terms.” — See ch. VII. v. 13.; Hodge (C.) “Systematic Theology,” vol. II. p. 44 sq.; Stu. u. Kr. XII. Ackermann (C.) “Beitrag zur theologischen Würdigung und Abwägung der Begriffe *πνεῦμα, νοῦς* und Geist.”

2. *To the phenomena of consciousness.* There is nothing, it is said, in human experience, which may not be traced as readily to two essential principles as to three. It is as easy to believe that the spirit has direct connection with the body as to suppose that it has connection with it indirectly, through the soul; to suppose that one and the same spiritual principle has a wide range of susceptibilities, passions, and powers, some higher and some lower, as to suppose two spiritual principles have this range. In short, the law of parcimony forbids us to assert any essential distinction between soul and spirit, unless we do it on the authority of Scripture.

But it is admitted that the words "soul" and "spirit" are not strictly synonymous. If they do not denote two parts of human nature, they must be admitted to denote the same part as seen in different lights, or as performing different functions; for, in certain connections, one of them is always used; and, in other connections, the other. What, then, are the meaning and use of these words respectively? Trichotomists and dichotomists are alike interested in finding a true answer to this question.

1. *The word "soul" is often used as nearly equivalent to self or person.* To say, "My soul doth magnify the Lord!" is to say, "I, myself, do magnify the Lord!" And, from this, it is but a step to the conclusion, that the soul is the *synthesis of spirit and body*,—the being which results from their union.—See Gen. ii. 7. The breath of life from God was the unembodied spirit; while the "living soul" was the result of the spirit's union with the body: it denoted the complex being in its completeness.

But a close study of the Scriptures leads rather to the view that man is called soul, *a superiori parte*, and not because the word "soul" properly means a being composed of body and spirit. This is rendered certain by the fact, that the soul is sometimes contrasted with the body; for, if the body were a part of the soul, it could not be thus contrasted with it.—See Matt. x. 28; 1 Pet. ii. 11.

(2) *The word "soul" is supposed to denote the spirit as modified*

by union with the body. It is the intelligent life-principle as it exists in man. This definition accounts for the use of the word "soul," rather than spirit, when reference is made to passions and desires awakened by sense or the flesh, and also for its use when mere life is referred to. For, according to this theory, the soul is at once the vital power and the rational power in man. Its functions are partly unconscious, and partly conscious; partly animal, and partly rational.

(3) *The word "soul" is thought to be used when certain functions or relations are in the writer's mind; and the word "spirit" when certain other functions or relations are in his mind.* Thus the immaterial principle in man is called soul, when it is conceived of as looking earthward, — as affected by the body, or as acting through the body; while it is called spirit when it is conceived of as looking God-ward, — as affected by the spirit of God, or as contrasted with the flesh. Hence those qualities of our inner nature which are modified by the flesh, and perishable, are suggested by the name "soul;" while those which are moral, religious, and eternal are suggested by the name "spirit."

It will be found difficult, and probably impossible, to account, by either of these theories, for the selection of the term "soul" or "spirit" in every instance where one of them is used. But by bearing in mind the last two, and also the fact that in many passages either of the words would be sufficiently exact, nearly all the language of the sacred writers may be readily explained.

III. THE ENDLESS EXISTENCE OF MAN.

The term "man" will be used in this section to denote whatever is essential to human personality. So long as the person exists, the man exists.

It may be a question, whether the endless existence of man should be considered at all in this place; for it will be necessary to recur to the same subject in the last part of theology, and exhibit more fully some of the evidence of man's unending existence.

So close a connection, however, exists between the moral nature of man and his endless existence, that a notice of the latter cannot be postponed to the end of our course; yet it will be enough for the present, if the chief lines of argument are indicated.¹

(1) *The Scriptures predict such an existence.* As to the pious, this is commonly admitted; but, as to the wicked, some entertain doubts; yet these doubts, it seems to us, do not spring from any obscurity in the language of Scripture. — See Matt. xxv. 46. “And these shall go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into life eternal.”

In confirmation of the biblical view, we remark, —

(2) *The mental powers of man are adapted to endless existence.* He is put in relation to endless being by his conception of it. His mind is also capable, so far as can be ascertained, of indefinite growth in knowledge and power. Such a mind seems to have been formed for perpetual existence.

(3) *His moral powers are adapted to such an existence.* They recognize moral relations and qualities which are the same forever, and perceive the excellence of God more perfectly the longer they contemplate it. Moreover, the incompleteness of moral government in this life, as judged by conscience, points to a future, if not to an endless existence of man, in which “all odds shall be made even.”²

(4) *His spiritual sensibilities are adapted to such an existence.* They are fitted to enjoy permanently whatever is beautiful, true, or good. Such objects do not cloy. Hence, man appears to have been made “to glorify God, and enjoy him forever.”

¹ Channing (W. E.) “Works,” vol. IV. pp. 169–182; Gray (J. T.) “Immortality: its Real and Alleged Evidences”; Simpson (A.) “Prize Essay on the Immateriality of the Mind, and the Immortality of the Soul”; Guizot (F.) “Meditations and Moral Studies”; Newman (F. W.) “The Soul: its Sorrows and its Aspirations”; Parker (T.) “A Sermon of Immortal Life”; Müller (J.) “Studien u. Kritiken,” 1833, sects. 703–794; Estes (H. C.) “The Christian Doctrine of the Soul”; Dick (T.) “The Philosophy of a Future Life”; Taylor (I.) “Physical Theory of a Future Life”; Fichte (I. H.) “Seelenfortdauer u. Weltstellung des Menschen.”

² See Jackson (W.) “The Doctrine of Retribution”; also Butler and Kaut.

“That religious instincts are as truly a part of our nature as are our appetites and our nerves is a fact which all history establishes, and which forms one of the strongest proofs of the reality of that unseen world to which the soul of man continually tends.” — Lecky, “Hist. of European Morals,” I. 339, 340.

(5) *His best aspirations point to such an existence.* This is commonly admitted. Annihilation is never thought of with pleasure, except as a release from misery. It is coveted, not by the good, but by the bad; and not by them as desirable in itself, but as a less evil than endless woe. Says Ten-nyson, —

“My own dim life should teach me this, —
That life shall live forevermore;
Else earth is darkness at the core,
And dust and ashes all that is.”

(6) *The general belief of mankind points to such an existence.* This belief is not universal: but it is so prevalent as to be esteemed normal; and, as normal, it is an indication of endless existence on the part of man.

IV. THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

No part of systematic theology requires more cautious and accurate treatment than this. If man ever “sees through a mirror obscurely” (1 Cor. xiii. 12), it is when he undertakes to explore the depths of his own spirit, and ascertain its powers in the domain of religion. And it has been truly said, that a “large portion of the predestinarian controversy has arisen out of an attempt to exclude, on speculative grounds, either one or other of the two fundamental conceptions, — the freedom of man, and the supremacy of God.”¹

That man is a moral being may be proved by an appeal to the word of God, to the common consent of mankind, and to the testimony of consciousness itself; for there is hardly a paragraph or doctrine of Scripture which does not imply the

¹ From Hannah (J.) “The Relation of the Divine and Human Elements in Scripture.”

moral nature and accountability of man; there is scarcely a law of civil government, or an institution of civil society which does not presuppose the same thing; and there is no rational man who fails to perceive a moral quality in many of his own actions and affections.¹

It is also certain that moral character may be revealed by almost any kind of action possible to the human soul, whether it be that of thinking, that of desiring, or that of willing. Yet every kind of spiritual action may not be equally the proper cause or source of virtue and sin; and it is therefore important to ascertain, if possible, to which grand division of the soul's life and movement they should be specially referred.

Many persons regard the sensibilities, propensities, feelings or tastes, of the soul as being *the source of man's moral character*. They believe that his thoughts and actions spring from his feelings, and say, that, as the heart is, so is the man. Others suppose the will to be fundamental and controlling,—the proper author of propensities and affections as well as of thoughts. Which of these views is correct?

(1) If one appeals to *the Word of God* for an answer to this question, he will readily find many expressions concerning man, as he now is, which seem to support the former view; (for example, Jer. xxxi. 18; Ezek. xxxvi. 26; Matt. vii. 17, 18; John vi. 44, 65; xv. 5; Eph. ii. 5, 10; Phil. ii. 13.) "Turn thou me, and I shall be turned; for thou art Jehovah, my God." — "A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you; and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you a heart of flesh." — "So every good tree bringeth forth good fruits; but the corrupt tree bringeth evil fruits. A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruits, nor a corrupt tree bring forth good fruits." — "No one can come to me, except the Father, who sent me, draw him." — "For this cause, I have said to you, that no one can

¹ Butler (J.) "Sermons upon Human Nature"; Alexander (A.) "Outlines of Moral Science"; Rothe (R.) "Theologische Ethik"; Jouffroy (Theo.) "Introduction to Ethics"; Hofmann (R.) "Die Lehre vom Gewissen."

come to me except it be given him from the Father." — "Without me, ye can do nothing." — "But God. . . . made us, even when we were dead in sins, alive with Christ." — "For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works." — "For it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to do, of his good pleasure." From these passages, it appears that all holy action in man is due to divine grace; that the state of every unrenewed soul is such as to make this grace practically indispensable,¹ and that moral action does, as a matter of fact, in the case of fallen men, spring from some permanent moral state or bias; and this permanent state is naturally thought to be a state of the feelings or affections or susceptibilities.

But the inquirer will also find many expressions of Scripture which seem to support the latter view; (for example, Ezek. xviii. 26, 27, 31, 32; Matt. xi. 28–30; Acts ii. 38; iii. 19.) "When a righteous man turneth away from his righteousness, and committeth iniquity, and dieth in them, for his iniquity that he hath done shall he die. Again, when the wicked man turneth away from his wickedness that he hath committed, and doeth that which is lawful and right, he shall save his soul alive." — "Make you a new heart and a new spirit; for why will ye die, O house of Israel? . . . Wherefore turn, and live ye." — "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy-laden, and I will give you rest," &c. "Repent, and be each of you baptized, upon the name of Jesus Christ, unto remission of sins." — "Repent, therefore, and turn, that your sins may be blotted out." These passages clearly teach the duty of sinners to repent and seek the Lord: nay, sinners are commanded, to make themselves a new heart, as they are elsewhere commanded to love God with, all the heart and their neighbor as themselves. This, therefore, is their perpetual duty; and hence it must be within the power of their will.

There is, then, a seeming disagreement between the two

¹ *Nemo per se satis valet ut emergat, oportet manum aliquis porrigat, aliquis educat.*—Seneca Ep. 52.

classes of texts cited; and the Bible fails to answer directly the question proposed. The former class leads to one inference, and the latter class to another. They may be reconciled by assuming, that, as a matter of fact, in the case of sinners, divine grace always takes the initiative in good, not because a sinner *cannot*, but because he *will not*, of himself, turn to the Lord.

But the language of Paul, in Rom. ix. 15, 16, appears to turn the scale in favor of the Calvinistic view as practically correct. — “I will have mercy on whomsoever I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whomsoever I have compassion.” — “So, then, it is not of him who willeth, nor of him who runneth, but of God who showeth mercy.” Beneath the whole discussion of Paul may lie the assumption that no man truly wills or runs without prevenient grace, — a grace which always takes the initiative in human salvation.

(2) If one appeals to *the history of mankind* for an answer to the question proposed, the same result will follow; for on the one hand, according to the testimony of history, sin appears to be universal in the race. And the universality of sin, from the hour of the fall until now, is hardly consistent with any theory of action which does not trace it back to a bias of the heart; or, if any one prefers, to a bias of the will, regarded as embracing in itself permanent moral affections and susceptibilities.

But, on the other hand, according to the testimony of sacred history, man was created upright, with a pure heart,¹ and by an act of his own will disobeyed the will of God. Hence Calvinists, as well as Arminians, admit that a holy being may fall into sin by exercising his freedom of will; but they deny that there is any evidence of power in a fallen being to recover, unaided, his lost rectitude of feeling.

¹ On the Sinless Condition of Man in Eden, reference may be made to the following works: Winer (G.B.) “The Confessions of Christendom,” p. 78 sq.; Hase (C. A.) “*Libri Symbolici Ecclesiæ Evangelicæ*,” p. 55 sq.; Niemeyer (H. A.) “*Collectio Confessionum in Ecclesiis Reformatis Publicatarum*,” pp. 79, 80, 88, 106, 116, 341, 368, 393, 476.

Thus the general course of human action since the fall favors one view; and the first act of sin in Eden the other view: and the question before us is not yet clearly answered, unless it be said that will is the cause of sin in a holy being, and wrong desire the source of sin in unholy beings. Many accept this double answer.¹

(3) If one appeals to *moral consciousness* for an answer, the result will be far from certain; for, on the one side, will appear a certain repugnance to holy action, which seems to unnerve, without excusing the sinner,—a fearful suspicion that sin is not wholly avoidable by his own power, and an instinctive moral judgment against selfishness and want of love to God, as being in their very nature sinful. “For example, not only are malice and envy sinful, when ripened into act, but the smallest conceivable exercise of such feelings is evil; and, as they increase in strength, their moral evil increases. It does not require an act of volition,—consenting to these feelings,—to render them evil; their very essence is evil, and is condemned by the moral sense of mankind.”²

“The reality of sin, for every man whose experience is worth being taken as testimony, is not in particular volitions of his will, but in its abiding state,—not in what he chooses to do now and then, but in that unceasing, uninterrupted determination of self to evil. This is the torment of his life,—that below his volitions to sin, below his resolutions to reform, even below his deepest self-examination, and his most distinct self-knowledge, below all the conscious exercises and operations of his soul,—there is a sinful heart, a dark ground of moral evil.”³

¹ Aug. “de natura et gratia,” I. c. 28; “Encheiridion ad Laut.” c. 30: Homo libero arbitrio male utens, et se perdidit et ipsum. Sicut enim qui se occidit, se occidendo non vivit nec seipsum potest resuscitare quum occiderit: ita, quum libero peccaretur arbitrio, amissum est et liberum arbitrium.” But see Hazard (R. G.) “Freedom of the Mind in Willing,” and “Causation and Freedom in Willing.” Willing is always and by its very nature free. Speaking accurately, the sinner is just as free in the act of willing as the saint; but he does not act as wisely: he does not seek his real and highest good; and he knows this at the time.

² Alexander (A.) “Outlines of Moral Science,” p. 145.

³ Shedd (W. G. T.) “Essays and Discourses,” p. 230.

But, on the other side, will appear a persuasion that our moral action is free,—that we are able, in every instance, to do right, and refrain from wrong,—that, whenever we have decided in favor of evil, we could have decided otherwise; and, in view of this a tendency to modify our instinctive moral judgment against evil biases or feelings, and to pronounce them innocent, unless they are indorsed or fostered by the will.¹ But it is replied to one of these statements that, “when we feel that we could and would act differently from what we have done, in certain specified circumstances, it is always on the supposition that our views and feelings should be different.”² Or, in other words, and with special reference to sin, it is said that “the will, in the time of a leading act or volition that is diverse from, or opposite to the command of God, and when actually under the influence of it, is not able to exert itself to the contrary,—to make an alteration in order to compliance. The inclination is unable to change itself; and that, for this plain reason, that it is unable to incline to change itself. Present choice cannot, at present, choose to be otherwise; for that would be *at present* to choose something diverse from what is at present chosen. . . . To suppose that the mind is now sincerely inclined to change itself to a different inclination is to suppose the mind is now truly inclined otherwise than it is now inclined.”³

In estimating the value of the testimony of moral consciousness in respect to the proper cause of sin in man, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact, that different persons appear to differ in their moral judgment when looking at the state of their feelings and affections.

(4) Finally, if one appeals to *reason, logic, or the causal*

¹ Metcalf (D.) “An Inquiry into the Nature, Foundation, and Extent of Moral Obligation”; Hazard (R. G.) “Freedom of the Mind in Willing”; Whedon (D.D.) “Freedom of the Human Will”; Tappan (H. P.) “The Doctrine of the Will determined by an Appeal to Consciousness.”

² Alexander (A.) “Moral Science,” p. 119; Princeton Theol. Essays, First Series, “The Power of Contrary Choice,” 250 sq.

³ Edwards (J.) “Inquiry concerning the Freedom of the Will,” Part III sect. 4.

judgment, a double response is heard; for, resting on the axiom that every event is due to a cause fitted to produce it, some argue, very justly, that choice, without any feeling or desire, is unthinkable; that choice, in accord with a weaker desire, instead of a stronger, is also unthinkable; and that such a choice, if possible, would be no expression of character, — would have no moral quality, would be purely capricious.¹

The first of these statements is admitted to be true by Sir Wm. Hamilton, and many others, who assert in the strongest manner the freedom of the will. Thus, "We cannot possibly conceive the existence of a voluntary activity independently of all feeling; for voluntary conation is a faculty which can only be determined to energy through a pain or pleasure, — through an estimate of the relative worth of objects."² And, if the first be correct, the second must be correct also, for to follow a weaker inducement instead of a stronger is even more inconsistent with the causal judgment than to act without any inducement at all. Moreover, it seems to be self-evident, that any action of the will which takes place without regard to reasons, motives, or inducements must be capricious and even dangerous.

President Edwards included feeling, desire, &c., in his definition of the will, and then affirmed that an element of love belongs to all virtue. Hence, this element must be in every choice or volition which is truly virtuous; for if love were not in the choice itself, but only in the effect of it, the choice would not be pleasing to God, and the effect, — virtue, — would be an effect without a cause. Virtue must, therefore, be logically antecedent to right volition, and must be in the feeling.

But, resting on the same axiom, others argue with equal force, that a cause can only be responsible for its effect; that

¹ Edwards (J.) "Inquiry concerning the Freedom of the Will," and "Dissertation concerning Liberty and Necessity"; Alexander (A.) "Moral Science," cc. 13-23.

² Hamilton (Sir Wm.) "Metaphysics," pp. 130, 567.

no person can be worthy of praise or of blame for what is in his heart without the consent of his will, and that no person can be worthy of blame for failing to make a choice, which he has not power to make. In a word, ability and responsibility are coëxtensive, and man can be accountable for that alone which has been made his own by his will.

But how is the autocracy of the will vindicated? By some, an act of moral choice is pronounced creative, or independent of the law of cause and effect.¹

By others, the imperative of duty is pronounced incommensurable with any other motive, even as light is incommensurable with sound. Hence, man is only free in his moral action.²

It will be seen that neither of these theories is free from difficulties. The former is suggested by the spontaneous decision of conscience, by the facts of experience and observation as to the influence of sinful affections upon conduct, and by the doctrines of election and regeneration by the Spirit of God; while the latter is suggested by our sense of freedom in action, by the fact of human responsibility for moral conduct, and by the action of conscience when swayed by the causal judgment.

To judge of the two views by their practical influence, it would seem as if both of them were needed, — the former to make men feel their need of divine help, and the latter to make them see the divine righteousness.

And there is doubtless a measure of truth in each of these views. For the interdependence and interaction of the different powers of the human spirit are so subtle, so mysterious, as to escape, in a great measure, the notice of consciousness; and the power of choice may, perhaps, hold different relations to the moral bias at different stages of probation.

¹ Tappan (H. P.) "A Review of Edwards's Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will," and "The Doctrine of the Will applied to Moral Agency and Responsibility"; Hamilton (Sir Wm.) "Metaphysics," II. XLVI.; Murray's "Outline of Hamilton's Philosophy," p. 226 sq.

² Hickok (L. P.) "Moral Science," p. 15 sq.

The following propositions may be safely accepted as true ; namely, —

(a) *That every man has whatever power of will is necessary to make him justly responsible for the moral good or evil in his character and conduct.*¹

(b) *That this power is inalienable, no degree of progress in holiness or sinfulness having any tendency to destroy it. However holy Gabriel may be, he possesses it; however wicked Satan may be, he also possesses it.*²

(c) *That even the moral bias of man's heart is in a most important sense voluntary; since all spiritual activity is at once intellectual, emotional, and voluntary.*

(d) *That moral character, as a permanent thing, may be discovered most readily in the state of the moral susceptibilities and feelings.*

(e) *That conscious choice and volition indorse, express, and deepen this character or these susceptibilities; while the latter in turn have great influence upon the former.*

(f) *Hence, that virtue and sin cannot be traced wholly to either function of man's spirit, — to his moral taste or to his will.*

(g) *Yet a certain power of choosing his end or aim in life appears to be the rational basis of responsibility.*

V. THE SINFULNESS OF MAN.³

I. THE REALITY OF SIN IN MANKIND.

It may seem unnecessary to say a word on this point; but it is known that some distinguished men have pronounced the idea of sin an illusion: and there is reason to fear that

¹ "Bib. Sac." for 1839, p. 381.

² Says Calvin: "Nego peccatum ideo minus debere imputari, quod necessarium est; nego rursus evitabile esse, quia voluntarium sit, Pro servitute miserabiles sumus, pro voluntate inexcusabiles."

³ Müller (J.) "The Doctrine of Sin"; Ernesti (H. F. T. L.) "Ursprung der Sünde," etc.; Edwards (J.) "The Doctrine of Original Sin," Works, Vol. II., p. 309 sq.; King (W.) "The Origin of Evil"; Young (J.) "Evil not of God"; Ritter (H.) "Über das Böse und seine Folgen"; Bellamy (J.) "The Wisdom of God in the Permission of Sin"; Woods (L.) Works, Vol. II., pp. 201-388,

their influence, unless it be counteracted, will encourage many to indulge their selfish and sensual desires.

The possibility of sin is denied on at least three grounds, namely, —

(1) On that of *Divine Predestination*. God has fixed all events by his purpose and agency. They must, therefore, take place as he has determined; for his purpose cannot be thwarted. Hence, there is no such thing as sin. His purpose is good; and, as all events are embraced in his purpose, they, too, must all be good.

(2) On that of *Constitutional Causality*. Every being has its own constitution or nature; and the contents or qualities of that nature, together with the circumstances in which it is placed, must determine its action. Hence, the Author of that nature, and of the circumstances affecting it, is responsible for all that it does.

(3) On that of *Hereditary Depravity*. Men are born with a damaged, or, at least, an imperfect moral nature; and, on this account, they cannot be altogether blameworthy for their evil conduct.

These arguments against the reality of human sinfulness are plausible, but delusive. They rest upon the assumption that man has no true freedom, but is strictly included in a chain of causes and effects, every link of which is forged by something outside of his proper self, — either by God, in making human nature, or by God *plus* Adam in making and marring that nature.

“Man’s Depravity”; Storr and Flatt, “Biblical Theology,” Vol. II., b. III. Nitzsch (C. I.) “System of Christian Doctrine,” Part II.; Philippi (F. A.) “Kirchliche Glaubenslehre,” Bd. III., “Von der Sünde”; Heppe (H.) “Dogmatik,” s. 251 sq.; Schmid (C. F.) “Biblische Theologie des N. T.” s. 196 and 494; Schleiermacher (F.) “Christliche Glaube,” I., 358; Tholuck (A.) “Guido and Julius, or Sin and Propitiation”; Schenkel (D.) “Christliche Dogmatik,” &c. Bd. II., s. 186–455; Barnes (A.) “Sin and Suffering in the Universe,” Am. Presb. Rev., Oct. 1869, Jan. 1870; Herzog, s. v. “Sünde,” by Dörtenbach; Hodge (Princeton Essays) “Original Sin,” and “The Doctrine of Imputation”; Sheldon (D. N.) “Sin and Redemption”; Tulloch (J.) “The Christian Doctrine of Sin”; Wardlaw (R.) “Systematic Theology,” Vol. II.; Hodge (C.) “Systematic Theology,” Vol. II.

But the assumption must be rejected, in view of its consequences; for, if consistently applied, it forbids us to believe (a) That man is free in any part of his conduct. In so far at least as the assumption rests upon the doctrine of predestination, or upon the theory of constitutional causality, it is applicable to all human action, — to thinking and speaking, to planting and sowing, as well as to choosing moral good or evil. But who is willing to concede that personal freedom is always an illusion? (b) That the action of his mind is trustworthy on any subject. For, if its action is unworthy of trust when it pronounces conduct to be right or wrong, it is equally unworthy of trust when it denies this, — in fact, it is not to be trusted at all. The outcome is blank skepticism: we can neither believe nor disbelieve; and we know nothing at all. This consequence of the assumption may be accepted in words, but it cannot be in heart or in life. (c) That the action of beings thoroughly bad can be at all blameworthy. For, if a hereditary bias to moral evil diminishes the guilt of one who breaks the moral law, it does this by diminishing his moral power; and, if he goes on in sin till he is wholly averse to good, he will then do evil without guilt. All his guilt will be due to his conduct while yet partly inclined to good. Hence, the most hardened men are the least culpable for their present action; and Satan, if wholly evil, does not commit any sin.

The consequences of the assumption on which the arguments against human sinfulness rest prove it, therefore, to be incorrect. Fatalism is false; and sin is no illusion.

For, (1) The Word of God declares it to be a reality (Rom. iii. 9, 23; Gal. iii. 10). Christ himself came not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance. He came into the world to save sinners: yet he tasted death for every man; and all who are saved will owe their salvation to him.

(2) The common judgment of mankind declares it to be a reality. This is evident from the nature of human government, from the literature of the world, and even from the language of men who deny the right of either God or man to

resort to punishment, except for purposes of reformation or self-defence.

(3) The consciousness of every man declares it to be a reality. There is no one who is able to say, "I have never sinned in desire, in thought, or in act. My heart is pure, and my hands are clean." Every man knows that he himself has done what he believed to be wrong.

There is, then, the best possible evidence of the existence of sin among men, — the testimony of Scripture, the testimony of mankind by government and literature, and the testimony of consciousness.

Sin is no phantom, but the saddest of all realities; and hence it is certain that men possess whatever power of will, of self-control, and of self-direction is necessary to moral character and responsibility.

II. *The nature of sin in mankind.*¹ In considering this point, it will be convenient to look at several definitions which have been thought to express the nature of sin.

1. *Sin is want of conformity to the law of God.*² In support of this definition, appeal is made (a) To the language of Scripture (1 John iii. 4; Matt. xiii. 41; Rom. vi. 19; 2 Cor. vi. 14; Rom. ii. 25; v. 14; Heb. ii. 2; Gen. iii. 3). (b) To many biblical designations of sin. — See Trench, *New Testament Synonymes*, 226 sq. (c) To the test-prohibition of Eden. This was a positive, in distinction from a moral rule, and, as such, was specially adapted to test man's disposition to obey. According to this view of the case, sin is essentially disobedience.

Two remarks are suggested by this definition, namely, (a) That if the emphasis is laid on mere infraction of law, this being regarded as the core of sin, the definition is wholly

¹ Hodge (C.) "Systematic Theology," vol. II. p. 133 sq.; Müller (J.) "Die Christliche Lehre von der Sünde," s. 32 ff.; Oosterzee (J. J. van.) "Christian Dogmatics," II. p. 393 sq.; Sartorius (E.) "Die Lehre von der heiligen Liebe," I. s. 61 ff.; Weitzäcker (C.) "Zu der Lehre vom Wesen der Sünde," in the "Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie," 1856, s. 131 sq.

² "Confession of Faith," of the Presbyterian Church of the U.S. p. 186.

unsatisfactory; for what the law of God requires or forbids is required or forbidden because it is right or wrong: in other words, the law reveals, but does not originate right and wrong. It is an expression of something; and we need to study what it expresses, in order to learn the nature of sin. This is true of the moral law, which is principally meant in this discussion. (b) That if the emphasis is laid on the rightness or divineness of the law, on its being *God's* law, this also raises a further question, to wit, What is it that the law brands as sin? What is it that man is forbidden to do? If this can be ascertained, the real nature of sin may be known. If, for example, all that the law forbids can be resolved into pride, or traced back to pride as its source, then the principle of sin must be pride.

Hence, the definition of sin, now in question, is formal instead of real, and, though correct, is not satisfactory. It settles nothing as to the unity of the law or the unity of sin; yet it is Scriptural, and in many respects extremely convenient. "There is," says Cicero, "a true law, a right reason, which accords with nature, and is implanted in all men, which is constant, eternal,—which calls to service, and deters from wrong, with a voice of authority that the good always obey, and the evil disregard. This law cannot rightfully be changed by adding to it, or taking from it; nor can it be abrogated as a whole. We can be set free from it neither by the senate, nor by the people; we need seek no other man as an interpreter of it: it is not one law in Rome, and another in Athens, one now, and another by and by; but this one eternal and unchangeable law will bind all nations in all times."—*De Re Pub.* III. 22.

"Of law," remarks Hooker, (vol. I. p. 240), "there can no less be acknowledged than that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempted from her power: both angels and men, and creatures of what condition soever, though each in different sort and manner, yet all, with uni-

form consent, admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy." — "Order is heaven's first law;" but is order the only thing sought by law?

We accept this definition as beautiful and convenient, but not as ultimate.

2. *Sin is inordinate desire or concupiscence.* In support of this definition, appeal is made to the language of Paul (Rom. vii. 8, 14, 18, 23, 24; viii. 6 sq.; Gal. v. 16 sq.; Rom. iv. 1; Phil. iii. 4; Col. ii. 18; Rom. i. 18 sq.; 1 Cor. iii. 1-4; i. 26; 2 Cor. i. 12 (cf. John iii. 6; i. 13; Gen. vi. 3).¹

But Paul uses the words "flesh," "fleshly," or "carnal," and the like, in these passages, to denote man in his unrenewed state,—or man, in so far as he is not ruled by the Spirit of God: they refer to the whole nature of man.

The body, indeed, is both an occasion and an organ of sin; yet sin no more originates in a bodily appetite than it does in the object which that appetite craves. A carnal mind is one that is obedient to bodily and sinful impulses,—to appetite, lust, pride, envy, wrath, and other evil affections; but sin originates in the mind or heart.—(See Prov. iv. 23; Matt. xv. 19.)

This second definition is unsatisfactory: (*a*) Because it fails to refer all sin to a single root or principle. Any inordinate desire is sinful. (*b*) Because, in the last analysis, it is only a formal definition; for inordinateness, or non-conformity to the divine rule, is supposed to be the very core and essence of sin. (*c*) Because it ignores the relation of will and choice to sin, and locates the latter in the heart or emotional nature of man. (*d*) Because, as commonly explained, it gives undue prominence to sensuality. This is, however, due, in all probability, to Paul's use of the term "flesh," in describing human sinfulness, rather than to the terms of the definition.

¹ Gould (E. P.) "New Testament use of Σάρξ," *Bib. Sac.* 1875, p. 36 sq.; Ernesti (H. T. L.) "Vom Ursprung der Sünde nach Paulinischen Lehrgehalt"; Cremer (H.) "Biblical Theological Dictionary of New Testament Greek," s. v. σάρξ; Hodge (C.) "Systematic Theology," II. p. 140 sq.; Müller (J.) "Die Christliche Lehre von der Sünde," vol. I. s. 450 sq.

3. *Sin is a deficiency of love to God and man.* In support of this definition, reference is made, (1) To the Word of God. (Matt. xxii. 37-39; Luke x. 27, 28; Deut. vi. 5; x. 12; xxx. 6.) (2) To the general goodness of many acts performed by unrenewed men. These acts shine with every good quality but one; and they are sinful by reason only of their lack of love to God. (3) To God's relation to sin. For, according to this definition, "whatever is evil is so not by the Creator's action, but by the creature's defection." — (Aug.) Uncreated and unsupported by God, it is unreal and unsubstantial; it is not something, but a want of something. And this view of sin is supposed to diminish the difficulty in accounting for its presence in the moral universe.

But against this definition may be urged the fact, that sin appears to be more than a lack of moral power, more than an absence of suitable love: it appears to be often positive, energetic, and hostile to good, — hatred, instead of love; power, turned in a wrong direction.¹

4. *Sin is preference of self to God.* De Pressensé says, that "there is only one way of violating the moral law, namely, to live to one's self, and not to God, — to substitute selfishness for love" — ("Jesus Christ," p. 234); and Auberlen says, that "the first element of sin is departure from God," while the source of this departure is *nimius amor sui*. Julius Müller, and a majority of modern theologians, adopt this definition. And it is supported (a) By many expressions of the sacred record; (for example, John v. 30; vii. 18; viii. 50; Matt. xxvi. 39; xx. 28; Rom. xv. 3; xiv. 7; Gal. ii. 20; 2 Cor. v. 15; Phil. ii. 4, 21; 1 Cor. x. 24, 33; John xii. 25; 1 Cor. xiii. 5). (b) By a careful study of selfishness. For this disposition will be found to comprehend self-indulgence, self-seeking, and self-will. And in these three forms, variously

¹ Says Calvin, "Quare qui peccatum originale definirunt carentiam justitiæ originalis, quam inesse nobis oportebat, quanquam id totum complectuntur quod in re est, non tamen satis significanter vim atque energiam ipsius expresserunt. Non enim natura nostra boni tantum inops et vacua est; sed malorum omnium adeo fertilis et ferax, ut otiosa esse non possit." Lib. II. 1. 8. prope finem.

combined, preference of self will be seen to account for nearly or quite all sin.

But it must be borne in mind, that selfishness, or supreme regard to self, does not forbid a secondary regard to other beings, any more than supreme love to God forbids a secondary, but great love to other beings. The definition uses the word selfishness in a broad sense, meaning by it only this, that the highest place, which belongs to God, is really given to self; and, thus explained, the definition is better than any other.

R. Several passages of Scripture speak as if love of the world were the root of human sinfulness; (for example, 1 Tim. vi. 10; 2 Tim. iii. 2-4; 1 John ii. 15). But "external things, in their true and normal relation to personality, are only *means*; and they remain so, though their use may be perverted. The man who loves earthly things instead of God really loves himself in them, — seeks, by means of them, his own gratification." — (Müller I. p. 133, Trans.)

III. THE EXTENT OF SIN IN MANKIND.

The evidence on this point justifies the statement, that all men, with the single exception of Jesus Christ, are morally depraved at birth, and, if they live long in this world, are found guilty of personal sin. By moral depravity is meant a state of the human soul which naturally leads to sin, and which can only be explained as an effect of sin.¹

In proof of this, reference may be made (*a*) To passages of Scripture which include bodily death in the penalty of sin; (for example Gen. ii. 17; Rom. v. 12 sq.; 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22,

¹ Edwards (J.) "The Doctrine of Original Sin;" Shedd (W. G. T.) "Essays and Discourses," p. 218 sq.; Müller (J.) "The Doctrine of Sin," II. p. 343 sq.; Woods (L.) "Works," I. p. 63 sq.; Wardlaw (R.) "Systematic Theology," vol. II. p. 119 sq.; Hodge (C.) "Systematic Theology," vol. II. p. 192 sq.; Oosterzee (J. J. van) "Christian Dogmatics," vol. II. p. 423 sq.; Reuss (E.) "History of Christian Theology in the Apostolic Age," vol. II. c. VI.; Lutterbeck (J. A. B.) "Die N. T. Lehrbegriffe," Bd. II. sect. 51; Turretin (F.) I. Loc. IX. Qu. x.; Philippi (F. A.) "Kirchliche Glaubenslehre," Bd. III. sect. 151 sq.; Schmid (C. F.) "Biblical Theology of the N. T." sect. 76; Winer (G. B.) "A Comparative View of the Doctrines and Confessions of the Various Communities of Christendom," p. 86 sq.

45 sq.) (*b*) To passages which represent the atonement as universal: (1 John ii. 2; 1 Tim. ii. 6; iv. 10; Heb. ii 9; 1 Peter iii. 18.) (*c*) To passages which teach that man's nature is vitiated at birth: (John iii. 6; 1 Cor. vii. 14; Eph. ii. 3; Rom. v. 12 sq.; 1 Cor. xv. 22; (cf. Ps. li. 7; lviii. 4; cxliii. 2; Isa. xlviii. 8; Prov. xxi. 8; Eccl. ix. 3; Gen. viii. 21; 1 Sam. xv. 3). (*d*) To passages which assert the sinfulness of all men; (1 Kings viii. 46; Eccl. vii. 20; Rom. iii. 9 sq.) But these passages may be supposed to refer to such only as have personally and consciously disobeyed the law of God. They can be used as confirmatory of better evidence; but they would have little force, taken by themselves. (*e*) To the language of pagan writers. Says Ovid, "We always strive after what is forbidden, and covet what is denied." — (See *Amor.* III. El. 4, 17; II. El. 19, 3; *Metam.* VII. 18 sq., and *Prov.* ix. 17.) And Seneca remarks, that "we have all sinned, some more and some less; some of set purpose, others impelled by chance, or borne away by another's wickedness. Some of us have persisted in good with too little energy, and, unwilling, resisting, have lost our innocence. Nor do we sin only; but we shall sin to the end of life." — (*Clementia*, c. 7; cf. c. 23.)

If all men are either morally depraved or sinful at birth, it must be in consequence of the apostacy in Eden; for Christians agree in teaching that man was originally upright. As he came from the hand of his Creator, he was inclined to good rather than to evil; but, since the fall, all men are inclined to evil.

The following synopsis will show what have been the views entertained by Christians on this point:—

The Council of Trent, at its fifth session, adopted this canon: "If any one shall assert that the transgression of Adam injured only himself, and not his posterity; and that he lost the holiness and righteousness which he received from God for himself only, and not for us also; or that, stained by the sin of disobedience, he transmitted to the whole human

race only death and penalties of body, but not also sin, which is the death of the soul, — let him be anathema.”¹

The Augsburg Confession declares that, “since the fall of Adam, all men propagated in the natural way are born with sin, — that is, without fear of God, without trust in God, and with evil desire.” And the Formula of Concord says, “We believe that original sin is not a slight corruption of human nature, but one so profound, that it has left nothing sound, nothing incorrupt in the body or mind of man, in his inward or outward powers.”

The Confession of Basle (Reformed Church) uses this language: “Through Adam’s fall, the entire human race is corrupted, and subject to condemnation; our nature has been weakened, and affected with such a bias to sin that, unless the Spirit of God restores it, man of himself can do nothing good.”

Art. 9, of the Thirty-nine Articles, speaks of “original sin” as “the fault or corruption of the nature of every man that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is, of his own nature, inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the spirit; and therefore, in every person born into the world, it deserveth God’s wrath.”

The Westminster Confession, after speaking of the fall of our first parents, says, “They being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity descending from them by ordinary generation. From this original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions.”

The Confessio Remonstrantium (Arminian) says, that “by transgression Adam was made through the power of the divine threatening guilty of eternal death and manifold misery, and was deprived of that primeval happiness which he had

¹ See further statements and explanations in Winer (G. B.) “A Comparative View,” &c., p. 86 sq.

received at creation. But because Adam was the root and source of the whole human race, he involved not only himself, but also all his posterity who were in his loins, as it were, and were to spring from him, by natural generation, in the same death and misery," &c.

The Quakers, according to Barclay's "Apology," "confess that a seed of sin is transmitted to all men, from Adam, although imputed to none until by sinning they actually join with it."

The Catechismus Racovianus (Socinian) says, "Man is exposed to death, because the first man transgressed the plain command of God, to which death was threatened as a punishment; whence also it has come to pass, that he has drawn all his posterity with him into the same sentence of death, yet only as every one's own sin is added." — "Since the fall of Adam was but a single act, it could not have power to deprave his own nature, still less that of his posterity; yet we do not deny that by the practice of sinning, *assiduitate peccandi*, the nature of men has been infected with a certain vice and too much inclination to sin, — *ad peccandum nimiam proclivitate*."

These citations show the general current of thought and belief in respect to the effect of the fall upon the moral condition of mankind. Believers in Christ have been convinced by the word of God, in addition to their own observation, that the spiritual state of all men is evil, and that this evil state is a result of the sin of our first parents.

IV. THE DEGREE OF SIN IN OUR RACE.¹

In respect to this it may be affirmed, —

1. That no man, except Jesus Christ, has fully obeyed the law of God. — See (Matt. xxii. 37-40; James ii. 10; 1 John iii. 15; iv. 20; Gal. iii. 10.) And this is equivalent to saying, that every man who has acted as a moral agent has disobeyed that law.

2. That no unregenerate man has any proper love to God (Rom. viii. 7; 1 John iv. 7). Sin is therefore in *all* the life;

¹ Wardlaw (R.) "Syst. Theol." vol. II. p. 119 sq.

and the principle of holiness is *entirely* wanting. Hence unrenewed men are said to be "totally depraved"; they have not obeyed the law at all.

3. That selfishness reigns in the hearts of all unrenewed men (Phil. ii. 21). On this point, reference may be made to what is said above under the fourth definition of sin.

4. That hatred to God is present in the hearts of all unregenerate men (Rom. viii. 7). It is there, though latent. Let the nature of God be seen in a true light, as opposed to all self-indulgence, self-seeking, and self-will, and this enmity or hatred will emerge at once into conscious action.

5. That all men are not equally sinful. — (See Prov. xxix. 1; Jer. xiii. 23; Luke xii. 48; John iii. 19; xv. 22, 24; 2 Tim. iii. 13; Rom. ii. 12; iv. 15; v. 13; 1 Cor. xiv. 20 (cf. Matt. xviii. 3; xix. 14; Mark x. 14; Luke xviii. 16; Ezek. xvi. 47-52; Matt. x. 15; xi. 22; John xix. 11; 1 Tim. v. 8; 2 Peter ii. 20, 21; Amos iii. 2). These passages teach that the sinfulness of men is much greater in some instances than it is in others, and especially that it is modified by the knowledge of the sinner.

V. THE IMPUTATION OF SIN; OR THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF MEN FOR THEIR SINFULNESS.

This topic suggests questions which it is very difficult to answer; and it may therefore be well to review some of the prominent theories in respect to it.

I. *The Pelagian Theory.*¹ This theory assumes that man can be responsible for nothing but his own voluntary action. It denies the hereditary depravity of mankind since the fall. "Capaces enim utriusque rei, non pleni nascimur, et ut sine virtute, ita sine vitio procreamur, atque ante actionem propriæ voluntatis id solum in homine est quod Deus condidit." — (Aug. De pec. orig. c. 13.) "Nemo naturaliter malus est; sed quicumque reus est, moribus, non exordiis, accusatur." —

¹ See Neander's "Dogmengeschichte," I. s. 360 sq.; Hagenbach (K. R.) "History of Doctrines," sects. 110-113; Shedd (W. G. T.) "History of Christian Doctrines," II., IV.; Wiggers (G. F.) "Augustinism and Pelagianism," p. 59 sq.; Ellis's "Half-century of the Unitarian Controversy," p. 56 sq.

(Opus Imp. I. 105, cf. v. 56.) It emphasizes "the power of contrary choice," — the "*possibilitatem utriusque partis.*" And it declares that Adam and Christ are set forth in Rom. v. 12 sq. (cf. 1 Cor. i. 30; 2 Cor. v. 21) as typical personages merely, illustrating the divinely established connection between sin and death, righteousness and life.

This theory is unsatisfactory (a) Because it denies such a connection between our sinfulness and the fall of Adam as the Scriptures assert (for example, Rom. v. 12, 18, 19). (b) Because it denies, on the other hand, such a connection between the righteousness of believers and the work of Christ as the Scriptures assert (Rom. v. 9, 17, 18, 19; x. 4; 1 Cor. i. 30). (c) Because it makes too little of sin as affecting moral character; too little of the moral bias of the soul to evil. (d) Because it fails to account for the universality of sin in mankind.

II. *The Arminian Theory.* The authorities for this theory are given below.¹ The Arminian theory supposes man to be responsible for his own voluntary action (or inaction), and, strictly speaking, for nothing else. It supposes that, since the fall, men are born "without original righteousness," and morally powerless, needing "new grace," but not guilty. "Unde fit, ut posterī omnes Adami eadem justitiā destituti, prorsus inepti et inidonei sint ad vitam æternam consequendam, aut in gratiam cum deo redeant, nisi deus novā gratiā suā eos præveniat, et vires novas iis restituat ac sufficiat, quibus ad eam possint pervenire." — (Apol. Conf. Remonstr. p. 84, b.) It supposes that men are made responsible for the right and wrong of their conduct by a *gracious ability* imparted by God. "It is not, then, until there is redemptively conferred upon man what we call a *gracious ability* for the right that man

¹ "Remonstrantia, libellus supplex exhibitus Hollandiæ et Westfrisiæ Ordinibus," 1610. Five Articles; "Confessio, seu Declaratio Sententiæ Pastorum, qui in fœderato Belgio Remonstrantes vocantur, super præcipuis articulis rel. Chr." 1622 (Simon Episcop. Opp. II. 69); Limborch (Phil. a) "Theologia Christiana" (Amstel. 1686, 1730); Arminius (Ja.) "Opera Theol." 1609, 1635; Wesley (J.) "Works" see p. 25 *supra*; Whedon (D.D.) "Doctrines of Methodism," Bib. Sac. XIX. p. 241 sq.

can strictly be responsible for the wrong." — (Whedon.) And it supposes that Adam and Christ are represented as "federal heads" of mankind in Rom. v. 12, but only "conceptually," or by a "legal fiction." But in reality the case stands thus: "It is as a depraved being that man becomes an ego; but instantly after, in the order of nature, he is met by the provisions of the atonement. If he is not thereby immediately unconditionally justified and regenerated, his death before the commission of actual sin would place him out of the category of condemnation." In other words, gracious aid is always granted, and must be granted, to render man justly accountable for sin.

This theory is unsatisfactory (*a*) Because the Scriptures do not found human responsibility on gracious aid, or the work of the Spirit. (*b*) Because they do not teach that this influence of the Holy Spirit is given to all men; much less do they teach that it is given to all in early life. (*c*) Because they do not justify us in calling that "grace" which must be imparted by God, to constitute man responsible. (*d*) Because they teach a doctrine of election which this theory repudiates. (*e*) Because they teach the entire sinfulness and the accountability of Satan, without once suggesting the idea of gracious aid, imparted to him for the purpose of rendering him justly accountable. The writer, at least, does not recollect any passage where such aid is pronounced necessary for Satan.

III. *The Edwardean Theory.*¹ This theory maintains that man is responsible for all his voluntary action (or inaction), and that he always has a *natural ability* to do right, though his inclination to sin leads him to do wrong uniformly. It also maintains that Adam and Christ are treated in Rom. v.

¹ See Duffield (G.) "Doctrines of the New Sch. Presb. Church," Bib. Sac. XX. p. 561 sq.; "The Auburn Declaration," Presb. Rev. 1876*; Fiske (D. T.) "New England Theology," Bib. Sac. XXII. 477 sq. and 568 sq.; Haven (J.) "Sin as related to Human Nature, and to the Divine Purpose," Bib. Sac. XX. 445 sq.

* It is not meant that the New School Presbyterians adopted in all respects "The New England Theology," but that the two may be studied together, as kindred types of thought.

12 sq. as sources of inclination to evil and to good; yet it denies that men are responsible for any inherited inclination. They are only responsible for the action by which they freely appropriate and express such an inclination. Hence men are born depraved, but not sinful; loaded with misfortune, but not with guilt. Their guilt begins with moral action; and this, owing to their inherited bias to evil, is always sinful.

In favor of this theory, it is urged (1) That it does something to explain the fact of human responsibility, — a great deal, indeed, if its distinction between natural and moral ability is correct, and if the former is a sufficient basis for responsibility. (2) That it agrees with many representations of Scripture as to personal guilt, and especially with the accounts of the final judgment (Ezek. xviii. 1 – 32; Matt. xxv. 14–46; 2 Cor. v. 10). (3) That it is compatible with the Scriptural doctrines of election and the work of the Spirit.

But it is not wholly satisfactory (a) Because it does not agree with the most obvious sense of Eph. ii. 3; 1 Cor. vii. 14; Rom. v. 12–19; John iii. 6. For these passages suggest that all men are exposed, even from birth, to the just displeasure of God. (b) Because it tends to make the salvation of all who die in infancy independent of the death of Christ; for, if they are simply unfortunate, it is impossible to see why Christ should suffer for them. — (See Rom. v. 8 sq.; 2 Cor. v. 15, 21; Heb. ix. 22, 26, 28; 1 Peter, iii. 18; 1 John ii. 2.) (c) Because it fails to satisfy the logical understanding, that man has all the power necessary to right action; for the admission of moral inability¹ seems to render null and void the assertion of natural ability. Besides, the difference between holding a child to be guilty for actions which flow uniformly from a bias to evil, and holding him guilty for that bias, seems much greater in theory than in practice.

iv. *The Placcan Theory.*² This theory supposes that men

¹ Since *any* inability is said to be inconsistent with responsibility, and especially if that inability is *inherited*.

² See Shedd (W. G. T.) "Hist. of Christian Doctrine," II. p. 158 sq.; Hagenbach (K. R.) "Hist. of Doctrines," II. pp. 181, 262; Baird (S. J.) "Elohim Re-

are accountable for all the sin which they commit, or desire to commit, or which they indorse in others by sympathy of aim and spirit. It supposes that all men participate with Adam in the corruption of nature induced by the fall. It supposes that they are directly charged with this corruption, and mediately with the sin which it indorses; and it supposes that Adam and Christ are set forth, in Rom. v. 12 sq., as the sources, respectively, of sin and death, righteousness and life, in mankind.

In support of this theory, it is said, (1) That it is in harmony with several statements of Scripture.—(See Luke xi. 47, 51; Matt. xxiii. 35, 36; Ex. xx. 5, 6; xxxiv. 7; Ps. ciii. 17, 18; Ezek. xviii. 1–32. Edwards (J.) “Inquiry concerning the Freedom of the Will,” — “Works” II., p. 482.) (2) That it agrees with the working of conscience, which holds every one responsible for his moral assent to evil. “Evil dwells in him, not as a dead inheritance, handed down from Adam, but as his own evil to which he consents.” — (Dorner, *Hist. of Prot. Theol.* I., p. 212.)

Yet it is not wholly satisfactory, (a) Because it casts so faint a light on the justice of God in the imputation of Adam’s sin to adults who do as he did. (b) Because it casts no light on the justice of God in bringing into existence a race inclined to sin by the fall of Adam. The inherited bias is still unexplained, and the imputation of it a riddle or a wrong to the natural understanding.

v. *The Augustinian Theory.*¹ The defenders of this theory agree with those just named, in making every man responsible for his moral feelings, as well as actions, and, in supposing him to be a *particeps criminis*, whenever he assents in heart to a sinful action.

vealed,” &c., p. 45–6; Schweitzer (A.) “Placeus,” *Herzog, Real-Encyklopädie*; Placæus (J.) “Opera Omnia,” 1699 and 1702, “Theses Theologicæ de Statu hominis lapsi ante gratiam,” 1640, and “Disputatio de imputatione primi peccati Adami,” 1655.

¹ Shedd (W. G. T.) “Discourses and Essays,” p. 218 sq.; Baird (S. J.) “The Elohim Revealed in the Creation and Redemption of Man”; Hodge (C.) “Systematic Theology,” II. p. 51 sq., and p. 216 sq.

They generally accept the *traducian* theory of the origin of human souls, as well as of human bodies. They emphasize the *oneness* of the human race, and approve the language of Augustine, saying, "We were all in that one man [Adam], since we were all that one man who lapsed into sin through the woman that was made from him previous to transgression. The form in which we were to live as individuals had not, indeed, been created and assigned to us, man by man; but that seminal nature from which we were to be propagated was in existence."

Hence they regard Adam and Christ as the sources, respectively, of sin and death, righteousness and life. Without rejecting the doctrine of "federal headship," they make it rest upon a real and natural headship, which is of chief importance.

Of this theory it may be remarked, (*a*) That it was probably suggested to the mind of Augustine by the inaccurate Latin version of $\epsilon\sigma\ \sigma\acute{\iota}$ in Rom. v. 12; (*b*) That it does not remove the objection which human reason urges against holding all men responsible for the first sin of Adam; for it does not assert that all human souls were *so* included in Adam's soul as to act with the latter *consciously* in that first sin; (*c*) That it lays too little stress upon the distinction between nature and will, between an unconscious bias and a rational choice; and (*d*) That it breaks down, when applied to the connection between the justification of believers and the righteousness of Christ; for believers were not in Christ, as to the substance of their souls, when he wrought out redemption for them.

vi. *The Calvinistic Theory.*¹ By this is meant the Old School view, fully stated by Turretin, and by the articles of the Westminster assembly. It asserts the responsibility

¹ Turretin (F.) "Institutio Theologiæ Elenticæ," Vol. I. Loc. IV. Qu. IX.; Hodge (C.) "Systematic Theology," Vol. II. p. 192 sq.; "Princeton Essays" (First Series), "Original Sin," p. 109 sq., and "The Doctrine of Imputation," pp. 128-217; Wallace (H.) "Representative Responsibility, a Law of the Divine Procedure in Providence and Redemption"; "Westminster Assembly's Confession of Faith," and "Catechism"; "The Philadelphia Confession of Faith" (Bap.).

of every man for his depraved heart and sinful action. It supposes that Adam and Christ are set forth in Rom. v. 12 sq., as federal heads or representatives; the sin of the former being imputed to all men directly, and the righteousness of the latter being imputed directly to all the elect.

To this theory objections may also be made; for example, (a) That it requires us to give a very unusual, if not unexampled meaning to the word "sinned," in Rom. v. 12, that is, "were regarded and treated as responsible for another's sin"; (b) That it makes too little of the real connection between Adam and his offspring, Christ and his people. — (See John iii. 6; 1 Cor. xii. 3); and, (c) That it puts justification before regeneration and faith; while the New Testament makes faith a condition of justification, and, therefore, prior to it, in the order of nature.

Something, then, may be said, with apparent justice, against every one of these theories. And evidently the connection of the race with Adam, and of believers with Christ, brings into the problem of the imputation of sin a great part of the difficulty which it offers to the human understanding. Were it not for that connection, a tolerably satisfactory solution might be reached; but that connection is a fact, whether we can ascertain all that it involves or not.

Looking at this subject, for a moment, in the light of human reason and conscience, it may be said, that every man, however depraved at birth, or hardened by wicked conduct, is a moral agent, and, as such, is accountable to God (a) *for every voluntary act that is wrong*; (b) *for the increase of inclination to evil which is produced by that act*; (c) *for the inclination to sin which is appropriated by that act*; (d) *for all the evil which may be expected by him to result from that act*. All this must be admitted by every thoughtful man, without regard to the instruction of Scripture. For what an amount of sin, then, is every one accountable to whom the gospel is preached! Heart-fellowship with sin is sin; and all mankind in their unrenewed state are guilty of this radical and sin-producing sin.

Many would add to all this, responsibility, (*e*) for the whole system of moral evil with which the act is seen by him to be connected; and, (*f*) for the sin of Adam, which is, in principle, repeated by every sinful act of his offspring. But it would be in many respects better to say, that he is accountable for the degree of sympathy which he has for the whole system of evil, and for the disobedience of Adam. If that sympathy is full, whether it be expressed by word or deed or thought, if the whole force of his being is arrayed against heaven, and on the side of hell, it is difficult to limit his responsibility.

A voluntary act, as used in this statement, is any act which is performed by a moral being in his ordinary condition,—any act, or course of action, which reveals his moral character.

But of course it is our duty to take the evidence of Scripture, as well as that of reason; and the evidence of Scripture is formidably strong in favor of the view, that both Adam and Christ acted for others; that, in some true sense, all men suffer the penal consequences of the sin in Eden, being in full fellowship with it, and that all who are in moral union with Christ will enjoy the full benefit of his death.

Yet the Scriptures recognize a difference between personal sin and inherited sinfulness, as appears in their accounts of the final judgment.

VI. PENALTY OF SIN. This topic requires us to consider (1) The proper idea of penalty; (2) The fact of penalty for sin; and (3) What that penalty is.

(1) The first point need not detain us long; for without doubt the primary and leading sense of penalty is, *suffering by pain or loss inflicted by the proper authority upon wrong-doers for their wrong-doing*. It looks to the past, not to the future; its primary aim is retribution, not reformation. It rests on the postulate, that government ought to make a distinction between crime and innocence, that evil-doers ought not to receive the same treatment as those who do well; and this postulate will be accepted by all who admit

the distinction between right and wrong, by all who admit that men are in fact moral beings.

(2) The second point may also be treated with brevity; for although many exclude punishment, properly so-called, from the moral government of God, they do this against the plain teaching of the Scriptures, and have, therefore, been answered in Part II., which proves that teaching to be infallible. If any one urges that the Scriptures reveal the natural consequences of sin, and not its penalty, we reply, (*a*) That their language will not admit of such an interpretation (Matt. xxv. 30, 41, 46; 2 Thess. i. 8); and (*b*) That the natural consequences of sin are due to a constitution given to man by his Maker. Hence the working of that constitution may well be regarded as retributive, — carrying into effect the just judgment of God.¹

(3) The third point must be treated with special care; and for two reasons: first, because it is one of no little difficulty in itself; and secondly, because the belief of Christians in respect to it is becoming divided. Some suppose that the penalty of sin is bodily death; some, that it is extinction of conscious being; some, that it is spiritual death; and some, that it is both spiritual and bodily death. Especially active are those who teach that *extinction of conscious being* is the divinely-prescribed penalty of sin. We must, therefore, spare no pains in trying to ascertain the truth on this point, nor ought we to be surprised if it occupies our attention for a considerable time; for the *data* to be examined are scattered here and there, through the whole Bible, and may be divided into three parts: — (*a*) The meaning and use of the terms employed in foretelling the penalty of sin; (*b*) The intimations as to the time when the penalty takes effect; and (*c*) The account of it, as suffered by those who have passed beyond hope.

In studying this subject, three facts ought to be borne constantly in mind, namely: That the style of the sacred writers is popular, and very often figurative; that the revelation of reli-

¹ Butler (J.) "Analogy," Part I. ch. 2d.

gious truth made by them is progressive in clearness and fullness, from first to last; and that comparatively slight attention is given to the doctrine of another life in the Old Testament.

In the discussion which follows, particular reference is had to the view, so zealously advocated by many,¹ that extinction of conscious being is the penalty of sin.

1. *The meaning and use of the principal terms employed by the sacred writers in foretelling the punishment of sin.*

The terms are Death, Destruction or Perdition, Lake of Fire, Outer Darkness, Eternal Punishment, and some others of similar import.

(1) The most important of them all is "death"; and therefore it deserves the most careful study.

What then is death? The one comprehensive answer to this question is this: *The opposite or negative of life.*

And therefore it is necessary to inquire, What is life? And to answer: A great mystery doubtless, yet *by no means the same as existence.* Life is more than existence; it is a particular kind of existence, — existence *plus* a mysterious force, which gives a higher form and a greater value to existence. This, if no more, may be premised before looking at the use of terms in the Bible.

Starting with this general view of the meaning and relation of the words "life" and "death," we turn to the Scriptures, and observe the following facts:² —

1. *That they recognize an original and important difference*

¹ Dobney (H. H.) "The Scripture Doctrine of Future Punishment"; Whately (R.) "A View of the Scripture Revelation concerning a Future State" — not very decided; Storrs (G.) "Man's Destiny," "The True Source of Life," "The Rich Man and Lazarus"; Hudson (C. F.) "Debt and Grace"; Constable (H.) "Duration and Nature of Future Punishment."

² Hovey (A) "State of the Impenitent Dead"; Thompson (J. P.) "Love and Penalty"; Bartlett (S. C.) "Life and Death Eternal; a Refutation of the Theory of Annihilation"; Stuart (M.) "Exegetical Essays on Several Words relating to Future Punishment"; Dexter (H. M.) "The Verdict of Reason upon the Question of the Future Punishment of those who die Impenitent"; New Englander for 1871, p. 659 sq., "The Theory of the Extinction of the Wicked"; Krabbe (O.) "Die Lehre von der Sünde und vom Tode in ihrer Beziehung zu einander und zu der Auferstehung Christi."

between the body of man and his spirit. (Eccl. xii. 7; Gen. ii. 7 (cf. i. 26); Num. xvi. 22; xxvii. 16; Heb. xii. 9; Zech. xii. 1; 2 Cor. xii. 2 sq.; Acts vii. 59; Gen. xxxv. 18; Ezek. xviii. 4; Rom. viii. 16; 2 Cor. v. 1; James ii. 26.)

2. *That this original difference between the body of man and his spirit underlies a difference of relation to endless existence* (Gen. iii. 22, 23, compared with 1 Cor. xv. 43-47, and the passages cited above). Accordingly, the body of man, as such, was not, even before the fall, adapted to endless existence; but his spirit was. His body, unless changed from an earthly to a spiritual one, must return to dust; but his soul, in its own proper nature, was a single, indissoluble power, adapted to endless being. This seems to be a natural conclusion, from the language of Scripture and from the testimony of consciousness.

Yet, as we shall presently see, the conscious existence of the soul is by no means its life; for the latter depends upon union with God: it is a higher condition of being, due to rational fellowship with the Most High. As the body without the spirit is dead (James ii. 26), so the spirit without God is dead. The connection between the soul and God, though different from that between the body and the soul, is no less essential and life-producing.

“Mors igitur animæ fit,” says Augustine, “cum eam deserit Deus, sicut corporis, cum id deserit anima . . . vivit itaque anima ex Deo, cum vivit bene; non enim potest bene vivere, nisi Deo in se operante quod bonum est.” — “De Civ. Dei,” xiii. c. 2. See also xi. c. 17. Non itaque esset vitium recedere a Deo, nisi naturæ, cujus id vitium est, potius competeret esse cum Deo. Quapropter etiam voluntas mala grande testimonium est bonæ naturæ. To test the correctness of this definition, we must observe with care the use of the terms “life” and “death” in the Scriptures. They are frequently used of the spirit, and signify respectively, —

1. *Union with God, and separation from him.* This is a natural use of the terms; for man as a spiritual being is not

self-sufficient, but dependent, needing fellowship; and his truest life is realized in communion with God. But union with God is secured by faith in Christ; and separation from God, by unbelief. Bearing this fact in mind, the following passages will be seen to justify our definition, namely:—

(1) John vi. 47, 48, 54, 56, 63; xi. 25, 26 (cf. John iii. 16; iv. 14; Rom. v. 1). From these selections, to go no further, it appears that men who have Christian faith have a state of being which has been originated by the Holy Spirit, with the use of Christian truth, and is called by the Saviour life, or eternal life. The possession of true faith proves the existence of this life, even if the one is not identical with the other; and, by virtue of this life, the believer is in Christ and Christ in him. They hold converse with each other, having the same thoughts, wishes, and aims. But this may be made a separate point.

(2) 'John xv. 2 sq.; Eph. i. 1; 1 John v. 20 (cf. Rom. viii. 6-11). These are but specimens of a large class of texts, which represent believers as being *in* Christ. And this their relation to him is conceived of many times as more than legal and protective, as vital also, through his indwelling spirit. Yet the vitality in question is plainly one of moral disposition,—of thinking and feeling in unison with Christ; it is spiritual life, the normal, unperverted, unimpeded, healthful action of a rational soul, uplifted by the thoughts of Christ communicated to it.

(3) John i. 4, 9; xv. 1 sq; xvii. 2, 3; Gal. v. 22. When we observe (*a*) that the life was the light of men, (*b*) that the eternal life of men consists in knowing the true God and Jesus Christ, (*c*) that by vital union with Christ men bear Christian fruit, and (*d*) that this fruit is love, joy, peace, &c., we are ready to conclude that the life given to men, in Christ and by Christ, is a normal state of the soul, revealing itself in holy action,—a state and action which will never cease (John xi. 25, 26).

(4) John v. 24; iii. 6; 1 John iii. 14, a.; Eph. v. 14; Titus iii. 5; 1 Peter i. 3, 23 (cf. Rom. vi. 2-14; vii. 4-6;

viii. 6, 7, 10, 11; Eph. ii. 1, 5, 6, 10; iv. 18; Gal. ii. 19, 20; Col. i. 21, 22; 1 Tim. v. 6). In these passages, the state of men after regeneration is contrasted with their state before it, — the one being called life, and the other death. But the difference between these two states is one of moral disposition and action. In the one case, there is fellowship with God; in the other, there is not. This is the difference, as revealed by experience; and all the accounts of regeneration, pardon, adoption, and union with Christ, found in the Bible, rest on this view.

It is plain that the selections in our parenthesis refer to the same conditions of being as are treated in the leading texts. But in the passages thus indicated, the unregenerate are described as those who are alive in sin, and subject to sin; alive to the flesh, and obedient to its lusts; alive to the law, but enemies to God, or dead to him; accomplishing the wishes of the flesh and of the mind, but darkened in the understanding, and alienated from the life of God, by reason of ignorance and hardness of heart: while the regenerate are described as those who have died to sin and to the law, and been made alive in Christ to God, — the servants of righteousness, a product of God's hand, created in Christ Jesus for good works, and destined to be made holy and spotless and blameless before him.

All this refers, beyond a doubt, to moral character and condition. Fellowship with God in Christ is life; alienation of heart from God is death.

II. *Spiritual blessedness and woe.* The idea of life includes that of happiness. It is only when life is disturbed, its laws violated, that suffering comes in. If the experience of man does not comport with this idea, he is but too conscious that his life is a failure by reason of sin. Hence, in spite of experience, he includes high spiritual enjoyment in his conception of human life, and applies this term to a blessed existence, by way of distinguishing it from a miserable one. From this point of view, death is misery, — the opposite of true life, or mere existence, — the negative of true life. — (See 1 Thess. iii. 8; Rom. vii. 9; viii. 6.)

Again, true life implies fellowship with God; and fellowship with God is purest enjoyment. Well and fervidly does Secrétan say that, "if feeling is but the echo of the depths within, if happiness is but the consciousness of power, harmony, and truth, as wretchedness is that of emptiness, discord, and falsehood, it is impossible that the love of God, the perfection of goodness, the plenitude of our being, should not also be fulness of happiness. Thus the soul that loves God is rich, free, happy; she is satisfied, moreover, and feels no further want." — (See Ps. xvi. 11; xlii. 1-5; Eph. iii. 19; 1 Peter i. 8.) Hence, loss of communion with God is a loss of blessedness; nay, as conceived of by the sacred writers, it is more than this, — it is the opposite of true life. The spirit of man cannot leave the realm of happiness, without entering that of woe. — (See 1 Thess. iii. 7, 8; Rev. ii. 11; xx. 6, 14; xxi. 8 (cf. Rev. xx. 10; xiv. 10, 11); Luke xvi. 23 sq.; Matt. xxv. 41, 46.)

But against the conclusion now reached, several objections are pressed by those who believe in the annihilation of the wicked. For example: —

1. *That death properly signifies extinction of being.* When it is predicated of a person, it denotes the end of his personal existence. When it is predicated of an animal, it denotes the end of its animal existence. And, when it is predicated of a plant, it denotes the end of its existence as a plant.

This is not wholly correct, as an account of the use of language among men; for, according to that use, a dead tree may be still in existence, and so may a dead body, or a dead spirit. Existence, in a state of death, is different from existence in a state of life; but it is existence still. The state or condition of being, called life, is terminated by death; and this is all.

2. *That Adam must have understood death to be extinction of being; and his view of the evil threatened for disobedience must have been correct.* Neither of these assertions can be sustained by evidence; for the Word of God gives no hint of the explanations which Jehovah doubtless made to Adam

of the threatening in question, — no hint of the meaning which Adam found in it. The record is very brief, giving, we suspect, the substance of much instruction and warning in a single clause.

Besides, we have no reason to suppose that Adam, any more than his descendants, had an exact or adequate view beforehand of the penalty of sin. The justice of punishment does not depend on its being known by the transgressor, before he disobeys the law.

3. *That the Scripture accounts of the dead prove death to be extinction of being.* — (See, for example, Ps. vi. 6; xxx. 10; lxxxviii. 11–13; cxv. 17; Eccl. ix. 10; Isa. xxxviii. 18, 19 (cf. Jer. li. 57; 1 Thess. iv. 13 sq). These passages do certainly, at first sight, favor the theory of extinction of being at death. But it should be recollected, in studying them, (a) That the Bible is a progressive revelation. This is true of its treatment of almost every doctrine, and especially of the doctrines of the trinity and the future life; “first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear.” Hence, we must look to the New Testament, rather than to the Old, for the fullest account of the state after death. (b) Poetry should be interpreted by prose, rather than prose by poetry; for poetry makes more frequent use of phenomenal and hyperbolical language than does prose. It is, therefore, more likely to seize upon the visible aspects of death, and describe it by its effects on the body. (c) The sacred writers appear to speak oftentimes of death with reference to the change which it makes on one’s relations to the present world. By it, the plans, enterprises, duties, and joys of time are brought to nought forever. — (See Eccl. ix. 10; Ps. cxlvi. 4; Job vii. 7–10.) (d) The views of uninspired men are sometimes given on this point; and of course their views may be incorrect. Hezekiah was, in all likelihood, uninspired when he prayed; and, though the preacher was inspired when he wrote, he has put on record many of the thoughts which he had when uninspired: we cannot, therefore, rely upon the testimony of either as conclusive. — (See, for example, Isa. xxxviii. 18, 19; Eccl. ix. 10; Job x. 20–22; xvi. 12; xvii. 1.)

(2.) Another term to be considered is "destruction," or "perdition." The Greek noun *ἀπόλεια* is used in twenty passages of the New Testament; and the corresponding verb is found in more than a hundred. They often denote the utter ruin of an object, and often the entire severance of its (normal) relation to another. — (See Matt. xxvi. 8; Mark xiv. 4; Acts viii. 20; Matt. ix. 17; x. 6, 42; xv. 24; Mark ii. 22; Luke xi. 51; xiii. 33; xv. 4, 6, 8, 9, 17, 24, 32; also xix. 10; John vi. 39; x. 28; xvii. 12; xviii. 9; 2 Peter iii. 6; 2 John, 8 (cf. 11). But if the verb is often used to denote sundered relations, in consequence of which one person or object is worthless to another; if it points to severed relations, and so implies great evil, but not extermination of being, this may well be its meaning, when selected to express the penalty of sin. Besides, it will be observed, that perishing or destruction is affirmed of prophets and good men, as well as of the wicked. (Luke xi. 51; xiii. 33 (cf. Isa. lvii. 1). And, therefore, it cannot be supposed to denote, uniformly, extinction of being, even if it may, in some instances, denote this.

(3.) Another expression to be examined, is the "lake of fire," and its equivalents. — (See Matt. v. 22, 29, 30; x. 28; xiii. 42, 50; xviii. 8, 9; xxiii. 33; xxv. 41; Mark ix. 43-48; Rev. xx. 10, 14, 15; xxi. 8 (of. Luke xvi. 23, 24). It will be noted, that the expressions, "eternal fire," "furnace of fire," "lake of fire," "fire that is never quenched," "Gehenna of fire," and "Gehenna," appear to be used by Christ as equivalent terms. It will also be observed, that in all these passages, men themselves, or wicked beings, are spoken of directly as being in the fire referred to. It will be still further remarked, that they are not said, unless it be in a single instance, to be destroyed by the fire. And, lastly, it will be observed, that they are generally represented as in a state of great suffering. The fire is conceived of as an unfailling source of pain, not as putting an end to conscious being; and this prevailing view of the office of the fire in question must naturally determine the sense of the word "destroy," in Matt. x. 28; especially, when we compare Mark i. 24, with v. 7.

(4) Another expression employed by the sacred writers is "torment" or "punishment."—(See Matt. xxv. 46; xviii. 34, 35 (cf. viii. 29; Mark v. 7). The word *κόλασις* occurs in but one other passage of the New Testament, namely, 1 John iv. 18; and the verb *κολάζω*, from which it is derived, occurs in but three places at most; (namely, Acts iv. 21, 2 Peter ii. 9, and perhaps 2 Peter ii. 4.) The biblical use of the words, therefore, shows that they refer to punishment in the form of conscious suffering; yet it is sufficient to know that, when applied to sinful beings, they signify punishment. The word "tormentors," points also to conscious and great suffering; and the bearing of the passages cited upon the nature of the penalty of sin cannot be doubted. It will be observed in this case, also, that the wrong-doers are referred to directly as men, or evil angels, and not under the figure of an evil tree, or of any other inflammable object.

(5) Still another expression is used to shadow forth the doom of the lost, namely, "The outer darkness."—(See Matt. viii. 12; xxii. 13 (cf. xxiv. 51); xxv. 11, 12, 30 (cf. vii. 23); Rev. xxii. 15.) Expulsion from the presence of Christ into the outer darkness, where there is wailing and gnashing of teeth, can be said to describe no other doom than one of felt misery; and it is plainly a misery in which the ungodly now suffer, though it will not reach its culmination till the last day. It is obvious, likewise, that loss of good, or as Turretin amplifies the thought, *separatio a Deo et Christo, privatio lucis, gaudii, gloriæ, felicitatis*, is supposed to be a principal part of the punishment suffered by the lost, whether here or hereafter.

Besides these, a few other expressions are found in the Bible which are thought to define the penalty of sin, as "extinction of being."

(6) The wicked are to be "consumed" or "devoured," &c., (for example Isa. i. 28; Ps. xxxvii. 20; Heb. x. 27.) In regard to the first two of these passages, and to many more of a similar tenor in the Old Testament, it may be said, (a) That they probably refer to merely temporal calamities.

(*b*) That the language is not to be pressed as literal, even with reference to temporal evil (cf. Gen. xxxi. 40; Ps. xxxi. 10, 11; xxxix. 11; lxix. 10; Jer. xiv. 12; Hab. iii. 14; Gal. v. 15; Mark xii. 40). And, in regard to the last passage, it may be said, that it is manifestly a strong figurative expression, and settles nothing as to the precise nature of the penalty of sin.

(7) The wicked are to be "burned up," or the like. — (See Ps. xxi. 10; xcvi. 3; Mal. iv. 1, 3, Eng. ver. (iii. 19, 21, in Heb.)) Matt. iii. 12; xiii. 40; John xv. 6; Heb. vi. 8; x. 27; xii. 29; Rev. xx. 9. But with these passages should be compared, Ps. cii. 4 (cf. Job xxx. 30); 1 Kings viii. 51 (cf. Deut. iv. 20; Jer. xi. 4); Ezek. xxii. 19–22 (cf. 1 Peter i. 7; iv. 12; 1 Cor. iii. 15); Num. xxi. 28; Lam. iv. 11.) It is evident from a careful study of the passages cited, not to mention others of a similar character, (*a*) That the words "burn" and "burn up," are often used, in a figurative sense, to describe the effect of God's wrath upon sinners. Whether the original words should be translated "burn," or "burn up," depends upon the context, and especially upon the object with which sinners are compared. If they are likened to chaff, or wood, the original terms may be rendered, "to burn up;" but if to a metallic substance, they must be rendered "to burn,"—for the substance is only melted, not dissolved. (*b*) These figurative expressions are often used to denote vengeance inflicted on those who still exist; and, in such cases, it cannot signify extinction of being. (*c*) The epithets used in connection with these words, or with the word "fire," denote in some instances long-continued or eternal burning; hence they point to protracted suffering, rather than to sudden extinction of being. We do not, therefore, find in the use of these figurative terms any valid objection to our view of the penalty of sin.

(8) The wicked are to be "cut off." — (See Ps. xxxiv. 17; xxxvii. 9, 22, 28. But compare Isa. liii. 8; Dan. ix. 26; Job vi. 9; Ps. lxxxviii. 17; Matt. xxiv. 50, 51.) The words "cut off" appear to refer in almost all these passages to natural

death ; and it seems to us very hasty to infer from them the extinction of the soul *along with* the death of the body.

(9) The wicked are to "be brought to nought," &c. Such texts as the following are referred to: Ps. xxxvii. 10, 36; Job vii. 21; xx. 8; viii. 22; Obad. 16; Isa. xli. 11, 12; Jer. x. 24. But with these should be compared a few others (for example, Isa. xl. 17; Ps. xxxix. 5; 1 Cor. vii. 19; viii. 4; 2 Cor. xii. 11; Gal. vi. 3; Acts v. 36; Mark ix. 12). It will be observed, that the former passages seem to speak of temporal judgments, and also that the same form of speech is used of the righteous which is applied to the wicked. Besides, it must be borne in mind, that the language of Scripture is very often figurative, and even hyperbolical,—indeed, through and through popular instead of scientific.

(10) The wicked, or their names, are to "be blotted out." And these passages are quoted: Ps. lxix. 28 (cf. Ex. xxxii. 32); Rev. iii. 5. The figure is that of a record-book, containing the names of persons entitled to certain blessings; but the blotting out of the names deprives the persons represented by them of all title to the blessings in question.

Having ascertained that the terms "life" and "death" are often used by the sacred writers to denote, on the one hand, the union of the human spirit with God, and, on the other, its separation from him, as also to denote its blessedness and its woe, and that other expressions employed to indicate the penalty of sin confirm rather than confute this explanation of death, we are now prepared to consider:—

II. *The intimations of Scripture as to the time when the penalty of sin begins to take effect.* For, if it begins to take effect in this world, it must be mainly, if not exclusively, separation of soul from God, with the consequent misery. The term "death" may signify this; and the circumstances of the case forbid any other meaning. That the penalty of sin begins to take effect in the present world, may be inferred,—

(1) *From the language of God to Adam before the fall.* That language was very explicit. Gen. ii. 17: "In the day of thy eating of it, thou shalt surely die." The obvious and the

only tenable meaning of these words is, that the death of Adam should follow at once his eating of the forbidden fruit ; and there is nothing in the narrative of the fall which warrants any other interpretation of them, or authorizes us to say, that God in his mercy postponed the execution of the threatened penalty.¹

Besides, we learn that Adam and Eve hid themselves away from the presence of God, thus relinquishing their fellowship with him ; and, that he, in turn, banished them from the garden, and so, as it were, from converse with himself. Some have concluded from his words, as recorded in Gen. iii. 19, that physical death was the punishment provided for disobedience, and that it was postponed a long time in the case of our first parents ; but the language of that passage does not show that physical death was even a part, much less that it was the chief part, or the whole, of the penalty of sin. We conclude, then, that Adam and Eve began to suffer the punishment of sin immediately after the fall ; and, if so, that their offspring, born in their likeness, suffer it also, to some extent, in the present state.

“To some extent,” we say ; for as the life of the soul, consisting in its union with God and consequent peace, begins here with regeneration, but culminates hereafter in glory ; so does the death of the soul, consisting in its separation from God and consequent woe, begin here with sin, but culminate hereafter in despair. This may be inferred,—

(2) *From the language of John the Baptist, preserved in the Fourth Gospel*, iii. 36: “The wrath of God abideth on him.” (Compare John iii. 18 ; Eph. ii. 3 ; Rom. i. 18 ; Isa. lix. 2.) Meyer supposes that the word “wrath” does not here mean *punishment*, but rather God’s holy indignation. His view is not, however, correct ; for the wrath spoken of is represented as being and abiding *upon* — ἐπί — the unbeliever ; it is wrath passing over upon its object in just punishment,—being, therefore, a foretaste of “the wrath to come.” And the

¹ See “State of the Impenitent Dead,” p. 99 sq.

reason why the wrath to come is referred to so much oftener than the wrath now revealed is because the former is so much greater and more enduring than the latter; even as, for the same reason, the future reward of Christians is spoken of far oftener than their present reward. Yet they receive a hundred-fold of good here.

(3) *From the frequent designation of the present state of unbelievers by the term "death."* For the mere fact that this term, chosen by the Most High to denote the penalty of sin, is applied to unrenewed men in this life, supposes them to be suffering that penalty. Death is the penalty of sin. Sinners are dead even here; hence they are bearing, in some measure, the penalty of sin. The *onus probandi* rests clearly upon those who deny our statement.

(4) *From the different language used by the sacred writers in describing the present sufferings of believers and those of unbelievers.* (Compare Rom. viii. 28 sq., and Heb. xii. 5 sq., with Rom. i. 18 sq.) In the one case, suffering is reformatory, with an aspect of retribution; in the other, it is retribution, with a glance towards reformation.

(5) *From the sufferings which are connected with natural death in this world.* The fear and sting of bodily death are not taken from it for unbelievers; and, if such death is included in the penalty of sin, that penalty is suffered in part here.

(6) *From the action of conscience, enlightened by the Word of God.* Men who read the Scriptures are wont to believe that, by the action of our moral nature and of his providence, God begins to punish the wicked in this life, and sometimes makes that punishment very awful and monitory.¹

(7) *From the language of Christ and of Peter concerning the ungodly in Hades.* Luke xvi. 23; 2 Peter ii. 9. For, if the punishment of unrenewed men begins before the last judgment, why should it not begin in the present world?

¹ Says Augustine: Si nunquam in præsentì judicaret, non esse crederetur. Si omnia in præsentì judicaret, nihil judicìo reservaret," cf. Butler (J.) "Analogy," Part I. ch. 2d *prope finem*.

Is it not reasonable to believe that its witness to the character of God must be as useful here as there?

We are therefore satisfied that the primary and chief penalty of sin consists in a separation of the soul from God, and the misery consequent thereon, and that it begins in the present state.

The correctness of our view of the penalty of sin may be inferred:—

III. *From the Scriptural accounts of it, as suffered by the lost in a future state.* These are regarded by some as affording, on the whole, the clearest evidence in respect to the nature of death,—the penalty of sin. Perhaps they do; but this is by no means certain: yet they certainly deserve most serious consideration. And we observe, therefore, that impenitent men are represented:—

(1) *As being, immediately after death, in a state of restraint and suffering.* (Luke xvi. 23, 24, 25, 28; 1 Peter iii. 19; 2 Peter ii. 4, 9; Matt. v. 25 (cf. Matt. viii. 29). Restraint implies a power of action in those restrained; and suffering, a state of consciousness. If the spirits of bad men are rendered impotent and unconscious by death, so likewise are their bodies; why, then, are not the latter, as well as the former, said to be in prison, or under guard (*ἐν φυλακῇ*, 1 Peter iii. 19)? The discourse of Christ in Luke, is quite as much to the point in proving the conscious existence of the wicked after death, if it be considered a parable, as it is when interpreted as a representative instance of God's dealings with men; and the language of Peter (2 Epistle ii. 4, 9,) clearly teaches that ungodly men, as well as fallen angels, are kept in a state of punishment until the last day. These passages seem to us very conclusive.

(2) *As going away from the final judgment into everlasting punishment* (Matt. xxv. 46).¹

(3.) *As being, after the judgment, in "Gehenna," or the "lake of fire."*²

From our study of the subject, thus far, we have learned

¹ Compare the passages cited after (1), (4). ² Compare passages after (1), (3.)

that "death," when predicated of the soul, signifies its *separation from God, and consequent misery*; and in these we discover the chief penalty for sin. But having ascertained that the penalty of sin, in its highest form, is spiritual death, we proceed with less confidence to say, that *it is also death of body, or natural death*. And, by this, we mean a separation of body from spirit, reducing the former to its essential properties. In support of this statement, we appeal to the following facts: (1) Bodily death is fairly comprehended in the meaning of the term "death." (2) It is due to the presence of sin in our race. (3) It seems to have been symbolized by the Jewish sacrifices. (4) It was an indispensable part of Christ's suffering. (Matt. xvi. 21; Rom. iii. 24, 25; Heb. x. 10; xiii. 12 (cf. ix. 22); 1 Peter ii. 24.) (5) It seems to be referred to inclusively in a few passages which speak of the penalty of sin (for example, Rom. v. 13, 14; 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22, (cf. Gen. ii. 17).

But it is objected to this view, (1) That Adam and Eve did not suffer natural death on the day of their transgression. We reply that they suffered one form of death, and the most dreadful one; hence, the threatening was fulfilled. For it is not necessary to suppose that the threatening referred to every subordinate form of the penalty annexed, in the purpose of God, to disobedience. (2) The wicked who are alive at the coming of Christ will not suffer natural death. This is not certain; possibly they will. A painful dissolution may be included in the change of their bodies. (3) The righteous, whose sins have been forgiven, suffer bodily death. We reply that a curse may be changed into a blessing (cf. Rom. vii. 24).

It must now be added, that spiritual death is an evil naturally permanent, but culminating in endless separation from God hereafter, and so in endless misery. Natural death, on the other hand, is a transitory evil, hardly worth naming in comparison with spiritual.

Finally, it may be remarked, before leaving the subject in hand, that the theory that the penalty of sin unforgiven is

extinction of being is liable to grave objections, besides those suggested by the previous discussion. For (1) *It makes the punishment of the most wicked the lightest, instead of the severest.* For the penalty is loss of conscious being; and such being is least valuable to the most depraved. But conscience and the Word of God both assure us that the worst men deserve the greatest punishment, and will receive it. — (See Luke xii. 47, 48 and the other passages quoted on p. 107, iv. 3).

But we may go a step further, and say, (2) *That it makes the punishment of sin unforgiven a good, instead of an evil; an act of grace, rather than of judgment.* For extinction of being is not supposed, by those who believe it the proper penalty of sin, to be an evil to the wicked; it is rather a welcome relief from a life of remorse and despair, which is far worse than no existence at all. Says Socrates in the *Phædo*: “If death had only been the end of all, the wicked would have had a good bargain in dying; for they would have been happily quit, not only of their body, but of their own evil together with their souls.”—Jowitt I., p. 437.

It seems to us, therefore, necessary to adhere to the explanation which we have given of death, — the penalty of sin. This penalty is primarily and chiefly *separation of soul from God, with the consequent misery*; and secondarily, *separation of the body from the soul.*

Remark. (a) The penalty of sin has been thought to comprise two elements; namely, a *loss of good*, and a *sense of evil*, — *pœna damni et pœna doloris*, or *privatio bonorum et sensus malorum*; and this analysis is evidently correct. The latter element is, without doubt, most dreaded by the sinful, but the former by the holy.

Remark. (b) Some look upon the penalty of sin as a positive infliction from without; others, as a natural consequence of wrong-doing. As to the *pœna damni*, we may say that, Given a moral nature made for the worship of God and for communion with him, sin will bring its own punishment, inflicting the greatest possible loss on that nature, — a loss

beginning in time, and continuing forever. And as to the *pœna doloris*, it may come from within, through the action of the spiritual nature itself, or from within and from without, through the action of all the susceptibilities of the sinner's being, with external circumstances adjusted to his deserts.

It is easy to see that remorse for past sin must unite with a conviction of having forfeited and lost forever great good in filling the soul with woe. To the former Cicero, *pro Roscio* (67), refers in these words: "Sua quemque fraus, et suus terror maxime vexat: suum quemque scelus agitat, amentiaque afficit: suæ malæ cogitationes conscientiaque animi terrent."¹

VI. RESULTS OF SIN.

All the consequences of sin which are not to be regarded as penal may be considered under this head. But theologians differ from one another as to what should be reckoned among the penal consequences, and what among the non-penal consequences of sin.

For example, the hardness and sterility of the ground may be looked upon as an adaptation of the world to a race of sinful beings, — God foreseeing the apostacy of men, and providing for them a "fit abode" for their period of trial as "prisoners of hope."

Or the world may have been subjected to changes at the time of the apostacy in Eden, which made it bring forth thorns and briers. The former view is perhaps more philosophical than the latter.

But, whatever may be true as to the time and process of preparing the earth for a sinful race, there are good reasons for believing that it has been thus prepared, and that it will be greatly changed, if it is ever made the home of holy beings. (2 Peter iii. 13; Rev. xxi. 1 sq.; Acts iii. 21; Matt. xix. 28; Heb. i. 11, 12; Rom. viii. 22–25.)²

¹ (Cf. Shakspeare, "Richard Third," Act V. Scene III.; Milton, "Paradise Lost," B. IV. l. 75–78.)

² On the last passage, see Arnold (A. N.) in "Bap. Quarterly," Vol. I, p. 143 sq.; Pepper (G. D. B.) "Bap. Quarterly," Vol. IV., p. 483 sq.; Hahn (C. von) "Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie," X. s. 511 sq.

While the hardness of the soil, and the reluctance with which it yields to man the food which he needs, have a look of severity, and remind him of God's displeasure at his sins, they are, in fact, a blessing. The cloud is silver-lined. Toil is better than self-indulgence; and self-indulgence would increase if toil were diminished.

Again, a considerable part of the ignorance of mankind is due to their sinfulness. For, however intense a desire for certain kinds of knowledge may exist in the hearts of wicked men, they have an aversion to other kinds of knowledge¹; while holy beings have a strong desire to understand, as far as possible, *all* the works and ways of God, who is the Father of lights. If mankind had continued upright, they would have made far higher attainments in knowledge than they have made as sinners. Intelligence would have been diffused through all nations and ranks of mankind, and error would be a comparative stranger to the world.

Yet ignorance is not an unmixed evil to a sinful race. There is good reason to suppose that vast knowledge would be a curse instead of a blessing, if it were not accompanied with virtue. For, in that case, it would be certainly used for the gaining of selfish ends, and would thus prove an evil to its possessor, by increasing his guilt; and to the world, by increasing his bad influence.

But may there not be certain moral advantages to the universe from the existence of sin? Is it not possible that God may so deal with sinners as to triumph over their wickedness, add glory to his own name, and augment the holiness and blessedness of his people?

This appears to be, not only possible, but probable. For, in dealing with rebels against his holy government, he has made a clearer exhibition of his moral character — his righteousness and benevolence — than could have been made, so far as we can judge, in any other circumstances. And, if this be so, it is well nigh certain that it must result in greater blessedness for the redeemed than would otherwise be possible.

¹ John iii. 19 sq.

And so a statement made in a previous part of this manual would be confirmed, — to wit, that a world, including in it beings who are capable of sinning, is better, notwithstanding the evil of sin, than it would be without such beings. Such a statement ought not to be perverted so as to seem an excuse for sin on the part of the sinner (Rom. iii. 6–8).

PART FIFTH.

THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.

THE economy of man's salvation is an economy of grace, resting upon one of justice. The latter has been considered; and the former, which is the distinguishing feature of the Christian religion, will now engage our attention. It embraces several distinct and important topics: The person and work of Christ, the person and work of the Holy Spirit, the effect of grace upon the character and life of man, and the state of men after this life. Before entering upon a study of the first of these topics, brief reference may be made to the time when Christ appeared in the flesh.

For the apostle declares, that "when the fulness of the time" was come, God sent his Son into the world (Gal. iv. 4); and by "the fulness of the time" must be understood that which filled up the period which was to elapse, according to the counsel of God, before Christ should be born. But Paul does not state in this place the reason why God had fixed the final term of the ante-Christian period at that point of time. It may, however, be inferred from other passages, that he believed it to have been fixed in view of the extreme need of men.¹ As Chrysostom says, "When they were ready to perish, then they were saved" (ad. Eph. i. 10).

It may be added, that the circumstances of the time, in other respects,² were suited to this supreme event in the history of mankind; for (a) The vast Roman Empire offered a broad and accessible field for the spread of the new religion. (b) The Greek language was widely known, and was the best

¹ Rom. v. 20; Gal. iii. 19, 24.

² Neander (A.) "General History of the Christian Religion and Church," introduction; Westcott (B. F.) "Intro. to the Study of the Four Gospels," cc. I. II.; Tzschirner (M. C. W.) "Der Fall des Heidenthums," Erstes Kapitel; Lutterbeck (J. A. B.) "Die N. T. Lehrbegriffe," I. vol.

possible medium for imparting to men the truths of that religion. (c) A deep distrust of the "gods many," which their fathers worshipped, had sunk into the hearts of great multitudes of the pagan world. (d) Acquaintance with Oriental nations had stimulated religious inquiry in the West, and had awakened an expectation of new light from the East. (e) Glimpses of spiritual truth had quickened the minds of some among the philosophers of Greece, and had led them to long for clearer light. (f) The tendency to idol worship and polytheism among the Jews had been conquered. And (g) In many hearts a longing for the promised Messiah had been kindled to a fervent heat.¹

CHAPTER FIRST.

THE DOCTRINE OF CHRIST.

I. THE PERSON OF CHRIST, THE MEDIATOR.

IN this chapter will be considered: I. The Deity of Christ; II. The Humanity of Christ; III. The Personal Oneness of Christ; IV. The Effect of the Incarnation on His Higher Nature; and, V. The Effect of the Incarnation on His Lower Nature.

On all these topics differences of belief prevail; and it is therefore desirable to make the examination as thorough and impartial as possible without prolixity.

I. THE DEITY OF CHRIST.²

Evidence that Jesus Christ, by virtue of his higher nature, was truly God, may be found (I) In the language of the Old

¹ Leathes (S.) "The Religion of the Christ," pp. 1 - 176.

² Liddon (H. P.) "The Supreme Divinity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ"; Parker (J.) "Ecce Deus"; Dorner (J. A.) "History of the Development of the Doctrine of Christ's Person"; Lange (J. P.) "The Life of Jesus," &c.; Bushnell (H.) "The Character of Jesus, forbidding his Possible Classification with Men"; Schaff (P.) "The Person of Christ the Miracle of History"; Malan (C.) "Jésus-Christ est L'Éternel-Dieu manifesté en chair"; Stuart (M.) "Miscellanies"; "Letters to Dr. Channing on the Trinity."

Testament. (a) In respect to the angel of Jehovah; and (b) In respect to the Messiah to come. (2) In the language of Christ concerning himself, as recorded, (a) In the Synoptical Gospel, (b) In the Fourth Gospel, and (c) In the book of Revelation. (3) In the language of the New Testament writers concerning him, as found (a) In the first three gospels, and in the Epistles of James, Jude, and Peter; (b) In the writings of Paul, including the Epistle to the Hebrews; and (c) In the writings of John, — Gospel, Epistles, and Revelation.

(I.) IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.¹

(1) *In respect to the angel of Jehovah.* For it appears from several passages, (namely Gen. xvi. 7, 10, 13; xviii. 1, 2, 3, 13, 17, 20 sq. (cf. xvii. 1 sq.); xxxi. 11–13 (cf. xxviii. 11, 22); xxxii. 25–31 (cf. Hos. xii. 4); xlvi. 15, 16; Ex. iii. *passim*; xxiii. 20–23 (cf. Isa. xlii. 8); xxxii. 34; xxxiii. 3, 14 (cf. 2 Sam. xvii. 11; Deut. iv. 37; Isa. lxiii. 8, 9), that “the angel of Jehovah,” “the angel of God,” “the angel that wrestled with Jacob” and “redeemed Israel from all evil,” “the angel in whom is God’s name,” “the angel of his presence,” and “his presence,” are appellations of a being who is also called by himself, or by the sacred writers, “God,” “Jehovah,” and “I am that I am;” and therefore it may be inferred that the two expressions are substantially equivalent.

The argument has been summed up as follows:—

“(1) The Malak Jehovah expressly identifies himself with Jehovah; (2) Those to whom he appears own, designate, and worship him as true God; (3) He accepts of sacrifices and prayers without protesting against such acts of worship; (4) Biblical writers frequently designate him as Jehovah.”²

Lange in “Herzog,” says that “The Theophany or Christophany of the Scripture is the manifestation of the future Christ, represented by the angel of Jehovah (Gen. xvi. 7, and

¹ Hengstenberg (E. W.) “Christology of the Old Testament”; Smith (J. P.) “Testimony of Scripture to the Messiah.”

² Kurtz (J. H.) “History of the Old Covenant,” I. p. 196; Oehler (G. F.) “Theology of the Old Testament,” sects. 59, 60.

often) the angel of the Presence (Ex. xxxiii. 14; Isa. lxiii. 9), the angel of the covenant (Mal. iii. 1). The view of those who see in the angel of the Lord merely a created angel pierces, in our opinion, the very heart of the Old Testament doctrine of revelation, and disturbs, fundamentally, the whole organic development of the revelation of God from its beginning to its fulness in the incarnation."¹

It has indeed been inferred from other passages in the Old Testament, and from some in the New (Deut. xxxiii. 2; Ps. lxviii. 18 (cf. Ex. xix. 18; xx. 1); see also Acts. vii. 53; Gal. iii. 19; Heb. ii. 2; Acts vii. 38; Heb. xiii. 2; Dan. viii. 16; ix. 21; x. 13, 21; xii. 1; Matt. i. 20; ii. 13; Luke i. 11, 19, 26), "that Jehovah presents himself in the Malak by the medium of a finite spirit, but as a person in this personal, living, and finite spirit. Jehovah is not without, but in the angel, who is the medium of God's revelation of himself. . . . And the manifestation of God is much more transparent in an angel than in a prophet, inasmuch as the former is a purely spiritual and sinless being."²

But the view that the angel of Jehovah was an actual theophany, or appearance of God to man, is most naturally suggested by the language of the Old Testament, and should therefore be accepted as true.

Moreover, there are indications sufficiently clear that the angel of Jehovah was, in fact, the pre-incarnate Word. For (a) Christ is called "apostle," or "messenger," in the New Testament (Heb. iii. 1). This name, it is true, is given to him but once; but the corresponding verb is frequently applied to him (John iii. 17, 34; v. 36; vi. 29, 57; vii. 29; xvii. 3, 8, 21, &c.). (b) The angel of Jehovah and the pre-existent Word appear to be identified by some of the New Testament writers. (Luke i. 15-17 (cf. Mal. iii. 1-24); 1 Cor. 10-4 (cf. Ex. xxiii. 20-21; Jud. ii. 1-5.)) (c) The work of the incarnate Word was to reveal the invisible God and

¹ Herzog, Real-Encyklopädie, s. v. "Theophanie."

² Delitzsch (F.) "Einleitung und Commentar zur Genesis," s. 256.

save his chosen people; and that work was essentially the same as that of the angel of Jehovah.

III. *In respect to the Messiah, as divine.* In this connection, it is necessary to study the four great Messianic Psalms, together with several paragraphs in the writings of Isaiah, Micah, Zechariah, Malachi, and Daniel.¹

(1) The second Psalm represents the wicked as conspiring against Jehovah and against his anointed. This Christ, on the other hand, is set forth as begotten by Jehovah, invested by him as king in Zion with the moral government of mankind, sure to subdue all his foes, entitled to the homage of all men, however high their rank, and a source of blessing to those who put their trust in him. The New Testament writers apply the words of this psalm to Jesus Christ. (See Acts iv. 24, 27; xiii. 33; Heb. i. 5; v. 5.) The internal peculiarities of it require such an application; and the ancient Jews ascribe to it the same Messianic character. Perowne believes that it had primary reference to some Jewish monarch, as Solomon, perhaps; but this monarch was so conceived of and described as to be a type of Christ. Such a view of its meaning does not detract from its value as evidence for the Godhead of Jesus.

(2) The forty-fifth Psalm celebrates the righteousness, power, glory, and happiness of the Messiah. His reign is to be perpetual. He is addressed as God; and his spouse, the object of his love, is urged to forget her own people and father in her regard for him. In favor of the Messianic interpretation of this psalm may be urged the authority of the Epistle to the Hebrews (see i. 8, 9) — which is of itself decisive, — and also the admission of the psalm into the canon of the Old Testament by the Jews; for, as a royal *epithalamium*, it must be pronounced extravagant, and even impious. Only

¹ Reinke (L.) "Die Messianische Weissagungen bei den grossen und kleinen Propheten des Alten Testaments"; Leathes (S.) "The Witness of the Old Testament to Christ"; Smith (J. P.) "Testimony of Scripture to the Messiah," vol. I.; Higginson (E.) "Ecce Messias"; Oehler (G. F.) "Theology of the Old Testament," II. sects. 230-234; Leathes (S.) "The Religion of the Christ," Lectures II., III., IV.

by interpreting it of Christ and his Church (cf. Eph. v. 23 sq.) can its right to a place in the canon be vindicated; and we know of no valid objection to this interpretation. Yet we do not mean to assert, that it could not have had respect, primarily, to some Jewish monarch, who was made by the spirit of God a type of Christ to the sacred writer.

(3) The seventy-second Psalm represents the Messiah under the figure of a king's son, who is also king, and whose reign is righteous, universal, peaceful, beneficent, and perpetual. Though the psalm is not expressly quoted in the New Testament, the terms which it employs are so extravagant, if meant for an earthly monarch, and so exactly pertinent to the Messiah, according to other descriptions of his reign in the Old Testament, that every just principle of interpretation requires us to look upon it as relating to him, either typically or directly; and, if so, the seventeenth verse teaches his divinity, — "His name shall be forever; before the sun shall he continue his name; and they shall bless themselves in him: all nations shall pronounce him blessed."

(4) The one hundred tenth Psalm represents the Messiah as co-regent with Jehovah, — as an eternal priest-king, and as subduing all his foes. The psalm is very often quoted in the New Testament, and always as descriptive of Christ; and its language is obviously inapplicable to a merely human being. One who is a *suntlronos* with Jehovah, and a regal priest forever, can hardly be less than God. This remarkable psalm is most naturally understood as a simple and direct prediction of Christ; yet some prefer to regard it as describing typically his reign.

(5) The words of Isa. ix. 5, 6, seem to pass entirely beyond the limits of any even poetic description of a simply human ruler, and must be interpreted of Christ. Consider them: "For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given; and the government shall be upon his shoulder; and his name shall be called, Wonderful, Counsellor, Mighty God, Father of Eternity, Prince of Peace. And to the increase of his government and to peace there shall be no end, upon the throne of David and

upon his kingdom, to establish it, and to uphold it in judgment and in righteousness, from this time and to eternity." This language ascribes to the Ruler in question a nature and office truly divine; and it may therefore be relied upon as teaching the deity of Christ.

(6) The words of Micah, v. 2-5, may be translated thus: "And thou, Bethlehem Ephratah, too small to be among the thousands of Judah, from thee for me shall one come forth to be a ruler in Israel; and his comings forth are of old, — the days of eternity," &c. In this remarkable prediction, the Messiah is represented as one (*a*) Whose places of coming forth had been "of old, — the days of eternity"; (*b*) Whose place of coming forth hereafter should be Bethlehem, — a small village in Judea; (*c*) Who should be born of a woman; (*d*) Who should be a ruler in Israel; and (*e*) Who should rule as a shepherd in the strength and name of Jehovah.¹

(7) The passage in Zech. xiii. 7, reads thus: "Awake, O sword, against my shepherd, and against the man, my associate, saith Jehovah of hosts!" The word rendered "associate" occurs in several other places (for example, Lev. v. 20; xviii. 20; xix. 11, 15, 17; xxiv. 19; xxv. 14, 15, 17), and signifies "union" or "fellowship"; and the "man of my union" can only signify the man with whom I am united, — that is, my associate, companion, fellow. That it should be used by Jehovah of an earthly king seems very improbable. It reminds one of several expressions in the New Testament which confirm the view we have taken (for example, John xiv. 9; Phil. ii. 6; Col. i. 15; Heb. i. 3; Rev. xxii. 1, 3).

(8) The words of Malachi iii. 1, "Behold, I am sending my messenger; and he shall prepare the way before my face: and the Lord whom ye are seeking shall suddenly come to his temple, even the messenger of the covenant whom ye delight in," &c. The speaker in this prophecy is Jehovah of hosts;

¹ See Hengstenberg (E. W.) "Christology of Old Test." I. p. 475 sq., 2 ed. Eng. transl. Commenting on the arbitrary changes in the text proposed by Hitzig, Maurer says, "Deprecamur omnipotentem istam superioris temporis exegesin; deprecamur iidem male sanam Hitzigii criticism."

the messenger sent before is *his* messenger, preparing *his* way; and the Lord, the messenger of the covenant, in whom the people profess to delight, and who is about to come to his temple, and sit as a refiner and purifier, must certainly be Jehovah himself, but in the person of Christ.

(9) Daniel "saw one like a son of man," who "came with the clouds of heaven," even to the Ancient of days. "And there was given him dominion and glory and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages should serve him; his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away," &c. (vii. 13, 14.) This vision was manifestly typical of the kingdom and reign of Christ; and, if it represents without exaggeration the greatness and duration of that kingdom, he must be divine; for the true God will not give his glory to another.¹

II. IN THE LANGUAGE OF CHRIST HIMSELF² as recorded (1) *In the Synoptical Gospels*. For according to the plain meaning of his words and conduct, as here represented, he claimed (a) To have superhuman knowledge, and particularly a knowledge of future events contingent on the free agency of man (Mark xi. 2-6; Luke xix. 30-34; Matt. xxvi. 31-35; Mark xiv. 27-31). (b) To work great miracles, such as raising the dead, and feeding the multitudes with five loaves and two small fishes (Matt. xiv. 19-21; Mark vi. 41-44; Matt. xi. 5; xv. 30, 31; Luke viii. 41-56; vii. 11-17). (c) To empower others to work miracles, or to perform them himself at their word, though he was not with them (Matt. x. 8; Luke ix. 1, 2; Mark vi. 7, 12, 13). (d) To forgive sins as if with divine authority, implying certainly a knowledge of the heart, and a right to speak as God, or for God (Matt. ix. 2-6; Mark ii. 5-12;

¹ See "Excursus on the Messiah," in the Speaker's Commentary; Hengstenberg (E. W.) "Christology of the Old Test.," III. pp. 82-92; "Smith's Bible Dict.," art. "Son of Man"; Schultze (L. T.) "Vom Menschensohn und vom Logos," Erster Abschnitt.

² Gess (W. F.) "Die Lehre von der Person Christi entwickelt aus dem Selbstbewusstsein Christi und aus dem Zeugnis der Apostel"; Rougemont M. "Christ et ses Témoins"; Schmid (C. F.) "Theology of the N. T.," sec. 22 sq.; Weiss (B.) "Theologie des N. T." ss. 57-67.

Luke v. 20-26). (*e*) To rule over all things,—at least, in behalf of his people,—and to be present with them in all their places of worship (Matt. xi. 27; Luke x. 22; Matt. xxviii. 18; Matt. xviii. 20). (*f*) To know the Father directly and fully, as no one else can (Matt. xi. 27; Luke x. 22). (*g*) To be the Son of God, in a peculiar and eminent sense, implying sameness of nature (Matt. x. 32, 33; xi. 27; xvi. 17, 27). And (*h*) To be the final Judge (Matt. vii. 21-23; xiii. 41-43; xix. 28, 29; xxv. 31 sq.; Mark xiv. 62; Luke ix. 26; xxii. 69, 70).

(2) *In the Fourth Gospel*.¹ The language of Christ in this gospel is often remarkable, and sometimes difficult to understand; but it evidently claims for him (*a*) To be from above, where he had been with the Father in glory, before the world was (iii. 13; vi. 38, 50, 51, 62; xvii. 5); (*b*) To be, in a distinctive sense, the Son of God, knowing perfectly the way of the Father, and doing always what the Father did (v. 17-27, 36, 43; vi. 40; x. 37, 38); (*c*) To be possessed of divine attributes and prerogatives (iii. 13; viii. 58; xiv. 9; xvi. 15; xvii. 10); and (*a*) To be the source of light and life to men (xii. 35, 36, 45, 46; xi. 25; xiv. 10).

The language preserved in the fifth chapter is certainly very profound. By it, Christ represents himself as knowing all that the Father performs, and as doing the same things which the Father does, in the same way in which the Father does them. Nay, more; by it, Christ affirms the impossibility of his doing any thing apart from the Father. The two were inseparable in action; and their activity was divine, having its source in the Father's will.

With this language should be connected his declaration in the tenth chapter, showing that his followers could not be wrested from him, because his own power and action were those of the Father as well, — "I and my Father are one";²

¹ Leathes (S.) "Testimony of John to Christ"; Messner (H.) "Die Lehre der Aposteln," ss. 316-360; Weiss (B.) "Biblische Theologie des N. T.," ss. 656-695; Sears (E. H.) "The Heart of Christ."

² Bengel, ad loc. "*Unum*, non solum voluntatis consensu, sed unitate potentiae, adeoque naturae, nam omnipotentia est attributum naturale: et sermo est de unitate Patris et Filii . . . Per *sumus* refutatur Sabellius: per *unum*, Arius."

and also his words to Philip and the other disciples, recorded in the fourteenth chapter, — “He that hath seen me hath seen the Father; and how sayest thou, show us the Father? Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me? The words which I speak to you, I speak not from myself, but the Father abiding in me himself doeth the works. Believe me that I am in the Father and the Father in me, but if not, on account of the works themselves believe.” It was difficult for even the eleven disciples to receive the truth as to the absolute unity of Christ and the Father, — a unity which made every act of Christ an act of the Father also.

It was clearly no part of Christ’s object to convince the Jews or his disciples of his own deity, apart from the Father. This would have been to convince them that there were two Gods for them to worship; but his object was to show them that he was one with the Father, in such a sense that all his working and teaching were the working and teaching of his Father. He knew that the expression, “the Father,” would be understood by all to denote the true God; and therefore, in order to emphasize the fact that his works were truly divine, he ascribed them to the will of the Father, as their first cause; but his own will was in absolute accord with his Father’s will. His own wisdom and action were a perfect manifestation of his Father’s will and action.

The language of Christ appears, no doubt, to give a certain precedence to the will of the Father; but it is not easy for us to define that precedence, or to determine how much his discussion of the matter was influenced by the state of mind which he saw in his hearers. One thing is certain: He acknowledged the deity of the Father; and, if he was to win their confidence at all, it must be by showing them, not that he was personally the Father, but that he recognized and honored the Father, and was one with him in word and deed.

But his sayings went beyond the idea of moral unity, such as might exist between a creature and the Creator, and suggested, on the one hand, the idea of a proper sonship, implying

the same kind of nature in him and the Father;¹ and, on the other hand, the idea of mutual interpenetration or indwelling, which again deepens into that of identity at the very root of being and power, so that the activity of the one was also the activity of the other. And this last view agrees best with the unity of God, and with the passages in which Christ claims divine attributes (for example, John iii. 13; viii. 58; xvi. 15).

Says Olshausen (H.) "In the Father, things are shut up and hidden which manifest themselves in the Son; therefore, all things which the Son has belong to the Father: but, in the Son, the properties of the Father are revealed to men, in order that his name may be celebrated with praise. Life thus lying concealed with the Father in the beginning was manifested to men in the Son; so that when the Father is manifested, the Son is to be seen." — (Opuscula, quoted by Fairbairn on 1 Tim. vi. 19.)

(3) *In the book of Revelation.* The words of this book, which may be regarded as the testimony of Christ himself, show, (a) That he is the Son of God, in a sense which makes him truly divine (ii. 18). (b) That he is the first and the last and the living; or, in other words, eternal (i. 17, 18; ii. 8; xxii. 13). (c) That he is the Word of God, the King of Kings, and the Lord of Lords (xix. 11–16). (d) That he is worshipped by the heavenly hosts with supreme adoration (v. 12–14). And (e) That he is associated with God as the source of life and light and joy in the heavenly world (xxi. 22, 23; xxii. 1, 3, 5).

III. IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE WRITERS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT CONCERNING HIM, as found: —

(1) *In the Synoptical Gospels and the Epistles of James, Jude, and Peter.* Without entering into any discussion of the objects specially sought by the several writers of these books,²

¹ On the question as to the Eternal Generation or Sonship of the Logos, see Stuart (M.) "Letters to Dr. Channing on the Trinity," and "Letters to Dr. Miller on the Eternal Generation of the Son of God"; Miller (S.) "On the Eternal Generation of the Son of God"; Princeton Theol. Essays, First Series, "The Sonship of Christ"; Wardlaw (R.) "Systematic Theology," vol. II.

² Westcott (B. F.) "Introduction to the Study of the Four Gospels," cc. 4–8.

it is perfectly evident that they looked upon Jesus Christ as being (*a*) One who knew the thoughts of men, — at least of all those whom he met or taught (Matt. xii. 25; Mark ii. 8; viii. 17). (*b*) One who was in a peculiar and eminent sense the Son of God (Matt. xvi. 16; Luke i. 32, 35; Matt. iii. 17; xvii. 15; Mark ix. 7; 2 Peter i. 17; 1 Peter i. 3). And (*c*) One who was the Head and Lord of all Christians, worthy of perfect obedience and religious homage (James i. 1; ii. 1; 1 Peter i. 8; iii. 15, 22; 2 Peter i. 1, 8, 11, 14; ii. 1, 20; iii. 18; Jude 1, 4, 17, 21, 25). It is difficult to believe that they could have looked upon him thus, without holding him to be in nature divine.

(2) *In the writings of Paul, together with the Epistle to the Hebrews.* Of the many statements in relation to the higher nature of Christ in this part of the New Testament, only a few can be mentioned. By some of them, Christ is represented, (*a*) As being along with the Father the original source of grace, mercy, and peace to all believers (Rom. i. 7; viii. 9; xv. 18, 19, 29; xvi. 21, 24; 1 Cor. i. 3; xvi. 23; 2 Cor. i. 2; xiii. 14; Gal. i. 3; vi. 18; Eph. i. 2; iii. 19; vi. 23, 24); (*b*) As being the possessor and giver of the Holy Spirit (Rom. viii. 9; Gal. iv. 6; 2 Cor. iii. 17); (*c*) As having supreme authority in the church, and over all things for the church (1 Cor. i. 1; v. 4; vii. 12; xv. 24, 25; 2 Cor. iv. 4, 5; v. 20; xi. 8; Eph. i. 21, 22; ii. 20 sq.; v. 5; Col. i. 18; Heb. iii. 3, 6); (*d*) As the One by whom and for whom all things have been made and are sustained (1 Cor. viii. 6; Col. i. 16, 17; Heb. i. 2, 3, 10); (*e*) As the final judge of all mankind (1 Cor. iv. 5; 2 Cor. v. 10; 1 Thess. iv. 15–17; 2 Thess. i. 6–10; 2 Tim. iv. 1, 8); (*f*) As the true and perfect image of God (Col. i. 15; Heb. i. 3; Col. i. 19); (*g*) As the own and beloved Son of God (Rom. i. 3, 4, 9; viii. 3, 29, 32; 2 Cor. i. 19; xii. 31; Gal. ii. 20; iv. 4; Eph. iv. 13; Heb. i. 2, 5, 8; iv. 14; v. 8; vi. 6; vii. 3); (*h*) As being in the form of God before incarnation, and as being God the Creator and Supreme Mediatorial King (Phil. ii. 6; Rom. ix. 5; Heb. i. 8, 10; Col. ii. 9 (cf. 1 Cor. ii. 8, 16; x. 21, 22; xi. 27; 2 Cor.

xii. 8); and finally (*i*) As being addressed in prayer, and made the object of religious worship (1 Cor. i. 2; 2 Tim. iv. 18, 22).

Meyer assigns three reasons for believing that the last clause of Rom. ix. 5 cannot refer to Christ, but must be a doxology to God the Father. Briefly, they are these:—

First, Paul nowhere else denominates Christ, God; and therefore he cannot be supposed to give him that name here. It is the name which he always applies to God the Father, who is *naturaliter* divine. But it must be said, in response to this, that Paul certainly teaches, that Christ once existed in the “form of God” (Phil. ii. 6), and that in him dwells “all the fulness of the Godhead bodily.” Why then might he not call him God once, or a few times, though for distinction’s sake he generally gave this name to the Father? Besides, Meyer admits that John calls the higher nature of Christ, God,—once, at least; and he says, but once. The case of Thomas is also paralled.

Second, that nowhere in the apostolic writings is there a *doxology* addressed to Christ. He admits, indeed, that the doxology in 2 Tim. iv. 18 refers to Christ; but he adds, that this is to be reckoned “with the traces of its post-apostolic composition.” There is, however, no sufficient reason to doubt the Pauline authorship of the Second Epistle to Timothy.¹ Nor is there any good reason for supposing that he would not use similar language here.

Third, that the words “over all” could not have been used of Christ as God. But surely if Christ could be denominated God, he could be described as “God over all;” since no one would dream that God the Father was embraced in the meaning of the word “all.” In another place, Paul asserts that God “gave him to be head over all things to the church.”²

In favor of the ordinary interpretation, which refers the

¹ See also 2 Pet. iii. 18; 1 Pet. iv. 11.

² Eph. i. 22. See also an instructive Article on this clause in the “*Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*,” 1868, s. 462 ff., by Schultz (H.), who believes that the words must refer to Christ, though without teaching his equality in nature with the Father. No one, probably, ever doubted the proper rendering of the clause, who was not influenced by dogmatic reasons.

clause to Christ, may be urged, (*a*) its naturalness in the connection, (*b*) the position of the adjective "blessed" after the word "God," and (*c*) the presence of the Greek participle, translated "is." For this participle appears to be superfluous, if the clause is a doxology; while the adjective regularly precedes the noun in a doxology, but follows it, as here, in a description. (Compare Luke i. 68; 2 Cor. i. 3; 1 Peter i. 3; Gen. xiv. 20; 2 Sam. xxii. 47; Ps. xviii. 46; lxxvi. 20; lxxii. 19; cxix. 12; Ezek. iii. 12; Dan. iii. 28, 33); ("Prayer of the Three," in the LXX.) with Rom. i. 25; 2 Cor. xi. 31.) The only apparent exception to this rule is in the Sept. version of Ps. lxxviii. 20, where the order of words in the Hebrew is regular. Meyer conjectures that the Hebrew word for "blessed" was repeated in the manuscript used by the LXX.

The best authorities require the word "who" to be substituted for the word "God," in 1 Tim. iii. 16. Whether "the Lord" should take the place of "God," as the original reading, in Paul's address to the Ephesian elders (Acts xx. 28), is still doubtful. Neither of these passages, therefore, can be associated with Rom. ix. 5, by way of argument.

The same may be said, though for other reasons, of Eph. v. 5. and Titus ii. 14. It is by no means certain, that the word "God" refers, in either of the passages, to Christ; yet a preponderance of evidence favors the view that it does, especially in the second. For, in respect to the first, it is to be borne in mind, that both "God" and "Christ" are used either with or without the article in the writings of Paul; and in respect to the second, that the words "coming," "appearing," and "revelation" are used exclusively of Christ,—that is, when they refer to his second advent. But it is also to be considered, that it is "the appearing of the glory of the great God," &c., which is spoken of here; and therefore, Matt. xvi. 27, and Mark viii. 38, must be compared.

Yet, even in the expression recorded by these two evangelists, prominence is given to *Christ* as the leading figure; for he is to "come in the glory of his Father, with his angels," or "with the holy angels"; while in other passages he is said

to come "in his own glory" (Matt. xxv. 31; 1 Peter iv. 13); but if the words "great God," in Titus ii. 14, refer to the Father, the leading place at the second advent seems to be assigned to the Father, or to his glory. It seems probable, then, that Christ is here called "the great God." If not, his glory must be conceived of as blended with, and of the same nature with that of the Father, though taking here a secondary place.

(3) *In the writings of John.* The beloved disciple appears to have been led by the Spirit of God, in view of errors which had begun to appear in the churches, and also, perhaps, in view of his own spiritual insight and predilection of heart, to set forth with uncommon fulness the doctrine of Christ's theanthropic nature; yet he was led to do this, for the most part, by putting on record the teaching of Christ himself, which has been already examined. His own language, however, will be found to repay careful study, whether it be regarded as merely interpreting that of his Lord, or, also, as adding somewhat to the teaching of the latter.

For he teaches distinctly, (a) The existence of the Word, or higher nature of Christ, in the beginning; and he uses a word to signify that existence which appears to exclude all thoughts of origin (John i. 1; 1 John i. 1, 2). Observe the use of $\bar{\eta}\nu$ in speaking of the Word, while $\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\tau\omicron$ is used of John the Baptist and of the incarnation (John i. 6, 14 (cf. viii. 58); (b) The Word, or higher nature of Christ, was *with God* in the beginning, and with him, as the Greek preposition suggests, in the way of rational affection and fellowship,—(see the same passages as above); (c) By the Word, according to the will of the Father, all things were brought into existence (John i. 3); (d) He was also the source of all life not strictly divine, and, through it, of all knowledge of God among men (John i. 4, 5; 1 John i. 2 (cf. i. 9, 14, 16); (e) The incarnate Word, while on earth, was in most intimate and loving communion with the Father whom he revealed, and whom he was able to reveal, because of that communion (John i. 18, 14); (f) He knew, therefore, the mind of God, and at the same

time the hearts of all the men with whom he had to do (John ii. 24, 25; v. 6; vi. 61, 64; xi. 13, 14); (*g*) He was the only-begotten Son of God, if not as to his higher nature in eternity, at least as to his divine human being and personality in time (John i. 14, 50; iii. 16–18, 35, 36; 1 John i. 3; ii. 23; iii. 23; iv. 14, 15; v. 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 20); and (*h*) By virtue of his higher nature, he was truly God (John i. 1; xx. 28; 1 John v. 20 (cf. John i. 18).

A few remarks may be added in explanation of certain passages referred to under (*h*).

The substance of Meyer's note on the last clause of John i. 1, is embraced in the following statements: *First*, that *θεός* (God) must be the *predicate* of the sentence; since, if it were not, this declaration would contradict the preceding one, by identifying God and the Word, who are there distinguished. *Second*, that the predicate *precedes* the subject, because the former is to be emphasized; for the progress of thought, "he was *with* God, and he was (not, perhaps, a person of inferior kind, but) of *divine nature*," requires the emphasis to fall on the added fact. *Third*, the *omission* of the article before *θεός* was necessary, for *ὁ θεός* after the foregoing *πρὸς τὸν θεόν* would have ascribed to the Word identity of *person* with the Father, which would have been inconsistent with the *distinction* of person just expressed; while the noun without the article adds to the assertion of distinction in person,—an assertion of unity in *essence and nature*. Meyer quotes from Luther the pithy remark, that "the last proposition,—*the Word was God*,—is against Arius; the other,—*the Word was with God*,—against Sabellius."

There is also force in Green's remark, "that a term cannot be fully effective, in virtue of its inherent signification, when encumbered with the article" (p. 47). Thus in Heb. i. 1, "had the words been *ἐν τῷ υἱῷ*, they would merely have called to mind the person already familiarly known under the title of the Son of God, without pointing attention to the inherent meaning of the title" (Ib. cf. John iv. 24). In John i. 1, last clause, "*θεός* is the predicate,—that is, all that is involved in

the notion of *θεός* is predicated of the Word; namely, the proper nature and attributes of God" (p. 37, Green's (T. S.) "Grammar of the N. T.").

It has been thought by some, that John borrowed the term "Logos," from Philo; but this is scarcely probable: certainly he gave the term a meaning very different from that which it has in the writings of the Alexandrian philosopher. After examining the evidence on this point, de Pressense uses the following language ("Jesus Christ, Times, Life, and Work," p. 83, transl.): "A judgment may now be formed of the assertion, so lightly thrown out, that Philo is the elder brother of Jesus, and the inspirer of John. For my part, I know no contradictions in the history of human thought more flagrant than those which exist between the doctrines of these two. The first rests wholly upon the negation of moral evil; the starting-point of the second is the deep and bitter consciousness of sin. Alexandrine theosophy admits no redemption; the Gospel is nothing without this article. Philo proclaims the impossibility of Deity uniting himself directly with the human creature; while the incarnation is the grand theme of St. John. The one sees in the Word only the abstract generalization of divine ideas; the other adores in him 'the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father.' Philo's ultimatum is this: *Deity cannot touch that which is material.* The Fourth Gospel is summed up in this expression of its prologue: *The Word became flesh.* The antithesis is absolute; for that which is with St. John a capital truth would be to the Jew of Alexandria appalling blasphemy. If, then, Christianity must, at all costs, be linked with an antecedent system, this precursor must be sought elsewhere than in the synagogues of Egypt."

John xx. 28: "My Lord and my God!" These words were addressed to Christ: hence, they pronounce him God, and teach his deity. But some reject the full sense of this expression, on the ground that Thomas was carried away by his feelings, and made use of extravagant language. We see no evidence of this; yet we hesitate to take the words of Thomas

at this time, as by themselves proof of the deity of Christ; for the Holy Spirit had not yet been given, to guide the disciples into all the truth. But his words do not stand by themselves. Christ seems to approve them; and John, whose chief object in writing was to set forth the nature and claims of his Master, records them.

“The unbelief of Thomas,” says Leathes, “rose to a height of daring obstinacy, which cannot frequently, if in any case, be equalled. It is plain, not only that he must have had evidence of the very nature that our modern doubters ask for, and such as they cannot have, but also, that every single convert whom Thomas brought to Christ must have believed, upon less evidence than he himself had fixed as the limit on which alone he would believe.”¹

And, on the other hand, his recognition of the very deity of Christ was as remarkable and unqualified as had been his unbelief. “His soul lifts itself, by a sudden mighty sweep, from the unbelief of hopeless melancholy to that highest word of belief.”—(Luthardt.) “The exclamation of adoration by Thomas: ‘My Lord and my God!’ in which the faith of the most incredulous of the disciples suddenly takes the most daring flight, and attains the height of its aim, such as is announced in the prologue, brings the narrative to a conclusion. It is thus that the end unites with the starting-point.”—(Godet.)

1 John v. 20: “This is the true God, and eternal life.” This clause relates to Christ, for three reasons: (1) The pronoun “this” is most naturally referred to Jesus Christ, the nearest antecedent. (2) John is wont to represent Christ, and not the Father, as “the Life,” or “the Eternal Life.”—(See John i. 4; vi. 48; xi. 25; xiv. 6; and 1 John i. 2; v. 11, 12). (3) The Son is declared in the former part of this verse to be essentially one with the true God, by the assertion, that we are in the true God by being in him.

The use of the adjective *ἀληθινός*² before *θεός* can be no

¹ “The Witness of John to Christ,” p. 125.

² Kluge (Dr.) “Der Begriff des *ἀληθινόν*,” *Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie* XI. s. 333 ff.

objection to a reference of the clause to Christ; for, if Christ was God at all, he was God in reality, not in appearance merely.¹ And, if he was entitled to the designation "true God," there is no reason why it should not be given him here; if it belonged to him as well as to the Father, this was a very suitable place in which to apply it to him.

But the use of the article makes a difficulty, though not, in our judgment, insuperable. For the object here is to emphasize the fact of the Christian's intimate fellowship with God; since being in Christ was being in God. The thought appears to be this: We are in the true God, by being, as we all know that we are, in his Son, Jesus Christ; for Jesus Christ, as well as the Father, and because he is in essence and nature one with the Father, is the true God and eternal life.

Neither the Father, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit can be said to comprehend all that is God, — the entire Godhead; but if they are one in nature and essence, one at the very root of being, it would seem that each of them must be in nature and in his appropriate action the true God to Christians, — the true God, that is, in distinction from all false gods.²

Reference is made to John i. 18, under (*h*), because there is important manuscript authority for reading *μονογενῆς θεός* instead of *ὁ μονογενῆς υἱός*. The reading is adopted by Tregelles, and ably defended by Dr. Hort.³ The four best uncials, \aleph BC^xL, and 33, a very important cursive manuscript, sustain it. If this reading be correct, the words may be translated: "God, only begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, he declared him." But the proposed reading, though so well

¹ Tittmann, Synon, N. T., p. 155, thus defines *ἀληθινόν*: "qui non tantum nomen habet et speciem, sed veram naturam et indolem, quæ nomini convenit, notioni nomine significatæ omni ex parte respondens, germanus, genuinus."

² See Kahnis (K. F. A.) "Die lutherische Dogmatik historisch-genetisch dargestellt," I. s. 354. The view which we have taken of this passage is supported by such interpreters as Luther, Calvin, Beza, Episcopus, Spener, Bengel, Olshausen, Thomasius, (II. 20), Tholuck (See John xvii. 3), Stier, Ebrard, Köstlin, Hahn, Braune, Schultze, Liddon, Weiss, and others.

³ Hort Dr. (F. J. A.) "Two Dissertations," 1876. Compare Abbot (E.) in the "Bib. Sac." for Oct. 1861.

supported, cannot be relied upon in establishing a doctrine of Christ's person.

In conclusion, it may be remarked, that the undeniable and frequent application of the title *κύριος*,¹ with or without the article, to Christ by the apostles, proves that they believed him to be God; for, in the Septuagint, this word represents the Hebrew name, Jehovah; and, in its religious use in the New Testament, is restricted to God and Christ. In several passages of the Epistles, it is difficult to say whether it means God the Father, or Christ Jesus. It was certainly applied to Christ in a religious sense, and was probably used instead of the term "God," for two reasons: first, because the Word was supposed to have been the Jehovah of the Old Testament theophanies; and, second, because it was desirable to avoid designating the Father and the Son by the same word, unless in rare instances, and for special reasons.

Any statements of Scripture which seem inconsistent with the doctrine that Christ, by virtue of his higher nature, was truly God, may be examined to better advantage after considering the evidence for his humanity and the effect of the incarnation on the condition of the Word, than in this place.

II. THE HUMANITY OF CHRIST.

Inasmuch as the humanity of Jesus Christ is admitted at the present day by all those who believe in him at all, the discussion of this topic may be made very brief, while it is not deemed unimportant.²

We are taught that Christ, in his lower nature, is truly man, by such passages as the following:—

(1) *Those in which he is denominated man* (John viii. 40; Rom. v. 15; 1 Cor. xv. 21; Phil. ii. 7, 8; 1 Tim. ii. 5). In the first three of these passages, there is no reason for supposing *ἄνθρωπος* to be employed in a restricted or uncommon sense. In the fourth, Christ is said to have appeared in the

¹ See Stuart (M.) "On the Meaning of *κύριος* in the New Testament," "Biblical Repository," vol. I. p. 733 sq.

² "Ecce Homo;" Bruce (A. B.) "The Humiliation of Christ in Physical, Ethical, and Official Aspects."

likeness of men, and to have been found in form as a man; not because his human nature was only *apparent*, or at best *defective*, but because it was not all, or even the chief part of him. He was not simply man, but *God* and man. In the fifth, he is denominated *man*, because he performed the work of *mediation in human nature*.

(2) *Those in which he is called the Son of man* (Matt. viii. 20; ix. 6; xxvi. 64; Mark ix. 9; Luke ix. 22; John v. 27; Acts vii. 56). This title is used upwards of eighty times by Christ, once by Stephen, and twice in the Apocalypse. It may be traced back to Dan. vii. 13, and characterizes Jesus as the true Messiah; but, in the last analysis, it is a descriptive title, derived from the human nature of Christ (Matt. i. 1, 21, 25; xii. 23; xxi. 9; Mark xii. 35; Luke xx. 41; Rom. i. 3; 2 Tim. ii. 8).

(3) *Those in which human properties and susceptibilities are ascribed to him* (Matt. iv. 1 sq.; xxvi. 37; Luke ii. 52; John xi. 33, 35; Heb. ii. 17; iv. 15 (cf. v. 2)). Accordingly, Christ possessed the spiritual as well as bodily nature of man. Heb. ii. 17 pronounces him to have been, *in all respects*, like his brethren; though a limitation is expressed in iv. 15. — (See Van Oosterzee on "The Temptation of Jesus," Am. and Presby. Rev. 169, p. 753 sq.)

(4) *Those in which his lower nature is called flesh, &c.* (John i. 14; 1 John iv. 2; 2 John 7; Rom. viii. 3; Heb. ii. 14). The word "flesh," as used in the first four passages, is held by most interpreters to signify *man*, or *human nature*. Precisely how much is implied by it in any passage must, however, be learned from the context (cf. Luke iii. 6; John xvii. 2; Acts ii. 17; Matt. xxiv. 22; Rom. iii. 20). The terms "blood and flesh," used in Heb. ii. 14, signify human nature, regarded, perhaps, as frail and mortal (cf. Gal. i. 16; Eph. vi. 12). Thus we find a name, strictly applicable to but one factor of Christ's lower nature, chosen to designate the whole of it.

(5) *Those which describe his official work, and suggest the fitness, if not necessity, of his being man, as well as God.* For, as such, —

(*a*) He could be truly under the law of God, and honor the same by perfect obedience. This evidently was looked upon as at least a part of his work, and indispensable to the rest (Rom. v. 19; Gal. iv. 4).

(*b*) He could suffer as an expiatory sacrifice; and by his own language it is clear that he must needs suffer in that way (Heb. ix. 24-28; 1 Peter ii. 24).

(*c*) He could sympathize with men in weakness and trial. This also is treated by the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, as if it were an important qualification for his work (Heb. ii. 17; v. 7-10).

(*d*) He could raise men into fellowship with God. This certainly was accomplished in his own person,—if he was truly man; and the same he is to accomplish for all who trust in him. He is the first-born among many brethren; and this he could not be, were he not, by virtue of his true humanity, their brother.

III. THE PERSONAL ONENESS OF CHRIST.

The evidence which has been adduced in proof of the deity of Christ, on the one hand, and of his humanity, on the other, must be understood to refer to the two sides of his being,—to the two natures brought together in his person. Yet his being was not bipersonal, but unipersonal; he had, strictly speaking, but one consciousness,—but one will.

In the early churches, an important controversy arose on the question, whether Christ had but a single will, or both a human and a divine will. The parties were denominated Monothelites and Diorthelites. The controversy was apparently terminated in favor of the second party; but it has been renewed from time to time down to the present day. In A. D. 680, the first Trullan (Constantinople) Council decided that "one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, is to be recognized in two natures, unmixed, unchanged, inseparable, indivisible; the difference of natures by no means being destroyed by the union, but rather the peculiarity of each nature being saved, and running together into one per-

son and one hypostasis. We also preach, in like manner, according to the teaching of the holy fathers, that there were two natural wills or voluntary faculties in him, and two natural energies, inseparable, unchangeable, indivisible, and unmixed; and that the two natural wills were not opposed (God forbid!) as the impious heretics say, but his human will followed, not resisting or struggling against, but rather being subject to, his divine and omnipotent will."

The decision of this council was doubtless correct in pronouncing the two natures in Christ to be unmixed and inseparable, and in saying that they were united in one person and one hypostasis; but it was incorrect in ascribing two wills to the one person.

Many of the creeds, formed soon after the Great Reformation, distinctly assert the unity of Christ as a person. "Two natures in one and the same person" may be called their motto on this subject; but it must not be inferred from this that they pronounced his consciousness and his will single. It was enough to say that he was truly one person.

In proof of the personal unity of Christ, as explained in the first paragraph of this section, reference may be made.

(a) *To his conception and birth.* For the simple fact that the human and the divine were brought into union in this way points to a single person as the result. Had the connection been established at the time of Christ's baptism, it would have been naturally regarded as similar to a possession. The Word might have been given to Jesus, as was the Spirit, without measure; but the union would not have been personal.

(b) *To the use of the pronoun "I," in speaking of himself.* If we may regard the gospels as fairly representing his custom in this respect, he was wont to speak with great uniformity in the first person singular; and the language of sincerity is the language of consciousness. Had the Saviour been conscious of two personal centres, of two *egos* in himself, he would doubtless have revealed that consciousness by a frequent use of the pronoun "we."

(c) *To his resurrection and visible ascension into heaven.*

The Scriptures lead one to suppose, that the union of the human spirit with the Word was not severed by his death on the cross; that he resumed by resurrection the same body which was laid in Joseph's tomb; and that, as the God-man, he ascended into heaven, and sat down on the right hand of power. His resurrection is treated as a type and pledge of the saints' resurrection; hence deity and humanity are united in him forever. All this points to a personal union and oneness.

(*d*) *To his habit of predicating of himself that which depended on his divine nature, and that which depended on his human nature*, — the one as freely as the other, — in precisely the same way as an ordinary man predicates of *himself* color and weight, hunger and thirst, as well as will and purpose, reason and affection, memory and hope (Matt. xii. 25; xvii. 27; John ii. 25; iii. 13; xxi. 17; viii. 58; and Matt. iv. 2; xxi. 18 sq.; Luke ii. 52; Mark xiii. 32; Matt. xxvi. 38; John xi. 5, 33, 35; Heb. ii. 17).

It may be remarked in this place that, in consequence of the personal unity of his being, whatever Christ did or suffered, by virtue of either of the natures united in him, received character from the other also. This remark will need to be borne in mind, when considering the value of his atoning death.

IV. EFFECT OF THE INCARNATION ON THE HIGHER NATURE OF CHRIST.

The subject to be discussed in this section is one of peculiar difficulty; and none but a cautious and reverent treatment of it will be likely to result in good. We propose to notice some of the leading theories that have been promulgated by Christian teachers, before stating the view which is supposed to approach nearest the truth.

(1) *Theory of Apollinaris*. This was substantially as follows: In the person of Christ, the divine Word took the place of a human mind or rational spirit, so that his person comprised a human body, an animal soul or life, and the infallible

Word. Three things were thought to be gained by this theory: first, the personal unity of Christ; second, the moral immutability of Christ; and third, the suffering of God in the person of Christ.

But it may be urged against this theory, first, that a mutilation of human nature in Christ cannot be proved necessary, in order to secure unity of person, or stability of moral character in him; and, secondly, that the absence of a genuine human soul in Christ must have rendered him inaccessible to temptation, as well as unchangeable in purpose.

The theory, as broached by Apollinaris, has no advocates at the present time.

(2.) *Theory of Nestorius.* This was an attempt to assert the completeness of the human nature, as well as of the divine in Christ. According to Hagenbach, "Nestorius supposed that the divine and the human natures of Christ ought to be distinctly separated, and admitted only a junction (*συνάρτησις*) of the one and the other, an indwelling (*ἐνοίκησις*) of the Deity." The union was regarded as ethical, rather than physical.¹

Objections to this theory may be found in the evidence which has been already presented of the personal oneness of Christ; yet it must be freely admitted, that Nestorius did not mean to deny the unity of Christ's person.

Theodore, a leader of this school, says, "In respect to the union of divinity and humanity, we recognize one person, just as it is said of husband and wife that they are one"; and such a statement condemns the theory which would lead one to make it.

(3.) *Theory of Cyril.* This was a reaction against that of Nestorius; and it laid special emphasis on the unity of Christ. The oneness of the natures was said to be physical. All the bodily sufferings of man were felt by the incarnate Word. But the higher nature of Christ remained omniscient; though, for the sake of acting in congruity with its condition,

¹ Dörner (J. A.) "Entwicklungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi," II. s. 24 sq.; Hagenbach (K. R.) "History of Doctrines," I. s. 100; Bruce (A. B.) "The Humiliation of Christ," p. 61 sq.

ignorance of some things was professed. The tendency of this view was to find in Christ a resultant of forces, human and divine; though the divine were so superior as to be in constant danger of absorbing the human. Says Dorner, "We may call the view of Cyril (according to which the human is changed into the divine) the *magical* aspect of the union; and that of Nestorius (according to which the two natures are only joined together) the *mechanical*." There appears to be no tendency to revive the doctrine of Cyril.

(4.) *Theory of Leo.* This was expressed in the confession adopted by the Council of Chalcedon in A.D. 451. It confesses Jesus Christ to be "perfect in deity, perfect in humanity, truly God and truly man; of reasonable soul and body; of the same substance with the Father as to his divinity; of the same substance with us as to his humanity; in all things like to us, except sin; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, manifested in two natures, without confusion, without conversion, indivisibly, inseparably; the distinction of natures being by no means abolished by the union, but rather the property of each, preserved and combined into one person and one hypostasis; not one severed and divided into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten, namely, God Logos, Lord Jesus Christ."

This statement represents the cardinal facts truly; but it does not attempt to show in what the humiliation of the Logos consisted.

(5.) *Theory of Gess.* This theory, which has found several advocates¹ in modern times, asserts that the eternal Word became human in his personality and experience. To be more specific, it is said, that the Logos became totally *unconscious* in the womb of Mary; that he awoke to con-

¹ Gaupp (Dr.) "Die Union," 1847, pp. 112-117; Hahn (G. L.) "Die Theologie des N. T.," I. pp. 195-210; Schmieder (Dr.) "Das hohepriestliche Gebet unsers Herrn Jesu Christi"; Reuss (E.) "History of the Christian Theology of the Apostolic Age," II. 96 sq., in the original, or B. IV. ch. 10; Godet (F.) "Commentaire sur l'Evangelie de Saint Jean," I. pp. 247-265; Liebner (T. A.) "Christologie," &c.; Beecher (H. W.) "Life of Christ," I. p. 49 sq.

sciousness as does a newly-born human soul; that his knowledge was obtained and increased in the same manner substantially as that of other men; that, during his whole earthly life, his consciousness, knowledge, and power were strictly finite; that his miracles were not wrought by his own might, but by the power of the Father and the Holy Spirit dwelling in him,—in a word, that he *became* human, having all the divine attributes, but in a latent condition, their natural action being suspended, the divine consciousness kept in perfect abeyance, and the Logos exercising his energies within the limits appropriate to mere humanity.

This theory revives that of Apollinaris, by teaching that Christ had no rational soul in addition to the incarnate Word, but differs from it by teaching that the incarnate Word in his actual experience was a human soul. In essence, the Word remained divine; but, in attributes, he became human.

In support of this theory, reference is made (a) To the words of John i. 14, and of Paul, Phil. ii. 6, which are said to teach the doctrine of this theory expressly. For, by emphasizing the words, *became flesh* (σὰρξ ἐγένετο), and *emptied himself* (ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε), the thought comes out distinctly, that in the act of becoming man, the Word depotentiated himself, or changed the properties of his divine nature into those of human nature.

But it may be doubted whether much stress is to be laid on the literal sense of these two expressions. For the verb employed by John is used by Paul (Gal. iv. 4) in the sense "was begotten" or "was born." And the language of John may signify no more than that of Paul. This is rendered more certain by the expression used by John in his First Epistle, iv. 2; for, "to come *in* flesh" is scarcely equivalent to coming *as* flesh. Still further, the words of the next clause, "and dwelt (or *tented*, ἐσκήνωσεν) among us," may be supposed to imply a reference to his human nature, as the tent in which the Word dwelt on earth. On the whole, it does not appear to be safe to infer, from John i. 14, that the Word became flesh by changing his own attributes into those

of flesh, even if essence and attributes are not inseparable, in such a sense that the essence would be no longer the same if the properties were changed.

Equally uncertain is the meaning assigned to "emptied himself," in Phil. ii. 7. For if the act referred to be interpreted by the clauses that follow, it consisted in "assuming the form of a servant," in "coming to be, (or being born) in likeness of men"; and the word "form" points rather to condition and manifestation than to attributes. If it be urged that the words, "emptied himself," naturally signify, that, by an act of his own, he parted with the very forces of his being,—the inner powers of his deity,—it must be considered, on the other hand, that change of "form" naturally signifies the opposite of this. Says Dr. Hackett, "Taking the form of a servant," states in what the act expressed by ἐκένωσε consisted; namely, in exchanging the form (or glory) in which he existed as God for that in which he existed as a servant. The difference between μορφή, form, manifestation, and ψυχή, soul, or οὐσία, nature, substance, becomes important here; for we can understand how Christ, as the pre-existent Logos, could exchange one mode or manifestation of existence for another, but not how he could divest himself of his original divine nature."

(b) To the language used in Acts i. 2; John xiv. 10 (cf. Matt. iii. 16; Luke iv. 1; John iii. 34). These passages teach, it is said, that the knowledge of Christ was limited, inasmuch as it could receive addition from the Father by the Holy Spirit. But, if it is borne in mind that the human nature of Christ was sanctified at conception by the personal agency of the Holy Spirit, it is natural to suppose the symbolical descent of the Spirit upon him at his baptism, in the form of a dove, significant of a larger, miraculous working of that Spirit in his human soul. And it has been thought by some, that all the miraculous action of the Spirit during the ministry of Jesus was confined to his person, or communicated to others from his person.—(See John vii. 39.) As it is the special work of the Spirit to prepare the faculties of

the human soul to discern spiritual truth, to receive revelations from God, and to impart these to men, it is reasonable to conclude that he rendered a like service to the human soul of Christ, enabling it to receive all needed truth from his higher nature, — the Word.

(c) To the language used in John v. 19, 20, 36; and Acts ii. 22; x. 38, which teach, it is said, that Christ's *power* was limited in the same way, and to the same extent, as his knowledge. In reply to this, we remark, that his miracles of power appear to have been wrought by Jesus himself, but not apart from the Father and the Spirit, even as the world was made by the Logos at first, but not apart from the Father and Spirit. It was doubtless Christ's aim, in the passages cited from John, to emphasize the inseparable unity of the Father and himself, and the utter absurdity of the Jewish charge, that he was speaking and acting without God, or apart from God. This he denies the possibility of.

As a general objection to this view, we remark, that it supposes no proper union of deity and humanity in the person of Christ. He was God, and he was man: God, by virtue of the deity of his original nature; man, by virtue of the human properties and limitations which that nature took for a time in lieu of the divine. According to this theory, it is scarcely proper to say, that he was God *and* man, or God *plus* man; for, as a whole, he was God in a certain sense; and, as a whole, he was man in another sense: but he was neither God nor man, in the full meaning of these words. As another objection to this view, we observe, that it affirms a change in the Logos, which seems to be incompatible with his deity, and, if really so, is incredible. It is true, that great caution should be used in reasoning about the nature of God; but we are unable to deny all force to this objection.

6. *Theory of Thomasius.* This differs from the foregoing, by teaching that, along with the depotentiated Word, Christ had a human soul, like that of any other man, sin excepted. Thus his human nature was complete; and the two souls, mysteriously united in one person, advanced *pari passu* in

knowledge and grace until the hour of his death on the cross. Nearly the same arguments are adduced in support of this theory and of the preceding; and nearly the same replies must be made to them.

But to these may be added several positive objections to them both. And (1) They appear to be inconsistent with the claims of Christ while on earth; for example, with his claim of knowledge (Matt. xi. 27; John v. 20); of power (Matt. xi. 27; John v. 19, 21); of authority (Matt. ix. 2-6); and of timeless being (John viii. 58).

(2) They appear to be inconsistent with any resumption of divine attributes by Christ, until his mediatorial work is accomplished; for a resumption of divine attributes must be equivalent to laying aside human attributes, which will not take place before "the end," nor even then (John v. 22, 23, 27; Heb. ii. 18; iv. 15; Rev. xxii. 1).

(c) They appear to be inconsistent with any proper idea of the relation between essence and attributes. The doctrine of transubstantiation is no more incredible than this view of the humiliation of Christ; for the doctrine of transubstantiation simply asserts, that the essence is changed from the natural to the divine, while the attributes or accidents remain unchanged. Very suitably may such theories be characterized as "magical." It is better to have no theory than to accept one of these.

(7.) *Theory of Dörner.* This distinguished theologian holds that the incarnation was gradually accomplished. The divine Word at first communicated himself partially to the human nature of Jesus, and then in ever larger measure as that nature became able to receive him.

At the outset, the will of the Logos was directed to the production of a theanthropic or holy nature, which should be called "Son of God";¹ and thenceforth, united with that nature, he knows and wills every act of it as his own.

¹ "Entwicklungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi," Zweiter Theil. s. 1271 sq. The passage is near the end of the last volume of the translation into English.

The eternal Word did not put himself, by the act of incarnation, into a kind of swoon, from which he at last awoke to a simply finite and human consciousness; but he entered and made his own the life of human nature in Christ, enlarging the sphere of conscious fellowship and oneness *pari passu* with the development of that human nature.

These are some of the theories which have been proposed concerning the incarnation and its effect upon the higher nature of Christ. They are none of them altogether satisfactory; though we are inclined to believe that the view of Dorner is less objectionable than any of the others, unless it be that of Leo.

It may be hazardous to say more; but we are partially satisfied with the following statement:—

8. *The divine Word so entered into personal union with human nature in Jesus Christ, that his theanthropic consciousness and experience embraced the action of both divine and human powers and susceptibilities.*

If his lower nature was truly human, it was finite, and therefore capable of growth; and the limits of his human intelligence must have been present to the consciousness of Jesus, as well as the perfection of his divine intelligence. What then may have been the law of his action as mediator between God and man?

Possibly this: (a) That both his divine and his human faculties were concerned in whatever he did as the God-man. If so, the action of his higher nature was confined within the limits in which the action of the lower could take part. (b) That, in particular, the human intelligence of Christ apprehended all that he taught; for he taught as a theanthropic being. (c) That the human faculties of Jesus shared the knowledge of the divine, as to all that his Messianic work required at any stage of its earthly progress.

A view similar to this is suggested by Dr. Schaff, in Lange's "Commentary" on John iv. 18,— "Not that Christ was strictly omniscient in the state of humiliation (he himself disclaimed this, Mark xiii. 32); but. wherever it was needed for

his mission of saving sinners and the interests of his kingdom, he could, by an act of his will, and in virtue of his vital and essential union with the omniscient Father, unlock the chambers of the past, or penetrate, by immediate intuition, to the utmost secrets of the human heart, and read the history which is indelibly recorded on the pages of memory."

In support of this view may be mentioned the following considerations:—

(1) *It agrees with the prima facie import of many passages of the New Testament* (for example, Matt. xi. 27; John v. 17, 19, 20, 21, 26; viii. 58; x. 28–30; xiv. 9). The first of them is thus translated by Alford: "All things are delivered unto me by my Father; and none certainly knoweth the Son but the Father; neither doth any fully know the Father but the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son is minded to reveal him." The verb *ἐπιγνώσκω* is properly translated, to know fully; for in the New Testament the simple verb is made intensive by the preposition. The second reads: "My Father worketh until now, and I work," referring to supernatural action, like the cure of the impotent man. The third declares the action of the Father and the Son inseparable: "The Son can do nothing of himself, save what he seeth the Father doing; for what things soever the Father doeth, these also doeth the Son in like manner." The fourth teaches that "the Father showeth the Son all things that himself doeth"; and the fifth, that the Son giveth life as truly as the Father; "for like as the Father raiseth up the dead, and quickeneth them, even so the Son quickeneth whom he will." The sixth affirms that, "as the Father hath life in himself, so did he give to the Son also to have life in himself." Says Prof. Gess, an able advocate of theory No. 5, described above, "If this word of Jesus refers to his earthly life no less than to that which preceded and followed it, the Son did possess the life of God while on earth; and all that we have said about the self-examination of the Logos in becoming flesh would be overthrown." It seems to us perfectly plain that this word of Jesus does refer to his earthly life, and overthrows the doctrine taught by

Gess. The next passage, as we have seen, declares the conscious life of Christ to be, in some way, unoriginated and timeless. It is a remarkable declaration, "Before Abraham was, I am"; and it seems incompatible with the theory of a merely human consciousness in Christ. There was a divine side to his consciousness, flashing its glorious light on certain truths for the human side, that the God-man might testify directly of his higher life. Equally conclusive are the other texts, quoted above; but it is unnecessary for us to notice them separately.

(2) *It ascribes to Christ a truly theanthropic experience.* It supposes that in him the divine Word, as such, and with all his powers unabridged, entered into conscious, personal union with human nature, — *Totus in suis, totus in nostris.* And in no other imaginable way could a being truly divine have personal experience of human weakness and woe. To drop the divine consciousness and become human, and then to drop the human and become again divine, gives no such experience or fellowship; and this circumstance alone raises the theory before us to an immeasurable height above many of the preceding.

(3) *It offers itself to the mind more readily than any other view.* This might be proved, we think, by an appeal to the history of the Christian faith; but we are willing to have every one test it, by recalling the action of his own mind on the subject.

To this last theory we look as the best expression yet given to the doctrine of the nature of the union of deity and humanity in the person of Christ. But we do not claim to understand fully the miracle of the incarnation, nor do we suppose that the view accepted by us as approximately correct can be applied with perfect ease to all the sayings of Christ and his apostles. It denies any mutilation of the human, any latency or paralysis of the divine in Jesus Christ. This seems to be a great excellence, if the Scriptures agree with it; and it affirms the unity of his person, which is equally important, if taught by the Scriptures. Both the denial and

the affirmation seem to us scriptural; though single expressions may be cited which seem at first inconsistent with one of them.

V. EFFECT OF THE INCARNATION ON THE LOWER NATURE OF CHRIST.

This topic may be treated with more brevity than the preceding; yet it cannot be passed by in silence. For (a) The marvellous perfection of Christ's character and development as man was due beyond question in some measure to the personal union of his human nature with the divine Word, And (b) Everything which relates to the genuineness of his humanity is singularly interesting to a large class of thoughtful men at the present time.

It must, indeed, be admitted that religious speculation has tended, of late, to an almost exclusive consideration and assertion of the true humanity of Christ; but this is a reason for, rather than against, giving to it all the prominence which it deserves; and a reason for, rather than against, attempting to show how that humanity was affected by the incarnation.

The following statements are suggested by the language of the sacred writers:—

(1) *That the human nature of Jesus, though derived from Mary, was purified from all moral evil, or bias to moral evil, by the Holy Spirit, at the moment of its union with the divine Word.* This appears to be no more than a just inference, from the prediction of the angel Gabriel to Mary, as recorded by Luke i. 35: "The Holy Spirit will come upon thee, and the power of the Most High will overshadow thee; wherefore the holy one that is to be born will be called the Son of God." — (Noyes.)

But the immaculate conception of Christ does not, in the least, presuppose the immaculate conception of his mother. For, if the nature of Jesus could not be spotless without having a spotless mother, neither could the nature of Mary be spotless without having a spotless mother; and so on, back to Adam. But if it was possible for his mother to have been

conceived and born from sinful parents, without any taint of moral evil, then it was certainly possible for Jesus to be conceived and born of Mary, though she was herself sinful, without any taint of moral evil; and, of *his* immaculate conception, the words of Gabriel are sufficient proof, especially when taken in connection with the story of his life, and with the ample testimony to his freedom from all personal sin: while, of his mother's immaculate conception, the Scriptures afford no proof whatsoever.

The doctrine of Edward Irving, that the Logos entered into personal union with human nature in its fallen state, having a bias to moral evil, is also to be rejected as unscriptural. Yet three arguments are alleged in support of it; namely (*a*) That it is directly taught by Paul, in Rom. viii. 3: "God having sent his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh." If Paul's language were "in sinful flesh," the Irvingite theory would be plainly taught: but that is not his language; and the words which he does use may very well signify, that "the flesh of Christ was *like* flesh of sin, inasmuch as it was flesh, but *unlike*, inasmuch as it was not affected with sin." Says De Wette, "ὁμοῦς ἀναορίως is *flesh* (or human nature) *possessed with sin*; the apostle could not then have said *in flesh of sin*, without making Christ *partaker of sin*; nor could he have said merely *in flesh*; for then the bond between the manhood of Jesus and sin would have been wanting. He says, then, *in likeness of flesh of sin*; meaning by that, he had a nature like sinful human nature, but had not himself a sinful nature."

(*b*) That it is clearly implied in the susceptibility of Christ to temptation, and especially in his knowing by experience how to succor those who are tempted, — the latter being sinners.¹ The argument is plausible, but not conclusive; for, if it be necessary to have a depraved nature, in order to feel the force of temptation, Adam and the angels must have been created with depraved natures. And, if it be necessary to have been in the moral condition of sinners who are tempted, in order to know how to succor them, Christ must have had not

¹ Heb. ii. 17, 18; iv. 15.

only a sinful nature, but also a habit of sinning, to qualify him for his work ; but this no one will assert.

(c) That it is implied in a correct view of the atonement. For human nature in its fallen state was summed up in the humanity of Christ, and in that humanity paid the just penalty for all its sin. But the idea that the human nature of Christ was the whole of human nature, in any other sense than that in which human nature is entire in any other man, is a mere fiction of the imagination. If he bore the penalty of sin at all, it was not the penalty of his own personal sin, or sinfulness, but the penalty due to others for their sins. Bearing the penalty of his own sinfulness would not help them, unless it were to bear in turn the penalty of *their* sinfulness. This is self-evident. If there was any thing vicarious in his suffering, it presupposes his holiness rather than his sinfulness.

(2) *That the human nature of Jesus was favored by the special presence of the Holy Spirit during his public ministry.* This is proved by several expressions of the sacred record.¹ Just what the relation of the Spirit's work in the soul of Christ may have been to that of his higher nature is unrevealed ; but from the office of the Spirit in the economy of salvation, — renewing, sanctifying, and preparing men for the reception of truth, — it may be inferred, with some probability, that the human soul of Christ was moved by the Spirit to desire and seek the very things which the incarnate Word desired and sought, thus contributing to the perfect unity of aim and spirit that distinguished Christ from all other men.

(3) *That the human nature of Jesus was helped forward in knowledge and virtue, by light which his divine nature imparted.* This may be inferred from the circumstance, that it was the Word, the Revealer of truth, with whom this human nature was in personal union. The same consciousness which felt the needs and trials of his finite soul was illuminated by divine light from the Word. Most surely then would the Logos impart to the human faculties all the light which they

¹ Matt. iii. 16 ; iv. 1 ; Luke iv. 1 ; John iii. 34 ; Acts i. 2.

needed at any time for intelligent participation in the work to be done, or the suffering to be borne. This may be nearly what Dorner means by a gradual incarnation, or communication of himself to his humanity.

In view of what has now been said of the effect of the incarnation on the divine and human natures of Christ, respectively, such passages as Mark xiii. 32 ; Luke ii. 52, and several others, do not appear to be altogether inexplicable. In his theanthropic work, both natures in the person of Christ were to participate ; and therefore the possibilities of appropriation by the lower nature furnished a moral limit to the action of the higher. That he should reveal his glorious perfections, on a scale determined by the ability of a holy human soul to appreciate his work, was, therefore, embraced in the humiliation of the divine Word.

II. THE WORK OF CHRIST AS MEDIATOR.

This part of theology may be divided into three separate topics, namely :—

I. *Propitiation by Christ*: especially the Saviour's death, as related to the attitude and action of God towards sinners.

II. *Revelation by Christ*: especially the moral influence of his humiliation and death on sinners.

III. *Government by Christ*: especially redemption and judgment, as administered by him.

I. No part of theology requires more profound and devout study at the present time than the first of these three topics :

PROFITATION BY CHRIST.

For there are many who utterly deny that the death of Christ has any thing to do with God's readiness to save sinners. They reject the doctrine of a vicarious atonement as absurd.¹

¹ Martineau (J.) "Studies of Christianity," p. 83 sq. ; Ellis (G. E.) "A Half-Century of the Unitarian Controversy," p. 157 sq. ; Ritschl (A.) "Reconciliation and Justification"; Bushnell (H.) "The Vicarious Sacrifice grounded in Principles of Universal Obligation," "Atonement and Forgiveness"; Young (J.) "Life and Light"; Robertson (F. W.) "Sermons," vol. I. p. 163 sq. ; vol. II. p. 327 sq.

There are others, and not a few, who admit that the death of Christ has much to do with God's readiness to save sinners, while they fail to see any reason why it should have such an influence. These accept the doctrine of the atonement, but as a deep mystery, as a divine expedient.¹

And there are others still who claim to see the best of reasons why the death of Christ should have the influence in question. These declare the doctrine of a vicarious atonement to be at once true and reasonable.²

To ascertain which of these three classes of writers is correct, and to answer the question, whether the death of Christ was necessary, on God's part, in order to the gift of the Spirit and to the pardon of sins upon repentance, it will be desirable to consider a previous question, namely: *Are righteousness and benevolence one and the same in God?*

The theory which identifies them must be rejected for the following reasons:—

I. *This theory is inconsistent with the common language and judgment of mankind.* Everywhere men speak of uprightness and benevolence as distinct qualities of character. There is probably no language which fails to express these qualities by different terms, no people which regard justice as one with grace.

¹ Park (E. A.) "Atonement," a number of treatises by different authors, in one volume; Campbell (J. McLeod) "The Nature of the Atonement and its Relation to the Remission of Sins, and Eternal Life"; South (R.) "Sermons," I. p. 493; Dale (R. H.) "The Atonement"; Schoeberlein (L.) "Die Grundlehren des Heils entwickelt aus dem Princip der Liebe." These works do not belong together as defending the same view; nor do they represent exactly the general statement of the text; yet they may be profitably read in connection with that statement.

² Anselm (St.) "Cur Deus Homo," translated in "Bib. Sac.," vols. XI. XII; Magee (W.) "On the Scriptural Doctrine of Atonement and Sacrifice"; Alexander (A. A.) "The Atonement"; Symington (W.) "The Nature, Extent, and Results of the Atonement"; Sweaton (G.) "The Doctrine of the Atonement as taught by Christ himself," "The Doctrine of the Atonement as taught by the Apostles"; Crawford (T. J.) "The Doctrine of Holy Scripture respecting the Atonement"; Shedd (W. G. T.) "The Atonement a Satisfaction to the Ethical Nature of both God and Man," "Bib. Sac." vol. XVI.; Turretin (F.) "Disputatio de Satisfactionis Christi Necessitate et Veritate," IV. p. sq.

2. *This theory is inconsistent with the customary language of Scripture.* For this language makes a clear distinction between righteousness and goodness, — a distinction which is applied in almost numberless places to the attributes of God, and not unfrequently to those of man. — (See Rom. ii. 2-13; v. 7.) But it may be objected to this, that Christ himself refers the whole law to the one requirement of love. This is true; and he could do it, because the law was given for a practical purpose simply, the great obstacle to perfect virtue in men being a want of that love which the law requires. This he could do, not because love comprises, but because it conditions, all right actions.

3. *This theory is inconsistent with the clearest decisions of our moral judgment.* The law of right, as revealed by conscience, recognizes a principle of obligation distinct from love; it requires justice before generosity. Suppose that A, B, and C are the only persons in the world; that A has a certain amount of property, which he can spare; that he owes it to B; but that C is in greater need of it. Love in the form of compassion says, help the most needy; but the intuition of right says, pay the debt; *suum cuique*. Moreover, if there were but one created being in the universe, and that being were to do wrong, God would condemn the wrong; he cannot be supposed to look upon sin as he would look upon mere calamity.

Starting with these principles, we add the following preliminary remarks:—

(a) God's opposition to sin is set forth, without exaggeration, by the penalty which he has affixed to it. A lighter penalty would not have agreed so well with his estimate and sense of the demerit of sin, and hence would not have so truly revealed his moral character to men.

(b) God's moral nature is altogether good and right; and therefore his opposition to sin must always be perfectly right, both in feeling and in expression.

(c) Hence his estimate and sense of the guilt of sin cannot diminish; nor can his expression of these be enfeebled; for

he will not deny himself, by exchanging an expression once chosen for a feebler and less adequate one.

(*d*) Yet he may, without absurdity, be supposed to exchange one expression for another which exhibits with equal force and clearness his opposition to sin, and perhaps for one which sets forth this opposition with new and greater energy.

(*e*) The only substitute which seems at all adapted to the case is the suffering of another in behalf of the sinner; and so far as we can judge, in order to make the substitution right, this vicarious suffering must be endured voluntarily by a sinless being, and must not authorize the sinner's pardon except on condition of repentance, and good security of future obedience.

(*f*) The amount of vicarious suffering required in such a case may, perhaps, depend, in some measure, on the excellence of the sufferer in the sight of God. Should the Most High be pleased to connect this suffering in any way with his own person, its significance would thereby be vastly enhanced.

(*g*) Christ suffered, according to the Scriptures, in such a way as to fulfil all these conditions. Hence, so far as we are able to see, his suffering may be a proper substitute for the sinner's death. Reason has nothing decisive to urge against this conclusion.

Says Dr. Shedd, "In the voluntary, the cordially offered sacrifice of the incarnate Son, the judicial nature of God, which by a constitutional necessity requires the punishment of sin, finds its righteous requirement fully met. Plenary punishment is inflicted upon One who is infinite, and therefore competent; upon One who is finite, and therefore passible; upon One who is innocent, and therefore can suffer for others; upon One who is voluntary, and therefore un-compelled."¹

These remarks will remove, it is hoped, from the mind all decided prejudice against the doctrine of propitiation by Christ; or, in other words, against the doctrine of an atone-

¹ "Bib. Sac." vol. XVI. p. 743, 4.

ment, which was prerequisite in the mind of God to the bestowment of renewing and forgiving grace upon sinners.

But whether this be the result or not, whether the philosophy of the atonement be comprehended or not, it is necessary for us to examine the testimony of Scripture as to the fact.

And the sacred writers testify : —

1. *That propitiation was made for the sins of men by Christ in his blood or death* (1 John ii. 2; iv. 10; Heb. ii. 17; Rom. iii. 24–26 (cf. Luke xviii. 13).

What is meant by “propitiation”? Does it refer to the influence which the death of Christ has upon God, or to the influence which it has upon men? In answer to this question, we appeal : —¹

(1) *To the classical use of ἱλάσσομαι, or propitiate.* In classic writers, Josephus included, this verb signifies, to appease or make propitious, whether by sacrifice, or gift, or song; and the object of it is almost always a god. Herodotus, indeed, speaks of propitiating men, but only those whom one has injured, and only by paying them divine honors after death. Notice, however, that it is always the party which has been wronged and incensed that is said to be propitiated or placated.

(2) *To the use of this verb and its derivatives by writers of the New Testament.* From the connection in which these words are employed, it is plain that God was conceived of as rendered propitious by the death of Christ; or that the exer-

¹ Funke (G.) “Bezieht sich die Versöhnung allein auf den Menschen oder auf Gott und den Menschen?” in St. u. Kr. 1842, 297 ff.; Schweitzer (A.) “Die Lehre des Apostel Paulus vom erlösenden Tode Christi von Gal. iii. 13, 14 aus betrachtet,” in St. u. Kr. 1858, 425 ff.; Munchmeyer (A. F. Q.) “Ueber den Zweck des Todes Jesu,” in St. u. Kr. 1845, 310 ff.; Reich (G.) “Ueber die Satisfactio Vicaria,” in St. u. Kr. 1844, 185 ff.; Schöberlein (L.) “Ueber die christliche Versöhnungslehre,” in St. u. Kr. 1845, 267 ff.; also s. v. “Versöhnung” in Herzog Real-Encyclopädie, and “Die Grundlehren des Heils, entwickelt aus dem Princip der Liebe”; Thomasius (G.) “Christi Person und Werk,” 3 Theil.; Ebrard (J. H. A.) “Die Lehre von der stellvertretenden Genugthuung in der heiligen Schrift begründet”; Gess (W. F.) “Zur Lehre von Versöhnung,” Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie Bde. III. IV.

cise of his grace towards the guilty was secured by that death.

Note the language of 1 John ii. 2; iv. 10. No one surely can suppose that the Advocate is *with* the Father, as a propitiation, in order to render sinners favorable, gracious, or even loyal to God. Nor can any one rationally affirm, that the sacrifice of Christ renders all men well-disposed towards the Supreme Ruler; but everywhere in the Scriptures God is represented as displeased with men for their sins. The language which is used to express this displeasure is fearfully strong. Yet he loves them still, and offers them his favor in view of the death of Christ, which he accepts as a reason for turning away his wrath, and imparting his grace.

In Heb. ii. 17, the verb is used in the middle voice but with an active sense, and is translated "to make reconciliation," namely, "for the sins of the people"; and this may be explained, with Winer, as an elliptical expression, meaning "to propitiate God for the sins of the people." Moll observes correctly, that the sacred writers employ the word in question to denote an expiation which interposes between wrath and sin, so that "the latter is *covered over*."

But the language of Paul in Rom. iii. 24-26, is worthy of special study. It should be translated as follows: "Being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God set forth as a propitiation, through faith, in his blood, for the exhibition of his righteousness, because of the passing by of the sins formerly committed, in the forbearance of God, for the exhibition of his righteousness in the present time, that he may be just, and the justifier of him who is of faith in Jesus."

This passage has been called the "Acropolis of the Christian faith"; and it teaches, (*a*) That Christ was set forth in his blood by God as a propitiatory sacrifice; (*b*) That this was done to illustrate the righteousness of God; (*c*) That his righteousness must be thus illustrated, (1) because he had passed by, in his forbearance, sins committed before the coming of Christ; and (2) because he would justify all who should henceforth believe in Christ.

Now it is obvious to every reader, that the setting forth of Christ in his blood is not here represented as propitiating men to God. It is conceived, rather, as something required to justify his propitious bearing towards sinners, as so conspicuous an illustration of his righteousness that this would be forever unclouded, though he had forborne to inflict upon sinners the just penalty of their sins.

According to the passage in Luke xviii. 13, the publican did not pray that his own heart might be changed and made friendly to God, but rather that God would be gracious to him, though a sinner. He assumed that God must be reconciled to the sinner, and not (merely) the sinner to God. Besides, if the place and the result of his prayer are duly considered, it will be natural to paraphrase it thus: "O God, be thou propitiated to me a sinner, by the sacrifices for sin offered in this thine house!"

(3) *To the use of this and similar terms, with reference to sacrifice, in the Old Testament.* The word *ἱλαστήριον* which is translated "propitiation," in Rom. iii. 25, is employed by the Seventy to denote the lid of the ark, which was sprinkled with blood on the great day of atonement. The Hebrew name of this lid was Kappóreth, or *cover*; and the Hebrew verb from which it was formed signified, literally, *to cover*, but was translated *ἐξιλάσκομαι*, by the Seventy, the preposition *ἐκ* being simply intensive.

It may then be assumed, without argument, that the act of covering, expressed by the Hebrew verb when applied to sacrifice, was not physical, but moral or spiritual; and that, if the Seventy did not wholly mistake its import, it served in some way to render God propitious to his sinful subjects, or his sinful subjects well-disposed to God. Is it necessary to prove that the former was its true meaning? It would seem as if no man who had read the Pentateuch could entertain a doubt of this.¹

¹ Oehler (G. F.) I. p. 413 sq.; II. p. 36 sq.; Fairbairn (P.) "Typology of Scripture"; Riehm (F.) "Der Begriff der Sühne im Alten Testament," in the "Studien und Kritiken," erstes Heft, 1877; Kurtz (J. H.) "The Sacrificial Wor-

Yet it will be wise to study the use of the Hebrew verb by means of several texts. There are two passages, at least, in which it appears to have a sense analogous to that which it has in sacrifice, though without any religious bearing—(Gen. xxxii. 21; Prov. xvi. 14). And there are many places where it is used to describe the grace of God, or the effect of acts or sacrifices not embraced in the prescribed worship of the temple. This unceremonial or extra-ceremonial application of the word is instructive (Ps. lxxviii. 38; 1 Sam. iii. 14; Isa. vi. 7; xxii. 14; xxvii. 9; Dan. ix. 24; Prov. xvi. 6; Jer. xviii. 23; Ps. lxxix. 9; Ezek. xvi. 63; Num. xv. 30 sq.; xxxv. 33; Deut. xxi. 8; xxxii. 43; 2 Sam. xxi. 3; Ex. xxxii. 30; Num. xxv. 13; Ex. xxx. 11–16; Num. xxxi. 50; 2 Chron. xxix. 24; xxx. 18).

With the foregoing should be compared those passages which describe by this word the aim of the bloody sacrifices prescribed for the temple service of the Israelites (Lev. xvii. 11; ix. 7, 8, 15; xvi. 16, 18, 20, 33).

And also the passages in which this term is employed to signify the effect of sprinkling the blood of the sin-offering on the horns of the altar, or on the mercy-seat (Lev. xvi. 6, 11, 17, 24; iv. 20, 26, 31, 35; v. 13, 18; xix. 22; Ex. xxix. 36, 37; xxx. 10; Lev. viii. 14, 15).

From Lev. xvii. 10, 11, it appears that propitiation through sacrifice was ordained by God for his people, and was accomplished by covering ritually the object affected by sin. The blood of an animal, slain for the purpose, was chosen for this emblematical cover; because the blood is the seat of life, and shed blood a natural sign or symbol of death (Lev. xvii. 11).

That the death of the animal was included in the ritual act, and presupposed in the effect of the sprinkled blood, may be inferred from two circumstances; namely, (*a*) That the slaying of the animal is often and formally prescribed, as only an important part of the sacrificial rite would be; and (*b*) That,

ship of the Old Testament," translated in "Clark's Foreign Theol. Library"; "Bib. Sac." vol. XIX. p. 1 sq. "Jewish Sacrifices with Particular Reference to the Sacrifice of Christ."

by partaking of bread and wine in the Lord's Supper, Christians declare the *death* of Christ; yet Christ was made an offering for sin, and his propitiatory sacrifice was typified by the sin-offering of the Mosaic ritual.

But against this view it has been objected, (*a*) That the word by which the slaying of the victim is expressed is not the proper one to denote judicial punishment; it means to slaughter, rather than to put to death.

This objection appears to have little force; for certainly the life of the victim was taken; and the word employed is the one commonly used to signify the killing of an animal. In like manner the Saviour is said to have been "crucified," rather than "put to death." He "gave his life a ransom for many," yet he "died for all."

(*b*) That the slaying of the animal was executed by the sinner himself, rather than by the priest who was the representative of the punishing God, and must have performed this act if it had stood for the penalty of sin.

This objection is by no means conclusive. For the penitent sinner might well confess the justice of the divine law by inflicting its penalty on his substitute. Even Christ died by the hands of sinners, and he was the great sacrifice; yet this was done by "the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God" (Acts ii. 23).

(*c*) That the slaying of the victim is not made so prominent as it would have been, had it been the essential act in the propitiation.

But it is very often mentioned, and was always attested by presenting the blood before God. The blood was the sign of life given up in death.

In confirmation of our view, the following particulars may be enumerated: (1) That this offering was always brought for sin, and often for a particular sin; (2) That it was named "*Sin*," because of its exclusive reference to the same; (3) That the offerer, before slaying his victim, laid his hands on its head, in token of imparting to it his sin; (4) That more prominence was given in this kind of sacrifice to the

sprinkling of the blood than in any other; and (5) That the end secured by this propitiation was the forgiveness of the offerer's sin (Ex. iv. 5).

Penitence and confession were not enough; the sin-offering must be presented, and then the sin could be forgiven. The displeasure of God ceased when that was offered.

Moreover, it is admitted by Oehler and Riehm that the idea of vicarious punishment was included in bloody sacrifice apart from the temple worship. "Evidently the punishment of death incurred by the manslayer is executed symbolically on the heifer," says the former, on Deut. xxi. 1-9.

Nearly all interpreters agree, that the blood of the sin-offering is conceived of as interposed between God and the sinner; so that, looking on the blood, God is gracious to the sinner. The propitiation, therefore, affects the attitude of God towards the sinner.

But it must be borne in mind, that the Mosaic sacrifices for sin had no respect to violations of the moral law, as such. There was no provision for pardon through sacrifice for such sins as idolatry, blasphemy, murder, cursing of parents, man-stealing; or for heart-sins, such as anger, malice, hatred, pride, avarice, want of love to God and man. The bloody offerings of the Jewish religion only availed to secure pardon for infractions of the civil or ceremonial law. They only "sanctified to the purifying of the flesh."¹

Thus they illustrated, within the sphere of temporal relations and an earthly kingdom, the principles of the divine government within the sphere of eternal relations and a spiritual kingdom. Thus principles were taught, hopes inspired, and moulds of language prepared which belong to a higher economy, but no more: the shadow could not give the substance, though it may help us to understand the substance. And the fact that, in the sin-offering, the death of the animal took the place of the death due to the offerer, for his sin, so meeting and ratifying the claims of righteousness, proves that the same is true on a higher plane of the death of Christ; as

¹ See Heb. ix. 13, 14.

sacrificial, propitiatory, it took up into itself and met the claims of eternal righteousness for sinners. And so we are led to say:—

(2.) *That propitiation was effected by the death of Christ, because this was an illustration of the righteousness of God.*¹

Reference must be made once more to Rom. iii. 24–26. The language of this passage renders forever vain any attempt to limit the need of the atonement to its moral influence over men; for the apostle distinctly specifies the exhibition of God's righteousness as a proximate end of Christ's death. And he declares that this exhibition was rendered necessary by God's treatment of sinners both before and since the time of Christ, by his forbearing to punish sins committed before the death of Christ, and by his accepting as righteous, since that event, sinners who believe in Jesus,—a course of action which must be complemented by the atonement, in order that God may be, and may be known to be, a righteous moral governor of men.

We conclude, then, that the atonement took up into itself and expressed the judicial righteousness, as well as the love of God. And, if the sufferings of Christ were distinctively an exhibition of God's righteousness, they must have been in some way an exercise of it. They must be traceable to his love of moral rectitude and opposition to sin, as they cannot be traced to his mere wisdom, or benevolence, or power. Says Dr. Hodge: "The atonement is an *exhibition* of God's purpose to maintain his law and inflict its penalty, . . . because it involves the execution of the penalty. It is this which gives it all its power. It would be no exhibition of justice, if it were not an exercise of justice; it would not teach that the penalty of the law must be inflicted, unless it was inflicted."² The word "illustration" seems to unite the

¹ We refer also to the following discussions of the atonement: Wardlaw (R.) "Systematic Theology," Vol. II. 332–483; "New Englander," 1864, "Atonement," and 1865, "Atonement as the Basis of Redemption"; "Methodist Quarterly," 1871, "Vicarious Atonement."

² "Princeton Essays," "First Series" p. 319; Gurlitt. (J. F. R.) "Studien zur Erklärung der *ἐνδειξις τῆς δικαιοσύνης*, Rom. iii. 25" in St. u. Kr. 1840, 930 ff.

two ideas of "exercise" and "exhibition," in the case of a divine attribute; and we have therefore made use of it in our second proposition.

It may be added, in this place, that the atonement is none the less an illustration of the *benevolence* of God, because it is an illustration of his *righteousness*; for, had it not been for the benevolence of God, he might have illustrated his righteousness by inflicting on men the just punishment for their sins, *without the death of his Son*; just as, on the other hand, he might, had it not been for his righteousness, have illustrated his benevolence by renewing, pardoning, and saving guilty men, *without the death of his Son*. Hence the whole force of Christ's passion goes to reveal both the righteousness and the benevolence of God. The end sought proves the latter; the means employed, the former.

"If the question were, Why did God give his Son to die for sinners, *rather than leave them to perish?* The answer would be, *Because he loved them*. But if the question be, Why did he give his Son to be an atonement for sinners, *rather than save them without one?* The answer would be, *Because he loved righteousness*.¹

(3.) *That propitiation was effected by the death of Christ; because this was suffered by him voluntarily, as the penalty due to men for their sins.* In support of this proposition, we appeal:—

(1) *To those passages of Scripture which affirm the necessity of Christ's death* (Matt. xvi. 21; xvii. 12; Mark viii. 31; Luke ix. 22; xxiv. 46; xxii. 37; Heb. viii. 3 (cf. ix. 12-14); Matt. xxii. 28; Rom. viii. 32). By simply putting together the two facts, that death is the penalty of sin, and that Christ, though holy, must needs die in order to save sinners, we are led to the statement just made. Or rather the singular emphasis

¹ Fuller (A.) "Works," Vol. II., p. 696; Says Zwingle (U.) "Justitia requirebat expiationem, misericordia veniam, venia novam vitam. . . . Mixtæ sunt igitur jnstitia et misericordia, ut hæc hostiam daret, illa vero acciperet pro universorum scelerum expiatione." Niemeyer (H. A.) "Collectio Confessionum," &c., pp. 40, 41.

laid by the sacred writers on the death of Christ, when put side by side with the biblical doctrine of death being the divinely-ordained penalty of sin, confirms our proposition.

(2) *To passages which speak of the death of Christ as being the death or penalty of those for whom he died* (2 Cor. v. 15, 21; Gal. iii. 13). The first of these passages should be translated: "If One died for all, then all died;" meaning that, in the person of their representative and substitute, they had suffered the penalty of sin prescribed by the law; and it only remained for them to accept the act of their substitute in humble faith.

"We must remember," says Usteri on the next passage, "that Paul looked upon death as the penalty of sin; and therefore the death of the sinless Christ must appear to him an assumption of *our* punishment."

The word "curse" in the third passage, evidently refers to the punishment of sin denounced by the law, even as the apostle had just testified: "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them." Hence these passages warrant our fourth statement.

And they are confirmed by such as follow (namely, 1 Peter iii. 18; Rom. iv. 25; Gal. i. 4; 1 Cor. xv. 3). The apostles had in mind, without doubt, actual sins. They were not thinking of the moral influence of Christ's death upon the hearts of men, but upon the relation of that death to sins already committed: for they do not say that Christ was delivered for our regeneration, but rather for our offences; they do not teach that he died for our sanctification, but rather for our sins.

(3) *To passages which teach that Christ in his death bore the sins of men*¹ (Heb. ix. 28; 1 Peter ii. 24; Isa. liiii. *passim*; (cf. Lev. v. 17; xxiv. 15; Num. xiv. 34). The phrase "to bear sins" is used in the Old Testament figuratively, to

¹ "Bib. Sac." XXXII., pp. 475-497, "The New Testament view of Christ as bearing sin"; "Bib. Sac." XXX., pp. 422-429, "The Meaning of נָשָׂא," both articles by W. H. Cobb.

express the idea of responsibility for them, and so of suffering the penalty which they merit. Many of the best authorities make it signify "to feel the guilt, or bear the punishment of sin:" but we would not separate these two; they naturally go together.

In the second passage cited by us, the expression, "in his body," points to that part of his nature as suffering death on the cross, but not in such a way as to exclude mental agony (cf. 1 Peter iv. 1). With the first two may also be compared John i. 29; 1 John ii. 2; Rev. v. 9.

The fifty-third chapter of Isaiah is descriptive of Christ's mediatorial work. Portions of it are applied to Christ in the New Testament; and it is impossible to find any other object of which this language is, from first to last, descriptive. Again, this prophecy represents the suffering of Christ as vicarious, expiatory. Its language admits of no other satisfactory explanation. Moreover, this meaning is found in it by nearly all who refer it to Christ. And, lastly, the fact and principle of vicarious suffering are taught here by the admission of many who do not concede any reference to Christ; for example, Knobel.

It may be added in confirmation of the general view of Christ's death which has been taken, to wit, that it *conditions*, as well as *reveals* God's grace to men:—

(4) *That the propitiation effected by the death of Christ removes an obstacle existing in the mind of God to the exercise of his saving grace.*¹ In support of this position, we refer:—

(1) *To passages which represent Christ as the source of salvation to men* (for example, Acts iv. 12; John iii. 36; x. 7–18). The first of these passages is very clear,—“And the salvation is not in any other; for neither is there any other name under heaven, which is given among men, in which we must be saved.” It is quite evident that Peter intends to affirm the dependence of all mankind upon Christ for salvation. He addresses the Sanhedrin, saying, in his name we *must* be

¹ Pendleton (J. M.) “A Treatise on the Atonement of Christ”; Jenkyn (T. W.) “The Extent of the Atonement in its Relation to God and the Universe.”

saved; "this is the only alternative, for God has appointed no other way of salvation" (Hackett, nearly) for any of the race of mankind to which we belong.

Can the apostle be supposed to mean that the moral influence of Christ is the only saving power? Did that influence beget faith in the ancient patriarchs? Did it heal the man at the gate Beautiful of the temple, — an event which suggested the great salvation given by him, and by him only? This view of the expression seems to us untenable; and the only other view that merits a thought is the one which recognizes Christ as having done and suffered that in consideration of which repenting sinners can be saved. The other passages can only be explained satisfactorily in the same way.

(2) *To passages which represent Christ as the source of repentance* (for example, Acts v. 31): "Him God exalted as a Prince and a Saviour to his right hand, to give repentance unto Israel," compared with Acts ii. 33: "Therefore, having been exalted to the right hand of God, and having received the promise of the Holy Spirit from the Father, he hath poured out this, which ye now see and hear." Doubtless "pouring out the Spirit" and "giving repentance to Israel" were closely connected in the apostle's mind, — the former pointing out the special agency employed by the Saviour, and the latter, the chief result of that agency. No direct reference is made in either of them to the moral power of Christ's earthly life, as producing repentance, or to the story of his patient death, as subduing rebellion in the selfish will.

(3) *To passages which represent Christ as the source of pardon for sins* (for example, Acts v. 31; xiii. 38; Eph. i. 7; Col. i. 14). Comment is unnecessary to show that the forgiveness of sins was inseparably connected, according to the belief of the apostles, with Christ, and indeed with his blood. Was it because they put the persuasive power of the cross so high? This view of the case is not brought forward by them.

Besides, pardon is distinguished in the first two passages from repentance and faith; and the latter are conceived of as antecedent to and conditions of the former. Those who

repent and believe are forgiven. By separating the inward change in man from the pardoning act of God, and tracing the latter, as well as the former, to Christ, they teach that his atonement was more than a moral influence on the hearts of men, — that it was a reason why God should forgive the penitent.

Moreover, the sacred writers speak almost always of a remission or forgiveness of *sins*, using the plural and not the singular; had they been thinking of a work on the heart, they would certainly have used the singular.

(4) *To passages which represent Christ as the source of justification* (for example, Acts xiii. 39; Rom. v. 8, 9, 19; iii. 24, 26). Justification is a judicial act, declaring one to be *rectus in curia*, absolving him from the charge of guilt. To prove this we appeal to such passages as the following (Deut. xxv. 1; Isa. v. 22, 23; l. 8; Prov. xvii. 15; 1 Kings viii. 31, 32; and Matt. xii. 36, 37; Rom. ii. 12, 13, 16; 1 Cor. iv. 4; Rom. viii. 33; also Luke x. 29; xvi. 15; viii. 29, 35; Matt. xi. 19). And if God is one who “justifieth the ungodly,” and Christians are “justified in the blood of Christ,” — that is, have in his blood the source of their justification, — it follows that their moral excellence or obedience is not that in consideration of which they are acquitted and accepted of God, but rather the atonement of Christ; and therefore his atonement has a Godward as well as a manward efficacy.

(5) *To passages which represent Christ as interceding with God for his people* (for example, Rom. viii. 34; 1 John ii. 1, 2; Heb. vii. 25; ix. 25). According to these testimonies, the sacred writers looked upon the presence of Christ in heaven as a constant plea for the favor of God to believers, as an all-sufficient reason for the bestowal of grace upon the followers of Jesus; and they saw in Christ such a plea, because he had offered himself a sacrifice for the sins of the people. This of itself is decisive as to the Godward influence of the atonement.

(6) *To passages which teach that, by the death of Christ, the human race was put in such a relation to God that he could treat it with favor, instead of wrath* (for example, Rom. v. 9, 10; 2 Cor. v. 19, 20). The former of these reads thus: “Much

more than, having now been justified in his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him. For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, much more, having been reconciled, shall we be saved in his life." The second of these verses manifestly reproduces and confirms the argument of the first; but the first speaks of justification, not as being found or founded in repentance, but rather in the blood of Christ, and of salvation from the wrath to come as the sure result of justification in that blood. For salvation is not rooted primarily in human action, but in divine grace.

The apostle then confirms this statement by another in the same line of thought: "For if, when we were the objects of God's wrath (like rebels whom the king counts as enemies), we were put in a condition to receive his favor, by the death of his Son, how much more, having been put in that condition, shall we be saved in his life." — (For the sense of the word "enemies," see Rom. xi. 28; and for the sense of the word "reconciled," Matt. v. 24; 1 Sam. xxix. 4, Jos. Antiq. v. 2, 8.)

In the second passage, the message given to the apostles for man is summed up as showing "How that God in Christ reconciled the world to himself, not imputing to them their transgressions," &c.; that is, by the death of his Son, God has removed every obstacle on his part to harmony between himself and mankind, and now calls upon them to accept his grace. If there be any more separation, it must be due to their rejecting peace, and choosing wrath.

(7) The result we have gained receives further confirmation from the prominence given by the apostles to *faith in Christ*, as the subjective condition or medium of justification (John iii. 15, 16, 18, 36; Acts xvi. 31; iii. 16; xxvi. 18; Rom. i. 17; iii. 22, 25, 28; v. 1; Gal. ii. 16; iii. 8, 24, 26).

We remark:—

(1) By requiring men to have fear, or repentance, or faith, or love, the word of God requires them to have all these; for the exercise of any one of them implies a moral nature disposed to exercise them all.

(2) The relative prominence given by the word of God to

one or another of these subjective conditions of life will be found to vary somewhat with the amount and character of the truth already revealed at any particular time.

(3) The instructions delivered by Christ and his apostles may be presumed to lay special emphasis on that which is most essential and fundamental in piety.

(4) These instructions assign a very marked *pre-eminence* to faith in Christ crucified, as the condition of pardon and life. To illustrate, the following table shows in the first column how many times *μετανοέω* and *μετάνοια* together occur in each book of the New Testament, and in the second column how many times *πιστεύω* and *πίστις* occur.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------|----|----|---------|----|----|------------|---|----|-------|----|-----|
| Matt. | 7 | 19 | John | 0 | 98 | 1 Cor. | 0 | 16 | Eph. | 0 | 11 |
| Mark | 3 | 20 | Acts | 11 | 52 | 2 Cor. | 3 | 9 | Phil. | 0 | 6 |
| Luke | 14 | 20 | Rom. | 1 | 58 | Gal. | 0 | 20 | Col. | 0 | 5 |
| 1 & 2 Thess. | 22 | | Tit. | 0 | 8 | James | 0 | 19 | Jude | 0 | 7 |
| 1 Tim. | 0 | 22 | Philem. | 2 | | 1 & 2 Pet. | 1 | 11 | Rev. | 12 | 4 |
| 2 Tim. | 1 | 9 | Heb. | 3 | 33 | 1 2 3 John | 0 | 11 | Total | 56 | 482 |

For these reasons, we believe that the atonement is revealed to us by the Word of God, *as that in consideration of which renewing and forgiving grace is bestowed on all who are saved.*

Bishop Butler, in general but unambiguous language, indorses this view of the atonement as scriptural: "The doctrine of the gospel appears to be, not only that he taught the efficacy of repentance, but rendered it of the efficacy which it is by what he did and suffered for us, that he obtained for us the benefit of having our repentance accepted unto eternal life; not only that he revealed to sinners that they were in a capacity of salvation, and how they might obtain it, but moreover that *he put them into this capacity* of salvation by *what he did and suffered for them.*" — "Analogy," II. c. v., p. 213.

But against the doctrine which has now been set forth, and which puts such stress upon the propitiatory death of Christ in its relation to the grace of God, it has been objected: —

(1) That his own words show that his work was finished before his death. — (See John xvii. 4; xix. 28–30.) In reply to this objection, it may be said, that Jesus refers in the lan-

guage preserved in the former passage to his work in educating the disciples ; and that he declares in the words of the latter the last prophecy concerning himself to be fulfilled, and, perhaps, the anguish of death to be past. As he uttered the words, "It is finished," he ceased to withstand by divine power the causes which would bring death, and passed, by the separation of soul and body, into rest. From that moment his relation to dying was passive ; his proper *work* was done.

Against our doctrine it has been urged (2) That death, the penalty of sin, is chiefly spiritual, being a loss of blessed fellowship with the Most High, together with a sense of his displeasure, aggravated by remorse and despair, and that Christ could not have experienced these. This objection once appeared to us insurmountable ; but for a long time it has ceased to have that appearance ; and for the following reasons : —

(1) It is not biblical, but purely rational. It rests for support on the assumed fact, that remorse can only be felt for one's own sin. But this fact is not a self-evident truth, nor can it be established by any process of demonstration ; for it pertains to the realm of actual life in which there are mysteries and seeming contradictions unknown to the realm of pure thought.

(2) Beings who have a like spiritual nature can realize and bear the spiritual sufferings of one another. And "bearing another's woe" is sympathy or compassion, when either of these words is used in its deepest sense ; it is suffering *with* another, — enduring what his spirit endures, sharing, not his bodily ill, but the feeling which that ill excites ; not his sin and guilt, but the spiritual state, the remorse and fear consequent upon them. Owing to the imperfection of their knowledge and love, the sympathy of men with one another is only partial, and not at all commensurate with that of Christ.¹ For —

(3) Christ's human nature was virtually perfect in knowledge and love. It had not, to be sure, all knowledge ; but it had at

¹Herzog "Real-Encyklopädie," s. v. Versöhnung, Bd. XVII. s. 128 ; Stroud (W.) "The Physical Cause of the Death of Christ."

every moment all the knowledge requisite to the complete performance of its work for that moment. And, for practical ends, this was as good as omniscience. His love, too, was equal to his knowledge; so that all the conditions for absolute sympathy met in his person. When, therefore, we read of his agony of soul in the garden and on the cross, culminating in the feeling expressed by the cry, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" it is not difficult to believe that he experienced the bitterness of remorse and the horror of being deserted of God.¹

Without professing to have set forth *the* way, and the only way, in which Christ actually bore the penalty due to men for their sins, — without asserting that Christ bore just the amount of suffering which awaited sinners, unredeemed, in eternity, and without overlooking the dignity of his person, which gave inestimable value to his death, we think *a* way has been indicated by which he could have borne penal woe; and if so, however different in some of its elements may have been the actual suffering of soul endured by him from that which we have suggested, the objection to our doctrine has been sufficiently met.

The following words of Dr. Bruce deserve to be quoted in this place: "Looking, then, into the Scriptures with unbiased mind, in order to find out the elements of value in our Lord's atoning work, as estimated by the wisdom of the omniscient Spirit, we observe that emphasis is laid on at least four things: *first*, the *dignity* of the sufferer; *second*, his *obedience* to his Father's will; *third*, his *love* to sinners; and *fourth*, his *sufferings* themselves." "The value of Christ's sacrifice was equal to his divine dignity, multiplied by his perfect obedience, multiplied by his infinite love, multiplied by suffering in body and soul carried to the uttermost limit of what a sinless being could experience."

But a further question may now be raised, namely: Was the holy life of Jesus co-ordinate in efficacy with his atoning

¹Schöberlein (L.) "Die Grundlehren des Heils entwickelt aus dem Princip der Liebe," s. 92 ff.

death, or only prerequisite to the worth of the latter? In other words, Was his *active* obedience vicarious, as well as his *passive*? Both Lutheran and Calvinistic theologians of the old school pronounce his active obedience vicarious; while the new school theologians generally deny this, and regard his holy life as strictly personal and prerequisite to the efficacy of his suffering for others.¹ The view of the former is clearly stated by Marsh on the "Evidence and Nature of the Christian Religion." "Christ chose to do all that it became us to do before we had fallen, and to suffer all that it became us to suffer after we had fallen; and thus, in both respects, though in no way bound by it, to exhibit a perfect and living example of what the law of God requires from his creatures."

In favor of the view that his active, as well as passive obedience was vicarious, reference may be made:—

1. *To passages which emphasize the voluntariness of Christ's death* (for instance, Phil. ii. 8; Heb. v. 8; x. 5 sq.; John x. 17, 18; 2 Cor. v. 14; Gal. i. 4; ii. 20); for, by emphasizing the *voluntariness* of his death, they justify the old dictum, "Actio ejus fuit passiva et passio activa."

2. *To the plain declaration of the apostle in Rom. v. 19:* "For, as by the *disobedience* of the one man, the many were made sinners, so also by the *obedience* of the one the many shall be made righteous." At first sight this language appears to be conclusive; but it should be borne in mind, that the act of obedience here meant was the voluntary death of Christ, and that the word "obedience" may have been chosen to denote this act because of the fine *antithesis* which it makes to "disobedience."

3. *To passages which assert the union of believers with Christ* (for example, 1 Cor. i. 30; Eph. iv. 15, 16; John xv. 1 sq.); for they seem to make Christ the representative of

¹See Hodge (A. A.) "Outlines of Theology," p. 300; Knapp (G. C.) "Lectures on Christian Theology," Lec. CXV. p. 405 sq.; Park (E. A.) "Atonement," including several treatises by adherents of the New England Theology; Heppe (H.) "Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformirten Kirchen," s. 325; Thomasius (G.) "Christi Person und Werk," III. 1, s. 69 sq.

Christians in obedience, and the source of their holiness. These statements of the Word of God strongly support the view in question, and justify us, perhaps, in regarding it as true.

Still another question must be briefly considered in this connection: For whom did Christ make his life a propitiatory offering? For all mankind, or for all the elect? Or did he suffer, with different ends in view, for the elect, and for all men?¹ Turning to the Word of God for light, we learn that Christ died, —

I. *To effect the salvation of all the elect.* His suffering was to be specially rewarded by their eternal purity, love, blessedness, and homage (John x. 11, 15, 26–28; xi. 52; Eph. v. 25; John xvii. 19; Rom. viii. 32; John vi. 39, 40; xvii. 2; Eph. i. 4; 1 Tim. iv. 10).

Hence (1) God purposed from the first to save certain persons of our race. (2) These persons were given to Christ, in a special sense, to be his flock; and (3) he had their actual salvation particularly in view when he laid down his life.

II. *To remove every objective hinderance to the salvation of mankind in general.* In other words, to provide for their pardon on condition of faith (1 John ii. 2; 1 Tim. ii. 1–6; Heb. ii. 9; 2 Cor. v. 15, 19, 20; 2 Pet. ii. 1; John iii. 16, 17).

Notes. 1 John ii. 2 (cf. iv. 14; 1 Tim. iv. 10; and John i. 29; vi. 51): *ἵλασις*, *propitiation*, refers to Christ as himself the atoning sacrifice for sin. The phrase, “for the whole world,” is equivalent to “for the sins of the whole world”; and the expression, “whole world,” must here signify all mankind; (1) because *κόσμος*, used of men, naturally includes all, unless its meaning is in some way restricted; (2) because *ἡμετέρων* and *κοσμοῦ* are here contrasted, — the one referring to Christians,

¹Jenkyn (I. W.) “The Extent of the Atonement”; Barnes (A.) “The Atonement in its Relations to Law and Moral Government”; Griffin (E. D.) “An Humble Attempt to reconcile the Differences of Christians respecting the Extent of the Atonement”; Park (E. A.) “Atonement: Discourses and Treatises,” giving for the most part what is sometimes called the New England Theory of the Atonement. The writers, besides Dr. Park, are Jona. Edwards, the younger, J. Smalley, J. Maxcy, N. Emmons, E. D. Griffin, C. Burge, and W. R. Weeks.

and the other to all men; (3) because the adjective *ἅλως* is manifestly emphatic.

Heb. ii. 9: *παντός*; must here signify every one of our race, or every believer of our race. The former is the natural meaning, and should therefore be preferred. 2 Peter ii. 1 (cf. Luke vii. 30; xix. 44; Acts xiii. 46; 2 Cor. ii. 15). For the meaning of *ἀγοράζω* with a personal object, see 1 Cor. vi. 20; vii. 23; Rev. v. 9; xiv. 3, 4. The participle with its object is prefixed to *δεσπότην*, in order to emphasize their guilt; and it shows that Christ purchased by his blood some who will deny him and perish. And, if he purchased some of this class, he did all, according to the obvious sense of the other passages cited by us.

2 Cor. v. 15 (cf. v. 20, 21; and Rom. v. 18, 19): If we have rightly explained this verse in speaking of the atonement, the word *πάντων* evidently signifies all mankind. Besides, verses 20 and 21 are understood by the best interpreters as an epitome of Paul's preaching to a promiscuous assembly; and, if so, he was wont to exhort men indiscriminately to be reconciled to God, affirming virtually that there was no obstacle to this out of their own hearts, since God had made the sinless Christ to be sin for them.

Matt. xxiii. 37 (cf. Rom. x. 21; Rev. xxii. 17; Ezek. xviii. 32) It is plain, we think, from the language of Jesus, that the people of Jerusalem did not perish for want of a Saviour.— Compare John Howe, "The Redeemer's Tears wept over Lost Souls." But, if Christ was ready to save them, he must be equally ready to save all who perish.

These and similar portions of the Word of God indicate, not merely that the atonement is sufficient for all men, but also that it has been made so *intentionally*; that God designed, by means of the atonement, to make *provision* for the pardon of all men,—to give them all a fresh probation and offer of life, by the economy of grace, as well as to lead some to repentance by the renewing power of his Spirit. Any other view of these passages seems to me unnatural, and therefore erroneous.

If there were *explicit* statements in the Word of God, to the effect that Christ suffered for the elect *only*, — that he did *not* suffer for those who will be finally lost, — it would certainly be necessary for us to look for a different explanation of these passages; but we are not aware of any such statements, and therefore abide by their obvious import.

At this point it may be proper to notice the relation of the propitiatory death of Christ to children who die in infancy. So far as now appears, such children are put in no practical relation to the atonement, unless it be by the secret and renewing work of the Spirit. Assuming, as we must, that this life is the only period of grace for mankind as sinners, and that the death of Christ was in some way for all our race, it follows that dying infants are regenerated by the Holy Spirit given by Christ. Says Henry Wallace, "Infancy is but a period in every human life; and the moral constitution of the race embraces the whole life of every member of it. Our relation to Adam is not restricted to adult life, but to all periods. Nor does this doctrine suppose or imply that children dying in infancy necessarily die under the guilt of Adam's first sin; for there is a second Adam revealed from heaven, whose redemption, by a representative constitution also, embraces all periods of life, from unconscious infancy to old age." — ("Representative Responsibility," p. 801.)

The same inference may be made from the language of Scripture concerning the love and mercy of God. Judgment is his "strange work." How much reliance is to be placed on a general statement of this kind, in judging of a particular case like the one in question, may be doubtful; but it surely has some bearing on it, and should therefore be mentioned.

And a similar inference may be drawn from the want of anxiety in respect to those who die in infancy, which seems to characterize the good of every age and nation. David was not apparently concerned about the spiritual condition of the infant for whose life he had so earnestly prayed in vain.

The next topic in course is, —

II. REVELATION BY CHRIST: and especially the moral influence of his humiliation and death upon sinners.¹

According to the prologue of John's gospel, the pre-existent Word was the source of life for the world; and that life originated by him was the light of men. From the beginning, therefore, the Word has been the revealer.

By creating man in the image of God, he made the very nature of man a means of knowledge in respect to the Most High, so that man could not use his own powers, and study his own constitution, without being reminded of him who is the "First and the Best."

And by surrounding him with numberless beings, inferior to himself, but of wonderful instincts and organs, he gave to him still further light concerning the eternal power and Godhead of his Maker. Every form of life was a ray of light from the divine Word; and, had man continued holy, there is little reason to suppose that he would have needed any better revelation of God.

But sin entered; and the light became darkness, for the eye of the soul was closed. Man read neither the lessons of his own constitution, nor those written on the face of "animated nature." In his self-will he turned the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped the creature more than the Creator.

Yet the Revealer did not utterly forsake the world of mankind. There were some to whom he made himself known in a miraculous way. He appeared to holy men in dreams and visions; he caused them to hear his voice, and proclaim to others his will. He was the Angel of Jehovah, who spoke from the burning bush. He led his people by the hand of Moses to the foot of Sinai, and gave them the Law.

This prophetic work of the Logos was continued through the whole Mosaic period, down to the time of Christ; the last and greatest messenger of the Word being John the Baptist, who came for a witness, that he might bear witness of the true light (John i. 7).

¹Wayland (F.) "Discourses," "Moral Efficacy of the Atonement"; Bushnell (H.) "The Vicarious Sacrifice."

Then the Word became flesh; and the apostle testifies, "We beheld his glory, — the glory as of an only begotten from (*παρά*) the Father, full of grace and truth" (John i. 14). He was himself a bright revelation of the Father. His spirit, his teaching, his working, were in absolute harmony with the Father's will. He was in the Father, and the Father in him. Every miracle, every parable, every rebuke, every invitation, was full of divine power, holiness, and love.

But the revelation of God made by him reached its highest point in his atoning death. By this more vividly than by any thing else in the days of his flesh was made manifest the very "heart of Christ"; and the heart of Christ was also that of God.

"Here the whole mystery is known;
Nor dares a creature guess
Which of the glories brightest shone,
The justice, or the grace."

After his ascension into heaven, the Saviour continued his prophetic work by means of his disciples, and especially by the inspired ministry of the apostles. These repeated and put on record his sayings, described his wonderful works, recounted the story of his crucifixion, and bore witness to his resurrection. More than all, they expounded the meaning of his death as sacrificial, propitiatory, vicarious; and indeed, as necessary, in order that God might be just, and the justifier of him that trusts in Christ (Rom. iii. 26).

By this prophetic work of the Saviour, continued down through the ages by the written word, and by the testimony of Christians, the moral power or manward efficacy of the atonement is realized. Thus the preaching of Christ, and him crucified, is found to be the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth.

As an exhibition of the divine character, the atonement tends to beget sorrow for sin and trust in the Redeemer. As a practical demonstration of Jehovah's love, paying homage to righteousness, and yet reaching out its hand to recover the lost, it makes the strongest imaginable appeal to man's

religious nature. For, plainly, a love which meets the claims of divine justice, as well as the needs of sinful humanity, must be more powerful, as a motive, than a love which has nothing to do with the former while accomplishing the latter. Whatever emphasizes the holiness and justice of God — his sense of what is due to the sinner as a fit penalty for his sins — emphasizes at the same time his love in providing a way of escape from that penalty.

In proof of the moral power of the Saviour's death, we appeal: —

1. *To the contrast between the effect of preaching before and after that death.* The signal effect of the gospel on the day of Pentecost and subsequently, though due in part to a wonderful outpouring of the Spirit, was also due in a great measure to the saving truth which was now preached with unprecedented clearness.

2. *To the description given by Paul of the gospel which he preached* (1 Cor. i. 23, 24; ii. 2; 2 Cor. v. 20, 21; Gal. iii. 1). It is certain, from such passages as these, that the preaching of Paul had, for its principal theme, not the holy life, but the sacrificial death of Christ. He relied upon this as most likely to reach the conscience and the heart, whether of the unbeliever or of the believer.

3. *To the account which the apostles give of the influence of Christ's dying love on their own hearts.* 2 Cor. v. 15; Gal. ii. 20; 1 John iv. 19 (cf. 1 Cor. i. 23, 24; ii. 2; 2 Cor. v. 20). The language of these passages is remarkably simple, yet forcible: "For the love of Christ constraineth us, since we thus judged that if one died for all, then all died; and he died for all, that the living might no longer live unto themselves, but unto him who died for them, and rose again." — "I am crucified with Christ; and I live no longer myself, but Christ liveth in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh, I live by faith which is on the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me." — "We love him, because he first loved us."¹

4. *To the history of the Christian religion in every land where it has prevailed.* It needs but a slight acquaintance

¹ Compare 1 John iv. 9, 10.

with that history to know how much depends on preaching Christ and his cross, — how little real piety there is if the latter is neglected, and how poorly missionaries succeed who say little of the atonement.

It is worthy of consideration, that the moral power of the atonement made by Christ is due to the union of deity and humanity in his person. Had Jesus been only a perfect man, he might have shown very clearly how much God would have a subject of his moral government do or suffer for the benefit of others, but not how much the Supreme Ruler himself would be pleased to do or suffer for such an end. Yet it is this which the heart of man longs to know; it is the latter, and not the former, which will touch the deepest chords of his spiritual nature. — (See Rom. viii. 32; John xiv. 9.)

III. GOVERNMENT BY CHRIST: and especially redemption and judgment as administered by him.¹

1. *The Scriptures teach that Jesus Christ is now acting as mediatorial King, subduing the world to himself* (Ps. ii. ; xlv. ; lxxii. ; cx. ; Acts ii. 33; Heb. i. 3, 4; viii. 1; Isa. ix. 6, 7; Luke i. 32, 33; John viii. 36; x. 27, 28; xviii. 36; Rom. xiv. 9; Eph. i. 22, 23; v. 23; vi. 5-9; Phil. iii. 20, 21; Col. i. 18; Heb. iii. 6; 1 Pet. iii. 22).

2. *They teach that the Holy Spirit is given by him as mediatorial King* (John xiv. 16; xv. 26; xvi. 7-15; Acts ii. 33; Rom. viii. 9; Gal. iv. 6; Phil. i. 19; 1 Peter i. 11).

3. *They teach that he imparts to believers their spiritual life* (John xiv. 6; vi. 35; xv. 1, 4; Rom. xii. 5; vi. 11; 1 Cor. xii. 27; 2 Cor. iv. 10, 11; v. 17; Gal. ii. 20; Eph. ii. 10; iv. 15, 16; v. 29, 31; Col. iii. 3; 1 Cor. xii. 12; Gal. iii. 16).

4. *They teach that he is their patron or advocate with the Father* (Rom. viii. 34; Heb. vii. 25; ix. 24; 1 John ii. 1).

5. *They teach that he is to be the final judge of all men.* — (See Matt. xvi. 27; xxv. 31-46; Acts x. 42; xvii. 31; Rom. xiv. 10; 2 Cor. v. 10-15.)

¹Steward (G.) "Mediatorial Sovereignty."

CHAPTER SECOND.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

A. THE PERSON OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.¹

Three subjects may be investigated in this section, namely : The Deity of the Holy Spirit ; the Personality of the Holy Spirit ; and the Identity of the Holy Spirit, and the Spirit of God.

I. DEITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

As the deity of the Holy Spirit is not often denied at the present time, it seems unnecessary to examine very fully the evidence for it. It will be sufficient to refer to certain passages of Scripture :—

1. Which ascribe to him divine attributes or actions (for example, Acts xxviii. 25 (cf. Isa. v. 8 sq.) ; Heb. x. 15 (cf. Jer. xxxi. 33 ; and x. 1) ; 1 Cor. ii. 10, 11 ; John iii. 5, 6 (cf. i. 13).

2. Which associate him in religious acts with the Father and the Son (Matt. xxviii. 19 ; 2 Cor. xiii. 13 ; 1 Peter i. 2).

3. Which call him God, either directly, or by implication (Acts v. 3, 4 ; 1 Cor. iii. 16, 17 ; 2 Cor. vi. 16 ; Eph. ii. 22 ; 1 Cor. vi. 19).

II. PERSONALITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

It will be found, upon examination, that the amount of evidence for the personality of the Holy Spirit is much less than that for the divinity of Christ. But it is to be borne in mind, that, if the deity of Christ and his personal distinction from the Father be admitted, the whole mystery of personal distinctions in the one God is admitted. *Triunity* is no more

¹Owen (J.) "On the Holy Spirit"; Buchanan (Jas.) "On the Office and Work of the Holy Spirit"; Bickersteth (E. H.) "The Spirit of Life"; Heber (R.) "The Personality and Office of the Comforter"; Hare (J. C.) "Mission of the Comforter"; Kelly (W.) "The New Testament Doctrine of the Holy Spirit"; Jenkyn (T. W.) "The Union of the Holy Spirit and the Church"; Walker (J. B.) "The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit"; Barrow (I.) "De Spiritu Sancto," "Works," Vol. III.; Kahnis (K. F. A.) "Lehre des heiligen Geistes"; Pearson (J.) "On the Creed," Art. VIII. p. 459 sq.; Parker (J.) "The Paraclete."

incredible than *biunity*; and, the latter being proved, there is no logical or philosophical objection to the former.

In proof of the personality of the Holy Spirit, reference may be made, —

1. *To the language of Christ.* According to Matt. xxviii. 19, the risen Saviour commanded his disciples to baptize those who should believe in him unto “the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.” And, as the Father and the Son are certainly conceived of as personally distinct, the Spirit must also be personally distinct from both; for it would be very unnatural to associate an operation or influence with persons, in such a formula.

Again, in his discourse to his disciples, before he repaired to the garden of Gethsemane, he promised to send them “another helper,” or advocate, namely, The Holy Spirit; and, by calling him “another helper,” he at once distinguished him from, and associated him with himself (John xiv. 16; xv. 26; xvi. 7–15).

Besides this, he designated him several times by the masculine pronoun, “he,” — *ἐκεῖνος* — thus persisting in the personal characterization. It is also true that he used the neuter pronoun “it,” in speaking of him; but this is probably due to the circumstance that the word signifying “Spirit” is neuter in the Greek language. — (See John xvi. 7, 8, 13; and xv. 26.)

The Lord also declared that the coming paraclete would “not speak from himself”; which certainly implies that he could do so, or might be conceived of as able to do so. Says Meyer, “This is the denial of *something conceivable*; and it serves to represent fully the harmony of the Spirit’s teaching with that of the Lord.” If the Holy Spirit was understood to be a divine energy, or influence, or mode of action, the apostles could hardly have needed this declaration. Independent action would have been quite out of the question. But, if he was to come as a person, the remark was pertinent, and important. — Compare John v. 19.

Still further, Christ assured his disciples that the Spirit would be “sent” by the Father, and by himself; that he would “come” from the Father and “abide” with them; that

he would "speak" what he "hears," and "announce" what he "receives"; that he would "teach" the disciples all things, and "guide" them into all the truth; that he would "bring to their remembrance" the Saviour's word, and "reveal to them things to come." If this be personification only, it is very bold, and persistent, and astonishing personification!

In estimating the weight of these expressions, it must be remembered, that they are taken from a discourse which was eminently solemn, deliberate, and even doctrinal. John may be called the ontological evangelist; and the words of Christ preserved in his gospel are full of truth concerning the being of God.

2. *To the language of the New Testament writers.* For by their language he is associated with the Father and the Son (2 Cor. xiii. 13; Matt. iii. 16, 17; Eph. ii. 22; 1 Peter i. 2; Rev. i. 4, 5; v. 6 (cf. Zech. ch. iv.); 1 Cor. xii. 4-6; Matt. iii. 16, 17); is represented as willing and feeling (Rom. xv. 30; 1 Cor. xii. 11; Eph. iv. 30); and is spoken of as if he were a personal agent. 1 Cor. xii. 8-11; Acts vii. 51; xiii. 2, 4; xxviii. 25; Eph. i. 14; (cf. Phil. iii. 3; Acts xxi. 11; 1 Tim. iv. 1; Rev. xiv. 13; ii. 7; iii. 6 and often.)

These passages, in themselves wholly unambiguous, ascribe choice, feeling, will, to the Holy Spirit. According to one of them, extraordinary gifts were bestowed by him, and at his pleasure; according to another, he can be grieved by worthless speech on the part of believers; and, according to a third, he can be provoked to anger by their rebellion. It must also be observed, that the relative pronoun, *ὃς*, in Eph. i. 14, represents the Spirit as a person. This reading is retained by Tischendorf, Tregelles, Meyer, Ellicott, and is undoubtedly correct. Had Paul regarded the Spirit as a mere influence, I think he would have used the neuter relative.

Hence the Holy Spirit cannot be simply a power or energy emanating from God the Father; for such an energy has no will of its own, but is directed by him who puts it forth.

We conclude, therefore, from these texts, that there is a personal distinction between the Father and the Holy Spirit.

But against this conclusion it has been urged, —

1. That God the Father is declared to be the efficient cause of all extraordinary powers and works (for example, 1 Cor. xii. 6).

Reply. We think the essential unity of the Godhead a sufficient reason for this. The one infinite Being operates with undivided energy in each person of the Trinity. The Father is not idle in the economy of salvation, but works in and through the Son and the Spirit, who are officially subordinate to him. Hence all their working may properly be referred to him, without denying their free, personal, omnipotent agency.

2. That the Holy Spirit is often called the Spirit of God (for example, 1 Cor. xii. 3).

Reply. So, too, is he called the Spirit of Christ (for example, Rom. viii. 9; Gal. iv. 6; 1 Peter i. 10, 11; Acts xvi. 7; Phil. i. 19). He may have been designated by the term, "Spirit," because of the special work which he performs in the hearts of men. Moreover, we cannot say that the phrase, "Spirit of God," indicates a more perfect union or identity of the Father and the Spirit than really exists according to the Trinitarian hypothesis. But this objection suggests that the Being who is often called Holy Spirit in the New Testament may be the same who is called Spirit of God in the Old Testament.

3. That the Holy Spirit is represented as being the same to God which man's spirit is to man (for example, 1 Cor. ii. 11).

Reply. We believe this statement too strong. Paul asserts that God is fully known by his Spirit only, — just as a man is known by his own spirit. This is the particular resemblance insisted on by the apostle; and we are not authorized to enlarge it by affirming that God's Spirit bears the same relation in other respects to the divine nature which the spirit of a man does to human nature.

We see no good reason, therefore, to doubt the correctness of our conclusion, as stated above.

In regard, however, to the whole doctrine of the Trinity, it

may be well for us to take the advice of Augustine to Consentius, ii. p. 458, ep. 120: "Nunc vero tene inconcussa fide, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum esse Trinitatem, et tamen unum Deum; non quod sit eorum communis quasi quarta divinitas, sed quod sit ipsa ineffabiliter inseparabilis Trinitas. . . . Et quidquid tibi, cum ista cogitas, corporeæ similitudinis occurrerit, abige, abnue, nega, respue, abjice, fuge. Non enim parva est inchoatio cognitionis Dei, si antequam possimus nosse quid sit, incipiamus jam nosse quid non sit."

Yet it is possible to deny too much, as well as to affirm too much, in respect to the Trinity. The Rev. Joseph Cook errs, perhaps, in the former direction. His definition of the Trinity is as follows: "1. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are one God. 2. Each has a peculiarity incommunicable to the others. 3. Neither is God without the others. 4. Each with the others is God." This definition is in itself unobjectionable on the positive side; but it allows of the following denials, which seem to us out of harmony with the New Testament: "In God are *not* three wills, three consciences, three intellects, three sets of affections." — "He is one substance, and in that substance are three subsistencies; but the subsistencies are not individualities." We do not like the word individualities, as applied to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; but we are satisfied that the New Testament represents them as personal beings. It shows that the distinction between them is of a personal nature. For it teaches (*a*) that the personal pronouns — *I, thou, he, we, they* — are applicable to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, — separately or collectively, — three egos, or consciousnesses. (*b*) That the Son is said to do the will of the Father, and the Spirit to be sent by the Father and the Son, — three centres or faculties of voluntary action. (*c*) That the Father knows the Son and all that he does, while the Son knows the Father and all that he does; and the Holy Spirit knows the very depths of God, — three centres of knowledge. (*d*) That the Father loves the Son, and the Son the Father; while the Holy Spirit is grieved at the coldness of Christians, — three sets of affections. Here, then,

we are taught that the Father, Son, and Spirit do have personal distinctions, — three faculties of will, three faculties of knowing, three sets of affections ; or, in a word, three personal centres, three consciousnesses. Objectively, and in respect to the universe, their knowledge, will, conscience, and affection are one in comprehension and aim ; subjectively, each is personally, though not in substance, distinguishable from the other.

III. IDENTITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT AND THE SPIRIT OF GOD.¹

We infer that the terms, "Holy Spirit," and "Spirit of God," as used by the sacred writers, are frequently, and perhaps generally, equivalent, from those passages :—

1. Which interpret the latter appellation by the former (for example, Acts ii. 16, sq. (cf. Joel iii. 1–5) ; (Acts x. 38 ; (cf. Luke iv. 18 ; and Isa. lxi. 1, 2) ; see also Mark xii. 36).

2. Which ascribe the same functions to the Holy Spirit, and to the Spirit of God. For example, —

(1) That of quickening the understanding of men for important service (John xi. 51 ; Rom. xii. 6–8 ; 1 Cor. xii. 28, (cf. verse 7) ; Ex. xxxi. 3, 6 ; xxxv. 31, 35 ; 1 Kings iii. 7–12 ; iv. 26 ; Jud. iii. 10 ; vi. 34 ; 1 Sam. xi. 6 ; xvi. 14).

(2) That of inspiring men to teach the will of God. (John xiv. 26 ; xv. 26 ; xvi. 13 ; Luke i. 67 ; Acts xxi. 11 ; 2 Peter i. 21 ; 2 Sam. xxiii. 2 ; 2 Chron. xx. 14 ; Ezek. xi. 5 ; Micah iii. 8 ; and Jud. vi. 34 ; 1 Chron. xii. 18 ; 2 Chron. xxiv. 20 (cf. Luke xxiv. 49).

(3) That of working directly in their hearts, to sanctify them (Rom. v. 5 ; xv. 16 ; John xvi. 8–12 ; iii. 3–8 ; Ps. li. 8–14).

R. It would, perhaps, be going too far, were we to affirm that the phrase, "Spirit of God," as used in the Bible, refers uniformly and distinctively to the Holy Spirit. It may be

¹ Kleinert (P.) "Zur alttestamentlichen Lehre vom Geiste Gottes"; "Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie," XII. s. 3 ff.; Kahnis (K. F. A.) "Die biblische Bedeutung des Wortes Geist"; Wörner () "Das Verhältniss des Geistes zum Sohne Gottes"; "Die Bedeutung des heiligen Geistes bezüglich der Auferstehung des Leibes und des ewigen Lebens"; Guers () "Der heilige Geist nach seiner Lehre und nach seinem Werk."

employed in some instances without any reference to personal distinctions of the Trinity; and it was doubtless generally employed by the Old Testament prophets without any definite idea of its reference to a particular person of the Godhead.

B. THE WORK OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

Some theologians, founding their arrangement of topics on the doctrine of the Trinity, characterize the present dispensation as that of the Spirit; and under "The Work of the Spirit" treat of conviction, regeneration, sanctification, and the means of grace. But objections to this analysis may be found (*a*) in the fact that justification was not regarded by the apostles as distinctively a work of the Spirit; (*b*) in the prominence which was given by them to the preaching of Christ and him crucified, as leading to repentance and faith; and (*c*) in the position which they assigned to Christ as the actual Head of the kingdom of grace.

Yet it will be seen at a glance that if the actual redemption of the elect is not discussed under "The Work of the Holy Spirit," this topic may be treated very briefly; since nearly all that may properly be said upon it has either been anticipated in speaking of the divine authority and inspiration of the Scriptures, or will be embraced necessarily in a discussion of the subjects comprehended in "the doctrine of redemption," — the word "redemption" being used to signify the application of the atonement to those who are saved.

It will therefore be sufficient to mention in this place the several topics that belong to a full discussion of "The Work of the Spirit"; while the treatment of them will be found under other heads. These topics are as follows: The Work of the Holy Spirit, —

I. In Conviction. John xvi. 8–11; Rev. xxii. 17; (cf. Gen. vi. 3; Acts vii. 51).

II. In Regeneration (John iii. 5, 6, 8; 2 Thess. ii. 13; 1 Peter i. 2).

III. In Sanctification (Gal. v. 22; Rom. xii. 3; 1 Cor. xii. 3, 9; Rom. viii. 13).

IV. In Inspiration (Num. xi. 24-29; Jud. iii. 10; vi. 34; Micah iii. 8; John xvi. 13).

V. In Imparting other Gifts. 1 Cor. xii. 8-11; xiv. 1-34; (cf. Ex. xxxi. 2, 3; xxxv. 31 sq.; 1 Sam. xi. 6).

CHAPTER THIRD.

DOCTRINE OF REDEMPTION.

THE topics to be considered in this chapter are three; namely, Regeneration, Justification, Sanctification.

I. REGENERATION. In studying this subject, we shall endeavor to ascertain from the Scriptures the nature of the spiritual change called regeneration, the author of that change, the means with the use of which it is effected, the antecedents to it in the human soul, and the first fruits of it in experience.¹

I. THE NATURE OF REGENERATION.

Before attempting to define the change in question, it will be necessary to examine some of the terms which are used by the sacred writers to denote it.

(1) The word *παλιγγενεσία* employed by Paul in Titus iii. 5, is derived from *πάλιν* and *γένεσις*, and signifies a "new birth," "another birth"; setting forth the event of birth, however, in a perfectly general, abstract manner, as another coming to be, without any reference to father or mother. The word *ἀναγεννάω*, used in 1 Peter i. 3, 23, is from *ἀνά* and *γεννάω*, and signifies, properly, "to beget again," of course as a father; yet this definite sense sometimes gives place to the more general one of bringing a child into existence. The word *γεννάω*, used in John i. 13; iii. 3, 5-8; 1 John ii. 29; iii. 9; iv. 7; v. 1, 4, 18,

¹ Owen (J.) "On the Holy Spirit," B. III.; Hodge (C.) "Essays and Reviews," p. 1 sq.; Wines (E. C.) "On Regeneration"; Phelps (A.) "The New Birth"; Fuller (A.) "Works," Vol. III. 776; Vol. II. 411, 461, 463, 515, 518; Woods (L.) "Works," Vol. III. p. 1 sq.; Witsius (H.) Part I. cc. 5, 6; Charnock (S.) "Works," Vol. II. p. 1 sq.; Winer (B.) "The Creeds of Christendom," p. 145 sq.; Anderson (W.) "Treatise on Regeneration," Princeton Theol. Essays, First Series, "Regeneration," p. 267, sq.; Bunyan (J.) "Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners"; "Pilgrim's Progress," and "Holy War."

signifies, properly, "to beget, as a father"; but it is also predicated of a mother, though rarely, — meaning, "to bring a child into being," — "to bring forth" (cf. 1 Cor. iv. 15; Gal iv. 19). Joined with *ἀνωθεν, ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος, ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ*,¹ it denotes the new birth. Hence these three words affirm, in the passages cited, the origination of a new or second life of man, — a life on which he never enters by natural birth. As to this particular life, they presuppose him to have been previously non-existent.

(2) But this is not the only view taken by the sacred writers. Sometimes the previous state is represented as one of death; and the event in question as bringing the dead to life. — (See Rom. vi. 4, 5, 8, 11, 13; Eph. ii. 5, 6; Gal. ii. 19, 20.) In the passages cited from his Epistle to the Romans, Paul speaks of Christians as walking in "newness of life, — *καινότητι ζωῆς*; and as "alive from the dead," — *ἐκ νεκρῶν ζῶντας*. In the one from his letter to the Ephesians, he says that "God made us, being dead in sins, alive with Christ," &c. The moral quickening of believers is here conceived of as involved in the reanimation of Christ (cf. Rom. viii. 29, 30; 2 Cor. v. 15), as also their resurrection and exaltation in his (cf. Rom. i. 4). In the one from his Epistle to the Galatians, he refers to the change in question as double, — as dying to the law; that is, to self-righteousness, self-confidence, or self as supreme, and as coming into possession of a new life, which has God for its end, and Christ, instead of the human ego, as supreme. His language agrees with the view, that, in the unrenewed heart, self holds the place which belongs to God. The passage in his Epistle to the Romans, vi. 2-14, also refers to this double change in regeneration, or rather to the two aspects or sides of the change.

(3) Still another view of the apostle deserves attention. He represents the event before us as a creation, and the result of it as a new creature, — (See 2 Cor. v. 17): "So that, if any one is in Christ, he is a new creature (*καινή κτίσις*); the old things passed away: behold all things have become new" (cf. Gal. vi. 15; also Eph. ii. 10). — "For we are his workmanship (*ποίημα*), created (*κτισθέντες*) in Christ Jesus unto good

¹ John iii. 3, 6; 1 John iii. 9.

works (ἔργοις)." And iv. 24: "Put on the new man, who was created after God (τὸν κατὰ θεὸν κτισθέντα) in the righteousness and holiness of truth." So likewise in Col. iii. 9, 10: "Lie not one to another; seeing that ye put off the old man with his deeds, and put on the new, who is being renewed unto knowledge after the image of Him who created him," — κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτὸν.

(4) No less instructive is another view of the apostles. They teach that, by regeneration, men pass from a state of darkness or blindness to one of light or vision. Thus 1 Peter ii. 9: "But ye are a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, a people for a possession; that ye should show forth the virtues of him who called you out of darkness into his marvellous light." And in Eph. v. 8: "For ye were once darkness, but now light in the Lord: walk as children of light." Also in Acts xxvi. 18: "To open their eyes, that they may turn from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God." (cf. 1 John ii. 9, 10).

(5) Another view is that of men being drawn or called to Christ. Thus John vi. 44: "No one can come to me, except the Father, who sent me, draw him" (cf. xii. 32). And 1 Cor. i. 24: "But to those who are the called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God" (cf. ver. 26, and Rom. viii. 28, 30). The calling referred to in these and similar passages is internal and effectual (cf. John v. 25-29; xi. 43).

According to the passages which we have examined, the change in question certainly takes place in the spirit of man, originating what is absolutely new in that spirit, — what is vital, active, powerful; what is morally right and good, like the Holy Spirit, or like God; what appreciates God and truth, swaying the soul to him as the supreme good. We know not how to describe this new element of life in the spirit better than by calling it a holy disposition, or a disposition to holy action; for it renders obedience to the holy will of God spontaneous and delightful.

Hence *regeneration* may be described as *a change in the soul*

of man, by which a disposition to holy action is originated, and in which such action begins.

Some would prefer to describe it as a change by which a predominant love of God takes the place of a predominant love of self. And others would prefer to consider it a fundamental and permanent choice of the soul, by which the glory of God is made the great end of life.

But the first and second definitions are preferable to the third. (a) Because moral renovation is often described by the sacred writers as a change of heart or affection (Deut. xxx. 6; Jer. xxiv. 7; xxxi. 33; Ezek. xi. 19; xviii. 31; xxxvi. 26; Heb. viii. 10). (b) Because sin and holiness are both traced to the heart as their source (Ps. lxxviii. 18, 37; Matt. xxii. 37; Rom. x. 10; Ps. xc. 10; Matt. xv. 18, 19; Acts v. 3; viii. 21; Rom. xiii. 10; Ps. xxiv. 4; Matt. v. 8; 1 Tim. i. 5; 1 Peter i. 22; 1 John iv. 7, 8). (c) Because it best accounts for the sudden change in the balance of our affections at conversion (1 Peter i. 3, 22, 23; 1 John iii. 9; ii. 29; iv. 7; v. 1, 4, 18; John iii. 3-8; Eph. ii. 8, 10; John i. 12, 13).

All these passages, unless John i. 12, 13, be an exception, suppose that regeneration is followed by the new affections. In this single instance, the usual order of sequence is apparently reversed, and faith is supposed to be made the condition of regeneration, and therefore prior to it. But if *ἰσχυρίαν* here signifies the right or privilege of sonship, it is a right which may presuppose faith as the work of the Spirit in regeneration, — a work apart from which no genuine faith exists in the soul.

But it is possible that John means to say that, in the case of all who received Christ, their power to believe was *given* to them by him. Note the order of the words in the original passage, by which the emphasis falls on the word *gave*. Yet the former interpretation is perhaps preferable to the latter, though the position of the word "gave," and the tenor of the whole passage, require us to suppose that divine grace was the great fact which filled the writer's soul.

We have put in our definition the words, "*and in which*

such action begins," because the first exercise of a right moral disposition takes place, as a rule, *at the very instant* of its origin. But we do not know that this is true in the case of those who are regenerated in infancy. The change may, indeed, be effected just when the spirit is leaving the body, and opening its eye to the realities of another world. We are not, however, aware of any good reason for believing this to be the fact; nor, on the other hand, are we aware of any good reason for believing it not to be the fact.

II. THE AUTHOR OF REGENERATION.

1. The Scriptures affirm, that, as a matter of fact, God is the author of the change in question (1 Peter i. 3; James i. 18; John i. 13; Rom. xii. 3; 1 John iii. 9; v. 1, 18; Ezek. xi. 19; xxxvi. 26; Jer. xxiv. 7; xxxi. 33; Deut. xxx. 6). The testimony of these passages, taken with that of others referred to in speaking of the nature of regeneration, is too exact and clear to admit of any doubt! It is not, then, by an act of his own will that any man is truly renewed in the temper of his mind, but by the will and grace of God.

2. Again the Scriptures affirm, that the change in question is effected by the Holy Spirit. (John iii. 5, 6; Tit. iii. 5; 1 Cor. xii. 3, 9, 13; Rom. viii. 2-11; Gal. v. 5 (cf. Rom. xi. 3; 1 Peter i. 2; 2 Thess. ii. 13). And the fact that it is often ascribed to God is no valid objection to the view that it is always wrought by the Holy Spirit; for the Holy Spirit is God. In like manner creation is ascribed to God; while it appears from several unequivocal declarations of Scripture that all things were brought into existence by the immediate agency of the Word.

(a) There can be no appreciable period in any man's life when he is neither for Christ nor against him,—when his religious state is strictly neutral. Hence the work of regeneration must be pronounced instantaneous. There must be a moment when the new life begins,—a point of time before which it was not, and after which it was.

(b) The Holy Spirit is not perceived by the consciousness

of man at the instant of regeneration ; or, indeed, at any other time. The effect of his presence is perceived ; and that effect is of such a nature as to be referred with full confidence to his working. Penitence for sin, trust in Christ, and joy in the Lord are represented as fruits of the Spirit ; and one who is conscious of these feelings may be sure that the Spirit is at work in his soul.

(c) All resistance of the Spirit may therefore be defined more exactly as resistance of those truths, views, convictions, or feelings which are known to be from him. One who resists his messengers rejects him ; one who attempts to smother feelings or convictions which may be rationally ascribed to his action does the same.

(d) There is no reason to believe that the regenerating action of the Spirit is assisted by the will of man. The subject of this saving change never co-operates with God in originating it, though some have asserted that he does. In other words, the *synergistic* theory is unscriptural.

(e) Yet the action of the Holy Spirit in regeneration does not conflict with the freedom of the human will, does not violate the laws, nor abridge the liberty of the soul, any more than did the action by which it was brought into existence. Indeed, we suppose that the soul is, in most instances, intensely active at the time of regeneration, — active with reference to the work of Christ, or its own sinfulness, or the love of God. It sees the evil of sin ; it cries for mercy ; it trusts in Christ ; and it does all these freely or voluntarily, under the influence of the Spirit.

III. *Relation of Christian Truth to Regeneration.*

This is a topic of no little difficulty, and must be carefully examined. There are a few passages, —

1. Which speak of truth as the means employed in effecting this spiritual change (for example, 1 Peter i. 23 ; James i. 18 ; 1 Cor. iv. 15). The first of these may be translated thus : “ Being born again, not of perishable seed, but of imperishable, through the word of God, which liveth and abideth

forever." Here the term "seed" may refer to the Holy Spirit, and the term "word" to the gospel. In favor of this interpretation may be urged (*a*) The difference between the prepositions translated "from" and "through"; (*b*) The use elsewhere of another word from the same root as the term translated "seed," to denote the Holy Spirit, or the holy disposition which is sustained by his action in the soul. — (See 1 John iii. 9). And (*c*) The analogy of other statements concerning regeneration. If this passage represents the "word" as the *source* from which regeneration proceeds, it stands alone.

Dorner (J. A.) favors the opinion, that, by "the word of God" is here meant Christ himself, who is conceived of in this clause as the one by whom regeneration is effected. He is called the Word of *God*, because he is the One by whom God has revealed himself. To him the participles "living" and "abiding" are of course applicable in a literal sense.¹

The second passage may be translated strictly: "Of his own will, he brought us forth by the word of truth, that we should be a kind of first fruits of his creatures." The word of truth is here represented as the means by which the new birth is completed; and the new life is conceived of, we think, as having its source in God, or the will of God, but as brought into conscious being by the word of truth. This interpretation accords with the use of *ἀπονοίει* in verse 15, where it refers to the very last stage of the process of generation or birth.

1 Cor. iv. 15: "For in Jesus Christ I begot you through the gospel." Here the words, "in Christ Jesus," point to the source of the new birth; "through the gospel," to the means by which it was accomplished; while the pronoun "I" refers to the agent who used the means.² The quickening element or power in which the spiritual generation was effected was Christ, or the Spirit of Christ;³ but the new life was not brought to light without the gospel.

¹ See "History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ." Introduction.

² Cf. 1. Cor. ii. 4, 5; Gal. iv. 19.

³ Cf. Rom. viii. 9, 10.

There are also passages : —

2. Which seem to imply that truth is the means of regeneration (for example, Rom. x. 17; Matt. xxviii. 19; Mark xvi. 15).

The last two verses referred to are not indeed very definite, and would prove no more than this, that the gospel must be received in faith by all who are saved through Christ. And this might be true, if regeneration were effected by the direct and single agency of the Spirit. But the first seems to go a little further, — “So, then, faith comes from hearing, and hearing through the word of God.” There can be no reason to doubt that Christian faith is always dependent on Christian truth as its proximate cause or occasion; and this is all that the apostle’s language teaches.

It is, then, a doctrine of Scripture, that religious truth is, in some sense, a means of the new birth, and in a sense obvious and certain a means of faith, love, hope, and every Christian feeling.¹

Hence it is held by many that the Holy Spirit does not act directly on the soul of man, but only mediately through the truth. The heart is really changed by the word, which the Spirit applies with infinite skill.

Another view is, that the Holy Spirit energizes the word of truth, — makes it vital, infuses into it a mysterious power to pierce and purify the soul.

But neither of these views is altogether satisfactory. We object to the former; namely, that the Spirit simply preaches the truth with infinite skill, (*a*) because it appears to have no clear support in the language of Scripture. The word of God is indeed called “the sword of the Spirit” (Eph. vi. 17);

¹ Müller (J.) “Abhandlungen,” IV. “Das Verhältniss zwischen der Wirksamkeit des h. Geistes und dem Gnadennittel des göttlichen Wortes,” 127-277; Woods (L.) “Works,” Vol. III., p. 1 sq.; Wardlaw (R.) “Systematic Theology,” Vol. III.; Phelps (A.) “The New Birth; or, the Work of the Holy Spirit,” p. 103 sq.; Owen (J.) “A Discourse concerning the Holy Spirit,” p. 135 sq.; Hodge (C.) “Systematic Theology,” II. 639 sq., III. 3 sq.; Dagg (J. L.) “Manual of Theology,” p. 277 sq.; Baird (S. J.) “The Elohim Revealed,” p. 863 sq.

but the meaning of the apostle is, that "the word of God" is to be used by Christians as a sword given to them by the Spirit (Rom. x. 17; 1 Cor. iv. 15). Whether the Spirit himself uses it, he does not say. But the language of Luke, in Acts xvi. 14, suggests that it is the work of the Spirit to open the heart to receive the gospel as preached by men. (*b*) Because the sinfulness of men is not due to their ignorance of the truth, but to their rejection and hatred of it and of its holy author (Rom. i. 18, sq). (*c*) Because the Christian has no such knowledge of the process of regeneration as this theory would suggest. He is conscious of the change, but not of its being wrought by the force of truth. (*d*) Because men are not generally conscious of any peculiar combination, or skilful application of truth to their minds, at the moment of conversion. It is often an old and common truth, which engages their thought, uttered perhaps by a friend's voice, or recalled and pondered in the field.

As to the second theory, that Christian truth is filled with divine energy by the Spirit dwelling in it at the moment of regeneration, the following may be said:—

(*a*) That it is impossible to conceive of truth as charged with any other power than that which it has as truth. But if it were charged with a power distinct from its own, that power must act in its own way on the soul; it cannot change the nature of truth, or give to it more than its own efficiency.¹

(*b*) That the effect of Christian truth on a human soul, at any time, must depend on the permanent nature and momentary condition of that soul, together with the adaptation of the truth to its nature in that condition.

(*c*) That any thing which predisposes the soul to heed or believe that truth may be said to co-operate with it, and impart to it an effectiveness which it would not otherwise have.

¹ Says Dr. Wardlaw, "That it (the influence of the Spirit) must be upon the mind, and not upon the truth, is quite evident. The latter description of influence is utterly unintelligible, — words without meaning. The truth is the truth, — incapable of alteration, incapable of being affected by any, even a divine influence. It must be on the perceiving mind that the influence comes." — "Sys. Theol." III. p. 24, 25.

(*d*) That the earnestness, sincerity, and love of the human preacher do often thus co-operate with divine truth, making it more effective than it would otherwise be. In other words, the manifest effect of truth on the speaker's heart may enkindle interest and awaken confidence in that truth on the part of the hearer. But this is something quite different from an energizing of the truth itself; and it wholly fails to justify the statement of Prof. Phelps, that "truth energized by the Holy Spirit may take possession of a man impetuously; so that, whether he is in the body or out of the body, he cannot tell."¹

How, then, is the instrumentality of truth in regeneration to be reconciled with the direct agency of the Spirit in effecting it? It has been supposed, —

1. That regeneration is effected by the joint action of the Holy Spirit and of Christian truth. This truth, when it enters the mind of a moral being, has, it is said, a certain tendency to give it a right moral bias or disposition; but its force is not sufficient to overcome the resistance which is encountered in the depraved heart of man. Hence the need of some further and greater influence from without; and this is afforded by the agency of the Spirit, co-operating with the truth. Both act in the same way for the production of exactly the same thing; namely, a right disposition. This view is certainly plausible; but it does not satisfy us.

(*a*) Because it co-ordinates the action of Christian truth with that of the Holy Spirit; while the Scriptures represent truth as only a means or instrument, but the Spirit as a generator or source of the new life.

(*b*) Because the action of truth is under the eye of consciousness, while that of the Spirit is not. It is, therefore, difficult to believe that they act in the same way. One convinces, persuades; the other works graciously in the unseen depths of the soul.

(*c*) Increase of religious knowledge appears to have in itself no tendency to change hatred of God into love. God as a holy

¹"The New Birth," p. 131. — Compare Rev. i. 10; iv. 2; xvii. 3; Ezek. ii. 2; iii. 12, 14, 24; xi. 24, which ascribe such an effect to the Spirit, but not to truth.

Sovereign, Christ as a vicarious sacrifice, and pardon as an unmerited favor are offensive to an unregenerate mind. We do not deny that truth has power to rouse the conscience, to awaken human sympathy, and to lead men to much that is commendable in human conduct; but it does not make them hate sin as such, nor love God as a holy Sovereign, nor delight in pardon on terms that humble self.

2. That regeneration, or the new birth, includes the first conscious working of the new life; that it has a conscious as well as an unconscious side, both of which are necessary to its completion. The principle of life, the new disposition, is given by the Holy Spirit; but the action of this bias, or spiritual life, as required by God, and experienced by us, is absolutely dependent on truth. There can be no holy desire, affection, or volition, except in view of truth. The conscious image of Christ in the soul is produced by the word of God. The Holy Spirit makes the soul sensitive to the light of truth at the very instant when that light, pouring in upon it, originates as a means the visible image of Christ, — the new life of faith and love. It is the action of the spirit which prepares the plate; it is the influence of truth which brings out the picture. The soul must be made susceptible, or the light of truth falls upon it in vain. The work of the Spirit is the logical antecedent of that of the word: both, however, act at the same time.¹

This view seems to be correct, — supported by Scripture, and reason, and experience.

Note. — The divine side of the change in question might have been called “regeneration”; the human side, “conversion”; and both united, “change of mind,” — that is *μετάνοια*; but the sacred writers made use of popular language.

But we must consider another point. Many believe that regeneration is effected by, or in baptism, regarded as a sacrament. According to the Council of Trent, Sessio VII., “the most holy sacraments of the Church” are the means “*per quæ omnis vera justitia vel incipit, vel cæpta augetur, vel amissa*

¹ See Principal Cunningham’s “Historical Theology,” Vol. I. p. 350.

reparatur." Moreover, an anathema is pronounced on every one who affirms that the "*sacramenta novæ legis non continere gratiam, quam significant, aut gratiam ipsam non ponentibus obicem non conferre, quasi signa tantum externa sint acceptæ per fidem gratiæ vel justitiæ,*" &c. So, too, an anathema is pronounced against every one who says that "children, because they do not exercise faith, are not, when baptized, to be reckoned among the faithful," &c.¹

According to the Augsburg Confession, the Lutherans "*de baptismo docent, quod sit necessarius ad salutem, quodque per baptismum offeratur gratia Dei: et quod pueri sint baptizandi, qui per baptismum oblatis Deo recipiantur in gratiam Dei. Damnant Anabaptistas, qui improbant baptismum puerorum et affirmant pueros sine baptismo salvos fieri.*"²

In the Liturgy of the Church of England for the public baptism of infants, the minister, after baptizing the infant, is required to say, "We receive this child into the congregation of Christ's flock": and still further, "Seeing now, dearly beloved brethren, that this child is regenerate, and grafted into the body of Christ's Church, let us give thanks unto Almighty God for these benefits," &c.³

It seems to us evident that the Evangelical or Low Church wing of the English Episcopalians holds a false position, and is losing influence year by year, as compared with the High Church wing, and no less so as compared with the advocates of the Broad Church theory. The language of the Liturgy teaches plainly the doctrine of baptismal regeneration; and those who maintain it have an advantage, in the Church of England, over those who oppose it, — similar to that which

¹Cf. "Catechismus Romanus," p. 2, c. II. s. 5; Perrone (J.) "Tractatus de Baptismo," in "Prælectiones Theologicæ"; Verriën (E.) "Infant Baptism in case of Danger"; the work is in French, and treats especially of ante-natal baptism, as authorized and practised by Romanists.

²Cf. "Catechismus Minor," IV. 6, 12.

³"Tracts for the Times," Vol. II. No. 76; III. 76; Wilberforce (R. I.) "The Doctrine of Holy Baptism," &c.; Goode (W.) "The Doctrine of the Church of England as to the Effects of Baptism in the case of Infants"; Mozley (J. B.) "The Primitive Doctrine of Bap. Regeneration."

Baptists have over those who reject their view of apostolic baptism.

Before considering the passages which are alleged in support of this belief, it will be proper to weigh the following facts, namely:—

1. In the apostolic age, baptism was preceded by repentance, faith, &c.—(See Acts ii. 37–41; viii. 12; xvi. 14, 31–33; xviii. 8 (cf. Matt. xxviii. 19; Mark xvi. 16; Matt. iii. 1–11; Mark i. 4, 5; Luke iii. 8.) For the import of the expression, “works or fruits meet for repentance,” see Acts xxvi. 20, and compare Luke xxiii. 41, and 2 Macc. iv. 25.

2. Persons were sometimes filled with the Holy Spirit,—that is, baptized in the Holy Spirit, and so endowed with miraculous gifts before baptism (Acts x. 44–48). These gifts, as a rule, presuppose regeneration, and furnish credible evidence of it; hence they were said to justify baptism.

3. Baptism is described by the apostle Peter as “the answer of a good conscience” (1 Peter iii. 21); but a good conscience is a fruit of regeneration (1 Tim. i. 5, 19; iii. 9 (cf. 2 Tim. i. 3); Heb. ix. 14; x. 22; xiii. 18).

4. Administering the ordinance of baptism was esteemed by Paul subordinate to the work of preaching (1 Cor. i. 17, 18, 21). This is very evident, not only from the language found in the verses here cited, but also from the way in which he generally refers to the work of preaching.

5. This apostle claims to have begotten the Corinthian Christians by the gospel; while he disclaims baptizing them, except in a few instances.—(See 1 Cor. iv. 15; i. 14, 15.) This is decisive.¹

With these facts before us, we turn to the passages which have been supposed to teach the doctrine of baptismal regeneration (namely John iii. 5; Tit. iii. 5; Eph. v. 26; and 1 Peter iii. 21; Acts xxii. 16). On the first three of these texts, we remark:—

¹“Baptist Quarterly,” Vol. IV. pp. 239, 240; Mellor (E.) “Priesthood in the Light of the New Testament,” p. 32 sq.; “Ecclesia: Second Series,” “Baptismal Regeneration.”

(1) If they refer at all to the rite of baptism, they do not prove the doctrine of baptismal regeneration; for it may be truly said that baptism is the symbol of regeneration,— the prescribed expression for it; and no true Christian of the first age could have thought of any substitute for it in acknowledging the change which had been wrought in his soul. The inward change and the outward expression of it must have been very closely united in the minds of Christians. Each would suggest the other; and forms of speech would be transferred from one to the other.

Hence Christ, in his discourse with Nicodemus, virtually said, "To be a true member of my earthly kingdom, you must be born again, ritually and spiritually; you must submit to the rite of baptism, and experience a renovation of heart by the Spirit of God; you must not only confess me openly in the prescribed way, which you are unwilling to do, but must also be the subject of a great spiritual change effected by the power of God" (cf. Rom. x. 9 for the same order of thought; it is the rhetorical instead of the logical order).

In the Epistles to Titus and the Ephesians, Paul blends the inward change with the outward expression of it, even as he does also in Rom. vi. 2 sq., and Col. ii. 11, 12. The two he regarded as practically inseparable: true belief in Christ involved the prescribed expression of it, and *vice versa*.

If this be the correct interpretation of these passages, they agree in sense with 1 Peter iii. 21, and Acts xxii. 16. Prof. Hodge remarks, that, "when any declaration or service is the appointed means of professing faith or obedience, making such declaration, or performing such service, is said to secure the blessings which are promised to the faith thereby professed" ("Way of Life," p. 267). To understand such language, it is only necessary to bear in mind, that, in the apostolic age, it was, as a rule, indispensable, (1) To be baptized in the name of Christ, in order to confess him before men; and (2) to confess him before men, in order to be saved by him.— (See Matt. x. 32, 33; xii. 30; Luke xiv. 26, 27, 33.)

By the limiting clause, "as a rule," we design to accept such

cases as follow : (*a*) those who had not bodily health or strength to be baptized ; (*b*) those who could not find a suitable person to baptize them ; (*c*) those who were prevented from receiving it by their parents ; (*d*) those who were prevented solely by a distrust of their own piety. Baptism has never been a prerequisite to salvation, except as obedience to the known will of Christ is such a prerequisite.

(2) It is not certain that either of the first three passages refers to baptism. Neither of them contains the word which commonly denotes this rite. It may be that the work of the Spirit in regeneration is characterized figuratively as a cleansing, purifying work by the words "water," "bath," and "bath of water." This is a very obvious and natural interpretation of the passage in Titus ; and scarcely less so of the words of Christ in John, and of Paul in his letter to the Ephesians.

IV. *The Antecedents on the part of man to Regeneration.*

These cannot be pointed out with entire accuracy ; for no man who is a Christian can be sure as to all that preceded and accompanied regeneration in his own soul ; yet experience, observation, and the word of God suggest a few things which commonly precede this radical change. They authorize us to say, that but few are regenerated save those, —

1. *Who have some knowledge of the gospel.* This may be inferred from the great commission (Matt. xxviii. 19 ; Mark xvi. 15, 16), from the language of Paul (Rom. x. 17, 18), and from the history of mankind. We do not say that no man has been regenerated without hearing the gospel ; but there is reason to suppose that comparatively few have been. The state of the heathen is deplorable.

2. *Who give earnest heed to the gospel.* God does not often impart the new life to a careless soul, — to one who pays no serious attention to the truth. It may be only for a short time ; but generally, if not always, the unrenewed man takes hold of the word seriously before the decisive change.

3. *Who are fully convinced of their own guilt* (Acts ii. 37). It is true, that many who are converted at the present day

seem to have but a faint sense of personal guilt before the change; but they have, we think, some sense of it: and they have no doubt whatever of their deep sinfulness. In former times, a deeper conviction of sin seems to have generally preceded a change of heart.

4. *Who are truly anxious to be saved* (Acts ii. 37; xvi. 30). "To be saved," we mean, from eternal death, from the penalty of sin, and perhaps from sin itself, as involving that penalty. Beyond this, the carnal heart does not go. It has no desire for God and holiness in themselves, and no hatred of sin as such. The conscience, indeed, condemns sin; but the heart loves it. Self cherishes self, and refuses to God his place. Men sometimes think they hate sin, as sin, before conversion; but we think they are mistaken. Certain forms of sin shock their sensibilities; but mere sin, as against God and right, they do not hate.

5. *Who feel their need of help, in order to be saved.* One who believes that he can do all that must be done to deliver himself from sin, and render himself acceptable to God, is not likely, while cherishing that belief, to be renewed by the Spirit of God. Men are commonly made to feel their need of divine help, before it is granted. Often they are led to the brink of despair, in their efforts to make themselves right, before the grace of God enters their hearts.

By calling these "antecedents," instead of conditions, we mean to guard against the following errors: (a) That, when realized, they place God under obligation to regenerate the soul; (b) that, when realized, they constitute the reason why he performs this work. Nothing which an impenitent man does establishes any claim to the mercy of God. He can plead no promise of renewing grace. His thinking, his anxiety, his fear, his sense of need, his prayer, all spring from a carnal heart, which has no real trust in Christ, or love to God (cf. Turretin, i. 318 sq.).

Nay, so far as we are informed by the language of Scripture, there is nothing which men do *before* regeneration which is *uniformly* followed by regeneration. Thus a man may become

eligible to the presidency of the United States, by reaching the age of thirty years; but not every man who is thirty years old is made president of the United States. Again, the taking of a certain oath might be necessary to render one eligible to that office; but taking it would not therefore secure him the office. So the particulars named above may be antecedents of regeneration, and yet constitute no claim to it, nor even a sufficient or proper motive for it.

We are brought, therefore, face to face with the doctrine of *election*. There are doubtless good and sufficient reasons which move God to regenerate and save some men rather than others; but they are not revealed, and should not be sought with too eager a curiosity.

“ But that soul in the heaven which is most pure,
That Seraph which his eye on God most fixes,
Could this demand of thine not satisfy;
Because so deeply sinks in the abyss
Of the eternal statute what thou askest,
From all created sight it is cut off.
And to the mortal world, when thou returnest,
This carry back, that it may not presume
Longer tow’rd such a goal to move its feet.”

— *Dante Paradiso*, xxi. 90.

The Scriptures forbid us to find the reasons in question in the moral action of men before the new birth, and refer us merely to the sovereign will and mercy of God; in other words, they teach the doctrine of personal election on the part of God.— (See Jas. i. 18; 1 Peter i. 1–3; Gal. i. 15, 16; Eph. i. 4, 5, 9, 11; 2 Tim. i. 9; Rom. viii. 28, 30; ix. 11, 24; Acts xiii. 48; Rom. xi. 29; 1 Cor. i. 24, 26; Eph. i. 18; iv. 1; Phil. iii. 14; 2 Thess. i. 11; Matt. xxii. 1–14; xx. 14–16; xi. 20–22; Luke xiv. 15–24; John xv. 16.)¹

¹ Mozley (J. B.) “The Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination”; Woods (I.) “Works,” Vol. IV. pp. 39–63, and 231–267; Taylor (N. W.) “Revealed Theology,” pp. 378–9; Bunyan (J.) “The Jerusalem Sinner Saved,” “Complete Works in one Vol.” p. 322; Calvin (J.) “Institutio Christianæ Religionis,” III. cc. 21–24; Wardlaw (R.) “Systematic Theology,” Vol. II. pp. 435–549; Weiss (B.) “Die Prädestinationslehre des Apostel Paulus,” *Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie*, II. s. 54 ff.; Winer (G. B.) “The Confessions of Christendom,” p. 162 sq.; Nemeyer (H. A.) “Collectio Confessionum,” &c., p. 218 sq.; “Consensus Genevensis: De Acterna Dei Prædestinatione.”

In view of what the Saviour and his apostles clearly teach, it may be considered certain (a) That God has a sovereign right to bestow more *grace* upon one subject than upon another,—grace being unmerited favor (Matt. xx. 11–16; Rom. ix. 20, 21). (b) That God has been pleased to exercise this right in dealing with men (Ps. cxlvii. 20; xix. 9, 10, compared with 1–6; Rom. iii. 1, 2 (cf. i. 20); John xv. 16). (c) That God has some other reason than that of saving as many as possible for the way in which he distributes his grace (Matt. xi. 20–22; Rom. ix. 22–25).

It may also be remarked:—

1. That the action of God in electing, calling, justifying, and glorifying men is intelligent,—not blind. In this case, as in every other, he does what he knows it is best to do. He knows the personal qualities and circumstances of every man; and it may possibly be that the uses to which he can put certain persons, as vessels of grace, determines his selection of them. But this is merely a conjecture. All we know is, that he has good and sufficient reason for the choice he makes.—“*Heus tu, caute de istis agas*”—(Zwingle.)

2. That he elects from mankind certain persons to be renewed and saved by his grace. Why he takes these, rather than others, we are not informed; but it is an act of pure grace on his part. It is not because they are more worthy or less unworthy of his favor than others; nor because they have done any thing morally pleasing to him; nor because they will to be saved, and others do not: he only tells us that such is his good pleasure (Rom. viii. 28; Eph. i. 9–11; Rom. ix. 11, 15, 16).

3. That his purpose to save the elect includes the atonement of Christ, and their union with him. Apart from his person and work, God purposes to save no one; but union with Christ is made actual by faith: and faith presupposes the effectual calling or regenerating work of God by his Spirit (Eph. i. 4; ii. 5; 2 Tim. i. 9).¹

¹Says Augustine, “*Non quia credimus, sed ut credamus, elegit nos: ne priores eum eligere dicamur*” (De Prædest. Sanctor. ch. 8); “*Apostolus gra-*

4. That God's treatment of the non-elect is just. His right (Rom. ix. 20) to save some men, while he leaves others to reap the fruits of their own sin, is as perfect as that of the potter to mould his clay as he pleases, — either to a noble or a vile use. The lesson is not that "might makes right," but that God is morally entitled to glorify his righteousness or his mercy in disposing of a guilty race. By virtue of his relation to men, he has a right to bestow more good upon some than upon others, though the former are as undeserving as the latter.

Says Dorner, "The working of God on Pharaoh finds him already wicked, and only brings out what is latent. If wickedness takes place, the fault is in the wicked tools which God does not allow to stand idle. God indeed preserves the wicked; but he does not create within them a new element of wickedness."

If we understand the apostle in his letter to the Romans, he regards the hearts of all men as fully set in them to do evil, — as at enmity with God, and disobedient to his righteous will: hence all men are living under just condemnation to death for their sins. He also regards mankind as so bent upon evil, that all, with one consent, reject, or would reject, the offer of pardon, though presented with every gracious influence but that which regenerates the heart; and, in view of these facts, he pronounces it to be perfectly right for God to save none, or to save all; or to save some, and leave the rest to perish.

But, it is said, this doctrine of personal election is unequal, and therefore unfair; all those who are equally guilty ought to be dealt with alike; and God is no respecter of persons. To this we reply, We have no reason whatever to believe that God treats all moral beings or all men alike, — doing as much

tiam præponit operibus, non ut opera extinguat, sed ut ostendat non esse opera præcedentia gratiam, sed consequentia. . . . Non enim ut ferveat, calefacit ignis, sed quia fervet. Nec ideo bene currit rota, ut rotunda sit, sed quia rotunda est; sic nemo propterea bene operatur, ut accipiat gratiam, sed quia accipit." — (Ad. Sinepl. lib. 1.)

¹ "History of Protestant Theology," I. s. 210.

for one as for another. "What, then, is the advantage of the Jew? . . . Much every way." He had reason to bless God for distinguishing goodness; and so have all who know the gospel.¹

Besides, the truly good rejoice that other beings are wiser and better than they, even though this superiority is due to the hand of God. What benevolent heart would not be glad to know that other races of moral beings have been more highly endowed, and placed in more favorable conditions for persevering in virtue than our own? But, of all beings, culprits condemned to death have the least right to insist that they all must be treated alike; that no favor be granted to one that is not given to all. A government may consult its honor and safety in the treatment of rebels.

Yet it may be said, as a matter of fact, (a) That God offers his favor to all men on the same terms: the conditions of justification by law or by grace are the same for all. (b) That, when he deals with men as a Judge, it is according to their true character; the great and the wise fare no better than the feeble and the foolish. (c) That he takes account of their different circumstances in estimating the guilt of men.—(See Deut. x. 17; 1 Sam. xvi. 7; Job xxxiv. 19; 2 Chron. xix. 7; Acts x. 34, 35; Rom. ii. 11; Gal. ii. 6; Eph. vi. 9; Col. iii. 25; 1 Peter i. 17 (cf. Matt. xxii. 16; Mark xii. 14; Luke xx. 21; Jas. ii. 1; Jude, 16).

v. *First Fruits of Regeneration in Experience.*

Of these, the most important are the following:—

1. *Spiritual Discernment.* This appears to precede in the order of nature every pious affection or volition. "In strictness of philosophical language, spiritual knowledge is distinct from faith, and precedes it. By knowledge, the object is furnished which is received by faith as true."² Yet it has some-

¹ See Froude (J. A.) "Address on Calvinism," p. 5; Dante Paradiso, XXXII. 61 sq.

² Alexander (J. W.) See Wardlaw (R.) "Sys. Theol." II. 749. Dr. Payne defines faith, "The belief of the gospel; its meaning, evidence, and glory being unveiled to the mind by the Holy Spirit." Dr. Wardlaw's discussion is able. He makes spiritual discernment a condition of faith.

times been doubted whether the power of discerning religious truth is increased by direct agency, or only by indirect, — by the relish for truth implanted in the soul.

2. *Christian faith.* By this is meant a genuine trust in Christ as Saviour, — a trust which presupposes a belief in the testimony of the Scriptures respecting him. Faith is a receptive act, and is supposed by many to precede regeneration. But this surely is an error; for, as Schmid says, “All the apostles agree in this, that faith is mediated by a new birth from God.”¹ Says Dr. Williams, “Faith in Christ is the very first outgush of the new-found spiritual life.” The relation of faith to regeneration is one of great importance, and cannot be too carefully settled.

3. *Christian love.* By this we mean a supreme delight in God, as revealed by Jesus Christ; and, in general, a truly benevolent disposition. “The glory of God,” says Charnock, “is the end of the new creature; self, the end of the old man” (Vol. II. p. 51).² Love is communicative, and is a higher grace than faith; for it is more blessed to give than to receive. The words ἀγαπάω and ἀγάπη are generally used by the writers of the New Testament to express Christian love. They signify *good-will* towards an object, united, for the most part, with delight in its qualities. Love to enemies is expressed by the word ἀγαπάω, but not by the word φιλέω.³

4. *Christian hope.* This relates to one's own salvation through Christ, and is logically subsequent to faith and love. It may be described in a word as *anticipation*, and it evi-

¹ See 1 John v. 1; Eph. ii. 8; 1 Cor. xii. 3; Rom. xii. 3; v. 24; vi. 47 (cf. 1 John iii. 9, 14). Fuller (A.) “Works,” II. pp. 118, 376, 377, 379 sq.; Anderson (W.) “Treatise on Regeneration,” p. 116 sq.; Köstlin (J.) “Der Glaube: sein Wesen, Grund und Gegenstand, seine Bedeutung für Erkennen, Leben und Kirche;” Erskine (J.) “The Nature of Christian Faith,” in “Theol. Tracts,” Vol. II. p. 201 sq.

² See Barrows (I.) “Works,” Vol. I. p. 238 sq.

³ French (R. C.) “The New Testament Synonymes,” p. 38 sq. Yet I am in doubt whether this author has rightly explained John xxi. 15–17. See also Cremer (H.) “Bibisch-Theologisches Wörterbuch der New Testament Græcität,” s. v. Ἀγάπη.

dently held a prominent place in the experience of the apostles.¹

*Repentance*² is a comprehensive term, often used to signify the first spiritual emotions of the soul, in contrast with its former views or feelings; more strictly, *mentem muto* (*in melius*), and sometimes to denote especially, though not exclusively, contrition for sin, Acts xx. 21; xxvi. 20; viii. 22; 2 Cor. xii. 21 (cf. 7, 9, 10). It is never employed in the New Testament to express mere regret or remorse, without any change of moral bias.

* II. JUSTIFICATION.

The religious literature of the present day furnishes evidence of no little contempt, on the part of some zealous teachers, for the doctrine of justification through the work of Christ, imputed to those who believe in him. Yet this doctrine must stand; for it is founded on the clear testimony of Scripture, and is necessary to peace of conscience, in view of personal sin and of a holy law. In studying it, therefore, we are studying a central and most important truth, which cannot be too well understood by a follower of Christ.

There may be an objection to considering it in this place, on the ground that regeneration is the beginning of sanctification; and therefore the latter ought to be studied in immediate connection with the former. But to this it may be replied, that justification is connected and contemporaneous with faith, while an assurance of it promotes sanctification. Hence it is safe to follow the usual arrangement, and consider justification, before taking up the subject of sanctification.

The following topics belong to the doctrine in question: The nature of the act, the author of the act, the ground of the act, the condition on which it depends, and the reasonableness of it.³

¹ Kelber (L.) "Christliche Hoffnung," in "Jahrbücher," &c., Vol. X.; Zöckler "de vi ac notione vocis ἔλπίς in Novo Tnto."

² Μετάνοια. See Trench, *ut supra*, p. 241 sq. In composition *μετά* denotes, 1, *cum*; 2, *trans.* (um.); 3, *post.* Wilkei Clavis, ed. by Grimm.

³ Owen (J.) "On Justification"; Buchanan (Ja.) "On Justification"; Preuss (E.) "Die Rechtfertigung des Sünders vor Gott, aus der heiligen Schrift dar-

I. THE NATURE OF JUSTIFICATION.

No one of the sacred writers makes use of this expression so frequently as the apostle Paul. Hence our knowledge of its meaning must come in a great measure from the study of his writings. The verb which is translated, *to justify*, occurs thirty-eight times in the New Testament, and mostly in books written by Paul, or by his companion, Luke. Thus (Matt. xi. 19; xii. 37; Luke ix. 29, 35; x. 29; xvi. 15; xviii. 14; Acts xiii. 39, twice; Rom. ii. 13; ix. 4, 20, 24, 26, 28, 30; iv. 2, 5; v. 1, 9; vi. 7; viii. 30, 33; 1 Cor. iv. 4; vi. 11; Gal. ii. 16, 17, four times; iii. 8, 11, 24; v. 4; 1 Tim. iii. 16; Titus iii. 7; James ii. 21, 24, 25).

An impartial study of these passages, with others in the Old Testament where the corresponding Hebrew word occurs, will convince any one that it is properly a legal term, and signifies to *pronounce one right or righteous before the law* (Ex. xxiii. 7; Deut. xxv. 1; 2 Sam. xv. 4; 1 Kings viii. 32; Isa. v. 23; xliii. 9). It never signifies to *make* a person righteous, but always, for one reason or another, to *declare* him righteous.

Note, *first*, that it is used of the decisions of an earthly tribunal (Isa. v. 23; Deut. xxv. 1); and also of the decisions of the Supreme Ruler at the last day (Matt. xii. 37; Rom. ii. 13, 16). *Secondly*, that it is used as the opposite of condemnation (1 Kings viii. 32; Prov. xvii. 15; Matt. xii. 37; Rom. viii. 33, 34). And, *thirdly*, that it is used as virtually equivalent to the act of forgiving sins, or of not imputing iniquity (Acts xiii. 38, 39; Rom. iv. 6-8).

It is doubtless true that pardon and justification are separable in thought. Pardon assumes that there is guilt; justification says that there is none. But, in the case of sinners believing in Christ, the two are but different sides of the

gestellt"; Fuller (A.) "Works," I. 276; Bunyan (J.) "Justification by an Imputed Righteousness"; "Works," ed. by Geo. Offer, I. 300 sq.; Bushnell (H.) "The Vicarious Sacrifice," Part III. c. 7; Chalmers (T.) "Institutes of Theology," Vol. II.; Wardlaw (R.) "Sys. Theol." Vol. II. p. 678 sq.; Gerhard (J.) "Loca Theologica," T. III. L. XVI. p. 300 sq. ed. Preuss; Winer (G. B.) "Creeds of Christendom," p. 178 sq.

same act. For God pardons no one whom he does not at the same instant justify; and he justifies no one whom he does not at the same instant pardon. Hence the sacred writers use the terms as if they were equivalent; or, since one involves the other, they do not deem it necessary to mention them both in the same connection.—(See Mark i. 4; Luke i. 77; iii. 3; xxiv. 47; Acts ii. 38; v. 31; x. 43; xxvi. 18; Eph. i. 7; Col. i. 14; and Luke xviii. 14; Rom. iii. 24; v. 9; viii. 30; Titus iii. 7).

In the order of nature, pardon precedes justification; for a sinner cannot be pronounced righteous before the law until his sins have been forgiven; yet in time and effect they are inseparable and equal, though not the same.

It may be added, —

(a) That justification does not set one free from the law of God as a rule of duty (Rom. vi. 1, 14, 20; vii. 5, 7, 9; Gal. iii. 19), though it does set him free from it, as a rule by which he is to be finally acquitted or condemned. Antinomianism is a dangerous perversion of the doctrine of grace.

(b) That justification does not secure for one the same treatment in all respects which he would receive if he were free from personal sin. Bishop Devenant remarks, "God absolves the justified from all punishment that is retributive; but not from all that is chastening and medicinal."¹

(c) That pardon and justification are complete from the first moment of their existence. God does not forgive a part of the believer's sins, or pronounce him partially just before the law. He forgives all, and declares the pardoned sinner righteous, or free from condemnation.

Yet this statement is by no means inconsistent with the theory of continuous pardon and justification. The relation of the believer to Christ is ever dependent on a vital union between the two (1 Peter i. 5); and the blessing of justification may well be conceived of as being perpetually renewed. Hence David could pray for the pardon of his

¹ Compare Heb. xii. 4 sq.

great sin (Ps. 1). Hence, likewise, all Christians ought daily to pray for the forgiveness of their sins (Matt. vi. 12); Preuss (E.) "Die Rechtfertigung des Sünders vor Gott," — "Sechster Abschnitt: Beständige Vergebung," s. 119.

Hence the doctrine of the Papal Church on this subject must be rejected. For that Church teaches that "justification is not solely the remission of sins, but also the sanctification and renovation of the inner man, by a voluntary reception of grace and gifts"; and also that the "sacrament of baptism" is the "sacrament of faith, — without which (faith) no one is ever justified."¹ That is, justification is conditioned on faith; and faith is conditioned on baptism.

In other words, righteousness is infused into the heart by justification; so that men are pardoned and sanctified by the same act, — the forgiveness of sins advancing from one degree to another with the process of sanctification. This doctrine is manifestly unscriptural.

II. THE AUTHOR OF JUSTIFICATION.

According to the apostle who speaks most frequently of justification, it is to be looked upon as an act of God the Father. — "It is God that justifieth." It was God who "set forth Jesus Christ in his blood as a propitiation, for the exhibition of his righteousness, that he might be righteous and pronounce righteous him that believeth" (Rom. i. 17; iii, 21, 30; iv. 5; viii. 30, 33; x. 3; 2 Cor. v. 21; Gal. iii. 8).

And according to the same apostle, it is the grace of God which leads him to justify any. Even faith in Christ has no virtue in itself. As an affection or act of the soul, it is inferior to love; and neither of them is half as steady or fervid as it ought to be. As strongly as possible, therefore, does Paul assert that justification is an act of free grace to the sinner on the part of God. In himself, the believer has no claim to it. Rom. iii. 24; iv. 4, 16; v. 15; xi. 5, 6; Eph. i. 6, 7; (cf. John iii. 16; 1 John iv. 9, 10, 19; Acts xx. 24; 1 Cor. i. 4; Eph. ii. 7, 8; 2 Thess. ii. 16; Titus ii. 11).

¹"Canones et Decreta Concilii Tridentini," Sessio VI. Canones III., VI. VII.

And this view of the case is yet more obvious, when the act of God is simply denominated forgiveness of sins. For no one would think of himself as having a right to forgiveness; much less would any one who had a just conception of the dreadful guilt of sin dream that any thing in his own action could entitle him to pardon. Forgiveness, in order to be forgiveness, must be unmerited.

But, from another point of view, it is an act of righteousness (1 John i. 9): "If we confess our sins, he is faithful and righteous to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness." For, in this passage, the faithfulness referred to is fidelity on the part of God to his promise; and righteousness is that attribute of God which insures such fidelity. In a certain sense, therefore, the penitent believer has a title or claim to the mercy of God, but not "in and of himself"; his title is in Christ, to whom he is joined by faith: and this brings us to another section.

III. THE GROUND OF JUSTIFICATION.

By this we mean the moral basis or sufficient reason for this act, — that in consideration of which the believer is justified. And this can only be *the vicarious work of Christ, culminating in his death*. This may be proved, —

1. *By the direct testimony of God's Word* (for example in Rom. iii. 24, 25; v. 9, 18, 19; Eph. i. 7; Gal. iii. 13).

The first of these passages describes men as justified "through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus"; and this redemption is said to be in him, because the righteousness of God had been illustrated by his propitiatory death. In the second, men are represented as having been "justified in the blood of Jesus," who had died for them while they were sinners. In the third, it is said that "as through one trespass it came upon all men unto condemnation, so also through one righteous act it came upon all men unto justification of life." In Eph. i. 7, the apostle speaks of Christ as the one "in whom we have the redemption through his blood, — the remission of our trespasses"; and in Gal. iii. 13, he declares

that "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us." It would be difficult to express the fact of justification through the vicarious death of Christ in plainer language than this.

2. *By the indirect testimony of God's Word.* Matt. xxvi. 28; 1 Cor. i. 30; xv. 3; 2 Cor. v. 21; Gal. i. 4; Col. i. 14; Heb. ix. 22; 1 Peter ii. 24 (cf. Luke xxiv. 47; Acts ii. 38.)

The whole of our argument for the Godward efficacy of the atonement may be referred to in support of the statement which we have now made in respect to the ground of justification; and on this account it seems unnecessary to protract our investigation at this point. A review of that topic will afford ample evidence of the proposition above expressed.

IV. CONDITION OF JUSTIFICATION.

It has been shown that the proper ground or sufficient reason for justification is the vicarious death of Christ. But unbelief in Christ, as the Saviour of sinners, or a refusal to accept of pardon on account of his atonement, would be an insuperable obstacle to a sinner's justification; and, therefore, *faith or trust in him* is very properly said to be a *condition* of justification. Some have preferred to call it a *prerequisite* rather than a condition; but we see no difference between the two words in this connection. Without faith in Christ crucified, no one can receive forgiveness of sins and an inheritance with the saints in light. This is the plain meaning of the inspired writers (Mark xvi. 16; John iii. 36; vi. 40; Acts xvi. 31; Gal. ii. 16; iii. 21; 1 John v. 10, 12; Rom. iii. 22, 28; iv. 5, 13, 14; v. 1; Gal. iii. 6 sq. 26; Eph. ii. 8; iii. 17; Phil. iii. 9; Heb. xi. 6).

From the testimony of the Word of God, therefore, it appears that trust in Christ, rather than sorrow for sin, or love to God, is the proper condition of justification; not as working, but as trusting, are men justified or forgiven. Hence faith does not justify as being in itself righteousness, obedience, a germ of righteousness, or an equivalent for obedience; but *as a total renunciation of all claim to personal*

righteousness, and a sole reliance upon Christ for acceptance with God.—“The glory of faith is, that its utter emptiness opens to receive consummate good.”¹

A disposition of heart, therefore, whose moral qualities were essentially the same as those of intelligent faith in Christ, must have been possessed by every adult of the human race that has been saved. Christian faith is the act of a sinner who sees himself to be a sinner, and utterly renounces all trust in his own works, whether internal or external,—all confidence in his own love, or trust, or humility, and casts himself without reserve on the mercy of God in Christ. It is, therefore, quite as truly distrust of self, as it is trust in Christ. It cannot live without doing good; but it can do no good in which it has any confidence as satisfying the law of a holy God.

V. REASONABLENESS OF THIS DOCTRINE.

On this difficult subject, only a few suggestions can be made; and they will be no more than inferences from the language of the New Testament in respect to the intimate connection between Christ and his people. They are said to be “in Christ”; and Christ is said to be “in them”: they are said to be one body; and he is said to be the head of that body. It may therefore be affirmed that in a profound, spiritual sense, (a) *The soul of the believer is united with Christ.*—(See John i. 12; vi. 35; xv. 1–11; Rom. xii. 5; 1 Cor. xii. 12–27; Gal. ii. 20; iii. 16; Eph. v. 29–33; and (b) *This union with Christ secures to the believer the benefits of his work.* What the believer in himself does *not* deserve,—that is, life,—Christ does deserve; and what the believer in himself *does* deserve,—that is, death,—Christ has suffered for him (cf. 2 Tim. i. 10).

¹ Alexander (J. W.) “On Faith”; Jackson (T.) “Works,” Vol. III., “Justifying Faith”; Winer (G. B.) “The Confessions of Christendom,” p. 183 sq.; Kahnis (K. F. A.) “Die Lutherische Dogmatik historisch-genetisch dargestellt,” II. s. 265 ff.; Preuss (E.) “Die Rechtfertigung des Sünders vor Gott,” s. 27, 83; Hase (K.) “Hutterus Redivivus,” s. 306 ff.; Luthardt (C. E.) “Kompendium der Dogmatik,” s. 219 ff.; Reuss (E.) “History of Christian Theology in the Apostolic Age,” II. ch. 13.

In these two facts we may discover, perhaps, the philosophy of justification. Believers are vitally and legally one with Christ. Hence (1) Their sins are now forgiven in view of what he with whom they are made one has suffered in their behalf. (2) They are treated as implicitly righteous; and this treatment comports as well with the divine righteousness as it would if they were personally righteous. The law has no penal claim on them for sin. (3) They are treated as sons of God, and joint-heirs with Christ; and thus, through adoption, they expect a glory which they could not have expected as a reward for their own obedience, even if they had never sinned.

The spiritual union of the believer with Christ is such, that he has true fellowship with the work of Christ. He indorses and accepts it, so far as possible, as his own. He acknowledges the law of God to be holy, and its penalty just. In dying to sin, he dies with Christ; entering into the meaning and necessity of the Saviour's death, and feeling that, if it were possible, he would gladly suffer in the same way, and for the same great end, — the honor of God, and the good of men. Hence we say that the imputation of Christ's work is mediate, — not immediate, — to the believer as such, and not to the elect as such. A moral union is prerequisite to the legal one.

The logical order of the process of redemption seems to be this: (1) Election by God, the Father; (2) Regeneration by the Holy Spirit; (3) Union with Christ by faith; (4) Imputation of Christ's work; (5) Justification on account of that work.¹

As the philosophy of justification is a matter of great interest, we subjoin a few extracts which bear upon it: —²

¹ Kahnis (K. F. A.) "Die Lutherische Dogmatik," II. s. 273 ff. — It is worthy of notice, that Lutheran theology makes union with Christ a *consequence* of justification by faith. "The doctrine of justification is treated by Paul; the doctrine of the mystical union, by John; and the doctrine of sanctification as preparatory to eternal life, by Peter." — (Kahnis.)

² Gordon (A. J.) "In Christ," VI. p. 115 sq., "Standing in Christ."

“I attribute the highest importance to *the connection between the head and members*, — to the mystical union by which we enjoy him, so that, being made ours, he makes us partakers of the blessings with which he is furnished. Because he has designed to *unite us* to himself, therefore we glory in a participation of his righteousness.”—Calvin (J.) “*Institutio Christianæ Religionis*,” L. III. c. xi. 10.

“Faith must be purely taught; namely, that thou art so entirely and nearly joined to Christ, that he and thou art made, as it were, one person: so that thou mayest boldly say, I am now one with Christ; that is to say, Christ’s righteousness, victory, and life are mine. And again, Christ may say, I am that sinner; that is, his sins and his death are mine, because he is united and joined unto me, and I unto him.”—Luther (M.) “*Com. on Gal.*,” Eng. Transl. p. 171.

Zwingle taught that Christ “is made unto us righteousness, for no one may come to God who is not righteous; and neither can any man be righteous in himself. But Christ is righteous, and he is *our head*; we are his members, and thus, as members, draw near to God through the righteousness of the head.”

“Justifying righteousness is the doing and suffering of Christ when he was in the world. . . . When Jesus Christ fulfilled the righteousness of the law, it is said it was fulfilled in us, because indeed fulfilled in our nature. . . . For there being a *union* between head and members, though things may be done by the head and that for the members, the things are counted *to* the members as if not done by the head. . . . Wherefore, in this sense, we are said to *do* what only was done by him; even as the client doth by his lawyer, when his lawyer personates him.” But, “mark, the righteousness is still *in Christ*, not in us, even then when we are made partakers of *the benefit* of it; even as the wing and feathers still abide in the hen when the chickens are covered, kept, and warmed thereby.”—Bunyan (J.) “*The Works of*,” Vol. I. pp. 302, 304, edited by George Offer.

The justification of the believer is no other than his being admitted to *communion* in the justification of the *head* and *surety* of all believers.—Edwards (J.) “Works of,” Vol. IV. p. 66, and Vol. I. p. 596 sq.

“I have no doubt that the imputation of Christ’s righteousness presupposes a *union* with him; since there is no perceivable fitness in bestowing benefits on one *for another’s sake*, where there is *no union* or *relation* between. It is not such a union, however, as that the actions of either become those of the other. *Obedience* itself may be and is *imputed*, while its *effects* only are *imparted*.”—Fuller (A.) “Works of,” Vol. II. p. 685.

“As Christ the Holy can alone be, in an absolute sense, the object of divine love and complacency, so no man can be its object, *except in connection with Christ*. . . . *As one with him, the redeemed are presented to the eye of God*.”—Neander (A.) “Commentary on the 1st Ep. of John,” ad. loc. ii. 1, 2.

“*Union with Christ* is the distinctive blessing of the gospel dispensation, in which every other is comprised,—justification, sanctification, adoption, and the future glorifying of our bodies; all these are but different aspects of the one great truth,—that the Christian is *one with Christ*.”—Litton (E. A.) “The Church of Christ,” p. 162.

“*Believers are in Christ*, so as to be partakers in all that he does, and has, and is. They died with him, and rose with him, and live with him, and in him are seated in heavenly places. When the eye of God looks on them they are found in Christ; and there is no condemnation in them that are in him; and they are righteous in his righteousness, and loved with the love which rests on him, and are sons of God in his sonship, and heirs with him in his inheritance, and are soon to be glorified with him in his glory. And this standing which they have in Christ, and the present and future portion which it secures, are contemplated in eternal counsels, and predestined before the foundation of the world.”—Bernard, Progress of Doc. in the N. T., p. 181.

III. SANCTIFICATION.¹

It has been already remarked that regeneration is the beginning of sanctification; and it may be added that the language of the sacred writers respecting the new birth is sometimes very sweeping,—as if regeneration completed the work which it begins; as if the production of a holy disposition were at the same time the destruction of all evil, or tendency to evil, in the heart (2 Cor. v. 17; Gal. vi. 15; 1 Cor. vi. 11; i. 2).

But this cannot be a true interpretation of their words; for it is a doctrine wholly inconsistent with their ordinary teaching, and with their own experience. They recognized the existence of evil affections in the sincere disciples of Christ; they deplored and reproved the sins of those whom they called saints; they spoke of many as babes in Christ, and carnal, because they walked as men; they called upon believers to mortify the deeds of the body; and they exhorted their brethren to grow in the grace and knowledge of the Lord Jesus.²

Whatever view, then, may be taken of the strong language mentioned above,—whether it be supposed to set forth the prescribed standard and perfect ideal of discipleship, or the nature of the new principle of life, without looking, for the moment, at the old which is destined to vanish away, or the end and fruitage of the seed implanted by grace as seen in its germ by the eye of faith, or the complete justification of the believer in Christ, by which his conscience is purified from dead works,—whatever, we say, may be the true interpretation of that language, there is a *scriptural doctrine of*

¹Owen (J.) "On Sanctification"; Romaine (W.) "The Triumph of Faith"; Doddridge (P.) "Rise and Progress of Religion in the Soul"; Williams (W. R.) "Religious Progress"; Bunyan (J.) "The Pilgrim's Progress," "Holy War"; Sibbes (R.) "The Soul's Conflict with itself, and Victory over itself by Faith"; Hare (J. C.) "The Mission of the Comforter"; Bonar (H.) "Way of Holiness"; Princeton Theol. Essays, First Series, "Sanctification," p. 405 sq.; Bunyan (J.)

²Braune (C.) "Die Sünden der Wiedergeborenen," in St. u. Kr. 1847 s. 371 ff.

sanctification regarded as a progressive work in the soul; and in studying it we are to ascertain, if possible, the nature of the work, the author of it, the means of it, the period of it, and the certainty of it.

I. THE NATURE OF SANCTIFICATION.

1. The verb which is translated "sanctify" often denotes the action that renders a person holy, either (*a*) in a judicial sense, as the atonement of Christ (Heb. ii. 11; x. 10, 14, 29; xiii. 12; or (*b*) in a moral and religious sense, as the work of the Spirit in connection with the gospel (John xvii. 17, 19; 1 Thess. v. 23; 1 Cor. i. 2).

2. The corresponding noun generally denotes the effect of the action expressed by the verb; that is, a state of partial or complete godliness (1 Thess. iv. 3, 4, 7; 1 Tim. ii. 15; Rom. vi. 19, 22; Heb. xii. 14; 2 Thess. ii. 13; 1 Peter i. 2). In the last two passages, the noun may denote the action itself, rather than its effect.

To avoid confusion, we will endeavor to use the term in the second sense; and, thus understood, sanctification consists in a gradual increase of faith, love, hope, &c., and a gradual decrease of pride, avarice, lust, or, in a word, selfishness. Perhaps the latter is best attained by means of the former. "Infinite toil," says Arthur Helps, "would not enable you to sweep away a mist; but, by ascending a little, you may often look over it altogether." As love to God and man increases, selfishness diminishes.

II. THE AUTHOR OF SANCTIFICATION.

In a general sense, God is the author of sanctification; for the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are equally concerned in having the polluted soul made pure. But in the special sense, here contemplated, the Holy Spirit accomplishes the sanctification of the believer. This is affirmed,—

1. *Because spiritual discernment or knowledge is traced to the Holy Spirit as its source* (1 Cor. ii. 13, 14, 15; 1 John ii. 20, 27; Eph. i. 17; Col. i. 9). In the first of these passages, Paul represents the unrenewed man as unable to receive the

things of God, because they are spiritually understood : while the renewed man rightly estimates all things ; he appreciates the truth. In the second of them, John speaks of the Holy Spirit as an unction, or anointing, from Christ the Holy One. *ἀνάρα* is restricted by the context to the essential nature or principles of the gospel, — to that which must be known by the Christian, in order to detect whatever is anti-Christian.

2. *Because the Christian virtues are traced to the Holy Spirit as their source* (Gal. v. 22 ; Rom. xii. 3 ; 1 Cor. xii. 3, 9 ; 2 Cor. iv. 13 (cf. Phil. ii. 13). In the first of these passages (Gal. v. 22), “love, joy, peace, forbearance, kindness, goodness, faith, meekness, self-control” are said to be the first fruit of the Spirit ; and in verse 5, of the same chapter, the Christian’s expectant waiting for future acceptance and glory is ascribed to the Spirit’s agency in his heart. In the second passage (Rom. xii. 3), Paul teaches that God gives to every believer the measure of faith which he possesses ; and, if we interpret this in harmony with 1 Cor. xii. 3, 9, it will be seen that he gives this faith by the operation of the Holy Spirit in the soul.

3. *Because Christian conduct and worship are referred to the Holy Spirit as their source* (Rom. viii. 14 ; Gal. iv. 6 ; Eph. v. 18, 19). In the first of these texts (Rom. viii. 14), the sons of God are said to be *led* or *moved* by the Spirit ; in the second, Christian *prayer* is ascribed to the *influence* of the Spirit (cf. Rom. viii. 26, on which Augustine remarks, “Non Spiritus Sanctus in *semetipso*, sed in *nobis* gemit, quia nos gemere facit”) ; and in the third (Eph. v. 18, 19), the *proper singing* of spiritual songs is made consequent on being *filled* with the Spirit (cf. also 1 Cor. xiv. 15 ; and Phil. i. 6).

4. *Because the Christian’s conflict with his evil propensities, and his victory over them, are traced to the Holy Spirit* (Rom. viii. 13 ; Gal. v. 17). In the former of these passages (Rom. viii. 13), we are taught, that, *by the assistance of the Spirit*, believers slay, or put an end to the deeds of the flesh, — those acts which are prompted by a carnal mind ; and, in the latter (Gal. v. 17), the Spirit is said to *strive eagerly* against the flesh, *ἐπιθυμῶν* (cf. v. 19, 20).

5. *Because the spiritual life of believers depends upon their union with Christ, who dwells in them by his Spirit.* (John xv. 1-6; and perhaps xiv. 16-21; Eph. iii. 16, 17; Rom. viii. 8-10 (cf. 1 Cor. iii. 16; vi. 19; Eph. ii. 22).

R. (a) The doctrine of the Trinity underlies and explains the various representations here given.

R. (b) The indwelling or gracious working of the Spirit is, therefore, really the indwelling of the Father and the Son as well.

6. *Because the work of sanctification is directly ascribed to the Holy Spirit* (2 Thess. ii. 13; 1 Peter i. 2; 2 Cor. iii. 18). In the first of these texts, belief of the truth is placed in logical order after the Spirit's working; that depends on this. In the second, election is said to be realized in sanctification wrought by the Spirit. Both these texts refer specially to the first act of the sanctifying work, but without excluding the remainder. In the third, we have the progressive transformation of the believer into the image of Christ attributed virtually to the Spirit. "But we all, with unveiled face, beholding in a mirror the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image, from glory to glory, *as by the Lord, the Spirit.*" That is to say, the transformation is such a one as might be expected from the working of the Spirit of Christ.

R. (a) Regeneration, inspiration, &c., are ascribed to the Holy Spirit; and, as the work of sanctification belongs to the same sphere of action with these, analogy would lead us to refer it to the same agent.

R. (b) In the economy of our salvation, the office-work of the Holy Spirit seems to embrace whatever is done within the human soul by special divine agency.

III. THE MEANS OF SANCTIFICATION.

The following are thought to be the most important:—

A. Providential Discipline. B. Religious Truth. C. Christian Action. D. Church Life. E. The Lord's Day.

A. PROVIDENTIAL DISCIPLINE. We do not here refer to such discipline as giving one who is in doubt as to his duty a

knowledge of God's will, but rather as preparing him in spirit to profit by knowledge from any source; and we place this means of sanctification first, because, in the order of nature, it goes before the others named, and because it is used by God alone. That Divine Providence does thus promote the sanctification of believers, we infer, —

1. *From the language of God's word.* (1) In respect to prosperity (Ps. cxlv. 7; Rom. ii. 4). (2) In respect to adversity (Rom. v. 3 sq.; 1 Cor. xi. 32; Heb. xii. 6; 2 Cor. iv. 17). (3) In respect to all events (Rom. viii. 28; 2 Cor. iv. 15; Eph. v. 20; 1 Cor. iii. 21, 22). *Query:* Does the πάντα of Rom. viii. 28, include the sinning of those who love God? We do not find it easy to reply. Steudel (in the Chr. Rev. XXVI. p. 241) remarks that, "Sin — in case we do not give ourselves up to its power — often impels the conscience to hold the truth before us more distinctly and sharply than it would otherwise have done. A close observer of himself will scarcely be able to say that he has not been greatly benefited by a deeper knowledge of his own heart, and by a more thorough use of the Christian truth at his command, even when these were occasioned by a sin which revealed to him the depravity of his moral nature." Chastisement stands related to sin; punishment to guilt: the former is corrective in its aim; the latter retributive. — See Müller (J.) "The Doctrine of Sin," I. p. 245.

2. *From experience and observation.* Such is the union of soul and body in man, that the latter often solicits the former to sin; but its power to do this may be greatly weakened, for example, by disease. Hence the Christian may be made to experience want or weakness, for the purpose of fitting him to welcome the truth as a little child, with humility and trust in Christ. So, too, prosperity may increase his thankfulness and power to benefit others. When it will do this, God is able and willing to bestow it. *Query:* Does God so direct events as to make them promote, in the highest degree, the sanctification of each believer? Or may that of one be delayed for the sake of greater good to others? For

example, if a man could know that a certain course of labor would do less to make him holy than another, would it then be certain that he ought to choose the latter instead of the former?

B. RELIGIOUS TRUTH. It has been observed that every Christian emotion, desire, purpose, and action is called into being by a perception of truth. Holy living is completely dependent on true knowledge. Right moral feelings and actions must be called forth, if at all, by the presence of suitable thoughts in the mind.

As to the relation of truth, as a means of sanctification to the Holy Spirit, its living Author, it will be enough to say, that, while the heart is made susceptible by the action of the Spirit, every truth presented serves to elicit and strengthen those affections, desires, or volitions which respond to its nature.

Without undervaluing the religious truth which is made known to us by the works of God in creation and providence, we must limit our study to that which is taught by Holy Writ; for, however important the voices of Nature may be to those who have not the Bible, they add very little to the contents of this book.

To show that religious truth is used in sanctifying believers, we refer, —

1. *To the direct testimony of God's word* (John vi. 63; xvii. 17; viii. 32; Heb. v. 12-14; 2 Tim. iii. 16, 17; 1 Cor. iii. 1, 2; 1 Peter ii. 2; 2 Peter i. 3, 4; Ps. cxix. 9, 50, 80, 93, 104, 130, 165). Divine truth is spoken of in John xvii. 17, as the element or atmosphere in which the sanctification is to be wrought by God. The word "sanctify" may here include two ideas: namely, that of consecration to a holy service, — preaching; and that of moral preparation for the service. With this passage may be compared 2 Peter iii. 18.

2. *To the implied testimony of God's word* (Eph. i. 8, 9, 17, 18 (cf. John xiv. 17; xv. 26; xvi. 13); Eph. iv. 11, 12; 1 Cor. xiv. 3-5, and many other places.)

3. *To the nature of the human soul.* For the word of

God contains just those moral and religious truths which tend to beget faith, love, hope, and every other holy exercise.

C. CHRISTIAN ACTION. Under this head, we shall speak of only certain forms of Christian action, since other forms may be conveniently treated elsewhere.

I. OF SECRET WORSHIP. By worship in general, we mean the homage of the soul paid to God in view of his attributes and prerogatives. This homage may be directly expressed in praise, and then it involves a corresponding admission of the worshipper's dependence, and perhaps guilt; or it may be implied only, while the worshipper testifies his sense of dependence and guilt. In further considering the topic before us, we shall confine our attention to the nature, the duty, and the efficacy of prayer.

I. *The nature of prayer.* Prayer is said to have four elements: namely (1) adoration, or homage to God in view of his nature, or the sum of his perfections, sometimes expressed by the single word, "holiness"; (2) thanksgiving, or homage to God in view of his beneficence; (3) confession of sin, or homage to God in view of his righteousness; (4) petition for favors, or homage to God in view of his grace and faithfulness.

It may be remarked:—

(a) That prayer should always be offered by us, either to Christ himself, or to God in the name of Christ. This is evident (1) from the words of Christ to the eleven (John xiv. 13; xv. 16; xvi. 23, 24). (2) From the words and example of his apostles (Acts i. 24; ii. 21; vii. 59; ix. 14, 21; xxii. 16; 1 Cor. i. 2). (3) From his relation to believers. He is their Head; and only in consideration of his work do they receive divine grace. Hence the Lord's prayer was not given as a permanent form, nor even as a complete model of Christian prayer. Yet the paraphrase of this prayer, attributed to Bernard, illustrates the wonderful fulness of its meaning, and is worthy of transcription. "*Our Father*—by right of creation, by bountiful provision, by gracious adoption; *Who art in heaven*—the throne of thy glory, the portion of thy chil-

dren, the temple of thine angels; *Hallowed be thy name* — by the thoughts of our hearts, by the words of our lips, by the work of our hands; *Thy kingdom come* — of Providence to defend us, of grace to refine us, of glory to crown us; *Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven* — toward us without resistance, by us without compulsion, universally without exception; *Give us this day our daily bread* — of necessity for our bodies, of eternal life for our souls; *And forgive us our trespasses* — against the commands of thy law, against the grace of thy gospel; *As we forgive those that trespass against us* — by defaming our characters, by embezzling our property, by abusing our persons; *And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil* — of overwhelming affliction, of worldly enticement, of error's seduction, of sinful affections; *For thine is the kingdom and the power and the glory forever* — thy kingdom governs all, thy power subdues all, thy glory is above all; *Amen* — as it is in thy purposes, so is it in thy promises, so be it in our prayers, so shall it be to thy praise."

(b) That prayer should always be submissive, instead of dictatorial. Strong faith will make it such; for faith leans upon Christ, trusts his wisdom, goodness, and promise. No prayer is acceptable to God unless it be offered in faith; and no dictatorial prayer is offered in faith.

"And so I sometimes think our prayers
Might well be merged in one;
And nest and perch and hearth and church
Repeat, 'Thy will be done.'"

Whittier.

But this feeling is not inconsistent with the most affectionate and importunate pleading for what is believed to be in harmony with the will of God.

(c) That prayer should be very often vocal. There are, indeed, feelings which cannot be uttered, and there are times when silent desires are enough; but, when it can be, secret prayer ought, we think, to be vocal; for the utterance of our desires by the voice strengthens them, and expels foreign thoughts.

II. *The duty of prayer.* Nearly all who believe in a personal God concede that praise, thanks, and confession should be offered to him; but many professed theists call in question the propriety of our asking God to grant any special blessing. Such a petition they deem useless, if not disrespectful, to the All-Wise. Says one of this class, "I cannot express my repugnance at the notion that supreme intelligence and wisdom can be influenced by the suggestion of any human mind, however great." — ("The Prayer-Gauge Debate," p. 122.) But we hold that prayer as petition is a Christian duty: —

1. Because it is commanded (Jer. xxix. 7; Matt. v. 44; vi. 6; ix. 38; xxvi. 40; Luke xviii. 1 sq.; 1 Thess. v. 17; Jas. i. 5; v. 16; 1 Peter iv. 7).

2. Because it is encouraged. (Jer. xxix. 12, 13; Ezek. xxxvi. 37; Matt. vii. 7, 11; xviii. 19; xxi. 22; Luke xi. 13 (cf. 1 Sam. xii. 23).

3. Because it is suitable. A child may fitly ask favors of a parent, and the Christian is a child of God.

4. Because it is spontaneous. The Christian prays, as a matter of course, just as he believes and loves.

III. THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER.

It may be truly said that prayer is one of the best exercises of Christian trust, love, humility, and holy desire; and that, according to a general law of our being, every power or principle, every affection or desire, is strengthened by fit exercise. Hence, if it can be offered honestly and intelligently, it must tend to the sanctification of Christians.

It may also be truly said, that every Christian who prays at all will be certain to pray for his own sanctification; and, therefore, if God bestows blessings, at the request of his children, which he would not otherwise bestow, prayer will secure sanctifying grace.

In proof that prayer is thus answered, reference may be made with confidence, —

(1) To the direct testimony of Scripture (Matt. vii. 7 sq.;

xviii. 19; xxi. 22; Luke xi. 13; Jas. i. 5 sq.; iv. 2, 3; v. 16 sq.; 1 John v. 14 sq.; Ex. xxxii. 7 sq). (2) To the indirect testimony of Scripture.— See the passages alleged to prove the duty of prayer; for God does not command and encourage a vain service. (3) To the moral nature which God has given us,—a nature which, in its renovated state, expects such answers.

“More things are wrought by prayer
 Than this world dreams of. Wherefore let thy voice
 Rise like a fountain for me night and day.
 For what are men better than sheep or goats,
 That nourish a blind life within the brain,
 If, knowing God, they lift not hands of prayer
 Both for themselves and those who call them friends?
 For so the whole round earth is every way
 Bound by gold chains about the feet of God.”¹

Alas! those who doubt the efficacy of prayer have little knowledge of a personal God; for no philosophical objection can be made to the doctrine that God answers prayer, which cannot be made to the doctrine of Divine Providence in general.

Yet scientific men have pressed the uniformity of nature into service against the doctrine that God ever answers prayer by “physical equivalents.” A formal review of their arguments would occupy too much space; but a few remarks may be offered in reply to them.²

(a) It is irrational to deny that God can use the forces of nature for the accomplishment of special ends; for man is able to do this on a large scale. Says Wallace, “We can anticipate the time when the earth will produce only cultivated plants and animals; when man’s selection shall have supplanted ‘natural selection’; and when the ocean will be

¹Tennyson (A.) “Morte d’ Arthur.”

²Hessey (J. A.) “Recent Difficulties on Prayer”; “The Prayer Gauge Debate,” ed. by J. O. Means; Romanes (G. J.) “Christian Prayer and General Laws”; Lord (E.) “Prayer and Meditation,” *Am. Presby., and Theol. Rev.* 1863, p. 407 sq.; Graves (S.) “The Efficacy of Prayer,” *Chr. Rev.* Vol. XXIII. p. 620 sq.

the only domain in which that power can be exerted, which, for countless cycles of ages, ruled supreme over the earth."¹

But human intelligence and power are finite. Not so those of God! As author of natural forces, and intimately present with them, he can surely, in ways imperceptible to man, direct them to the accomplishment of such ends as he pleases. If prayer is acceptable to him, and if he chooses to answer it, by making use of physical forces, there is nothing in the known character of these forces, or in his known relation to them, to forbid his doing it.

(*b*) It is irrational to deny that God may add to the permanent forces of nature for the accomplishment of special ends in answer to prayer. Says Romanes, "No man of science will hesitate to admit that most, if not all petitions, would require for their answer but the creation of force alone. We can see plainly enough that there is no prayer which may not receive a physical equivalent, provided that the Being to whom it is offered is able and willing to originate the adequate physical conditions."² There is, moreover, "no argument in support of the belief that the creative energy is spent or suspended."³ Still further, "An alteration in the total sum of energy, requisite to produce any physical result in answer to prayer, might, in comparison with that sum, be inadequately represented by the difference between the mass of a chyle molecule, which is indefinable by the highest powers of the microscope, and the mass of the solar system."⁴ In other words, the added force thus introduced might be wholly inappreciable to sense, wholly unknown to man, unless God should be pleased to reveal the fact of such continuous and gracious exercise of his power.

(*c*) It is irrational to deny that God may have preadjusted the forces of nature in such a way as to answer by them some of the prayers which are offered by his children. His knowledge is perfect, embracing from the foundation of the world every act of every one of his creatures. Why, then,

¹ "Natural Selection," p. 326.

² "Christian Prayer and General Laws," p. 143. ³ *Id.* p. 159 ⁴ *Id.* p. 150.

may he not have provided for the answer of acceptable prayer, in some instances, through the working of natural laws? It seems to us that no one who admits the omniscience and wisdom of God can question the possibility, or indeed, the probability of such answers to prayer.

(*d*) It is impossible to deny the use of physical forces in answering prayer, without denying that it is answered at all; for all modifications of mental action are accompanied by corresponding modifications of the substance of the brain, and so of the body. Thus spiritual forces change the action of physical forces; and indirectly, if not directly, God makes use of the latter, as well as of the former, in answering prayer. But is it credible that God cannot do that directly, which he can do mediately? Or is it reasonable to suppose that man can do what God cannot, in using the powers of nature to accomplish rational ends?

The following queries may also be suggested, before leaving this subject:—

(*a*) If the influence of the Holy Spirit is presupposed in acceptable prayer, what need is there of praying for his influence?

(*b*) Is some additional influence of the Spirit always given in answer to earnest prayer for the same?

(*c*) Does the Holy Spirit *ordinarily* direct the minds and desires of Christians towards special objects, — say persons, — or does he enkindle holy affections, and leave them to the guidance of the word and providence of God in selecting objects for prayer? Is his influence on the mind, or on the heart? Is it prophetic or quickening?

(*d*) In what sense, and to what extent, may one believe that his own prayers are answered? or that a particular blessing was conditioned on his own praying?

II. OF LABOR FOR THE GOOD OF OTHERS.

It is not easy to over-rate the benefit of Christian effort for the salvation of men; for such effort brings into exercise almost every Christian affection, while it prevents the growth

of evil propensities. It cultivates the manly virtues of piety,—boldness, frankness, self-forgetfulness, sympathy,—and tends to cheerfulness and hope.

Hence, as a rule, monastic life is unfavorable to growth in grace. If long continued, it is almost certain to develop a one-sided piety,—self-scrutiny becoming too minute, and the free and natural action of love being prevented. If a man love not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God, whom he hath not seen? Love to God is most genuine and healthful when it is accompanied by love to man; and love to man is best cultivated by persistent and direct effort to secure his eternal welfare.

Yet it may be admitted that seclusion for a brief period, with a view to deeper self-knowledge and more protracted communion with God, especially when looking forward to some great service, has proved, in many instances, useful. It has given one a knowledge of *man*, if not of men; of his own *soul*, if not of society; and has opened the mind to the much-needed influence of the invisible world, to a degree not easily reached without seclusion.

That labor for the good of others is conducive to personal sanctification may be shown by an appeal (*a*) To the word of God (John vii. 17; Ps. cxix. 100). In commenting on the second passage, Dr. South quaintly remarks, "David got the start of them in point of obedience, and thereby outstripped them, at length, in point of knowledge." (*b*) To the nature of true religion, the highest principle of which is love; for love leads to action for the good of others. (*c*) To the constitution of the human soul; for not only is man commanded to love his neighbor as himself, but his soul is so constituted that its health requires him to do this. Yet this love will be morbid and puny when it leads to no action for the highest welfare of men. (*d*) To the history of the Christian religion. Working disciples, like Paul and John, Athanasius and Augustine, Luther and Calvin, Bunyan and Wesley, Edwards and Judson, have made the greatest progress in the divine life.

D. CHURCH LIFE. "A Christian Church is an association of believers in Christ for the observance, the maintenance, and the extension of the Christian religion."¹ The power of Church life to promote the sanctification of believers may be discovered (1) in the spirit of obedience to Christ which it cultivates; (2) in the practice of social worship which it maintains; (3) in the increase of Christian knowledge which it secures; (4) in the labor for others which it organizes and stimulates; and (5) in the watchfulness and consistency which it promotes. We must give attention to each of these points.

I. *It cultivates a spirit of obedience to Christ.* For it requires, at the outset, a solemn act of obedience, — a public profession of faith in Christ, and allegiance to him. No act in a Christian's life is adapted to fill his mind with greater awe and thankfulness than that of being buried with Christ in baptism. It is an act never to be repeated, deliberate, irreversible; and, by its very solitariness, it lays hold of his imagination, and repeats its lesson again and again to the close of life. Besides, there is self-denial in it: the offence of the cross has not ceased; and, if it clings to one act of obedience more than to others, that act is baptism. Perhaps this was intended by the Saviour as one check to a rash profession of faith.

In a less marked degree, church-life is, from first to last, a school of obedience. It must be continued when the affections languish, when doubt creeps into the heart, when courage wanes, because it is commanded. It must be persisted in against the opposition and contempt of the world, because it is commanded. And, by this obedience, it cultivates an open, manly spirit, — the heroic virtues; for, in church-life, the Christian has his place apart from the world, under the banner of his Lord: and, after a time, obedience becomes easy.

II. *It maintains the practice of social worship.* And, by social worship, we mean all worship in connection with

¹ Ripley (H. J.) "Church Polity."

others. It will be in place to speak briefly of the duty and benefits of social worship.

1. The *duty* of social worship is evident (1) From its being enjoined in the word of God (Heb. x. 25 ; Col. iii. 16). (2) From its being encouraged in the same word (Matt. xviii. 19, 20). (3) From its being practised by apostolic men (Acts i. 13 sq. ; ii. 1 sq.). (4) From its being implied in the organization of church and family.

2. The *benefits* of social worship. This form of worship promotes growth in grace, —

(1) By enkindling higher devotion to God in the heart. We are beings of sympathy, easily affected by the feelings of those around us. Hence religious emotion is increased by contact with religious emotion. Besides, the truths of the Bible are set in new lights by the experience and meditation of different minds. The old is made new, and gains new power over the heart.

(2) By bringing into livelier exercise brotherly love. "The sight of the eye affects the heart." We do not often feel a very deep love for those who are strangers to us. As a rule, we love our fellow-Christians, as such, in proportion to our knowledge of their Christian life and experience.

(3) By securing a special blessing from God. "If two of you shall agree on earth concerning any thing that they shall ask, it shall be done for them by my Father who is in heaven ; for, where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." United prayer and worship do, therefore, entitle us to expect signal favors from God through Christ.

It is not, indeed, easy to overstate the spiritual benefits of social and public worship to believers ; yet for this they are indebted to the Christian church. It preserves multitudes from apostasy ; it stimulates multitudes to higher activity ; it unites the moral life and force of many persons ; it augments their faith, love, hope, zeal, and thereby the efficiency of their prayer.

III. *It secures an increase of Christian knowledge.* This

it does (1) by the regular preaching of the gospel, which it supports; (2) by the study of God's word, which this preaching induces; (3) by the vivid representation of Christian truth,—central, vital truth, in the ordinances.

IV. *It organizes and stimulates labor for the good of others.* This is one great end of church-life. Thus associated, Christians can act with more success in diffusing the gospel and saving men; and, the more effectually they are able to labor, the more earnestly will they do so. Success stimulates effort; numbers do the same. There is, or should be, in every church, a kind of *esprit de corps* which excites a degree of enthusiasm in the several members, animating them to greater boldness and activity. But seeking a high and holy object, as the honor of Christ and the salvation of men, is always beneficial to the moral nature of him who seeks it. Hence church-life tends to sanctify the believer's heart; to render him more unselfish, hopeful, magnanimous.

Perhaps we ought to add,—

V. *It promotes, by its discipline, watchfulness and consistency.* Many a Christian has been saved from apostasy by the consciousness of being under the eye of the church, and liable to its discipline; and many a one has doubtless, like the incestuous man at Corinth, been led to repentance by solemn exclusion from the church.

E. THE LORD'S DAY. This topic may be subdivided into three: namely, The Duty of Keeping the Lord's Day, The Manner of Keeping it, and the Relation of it to Sanctification.¹

¹Baxter (R.) "The Divine Appointment of the Lord's Day," Works, Vol. XIII. p. 369 sq.; Hessey (J. A.) "Sunday: its Origin, History, and Present Obligation"; Wilson (D.) "The Divine Authority and Perpetual Obligation of the Lord's Day"; Gurney (J. J.) "Brief Remarks on the History, Authority, and Use of the Sabbath"; Gilfillan (J.) "The Sabbath viewed in the Light of Reason, Revelation, and History"; Stone (J. S.) "Lectures on the Institution of the Sabbath"; Arnold (A. N.) "The Christian Sabbath," in *Bap. Quar.* for 1868; Dwight (T.) "Theology," &c., Vol. III. pp. 222-273; Bacon (G. B.) "The Sabbath Question"; Brown (T. B.) "Thoughts suggested by the Perusal of Gilfillan, and other authors, on the Sabbath"; Turretin (F.) "Institutio Theologiæ," &c., Loc. XI. Quæst. 13 and 14; Hengstenberg (E. W.) "Ueber den Tag des Herrn."

1. *The Duty of Keeping the Lord's Day.*

Of the several theories maintained by Christians as to the Lord's day, the following deserve particular notice: (a) That men are under no obligation to keep it by abstaining from secular business; either (1) because reason and Paul unite in declaring that all days are alike, — a view which we need not pause to refute, or (2) because the fourth commandment of the decalogue and the original appointment of the Sabbath require all men to keep the seventh day of the week holy. But this view is inconsistent with the language of Paul in Col. ii. 16; Gal. iv. 9, 10; and Rom. xiv. 5; with the testimony of Christian writers, like Justin Martyr, as to the practice of the early churches; and with the principle laid down by Christ, that the Sabbath was made for man, — that is, for his highest good.

(b) That by the authority of Christ, the first day of the week has been substituted for the seventh, — the day being changed, but the command to observe it by abstaining from all secular labor remaining in full force. The defenders of this theory insist that the decalogue is binding on Christians, from the first command to the last, though God has seen fit to ordain that the Lord's day shall take the place of the Jewish Sabbath. This theory has prevailed extensively in England, Scotland, and the United States; and a great deal may be justly said in its favor.

Yet it does not seem to be entirely consistent with the language of Paul in the passages cited above, with the views of fair-minded Christian writers in the early Church, or with the general character of the new dispensation. It appears to emphasize unduly the legal side of the question, attaching more importance to the fourth commandment of the decalogue, as directly applicable to the Lord's day, than is altogether safe. The adherents of this view are careful to call the Lord's day the Christian Sabbath, — a designation which is never given to it in the New Testament, or by any Christian writer of the first three centuries.

(c) That the duty of keeping the Lord's day rests entirely on the practice and authority of the church. Many who accept this theory believe that the practice began in the days of the apostles; but they do not admit that this circumstance is of decisive importance. They may be divided into two classes; namely, those who concede to the church authority in such matters, and those who are willing to comply, in some measure, with a good and useful custom.

This theory overlooks the real grounds of Christian obligation in this matter, and tends to great laxity in observing the Lord's day. Where it prevails, recreation, if not business, will be sure to encroach upon the proper use of the day, as a period for religious worship and instruction, and thus defeat the chief end of its appointment.

(d) That the duty of consecrating the Lord's day to religious uses rests upon THE AUTHORITATIVE EXAMPLE OF THE APOSTLES (Acts xx. 7; I Cor. xvi. 2; Rev. i. 10; Heb. x. 25); *confirmed* (1) *by the practice of the early churches* (see the works quoted *supra*); (2) *by the Sabbath-keeping enjoined on the children of Israel* (Ex. xx. 8 sq.); (3) *by the original sanctification of the seventh day* (Gen. ii. 2, 3); and (4) *by the words of Christ, affirming that the Sabbath was made for man* (Mark ii. 27).

The practice of the early churches tends to establish very firmly the distinction between the Lord's day and the Jewish Sabbath. The fourth command of the decalogue proves that the Israelites needed to have one day in seven set apart from secular toil to religious service; the primeval institution of the Sabbath shows that it was meant for all mankind; and the reason of its existence, declared by Christ, fully accounts for the change from the last day of the week to the first, made by the apostles. For, since the resurrection of Christ, the first day of the week takes precedence of every other in religious interest, and it is practically impossible for Christians to feel as deep an interest in the finishing of the work of creation as they do in the finishing of the work of atonement.

It should be borne in mind, that when God rested from

creating, — a kind of secular work, — he entered at once on the moral and religious training of man; so that Jesus could say, "My Father worketh until now, and I work" (John v. 17); that is, even on the Sabbath, and, perhaps, especially on the Sabbath. But this primeval training was carried forward, chiefly, by means of the light which shines from creation, — a light which has proved insufficient for fallen man. Not the knowledge of creation, but the knowledge of redemption, provided by God, is what sinful man most needs. Hence the day which commemorates a completed atonement, ready to be applied by the gospel and grace of Christ, is the day of divinest significance and greatest spiritual influence for sinful men.

This theory is in perfect accord with the doctrine of Paul, and with the character of the new dispensation. It recognizes the very important bearing of the primeval and Jewish Sabbath on the question of keeping the Lord's day; and it assigns a proper place to the inspired guidance of the churches by the apostles.

2. *The Manner of Keeping the Lord's Day.*

It has been shown above, that it is the duty of Christians to consecrate the day to religious uses. But how strictly? Must they be governed by the same rules as were the Jews in abstaining from every kind of secular toil? Or have they greater freedom in this respect?

It must doubtless be conceded that much is left to their own judgment and conscience, to their love of Christ, and desire to win men to his service. But with the general duty made plain, and with the law of love written upon their hearts, it is to be presumed that they will keep the day very much as Christ kept the Jewish Sabbath, finding no occasion for secular business or idle self-indulgence. Hence it may be remarked that their employments on the Lord's day should be: —

(a) *Those which are either embraced in religious service, or are immediately prerequisite to it.* By religious service is

meant not only worship in the sanctuary, or elsewhere, but all labor for the salvation of men.

(b) *Those which are evidently necessary for the preservation of life and health.* A tender Christian conscience will guide one to the right application of this general rule; especially, with the aid of Christ's example.

(c) *Those which are required to prevent or to relieve severe suffering in man or beast.* Particular applications of this rule must also be left to the enlightened conscience. If it is honestly accepted, and interpreted in the light of the Saviour's conduct, few mistakes will be made.

The idea of rest was more predominant in the Jewish law than it should be in Christian practice; for spiritual joy and activity are characteristic of the followers of Christ. Their religion is not conservative chiefly, but aggressive; it should go forth with joyful step, conquering and to conquer.

In saying that it is the duty of Christians to keep the Lord's day in the manner specified, it is meant that all who have a knowledge of the Christian religion ought to do this; but it is not meant that some may compel others to do it. As to the Lord's day as a civil institution, something will be said in "Christian Ethics"; but, in this place, reference is made solely to the personal obligation of every man to do the will of God in this respect.

3. *The Relation of the Lord's Day to Sanctification.*

This may be indicated in a very few words. A proper use of the Lord's day affords opportunity, —

(a) For protracted religious study and worship, as well in public as in private; (b) For special Christian effort in behalf of others, and especially of those who are impenitent; and (c) For breaking the current of worldly thought and desire, and thus gradually eradicating sinful affections, as well as strengthening those that are holy.

III. THE PERIOD OF SANCTIFICATION.

By this is meant the period during which sanctification is yet *partial, but progressive*, — the subject of it being not yet

free from sin, but becoming so through the power of divine grace. And this period, it is supposed, closes with the life of the believer on earth. Beginning with regeneration, it is terminated by death and entrance into paradise.

In support of this view, reference is made (1) To the language of John in his first Epistle (i. 8–10),—“If we say that we have not sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. If we confess our sins, He is faithful and righteous to forgive us the sins, and to cleanse us from every unrighteousness. If we say that we have not sinned, we make Him a liar, and His word is not in us.” It is to be observed, that, in the eighth verse, John puts himself in the same class with his Christian readers, and that he employs a verb in the present tense, thus referring to the present state of believers; also, that, in the ninth verse, he associates himself with those who should seek forgiveness; and that, in the tenth verse, he uses the perfect tense to describe that which has come over from the past into the present. This view of his language agrees with that of Calvin, Turretin, Lücke, De Wette, and Neander.

Yet it has been thought by some to be irreconcilable with other statements of the same Epistle (for example, iii. 9; v. 18). “Every one who has been begotten from God doeth not sin, because his seed remaineth in him; and he cannot sin, because he has been begotten from God.”—“We know that every one who has been begotten from God sinneth not; but he that was begotten from God keepeth himself, and the wicked one toucheth him not.”

This language is no doubt remarkable; but, if it proves that any Christian lives without committing sin, it proves that every Christian does the same. And, if it affirms that all Christians live without sinning, it contradicts the testimony of John himself, as well as the whole tenor of Scripture.—(See for example, 1 John ii. 1; v. 16; and Gal. ii. 11.) This, therefore, cannot be its true meaning, however difficult it may be to ascertain that meaning.

But it has been supposed to signify one of three things,

namely (a) That, in so far as the new principle of life is concerned, the regenerate man does not commit sin. In this case, that which is highest and best in the believer is spoken of as the person himself, even as Paul in the seventh of Romans says, "But if what I desire not, that I do, it is no more I that perform it, but the sin that dwelleth in me." Thus "the new man" and "the old man" both exist in the Christian (Rom. vi. 6; Eph. iv. 22, 24; Col. iii. 9 sq.). (b) That one who has been begotten of God cannot sin deliberately, habitually, or persistently, since, by the grace of God, the new disposition is stronger than the old. (c) That one who has been made a child of God will not be suffered to apostatize and perish. The first of these interpretations is preferable to the second, and the second to the third; though the third may express a truth which is elsewhere taught.

It does not appear, therefore, that John has written any thing in this Epistle inconsistent with the interpretation given to his language in the first chapter. More than this, his language in that chapter agrees with the teaching of James, of Peter, of Paul, and of Christ himself (James iii. 2; ii. 11; Rom. viii. 10, 13; Gal. v. 17; Phil. iii. 12; Mark x. 18; Matt. vi. 12; see also 1 Kings viii. 46; Prov. xx. 19; Eccl. vii. 20).

It may also be remarked, in this connection, that there seems to be no sufficient evidence of the existence of two, and only two, great classes of Christians, namely, a small one, embracing persons who exercise sanctifying faith and enjoy what has been called "the higher Christian life"; and a large one, embracing persons who have justifying faith, but know not the blessedness of perfect trust. It seems more in harmony with the representations of Christian life in the Bible, and with the experience of believers in every age, to say that the varieties of true life and progress are manifold, no two disciples standing on exactly the same plane.¹

¹See "The Doctrine of the Higher Christian Life compared with the Teaching of the Holy Scriptures," by the author of this manual; Owen (J.) "On the Remainder of Indwelling Sin," and "On the Mortification of Sin in Believers";

But are Christians set free from the power of sin at death? Or do they enter the other world with the viper still in their bosom? Is the period between death and resurrection a kind of purgatory to many of the saints? Or is paradise the home and rest of all who have trusted in Christ? The Bible knows nothing of a purgatory for the saints after death. It teaches, rather, that the state of both the righteous and the wicked will be fixed from the hour when they leave this world (Luke xvi. 22 sq.; xxiii. 43; Phil. i. 23; 2 Cor. v. 8).¹

Sanctification will therefore be completed at death, but not before. The conflict with sin will be more or less arduous till the call to pass beyond the river comes.

“The way is long, my child! But it shall be
Not one step longer than is best for thee;
And thou shalt know, at last, when thou shalt stand
Safe at the goal, how I did take thy hand,
And quick and straight
Lead to heaven’s gate
My child!”

IV. THE CERTAINTY OF SANCTIFICATION.

The question may now be asked, Is it certain that persons who have been truly regenerated by the Holy Spirit will be preserved and carried forward in the new life unto the end? That they will be kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation? Or is it probable that the work of sanctifying them will be arrested and brought to nought, in many instances, so that men who have been made partakers of the Holy Spirit, and have tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come, will finally perish?

That some, at least, will “fall from grace” is confidently asserted by a large class of devout Christians; and the arguments which they bring forward in support of their belief

Hodge (C.) “Systematic Theology,” III. p. 245 sq.; Oosterzee (J. J. van) “Christian Dogmatics,” II. p. 657 sq.; Herzog (R. E.) s. v. “Heiligung”; Harless (Dr.) “Christian Ethics,” s. 33 sq.

¹ Hovey (A.) “State of Men after Death.”

² Hodge (A. A.) “Outlines of Theology,” p. 425 sq.

are worthy of careful examination. The most important are these : —

(*a*) That analogy favors their doctrine ; for not only Adam and Eve, but also holy angels, fell from a state of moral purity. By parity of reason, it may be presumed that men imperfectly sanctified will also, in some instances, fall.

In reply to this argument, it is to be said, that the relation of Christians to the Saviour is peculiar. In all probability, the grace of God is given to them in larger measure, and on a different principle, than it was given to our first parents, or to angels in heaven. It is not therefore legitimate to infer the lapse of believers in Christ from that of beings superior to them in goodness, but standing in other relations to divine grace.

(*b*) That Christians are exhorted to persevere ; and exhortation to perseverance implies a danger of the opposite. — (See Rev. ii. 10, 25 ; Heb. iv. 1 - 3, 11). But, in answer to this, it may be affirmed that exhortations to perseverance hardly prove that those exhorted will *not* persevere. At most, they imply that *without* the exhortations, they might not persevere. Moral means must be used in accomplishing moral ends.

(*c*) That Christians are warned against apostatizing, and must therefore be in danger of this sin (Heb. vi. 4-6 ; x. 26-32 ; 2 Peter ii. 20-22 ; iii. 7). The same reply may be made to this argument as to the preceding. Warnings against apostasy do not prove that any of those addressed *will* apostatize ; they only prove that the use of means is necessary to *prevent* them from committing so dreadful a sin. The principle involved is aptly illustrated by the narrative of Luke in Acts (cf. xxvii. 22-25, with verse 31). Contingency and certainty are compatible in the government of God.

(*d*) That cases of apostasy are introduced hypothetically by the sacred writers ; and from these the same inference may be drawn, as from exhortations and warnings (Rom. xvi. 15 ; 1 Cor. viii. 11 ; John xv. 1-6 ; Matt. xxv. 1-13 ; Luke viii. 11 sq.). In this case also, the same answer may be made as

in the two preceding cases. The passages appealed to are virtually warnings against apostasy. They recognize the moral freedom of Christians, and the natural possibility of their turning utterly away from Christ; but they are written to prevent such a fall: and none of them show that any who are truly united to Christ will finally be lost.¹

(e) That instances of final apostasy are related in the Bible, — as those of Saul, Judas, Hymenæus, Alexander, and others.

In studying the history of Saul, we find no evidence that he was ever a child of God. — (See 1 Sam. x. 9–13; xiii. 13, 14; xv. 10 sq.; xvi. 13, 14). The gift of the Spirit which he had for a time was apparently official, and somewhat of the nature of inspiration; but he seems never to have possessed a docile and obedient heart.

Still less do we discover any evidence of true piety in the life of Judas, or in the language which either Christ or the evangelists use respecting him. — (See John vi. 64, 70; xii. 6; xiii. 18, 19; xvii. 12; xviii. 9). It is not, indeed, easy to account for his being one of the twelve by the free choice of Christ, if he was evil from the first; but this hypothesis agrees better than any other with the narrative of John.

Nor is there any decisive proof that Hymenæus and Alexander were, on the one hand, ever true Christians; or, on the other, finally lost. Both of them were delivered to Satan in order that they might be taught, by chastisement, not to blaspheme (1 Tim. i. 20). This language suggests Paul's hope of their recovery. Whether the Alexander mentioned in 2 Tim. v. 14, was the same as the one named in 1 Tim. i. 20, is quite uncertain, since the name was a common one among the Greeks; and, if not, there is no evidence of his being a Christian, even by profession.

But the weight of scriptural evidence for the preservation and sanctification of all true believers depends very much upon the view which is taken of God's relation to the work. If it be true that some are chosen to eternal life, and that

¹ See Edwards (J.) "Works," I. p. 125.

they are the same as those who are regenerated by the Spirit of God, it follows that they will be kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation; but the clause, "through faith," should never be overlooked. The Scriptures furnish no evidence for the opinion that men will be either sanctified or saved, without faith in Christ. If they are kept, they are kept by keeping alive their faith.

It is doubtless conceivable that God has elected some of our race to a temporary faith,—to a state of grace from which they are to fall away and perish; but the Scriptures do not, on the whole, present this view of election. Thus, in 2 Thess. ii. 13, 14, the apostle writes as follows: "But we are bound to give thanks to God always for you, brethren, beloved of the Lord, because God from the beginning chose you to salvation, in sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth; whereunto he called you by our gospel to the obtaining of the glory of our Lord Jesus Christ." And this is not the doctrine of Paul only; Peter expresses the same belief (1 Pet. i. 3-5),—"Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who according to his abundant mercy begot us again unto a living hope through the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead; unto an inheritance imperishable and undefiled and unfading, reserved in heaven for you, who, by the power of God are kept through faith, unto a salvation ready to be revealed in the last time."

In both these passages the end is salvation; and the means a vital union with Christ, established and maintained by the purpose and grace of God. In both, it is most natural to suppose that the writers considered all true believers as certain of being led by the grace of God, freely given and heartily received, to persevere unto the end. Says Turretin, "Faith is not true because it perseveres; but it perseveres because it is true." It would be still better to say, that it perseveres because the Saviour, by his Spirit and his truth, keeps it alive in the heart which he has renewed; but there is no salvation for men who do not abide in Christ. The purpose of God comprehends the means as well as the end. If the

means fail, the end will fail (cf. John xv. 6; Matt. xxiv. 13; Heb. vi. 9, 11, 12; Rom. viii. 29 sq.).

But if the means fail, if faith and love are utterly wanting, if the soul that supposed itself united with Christ finds that it has no allegiance to him, or trust in him, what is the inference to be drawn from its state? John appears to have furnished a satisfactory answer to this question in his first Epistle, — “They went out from us, but they were not of us; for, if they had been of us, they would have continued with us” (ii. 19). Very many passages of the New Testament are addressed to bodies of Christians as if they were, all of them, what they profess to be, and, therefore, as if any defection among them would be a defection of true believers; but, in this instance, John appears to have given the key to such passages.

It may be added, that Christ, as mediator, has received power to keep his own, and sanctify them (see John vi. 39, 40; x. 27–29; xvii. 2), and that it agrees with our idea of the divine mind, that he should complete the work of their redemption which was begun by the new birth. Paul seems to have had this thought when he wrote to the Philippians, “Being confident of this very thing, that He which began a good work in you will perfect it up to the day of Jesus Christ.”

The doctrine of the perseverance, or the preservation of the saints, is, like the doctrine of election, very easily perverted; but, rightly understood, it may be a source of great comfort and power, — an incentive to gratitude, a motive to self-sacrifice, and a pillar of fire in the hour of danger.

PART SIXTH.

CHRISTIAN CHURCHES AND ORDINANCES.

IN considering the "means of sanctification," reference was made to "church-life"; but no account was given of the constitution, the government, the work, the officers, and the ordinances implied in the use of the word Church, as interpreted by the New Testament.¹

To these, attention must now be given; for it is manifest that the functions of a Christian Church are not exhausted in seeking to further the sanctification of its own members; it is an aggressive as well as a conservative organization; it is to be employed in preserving the truth and edifying the saints, but also in diffusing the truth and subduing the world to Christ. In view of its two-fold office, we assign it a separate place in this treatise.

I. CHRISTIAN CHURCHES.

In regard to the constitution, government, and work of a Christian Church, the following statements may be made:—

I. *That the apostles, either by word or action, have determined what ought to be the polity of Christian churches to the*

¹Dagg (J. L.) "Church Order"; Ripley (H. J.) "Church Polity"; Reynolds (J. L.) "Church Polity"; Dexter (H. M.) "Congregationalism: What is it? Whence is it? How does it work?" Punchard (G.) "History of Congregationalism"; Litton (E. A.) "The Church of Christ"; Jacob (G. A.) "The Eccl. Polity of the New Testament"; Whately (R.) "The Kingdom of Christ"; King (P.) "An Inquiry into the Constitution, Discipline, Unity, and Worship of the Primitive Churches"; Davidson (S.) "The Eccl. Polity of the New Testament Unfolded"; "Ecclesia," "First Series," "Second Series"; Cunningham (W.) "Discussions on Church Principles"; Smith (T.) "Presbyterianism, not Prelacy, the Scriptural and Primitive Polity"; Lindsay (A. L.) "Œcumenicity in Relation to the Church of England"; Stevens (A.) "An Essay on Church Polity"; Hooker (R.) "Laws of Eccl. Polity"; Rothe (R.) "Die Anfänge der Christlichen Kirche"; Ritschl (A.) "Die Entstehung der altkatholischen Kirche."

end of time. (a) 1 Cor. xiv. 33, 40; xii. 12 sq. (cf. vii. 15). (b) 1 Cor. iv. 17; vii. 17; xi. 16, 34. (c) Acts xiv. 23; Titus, i. 5 (cf. Acts xx. 17; Phil. i. 1, &c.). (d) Heb. xiii. 7, 17; Acts xx. 28; 1 Peter v. 1-4; Titus ii. 15. (e) 1 Cor. ix. 14 (cf. vv. 7-11); Gal. vi. 6; 1 Tim. v. 17, 18. (f) 1 Cor. v. 1-13; 2 Thess. iii. 6 (cf. Matt. xviii. 15 sq.; 1 Tim. iii. 15). (g) 1 Cor. xvi. 1, 2; xiv. 34-36 (cf. 1 Tim. ii. 12). (h) Acts xiv. 26, 28; xv. 2, 3.

These passages show (a) that, in the apostle's view, order should reign in the churches of Christ, every member filling his own place and doing his own work; (b) that essentially the same principles and practices were taught by Paul in all the churches under his care, the practices resting upon the principles; (c) that he was wont to organize churches, and appoint elders or pastors over them, wherever there was a group of converts; (d) that these elders had everywhere substantially the same rank and work in the churches, and were to be treated accordingly; (e) that they were, as a rule, entitled to a reasonable support from those for whom they labored, if they gave their whole time to the work; and (f) that the churches, as such, were charged with the duty of maintaining Christian doctrine and discipline. These various items fully justify our statement, unless it can be proved that the church arrangements of the apostolic age were temporary; and, if that can be shown, it will, of course, be impossible to prove that Christians are under obligation to form themselves into societies at all. But evidently the presumption is altogether in favor of our statement; and it belongs to those who deny the permanency of church-life and order to show cause for their denial.

2. That the word "*polity*" is used by us in the sense of constitution and government; while the word "*church*" is used to denote a society of baptized believers, maintaining together the worship and ordinances of Christ, according to his revealed will. For this use of the word church, see Matt. xviii. 17; Acts v. 11; viii. 1; xi. 22, 26; xii. 1, 5; xiii. 1; xiv. 23, 27; xv. 3, 4, 22, 41; xvi. 5; xviii. 22; xx. 17, 28; Rom. xvi. 1, 4,

16, 23; 1 Cor. i. 2; iv. 17; vi. 4; vii. 17; x. 32; xi. 16, 18, 22; xiv. 4, 5, 12, 19, 23, 28, 33, 34, 35; xvi. 1, 19, and other passages, about ninety times in the New Testament.

The word *ecclesia* is also used in the New Testament to denote (a) all the churches in a part or the whole of the world, as being in some sense one. — See Acts ix. 31, though the singular is not absolutely certain in this place; and 1 Tim. iii. 5, and 1 Cor. xii. 28, though the word may possibly refer in these places to a particular church, — indeed, we think it does in the former; (b) all Christians in heaven and on earth. — See Eph. i. 22; iii. 10; v. 24, 25, 27, 29, 32; and (c) a public assembly, whether orderly or not, but, properly, one capable of civil action. — See Acts xix. 32, 39, 41. But these uses of the word are infrequent; and the New Testament gives us no reason to connect the word “polity” with the word “church” when employed in the senses marked (a) and (b); while (c) is the original and secular meaning of the word, of no importance to us, except as accounting for its ordinary Christian use. Twice it is used with reference to the Jewish assembly or congregation (namely, Acts vii. 38; Hebrew ii. 12).

3. *The primary relation of the members of a Christian church to one another is that of equality and fraternity.* They are all brethren; all entitled to the same privileges, all kings and priests unto God. Matt. xxiii. 8; Acts vi. 3; 1 Cor. viii. 12; Gal. iii. 26 sq.; iv. 7 (cf. 1 Cor. xii. 12 sq.; Gal. vi. 10; Eph. ii. 18 sq.; Heb. iii. 6; 1 Tim. vi. 2; 1 Peter ii. 9; Rev. i. 6; 1 Peter v. 3.)

Hence, social and civil distinctions do not affect one's position in the church. A son may be the spiritual teacher and overseer of his father, or a servant of his master. Hence, too, in the church, men do not claim office as a right, but are put in office by the act of their brethren. Fitness for official service is the only good reason for appointment to it.

4. *In the last instance, it belongs to every church as a whole, and not to its officers, to exclude and receive members; the right to exclude presupposing the right to receive* (Rom. xiv. 1; Matt. xviii. 17; 1 Cor. v. 13; 2 Thess. iii. 6, 14 (cf. Titus iii. 10, 11); and see also Acts i. 23; vi. 3, 4, 5; xv. 2.)

The members of a church cannot transfer their authority to others, for it is intrusted to them; and the use of it is a duty no less than a right. They may perhaps do a particular act, agreed upon, through representatives; but there is no Scriptural ground for more than this. The so-called council at Jerusalem may be thought to furnish an example of submitting a particular point to others for final decision; but neither that nor the nature of the case warrants a general transfer of rights and duties to any other body. For, in the first place, there is no valid reason to suppose that the church polity sanctioned by the apostles is not adapted to all times and peoples, since true religion fits men for responsibility: and, in the second place, such a transfer, once made, cannot easily be revoked; and, therefore, by making it, the members of a church interfere, more or less, with the rights and duties of their successors.

Whether all who belong to a church, or only the brethren, should act in receiving and excluding members is somewhat doubtful; see 1 Tim. ii. 12; but, in a majority of Baptist churches, all are expected to act, if they see fit to do so. The voice of a majority is binding on the whole body.— (See 2 Cor. ii. 6.)

5. *The members of a Christian church ought to receive into the same those, and those only, who are baptized on a credible profession of their faith, and who have reasonably correct views of Christian doctrine.* Matt x. 32, 37, 38; xxviii. 19 (cf. xvi. 16); John iii. 5; iv. 1; Acts ii. 41; viii. 12, 13; 1 Tim. i. 19, 20 (cf. 1 Cor. v. 5, 13; Titus iii. 10).

As the essential prerequisites for admission to a Christian church are given in the New Testament, no church can rightfully welcome to its fellowship persons who are not believed to have those prerequisites; nor is any church at liberty to insist on qualifications other than those virtually prescribed by the New Testament.

We say "virtually prescribed"; and we think the last qualification named above, to wit, "reasonably correct views of Christian doctrine," to be in this way prescribed; for it is im-

plied in the law of discipline for heretics and errorists. A man who will probably sow error in the church that receives him ought not to be received; for the law of self-preservation and efficiency forbids it. But regard must be had to the age and circumstances of a candidate, in deciding whether he has "reasonably correct views of doctrine."

It may properly be added, that persons should be received to baptism and church-membership as soon as they give to the members of the church satisfactory evidence of their faith and desire to obey the Saviour's commands.

6. *The members of a Christian church are responsible for the proper discipline of offenders belonging to the body.* This appears from (a) Matt. xviii. 15-17; Matt. v. 23, 24. (b) 1 Cor. v. 1-13. (c) 1 Tim. i. 19, 20 (cf. 2 Tim. ii. 17, 18). (d) Titus iii. 10. (e) 2 Thess. iii. 6 (cf. 1 Tim. v. 8); also 1 Tim. v. 19.

It is evident, therefore, that there are at least five kinds of offences, for any one of which a person ought to be excluded from the church; namely, (a) wrong-doing to a brother in the church, for which satisfaction is refused; (b) gross immorality of any kind; (c) inculcating religious error; (d) creating division in the church; (e) idleness, meddlesomeness, or disregard of manifest family obligations.

In case of flagrant immorality or crime, the offender ought to be promptly excluded, without waiting to see whether he repents or not; but, if he then gives convincing proof of repentance, he may in due time be restored.

No charge against an elder or pastor of a church should be received, unless it is sustained by two or three witnesses, — a rule which seems to presuppose eminent integrity and self-control in such an officer, making it particularly improbable that he will commit an offence worthy of discipline.

In case of special doubt or difficulty, it is sometimes wise for a church to seek the advice of judicious brethren from without, or of a council of delegates from other churches, before giving its final judgment.

All the important business of a church ought to be trans-

acted at meetings properly notified as business meetings, so that all members who desire to do so may be present, and share in its action.

7. *It belongs to a Christian church to select for official service such of its members as it deems qualified for the same.* Acts i. 21 sq. ; vi. 3 (cf. xiii. 2. 3 ; xiv. 26, 27 ; xv. 2).

The action of the church under the direction of the apostles, before the day of Pentecost, cannot be relied upon as certainly expressing the mind of Christ ; yet the presumption that it did so in the instance cited is very strong ; for we find the apostles, after the Pentecost, directing the church to repeat its action in the choice of another grade of officers. These two cases evidently establish a precedent, and reveal a principle ; and we find nothing inconsistent with this precedent and principle in the later teaching of the apostles. We have, I think, a right to presume that the churches were always called to choose their pastors and deacons, though the formal act of consecration was performed by apostles or elders.¹

8. *As a rule, churches ought to respect the action of one another; for, though organically separate, they are under the same law, animated by the same spirit, seeking the same end, and intrusted with equal authority.*

Hence the ordination of a minister by one church may be properly accepted by others as valid ; yet this act is of such a nature as to render the advice of a council of delegates from several churches very desirable, if not imperative. Should the council deem the candidate presented unworthy of ordination, and thus disagree with the church calling it, the latter may have power to go on and ordain the man : but it is rarely or never wise to do so ; and the man thus ordained would have no claim to be recognized by other churches as a competent and trustworthy minister.

Hence, too, the discipline of one church should be treated as valid and just by other churches. Exceptions to this rule must be of very rare occurrence ; for the relation of churches

¹ Compare Clemens Romanus ; 1 Ep. ad Corinthios, c. 44, *συνεὺδοκησάσης τῆς ἐκκλησίας πάσης.*

to one another is fraternal; and a spirit of mutual confidence ought to be cherished.

This is what churches ought to be and to do, according to the apostolic teaching; but, if any so-called churches differ essentially in doctrine or in polity from the New Testament standard, their action need not, and oftentimes should not, be considered as valid.

9. *Without risk to self-control or separate responsibility to Christ, churches may combine their resources and influence for the furtherance of religious or benevolent enterprises* (Acts xi. 29, 30; Gal. ii. 10; 2 Cor. viii. and ix).

It is evident from these passages that, under the direction of Paul, a systematic and united effort was made by the churches of Macedonia and Achaia to assist, by a large contribution of money, their poor brethren in Judea. It also appears that a well-known and trusted brother was associated by the churches with Paul for transmitting this contribution. But it does not appear that any ecclesiastical body, superior to the churches, was called into existence, or was engaged in this work. By what method the churches appointed the brother referred to, we are not informed. One church may have chosen him, and the other churches may have been asked to concur in the choice; or the several churches may have made the election by delegates empowered to act for them. It is plain, however, as before stated, that delegates can only act for churches in the particular matter intrusted to them. If they do more than this, their action can be only advisory, binding themselves, perhaps, but not the churches.

But the members of a Christian church, fully organized for growth and service, may be divided into three classes, laical, diaconal, and clerical; and a few words must be said as to the particular functions of each.

10. *The lay members of a church are required to pay suitable deference to their officers, and, along with the deacons, to see that their pastors have reasonable compensation for their official work.* (Heb. xiii. 7, 17; Gal. vi. 6; 1 Tim. v. 17, 18; 1 Cor. ix. 14 (cf. vv. 7-11).

Of course they are to share in all the work of the church, previously described, every one endeavoring to serve the body according to his special ability (1 Cor. xii. 12 sq.; Rom. xii. 4 sq.). The decision as to what is reasonable pay for the official work done by a pastor must be left to the judgment of the whole church. But if any layman of means differ from the church, thinking the pastors ought to be paid more than is judged to be a reasonable compensation by the body, he is not to be blamed for making up what he considers the deficiency. It is doubtful whether a church has a right to fix the sum which each one of its members shall pay in support of public worship, and, in case of refusal, to deal with the delinquent by way of discipline. Nor is it certain that every member of a church ought to pay for the support of preaching in proportion to his income. Yet the salary of a pastor, though raised by voluntary contributions, is not a gift to him, nor alms from the church.

11. *The deacons of a church ought to assist the pastor in the subordinate duties of his office, especially in caring for the sick and the poor* (Acts vi. 1 sq.; Rom. xii. 7; xvi. 1, 2; 1 Cor. xii. 28; Phil. i. 1; 1 Tim. iii. 8-12).

It is sometimes thought that deacons, by virtue of their office, have charge of all the finances of the church; but there is no adequate proof of this. A church may select for its treasurer one who is not a deacon, or may appoint a financial committee to look after pecuniary matters. The duties of a deacon are of a semi-spiritual character, and are determined by the amount of help which the pastor needs. In small churches, having pastors, there may be no occasion, for a time, for the service of deacons; yet it may be wise, even in such cases, to have at least one, who can take the lead, should the office of pastor become vacant.

From the statement of Justin Martyr, in his "First Apology," it is almost certain that deacons distributed the bread and wine at the Lord's Supper; but the New Testament does not allude to this as one of their functions.

Deacons should be selected for office by the church of

which they are members, and which they are to serve; and should be set apart to their work by prayer and laying on of hands, the pastor or bishop naturally leading in the consecration.

12. *The pastors of Christian churches are to watch over the churches which they serve, instruct them in the gospel, rebuke false teachers, and refute their errors, insist upon suitable discipline; and, in a word, be leaders, teachers, and examples to the flock in all spiritual things* (Acts xx. 17, 28; Eph. iv. 11, 12; Phil. i. 1; 1 Tim. iii. 1-7; v. 1, 17; Titus i. 5-9; Heb. xiii. 7, 17; 1 Peter v. 1-4; 1 Tim. iv. 11-14; 2 Tim. ii. 2).¹

For the use of the word *pastors*, see Eph. iv. 11 (and cf. John xxi. 16; Acts xx. 28; 1 Peter v. 2; Matt. xxvi. 31; John x. 11 sq.; Heb. xiii. 20; 1 Peter ii. 25). For the use of the word *teachers*, see Eph. iv. 11 (cf. Acts xiii. 1; 1 Cor. xii. 28, 29; 1 Tim. ii. 7; 2 Tim. i. 11; iv. 3; Heb. v. 12; James iii. 1; 1 Tim. iii. 2). For the word *bishops*, see Acts xx. 28; Phil. i. 1; 1 Tim. iii. 2; Titus i. 7 (cf. 1 Peter ii. 25; 1 Tim. iii. 2; Heb. xii. 15; 1 Peter v. 2). For *elders*, see Acts xi. 30; xiv. 23; xv. 2, 4, 6, 22, 23; xvi. 4; xx. 17; xxi. 18; 1 Tim. iv. 14; v. 17, 19; Titus i. 5; James v. 14; 1 Peter v. 1; 2 John i.; 3 John i). For *presidents* or *leaders*, see 1 Thess. v. 12; 1 Tim. iii. 11 (cf. Rom. xii. 8); Heb. xiii. 7, 17, 24 (cf. ii. 6; Luke xxii. 26; Acts xv. 22).

¹Müller (J.) "Von der göttlichen Einsetzung des geistlichen Amtes," Abhandlungen, pp. 468-657; Nitzsch (C. I.) "Praktische Theologie"; Hoppin (J. M.) "The Office and Work of the Christian Ministry"; Vinet (A.) "Pastoral Theology"; Ripley (H. J.) "Sacred Rhetoric"; Wayland (F.) "The Ministry of the Gospel"; Cannon (J. S.) "Lectures on Pastoral Theology"; Beecher (H. W.) "Yale Lectures on Preaching"; Hall (J.) "God's Word through Preaching"; Storrs (H. R.) "Preaching without Notes"; Taylor (W. M.) "The Ministry of the Word"; Blaikie (W. G.) "The Work of the Ministry"; Porter (N.) "Lectures on Homiletics and Preaching"; Broadus (J. A.) "Preparation and Delivery of Sermons," and "History of Preaching"; Vinet (A.) "Histoire de la Prédication"; Ehrenfeuchter (F.) "Die Praktische Theologie," &c.; Zincke (F. B.) "The Duty and Discipline of Extemporary Preaching"; McIlvaine (J. H.) "Elocution: the Sources and Elements of its Power"; Day (H. N.) "The Art of Discourse."

That the words, "elder" and "overseer," or "bishop," refer to the same officer in a church is evident (*a*) from their being used interchangeably; (*b*) from the identity of qualifications required of them; (*c*) from the way in which overseers and deacons are named together,—as if they were the only officers of a church.¹

Against this it is urged (1) that Titus had Episcopal authority in Crete (Titus i. 5); but there is no sufficient evidence of this. The brief direction of Paul is fairly accounted for, by assuming that Titus was an evangelist, commissioned to effect a further organization of the churches by the action, or with the co-operation of the same. It is safe to presume that he performed a definite service in the usual way, but with Paul's authority.

(2.) That the "angels of the seven churches," addressed by John, were bishops or overseers, holding an office superior to that of "elders." There is, however, much doubt in the minds of good interpreters as to the significance of the word, "angels," in the passages referred to; and there is little or no evidence for the assertion, that they were diocesan bishops.

Again, it appears that many churches had more elders than one; and this may have been the case with all. — (See Acts xi. 30; Phil. i. 1; Acts xiv. 23; Titus i. 5). Yet the use of the singular number in 1 Tim. iii. 2, and Titus i. 7, compared with 1 Tim. iii. 8, 11, 12, has suggested the idea, that there was but one pastor in some of the churches. In most of the larger cities, there were doubtless several small congregations, as well as several pastors.

It will also be observed (1) that bishops were overseers *in* the Church, and not lords *over* it; (2) that, in distinction from deacons, they must be "apt to teach"; and (3) that they were to look after the spiritual interests of the Church by preaching, as their principal work.

¹ Winer, Neander, De Wette, Meyer, Huther, Wiesinger, Bickell, Rothe, Jacobson, Alford, Ellicott, Conybeare; see especially Mellor (E.) "Priesthood in the Light of the New Testament,"—a very spirited and able work. Hackett and others agree on this point.

There is scarcely sufficient ground for the opinion that elders were of two classes,—teaching and ruling; but this may have been the case. The only passage which obviously suggests this view is 1 Tim. v. 17,—“Let the elders that preside well be counted worthy of double honor, especially those who labor in word and teaching.” But the word translated “labor” means literally, “to work hard,”—“to weary or beat out one’s self by labor”; and the apostle may intend to say that such as give themselves *wholly* and *exhaustively* to the ministry of the word deserve more respect and compensation than others. This is the view of Mosheim; and it appears to be very reasonable. But Dr. Ripley thinks the word, “elders,” here includes deacons; and his judgment always deserves consideration.

The authority of pastors is moral,—depending on their character, their call from God, their Christian knowledge, and their position as religious teachers. They will be likely, in ordinary circumstances, to have all the respect and confidence which they deserve. They will mould their people,—“Like priest, like people.” Probably ministers do not have as much control over their people as the New Testament authorizes them to have; but it is because they are not sufficiently wise and godly to win it.

Pastors should be selected by the whole church which they are to serve; but, in the first instance, they should be set apart to their work by the aid and approval of a council of elders and laymen from other churches. The service of ordination should include prayer, and the laying on of hands by the eldership (1 Tim. iv. 14). But, as we understand the matter, the vote of a properly organized council, recognizing one as called of God to the ministry, and deciding to set him apart to that work, is the essential act in ordination. All that follows is but a fitting announcement of this act, (1) by the imposition of hands, publicly; and (2) by solemn prayer to God for his blessing on the person ordained. It is this vote of a council (or of a church) which, under God, *authorizes* a given person to administer the ordinances, and

to perform all the duties assigned to the ministry in well-ordered churches. Churches and councils should beware of acting hastily or under pressure in ordaining persons to the ministry (1 Tim. v. 22). All the preliminary steps should be taken prayerfully and deliberately by the church.

It may also be remarked, that, while ordination does not impart any official gift or grace to him who receives it, it does promote order and efficiency in the churches; *first*, by keeping out of the ministry not a few persons who are unqualified for it; and *secondly*, by giving moral countenance and support to suitable men in and after entering it. Thus the churches are able to protect themselves, in a measure, against fluent and plausible men who do not hold the truth, and to secure a better class of "pastors and teachers" than they would otherwise have.

But should ministers of other evangelical denominations be ordained, if they would become Baptist ministers? In many instances this appears to be scarcely necessary; for they are already well-known and approved, needing no recommendation to Baptist churches, save this: that they fully accept our views of the doctrines and ordinances of Christ. A council for examination and recognition would, therefore, be as suitable as one for ordination; yet there would be no sacrilege in the latter. For ordination confers no indelible character or permanent grace; and, if circumstances require this, may be repeated a dozen times without harm,—as often, indeed, as the pastor is placed over a new church. But ordinarily there seems to be no sufficient reason for such a course, or for re-ordaining a Pedobaptist minister who becomes a Baptist; for, setting aside the figment of sacramental grace, ordination and recognition are virtually the same, with this difference only: that the latter treats the candidate as one who has been acting as a minister before, though not in fellowship with those now receiving him. The essential point in such a case is that the council, after suitable examination, recognize by vote the person in question as qualified to do all the work of a regular Baptist minister, and as worthy of the

confidence of Baptist churches in doing the duties of the ministry.

It is often the duty of pastors and churches to take the initiative in directing the minds of suitable men to the work of the ministry. Females are not eligible to the office of pastor or evangelist; but they may be made deaconesses, though not as substitutes for men. Rom. xvi. 1; 1 Tim. iii. 11 (cf. v. 3, 9).

13. *Evangelists are simply preachers of the gospel, or ministers who have no pastoral charge* (Acts xxi. 8 (cf. viii. 40); Eph. iv. 11; 2 Tim. iv. 5). Many missionaries are strictly evangelists. As to the wisdom of setting apart a class of ministers for irregular, itinerant preaching, in a region where pastors and churches abound, there will be honest differences of opinion; but, in those parts of a country where there are but few churches supplied with pastors, evangelists are necessary.

14. *The apostles and prophets of the first age have had no successors thus far; and there is no promise of them for the future.* Their work could be done once for all. But they still speak to us by the Scriptures; and their position, commission, and illumination were such that all Christians should obey their word.

II. CHRISTIAN ORDINANCES.

There are but two ordinances or sacred rites enjoined upon Christians by the New Testament; namely, Baptism and the Lord's Supper. Both are emblematic of central facts in the Christian religion; and together they teach in a very impressive manner the vital doctrines of the gospel. It is therefore important to understand their meaning and use, to guard against their misinterpretation, and to keep them as they were delivered by Christ to his apostles, and by the apostles to the primitive Christians.

I. CHRISTIAN BAPTISM.

We propose to consider the external rite, the significance of the rite, the subjects of the rite, and the relation of the rite to John's baptism.

1. *The External Rite.*

Aside from the words employed, *the external rite of baptism consists in an immersion of the candidate in water, unto or into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.*

That the rite includes an immersion of the subject in water is learned, —

(a) *From the meaning and use of the word βαπτίζω, which was employed by Christ himself and the inspired apostles to denote the rite. Strenuous and learned efforts have been made to show that the word in question does not point to immersion as the primitive rite; but these efforts are unavailing. The proper meaning of the word — a meaning which it has always retained in the Greek language, and a meaning which it always has, unless the circumstances of the case point to a tropical use — is immerse. The figurative applications of the word may all be traced back to this, as the literal and radical sense expressed by the verb. To this view the best lexicographers assent.*¹

(b) *From the use of λούω, and, perhaps, λουτόν with reference to baptism. Acts xxii. 16 (cf. 1 Cor. vi. 11; Titus iii. 5; Eph. v. 26; John xiii. 10; Acts ix. 37; xvi. 33; Heb. x. 22; 2 Peter ii. 22). On the first of these passages, Dr. Hackett remarks: "The sort of outward washing expressed by this verb has been noticed on xvi. 33. Hence, there can be no question as to the mode of baptism in this instance; for if it be maintained that βάπτισαι is uncertain in its meaning, a definition is added in ἀπόλουσαι, which removes the doubt." His note on the simple word in xvi. 33, is this: "This verb," says Dr.*

¹ Sophocles (E. A.) "Greek Lexicon of the Later and Byzantine Periods," s. v.; he remarks: "There is no evidence that Luke and Paul and the other writers of the New Testament put upon this verb meanings not recognized by the Greeks"; Liddell and Scott, "Greek-English Lexicon, based on the German work of F. Passow," s. v.; Pape (W.) "Handwörterbuch der Griechischen Sprache," s. v.; Robinson (E.) "Greek and English Lexicon of the New Testament," s. v.; Grimm (C. L. W.) "Lexicon Græco-Latinum in Libros Novi Testamenti," s. v.; "Stephani Thesaurus Græcæ Linguae," tertia editio, and other works.

Robinson (Lex. N. T. s. v.), "signifies to wash the entire body, not merely a part of it, like *νίπτω*." Trench says: "*νίπτω* and *νίψασθαι* almost always express the washing of a part of the body . . . ; while *λούω*, which is not so much 'to wash' as 'to bathe,' and *λούσθαι*, or in common Greek, *λούεσθαι*, 'to bathe one's self,' imply always, not the bathing of a part of the body, but of the whole." The other passages cited merit careful attention, as confirming this account of the word. Baptism is a bathing.

(c) *From the circumstances mentioned by New Testament writers in connection with baptism* (Mark i. 9; John iii. 23; Acts viii. 38, 39). It is sometimes said that the reason for resorting to places where there was much water was this, that the people and their animals might be supplied with a very necessary means of refreshment and cleanliness. But this reason is nowhere suggested by the sacred writers; and it has never been shown that there was any such lack of water in Palestine, at that time, that a multitude, even an army, could not subsist comfortably in any of the larger towns. Besides the natural sequence of thought in John iii. 23, makes it almost certain that the abundant waters of Enon¹ were convenient for administering the rite of baptism, and that the place was chosen on that account. "But John also was baptizing"—not holding great meetings, and preaching, but—"baptizing in Enon, near to Salim, because there was much water there: and they came, and were baptized."—(Alford's Trans.)

(d) *From references to the ritual act, in stating its import* (Rom. vi. 3-5; Col. ii. 12). Says Lightfoot on Col. ii. 12: "Baptism is the grave of the old man, and the birth of the new. As he sinks beneath the baptismal waters, the believer buries there all his corrupt affections and past sins; as he emerges thence, he rises regenerate, quickened to new hopes and a new life. . . . Thus baptism is an image of his participation, both in the death and in the resurrection of Christ.—(See

¹ See G. W. Samson, "The Sufficiency of Water for Baptizing at Jerusalem, and elsewhere in Palestine," in "The Design of Baptism," &c., esp. p. 136 sq.

Apost. Const. III. 17). — *The immersion is the dying with him; the emersion is the rising with him.* For this twofold image, as it presents itself to St. Paul, see especially Rom. vi. 3 sq." And this is but a sample of the concessions made by those who do not insist on immersion. A very large number of scholars, belonging to churches that do not practise immersion might be quoted in support of the view, that the passages cited above presuppose immersion as the customary rite in the apostolic age.

But, if it was the customary rite, what evidence is there that it was not the uniform rite? This evidence ought to be very clear, to be of any avail against the presumption in favor of a ritual act that was always the same, and sure to speak the same language. But, instead of being clear and stringent, it is inferential and weak.

(e) *From the practice of "the early churches,"* — meaning by this expression, the churches of the second century and the beginning of the third. This practice was evidently immersion; and it furnishes a presumption of more or less force in favor of immersion as the apostolic rite. No one ought to rely upon it with entire confidence; for it may have been one of the earliest errors that crept into the churches, as Coleman suggests; but it is not antecedently very probable that error would first enter at this door, since the Greek language was largely used in the West as well as in the East.

Pouring was indeed allowed in case of sickness; and Cyprian defends it on the plea of necessity. God will accept *compendia*, when the full service is impossible. But on whose authority does he say this? In such case, *compendia* are *dispendia*.

(f) *From the practice of the Greek Church down to the present time.* In proof of this statement, appeal may be made to many high authorities (for example, to Alexander de Stourdza, Russian State Councillor, and member of the Greek Church; to Dean Stanley, the historian of the Greek Church; and to Dr. Arnold, for many years a missionary in Greece). There may have been instances in which a priest has forborne to immerse an infant; but these instances must

have been extremely rare. The almost if not quite uniform practice of the Greek Church is immersion; and I do not think any native Greek would admit that *βαπτίζω* means either to sprinkle or to pour.

(g) *From the concessions of those who practice affusion or sprinkling.* Among these may be named A. P. Stanley, G. F. Howson, F. W. Robertson, J. B. Mozley, Thomas Chalmers, E. Pressensé, Edw. Reuss, Daniel Schenkel, H. A. W. Meyer, W. M. L. De Wette, A. Tholuck, L. J. Rückert, A. Neander, H. Olshausen, F. Bleek, H. Alford, C. J. Ellicott, J. P. Lange, J. B. Lightfoot, J. H. A. Ebrard, K. F. A. Kahnis in his "Die Lutherische Dogmatik historisch-genetisch dargestellt," II. s. 319, ff. besonders s. 337.¹

It has been customary to mention also *the use of the prepositions εἰς, ἐν, and ἐκ,* in connection with going into the water, being baptized in the water, and coming out of the water, as confirmatory of the view that the sacred rite included an immersion of the candidate; and this, at least, may be said with confidence, that the use of these prepositions is precisely what might have been expected, if the rite was performed by immersion. Nor is the circumstance that the element, water, is put several times in the dative without a preposition, thus denoting the means,—if, indeed, this is the true explanation of the dative in every such case,—any reason for denying that the rite was performed by immersion; for baptism is *with* water, whether it is immersion, or pouring, or

¹Of Special examinations, the following may be mentioned: Stuart (M.) "Is the Manner of Christian Baptism prescribed in the New Testament?" *Biblical Repository*, Vol. III. p. 288 sq.; Höfling (W. F.) "Das Sacrament der Taufe"; Matthies (C. L.) "Baptismatis Expositio, Biblica, Historica, Dogmatica"; Dale (J. W.) "Classic Baptism," "Judaic Baptism," "Christic and Patristic Baptism"; Hutchings (S.) "The Mode of Baptism"; Ripley (H. J.) "Reply to Stuart on Baptism"; Wiberg (A.) "On Baptism"; Chase (I.) "The Design of Baptism," &c.; Carson (A.) "On Baptism"; Conant (T. J.) "On the Meaning and Use of *βαπτίζω* in Greek Authors"; Crystal (J.) "A History of the Modes of Christian Baptism"; Dressler (E.) "Die Lehre von der Heiligen Taufe"; Ingham (R.) "Handbook of Baptism," Vol. I; Gotch (F. W.) "A Critical Examination of the Rendering of the word *βαπτίζω*, in the Ancient, and many of the Modern Versions of the N. T."

sprinkling. Yet we do not see that much reliance can be placed on the argument drawn from the use of the prepositions named above; though whatever bearing they have on the question is in favor, rather than against, the Baptist view.

But the following objections have been urged by Dr. Robinson against supposing that the word, βαπτίζω always retains its classical sense in the New Testament:—

1. It is used in Luke xi. 38, to signify ablution, or affusion, as may be seen from Mark vii. 2, 4, 8 (cf. 2 Kings iii. 11). But, in this view, he differs from the ablest critics of Germany. Indeed, the references of Dr. Robinson prove nothing; because the circumstances are not described as similar. Couches, as well as smaller articles, were naturally plunged in water to cleanse them. If they included a frame, it was doubtless separable into parts, which could easily be immersed; but Tischendorf omits “couches” in his last edition.

2. He supposes that Acts ii. 41, and iv. 4, prove eight thousand persons to have been baptized in Jerusalem within a short period; and that there was not water enough in the city to immerse so many. We respond (*a*) That there were pools in and around the city, large enough to immerse almost any number of persons at a time; for Dr. Hackett, who was not given to exaggeration, and who had visited the city, remarks, “that the pools so numerous and large, which encircled Jerusalem . . . afforded ample means for the administration of the rite”; and adds, that “The habits of the East, as every traveller knows, would present no obstacle to such a use of the public reservoirs”; (*b*) that a pool large enough for the immersion of one might serve for the immersion of five thousand in succession; (*c*) that five thousand, instead of eight thousand, was probably the number of believers in Jerusalem at the time referred to in Acts iv. 4; (*d*) that it is by no means certain that three thousand were baptized on the day of Pentecost; yet the apostles and their assistants could easily have baptized this number in a few hours. In-

deed, immersion may be administered in a reverent manner, as rapidly as sprinkling or pouring.¹

3. He urges that βαπτίζω was transferred, and not translated, in the early Latin version; hence it did not mean the same as *immergo*.

Reply. This transference of the word can be readily explained without supposing any difference of meaning between βαπτίζω and *immergo*; for the Greek language was generally understood, and largely used during the first three centuries of the Christian era. Hence the word βαπτίζω first used to describe the act of Christian baptism, would naturally become well known; and, like the word ἐνχαριστία, be retained, when other less important words were translated. But it must also be said that the earliest Latin version of the New Testament, of which we have any traces, was the one used by Tertullian in North Africa; and that in this version the Greek verb is translated by *tingo* or *tinguo*.² Tertullian also used the nouns, *inctio* and *intinctio*, to denote baptism. These words point to immersion as the ritual act, especially when compared with *mergo*, *immergo*, *lavo*, and *lavacrum*, which he employs likewise; but they suggest, at the same time, the idea of some sacred and mystical energy, imparted to the baptismal waters by the presence of the Holy Spirit, — the incipient doctrine of baptismal regeneration.³

4. He says that certain baptismal fonts of an early date were too small for the immersion of adults, and must therefore have been used for sprinkling or pouring. But it may be remarked, in reply, that the fonts examined by him were subsequently examined by Dr. Hackett, and pronounced large enough for the immersion of adults. Surely, then, they were absurdly large for any other mode of administering the rite in

¹ "The Design of Baptism, with other Baptismal Tracts for the Times," p. 112 sq.; Barclay (J. T.) "The City of the Great King"; Robinson (E.) "Biblical Researches in Palestine," &c., I. p. 323 sq.; Williams (Geo.) "The Holy City."

² See Rönisch (H.) "Das Neue Testament Tertullians."

³ It may be proper to remark, that the writer is not indebted to Dr. Dale for this view, it being one that he has held and taught for many years.

question. Besides, it is difficult to fix the date of these fonts. More recently one has been brought to light in ancient Tyre, *having steps leading down into it at one end*, and being manifestly intended for the baptism of adults; it is a monolith, large enough within for the immersion of adults. The church in which it was found was built, we believe, in the fifth century.

Others add to these objections, the plea that the baptism of the Holy Spirit was conceived of and represented as an effusion; and therefore baptism with water must have been performed by affusion. This argument has been put in the forefront of the controversy by some Pedobaptist writers. But it seems to us destitute of any force; for it cannot be denied, that the same operation of an invisible and spiritual agent may be represented by different figures of speech. And it is perfectly natural to represent a very abundant communication of the Spirit as being poured out from above,—from God, or from Christ; while, on the other hand, it might be, and it surely was, by the word, βαπτίζω, represented as encompassing the apostles, and as being the very element or atmosphere of this new life. The two representations are distinct, but not inconsistent; for they present different sides of the same marvellous act. — See Acts ii. 17, 18, 33; also Isa. xlv. 3 (cf. Acts i. 4, 5; Joel iii. 1–5). But is it not true that, with those who reject immersion, sprinkling is more frequent than pouring? And does ἐσχέω signify to “sprinkle”? Was the Holy Spirit “sprinkled” on the apostles? Were not their souls encompassed and pervaded by his presence? Was not the Pentecostal miracle a gift of new powers, rather than a purification, even if sprinkling were the proper symbol of any other purification than that by atoning blood?

As to the plea that Christianity is a spiritual faith, and therefore any thing like a scrupulous exactness in preserving the *form* of a rite is indefensible, we reply (1) that in symbolical language the form is essential, for it expresses the meaning: the form of the rite is the rite, for the rite itself is

a form ; and (2) that "it is of the essence of disobedience and rebellion to assume to make commutations and substitutions of duty, — to transfer obligation to where it would be less inconvenient that it should be enforced, and to affect to render, in the form of preferred and easier services, an equivalent for the obedience which the righteous and supreme authority has distinctly required to be rendered in that harder service which is evaded." — (John Foster, "The Glory of the Age," 70.)

As to the formula which should be used by the administrator of baptism, we think it is virtually given in Matt. xxviii. 19. Not that the words there recorded are necessary to the validity of the act, nor that the Saviour designed to have his words repeated as a prescribed form ; but that they express briefly and clearly what ought to be said by the administrator. The preposition *εἰς* before *τὸ ὄνομα* signifies *into* or *unto* ; and the telic clause signifies that the candidate enters publicly into a very close relation to the Holy Trinity, avowing himself a servant of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

An abbreviated formula, mentioning only the name of Christ, may have been sometimes used by the apostles. — (See Acts ii. 38 ; viii. 16 ; xix. 5). But there is no certain evidence of this. From the time of Justin Martyr, A.D. 130, the formula given by Christ was carefully observed ; and, we presume, it was by the apostles themselves.

II. *The Significance of the Rite.*

In determining the significance of baptism, our appeal must be to the language of the New Testament on this point, and to the natural import of the rite itself ; for ritual acts are, to a certain extent, self-interpreting, and there can be no reasonable doubt that, in most instances, their true meaning lies on the face of them, — that they were chosen as being a sort of universal language, readily understood by men of every age and nation. Hence, where the natural language of the ritual act accords with the explanation of it by the sacred writers, there remains no ground for doubt ; assurance becomes doubly sure. And this is true in the present case.

For, looking at the ritual act, and at the language of Scripture, we remark (1) *That it symbolizes the regeneration of the subject, as being, on the one hand, a dying to sin, and, on the other, a rising to holiness.*—(See Rom. vi. 4; Col. ii. 12; together with the passages cited under “Penalty of Sin,” (I.) (1) 2 (4), and under “Nature of Regeneration”). (2) The language of Prof. Lightfoot, quoted under (d) above, clearly expresses the meaning of Paul, but need not be repeated.

(2) *That it commemorates the accomplished death and resurrection of Christ* (Rom. vi. 3; Col. ii. 12; Mark x. 38, 39; Luke xii. 50). Says Dr. Döllinger, “St. Paul made this immersion a symbol of burial with Christ, and the emerging a sign of resurrection with him to a new life.” And Messner remarks, with equal clearness, “Peculiar to Paul is the manner in which he connects the two acts of the rite of baptism, as then administered; namely, the submersion and the emersion, with the idea of fellowship with Christ in his death and resurrection,—a view which, in this definite form, belongs to him alone. While the submersion symbolizes the putting-off of the old man, the emersion from the water is an emblem of the reception of a new divine life; and, because the former is considered by him as an effect of the death of Christ, the latter is brought into connection with the resurrection of Christ. Thus Paul connects the *act of submersion with the death of Christ, and that of emersion with the resurrection of Christ*,—a symbolism of the baptismal rite which has lost its significance with the disappearance of the rite as then observed.”¹

The same explanation of the apostle’s language may be found in the works of numerous Pedobaptist scholars; and there is no good reason whatever for doubting its correctness.

(3) *That it represents this regeneration as a purifying change.* Acts xxii. 16; Titus iii. 5; Eph. v. 26 (cf. 1 Peter iii. 21). To this part of the symbolism of baptism, those persons who reject immersion attach almost exclusive importance; and they maintain that this part of the meaning

¹ Messner (H.) “Die Lehre der Apostel,” s. 279–80.

symbolized is set forth as clearly by sprinkling as by immersion. But there is abundant reason to doubt whether biblical writers ever express the idea of purification by the sprinkling or pouring of mere water upon a person or object.¹

The only passage where this seems at first sight to be the case is Ezek. xxxvi. 25, — “Then will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean; from all your filthiness, and from all your idols will I cleanse you,” &c. But the words “clean water” should rather be “pure water,” meaning the “water of purification,” in which the ashes of the heifer of purification had been steeped. Num. xix. 11–22 (cf. viii. 5–22). Says Hengstenberg, “The sprinkling with water has likewise the shedding of blood for its foundation. It was done with such water only as had in it the ashes of the sin-offering of the red heifer.” — (See Heb. ix. 13, 14.) — “It is very evident that there is an allusion in this passage to the Mosaic rites of purification; especially to the holy water, in which the ashes of the red heifer were mixed, and which served as an antidote, first to the greatest of all defilements, — contact with a corpse, — and then to defilements in general.”²

But washing or bathing in water is a natural symbol of purification; and, if Baptists have not insisted on this as often as on other ideas symbolized by immersion in water, it is perhaps due in part to a reaction of feeling against the exclusive reference made to it by Pedobaptists; yet they have by no means failed to recognize this part of the meaning conveyed by the rite. Says Dr. Chase, “In baptism, there is retained, in all its significancy, the idea of cleansing or purification; for the water in which we are buried is a purifying element. Thus there is a figurative washing away of sins, — a putting off of the body of sinful propensities, and, as it were, a depositing of it in the grave, — from which, in

¹ For this view, the writer is indebted to an admirable and conclusive tract on the subject, by the Rev. J. C. Wightman.

² “Christology of the Old Testament,” transl. by T. Meyer, Vol. II. p. 271 and Vol. III. p. 47.

this emblem, we come forth as alive from the dead, to walk in newness of life, and at length to enter on the life everlasting."¹ And this is but a sample of the language often used by Baptists.

It may be added in this place, that baptism is emblematical of the candidate's experience, — an act of confession by which his own conscience is obeyed and filled with peace (1 Peter iii. 21). It is fitly administered by regularly ordained ministers of the gospel; and, though its *validity* does not really depend on the spiritual or ecclesiastical standing of the administrator, it is highly important, for the sake of order, decorum, and a reverent performance of the rite, that the standing of the administrator should be in all respects unexceptionable.

If *necessary*, in order that the baptism of suitable candidates be not omitted, a church may even select one of its lay members to administer the ordinance: but this is *very rarely*, if ever, necessary. Only in extreme cases would it be wise to deviate thus from the usual order. We may also remark, that a baptism administered by a clergyman who has never been baptized himself may be valid for the candidate. The ordinance expresses the candidate's entrance upon a new life, — his union with Christ, not with the administrator; and, if it be reverently performed, need not be repeated.

III. *The Subjects of the Rite.*

On this point, Baptists differ more widely from other denominations than on the rite itself; or, rather, the difference between them and others on the former point is more important than the difference on the latter; for they hold that *only believers in Christ are entitled to baptism*, and that *only those who give credible evidence of faith in him should be baptized*.

In proof of this, they appeal, —

1. *To the great commission* (Matt. xxviii. 19; Mark xvi. 16). For it is believed that the verb translated "teach," in the former passage, means to "make disciples by teaching,"

¹ "The Design of Baptism," &c., p. 21.

even as Paul declares that "God was pleased by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe" (1 Cor. i. 21); and that the consecration by baptism is mentioned afterwards, because it was to be subsequent in fact, — first, discipleship in heart, then a public profession of it in baptism.

But this interpretation has been called in question; and it has been said that the participial clauses describe the way in which the duty expressed by the verb "teach" is to be performed: thus, "Go make all the nations disciples, by baptizing and teaching them all things which I have commanded you." That this is not required by the use of language in the New Testament may be seen by consulting the following passages (Matt. viii. 27; ix. 33, 35; xix. 25; xxi. 10, 20; xxvi. 8; also Matt. xvii. 14; xix. 3; xxii. 16; Luke vi. 35; Matt. xix. 28; also Col. iii. 16; Eph. v. 18–21; vi. 17, 18; 1 Tim. vi. 20; Acts xx. 29, 30, 31, 37, 38; xxii. 16; Joel i. 18 sq.; 1 Cor. xv. 58; 1 Tim. i. 12; Rom. xv. 25; James ii. 9; Luke ii. 45; Acts xv. 27; Heb. xiii. 13; 2 Peter ii. 5; Matt. xix. 22; also Wiberg and Ingham on Baptism). And that it is not the meaning which lies on the face of the passage may be proved by the impression which the passage makes on ninety-nine out of a hundred who read it, as well as by the course which the apostles took in spreading the gospel. — (See Hofmann (J. C. K. v.) "Der Schriftbeweis," II. s. 164). Yet if the word translated "teach" be understood to signify "make disciples," and the following participial clauses be understood to set forth in general the way of doing this, it is to be observed (*a*) That no one becomes a "disciple" of another, unless it be by his own preference and choice. (*b*) That such preference and choice presuppose a knowledge of the Master selected, and a willingness to be taught and trained by him. (*c*) That baptism would then be the act by which discipleship was formally avowed and openly begun. (*d*) That it would be an expression of faith in Christ, including a purpose to be guided by him in all things. And (*e*) That discipleship would only be consummated when the followers of Christ had been taught all things which he commanded.

But this last point suggests the remark, that a disciple is a learner, — not one who has learnt all which the Master has to teach; that a person is a disciple *as soon as he accepts one as his teacher and guide*. And this circumstance is almost, or quite, decisive against the interpretation proposed.

2. *To the practice of the apostles and their contemporaries* (Acts ii. 38, 41; viii. 12, 13; ix. 18; x. 44, 47; xvi. 14, 15, 31, 33; xviii. 8). There should, it would seem from these portions of the New Testament, be no doubt as to the practice of the apostles and those acting under their direction. Faith in Christ, with a radical change of heart towards God, preceded baptism. But, if it should be thought by any that the Great Commission, as given by Matthew, embraces both baptism and teaching in the work of making men disciples of Christ, — a view which we reject, — it would still be evident, from the course pursued by the apostles, that faith in Christ was required in order to baptism. Whatever knowledge must precede a hearty acceptance of Christ as Saviour and Lord must precede baptism and avowed discipleship.

3. *To apostolic language concerning it* (Rom vi. 3, 4; Gal. iii. 27; 1 Peter iii. 21). The language of Peter is a veritable *crux interpretum*. He says clearly enough what baptism is not; namely, “a putting away of filth of flesh,” the emphasis being on the word “flesh,” but more darkly what it is, — *ἀλλά σπουδαίως ἀγαθῆς ἐπερωτήματα εἰς θεόν* — translated by Noyes, “The earnest seeking for a good conscience toward God”; by Alford, “The inquiry of a good conscience after God”; by the Bible Union Committee, “The requirement of a good conscience toward God”; and in the common version, “The answer of a good conscience toward God.” Tertullian appears to have had this passage in mind, when he wrote (*de resur. carnis*): *anima non lavatione, sed responsione sancitur*.

If, with Noyes, Wiesinger, and others, the genitive *σπουδαίως* is regarded as objective, the expression, “good conscience,” must signify a state of mind resulting from obedience to the will of God, — a sense of peace and fellowship

with him and an earnest seeking for this in the prescribed way must certainly presuppose faith in the seeker. If, with Alford, Huther, and many others, the genitive *συνειδήσεως* is held to be subjective, the expression, "good conscience," naturally signifies the candidate's purity of religious intention, resulting from a belief of the gospel and desire to obey the Lord. But against the view of Alford may be urged the remark of Huther, "That baptism, on the part of man, is not so much a seeking after God as rather a confession of having found him." Yet looking at Baptism from the sacramental point of view, and remembering that the entire life of a believer is a drawing near to God (see Thomas Aquinas, "*de motu ad Deum*"), a seeking after him, it must be easy to regard this as "the aim and end of the baptismal life." But any view of the passage is unfavorable to infant baptism; for infants neither seek nor obey a good conscience in baptism.

4. *To the usage of the church for upwards of two centuries.* — See "Christian Review," Vol. XVI. Dr. Ripley; and Vol. XIX. Dr. Chase; also "Baptist Quarterly," Vol. III. p. 168 sq.

But there are many persons who add to "believers in Christ," *their children*, as proper subjects of baptism.¹ And they rely upon such statements as follow to justify their view; namely, —

1. *Baptism under the new covenant takes the place of circumcision under the old.*

Reply. If this be true, it does not follow that the natural offspring of believers should be baptized: for the initiatory rite may belong to natural offspring in one case, and to spiritual in the other; to babes, and to "new-born babes."

¹ See Wall (Wm.) "The History of Infant Baptism," &c.; Gale (J.) "Reflections on Mr. Wall's History of Infant Baptism," &c.; Hibbard (F. G.) "Christian Baptism," "Part First, Infant Baptism"; Ingham (R.) "The Theology of the Commission on the Subjects of Baptism," and "Christian Baptism: its Subjects"; Hodges (W.) "Baptism tested by Scripture and by History"; Booth (A.) "Pedobaptism Examined," &c., Vol. II. of his work on baptism; Chase (I.) "Infant Baptism an Invention of Men."

Being born of the flesh, and being born of the Spirit, may be prerequisite to circumcision and baptism respectively.

That this is true, we conclude (*a*) From the fact that God established the old covenant with Abraham and his natural seed (Gen. xvii. 10–14); but the new covenant with Christ and a spiritual seed (John iii. 3–7; Rom. ix. 6–8; ii. 28, 29; Gal. iii. 28, 29; 1 Peter i. 23; 1 Cor. iv. 15; James i. 18 (cf. Heb. v. 12, 14; 1 Peter ii. 1, 2; Matt. xi. 25; and see also Luke xiv. 26, 33; Mark iii. 34, 35; Heb. ii. 13; 1 Peter ii. 5; Heb. viii. 10, 11). (*b*) From the fact that the subjects of each rite are carefully described, and are not the same.— (See Gen. xvii. 10 sq.; and Mark xvi. 16; Acts viii. 12.) The male children of Jews, and the male servants of Jews, with their male children, were to be circumcised; while believers in Christ, both male and female, Jew and Gentile, were to be baptized.

But, still further, it is evident that baptism did not take the place of circumcision in the apostolic church:—

(1) From the fact that the rite of circumcision was practised by the Jewish Christians, along with baptism, for a considerable period (Acts xvi. 3; xi. 3 sq.; Gal. ii. 12 sq.; Acts xxi. 20 sq.). In proof of a distinction between the Jewish Sabbath and the Lord's day, Hengstenberg (*Ueber den Tag des Herrn*, s. 104) says, "Mosheim appeals to the fact that the Sabbath was observed along with Sunday. Such a co-observance of the Sabbath has indeed no meaning, if Sunday had entered simply into its place."—"Oh, most wise Judge!" Even so a co-observance of circumcision has no meaning if baptism had entered simply into its place.

(2) From the fact that Paul, when opposing the circumcision of Gentile converts, never hints that baptism takes its place. Says Neander, "The dispute carried on with the Judaizing party on the necessity of circumcision would easily have given an opportunity of introducing this substitute, into the controversy, if it had really existed."¹

¹ See Smith (J. T.) "On the Covenant of Circumcision"; also "The Technobaptist."

2. *Entire households were baptized by the apostles*; and we must suppose there were infants in some of them. Acts xvi. 15, 33, 34; xviii. 8; 1 Cor. i. 16 (cf. xvi. 15, 17).

Reply. There is no evidence, nor is it probable, that any members of these households were infants or unbelievers. The best modern interpreters have dropped this argument.

3. *Christ blessed little children, and said, "Of such is the kingdom of heaven"*; and, if infants are saved by Christ, of course they are to be baptized (Mark x. 13-16; Luke xviii. 15-17; Matt. xix. 13-15).

Reply. (1) The words, "Suffer little children to come unto me," do not point to babes, but to those a few years old, at least. (2) The language of Christ cannot be restricted to the children of believers; it means children as such. (3) The clause, "Of such is the kingdom of heaven," as interpreted by Pedobaptists, affirms the salvation of all these and similar children, if it does of any. (4) Christ's disciples had not been accustomed to baptize little children, as such; for they did not see the propriety of their coming to Christ. (5) Christ did not baptize these children; for he baptized none. (6) There is no intimation that he now, for the first time, directed them to be baptized by his disciples. (7) The words, "Of such is the kingdom of heaven," mean that persons of a child-like spirit belong to the kingdom; they compose it.

Says Archb. Thomson, "The account of the bringing of *young children* to Jesus unites again the three evangelists. Here, as often, St. Mark gives the most minute account of what occurred. After the announcement that the disposition of little children was the most meet for the kingdom of God, "He took them up in his arms, put his hands upon them, and blessed them." The childlike spirit, which in nothing depends upon its own knowledge, but seeks to be taught, is in contrast with the haughty pharisaism with its boast of learning and wisdom; and Jesus tells them that the former is the passport to his kingdom."¹ It has been justly said, that "to infer infant baptism from Christ's blessing little children

¹ Smith (W.) "Dictionary of the Bible," Am. Ed. Vol. II. p. 1370.

proves nothing so-much as that there is want of better argument. For the conclusion would, with greater probability, be derived thus : Christ blessed little children, and so dismissed them, but baptized them not ; therefore infants are not to be baptized."

4. *Children are said to be holy by virtue of their parents' faith ; hence they must have been baptized (1 Cor. vii. 14).*

Reply. Paul's argument seems to us to prove that the children of believers were not, as such, baptized ; for he argues that it is not contaminating for a Christian to live in wedlock with an unbeliever, because it is not contaminating for him to live with his children. But there could surely be no force in this to one whose children had all been brought into a covenant relation with God. The heathen companion and the baptized children would not have stood on the same level, would not have been in the same fold ; and hence the propriety of associating with the latter could not prove the propriety of doing the same with the former. — (See Neander, Rückert, Meyer, De Wette, Müller, Hackett, and others.)

5. *The Jews would have made great complaint, if Christianity had not admitted children to baptism.* But we read of no such complaint ; hence their infant seed were treated as well under the new covenant as under the old.

Reply. The Jews who believed in Christ during the apostolic period continued for the most part to practise circumcision ; and regarded Christianity, we doubt not, as a separate, additional blessing for those who believed in Christ. The new did not displace the old ; the rites of the new did not supersede the rites of the old : hence there could be no reason why Jews, more than others, should insist upon infant baptism. They were too much accustomed to associate particular rites with particular conditions, to be surprised that repentance and faith were made the conditions of baptism. Says Neander, "Among the Jewish Christians, circumcision was held as a seal of the covenant ; and hence they had so much the less occasion to make use of another dedication of their children."

6. *The early church admitted the children of believers to baptism*; hence it must have been an apostolic practice likewise.

Reply. If reference be had to the first two centuries after Christ, the statement is incorrect; if to a later period, it has no force.

It may be added in this place (1) That the practice of infant baptism appears to have had its origin in the doctrine of baptismal regeneration. So far as history casts any light on this point, the latter preceded the former, and sacramentalism led to Technobaptism. (2) That the practice of infant baptism sustains and extends the doctrine of baptismal regeneration. If the theory led to the practice, the practice evermore leads back to the theory, and is empty without it; and (3) That the practice of infant baptism has made the union of church and state possible. Without this practice, such a union would have been extremely improbable, if not impossible.¹

IV. *The Relation of the Rite to John's Baptism.*

Many writers have taken the position, that Christian baptism is entirely distinct from John's baptism; while others have considered them virtually the same. There is something to be said for the former view, and something also for the latter.

For the former, it is urged, —

(a) *That John the Baptist belonged to the old dispensation, and therefore his baptism could not belong to the new.* There is certainly evidence enough that he belonged to the old economy (See Matt. xi. 11 sq.); but it may be that he belonged to the new also. Certainly both John and Christ passed most of life under the mosaic law. But John lived to point men to Christ, the Lamb of God; and his work had respect to the introduction of the new era rather than to the filling out of the old. It is therefore by no means certain that his relation to Judaism forbade him to introduce, by divine authority, an ordinance which belonged to Christianity.

¹ Hovey (A.) "Evils of Infant Baptism," p. 41 sq.

(b) *That he could not have administered baptism into the name of the Trinity.* Possibly not; indeed, it seems scarcely probable that he used the formula which has been generally used by Christians; for this formula presupposes a fuller knowledge of the gospel than can be reasonably attributed to him. But if his words in baptizing were an epitome of his preaching, they must have implied allegiance to the Christ and the Spirit, as well as to the Father; for Luke testifies expressly, that he "evangelized" the people (ch. iii. 18); and John bears witness to nearly the same thing (i. 29 sq. 36; iii. 25 sq.), as well as Paul (Acts xix. 4).

(c) *That baptism was sometimes repeated when the followers of John embraced Christianity, as preached by the apostles after the day of Pentecost* (Acts xix. 1 sq.). In the only instance of the kind recorded, "the disciples" had never heard "whether there is a Holy Spirit;" and it is therefore difficult to believe that they had been baptized by John himself; for John had taught his disciples to believe in him that should come after him, and had described Jesus as one who should baptize them in the Holy Spirit. This appears to have been an important feature of his preaching; and therefore it is fair to presume that the disciples in question had not been taught and baptized by him. They had probably been baptized without suitable instruction, by some unenlightened follower of John; and hence their baptism had no reference to Christ or to the Holy Spirit.

But, on the other hand, it may be said (a) *That the ritual act was in both cases the same, representing the same inward change.* Matt. iii. 6 sq.; Mark i. 4 sq.; Luke iii. sq.; vii. 10; xx. 3 sq. (cf. the senior Edwards, I. p. 163).

(b) *That repentance towards God, and faith in the Messiah, as the Giver of the Holy Spirit, were required in both cases* (Matt. iii. 11 sq.; Mark i. 7 sq.; Luke iii. 15 sq.; John i. 27 sq.; Acts xix. 4). It will be evident to those who study closely all the passages bearing on this point, that John invited none but renewed persons to his baptism. For (1) Repentance — *μετάνοια* — is a change of mind and heart,

implying faith and love. By it one enters upon a new spiritual life. But was not the baptism which he administered *unto* or *into* repentance, — that is, a rite by which an impenitent man *pledged* himself to repent? Such a rite would have been absurd; for no impenitent man can give a satisfactory pledge of repentance in the future. It is a *present* duty; and a refusal to do it now vitiates every promise to do it by and by. (2) Both Mark and Luke say that John came preaching “a baptism of repentance *unto the remission of sins*” (Mark i. 4; Luke ii. 3); and the sins of unregenerate men cannot be forgiven. His baptism symbolized the beginning of a new spiritual life, to which those who received it devoted themselves. (3) Both Matthew and Mark testify that “confession of their sins” was made by those who were baptized by John (Matt. iii. 6; Mark i. 5); doubtless then it was required by him as one of the clearest evidences of a new heart. Men do not readily make public confession of “their sins,” while still foes to God. (4) “Fruits meet for repentance,” or rather, “worthy of repentance,” were required of some, — (See Matt. iii. 6–12; Luke iii. 7–14); and both from the expression itself and from the use made of it by Paul (Acts xxvi. 20), we know that it refers to fruits which reveal a penitent or changed mind, rather than those which will lead to it. The passages quoted above give ample proof that John accompanied the requirement of repentance with that of a readiness to welcome the Messiah, who should baptize in the Holy Spirit.

(c) *That baptism was not repeated when the followers of John became disciples of Christ.* Some suppose that many of the three thousand who were added to the church on the day of Pentecost had been disciples of John; but, if so, there is no evidence of their re-baptism; if so, there is no evidence of their being regarded as for the first time believers. They were probably said to be added, because now they were fully convinced of the Messiahship of Jesus, and were at last ready to avow themselves his followers. There is no proof to be found in the New Testament, that those baptized by John

were commonly re-baptized when they connected themselves with Christians. In Acts xviii. 24-28, the story of Apollos is told. He knew only the baptism of John; but there is no hint of his receiving Christian baptism. Aquila and Priscilla taught him the way of the Lord more perfectly, and that is all. "In every instance, unless this be an exception, where the case of an individual is mentioned in the Acts, as in a state requiring baptism, this rite is administered, and prominent notice taken of it in the narrative." Apollos was not baptized, because John's baptism was virtually Christian baptism.

(d) *That the apostles themselves were, it is probable, only baptized with John's baptism.* This seems to be a natural inference from the narrative in the first chapter of John, verses 35-49; at least so far as those were concerned who had been baptized by the harbinger of Christ. If any of the twelve had not been immersed by John, they were doubtless introduced into the fellowship of the earlier apostles by the rite of baptism.—(See John iv. 1, 2). It is likewise to be noted, that Jesus himself submitted to John's baptism (cf. Turretin, Loc. iii. Qu. xvi. p. 340 sq.).

(e) *That the new dispensation is represented as beginning with the work of John* (Luke xvi. 16; Acts x. 36, 37; John i. 22 sq.). The first of these texts reads thus: "The law and the prophets (were), until John—*μέχρι Ἰωάννου*; since then the kingdom of God is preached, and every one presses forcefully into it." Meyer says, "Since then (already by John himself) the good news of the Messiah's kingdom has entered, and with what result! *Every one presses with force into it.*" And this is the only obvious meaning of the words.

The reasons for believing that Christian baptism began with that of John, and only became more significant as the truths which it represented were more fully revealed, seem to us stronger than those which are supposed to show an essential difference between the two.

II. THE LORD'S SUPPER.

In this case it is proper to consider the external rite, the import of the rite, and the proper communicants.

1. *The external rite.* The institution of this rite by our Saviour has been described by four of the sacred writers (namely, Matthew xxvi. 26–29; Mark xiv. 22–25; Luke xxii. 19, 20; and Paul 1 Cor. xi. 23–25). From these several accounts, we learn the following facts in respect to the *elements* employed in this rite, and the *way* in which they were used:—

1. *The elements were bread and wine.* The bread was doubtless *unleavened*; yet this peculiarity is nowhere referred to by the sacred writers, or by Christ himself; and hence is not to be looked upon as significant. The wine is spoken of by Christ as “this fruit of the vine” (Matt. xxvi. 29; Mark xiv. 25); and it seems very desirable for us to make use of the same at the present day.

2. *The ritual use* of these elements embraced (1) the eucharistic prayers; (2) the breaking of the bread, and giving of the wine by the presiding officer; and (3) the eating and drinking of the respective elements by all the communicants.

Remark a. We do not suppose that the *singing* or *chanting* of Christ and his disciples, just before they went out into the Mount of Olives, was intended to be a part of the new ordinance; for it is mentioned by neither Luke nor Paul in describing the institution of the Lord’s Supper, and we do not find it anywhere enjoined as a part of this ordinance. The words sung by Christ and his disciples were probably the second part of the great Hallel,—namely, Psalms cxv., cxviii.—which the Jews were in the habit of singing after they had eaten the paschal lamb. It is, however, eminently proper to praise the Lord in song after partaking of the emblems of his death.

R. b. It has been conjectured, that, in the age of the apostles, the eucharistic prayers were offered by the whole body of the church in concert; but there is no good reason for this conjecture. The language of Paul (1 Cor. x. 16) would be perfectly natural, if all the members of the church were supposed to join in the prayers offered by the pastor,—

a fact which they were accustomed to signify by saying "Amen" at the close.

II. *The import of the Lord's Supper.* Since the elements represent the body and blood of the dying Saviour, the reception of them, —

1. *Symbolizes* the reception by faith of Christ crucified as the source and support of spiritual and eternal life (1 Cor. x. 16; cf. John vi. 51, 53, 54). This implies, of course, a belief in the doctrine of the atonement. To believe in Christ *crucified* as the perpetual source of life is to believe in the atonement as that source. It implies also union with the spiritual body of Christ; by virtue of receiving him. This is a subordinate but important fact represented by the joint partaking of the Supper. It is the act of a family (1 Cor. x. 15–21).

2. *Commemorates* the atoning death of Christ, or Christ as the Lamb of God offering himself in sacrifice for sin (1 Cor. xi. 24, 26; v. 7). This office of the Lord's Supper, it will be noticed, was very emphatically declared by the Saviour. Indeed, the commemorative import of this rite makes its symbolical meaning doubly impressive. That the *emblems* are also *memorials*, bringing the scenes of Calvary distinctly before the mind, adds greatly to their power in sustaining faith and love.

3. *Typifies* the marriage supper of the Lamb, or, in other words, the future blessedness of believers in the presence of Christ. Matt. xxvi. 29; Mark xiv. 25; 1 Cor. xi. 26 (cf. Matt. xxii. 2 sq.; xxv. 10; Rev. xix. 7–9). Some theologians have doubted whether the Lord's Supper is really typical of heavenly fellowship and joy; but the passages referred to are sufficient evidence that it is.

Remark a. It appears from several passages that the paschal lamb was, in some sense, a type, not of the Lord's Supper, but of Christ himself. 1 Cor. v. 7; John xix. 36 (cf. Ex. xii. 46; and Num. ix. 12.) But, if the paschal lamb bore some resemblance to Christ, the paschal supper must naturally have borne some resemblance to the Lord's Supper. The former, in fact, commemorated the deliverance of the natural

Israel from temporal ruin ; while the latter commemorates the deliverance of the spiritual Israel from eternal ruin. As the Jewish people typified the true Israel, so likewise did many Jewish rites foreshadow Christian *realities*, but *not* Christian rites.

R. b. Breaking the bread and pouring out the wine are important parts of the ordinance ; for they increase its commemorative power by bringing the death of Christ more vividly to mind. This is lost by the Catholic form.

R. c. The papal custom of withholding the cup from laymen is not authorized by the word of God ; though several expressions in the New Testament are appealed to as furnishing, at least by implication, this authority. For example, Acts ii. 42 ; xx. 7, 11 ; 1 Cor. xi. 27-29 ; (but cf. x. 16, 17, 21).

R. d. The papal doctrines of *transubstantiation*, and sacrifice of the mass are unscriptural. — (See Heb. vii. 27 ; ix. 26, 28 ; x. 10 (cf. Mal. i. 11), for conclusive proof of this remark.)

For the papal doctrine, see "Canones et Decreta Concilii Tridentini," p. 66, i. : "Si quis negaverit, in sanctissimæ eucharistiæ sacramento *contineri vere, realiter et substantialiter corpus et sanguinem una cum ANIMA et DIVINITATE Domini nostri Jesu Christi, ac proinde totum Christum ; sed dixerit tantummodo esse in eo, ut in signo vel figura aut virtute : anathema sit.*" Yet Christ says expressly of one of the elements which he had consecrated, "I will not *drink again* of this *fruit* of the *vine,*" &c.

R. e. The Lutheran doctrine of *consubstantiation* is exceedingly unnatural, and no more scriptural than the papal doctrine. Could the disciples have supposed the real body and blood of Christ present in the elements, bread and wine, which they received from him ? It does not seem possible. Yet the Augsburg Confession says, "De Cœna Domini docent, quod corpus et sanguis Christi *vere* adsint et *distribuantur* vescentibus in cœna Domini, et improbant secus docentes," (A.D. 1530;) and the Formula of Concord says, "Credimus, quod in cœna Domini corpus et sanguis Christi *vere et substantialiter* sint præsentia, et quod una cum pane et vino *vere* distribuantur atque sumantur," (A.D. 1579.)

R. f. The view which regards the elements as merely emblems of the body and blood of Christ rests upon a simple and obvious interpretation of Christ's language. — (See John xiv. 6; xv. 5; Luke xii. 1; Heb. x. 20; Philem. 12, and Ex. xii. 11.)

R. g. The New Testament nowhere prescribes *when* or *how often* this ordinance is to be observed. It was, however, in all probability, observed more frequently in the apostolic church than it is by Christians at the present day. Whether a more frequent observance of this rite is now desirable can only be determined by careful observation.

III. *The proper communicants.* For the sake of treating this topic in a practical way, we offer the following questions and replies, namely: —¹

1. *Should any except credible believers in Christ be invited to the Lord's Supper?*

Replying in the negative, we appeal, —

1. *To the import of the ordinance itself.* It is partly commemorative, — "This do in remembrance of me." It is a memorial of the dying Redeemer. But those who have no true faith in Christ, who are at heart self-righteous, who reject his proffered aid, cannot properly commemorate his death. Again, it is partly symbolical: "Take, eat; this is my body which was broken for you." The act of eating and drinking the consecrated elements is made prominent; and by it the communicants signify their reception of Christ as the support of their spiritual life. How, then, can any person who rejects the Saviour wish or dare to approach his table? Or how can one who gives no satisfactory evidence of faith in Christ, or fellowship with him, be invited to his table?

¹ See Edwards (J. the elder) "On the Qualifications for Full Communion"; Arnold (A. N.) "Qualifications for the Lord's Supper"; Curtis (T. F.) "The Distinction between Christian and Church Fellowship, and between Communion and its Symbols"; Howell (R. B. C.) "The Terms of Communion at the Lord's Table"; Denison (F.) "The Supper Institution"; Pepper (G. D. B.) "Open Communion," "Bap. Quarterly," Vol. I; Sarles (J. W.) "Qualifications for the Communion," in the "Madison Avenue Lectures"; Hovey (A.) "Close Communion"; Bunyan (J.) "Reason for my Practice in Worship," II. 602; Hall (R.) "Terms of Communion."

2. *To the example of the apostolic churches.* So far as this point is concerned, their practice seems to have been uniform. The sacred emblems were never offered to unbelievers. But is the example of churches under apostolic guidance of any weight in the present case? We believe it is; for when Paul declares, with reference to a practice far less closely connected with the gospel than this, "We have no such custom, neither the churches of God," he appears to regard this fact as a final argument against it. Moreover, the practice now in question must have been established by the apostles; for they received the ordinance from Christ, and caused it to be observed in the primitive church.

3. *To the caution which Paul gave to the Corinthians.*— "Let a man examine himself, and so let him eat of the bread, and drink of the cup,"—words which imply the need of special preparation for the ordinance. Whoever does not appreciate the sacrifice of Christ, and does not feel his need of it as an atonement for sin, is unprepared for the Lord's Supper. If he partake, it will be "unworthily, not discerning the Lord's body."—"He will eat and drink judgment to himself."

II. *Should any except baptized believers be invited to the Lord's Supper?* We reply in the negative, and justify our answer by an appeal,—

1. *To the relation of the two ordinances to each other as symbols.* Baptism symbolizes the beginning of the new life; and the Lord's Supper, its nourishment. The former represents a change from one spiritual condition into another,—putting off the old, and putting on the new,—death and resurrection; while the latter represents growth,—progress in a present condition. The one sets forth a single event; the other, an ever-recurring duty and refreshment. As the life of faith must be originated before it can be nourished, so an ordinance which represents the inception of this life must naturally precede one which represents its existence and support. In baptism, the sinner publicly declares his allegiance to Christ; at the Lord's table, he takes his place among the

acknowledged friends of Jesus, and receives from him tokens of love and favor. By baptism, he is formally qualified for the duties and privileges of citizenship; by the Lord's Supper, he is formally recognized and honored as a citizen.

2. *To the practice of Christian churches in the apostolic age.* We find no hint in the sacred record of the presence of unbaptized persons at the Lord's table; but we do find that baptism was treated as the first great duty to be done after exercising faith, and that the eucharist, when noticed at all, is assigned to those who were already baptized. In no case is the Lord's Supper put before baptism; in no case are believers brought into the church, and afterwards baptized.

But to this it has been objected, that some of the eleven, who were present at the institution of the Supper, had never been baptized at all; and that none of them had received Christian baptism. In reply, we remark (1) That John's baptism was substantially the same as Christian; (2) That several of the eleven had been baptized by John prior to their connection with Jesus; (3) That all of them had probably been thus baptized. For John was sent expressly to prepare the way of the Lord; and, in default of evidence to the contrary, it may be presumed that men whose hearts had been prepared by his preaching were selected by our Saviour to be his personal attendants. Besides, the promptness with which they left all, and followed Christ, is favorable to this view. (4) That Jesus, by the hands of his disciples, baptized others who believed in him; and, if it was his custom to have his followers baptized, it may be taken for granted that he did not make the case of the twelve an exception. He was, moreover, himself baptized,—a fact which strengthens our conviction that his chosen were also baptized.

III. *Should any but those whose church-walk is orderly be invited to the Lord's Supper?* No persons, we reply, but those who are members of some Christian church, whose deportment agrees with the gospel of Christ, and who strive together for the faith of the gospel, should be invited to the communion. In support of this position, we remark,—

1. *That becoming connected with a Christian church naturally precedes partaking of the eucharist.* By baptism, one avows himself a servant and soldier of Christ. But the army of Christ is made up of different companies,—one here, another there; and he can have no regular connection with it, unless he joins one of these companies, or, in other words, a particular church. Uniting with a local church is therefore the natural sequence or counterpart of the baptismal vow. Hence baptism is often, called the door into the church; and membership is supposed to follow it as a matter of course. Ordinarily it should do so, and thus precede admission to the Lord's Supper. The latter is to be repeated till the close of life; while the former,—uniting with a Christian church,—is, like baptism, an act to be performed but once, unless a repetition is made necessary by local changes.

2. *That the Lord's Supper is, properly speaking, a church rite, and should therefore be restricted to church members in good standing.* It was meant, we believe, to be observed, not by individual Christians at will, nor by irresponsible companies of believers, but by the churches of Christ as such.

(1) This view is justified by the language of Paul to the Corinthians (1 Cor. x. 16, 17; xi. 18–34). Several points are fixed by these words of the apostle; for example:—

(a) The Corinthian Christians were evidently accustomed to meet together to observe the Lord's Supper. No less than four times, within the space of a few verses, does Paul connect their coming together in one place with the celebration of the eucharist. To do this seems to have been the avowed and principle object of their assembling.

(b) They could not properly observe it without coming together. This is evidently implied. Many things could be done by Christians separately and at home. "Have ye not houses to eat and to drink in?"—"If any man is hungry, let him eat at home;" but it does not seem to have entered the apostle's mind that the Lord's Supper could be eaten at home.

(c) They came together "in church," to observe the Lord's

Supper. When Paul wrote his first letter to the Corinthians, the word *ἐκκλησία* had already become the appropriate designation of an organized body of Christians; and, in the passage before us, it must be used in this sense,—a sense which it generally has in this Epistle. Hence the words *ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ* signify “in church form or capacity,” and show that the Corinthian believers celebrated the eucharist as a church.

In no other instance has an inspired writer spoken at length of the manner of celebrating the Lord’s Supper in the apostolic churches. If the New Testament anywhere shows with sufficient clearness the practice of those churches which were planted and trained by the apostles, it is in this letter; and, in this letter, the ordinance is represented as observed by the church as such.

(2) Looking back from this, the fullest account of the eucharist in the New Testament, we find a brief reference to it in Acts xx. 7: “And in the first day of the week, when we were assembled to break bread,” &c. That there were disciples in Troas is not denied; and that they were a regular church is almost certain.—See Acts xvi. 8; 2 Cor. ii. 12, 13 (cf. Acts xiv. 23; Tit. i. 5).

(3) Going back still further, we find another record in Acts ii. 41, 42. The Christians here spoken of were already baptized; they were under the guidance and teaching of the apostles; they met together almost daily for social worship; they provided for their poor with great liberality; and they were living in the same city. Hence they were, to all intents and purposes, a Christian church. If not, when did they become such a body? They are called expressly by this name a few verses farther on; and, after this record of their breaking bread, they are habitually spoken of as “the church at Jerusalem.”

But it may be said, they did not meet together and observe the Lord’s Supper as a church; for they are described as “breaking bread from house to house.” In reply, it may be remarked, that the circumstances of the church at Jerusalem

were peculiar. The disciples of Jesus could use neither temple nor synagogue for any service distinctively Christian. Meyer, De Wette, Alford, Bengel, and others, think that *κατ' οἶκον* means a private house, or a house of their own, as distinguished from the temple; but even if they had no house large enough to receive them all, and therefore met in several places to break bread, — one or two of the apostles presiding over each assembly, — this provisional arrangement would not have caused the Holy Supper to be esteemed a family or social rite; for only those who had been baptized, and were walking together in the faith, partook of it. The emblems were not carried out of the church as an associated body of believers, nor were they used at pleasure by families, or groups of brethren.

(4) Finally, we come to the institution of the Supper by our Saviour himself. There were doubtless many Christians in Jerusalem at the passover when the Supper was instituted; but they were in no proper sense a church, — a distinct, responsible body, — called out from the rest of the nation, and acting together as the servants of Christ. “For the Greek word *ἐκκλησία*, which expresses the idea of evoking, calling out, expresses also the idea of convoking, calling together, and is therefore most applicable to a Christian church as a select, organized body, called out by direct choice from the mass of men, and called together by divine authority as a spiritual corporation.” — (Alexander.)¹ On the other hand, the little band of disciples to whom the Supper was first administered were essentially such a body. They had been summoned to his side by the Saviour, were his recognized and constant followers, were under his instruction, were the champions of his cause, had a common purse and treasurer, were united in belief and action, and, in a word, were a responsible community, separated from the world, and associated together in the service of Christ.

(5) It is also to be observed, that when we read of the baptism of single individuals, or even of households, — as of Paul,

¹ See also Litton (E. A.) “The Church of Christ,” ch. IV. p. 203 sq.

of the Ethiopian eunuch, of Lydia, of the Philippian jailer, and of Crispus at Corinth,— there is never any allusion to the Lord's Supper as following the baptism ; but, when great numbers were baptized on the day of Pentecost, there is a reference to the Supper as presently observed.

3. *That this ordinance appears to have been restricted by the early Christians to church members.* Says Justin Martyr, "First Apology," ch. 66 (A.D. 138-9), "This food is called among us *εὐχαριστία*, of which no one is allowed to partake who does not believe that what we teach is true, and has not been bathed the bath for the remission of sins and unto regeneration, and does not live as Christ has enjoined." Three prerequisites are here laid down,— faith, baptism, and an orderly walk ; and there is abundant evidence that these were insisted upon by Christians of every name for a long time.

As the eucharist is a church ordinance, Baptists generally hold that none but members of the church, observing it, are strictly entitled to partake ; and that none can properly be invited to join with them who could not be welcomed, without change of views, to full membership. They also hold that those who are giving, and are pledged to give, the weight of their influence against what is believed to be essential to Christian obedience, cannot properly be received into its fellowship. If admitted, they would sow dissension, and thus prove themselves "heretics" in the primitive sense of the term.

But members of Pedobaptist churches do steadily affirm and teach by their ecclesiastical position, that infant sprinkling is, in effect, Christian baptism ; or else that baptism is not prerequisite to full membership and an orderly walk in a Christian church. In either case, they throw the whole weight of their example against the practice of Christian baptism,— a practice which, in the judgment of Baptists, is essential to Christian obedience. How, then, can their church-walk be indorsed as orderly? If the members of a Baptist church were, in some other way, to act as decisively

against this doctrine and practice, they would justly be esteemed by their brethren subverters of the truth, and originators of division. — (See Rom. xvi. 17; and cf. Titus iii. 10; Gal. v. 12; 1 Cor. i. 10).

But, if a Baptist church ought to withdraw the hand of fellowship from those who set themselves firmly against the duty of obeying a plain command of Christ, it surely has no right to offer this hand to the same persons when united to another church, or to any persons who persistently assail the duty in question. If communion at the Lord's table were the sign of Christian fellowship merely, the case would be different; but such a sign it can never be while, besides faith, baptism and an orderly church-walk are the scriptural terms of admission to the Lord's Supper.

It may now be remarked, that Baptists heartily acknowledge both the duty and the privilege of Christian fellowship with all who love the Lord, and approve of denominational co-operation, if and so far as it requires no one to disregard his convictions as to the paramount claims of Christ. To "love the truth and peace" is their watchword (Zech. viii. 19).

PART SEVENTH.

DOCTRINE OF THE LAST THINGS.

THE topics to be considered in this part of theology are Natural Death, the Intermediate State, the Second Advent of Christ, the Resurrection of the Dead, the Last Judgment, the Final State of Unbelievers, and the Final State of Believers. Some of them may be treated briefly, but others will require careful study.¹

I. NATURAL DEATH.

In discussing the Penalty of Sin, it was necessary to speak of natural death; and, on that account, it will be sufficient to reiterate our conclusions in this place. In that discussion, it was shown that natural death does not put an end to the conscious existence of the soul, — that the separation of the body from the spirit leaves the latter in possession of all its essential powers. Further evidence of this will be embraced in the testimonies which will be brought from the word of God, to show the condition of man after death.

II. THE INTERMEDIATE STATE.²

By this is meant the state of men between their bodily death and resurrection. That there is such a state must be assumed for the present; but we shall soon have occasion to

¹ "Studien und Kritiken," IX. s. 271 ff.; Weisse (C. H.) "Ueber die philosophische Bedeutung der Christlichen Lehre von den letzten Dingen," s. 271 ff.

² Brown (J.) "The Dead in Christ: their State Present and Future"; Kitto's "Journal of Sacred Literature," for Jan. 1850, "On the Separate State"; "Christian Review," 1855, D. W. Phillips, "The Intermediate State"; Bib. Sac., G. H. Griffin, "Place and Condition of the Departed"; Calvin (J.) "Psychopannychia," &c.; "Meth. Quarterly," 1850, J. Porter, "The Condition of the Dead"; Estes (H. C.) "The Christian Doctrine of the Soul"; Hovey (A.) "State of Men after Death"; "Church Review," 1852, "The Place of Departed Spirits"; Weitzel (Dr.) "Die Urchristliche Unsterblichkeitslehre," *Stu. u. Kr.* IX. s. 579 ff. und 895 ff.; Fitch (E. T.) "Theol., Hades, the Invisible State"; "New Englander," 1864, p. 125 sq.; König (J. L.) "Die Lehre von Christi Höllenfahrt."

exhibit the proof of it, by showing that there will be a simultaneous resurrection of the dead. Almost all Christians feel a particular solicitude about the condition of human souls immediately after death. The proximity of that state to this invests it with double interest. Friends accompany their friends to the very borders of it, and know that, when the latter close their eyes here, they open them at once there,—know that in a moment their loved ones are in the state that lies between time and eternity,—between existence in a natural body and existence in a spiritual body. Besides, that is a profoundly mysterious life which connects the one before death with the one beyond the judgment,—a life of waiting for the Lord, with how much of blessed service on the part of the righteous, no one knows; for the teaching of Scripture concerning the middle state is neither full nor explicit, but it assures us of these facts:—

1. *That the spirits of the departed are bodiless in that state.* This may be inferred (1) From the joy which Paul expresses in view of the resurrection at the coming of Christ (1 Cor. xv. 54). (2) From the way in which the Scriptures connect our present and our future bodies (John v. 28; 1 Cor. xv. 44, 51, 52; Phil. iii. 21). Were we to have other bodies in the middle state, the language of these passages would be unnatural. (3) From those texts of Scripture which refer by way of distinction to the spirit of man at death, or after it (Eccl. xii. 7; Acts vii. 59; Heb. xii. 23; 1 Peter iii. 19).

Against this view, the following passages have been urged as decisive; namely, Luke xvi. 23 sq.; Matt. xxii. 23–33 (cf. Luke xx. 27, 40; 2 Cor. v. 1–8). But we cannot admit them to be so. They may all be explained, without violence, in harmony with the statement made above, that the spirits of the departed are bodiless.

2. *That the spirits of the departed are conscious in the middle state.* This may be asserted on the authority,—

(1) *Of the Old Testament.*—(See Eccl. xii. 7; Prov. xv. 24; xxiii. 14; xiv. 32; Ps. xvii. 15; lxxiii. 23, 24; xlix. 15). But still more confidently on that,—

(2) *Of the New Testament* (Luke xvi. 23 sq.; 1 Peter iii. 19; 2 Peter ii. 4 sq.; Luke xxiii. 42, 43 (cf. 2 Cor. xii. 4; Rev. ii. 7; xxii. 2); Acts vii. 59; Matt. viii. 11; 2 Cor. v. 1-8 (cf. Rev. vi. 9); 1 Sam. xxviii. 11-20; Phil. i. 21-24).

Objection 1. The dead are usually spoken of as asleep. Hence they must be unconscious.—(See 2 Sam. 7-12; Dan. xii. 2; 1 Thess. iv. 13-15; v. 10). To this we reply, that death is called sleep by a natural figure of speech, though it does not involve unconsciousness. It is the bodily senses which are inactive in sleep; the spirit is often, if not always, active, and in a certain way conscious. Besides, the term *sleep* is used instead of the term *death*, when speaking of believers in Christ, because it is at once a milder term, and one suggestive of a resurrection. It is very rarely applied to the death of unbelievers,—at least, in the New Testament.

Objection 2. A general judgment which is based, as the Scriptures affirm, on the conduct of men in this life, is scarcely compatible with moral existence in the middle state; for character must be greatly modified by the course pursued in that state; and it is absurd to suppose that moral conduct there will not be taken into account in the final decision.

To this we reply (*a*) That the objection undertakes to set aside positive testimony by an appeal to difficulties, even though it must be admitted that human reason cannot fully understand the merits of the case. Such an attempt is certainly rash, and likely to lead one astray. (*b*) That it probably rests on a false view of the ends to be reached by a general judgment; for these ends may be more numerous and important than any man supposes, even though the judgment should consist chiefly in a manifestation of the perfection of God's government to all intelligent beings. (*c*) That it undervalues the moral influence which the certain prospect of a general judgment has upon the minds of men in this life.

3. *That unbelievers are in a state of misery.* This might be inferred from the circumstance that they are unreconciled

to God; but whether their condition will be one of greatly increased misery, as compared with a sinful life here, can only be learned from the word of God. The language of that word, though figurative, is sufficiently clear; and one who believes it to be true cannot doubt the great misery of those who die in their sins (Luke xvi. 23 sq. (cf. Matt. xi. 23; xvi. 18); Luke x. 15; 2 Peter ii. 9; Rev. i. 18; vi. 8; xx. 13, 14). The state or place in which they are is called hades.

4. *That believers are in a state of happiness* (Luke xvi. 22; xxiii. 43; 2 Cor. v. 1-8; Phil. i. 23). The terms applied to their state or abode suggest that it is one of greatly advanced satisfaction. They are to be in Abraham's bosom, which would be esteemed by any pious Jew the highest privilege. They are to be in paradise; and this word signified almost every thing delightful. They are to be with the Lord, than which nothing could be more desired by the Christian. They are to be numbered and united with the spirits of just men made perfect; and every true believer longs to be free from sin.

5. *That neither believers nor unbelievers are on probation in that state* (Luke xvi. 21 sq.; Matt. xxv. 31 sq.; 2 Cor. v. 10; Matt. xi. 22-24; Rom. ii. 7-9, 12). It will be noticed that an impassable gulf is said to separate the evil from the good after death; and that, in all the accounts of the judgment, the deeds done in the body are represented as determining the destiny of men. This seems to show that the eternal condition of men depends on their conduct in the present life. All that is done afterwards will be in the direction of what they do here.

Against this view many protest, appealing to 1 Peter iii. 19, 20; iv. 6. But it seems to us, on the whole, improbable that Peter refers to a personal visit of Christ to hades, between his crucifixion and resurrection, for the purpose of preaching to the ungodly who were there confined. It is more probable that he refers to the ministry of Noah, who, by the power of the Spirit of Christ imparted to him, preached to his unbe-

lieving contemporaries for a hundred and twenty years, while the ark was building.¹

III. THE SECOND ADVENT OF CHRIST.

In this section, we are to inquire whether the return of Christ, spoken of in Acts i. 11, will precede or will follow the period of a thousand years described in Rev. xx. 1 sq. . . . For if it is to precede that period, the resurrection of the wicked will be effected at least a thousand years later than that of the righteous, and the judgment of the former will be separated by as great an interval from that of the latter. Moreover, if this be true, the proper reign of Christ has not yet begun.

The question is one of much interest; and it is now attracting attention in every part of Christendom. Many of the ablest German and English expositors believe in the pre-millennial advent of Christ, as an event predicted by the Scriptures, and not very distant from the present time.

But those who entertain this belief are divided into two classes. One of these classes believes, that, at the coming of Christ to introduce the millennium, the righteous dead will be raised, the living believers changed, and the wicked who are alive on the earth destroyed, so that Christ will reign on the earth with his saints in their glorified bodies a thousand years: then all the wicked dead will be raised and judged.

The other class holds that the righteous dead will be raised, living believers changed, and yet the race be continued by natural generation; all, or nearly all, who are born, being converted very early in life. In the millennium, therefore, Christ will reign with his saints in their glorified bodies over the race of mankind in their natural bodies.

Both classes hold that the earth will be changed or renewed at the coming of Christ; but the former class supposes that the renewal will be very complete, while the latter does not.

¹ See "Baptist Quarterly," Vol. IV. p. 486 sq.; Bib. Sac. Vol. XXXII. p. 401 sq.; "New Englander," 1872, p. 601 sq.; (Expositions by the author of this manual, by H. Cowles, and by S. C. Bartlett); and for the opposite view a majority of German Expositors.

In support of their opinion, they appeal to such passages as follow: Matt. xix. 28 sq.; Luke xix. 11 sq.; Acts i. 6-8, iii. 21; 1 Cor. xv. 23 sq.; 1 Thess. iv. 16, 17; 2 Thess. i. 7-10; Rev. xx. 1-7. Of these New Testament passages, it may be remarked,—¹

1. That the first four are too indefinite to have any value as proof-texts. This must be obvious to the careful student.

2. That the argument from 1 Cor. xv. 23 sq. has little, if any, force. It is said that, as a long period separates the resurrection of Christ from that of his people at his coming, so a long period may be expected to separate the resurrection of his people from that of the ungodly, — an argument of little weight.

3. That the remaining passages, though difficult of explanation, are no sufficient basis for the doctrine in question. The word "resurrection" may be used figuratively in Rev. xx. 5. The fidelity of Christians will be like that of the martyrs; and they will be so numerous as to bear rule in the earth. Hence it will be as if all the martyrs had been raised at once, to people the earth for a thousand years; that is, an indefinite but vast period of time. As Elijah reappeared in John the Baptist, so will all the martyrs in the faithful men of that future day. But, when this period has

¹ Seiss (S.) "On the Pre-Millennial Advent of Christ"; Auberlen (C. A.) "The Prophecies of Daniel, and the Revelations of St. John"; Christiani (A.) "Darstellung des Inhalts der Apocalypse"; Weitbrecht (Dr.) "Christliche Glaubenslehre," Bd. III.; Karsten (Dr.) "Die letzten Dinge"; Luthardt (E.) "Vom Lehre der letzten Dingen"; Hofmann (J. C. K. von) "Schriftbeweis," Bd. II. s. 624 sq.; Brown (D.) "On the Second Advent"; Fairbairn (P.) "Prophecy viewed in respect to its dist. Nature, its special Function, and proper Interpretation," p. 434 sq.; Brown (J. A.) "The Second Advent, and the Creeds of Christendom," Bib. Sac. 1867, p. 629 sq.; Keil (C. F.) "Zur Frage über den Chiliasmus," Zeitschrift für lutherische Theologie u. Kirche, 1870, s. 639 ff.; Harris (S.) "The Scriptural Doctrine of the Triumph of Christ's Kingdom distinguished from Millenarianism," Bib. Sac. 1873, p. 77 sq.; Cowles (H.) "On the Man of Sin," 2 Thess. ii. 3, Bib. Sac. 1872, p. 623 sq.; also "On the Teachings of Christ in Regard to his then future Comings, and the Phraseology of the Apostles on this Subject," Bib. Sac. 1871, p. 485 sq.; Thomasius (G.) "Christi Person und Werk," III. 2 s. 459 sq.; Köhler (Dr.) "Die Schriftwidrigkeit des Chiliasmus"; Hodge (C.) "Sys. Theol." III. 792 sq.

elapsed, there will be great wickedness again, as if all the enemies and persecutors of Christ had reappeared on earth. This is the second resurrection, described in the following verses; namely, Rev. xx. 8, 9.¹

Against the second theory of the pre-millennial advent of Christ may be urged the following considerations:—

(1) It is inconsistent with the fact that the kingdom of Christ has already been set up. — (Acts ii. 29–36; iii. 13, 15; iv. 26, 28; v. 29, 31; Heb. x. 12, 13; Rev. iii. 7–12.)

(2) It is inconsistent with the language of Peter (2 Ep. iii. 10–13). For this language predicts such a dissolving of the earth by fire as will make it a new earth, if the new earth be not rather wholly distinct from it.

(3) It is inconsistent with the passages which connect the second advent of Christ with the resurrection and general judgment (Dan. xii. 2; John v. 28, 29; Matt. xxv. 31–46; Rev. xx. 11 sq.).

(4) It is inconsistent with those passages which represent the Jewish sacrifices and priesthood as superseded by the work of Christ (Heb. vii. 12, 22, 24; x. 14). For the principle of literal interpretation on which this view of the second advent chiefly rests requires its advocates to concede the resumption of Jewish sacrifices in Jerusalem. — (See Ezek. xliii. 18 sq.).

IV. THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD.

By this is meant the restoration of man to his normal condition, as a complex being, or a reunion of body and spirit. Our knowledge of this subject is derived entirely from the Scriptures, and may be comprehended in a few brief, but extremely important statements.

1. *There will be a resurrection of all the dead.* (a) Of the righteous (Luke xiv. 14; xx. 34 sq.; John vi. 54; xi. 23 sq.; 1 Cor. vi. 14; xv. 1–58; 2 Cor. iv. 14; Phil. iii. 11; 1 Thess. iv. 14, 15). And (b) of the wicked. John v. 28, 29; Acts xxiv. 15 (cf. Dan. xii. 2; Rev. xx. 13).

¹ See Fuller (A.) "Works," Vol. III. p. 29.

In respect to the righteous, the testimony is certainly ample and unambiguous. If it were necessary, it could be increased; but every one will regard it as sufficient.

In respect to the wicked, it is limited to a few passages; but these are clear. The words of Christ are entirely decisive; for it seems impossible to assign them any other meaning. Equally clear is the language of Paul before Felix.

How this statement of the apostle is to be reconciled with the testimony of Josephus concerning the doctrine of the Pharisees¹ may not be obvious, but it is conclusive as to Paul's belief.

Perhaps the Pharisees laid principal stress on the resurrection of the just, and were all united on that point; while many, or even most of them held, though with less confidence, to the resurrection of the unjust also. In this case, Paul could utter his own belief, as agreeing substantially with theirs, and could hope for their sympathy, as against the Sadducees.

2. *The dead will be raised at the end of the present world.* And by the "present world" is meant the present order of things which will be changed at the second coming of Christ (John v. 29; Matt. xxv. 46; John xi. 24; Acts xvii. 31; 1 Cor. xv. 23, 24, 52; 1 Thess. iv. 16, 17; 2 Thess. i. 7-9; 2 Peter iii. 7; and perhaps Rev. xx. 11 sq.).

Of course the believers in a premillennial advent of Christ teach that the resurrection of the just antedates that of the unjust, by the period of a thousand years; but they affirm that the present world, or dispensation, ends with the premillennial advent of Christ, and only postpone the resurrection of the wicked a thousand years.

We have expressed our dissent from their view, and believe that, according to the Scriptures, all the dead will be raised at the same time. By the expression, "the same time," however, we do not mean to assert any thing in respect to the amount of time employed in raising the dead, or in respect to the exact order of this miraculous work; but only that the

¹ Antiq. XVIII. 1, 3; Wars II. 8, 14.

Scriptures, on the whole, assign the resurrection of all to the same period. It may be an instantaneous, it may be a gradual process.

3. *The bodies raised will be real and material organisms, additional to the spirit* (1 Cor. xv. 36, 38). Not only does the language of these verses point to such organisms, but the term "body" itself can be reasonably understood to mean nothing else. There are many Christians who do not understand this; but they are probably misled by the word "spiritual" in 1 Cor. xv. 44.¹

4. *Their raised bodies will be very different from their earthly ones* (1 Cor. xv. 42-54; Phil. iii. 21; 1 Cor. vi. 13). It is not easy to overstate the difference between the present and the future bodies of the saints. The language of the Scriptures seems to us very strong. The present are earthy, corruptible, weak; the future will be celestial, incorruptible, glorious, rendering men like angels.

5. *Their raised bodies will be adapted to spirit-life, as their present bodies are to animal life* (1 Cor. xv. 44). A physical body is an organ for the psyche, or animal life; a spiritual body is an organ for the pneuma, or rational spirit. This is the distinction laid down by the apostle; and it is the most important and comprehensive one named by him. Indeed, it includes all the rest, and deserves the closest study.

6. *Their raised bodies will have some connection with the present ones, serving at least to identify the two.* Such is the impression made upon our minds by the language of Scripture; but whether this connection will be due to identity in any of the particles of matter, we do not certainly know. In some instances, as in Christ's glorified body, we may affirm that identity; but it may be going too far to affirm

Compare Augustine "De Civitate Dei," XIII. 20, 22. "For as spirit that serves flesh is called carnal, so flesh that serves spirit is called spiritual; not because it is converted into spirit, but because it is subject to spirit with a supreme and marvellous facility of obeying, having no sense of weariness, no liability to decay, and no tardiness of motion."—"Surely Christian faith doubts not in respect to the Saviour himself, that even after his resurrection, he still, in spiritual but true flesh, took both food and drink with his disciples."

it in all, or to find in it *the* identity which was in the mind of the Spirit, when moving and guiding the sacred writers in their work.¹

R. We have no special instruction as to the sort of bodies which unbelievers will possess hereafter; yet, though they will be immortal, it can hardly be supposed that they will be glorious.

V. THE LAST JUDGMENT.

I. *There will be such a judgment under Christ* (Matt. xxv. 31 sq.; John v. 22, 27, 29; Acts xvii. 31; Rom. xiv. 9, 10). These portions of Scripture refer in plain words to a future judgment, and also declare that Christ will be the judge. Some of them appear to emphasize his human nature as in some way making it specially suitable for him to fill that office,—whether because honor should be put upon his suffering humanity, or because his human sympathy would make him a merciful judge, is supposed to be doubtful; but the former reason is suggested by the passage in John. In one place he is called *ἀνὴρ*, but elsewhere *ἀνθρώπος*.

According to certain expressions of Scripture, it is thought that Christians will first be judged, and then take part with Christ in judging the wicked (Matt. xix. 28; Luke xxii. 30; 1 Cor. vi. 2, 3 (cf. Matt. xxv. 21, 23; Luke xix. 17–19; Rom. v. 17; Rev. xxii. 5). It is not easy to determine the exact sense of these statements; for example, whether they refer to the judgment itself, or to something which may precede or

¹ Gouldburn (E. M.) "The Doctrine of the Resurrection of the Same Body," &c.; Brown (J.) "The Resurrection of Life," 1 Cor. xv.; "A Masterpiece and Model of Exegesis," Jour. of Sac. Lit.; Hanna (W.) "The Doctrine of the Resurrection," Discourses on 1 Cor. xv.; Edwards and Parks, "Selections from German Literature"; "The Doctrine of the Resurrection of the Dead," by L. I. Rückert; Bib. Sac. 1852, "The Resurrection of the Body," by D. R. Goodwin; Bap. Quarterly, I. pp. 385–399, "The Resurrection of the Dead," by A. Hovey; Bush (Geo.) "Anastasis: or the Doc. of a Res. of the Body rationally and scripturally considered"; Schöberlein (L.) "Über das Wesen der geistlichen Natur und Leiblichkeit," in the Jahrbücher für Theologie," VI. (1861); Hamberger (J.) "Die Rationalität des Begriffes der himmlischen Leiblichkeit," in "Jahrbücher," VIII. and "Die Wichtigkeit des Begriffes der himmlischen Leiblichkeit für die Theologie," in "Jahrbücher," XII.

follow that crisis; or whether some of them refer to one thing, and others to another.

2. *It will be a general judgment.* All men of all ages of the world will be judged (Matt. xii. 36, 37; (Eccl. xii. 14); Matt. xxv. 32; Acts xvii. 31; Rom. xiv. 10; 2 Cor. v. 10; 2 Thess. i. 6-10; Rev. xx. 11-15).

The opinion of some that *πάντα τὰ ἔθνη*, in Matt. xxv. 32, refers to *unbelievers* exclusively—that is, to “all the nations” as distinguished from the elect,—is not well founded; for the principal arguments in favor of it are inconclusive, while those bearing against it are apparently conclusive.

Three considerations are pressed:—

(a) That the judgment of believers is described in the two preceding parables, from which this account differs essentially, and in such a way that it is complementary to them. No doubt this passage differs from the two parables that go before it. It is more nearly literal in form than they. It brings forward the Supreme Judge at the supreme moment in language befitting his greatness; but it does not read like a third parable on the same plane as those that go before it, and merely intended to fill out an account begun in them.

(b) That those on the right hand are represented as unconscious of having done any thing for Christ, while believers must be perfectly aware of having done many things for him. To this we reply, by saying that the language which Christ puts into the lips of his friends seems to us true to the *feeling* which must be in their hearts at that time. The language of the judge will be a surprise. All his previous grace to them will not prevent grateful wonder at the marvellous manner in which he will identify himself with the “least of his brethren,” and accept a service rendered to them as rendered truly to him.

(c) That believers are not to be judged with the rest of mankind, but are to take part with Christ in judging them. This is indeed true; at least, according to the most obvious sense of several passages; but the language of Christ in Matt. xxv. 31 sq. represents believers as judged before others;

and it is difficult to see why their own acceptance should interfere in the least with their participating in the subsequent act of judging unbelievers.

Against this interpretation, three facts may be urged; (1) That, according to verse 34, those on the right hand must be the elect; for they are invited by the judge to "inherit the kingdom prepared for them from the foundation of the world;" and it is evident that the kingdom referred to was prepared for God's chosen people (cf. John xiv. 2).

(2) That according to vv. 35-40, those on the right hand must have befriended Christians as the followers of Jesus. Any other view of the Saviour's words will be found unsatisfactory. They are plainly parallel to his saying in Matt. x. 40-42, "He that receiveth you receiveth me; and he that receiveth me receiveth him that sent me. He that receiveth a prophet in the name of a prophet shall receive a prophet's reward; and he that receiveth a righteous man in the name of a righteous man shall receive a righteous man's reward" (cf. Mark ix. 41, 42).

(3) That, according to vv. 43-45, those on the left were not heathen men, but persons who lived where there were Christians whom they knew to be followers of Jesus, and in need of their assistance.

Meyer goes to the opposite extreme, and holds that only those who profess to be followers of Christ are meant by "all the nations." (a) Because the decision respecting each class depends on the disposition manifested towards Jesus Christ, or, in other words, on love instead of faith. But there is no force in this circumstance; for faith and love are inseparable. Faith works by love; and, if faith is revealed in the conduct of life, it will be revealed, for the most part, by the exercise of love.

(b) Because those who are judged are represented collectively as the *flock* of Christ; for an oriental flock usually comprises both sheep and goats. To this it may be answered, *first*, that Christ as mediator is in a certain sense the head and shepherd of all mankind; and, *secondly*, that the descrip-

tion of the judgment here given introduces Christ as king, and brings forward the figure of a shepherd and his flock to illustrate but a single point,—the separation of one class from the other.

(c) Because the subjects to be judged are designated “all the nations”; and Christianity will be universal at the time of the *Parousia*. In response to this, it may be remarked, that there is no sufficient evidence of the universal prevalence of Christianity at the time of Christ’s second coming; indeed, many expressions of the sacred writers are apparently inconsistent with the view, that all nations will then be nominally Christian. But if they are all nominally Christian, can we suppose that they alone will be judged? Must we conclude that the generations of the dead are overlooked, because the word “nations” is used? Are they no part of “all the nations,” when one speaks of the coming of Christ?—(cf. 1 Thess. iv. 13–17; 2 Thess. i. 6–10; 1 Cor. xv. 51, 52; John v. 28, 29.)

3. *It will be a righteous judgment.* (Acts xvii. 31; Rom. ii. 6; 2 Cor. v. 10; Gal. vi. 7–10; Eph. vi. 8; Rev. ii. 23; xx. 12; xxii. 12 sq.) This fact should be frequently and earnestly asserted, when the last judgment is referred to. It should be urged with all possible emphasis, as a first truth of Christianity, that no man will be wronged in the least by the final sentence,—that every one will be sent to his own place. The final day will bring a *revelation* of the righteous judgment of God, and will thus render it forever impossible for the good to doubt his righteousness, or be troubled at the dark features of his providence. Such a judgment, vindicating the ways of God to men, and setting plainly before them the wonders of his holiness and grace, can only be effected at the end of the world.

Michel Angelo’s fresco of the Last Judgment in the Sistine Chapel is a failure at just this point; for it represents the judge as a being of dreadful decision and force, but gives no impression of what John Bunyan calls the “equitableness,” and “excellent righteousness,” which will make even

the lost "conclude that there is all the reason in the world" why "they should be shut out of heaven." It gives no impression of either holiness or tenderness in "the Son of Man." Many have looked upon this as a grave defect in that powerful work.

Yet the language of Dr. Lillie on Peter is in accord with the Sistine fresco. "The man that meets his descending judge, unreconciled and alienated from the life and love of God, shall be hurried forth by whirlwinds to a waste, howling wilderness, — a dry, parched land where no water is — where no light of the sun nor of the stars appears; where no sleep refreshes, and hope never comes: but, as the blighted soul wanders on through eternity, the only memorial of the existence of Him who is Almighty will be the ever-thickening reverberations, bursting all around its path, of that voice of doom, 'Depart from me!'" ("Lectures on the Epistles of Peter," p. 236.)

4. *It will follow after the resurrection of the dead.* This must be the case, if there is to be a general judgment at all; and it seems to be a natural inference from the several passages of the New Testament which refer to the resurrection and the judgment. — (See Rev. xx. 12 sq.)

VI. THE FINAL STATE OF UNBELIEVERS.

On this subject, the Bible teaches, —

1. *That the state in question begins directly after the last judgment* (Matt. xxv. 41, 46; Rev. xx. 10–15; Rom. ii. 5–16). It does not seem possible to find in these passages any other sense than the one adopted in our statement. The very idea of such a judgment carries with it retribution as its consequence, and without any further offer of pardon.

2. *That it continues the same in kind forever.* Matt. xxv. 46; Mark ix. 43–48; Rev. xx. 10, 15; xxii. 11, 15 (cf. Matt. xii. 32; xxvi. 24; Luke xvi. 26; John viii. 21; 1 John v. 16). According to the passage in Luke, a gulf of some kind separates the unbelieving from believers in the middle state; and that gulf is for some reason impassable: much more, then,

will the good and the bad be separated by an impassable gulf after the last day.¹

3. *That in it the wicked will be conscious of great misery.* Dan. xii. 2; Matt. xxv. 46; Mark ix. 43-48; Rev. xx. 10, 15; xxi. 8; xxii. 15 (cf. Matt. xxii. 13; xxv. 30).

What Bishop Butler remarked in the last century is no less true in this; namely, "There is, in the present age, a certain fearlessness with regard to what may be hereafter under the government of God, which nothing but a universally acknowledged demonstration on the side of atheism can justify; and which makes it quite necessary that men be reminded, and, if possible, made to feel, that there is no sort of ground for being thus presumptuous, even upon the most sceptical principles." — ("Analogy," Part I. ch. II). Hence the necessity of bringing forward distinctly God's word on this point.

And, though the language employed by the sacred writers is figurative, and cannot therefore be used to prove the *kind* of suffering which the wicked will endure hereafter, it must be presumed to give us some just idea of its greatness and dreadfulness; it must be fitted to awaken in our souls such a dread as the reality ought to awaken, and would awaken, if we had a proper conception of it.

4. *That some of the wicked will suffer greater punishment than others* (Luke xii. 47, 48; Matt. xi. 21-24; Heb. x. 29). In this statement, we assume (a) That some unbelievers in Christ are more guilty than others, since they have rejected him in the face of clearer light, and therefore

¹ Whiton (J. M.) "Is Eternal Punishment Endless?" Stuart (M.) "Essays on Future Punishment"; Erbkam (H.) "Ueber die Lehre von der ewigen Verdammniss ein dogmatische Versuch," St. u. Kr. 1838, s. 384 ff.; Thompson (J. P.) "Love and Penalty"; Long (C.) "Objections from Reason against the Endless Punishment of the Wicked"; Hovey (A.) "State of the Impenitent Dead"; Dexter (H. M.) "The Verdict of Reason," &c.; Bartlett (S. C.) "Life and Death Eternal"; Parker (J.) "Ecce Deus," ch. XIV.; Hoppin (J. M.) "The Future State," Bib. Sac. XV. p. 381 sq.; Barrows (E. P.) "The Scriptural Doctrine of a Future State," Bib. Sac. XV. p. 625 sq.; Alger (W. R.) "History of the Doctrine of a Future Life," *passim*; Jackson (Wm.) "The Doctrine of Retribution"; Schaff (P.) "Die Sünde wider den heiligen Geist."

with greater opposition to the revealed character of God. (b) That retribution in the final state will be strictly just, — no one suffering a particle of anguish more than he ought to suffer.

But it is to be borne in mind, that sin, as well as suffering for sin, may be eternal;¹ and it is not impossible that some who have hated God less than others in this life may overtake in wickedness their more guilty companions hereafter. If so, their misery will surely equal that of their companions; for no one's accountability will come to an end at the last day. Moral beings must be forever under obligation to do perfectly the will of God; for that will is holy: and, if they refuse to do it, they must forever experience the reproach of conscience for their refusal.²

This view of the case seems to imply, that the misery of the lost will increase from æon to æon; and it must be conceded that all we know of the human soul and of divine righteousness points to such an increase. But just what will be the result of sin and of woe in the final state, no one of the sacred writers has informed us. Whether the wicked will always seek for more knowledge, or rather as far as possible shun the light, can only be conjectured. Preferring to remain the enemies of God, they may nevertheless despair of improving their condition, and so make no effort to enter new fields of thought. A sense of shame and of guilt may brood over them, and turn their attention to the past rather than to the future. Opportunities to do evil, except in thought, may be cut off, and their minds be chiefly occupied with what they "might have been," — with what they have lost, and with the conviction that they have no excuse for their sin and folly.

Objections are often urged against the doctrine of endless

¹ Mark iii. 29, Alford translates, "but is guilty of eternal sin"; which may signify sin that will never end, — sin that sets the soul forever against God, and which grace will never reach.

² Cheever (G. B.) "The Powers of the World to Come," *Bibl. Repository and Class. Rev.* 3d. Series, Vol. V. pp. 651-668; Vol. VI. pp. 75-99; 457-474; and *Bib. Sac.* Vol. VIII. pp. 471-491.

punishment, as being inconsistent with the justice and goodness of God. These objections are so stated as to seem very conclusive; but, in reply to them, it may be said,—

(a) That, while the moral judgment of man is able to approve right action, and condemn wrong action, it does not pretend to know the amount of punishment which the latter deserves.

(b) That conscience is of such a nature that it must forever condemn any act of sin; and, therefore, unless that act of sin be repented of, and forgiven, or the moral constitution of man be destroyed, the sinner must forever experience remorse of conscience. He may say, "Evil, be thou my good;" but he will never cease to know that he sins in doing this.

"So I sit alone with my conscience
In the place where the years increase;
And I try to remember the future
In the land where time will cease.

"And I know of the future judgment,
How dreadful soe'er it be,
That to sit alone with my conscience,
Will be judgment enough for me."

— *Charles W. Stubbs.*

But, to be more specific, we remark,—

(c) That impenitence for sin is sin, and must be condemned by conscience as long as this impenitence continues. The same is likewise true of want of love to God, which inevitably passes over into hatred of God; while hatred of God is hatred of holiness, and must be forever recognized by the moral nature of man as wrong and without excuse. If impenitence continue, punishment will continue; for it is involved in the constitution of the soul: so of hatred to God, and punishment for the same.

(d) That there is no ground for a belief, that, after the last judgment, any one will repent. This is said (1) Because the will of man tends to act in the same moral direction which it has become accustomed to follow. Thus, in a certain sense, man becomes more and more the servant of sin the longer he

continues in sin. (2) Because punishment appears to have very little, if any tendency, to work reformation in offenders. It often deters from crime, but it rarely brings one to genuine repentance. (3) That during the middle state, if at any time after this life, a return to God might be expected; yet the language of Scripture does not permit us to expect it then (Luke xvi. 26).

VII. THE FINAL STATE OF BELIEVERS.

A glimpse of what that state will be is afforded us by such texts as the following (Matt. xxv. 46; John v. 29; 1 Cor. xv. 51 sq.; 1 Thess. iv. 16-18; 2 Thess. i. 6-10; 2 Tim. iv. 8; Rev. xxi. 1 sq.). From these portions of Holy Writ, however figurative they may be, we may safely conclude:—¹

1. *That this state begins directly after the last judgment.* On this point we suppose there is no disagreement among Christians, certainly none among Protestant Christians. The Papal church ought to place the last judgment long after the end of the world, that the souls of the pious dead may escape from *purgatory* before it; or else to remand some of the pious to purgatory for a time after the judgment.

2. *That it continues the same in kind forever.* “Ibi esse nostrum non habebit mortem, ibi nosse nostrum non habebit errorem, ibi amare nostrum non habebit offensionem.”—(Augustine De Cir. Dei, xi. 28.) Let such a state be endless, and it is heaven. The immutability of the saints in holiness and blessedness is perfectly consistent with the very highest degree of moral freedom and activity. To do the will of God will be their supreme delight, and their growing knowledge of his ways will be a source of unfailing joy.

3. *That in it believers will enjoy perfect blessedness.* To use the language of Roger Williams, in that final state believers will enjoy forever “the holy and sweet presence of

¹ See also Mant (R.) “The Happiness of the Blessed”; Baxter (R.) “The Saints’ Everlasting Rest”; Bonar (H.) “The Eternal Day”; Harbaugh (H.) “Heaven,” &c., 3 vols.; Dick (T.) “The Philosophy of a Future State”; Taylor (I.) “Physical Theory of a Future Life.”

the Father of lights." Just how this presence will be manifested, we cannot tell. The "beatific vision" of God is now inconceivable.

Yet something is meant by "seeing as we are seen, and knowing as we are known" (1 Cor. xiii. 12). And it is quite credible that the nature of God may be as clearly revealed to our spiritual eye hereafter as the nature of any material object is revealed to the eye of sense here. Says Bishop Pearson, "*Invisibilitas essentialis divinæ non tollit clarem visionem intellectualem in statu supernaturali,*" quoted by Ellicott, on 1 Tim. vi. 16. This, at least, may be confidently affirmed, that the blessed and glorified Redeemer will be an object of direct vision and of perfect beauty.

"Now just as the gates were opened to let in the men, I looked in after them, and, behold, the city shone like the sun. The streets also were paved with gold; and in them walked many men, with crowns on their heads, palms in their hands, and golden harps to sing praises withal.

"There were also of them that had wings; and they answered one another without intermission, saying, 'Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord' (Rev. iv. 8). And after that, they shut up the gates; which, when I had seen, I wished myself among them." — "And there shalt thou, oh my mansoul! have such communion with me, with my Father, and with your Lord Secretary, as is not possible here to be enjoyed." — (Bunyan.)

4. *That this blessedness will be proportioned to their fidelity on earth* (Dan. xii. 3; Rom. ii. 6, 7; Phil. iv. 1; 1 Thess. ii. 19, 20). It might be enough to say, that the quality and degree of their blessedness will depend in some measure on their fidelity in this life; for this may not be the only thing that will affect that blessedness: original capacity may have something to do with it. A knowledge of human sinfulness and divine grace, due to the providence of God rather than to personal service, may have much to do with it; but holy living amid the trials of earth will surely augment the bliss of those who have washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb.

5. *That this blessedness will be forever increasing.* For the soul will be restored to its normal condition, ever adding to its knowledge, and thereby to its happiness.

“She recommenced: We from the greatest body
Have issued to the heaven that is pure light, —
Light intellectual replete with love,
Love of true good replete with ecstasy,
Ecstasy that transcendeth every sweetness.”

— *Dante, Paradiso, xxx. 38 sq.*

CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

INTRODUCTION.

CHRISTIAN ethics is the science of Christian conduct, the latter expression being used in its broadest sense. The term "ethics" is thus synonymous with "morals," "morality," or "moral philosophy."

This science is founded on the moral teachings of the Bible, illustrated by the life of Jesus Christ.

The New Testament is naturally the best guide to Christian conduct for men of all nations and times; but the Old Testament reveals, in its own way, the essential principles of morality, though modified in their application by the character of the Jewish theocracy.

In the order of logical study, Christian ethics must follow Christian theology. For theology treats of God and his grace, while Christian ethics treats of man under the influence of that grace; the former deals with the Giver and the giving of true moral life; the latter with the growth and expression of that life.

The various theories of moral science differ from one another primarily in respect to *the original ground or principle of right*; that is, the reason — back of which we cannot go — why any act or feeling is to be considered right or wrong. Hence a brief discussion of this point is necessary.

For assuming that the manner of life enjoined by the Scriptures, and illustrated by Christ is right, we may still ask, Why is it right? Is such a life right in view of its end; that is, because it tends to something good other than right character or conduct, and will issue in that good? Or is it right in view of itself; that is, because it is good and desirable *per*

se? And, if it be pronounced good in itself, can we say that it is good independently of the actual nature of God, and the actual constitution of the universe?

For different answers to these questions, see the works mentioned below:¹ —

Without stopping to criticise other views, it is enough for our purpose to say that the Scriptures seem to make the moral nature of God the original ground of right. For, —

1. They propose the holiness of God as an all-sufficient reason why men should be holy. And it is quite noteworthy, that, when his holiness is appealed to as an argument for holiness in man, no other reason is added (Lev. xi. 44, 45; xix. 2; xx. 7, 26; Matt. v. 48; 1 Peter i. 14-16; also Gen. i. 26, 27; Eph. iv. 24; Col. iii. 10; 2 Peter i. 4).

2. They enjoin upon men the duty of supreme love to God. Here again it is noteworthy, that the duty of honoring abstract right, eternal order, or natural law is never urged by them as tantamount to honoring God (Deut. x. 12; xi. 1, 13, 22; xix. 9; xxx. 6; Matt. xxii. 37; Luke x. 27; 1 John v. 3; iv. 19; Rom. i. 18, 20).

3. They represent Christ as absorbed in doing joyfully the will of God. His language and bearing carry our minds up to God the Father as a person; and not to God, and the immutable right, as something beside him (John iv. 34; viii. 29; xv. 10; Matt. xi. 25; Luke x. 21; Heb. x. 7).

These three classes of passages favor the view that the moral nature of God, which finds expression in his will, is

¹ Wardlaw (R.) "Christian Ethics," &c.; Mackintosh (Sir James) "A General View of the Progress of Ethical Philosophy," &c.; Whewell (Wm.) "Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England," &c.; Jouffroy (Theo.) "Introduction to Ethics," &c.; Lecky (W. E. H.) "History of European Morals," &c., ch. I.; Hopkins (M.) "Lectures on Moral Science"; also "The Law of Love, and Love as Law"; Butler (Bp. Jos.) "Sermons upon Human Nature"; Wayland (F.) "Moral Science"; Hickok (L. P.) "Moral Science"; Alexander (A.) "Outlines of Moral Science"; Haven (J.) "Moral Philosophy"; Harless (C. A.) "System of Christian Ethics"; Cobbe (Miss F. P.) "Studies New and Old," &c.; Martineau (Jas.) "Studies of Christianity," p. 299 *seq.*; Calderwood (H.) "Handbook of Moral Philosophy"; Blackie (J. S.) "Four Phases of Morals"; Rothe (R.) "Theologische Ethik."

ultimate, — the proper and original ground of right; and this view is certainly in accord with the general tone and spirit of the sacred writers.

But it is sometimes objected that men have a natural intuition of the right, and recognize it as something independent of God (Rom. ii. 14, 15; Luke xii. 57).

Our reply is (1) that the power of moral intuition is from God, and is one of the means by which he reveals to us what is approved by himself; (2) that as men often know phenomena or effects without knowing their cause, so they may perceive the existence of a law without recognizing the law-giver. But as the question is one of some difficulty, as well as importance, we can afford to look at it a little longer.

In doing this, we begin with the words of Secretan; namely, "The distinction of good and evil has been established by the divine will. To suppose moral order pre-existent and supreme would be to make moral order God. To suppose them eternally simultaneous would be to divide the sovereignty of the universe between abstract law and the Being consenting to it." The last two of these sentences appear to us correct statements. — (See also the "Office of Law," by the Rev. L. B. Tefft, in "The Baptist Quarterly," II. p. 476 *seq.*)

We regard the nature of God as the one *fons naturarum*, the absolutely original and sole reality, beyond which we should never seek to go in thought. But, since God has made men in his own image, they see that which he approves to be right, and cannot, without destroying their own nature, see otherwise. Yet this remark applies only to principles, and not to their various applications.

We do not, however, suppose that moral right, and moral law, its expression, are related to the consciousness of God just as they are to our consciousness. The moral law is a free expression of his will to others, and therefore in the fullest and strictest sense it is from him, under him, dependent on him, and immutable only as he is immutable; while the same law comes down upon us from his mind and will,

imposing itself on our consciences, and therefore is over us, and independent of us.

But it is important to bear in mind always, that we are so constituted that what the law enjoins we look upon as in its own nature good and right, and therefore fit to be enjoined. Hence we do not believe that the law has made right to be right, but has only expressed it as such; nor could it be different, and yet be right, any more than God could be different and still be God.

Yet we do not know whether it is, or is not, logically conceivable, that the nature of God might have been different from what it is, approving what it now disapproves, and disapproving what it approves. But, if it had been so, it is plain that we, having been made in his image, must have regarded that as good and right which we now look upon as evil and wrong. That is to say, a morally different Creator would have insured a morally different creation. This is self-evident.

Whether it would have been as good as the actual one, we cannot tell; for our faculties are utterly incompetent to judge or even conceive of it in any definite way. We must see with the moral eye which God has given us; must see facts and laws and principles *as they are*, the moral universe *as it is*. And, being ourselves a part of the moral universe as it is, we cannot but regard God and his moral law as perfect and immutable.

It may be added briefly, that we hold, —

(1) With Hickok, that whatever is right is worthy of man's spiritual nature; but against him we say, it is worthy of that nature because it is right, and not right because it is worthy of that nature.

(2) With Smith, that whatever is right excites a peculiar feeling in us, namely, that of approbation; but against him we say, that this feeling is due to a judgment or cognition of the rightness of the act, instead of the judgment being due to the feeling.

(3) With Dwight, that whatever is right is conducive to the greatest good; but against him, that under God, and by his providence, it is conducive to the greatest good because it is

right, and not right simply because it is conducive to the greatest good.

(4) With Price, that whatever is right comports with the nature and fitness of things ; but against him, that the very nature and fitness of things are due to the action of God, and express his will, instead of his nature and will being due to the fitness of things.

(5) With Paley, that whatever is right is required by the will of God ; but against him, that God's will expresses an unchangeable and rational nature, — the source of our own.

(6) With Paley, that whatever is right is useful to us ; but against him, that it is not right simply because it is useful to us, but under God it is useful to us because it is right.

Having ascertained from the Scriptures the original ground of right and wrong, our next step is to find *the supreme rule of right*. And this, if we are correct as to the ground, must be the revealed will of God, — a will revealed partly by nature, and more fully by the sacred record. In support of this statement, we may appeal, —

(1) To the common judgment of Christians. For there are very few points on which they are better agreed than on this, — that the will of God is the rule of right.

(2) To the general consent of ethical writers. For most of these writers distinctly admit the truth of our statement.

(3) To the testimony of God's word. This appears to be very plain and consistent from first to last. — (See, for example, Mark iii. 35 ; Luke xxii. 42 ; Acts xxi. 14 ; Ps. i. 2 ; cxliii. 11 ; Rom. vii. 10–12 ; ix. 20 *seq.* ; 1 John iii. 4, 20 ; 1 Cor. iv. 3, 4 ; Acts xxvi. 9–11 ; also 1 Cor. xv. 9 ; Eph. iii. 8 ; John xii. 28).

The will of God as to Christian duty *is revealed in nature*, —

(1) By the original testimony of conscience to the existence of a moral quality in human conduct, and of man's duty to be and to do right. This testimony assures every man, also, that he ought to seek light in regard to his duty from every source open to him ; and the Saviour has taught us why it is

unheeded (John iii. 19, 20). Without it, however, the ignorant might remain ignorant, in many instances at least, and yet be blameless.

Says Pres. Chadbourne ("Instinct in Animals and Men," p. 264), "While obligation must have light from the comprehending power, it does not wait for that light to come, or not, as some lower impulse may determine; but with royal voice it demands more light every instant of time; it demands all the light the comprehending power can give; it will be satisfied with nothing less; and it increases its demands as the capacity of the comprehending power increases, when used in the best manner possible. Can any thing be more beautiful than this *double action* of obligation in the system of means? It does not make man a perfect being, as to knowledge; but it is beautiful as the means of constant progress toward perfection. There is resting upon man, evermore, the obligation to do right, and to secure knowledge that he may know what is right." — (See also Rom. ii. 14, 15, the classic passage on this point; and Hofmann, "Die Lehre von der Gewissen.")

Yet it must be admitted that conscience affords by itself but little ethical knowledge; namely, that there is a moral quality in conduct, that man ought to do right and be right, and that he is bound to seek the knowledge which will assist him to do right.

(2) By the working of natural sympathies and impulses, For these sympathies, when normal, indicate the will of God, and can therefore be used as sources of light to moral judgment. The conjugal, parental, and filial instincts may be named as the most important in this respect. Yet these affections and sympathies teach but little perfectly; for sin has marred their character, and thereby diminished the clearness and fulness of their testimony.

(3) By the relations which God has established between living beings. These relations may be studied as they exist in families and nations; indeed, wherever living beings of any race have any thing to do with one another. But the knowledge thus attainable is obscured by the complexity of the

relations to be studied, and the disturbance which they have suffered from sin.

The will of God is also *revealed in the Scriptures*, —

(1) By a clear statement of moral principles. These principles are so comprehensive, that, when properly applied, they always guide the inquirer in the way of duty.

(2) By special rules, showing the application of said principles in particular instances.

(3) By the life of Christ, the one example of perfect conduct among men. This is perhaps the most important source of ethical truth in the Scriptures.

Thus, in a very simple manner, the sacred record rectifies, completes, and confirms the knowledge derivable from other sources, and proves itself to be an inexhaustible fountain of ethical light or truth.

The sources of ethical knowledge seem, therefore, to be ample; yet in no man on earth is this knowledge perfect, —

(1) Because no man seeks it with a zeal proportioned to its importance. Sin has weakened our desire to know the will of God.

(2) Because no man has moral powers unimpaired by sin. Evil propensities have warped the moral judgment, and led to imperfect views of truth and duty.

(3) Because many of our race have not the Holy Scriptures, but only the light of nature.

This imperfection of ethical knowledge has doubtless to some extent an unfavorable bearing on the conduct of Christians (1 John iii. 2; and comp. 1 Cor. xiii. 12; 2 Cor. iii. 18; Phil. i. 10). Hence they should seek to acquaint themselves with the principles of Christian morality.

The imperfection of their ethical knowledge affects the form, rather than the substance, of the conduct of unbelievers (Rom. i. 18–32; vii. 8; Gal. iii. 19).

Imperfection of ethical knowledge can modify one's responsibility for his conduct only in so far as the former is due to causes beyond his control (John iii. 19, 20; Rom. i. 28). For instance, a man who in a fit of drunkenness kills a neighbor

may be guilty of murder, though a part of his guilt belongs to the act of drinking.

But, as due to causes beyond his control, no man's ignorance of duty is so complete as to destroy his responsibility for evil conduct.—(See Luke xii. 48; John ix. 41; Rom. i. 19 *seq.*; ii. 15 *seq.*; Acts xxvi. 9; comp. 1 Cor. xv. 9.) Yet in so far as it is due to such causes, it diminishes his guilt in the sight of God (Matt. xx. 20–24; Luke xii. 47, 48; John iii. 19; xv. 22, 24; Rom. ii. 12; iv. 15; v. 13; 2 Tim. iii. 13; James iv. 17.)

Finally, the grand distinction of Christian conduct is this: it is rooted in faith, and sustained by divine grace. Faith works by love. The former receives; the latter gives. The former sustains; the latter acts. Moreover, gratitude for love quickens returning love (2 Cor. v. 14; 1 John iv. 19). Hence the possibility of a gradual transition from sin to holiness.

“Gradual,” we say, because if we reason from the conscious experience of believers, this change seems to be thus effected in a majority of instances, because it is represented in the New Testament as a growth in the grace and knowledge of Christ, as a progress from childhood to maturity, as a renewal of the inner man from day to day, as a transformation from glory to glory into the image of Christ, as a race and a conflict, and because we are assured that all things work together for good to them that love God; a statement which appears to be true of every Christian, though it is certain that the conscious progress of some is so slow as to be imperceptible, except at long intervals.

In the further study of Christian ethics, the works named below may be consulted:¹—

¹Harless (G. C. A.) “Christian Ethics”; Schmid (C. F.) “Christliche Sittenlehre”; Martensen, “Christian Ethics”; Wuttke (Adolf) “Christian Ethics”; Rothe (R.) “Theologische Ethik”; Wardlaw (R.) “Christian Ethics”; Sartorius (E.) “Die Lehre von der heiligen Liebe”; Row (C. A.) “Moral Teaching of the New Testament”; Wilkins (A. S.) “The Light of the World”; Luthardt (C. E.) “The Moral Truths of Christianity”; Dale (R. W.) “The Ten Commandments”; Gregory (D. S.) “Christian Ethics.”

CHAPTER I.

CHRISTIAN CONDUCT WITH REFERENCE TO GOD.

THE leading passages of Scripture bearing upon this topic may be gathered into three groups, namely:—

(1) Deut. x. 12, 13; Matt. xxii. 37; Luke x. 27.

(2) 1 Cor. x. 31; 1 John v. 2, 3; John xiv. 23; xv. 10, 14.

(3) Eph. vi. 18; Phil. iv. 6; Col. iv. 2; 1 Thess. v. 16; 1 Tim. ii. 8.

The *first* of these groups evidently requires of Christians a love to God commensurate with the utmost natural power of man to love. This love comprises in itself (1) a clear view of God's moral perfection; (2) a profound admiration of his character; (3) a peculiar delight in his presence; and (4) a high regard for his honor. The Saviour makes all our duties to God depend upon love, because love will lead us to perform them all; or, better perhaps, because it is the condition of their performance. Without it, conscience dictates in vain; with it, conscience always rules the will.

The *second* group requires of Christians not only a reverent obedience to the commands of God, but a purpose to honor him by all their conduct. Is the latter practicable? We reply, that the honor of God may be the ruling motive of every action, though the mind does not always have that end consciously in view.

For (1) a series of actions is often embraced in a single purpose; and the right doing of those acts may at times absorb the mind, so that the end sought by them all is lost sight of. Yet the one ruling purpose may pervade the whole series, and give character to it all. Nay, it is possible that the mind may have consciously in view a great end, and be moved by a deep love, without being distinctly conscious of its own state; and in certain circumstances this may be the very highest kind of Christian action.

And (2) many duties are so unquestionable, and constantly recurring, that they may be performed as a matter of course, without a thought of the supreme end. Of this character are numberless social and domestic duties. Perhaps, however, it would be right and easy to connect them more frequently in thought with God, who has established our social and domestic relations.

The whole spirit and bearing of Oliver Cromwell are said to have risen with his advancement to higher stations of power and trust. Charles Sumner is supposed by some to have never lost for a moment the feeling that he was a senator of the United States. A poor German wood-sawyer arrested the attention of a young Jewish scholar by the noble and happy expression of his countenance while engaged in his work; and when asked to explain it, replied, "I am a King's son." He was a Christian who rejoiced in the privilege of adoption.

While, then, the requirement that we should always act with reference to the honor of God is not unreasonable, it is exceedingly comprehensive; and no Christian in this life does more than advance towards a fulfilment of it.

The *last* group enjoins upon the followers of Christ unceasing worship or prayer. Is this possible? Certainly not as an outward service, and probably not as a form of conscious mental action. Yet, in a certain intelligible sense, the whole life may be, in the words of Origen, "one connected prayer"; but only if the word "prayer" is understood to include praise, and giving of thanks, as well as petition and states of heart, half-conscious, as well as separate acts. As every Christian knows, there is a tone of thought and feeling which may be characterized as devout and prayerful,—a perpetual uplooking and uprising of the soul to God,—which do not interfere with any duty to man. All this may be called prayer, and associated with what has been said in the outlines of secret prayer.

But Christian conduct embraces the duty of *public* or *social*, as well as of secret worship. And public worship should be

simple, direct, earnest, and reverent. In the strictly devotional parts of such worship,—that is, in prayer and singing,—God himself should be the chief object of thought. The spirit should be turned fervently to him; and, if it is, the worship will be such as we have described, for no other will satisfy the worshipper. “The most eloquent prayer,” &c., would be unnatural. — (See Matt. vi. 5, 6.)

One who leads in social prayer should never address others through God, or choose his language to God with a view to convince or impress men; for this would be irreverent. Prayer to God is always primarily and chiefly for his ear. Hence the special danger in one feature of the woman’s crusade against intemperance. It must be very difficult, though perhaps not impossible, to pray in presence of the rumseller, without thinking much of the effect of the prayer itself upon his conscience, instead of looking simply to God for help. Prayer *with* a stubborn child is for the same reason difficult.

Again, it is quite true that genuine worship by prayer and song quickens the spiritual life of those who engage in it; but this is a result,—not the end consciously sought. The proximate end of praise is the honor of God; and the proximate end of petition is the blessing of God,—his interposition in some way for the suppliant, or for others. Hence, if prayer is to be sincere, and the best exercise of holy affections, it must not be offered for the sake of the benefit which there is in this exercise; it must not terminate in itself, but in God: the improvement of holy affection by prayer must be a result, and not an end.

Yet public worship implies a consciousness that others are taking part with the leader, and so a desire in him to assist their approach to God. Hence ecstatic devotion, excluding the sense of fellowship with men by the sense of Jehovah’s glory, is scarcely natural in public worship. Whoever conducts such worship should ordinarily be so far mindful of those who are expected to join in it as to fix his attention upon objects of common interest, and use language fit to be uttered by the common voice; in order that those who hear

may appropriate his words in silence, if not by an audible Amen at the close.

Remark. In this connection, it would be well to examine carefully the prayers, some private and some public, recorded in the Scriptures; and, in particular, the Book of Psalms.

CHAPTER II.

CHRISTIAN CONDUCT WITH REFERENCE TO ONE'S SELF.

FROM the circumstance that Christ makes love to one's self the standard of love to a fellow-man, two inferences may be drawn; namely, first, that he looked upon a certain degree of self-love as right; and, second, that he knew men were not deficient in that love.

Self-love is, indeed, far too strong in the heart of man unrenewed, — so strong as to be a passion, blind and tyrannical. But in the Christian it is not supreme, though it still exceeds the lawful measure, — that of love to one's neighbor. In what way, then, should the Christian have respect to his own character, improvement, and welfare in the conduct of life? This is the question which we are now to answer according to the intimations of God's word.

And it may be answered thus: in so far as Christians can properly have regard to themselves in their conduct, they should seek their own highest good, especially by aiming to render their whole nature, in body and spirit, perfect. But this general reply is too vague for our purpose. We must look at the subject in detail, beginning with the spiritual side of our being, and passing thence to the animal. We shall thus be led to consider the *moral* and *religious*, the *intellectual* and *aesthetic*, and finally the *bodily powers*, which are to be guarded and improved by right conduct.

The Scriptures always treat men as moral beings, able to distinguish between good and evil, right and wrong, and to

feel their obligation to do the one, and avoid the other. Moreover, they sometimes speak of that in their nature, by which they are able to do or feel this, as *conscience*. Acts xxiv. 16; Rom. ix. 1; 2 Cor. i. 12; 1 Tim. i. 5, 19; iii. 9; 2 Tim. i. 3; Heb. xiii. 18; 1 Peter iii. 16 (cf. 1 Cor. iv. 4; Heb. ix. 9, 14; x. 22; 1 Peter ii. 19; iii. 21).

The term, *συνείδησις*, means literally "a knowing with one's self,"—that is, "consciousness," then "conscience." Whewell says, "Conscience is the reason employed about questions of right and wrong, and accompanied with the sentiments of approbation and condemnation; which, by the nature of man, cling inextricably to his apprehension of right and wrong."—(Sys. Mor. Lect. VI. See Fleming's Vocab. of Phil. sub. v., and Hofmann's (R.) "Lehre von der Gewissen.")

Conscience may be regarded as discriminative, mandatory, and sensitive in its functions; but it will be enough for our present purpose to speak of it as discriminative and sensitive. These two functions must, however, be carefully distinguished; for it is one thing to see that a given course of conduct is right, and quite another to love it on that account. Hence the judicial power of conscience is sometimes good, when its tenderness is lost; and its tenderness is sometimes great, when its power of discrimination is feeble.

From some of the passages noted above, it appears that Christians should excel other men in soundness and purity of conscience, and that strict regard should be paid by them to the culture of their moral nature.

Hence it may be said, in the *first* place, that every Christian should bring his conscience, as a judicial power, to bear upon his whole life, secular and religious; and should assist this faculty to decide aright by every means within his reach. He should not only give the first place to the question, Is this or that contemplated action right? but he should aid his moral judgment by the use of all available knowledge, to answer this question correctly. Moreover, it will be his duty to pass judgment upon actions already performed by himself or by others, and, indeed, to study, if practicable, the whole

science of Christian ethics. In this way only can the judicial power of conscience be fitly cultivated.

And it may be said, in the *second* place, that every Christian should strictly obey the decisions of his own conscience. To this remark there can be no exception. It is impossible for any one to be without blame in doing that which he believes to be wrong. To deny the authority of conscience in a single instance is to pronounce the moral nature a wreck, and remove the actor beyond the sphere of responsibility. Yet we do not mean to say that the decisions of conscience are always right; this is far from true: yet, right or wrong, they are imperative. By careful obedience to conscience, its practical force and its continued sensitiveness are increased.

It may also be said, in the *third* place, that every Christian should abstain from such forms of mental action as tend in any way to injure the clearness or sensitiveness of his conscience. Any kind of study which rarely presents moral questions or phenomena may deny to this faculty the exercise necessary to its health and improvement. Moreover, conscience is a practical faculty: it was meant to produce or control action; and therefore it must have to do with real life far more than with ideal. Much reading of fiction is, therefore, unfavorable to its growth in power. For the same reason, no Christian can dwell in imagination upon scenes of cruelty, deception, or vice, without peril to conscience; much less can he witness such scenes very often without injury. Gladiatorial combats, bull-fights, horse-races even, are likely to harm the moral nature; and the same may be said of the stage.

But two points need to be recalled and supported by the language of Scripture, namely: —

(1) That the decisions of conscience are not always correct. Acts xxvi. 9 (cf. 1 Cor. xv. 9; 1 Tim. i. 13, 16.)

(2) That it is wrong for Christians to disregard the decisions of a weak conscience (1 Cor. viii. 7, 10, 12; x. 28, 29; Rom. ii. 15). If they are bound to respect such a conscience in others, it is plain that they should obey it when it is their own. To these we add, —

(3) That Christianity is the only religion which can fully purify and educate the conscience of man. — See 1 Tim. i. 5, 19; 2 Tim. i. 3; Heb. ix. 9, 14; x. 22; xiii. 18 (cf. 1 Tim. iv. 2; Tit. i. 15); for it insists on a perfect moral standard, while it brings the believer, though still imperfect, into favor with God through Christ, and gives him hope of ultimate holiness.

But, though morality and religion are so united that neither can prosper without the other, they are not, as many believe, identical. We are able to distinguish between trust in Christ, and a sense of duty to him; between love to God, and a conviction that he ought to be loved; between the effect of divine grace as a state of the heart, and the act of seeking that grace, or of manifesting that state.

Though devout affections are due to the grace of God, they are strengthened by exercise; and therefore it is clearly a part of our duty to provide for that exercise. Hence it is plain that meditation on the power, the wisdom, the holiness, and the love of God—a reverent but trustful uplooking of the soul to him, and a diligent study of his word and works for the purpose of obtaining new views of his glory—are embraced in Christian conduct.

The New Testament inculcates penitence for sin, lowliness of heart, submissiveness of will, and perfect docility towards God. These are humble virtues; they attract little notice; they are foreign to the unrenewed mind. But they are of great price in the sight of God, and they are indispensable to Christian life.

Again, it has been often remarked, that the sacred writers insist upon the duty of meekness, patience, forbearance, long-suffering, forgiveness of injuries, and a lowly estimate of one's self as compared with others; in a word, upon the passive virtues rather than the active, the enduring rather than the heroic, the obscure rather than the conspicuous. A desire to shine by his own light, and to be admired for his own excellence, is a heathen, not a Christian feeling. But this topic has been considered in the *Manual of Theology*, and may therefore be dismissed with only a brief notice.

Again, Christian conduct should have some respect to the health and growth of one's mental powers. And this growth depends (1) upon their being *sufficiently* used. In professional men, there is, perhaps, as much danger of their being overworked, as of their being left idle. Christian ethics requires one to avoid both extremes, and thus secure a normal development of the mind. (2) Upon their being *rightly* used. No mental power should be neglected; no one should be cultivated in such a way as to injure another. Reason, memory, taste, will, should all be disciplined for the best service. The Christian must therefore have regard to what he reads, and how he reads; he must learn to hear well, observe well, speak well. He must be interested in the phenomena of matter, as well as of mind; in nature inorganic, organic, animate, rational; and in the progress of events, whether social, civil, or religious. He must also provide for mental recreation; and to do this will sometimes test his wisdom and virtue. Conversation and reading, games which require close thought, and those which tax the body, foreign travel, and camping out will offer their attractions.

The Christian religion honors human feeling and sensibility, as well as intellect. It rejects the stoic view of life. It calls upon every Christian to shape his conduct with some regard to the training of his natural senses, susceptibilities, and affections. He should be able to appreciate the grandeur and beauty of nature. He should admire the forms and colors which adorn the universe. He should know something, if practicable, of music and painting, so that the blessings of life may be multiplied to him.

And lastly, as the nature of man includes a body, the organ and instrument of the spirit, this body should also be suitably regarded in the conduct of life. It may be used for the glory of God (1 Cor. vi. 20). But, in order to this, it must be ruled by the spirit (1 Cor. ix. 27). Both suitable food and suitable exercise are necessary to the health and perfection of the body. Perhaps there is little reason to speak of the former; yet Christians are certainly liable to be too careless,

as well as too fastidious, about their food. A plain, nutritious diet has much to do with mental, and even moral vigor; and for none is such a diet more necessary than for persons who labor with the mind, rather than with the body. In almost all cases, alcoholic and narcotic stimulants are sooner or later injurious to those who employ them. Men of sedentary life have special reason to avoid them.

Many employments furnish ample exercise to the body. But this is not true of all; and, when it is not, exercise should be sought as a condition of health and strength. And, other things being equal, those forms of bodily exercise should be chosen for this purpose which are least likely to be abused by evil men. It is, however, extremely difficult to lay down any rules on the subject. But it is, perhaps, generally true that the most fascinating amusements are the most likely to be perverted. Walking, especially with a congenial friend or two, is a good exercise. Croquet, bowling, ball-playing, may prove equally healthful, and more attractive. Dancing is not an altogether safe recreation. Riding on horseback is excellent, if one can afford it. Rowing is likely to be too severe.

CHAPTER III.

CHRISTIAN CONDUCT WITH REFERENCE TO OTHER MEN.—

INTRODUCTORY.

It may be inferred from several statements of the New Testament, and especially from Acts xvii. 26, and Luke x. 27 *seq.*, that every man should treat every other man as kindly as he would treat a neighbor or a brother; but the Christian standard for motive and conduct is defined even more exactly by Matt. xxii. 39, and vii. 12.

The last of these passages, often called the Golden Rule, seems to presuppose three things: (1) that no man stands on a higher level in essential worth than his fellow-man; (2) that

no man is entitled to better treatment from others than he is willing to accord to them ; (3) that God takes the will for the deed, making one's settled desire the criterion and standard of his character.

But, assuming the truth of these positions, can it even then be seen that one's own desires are in all cases a safe guide to what would be best for others, and right for him to do to others? It is difficult to answer these questions in the affirmative ; for the desires of a selfish being crave much that is not for the highest good of that being, and cannot, therefore, be a proper measure of what would be useful to another person of the same nature, even though they are a sure index of what might be justly required of their possessor. We are, therefore, inclined to something like the following view of the Golden Rule, namely : —

It requires that, in so far as conduct depends upon feeling, or may properly be swayed by it, every man should do to others as he can see that he would have them do to him, were he in their circumstances, and they in his. But, as love to one's neighbor is not so strictly the fulfilling of the law as rather a pledge of its fulfilment, so the Golden Rule is not of itself an all-sufficient guide to duty, but rather a clear statement of the feeling that will insure right conduct towards others. It is a perfect expression of what a man, so far as he himself is concerned, ought to be willing to do. It points out the degree of self-sacrifice which he should be ready to make ; and, if he is ready to make it, he will rarely or never do wrong to his neighbor.

And, if we look at the second great command of the law, it will be necessary to bear in mind, —

(1) That neither self-love, nor love to one's neighbor, includes of necessity any moral approbation of the character of the person loved. It is, rather, a genuine interest in the welfare of that person, though his character may be viewed with abhorrence.

(2) That external duties are often affected in this life by local, social, domestic, or ecclesiastical relations, and not

determined altogether by the degree of love which ought to be felt for the persons concerned.

(3) That natural affection and moral sympathy knit together many hearts with ties additional to the tie required by the second command. Hence it is possible for one human being to love another better than himself; that is, with a self-sacrificing love.

But we must consider Christian conduct with reference to others in the several relations of life, and, —

SECTION I. — IN CHURCH RELATIONS.

The bond of union which connects members of the same church is twofold, — love to their common Lord, and love to one another; the latter growing out of the former. — (See 1 John iv. 20, 21; Matt. x. 42; xxv. 40.)

The primary relation of the members of a Christian church to one another is that of brethren, all being entitled to the same privileges. Matt. xxiii. 8; Acts vi. 3; 1 Cor. viii. 12; Gal. iii. 26 *seq.* (cf. 1 Cor. xii. 12 *seq.*; Gal. vi. 10; Eph. ii. 18 *seq.*; Heb. iii. 6; 1 Tim. vi. 2; 1 Peter ii. 9; v. 3; Rev. i. 6; and "Bap. Quarterly," iv. p. 225 *seq.*, "Church Polity;" also Litton (E. A.) "The Church of Christ"; Jacob (G. A.) "The Ecclesiastical Polity of the New Testament"; Ripley (H. J.) "Church Polity"; Whately (R.) "The Kingdom of Christ.")

Hence social and civil distinctions do not affect one's position in the church. A son may be made the spiritual overseer and teacher of his father, or a servant of his master. But natural distinctions, as of sex, ability, and experience, are not to be overlooked in the organization and work of a church.

It may be noted in particular, —

(1) That every member of a Christian church should seek the spiritual welfare of the other members with all fidelity, love, patience, and hope (Gal. vi. 2; Phil. ii. 3 *seq.*; Rom. i. 11, 12).

(2) Should co-operate with the others, according to his own gift, in every good work; that the church being complete,

wanting nothing, may accomplish its labor of love (Rom. xii. 4 *seq.*; 1 Cor. xii. 12 *seq.*). These are most instructive paragraphs.

(3) Should treat the poor, the lowly, the ignorant, with as much honor and affection as those who have wealth or station or learning (Jas. ii. 1 *seq.*). This passage does not refer to members of the church; though it must apply to them, as well as to others.

(4) Should fully recognize the rights and functions of church officers, and heartily honor those officers (Heb. xiii. 7, 17). The kind of authority belonging to pastors should be carefully learned from the New Testament; and, when learned, it should be exercised on the one hand, and respected on the other.

Hence we remark still further, —

(a) That fraternal equality in the church does not of itself render one eligible to office in the same; much less does it entitle one to claim office. Fitness for special service is the only sufficient reason for appointment to it; and the brethren as a body must judge of this fitness.

(b) That, in judging of any member's fitness for the ministry, the brethren must bear in mind the qualifications enumerated by the apostle (1 Tim. iii. 1-7; Tit. i. 6-9), quite as much as the member's sense of duty. A similar remark may be made in respect to deacons. — (See 1 Tim. iii. 8-10.)

(c) That women are not eligible to the ministry; nor is it their duty to address public assemblies comprising men as well as women (1 Tim. ii. 12-15; 1 Cor. xiv. 33-35).

In the former passage, Paul affirms (1) that the sphere of woman's appropriate and blessed activity is domestic (v. 15); (2) that in public assemblies she is to be a learner, quiet and subordinate to man, — not a teacher, or one exercising authority over man (12, 13); and (3) that this position is assigned her in view of her distinctive nature as revealed in the history of the first sin (14).

In the latter passage, Paul enjoins upon Christian women the duty of silence in the church assemblies, and supports

this injunction by an appeal (1) to the practice of all the other churches (33); (2) to the divinely ordained subordination of woman to man (34); (3) to the instinctive feeling of right-minded persons, especially women (35). If this interpretation of the last clause be rejected, we must suppose that the apostle regarded public speaking as incompatible with the true nature of woman. — (See also 1 Tim. iii. 11; v. 9, 10.)

But, against this apparently obvious and indisputable sense of the two passages quoted above, many things are urged on the ground of Scripture and of reason. And, in particular,—

The following passages of Holy Writ (1 Cor. xi. 5–16; Acts xxi. 9; xviii. 26; ii. 17, 18; i. 14; Luke ii. 38; Exod. xv. 20, 21; Judges iv. 4–6, 14; v. 1; Ps. lxxviii. 12; Gal. iii. 28). It is manifestly proper for us to look with care at these statements of Scripture; for our simple duty is to ascertain, if possible, the will of God on the point in question.

In the first passage, women are admonished not to pray or prophesy with uncovered head; and this admonition is enforced by sundry reasons, especially by one from the subordination of woman to man, and by one from the custom of all the churches. It is therefore inferred that the apostle had in mind praying or prophesying in the public assemblies of the church; and that he sanctioned the practice by simply correcting an abuse in it.

But we see no evidence that Paul refers to public assemblies of the church. For, beyond a doubt, there were many small meetings of Christians in private houses, where men and women prayed and talked together familiarly; and in these the apostle may have encouraged women to pray and prophesy, though with due modesty, and recognition of man as the natural leader in even such meetings. This is the view to which Meyer came in the last revision of his commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians.

In the second passage, Luke mentions that Philip, the Evangelist, had four unmarried daughters who possessed the gift of prophecy, or inspiration; and it is inferred that they were accustomed to deliver their prophecies in public assemblies. But we know of nothing decisive in favor of this inference. The word “prophesy” means undoubtedly to speak for God, to utter truth received by inspiration from him; but this truth may be communicated by writing as well as by word of mouth, and to one or two as well as to many (1 Sam. xxii. 5; 2 Sam. vii. 5, 17; xii. 1 *seq.*; 1 Kings xi. 29 *seq.*; xiii. 1 *seq.*, &c.).

In the third passage, Priscilla is spoken of with her husband as having set the way of the Lord more exactly before the mind of Apollos; and hence it is supposed that Christian women may teach in the public assemblies. But we are unable to see the connection between the premise and the conclusion.

In the fourth passage, the effect of the outpouring of the Spirit on the day of Pentecost is said to include a fulfilment of Joel's prophecy, that "sons and daughters," "servants and handmaids," should prophesy; and hence it is supposed that Christians of both sexes took part in the public speaking of that wonderful day. But we find no satisfactory evidence of this in the narrative, and of course none in the single word "prophesy."

In the fifth passage, Luke says that the women continued in prayer with the other disciples; but this they might certainly have done without leading the company in their worship.

In the sixth passage, Luke mentions that Anna, an aged prophetess, who lived in the temple, came up at the very time when Jesus was presented by his mother in the temple, "gave thanks to the Lord, and spoke of him to all that were looking for the redemption of Jerusalem." But that this giving of thanks, or speaking, was in the presence of any thing like an assembly, we do not know. Is it not more probable that she joined the family group, and expressed her thanks to God in a simple, informal way, while both on that day and afterwards she spoke of the holy child to such devout persons as she met in the courts of the temple? Says Bleek, "It would be proper to place a period before *καὶ ἐλάλει*, especially as the speaking mentioned here was not restricted to what she said while the child was present in the temple" (Drei ersten Evang. i. S. 90). Godet also observes that "it is not necessary to refer the imperfect, *ἐλάλει*, to the actual moment; she was doing thus continually" (Com. ad. loc). And Olshausen remarks that "the aged woman with busy haste imparted the joy of her heart to like-minded friends of the Messiah in Jerusalem." We may ask still further, why, if her address was a public one to a considerable assembly, it is said that she "was speaking of him to all those who were waiting for the redemption of Jerusalem"? A public address could hardly have been restricted to that class.

The seventh passage may be explained by the Speaker's Commentary. — "The men are represented as singing the hymn in chorus, under the guidance of Moses; at each interval, Miriam and the women sang the refrain, marking the time with the timbrel, and with the measured, rhythmical movements always associated with religious festivities (Comp. Judges xi. 34; 1 Sam. xviii. 6; and 2 Sam. vi. 5)." This narrative does not therefore have any bearing on the subject before us, except only as Miriam is called a prophetess; and this circumstance decides nothing.

In the eighth passage, Deborah, the prophetess who judged Israel for a time, is said to have summoned Barak to lead the warriors of Israel

against their enemies now in the land; and, in compliance with his demand, to have gone with him to the war. After the victory, these two are said to have sung a triumphal song; but whether they two chanted it together in public, or in private, we cannot be certain. Perhaps it was only composed by them, as the song of their hearts to the Lord, and vocalized by them and by the people, as other sacred songs (cf. 2 Kings xxii. 14 *seq.*).

In the ninth passage it is said, "The Lord gives the word; the women that publish the glad tidings are a mighty host." To what does this language refer? Dr. Conant answers, by quoting Exod. xv. 20, "All the women went out with timbrels" (Miriam, &c.), *seq.*; and 1 Sam. xviii. 6, "The women came out of all the cities of Israel, singing," &c.; and he adds that "verses 12-14 in the Psalm may be understood as the message which they proclaim." Hupfeld says, "It is the chorus of singing and dancing women whom we see in the Old Testament, as in all antiquity, celebrating victories. — (See Exod. xv. 20; Judges v. 11, 34; 1 Sam. xviii. 6 *seq.*; 2 Sam. i. 20, and verse 26 below.)" So also Vaihinger, Ewald, Olshausen (Justin), Tholuck, De Wette, Alexander, Noyes. Delitzsch says that "there is no reference here to the preaching of the gospel"; and in this we think he is certainly correct.

In the last passage, we have the doctrine, that, so far as salvation in and through Christ is concerned, there is no difference between Jew and Greek, bond and free, male and female; but how this bears on the question before us, we fail to see.

We conclude, therefore, that there is no passage in the Bible, which, fairly interpreted, conflicts with the *prima-facie* sense of Paul's language in 1 Cor. xiv. 33-35; and 1 Tim. ii. 12-15.

But is this language of the apostle applicable to Christian women of the present day? "Tempora mutantur; mores mutantur." This question seems to us more difficult to answer than the one which we have been considering; for the form of some of the precepts or counsels given by the apostles was determined, no doubt, by temporal or local circumstances, though the underlying principle must have been, in all cases, of perpetual validity.

This statement is founded on certain expressions in the following texts (Acts xv. 29; 1 Cor. vii. 1, 7, 26; xi. 6 *seq.*; 1 Tim. ii. 9, 10). But it should be observed (1) that other passages of the New Testament show that the regulation recorded in Acts xv. 29, was temporary, not permanent, except as embraced in other teaching of the Scriptures;

(2) that the language of Paul commending celibacy as better in certain cases than marriage is still applicable to some in the church, for marriage is not best for all Christians; yet a special reason for his words is intimated by 1 Cor. vii. 26; and (3) that a principle of eternal validity underlies the language respecting female dress and ornament, though it may, perhaps, be right to vary the application of it with changes of time and place.

Are we, then, authorized to class the apostle's injunction of silence on the part of women in public assemblies with the expressions just noticed? Are the grounds on which the injunction is made to rest temporary or permanent, fluctuating or stable? These grounds may be reduced to two; namely, the divinely established subordination of woman to man, and the custom of the apostolic churches; and the second of these may be presumed to rest upon the first.

Two questions now present themselves: (1) Is the act of addressing public assemblies, composed of men and women, now and naturally inconsistent with the subordinate position assigned to woman by her Creator? and (2) Is this subordination penal, abnormal, and destined to be gradually removed by the Christian religion?

To the former question, an affirmative reply must, we think, be made; for it would be difficult to name any kind of leadership more real than that of public speakers. Indeed, the authority or influence of Christian pastors is nearly all embraced in their privilege of standing forth as the teachers and guides of the people by means of public discourse. To the latter question, we are constrained to reply in the negative; for woman was originally given to man as a fit helper (Gen. ii. 18); and her relative position is recognized as still the same after conversion (Eph. v. 22 *seq.*; 1 Cor. xi. 3, 7-9; 1 Peter iii. 1-7). The language of Gen. iii. 16, may imply that man's authority over woman would be felt as a burden henceforth; but in itself it was no more a part of the penalty of sin than childbearing was a part of that penalty.

From this examination we return to our first statement,

that women are neither eligible to the Christian ministry, nor is it their duty to address public assemblies of both sexes. If asked to define the expression, "public assemblies," we can only respond in a general way, by saying, They are assemblies of people too large to be easily addressed in a conversational tone without rising from one's seat. In small social meetings, especially such as are often held in private houses, Christian women may speak or pray without transgressing the rule given by the apostle. They may also recount their personal experience to the church from time to time in covenant meetings; and the information which they thus give enables others to sympathize with them.

SECTION II.—IN DOMESTIC RELATIONS.

As marriage is the basis of these relations, it claims attention at the outset. We shall therefore speak of the *design and the law of marriage*.

The marriage union was evidently designed,—

(1) To bring into healthful action the moral nature of both parties: since, beyond all other relations, it calls for the exercise of mutual integrity, confidence, affection, and tenderness.

(2) To improve the mental powers of both. The natural difference between man and woman renders their influence in this respect more stimulating and wholesome, while it prevents envy and ill-will.

(3) To cultivate the social affections. Celibates are liable to become, in process of time, selfish and censorious. Even natural affection may die for want of suitable exercise.

(4) To tranquillize the violent, and regulate the sensual passions of man. On this point we are not accustomed to speak with as much freedom as they do in Germany; but it is one which ought not to be wholly overlooked by the intelligent Christian.

(5) To continue the human race without further deterioration. For while it is certain that the organs and instincts of our nature unite with the Scriptures in proving that God

intended to have mankind increase, and fill the earth, it is no less certain that children born and nurtured in wedlock have great advantages over those who are not. To say the least, they have the love and care of two parents, instead of one. But this is only a small part of their advantage, — an advantage which is really too great and manifold to be set forth in words.

Remark. From what has been said, we conclude, —

(1) That marriage, when their circumstances permit of it, should be regarded by Christians in general as more than lawful, — as desirable and wise. Many persons are plainly counselled by the word of God to seek or to welcome matrimony (1 Thess. iv. 3-7; 1 Tim. v. 14; 1 Cor. vii. 1, 2, 9, 26-28).

(2) That there are persons, perhaps few in number, who, in certain states of society, do right in forbearing to marry (Matt. xix. 12; 1 Cor. vii. 7, 8, 26, 32-34). But the papal church is not authorized by the Scriptures to ascribe special sanctity to a single life (Heb. xiii. 4); nor to forbid the clergy to marry (1 Tim. iv. 1-3).

If we now pass to the *law of marriage*, it will be found to embrace several particulars; for example, —

(1) It limits the union to one of each sex. Monogamy is Christian; polygamy, unchristian (Matt. xix. 4-6). The union of our two first parents in Eden was evidently adduced by the Saviour as furnishing the type and norm of all true marriage; and the view which he inculcated is confirmed by the fact that the number of men is about equal in every land to the number of women.

Remark. It has been inferred from 1 Tim. iii. 2; Tit. i. 6; which teach that a bishop must be “husband of *one* wife,” — *μῦς γυναικὸς ἄνδρα*, — *μῦς γυναικὸς ἀνῆρ*, — that polygamy was tolerated among the laity of the apostolic churches, though under protest, as disqualifying one for the highest spiritual service; just as divorce for other causes than one was tolerated among the Jews, because of the hardness of their hearts. But there are two serious objections to this view; namely

(1) that polyandria was unknown at that time, yet the apostle uses the same phrase of an enrolled widow (1 Tim. v. 9), that she must be "wife of *one* husband"; and (2) that there is no trace whatever of polygamy in the early churches. For the true interpretation, see "Scriptural Law of Divorce," sect. 4.

(2) It limits this union, in case of Christians who are yet free, to persons whose conjugal influence will not be likely to lead the Christian away from Christ, or interfere with his "growth in the grace and knowledge of Christ," or diminish his service of the Lord (1 Cor. vii. 39; 2 Cor. vi. 14).

Many interpreters believe that these passages forbid a Christian to contract marriage with an unbeliever (Tert., Cyp., Ambr., Jerom., Grot., Est., Beng., Olsh., Mey., De W., Alf., Con., and How., Stanley, and perhaps Hodge). And at first sight this seems to be the natural interpretation; but Chrys., Theoph., Calv., Beza, and perhaps Rückert, take a different view, namely, the one first expressed; and this view is favored by the use of "in the Lord," *ἐν κυρίῳ*, in Eph. vi. 1. Even thus understood, however, the passage would discountenance the marriage of believers with unbelievers, unless, perhaps, in exceptional cases.

Two important objections are urged against the interpretation favored by a majority of expositors, namely, —

(a) That the persons of one sex are always nearly equal in number to those of the other; while the Christians of one sex are often far more numerous than those of the other. But to this it may be replied, that it is always safe to obey the law of God, and leave the result with him.

(b) That parental, filial, and conjugal relations resemble one another in closeness and sacredness; while, from the nature of the case, the two former are independent of religious character. — (See 1 Cor. vii. 10.) But it may be replied, that the cases are not alike, except where one of the parties is converted after marriage. Entering into marriage with an unbeliever is not to be put on a level with continuing in that union when formed; for we readily admit that incompatibility of temper may be a sufficient reason for not seeking

marriage with a particular person, while we promptly deny that it is a sufficient reason for dissolving marriage.— (German Baptists.)

(3) It requires husband and wife to love and assist each other. They should be one, having, as far as it is practicable, all interests and anxieties in common (Matt. xix. 3–9; Eph. v. 22 *seq.*). It may well be doubted whether the present tendency of legislation to distinguish between the property of husband and wife is free from danger to the marriage union.

(4) It makes the husband head of the domestic circle, including the wife (1 Peter iii. 1–7; Eph. v. 22 *seq.*; Col. iii. 18). Yet, while this position is assigned to the husband, it will be observed that he is specially charged with the duty of loving his wife. A Christian husband should never forget this duty, any more than a Christian wife should forget the duty of giving the place of authority to her husband.

(5) It makes the union indissoluble, except by death or unfaithfulness. — (See Matt. xix. 8, 9; and the “Scriptural Law of Divorce,” with the article “Divorce,” in “Smith’s Dictionary of the Bible”; and Harless (G. C. A. von) “Die Ehescheidungsfrage.”) The legislation of many States is not in full agreement with the Christian law on this subject; but this fact is no excuse for disregard of the latter by the followers or the churches of Christ. The morality of Christians should be higher than that of the State.

Our study of Christian conduct in domestic relations brings us, in the second place, to *parental duties*. For, according to the divine idea of the family circle, it is incomplete without children. But with the blessing of children come new and important duties, which may be brought under the following heads:—

(1) Parents are under obligation to support their children during minority, or until the latter are able to support themselves (1 Tim. v. 8). The words of the apostle do not, indeed, refer primarily to parents; but they seem to be a general statement, intended to justify the specific one made

in verses 4 and 7. Children and grandchildren should, if able, provide for a widowed mother or grandmother; for it is in general the duty of those who are near kinsmen, and especially of those who belong to the same family, to provide for one another in case of need. And this, Paul suggests, is so plain a duty, that persons who have not believed in Christ perform it; so that a Christian who should refuse to do it would be worse than an unbeliever.

From this passage, by an argument *a minori ad majus*, we conclude that parents should support their children until the latter are able to support themselves, and especially while the latter are in the family, and subject to the control of the former. The only case of doubt would be when other kindred, as brothers or sisters, were much better able to do this than the parents.

By "support" may be understood the providing of suitable food, clothing, and shelter. But the quality of these may vary with circumstances, as severity or mildness of climate; health, sex, or probable employment of the children; station, resources, and other duties of the parents; and habits of dress or living in a particular age or place. Yet, if parental love is strong, there will be little danger of neglect in this matter.

(2) Parents should govern their children, though with a wise regard to age, health, temper, &c. (Eph. vi. 1; Col. iii. 20). Government is more than advice, admonition, entreaty, or bribery; it is *authority*, to which obedience is rendered from a sense of duty or a fear of penalty. Parental government by moral suasion alone is not recommended by Solomon (Prov. iii. 11, 12; xiii. 24; xix. 18; xxiii. 13, 14; xxix. 15). Mr. Oncken once said that there "was enough family government in America, but it was in the hands of the children." Parental control should be mild and affectionate, but firm and steady.

(3) They should educate their children for the duties of life (Eph. vi. 4; Deut. vi. 6, 7). This education must include a proper training of their faculties, — mental, moral, physi-

cal, — with some regard, in most instances, to their probable work in life. But the former is of chief importance. Their great duty is to train their children by all proper means, in the way of piety, integrity, and sound knowledge, to Christian manhood and womanhood.

Remark. The duties of parents to their children are modified by the age, capacity, and character of the latter; and the time generally comes, as the latter grow up, when parental authority should give place to counsel; but the transition from one of these to the other will, in most instances, be natural and almost imperceptible.

Our next topic is *Filial Duties*. And an enumeration of these must certainly include the following:—

(1) Prompt and cheerful obedience. Eph. vi. 1–3 (cf. Jer. xxxv. 18, 19; Prov. xxx. 17). Submission to no earthly authority is so universally necessary and reasonable as that of children in early life to their parents. “Filial impiety,” says Dr. Conant, “is a violation of one of the purest and strongest instincts of nature.” A refusal to obey one’s parents can only be justified by the conviction that obedience to them would be disobedience to God.

(2) Docility in receiving their instruction (Prov. i. 8, 9; xxiii. 22). If parents are by the law of nature, for several years at least the teachers of their children, it may be safely presumed that children should receive with interest and respect the instruction of their parents. Their respective duties must agree.

(3) Peculiar deference to them through life (Ex. xx. 12; Prov. xxiii. 22). When children leave their father’s house, and have families of their own, they cease to be subject to their parents; but they can still honor them in many ways, and should certainly be careful to do this. — (Dr. Lord’s theory.)

(4) Cheerfully support them, if necessary (1 Tim. v. 8). The doctrine of Paul appears to be evident and reasonable. For while we may admit that the duty of parents to their offspring is in this respect more self-evident than the duty of

offspring to their parents, even as the love of parents to their children is more instinctive and universal than that of children to their parents, yet both are natural, and are, therefore, trustworthy indications of the will of God.

It is the tendency of communism to ignore family instincts, affections, and duties, putting every thing into the hands of the State. But this tendency is against nature, — against all that is sweetest, purest, highest, holiest, most self-denying in life. Others, without being communists, believe that the State should do a large part of the work which the Bible assigns to parents, to children, or to friends. Their mistake is a grave one, though we are far from asserting that their motive is bad. The poor, the blind, the deaf, and dumb, the insane, and the idiotic may be objects of charity; but it does not certainly follow that the State should assume their support. Perhaps kindred or friends should do this.

The relation of *brothers and sisters* in the same family is one of natural equality as to privilege, duty, and discipline; and their affection is often singularly pure, unselfish, and beautiful. Hence Christ said to his disciples, "All ye are brethren," and by his Spirit moved the apostle to speak of him as "the first-born among many brethren." The fraternal relation is extremely useful in the early discipline of life. It is very difficult to educate a single child. Brothers and sisters owe to one another, —

(1) *Fraternal Affection* (Rom. xii. 10; Heb. xiii. 1; 1 Peter iii. 8; 2 Peter i. 7). This affection should be tender, unselfish, lifelong. To insure this, great forbearance, sincerity, and frankness are necessary.

(2) *Fraternal Concord*. This is a natural fruit of affection; and, when the latter is strong and pure, the former will be likely to exist. But let the bond of true affection be once severed by passion, selfishness, or insincerity, and the alienation is apt to be very bitter and irreconcilable (Prov. vi. 19; xviii. 19; Matt. x. 21).

(3) *Fraternal Help*. This help should be rendered in every way possible during childhood and youth; and, in riper

years, by sympathy, counsel, and, if need be, property. — (See Gen. iv. 9.)

Remark. The patriarchal and Jewish constitution of families gave to the oldest son certain prerogatives which appear to spring from no natural source, and are therefore properly disregarded under the Christian dispensation.

But in many families there are *servants*, as well as children; hence the reciprocal duties of masters and servants should be treated under the head of “domestic relations.” And, in speaking of these duties, we should bear in mind, —

(1) That all men are of the same race and nature (Acts xvii. 26); (2) that all men have equal rights by nature, — a corollary from the preceding; (3) that all men are neighbors in the sense given to this term for the moral law by Christ (Luke x. 29 *seq.*); (4) that we should seek another’s welfare as earnestly as we should our own (Matt. xxii. 39). No form of servitude which disregards these principles can be justified by Christian ethics.

A. *Duties of Masters to their Servants, or of Employers to those employed.*

These duties may be learned from the precept of Christ in Matt. vii. 12. A master should be willing, and should aim to treat his servant in all respects as he would be willing to have that servant treat him, if their positions were reversed. To put the same rule in the form of a prohibition: Christian morality forbids him to exact from another for his own benefit that which, willingly rendered, would express a higher moral excellence than he himself possesses; for in the sight of God no man has a just claim to be dealt with in a manner better than he is willing to deal with others; nor has any one a right to complain of being treated as he aims to treat others. The rule, “An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth,” expresses a just principle, though it gives no sanction to private revenge.

The general precept of Christ, already considered, is confirmed by the more specific language of Paul (Eph. vi. 9;

Col. iv. 1; Philem. 8-21 (cf. 1 Cor. xii. 13; Gal. iii. 28; iv. 1). These passages teach, —

(1) That masters should ascertain their duties to their servants from the divine rather than the civil law; for the fact that God has spoken on the point is enough.

(2) That they should treat their servants as having equal rights, whether as men, as husbands, or as parents with themselves.

(3) That they should do this cheerfully and kindly. For the way in which an act is performed has oftentimes more to do with its moral quality than the act itself. Whatever is right should be done with the whole heart.

B. *Duties of Servants to their Masters, or of Employees to their Employers.*

These may also be learned from the precept of Christ in Matt. vii. 12, — a precept which is confirmed and explained for servants by the more specific language of two apostles. Eph. vi. 5-8; Col. iii. 22-25; 1 Tim. vi. 1, 2; Tit. ii. 9, 10; 1 Peter ii. 18-20; 1 Cor. vii. 20, 21 (cf. Philem. *passim*.)

In the light of these passages, it will be seen, —

(1) That Christian servants should render cheerfully all the service which is due to their masters or employers.

(2) Should obey the will of their masters, if not required by them to disobey God.

(3) Should treat their masters with the respect due to their position.

(4) Should do all this in spite of injustice and severity on the part of their masters. Christianity honors the passive virtues, as well as the active.

(5) Should regard a state of freedom as preferable in itself to one of servitude, and act accordingly. The interpretation of 1 Cor. vii. 21 is doubtful; but a majority of recent interpreters suppose it exhorts to remaining in slavery. We cannot, however, accept this view as the most probable.

Remark. Though the passages cited above have respect to the duty of slaves, instead of hired servants, the duties of

the latter are, for the time being, identical with those of the former.

With the instructions of the New Testament may properly be compared the *statutes of the Mosaic law* on the same subject. That law did not introduce domestic servitude; it rather ameliorated its character, —

(1) By the rule that every Hebrew servant should be released at the end of six years, — longer servitude being strictly voluntary (Deut. xv. 16, 17).

(2) By the rule that a Hebrew servant should not be retained in even voluntary servitude more than forty-eight years (Lev. xxv. 8–13, 39–45).

(3) By the rule that masters must bestow liberal gifts on Hebrew servants at their discharge (Deut. xv. 12–18).

(4) By protecting *all* servants from violence at the hand of their masters (Ex. xxi. 20, 21, 26, 27).

(5) By providing for their instruction in the law of the Lord. Deut. xxxi. 10–13; Josh. viii. 33–35; Deut. xxix. 10–12 (cf. Gen. xvi. 12, 13; Ex. xx. 10).

(6) By giving them ample rest from labor (Ex. xx. 10; Lev. xxv. 3–6; Deut. xii. 17, 18; xvi. 10, 11). Add to eight years of rest in every fifty, six years of Sabbaths in the remaining forty-two, and the time of the national festivals, Easter, Pentecost, &c., and less than two-thirds of the time was left for labor.

Remark (1) It may be that all servants became free at the year of jubilee. Lev. xxv. 10 (but cf. verses 39–55.)

Remark (2). As a rule, Gentile servants might, after three generations, enjoy all Jewish rights and privileges. Deut. xxiii. 2–8 (cf. xxix. 10–12).

Remark (3). Involuntary servitude was treated as abnormal (*a*) by prohibiting the act of sending back fugitive slaves to their masters (Deut. xxii. 15, 16); (*b*) by forbidding man-stealing (Ex. xxi. 16). Hence none but captives could be *reduced* to slavery against their will.

Remark (4). The Bible did not, therefore, sanction slavery, but only tolerated it for the time because of the hardness of

their hearts; and obedience to the Golden Rule is incompatible with it.

SECTION III. IN SOCIAL RELATIONS.

We apply the term "Social Relations" in its popular sense, reserving the business and civil relations of life for separate treatment.

Men, and especially women, do very much in social intercourse to mould the character of one another. Hence the nature of their social influence is of the utmost importance; and Christian morality leads them, —

(1) *To be truthful* in these relations; that is, to be in the habit of so speaking and acting as to convey to others their actual knowledge, belief, opinion, feeling, wish, or purpose, as the case may be. In support of this statement, reference may be made to several passages (*a*) (Ex. xviii. 21; Ps. xv. 2; li. 8; Prov. iii. 2; viii. 7; xii. 19; xxx. 23; Zech. viii. 16, 19; (*b*) Lev. v. 20; xix. 11; Prov. xix. 22; xiv. 15; xii. 19; Rev. ii. 2; xxi. 8; (*c*) Ex. xxxiv. 6; 1 Sam. xv. 29; Ps. xxv. 10; John 1. 14; viii. 40; xiv. 17).

(*a*) Truthfulness is not necessarily violated by the use of tropical, ironical, or hyperbolic language (Deut. xxxii. 4; Job xii. 2; Dan. ii. 38; Acts ii. 5). But it may easily be violated by such forms of speech: there should be something in the connection, or in the tone of voice, to show the meaning of what is said.

(*b*) It is not necessarily violated by withholding truth (cf. John vii. 6 *seq.*; Luke xxiv. 13 *seq.*; Mark vi. 48).

(*c*) It is often violated by the use of forms of speech adopted for the sake of politeness. However difficult it may be in this case to draw the line between true and false language, a Christian is bound to do it; for example, he cannot justify himself in telling a servant to report him as "not at home," when he is only too busy to be seen. If the caller is not deceived, a bad use of language is made before servants and children.

(*d*) It is often violated in repeating and adjusting anec-

dotes, in pleading for clients at law, in pronouncing eulogies, and writing biographies ("De mortuis nil nisi bonum?"), in making use of other persons' wit or wisdom without acknowledgment, in revealing secrets, or insinuating evil of others,—

("Fama malum, quo non aliud velocius ullum;
Mobilitate viget, viresque acquirit eundo," *seq.*
— *Virg. A. IV.* 174, 175; cf. *Ovid M.* xii. 43, *seq.*)

in withholding just praise, &c. The biographical notices found in the Bible are models of candor.

(e) It is sometimes violated in the treatment of the sick, and especially the insane. Physicians of large experience have testified that there is almost never any good reason for speaking what is not literally true to the insane; and we think it probable, that, in nine cases out of ten where doctors try to deceive their patients, it is wholly unnecessary for them to do so.

(f) It is sometimes violated for the purpose of self-defence. Heb. xi. 31; James ii. 25 (cf. Josh. vi. 23). The faith, not the falsehood of Rahab, is commended by the sacred writers. It is possible for an untaught person to mistake the path of duty, and yet be at the time loyal to God. Military feints, though intended to mislead, are not to be put on the same level with ordinary falsehood. They are understood to be puzzles for the enemy to solve, if he can. One foe has no right to know the plans of the other. The same is true in a game of chess.

Christian morality leads men, —

(2) *To be magnanimous* in their social relations (1 Cor. xiii. 4, 5; 2 Cor. iv. 2, 5, 15; Phil. ii. 4; iii. 7, 8; i. 24; iv. 8, 9; Num. xi. 29; Phil. i. 18; Rom. ix. 3). — (See Bunyan's Great heart, in the second part of the "Pilgrim's Progress," &c. The occasions which call for true nobility of character, for patience, courtesy, self-forgetfulness, are very numerous in social life.

(3) *To be sympathizing* in these relations. Rom. xii. 15 (cf. Gal. vi. 2; 1 Peter iii. 8; 1 Cor. xii. 15). According to its

primary sense, sympathy is compassion, — that is, suffering with another ; but, as now used, it embraces rejoicing with another also ; in a word, sharing another's feelings, whether of sorrow or of joy. It is sometimes harder for a bad man to rejoice with another in his prosperity than to weep with him in his adversity. Ambition, envy, rivalry, are put to rest in the latter case, but are roused in the former.

(4) *To be beneficent in these relations.* For a majority of mankind, social intercourse is the principal means of doing good beyond the family circle. And the art of conversing well, — that is, naturally, sincerely, cheerfully, intelligently, without cant, without slang, without assumption, — is a great accomplishment, and a means of usefulness second to no other. It should therefore be cultivated by all ; and even students should feel that this art, which comes only by practice, is a reason for their going into society. If Christians generally possessed the power of conversing well upon religious subjects, their usefulness would be more than doubled. But this power presupposes not only intelligence and practice, but also a right spirit, a genuine interest in men, a desire to do good in little things, as well as in great. It may be added, that social life belongs in an eminent degree to woman ; indeed, almost as much so as domestic life.

SECTION IV. IN BUSINESS RELATIONS.

If a Christian regulates his conduct in these relations by the rule of duty prescribed by the Bible, he will, —

(1) *Be honest.* And honesty in business precludes every species of fraud, deception, misrepresentation, and requires fidelity to all engagements. — (See Prov. xxiv. 14, 22 ; xvi. 11 ; Hos. xii. 1 ; Amos viii. 4 *seq.*). This statement applies to corporations, as well as individuals, and to all kinds of false pretences, and repudiation of just debts. It condemns every attempt to mislead the judgment of purchasers. It requires things to be called by their right names. If the Golden Rule were fairly applied to all the processes of manufacture and trade, the change in society would be considered a revo-

lution. The watering of milk, and of stocks, would cease. But this will never come to pass while the maxim that "business is business" — a maxim whose import is deep and vast and mysterious as the ocean — is accepted as a sufficient reason for any course of conduct. The one principle which seems to be clearly indorsed by this maxim, namely, "Every one for himself," is false. War, instead of peace, is assumed to be the normal state of business.

(2) *Be equitable.* We transfer this word to business relations for want of a better one; and by equity in trade we mean the rendering of a full equivalent for what is obtained from another. Exchange of values should be for the equal benefit of both parties. This is the only general statement that agrees with the Golden Rule. Hence it is wrong for one man to take advantage of another's necessity or ignorance, to wring from him an exorbitant price for any commodity. The practice of "cornering stocks," or of getting control of the market for the purpose of compelling people to pay for an article more than it should be worth, is wrong. All this is, morally speaking, no better than theft or robbery. It is living on others' labor. Again, the practice of investing the proceeds of business in the name of a wife, that it may be saved from creditors in case of bankruptcy, seems to be unjust, especially if it be done while there are outstanding debts.

(3) *Be beneficent.* To benefit others, as well as himself, should be an aim of every Christian man in business, as well as in social life. He should in all cases choose a useful employment. The product of his labor should be of real service to the people. Let wicked men raise the tobacco, manufacture and vend the intoxicating drinks, even if we believe it right to say that these articles are simply useless, but not injurious to mankind. A good man should be careful to render a real equivalent to society for all that he receives from it. Moreover, he should seek to encourage others, — the young, the poor, the unfortunate, — in a business way (Deut. xxiv. 6, 10). What the latter need, in many cases, is not

charity, but credit,—favor in the way of business, and possibly, in some cases, indorsement to lift them over a hard place. They wish to be put in a condition to earn for themselves what they need. But one should not indorse the paper of another beyond what he is able and willing to pay, if this should become necessary.

In speaking of domestic relations, we referred to the duties of employers and those employed, when the latter belong in a general way to the families of the former. But, in modern society, great numbers are hired to perform a definite work. To this class may be assigned factory operatives, mechanics, masons, miners, railroad employees; indeed, a large part of the men who live by manual labor, with the exception of farmers. And the relations between this class and their employers are by no means satisfactory. The latter plan, organize, and direct the business, furnishing also the capital, and naturally expect large returns; while the former do the work, and often think themselves entitled of right to most of the profit. Neither class is deeply concerned for the welfare of the other. Neither class manifests as strong a desire to do all its duty to the other, as to have the other do all its duty to it. Hence "strikes" on the part of workmen are becoming frequent, and associations for the regulation of wages, &c., are multiplied. How, then, is this selfish and chronic warfare to be brought to an end? Two ways may be suggested:—

(1) That both parties adopt the Golden Rule as their standard of duty in business, seeking to understand the relations of capital to labor, and of labor to capital, and neither of them wishing to overreach the other. The employer should feel that he is a robber, if he takes more than he gives; and the employé should judge himself by the same rule.

(2) That workmen be allowed a reasonable share of the profits, instead of uniform wages, thus enlisting their interest in the business itself. In some kinds of business, the whole association may be composed of those who labor with their

hands. In others, this may be found impracticable for want of sufficient capital; yet in such cases the workmen might, perhaps, be allowed to share in the management, the profits, and the losses of the business.

APPENDIX. USE OF MONEY.

Before leaving the present topic, we propose to speak briefly of the use of property for the good of mankind. For business and charity are closely connected. Indeed, it would be difficult to justify a Christian in laboring to accumulate wealth without regard to the use which he intends to make of it; and we venture to say that the best way of using property will often merit as careful thought and study as the best way of acquiring it.

We have already remarked that those who are near of kin should assist one another when in need. For by the law of Christ, as well as by the law of nature, charity to the poor should begin with one's own house, and then seek for objects beyond. But besides providing reasonably for his own support, and for the necessities of immediate kindred, a Christian is almost always able to do something for the higher interests of mankind. And the latter service should not be postponed until the former has been finished for life; but the two are to be associated from first to last, else there is reason to fear that the latter will be wholly neglected.

We submit the following remarks on the charitable use of property:—

(1) *To give is to impart what is one's own to another for his benefit.* The last clause of this definition is essential to it; for love to others is the source of all true charity. If something is imparted to another, not for his good, but for one's own honor, advancement, or pleasure, the act, in its deepest character, is one of exchange, not one of giving.

(2) "*To give is more blessed than to receive*" (Acts xx. 35). From the language of Christ, as quoted by Paul, we conclude that man has received from his Maker a spiritual constitution, which requires him to be beneficent. In his normal state he

is like God, — a benevolent, rather than a selfish being. And this agrees with the law of God, which demands of him love, rather than prudence; enthusiasm for the welfare of others, rather than intense regard for his own welfare.

(3) *To give liberally is therefore a Christian's privilege and duty.* Matt. x. 8, *δωρεάν ἐλάβετε, δωρεάν δότε*, xix. 21; Mark xii. 41-44; Acts ii. 44, 45; 2 Cor. viii. 1-4; ix. 7 (cf. Prov. xi. 25; Isa. xxxii. 8). We do not infer from the test which Christ applied to the young man, or from the praise which he bestowed on the poor widow, or from the course taken by the first Christians in Jerusalem, that it is always or commonly wrong for Christians to hold and increase their property, at least for a time; but we must infer that they should be ready to part with it, if either the Lord's honor or the best good of man requires this at their hands. Wealth in their possession should be a means of usefulness, rather than of self-indulgence; it should be held in trust for the Master's service, and employed according to his will. We must also infer that the Lord is sometimes pleased to have his servants trust him in the dark for their daily bread, when the calls for charity are extremely urgent.

(4) *To give in proportion to one's ability is also a Christian's privilege and duty* (2 Cor. ix. 12-15; 1 Cor. xvi. 2; Luke xii. 48). The truth of this statement needs no proof; but a Christian should be very cautious, when applying it, not to measure his own duty by the conduct of others (cf. 2 Cor. x. 12). Circumstances may make it unwise for a rich man to give as much in proportion to his ability for a particular object as the poor may give; while, for other objects, he may give largely, and they give nothing. Great charity is needed in judging others.

(5) *To give regularly, and at frequent intervals through life, is a Christian's duty* (2 Cor. xvi. 2). It is, perhaps, inconvenient for some to set aside, every Lord's Day, a portion of their income for charitable use; but it is certainly practicable for them to review the claims of Christ on that day, and keep themselves in readiness to give regularly of their substance

to the Lord's cause. This practice should begin with Christian life, and cease only with death.

(6) *To give unostentatiously is a Christian's duty and privilege* (Matt. vii. 2 - 4). Christ condemns those who give alms to secure the praise of men; and, according to our first remark, this is not, in a moral sense, giving at all; it is rather buying a good name with money. Nay, more; it is in reality an act of either conscious or unconscious hypocrisy; for the giver expects to be credited with a benevolent regard to others. But we do not suppose that Jesus intended to prohibit open or public almsgiving. He was dealing with the heart, the motive, rather than the outward act. And therefore it may sometimes be a Christian's duty to give openly (1) that his words may be supported by his conduct; and (2) that others may be moved by his example to give also. Men are sometimes charged with baser motives than really influence them.

(7) *To give discreetly, according to the greatness of the object, and the urgency of the need.* Among the great enterprises which ought to be sustained by the contributions of those who love the Saviour may be named (1) preaching the gospel to all mankind. This was laid upon his followers by the Lord, when he was about to leave them; and it is the only work which was thus solemnly committed to them. It should therefore hold the first place among Christian enterprises; and all those who give to the support of foreign missions are entitled to feel that they are aiding the most important work of the church. (2) Maintaining and applying the gospel where it is known. To this end, preachers, teachers, buildings, and books are needed. The means of grace cannot be brought to bear upon all classes in a land nominally Christian, without a liberal use of money and of time for this purpose. (3) Providing institutions of higher learning for the people, and especially for the ministry. For unless the State is to support religion, and furnish all the means of education, including those needed by only a few of the people, Christians must do this; and we have no doubt of its being their

duty and privilege to do it. (4) Caring for the poor and unfortunate, the aged and infirm. Christ did not hesitate to relieve the bodily ills of those who appealed to his compassion. Paul did not think it inconsistent with his spiritual calling to raise money for the poor saints in Judea. And the early Christians were not more distinguished by their worship of Christ than by their liberality to those in distress. But idleness and mendicancy must be discouraged. He that will not work has no right to eat; and indiscriminate giving is almost as evil as not giving at all.

But, if Christians are to make giving an important part of their life-work, it is plain that they must have something to give. And to this end, they must be *diligent* and *frugal*, — must earn much, and consume little. It would be easy to enlarge upon the former duty, that of diligence; but we will limit our remarks to the latter, — that of economy.

Economy should be practised by Christians, —

(1) *In food and drink.* Wholesome food is necessary to health of body and vigor of mind; but the most highly seasoned and costly dishes are not the most wholesome. By proper care in the selection and preparation of food, a considerable sum might be saved from the yearly expenses of many families. For children, if not for older persons, water is the only suitable drink, unless milk be used as a substitute.

(2) *In dress and equipage.* We cannot doubt that very many Christians, and especially women, spend far more in this way, than is pleasing to the Saviour. While complaining of the tyranny of fashion, they deem it necessary to submit to that tyranny. And it is alleged that Protestant women dress more fashionably for church than do Catholic women (1 Peter iii. 3, 4; 1 Tim. ii. 9, 10). But it is also true that many a Christian man has his carriage and span, not because he needs them, but because others of no greater wealth have them, and because they distinguish in a certain way, the moneyed aristocracy of the day. Thus he wastes several hundred a year in equipage.

(2) *In houses and furniture.* There is almost equal

danger of extravagance in this direction. Health and comfort should be sought in the construction of a house, not display within or without. A fine house has been the ruin of more than one fortune. Taxes, insurance, repairs, servants, company, must all be provided for yearly; and oftentimes the admired house renders liberal giving impossible.

(4) *In books and travel.* It is easy to cultivate a passion for costly books, while deriving little benefit from what there is in them. Books should be bought as they are needed for use; and, with the exception of a few reference-books, it is a good rule to read or study one before buying another. In many places there are public libraries where all books for mere reading can be wisely obtained. As to travel for health and recreation, we need only remark, that it is an expensive luxury, and should be used sparingly. Ministers of Christ ought certainly to ask themselves how much it costs, and whether it is the best use to which they can put their limited means.

(5) *In church buildings and choirs.* There are few, we presume, who would hesitate to admit that many churches build costlier houses of worship than they ought to build. By so doing they burden themselves with a heavy debt, and feel constrained to choose their minister with almost sole reference to his popular qualities. Sound or unsound in doctrine, consistent or inconsistent in life, he must be a man that will draw, and help pay the debt. We would speak with caution of choirs, and other helps to the congregation in worship, but have no doubt that churches often err in relying too much upon them.

SECTION V. IN CIVIL RELATIONS.

That civil government is an *ordinance of God* may be proved by an appeal to the Scriptures (Matt. xxii. 21; Rom. xiii. 1-7; Tim. ii. 2; 1 Pet. ii. 13-17); by an appeal to history, which shows that no people has long existed without some kind of government; and by an appeal to the present nature of man, which as social, and at the same time sinful, renders civil government necessary.

But government is ordained by God in the same way, and to the same extent, as labor is ordained by him. The form of neither is prescribed. That form is therefore best which best secures the end to be sought; and the end to be sought by the State is the protection of men in the exercise of their natural rights. Many, indeed, suppose that it should go far beyond this, and use its power for the support of every thing good, and the repression of every thing evil; but we are unable to accept this view.

The form of any civil government depends upon the will of the people protected by it. That will is expressed either by action or by sufferance. Every person, therefore, is responsible in some degree for the character of the government by which he is protected; and his particular responsibility is measured by the influence which he is able, on Christian principles, to wield in determining its character. The responsibility of some persons is, therefore, far greater in this respect, than that of others.

Christians may be called to act either as subjects, as supporters, as rulers, or as reformers, of the State; hence the present section falls naturally into four parts.

I. *As subjects* of the State, it is the duty of Christians to render cheerful obedience to the civil authority over them, whenever that authority does not require them to disobey God. Such obedience is clearly enjoined (1) by the Word of God in the passages cited above, (2) by the example of Christ and his apostles, and (3) by the dictates of sound reason; for it is plain that, without obedience, the good ends of civil government will never be reached. But our statement limits the duty of obedience to human magistrates by the higher duty of obedience to the will of God made known in the Scriptures. Is there not a contradiction in this? If we are told in one place to worship Jehovah, and in another to obey magistrates, what shall we do if the magistrates forbid us to worship Jehovah? Which of these commands supersedes the other? The answer to these questions is at hand: derived authority must yield to unde-

rived, secondary to primary. The direct command of a sovereign cannot be annulled by his servant. On this principle the apostles acted in preaching the gospel (Acts iv. 19; v. 29). On this principle, Daniel and the three worthies acted (Dan. vi. 10, 11; iii. 16-18). And on this principle Christians should always act when civil rulers require them to disobey either the moral law, or any plain command of Christ. But when it is doubtful whether God has forbidden what the powers that be require, or has required what they forbid, it is proper that they should have the benefit of the doubt.

II. *As supporters* of civil government, it is the duty of Christians (1) To pay cheerfully the taxes necessary to insure its honor and efficiency. The people should never suffer the government to repudiate an honest debt, or in any way to evade the payment of it. (2) To uphold it against enemies, even at the risk of life. Defensive war appears to be justifiable in many cases; for the State is organized for the express purpose of protecting the people against domestic and foreign violence. (3) To honor its laws and officers with the respect which their place in the government authorizes. Disobedience to a bad law should be a serious and thoughtful and even respectful act, never defiant or contemptuous. Bad rulers should be treated in such a way as to put honor on the office, if not on the man. (4) To seek the blessing of God upon it. This is expressly stated by the apostle in one of the passages referred to above; and a sincere performance of this duty will prepare Christians to fulfil every other named by us. Let this be neglected, and the party spirit fostered by a frequent change of rulers is likely to weaken respect for government itself, as ordained of God.

III. *As officers* of civil government, it is the duty of Christians to seek, within the proper limits of State control, the best good of the people; and this may be done by enacting good and useful laws, by interpreting them truly and impartially, and by executing them without fear or favor. But, in the best constitutional governments, these distinct

functions are assigned to separate officers. Hence we are called to speak of the duty of Christians, —

I. *As legislators.* We have already assumed that the proper function of civil government is to protect the people in the exercise of their natural rights. And by natural rights we mean, the right to life, unless it has been forfeited by crime; the right to liberty of action, save when it wrongs others; and the right to property regarded as the fruit of one's labor, except what is due to the State for its protection. It may, then, be remarked, —

(1) That legislators should make the laws as few and plain as possible, without leaving the rights of the people unprotected. This rule appears to us of great importance. Laws for the people should be founded on the plainest principles of equity, should be couched in simple, unambiguous language, and should be carefully made known to all whom they concern. Hence they should be few. The tendency in many States to multiply laws, and the details of law, is to be deprecated.

(2) That they should require the people to contribute, according to their several ability, for the support of the government. In the word "ability" we include personal power, and therefore approve of assessing a poll-tax on those who have no property. But the principle which we have stated is believed to be of little or no value by many legislators, and is set aside (*a*) by indirect taxation. This is defended, first, because it conceals from the people generally the amount which they pay for the support of government; and, secondly, because it lays the burden of civil affairs on those who indulge in luxuries. But it is well for both rulers and people to feel the cost of government is our reply to the former argument; and it is wrong for the State to discriminate against the rich or the self-indulgent is our reply to the latter. (*b*) By exemption from taxes. This is defended on the ground that certain kinds of property are used for ends coincident with those of the State. So also, we reply, is a vast amount of property which is not thus favored; and a

principle which can only be applied very partially is unsafe. (c) By adjusting the taxes to the cost of protection. Looked at from a simply business point of view, this might seem to be just; but there would be no end to special legislation, if this principle were applied, and no end to the study which would be necessary in order to apply it fairly.

(3) That they may, and perhaps should, require the people to be educated physically, mentally, and morally in early life, in so far as their health will permit and the ends of good government demand. But it seems to us that the State has no moral right to tax the people for the support of colleges and professional schools, with the exception perhaps of military and naval academies. For the higher schools of learning are sure to be supported by the liberality of good men; and, from the nature of the case, only a small part of the people will enjoy their advantages.

(4) That they should make no laws for the support of religion, or the forms of religion. Men can neither be bribed nor compelled to worship God. Christ and the apostles made no appeals to the State for support. The language and conduct of both are a sufficient warrant for the statement, that the Christian religion should do its work by moral and spiritual means alone.

(5) That they should prohibit no form of worship which respects the rights of men. This is but a corollary from the preceding.

(6) That they may forbid ordinary labor on the Lord's Day for such reasons as these; namely, (a) that all may have the amount of rest which is favorable to health and long life; and (b) that those who desire it may be able to worship God undisturbed.

II. As *judges* and *jurymen*. It is the duty of judges to decide all questions and cases, properly brought before them, according to the constitution and laws of the land; and they should not permit any considerations whatever to turn them from this course. Should it become their settled conviction that the laws which they are called to expound and maintain

are morally wrong, they ought doubtless to resign their office.

Nearly the same may be said of jurymen. They are bound to weigh properly the evidence which is brought before them, and then to render their verdict according to law and evidence. Both judge and jury are to remember that they are not law-makers, but simply interpreters of law, or of law and evidence.

Intelligent and upright men are needed for judicial action; and Christians should not refuse to serve the State, even though they must do so at a considerable pecuniary loss. Yet we have long believed that judicial service deserves a larger compensation than it receives in our land. Especially difficult is it to secure the right kind of men for jurors, at the rate of compensation fixed by law; and this is a serious obstacle to the administration of justice. There is much reason to fear that trial by jury is forfeiting in a measure the confidence which it has enjoyed.

III. As *executive officers*. In their own sphere these are bound to carry into effect the laws of the land, as interpreted by the proper authority. And, in respect to laws which are believed to be incompatible with natural right or the plain requirements of God, the same remark may be made as was made in speaking of judicial officers. When a man cannot conscientiously execute the laws, it is time for him to resign his office.

The pardoning power, lodged in the hands of certain executives, should be used with the greatest caution. Perhaps it would be safe to limit its exercise to cases when new evidence of very great importance comes to light after they are decided, and removed from jurisdiction of the courts. The people should never be taught to presume that the penalty of the law will not be executed. Indeed, the most obvious remedy for injustice upon the discovery of new evidence would be to submit the case to a fresh trial.

IV. As *reformers of government*. It seems to us very evident that Christian men may attempt to secure a change in government, —

(1) Whenever the government does not accomplish in the best manner practicable its legitimate ends; whether it fails to do this (*a*) through the unfaithfulness of its officers, in which case they will seek to substitute better ones for them; or (*b*) for the want of good laws, or the existence of bad ones, in which case they will seek to have the laws rectified; or (*c*) owing to the nature of the government, as not adapted to the age or nation, in which case they will seek to effect a revolution.

(2) Provided always, (*a*) there is a reasonable prospect of effecting in the end more good than evil by the effort, and (*b*) there is no reason to believe that a better opportunity for effecting the change required will be likely to occur. In other words, the change must be *right, practicable, and timely.*

The extension of the legal rights of suffrage to women seems to us needless, undesirable, and unnatural; needless, because women can influence legislation sufficiently without voting; undesirable, because voters, and candidates for office, would thereby be doubled with no prospect of advantage to the State; and unnatural, because the distinctive tendencies and duties of women disqualify them for civil affairs.

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