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From the Editor’s Desk

PART OF THE STANDARD LECTURE on obituaries in basic newswriting admonishes new writers to never take them for granted. What we can’t teach is how to write about the passing of friends and colleagues. In this case, we reminisce about two AJHA members and scholars, MaryAnn Yodelis Smith and Sidney Kobre and worry about what to say.

We first met MaryAnn when the new crop of graduate students gathered at the University of Wisconsin Journalism School in September 1968. We were a disparate group of folks, former journalists, teachers on leave from elsewhere to pursue advance degrees, you know the kind. She was then a nun, dressed in the more modern habit, suitable for trudging about the frigid UW campus and stalking the stacks of the grad library. Many of us graduate drudges were sentenced to office space in a former gym, where we griped, worked, swapped wry humor, ate, and supported each other through difficult times. We had no real leader, but no one matched MaryAnn for dedication, humanity, good humor, and scholarship. As the saying goes, we all bonded, and the memories of those years are good ones because of the decent, caring people who helped each other navigate the academic obstacle course. MaryAnn left holy orders, married, and climbed the academic ladder. Her reputation as teacher, scholar, and administrator grew. But she never forgot our common bond, and her dedication to the field of media history was constant, even as she ascended to the stratosphere of university administrative posts. She tenaciously fought the cancer which eventually took her, giving it as little space as possible while she lived her life. When she was scheduled for an AJHA panel presentation, she timed her chemotherapy so she’d be at her best for her colleagues. Her manuscript reviews for this journal reflected her life: honest, caring, thorough, thoughtful, on time.

Sidney Kobre was retired by the time many of us began teaching and researching, but you wouldn’t have known it. I can’t remember an AJHA convention without his pleasant presence. He was not just wiling away the golden years with convention trips, but keeping fresh and adding his thoughts to the intellectual mix. His thirteenth book came out in the year that he died. His work was of high quality and will be constantly read and referred to for the foreseeable future.

Our farewell to these two scholars is not as final as it seems. Both leave behind strong and positive memories that speak to the best of the human condition. Their tangible contributions to scholarship will survive all who mourn their departure.
From Pity to Necessity: How National Events Shaped Coverage of the Plains Indian War

By Patricia A. Curtin

In 1864 news media labeled the killing of Southern Cheyennes a "horrible butchery," yet a massacre of the same tribe four years later was termed a "necessary harvest." The author argues the Civil War contributed to this marked change through its effects on war reporting and the country's need for a renewed sense of common purpose.

Many historians date the start of the Plains Indian War to the Sand Creek Massacre on 29 November 1864. Hostilities continued almost without pause through the 1890 Battle of Wounded Knee, making it arguably America's longest war. Yet few scholars have analyzed press coverage of this war, or its war correspondents, particularly in the early years. Elmo Scott Watson's study of accredited Indian War correspondents remained unfinished at his death. Oliver Knight expanded Watson's work in Following the Indian Wars, providing descriptive biographical portraits of the correspondents but little analysis of the larger role they played in forming the public's understanding of the conflict.

Other scholars have examined how coverage in frontier newspapers created a climate of hostility toward Indians. Sharon Murphy analyzed Arizona press coverage, culminating in the Camp Grant Massacre. She concluded: "Although the massacre might have occurred without press encouragement, it is hard to ignore the effect of constant negative imagery of Indians." David Svaldi, in a content analysis study of the Rocky Mountain News, concluded the paper used a "rhetoric of extermination," creating an atmosphere in which a massacre formed rational action. Lorenz, Heuterman, and Halaas in their examinations of the frontier press, noted frontier papers often depended on the financial support of speculators hoping to attract immigrants, making community boosterism part of the editorial job. Because Indians discouraged settlers, these papers were often vehement in their anti-Indian sentiment.

Fewer scholars have examined how established news media coverage made sense of frontier events for the majority of the population in the East. John Coward examined the role national coverage of the Fetterman Massacre had in shaping how later massacres were reported in the news. He concluded the journalistic model perpetuated itself, framing reporting of Custer's massacre and supporting the national myth of manifest destiny. This study examines the beginning of the Plains Indian War, based on coverage of the Southern Cheyenne tribe from 1864 through mid-1869. The reason for this focus is threefold: The initial battle of the war, the Sand Creek Massacre, involved this tribe; the Southern Cheyennes effectively were removed from the war by a remarkably similar massacre in 1868, allowing a comparison over time in the way the two events were reported. Finally, this time period overlaps the Civil War, during which the genre of war reporting was firmly established in this country.

The media studied were New York newspapers and national news magazines headquartered in New York. The New York Herald, New York Tribune, Harper's (Weekly and Monthly), and Frank Leslie's Illustrated

9. Some pages of these two papers were either missing or illegible on microfilm. Supplementary material was gathered from secondary sources, particularly the books written by the two correspondents for these papers. See De B. Randolph Keim, Sheridan's Troopers on the Borders, (New York: G. Routledge, 1885; reprint edition, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985); Henry M. Stanley, My Early Travels
Newspaper each fielded accredited correspondents beginning in late 1866. The New York Times did not send a correspondent but carried extensive coverage, including special correspondents' reports, military reports, letters, wire copy, and editorials. The Nation did not begin publication until July 1865 and had no correspondent, but it also showed an interest in the subject matter.

The Sand Creek Massacre

In the spring of 1859, one hundred-fifty thousand would-be gold miners marched across the Plains, causing one-half-Cheyenne to observe: “The plains swarmed with hurrying bands of gold-seekers; the buffalo were frightened off, the last of the timber in the big groves along the streams was cut down, and the Indians did not know where to turn.” Horace Greeley, editor of the New York Tribune, chronicled his travels across the Plains in 1859 for his readers. Of the Indians he wrote: “Squalid and conceited, proud and worthless, lazy and lousy, they will strut out or drink out their miserable existence, and at length afford the world a sensible relief by dying out of it.”

From 1859 to 1864, the growing number of erstwhile gold miners settled on land that by treaty belonged to the Southern Cheyenne and Arapaho. Colorado Territorial Governor John Evans wanted clear land rights to Denver and the surrounding mines, and in these efforts he was backed by his close friends: William Byers, editor of the Rocky Mountain News, and John Chivington, the commander of the Military District of Colorado. Byers' editorials became calls to exterminate the Indians, and the role of Byers and the Rocky Mountain News in exciting anti-Indian sentiment is documented in other studies.

At this time, however, only the frontier papers carried news of the increasing number of skirmishes on the Plains. The New York media covered the larger battles of the Civil War, not small fights with Indians. One exception was Frank Leslie's. During August and September 1864, Leslie's published four articles based on letters written by military men. They reported rumors of a united Indian uprising, “the roads swarming with red skins,” and well-provisioned Indian war parties led by white rebel soldiers who were “heading these copperheads in their work of devastation and slaughter.” In short, these letters capsulized the rumor and hyperbole often attributed to the frontier papers and presented it to readers back east as the situation on the Plains. At the time, military men often supplemented their pay by providing copy, and Watson noted

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and Adventures in America (London: S. Low, Marston, 1895; reprint edition, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982).
13. In addition to Svaldi's works, see also Duane Schultz, Month of the Freezing Moon (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).
14. 27 August 1864, 354; 9 September 1864, 387; 17 September 1864, 402; 24 September 1864, 7.
these unaccredited, voluntary contributors were more gifted in imagination than accuracy, having consumed a heavy diet of dime novel adventure fare.15

On 11 June 1864, the mutilated bodies of a family were found on their ranch just outside Denver. Although the identity of the murderers was unknown, Byers identified them in his paper as Cheyennes,16 and Chivington gave orders to "kill Cheyennes whenever and wherever found."17 The bodies were put on display in Denver, whipping up a public frenzy. Evans instructed peaceful Indians to go to Fort Lyon, where they would be safe; the remaining Indians would be punished.18 Two weeks later, the News ran Evans’ proclamation addressed to "Patriotic Citizens of Colorado," authorizing them to pursue and kill all hostile Indians.19 Byers advised that "a few months of active extermination against the red devils will bring quiet and nothing else will."20 A Tribune special correspondent noted the difficulty lay not in deciding whether the Indians should be exterminated, but in how difficult the job might be: "Most of the miners are in favor of extermination, but that is not a thing easily accomplished, for they are so well acquainted with the country that all attempts to pursue them are entirely futile."21

But in late August 1864, Chief Black Kettle of the Southern Cheyenne sent a message stating his tribe desired peace and the safety of the fort. The Indians were advised, in part by Chivington, to go to Fort Lyon, surrender their arms, and settle their village on Sand Creek near the fort.22 Once the Indians were camped, Chivington made his move. He marched five- to six-hundred troop members and four howitzers to Fort Lyon, where he picked up 125 more men. They traveled forty miles in an all-night march to Black Kettle’s camp.23

The soldiers surrounded the camp, attacking from all sides at sunrise. The Indians were asleep and taken completely by surprise. Many witnesses said Black Kettle had a U.S. flag flying over his lodge and on hearing the commotion ran up a white surrender flag. Indians were shot down as they ran for the protection of the flags.24 The next day, a guide tried to identify the dead Indians, but the bodies were so badly mutilated that Black Kettle mistakenly was identified among the dead.25

16. Published in the Denver Commonwealth, 15 June 1864, which Byers was co-editing at the time. In Svaldi, Sand Creek and the Rhetoric of Extermination, 163.
19. SCM Doc., 53.
Chivington’s official report, printed 8 December in the Rocky Mountain News, went out over the wire and was run by the Tribune on 9 December. The report gives no tribal affiliation, mentioning only that four-hundred out of nine-hundred Indians were killed, including the chief Black Kettle, “making almost an annihilation of the entire tribe.” In fact, of the approximately five-hundred Indians in the camp, 105 women and children and twenty-eight men were killed.26

But with the Civil War raging and Sherman marching toward the sea, most of the media studied carried no notice of the battle, even when Congress announced at the end of December that it would investigate the affair.27 Only the Tribune took note, suggesting members of Congress were as much to blame as Chivington because they had given away Indian lands: they “no doubt, feel the need to purge themselves by probing deeply into the hideous affair at Sand Creek.”28 Leslie’s reprinted a Louisville Weekly Journal article condemning “The recent conduct of Colonel Chivington...attacking a defenceless [sic] Indian village and perpetrating wholesale massacre of men, women, and children, [which] should excite for those poor creatures the generous pity of the nation...”29

The Congressional Joint Special Committee made it report public in July 1865, three months after the end of the Civil War. For the New York Times, which printed the report in full, it was the first mention that a battle with Indians had taken place. It presented a grim picture: “And then the scene of murder and barbarity began—men, women, and children were indiscriminately slaughtered...Not content with killing women and children...the soldiers indulged in acts of barbarity of the most revolting character.”30

The remainder of Black Kettle’s band, which had fled north and joined the Northern Cheyenne, then began raiding the Platte River route. Black Kettle was no longer in power; most who survived wanted revenge, not peace. As the raids continued over the summer, the Times despaired over what to do; civilization was not working, and extermination was not civilized. Just six days after carrying the Sand Creek report, the Times ran a wire piece from Fort Laramie in which the author expressed the opinion the Indians should be severely punished.31 In the same issue, an editorial complained that “Mr. Telegrapher” should keep his opinion to himself. Referring to Sand Creek, the editorial said extermination was not the answer: “Doubtless the red race will ultimately come to that fate; but there is no need for hastening the event.”32 Two weeks later the Times concluded in exasperation that if the Indians “would take it into their heads to move southward to Mexico, where the bulk of their race is now concentrated, it would be a happy thing for them and for us.”33

26. See accounts by Hyde, The Life of George Bent.
29. 4 February 1865, 307. The same article predicted Indians would soon be extinct by natural causes.
30. 23 July 1865, 2.
31. 29 July 1865, 1.
32. Ibid., 4.
33. 12 August 1865, 4.
As the raids continued over the next two months, the *Times* published three letters from unidentified enlisted men full of second-hand atrocity stories. In December 1865 a letter from *Times* special correspondent "Croquis" blamed the Cheyennes for the trouble and cynically concluded: "The idea of expending government funds for the purchase of presents for Indians, who take every opportunity to murder citizens and destroy property of every description, seems a novel one." Another *Times* special correspondent (possibly the same, but only identified as "C") reported the citizens of Colorado were appalled by the unrealistic attitude of the government and its lack of action.

The people of Denver have not forgotten the mangled bodies brought into their city, and the terrible vengeance that was sworn upon the Indians in consequence. A part of that revenge was administered by Colonel Chivington at Sand Creek, but he did not complete it. All through the Western Territories the people would rejoice to have an Indian war inaugurated of such proportions that they would be warranted in taking the rifle in hand and "cleaning out" the Indians from Missouri to the mountains.

A recurring theme was that people in the East had a romantic, literary view of Indians, whereas Western settlers knew about Indians firsthand.

Nothing strikes one more on crossing the Missouri River than the marked change in feeling toward the "sauvages"...East of that river the subject is rarely broached or spoken of only in the "poor Indian" style. But crossing the few hundred yards of that stream makes a decided difference...To one who has admired the Red Man with Cooper, and read the thousand tales of his marvelous heroism...which are extant, it is rather melancholy to find that there is nothing he takes such good care of as that same precious red skin.

Indian War correspondent Theodore Davis wrote in *Harper's*: "It was not 'Lo, the poor Indian!' but Lo, the poor white! Cooper might have his Indians; we did not care for their company." His colleague, Henry M. Stanley of the *Tribune*, searched in vain for the beautiful Indian female features "as described by the Cooper and Murray type of romances."

**The Changing Face of the War**

The appearance of accredited war correspondents Davis and Stanley in 1866 marked a change in how the war was reported. With the end of the Civil

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34. 3 February 1866, 5; 11 February 1866, 6; 9 April 1866, 8.
35. 4 December 1865, 1.
36. 11 September 1866, 2.
37. Ibid.
War, the press lacked the exciting war news that had sold so many papers, and they turned to the brewing war on the frontier. But few experienced Civil War correspondents came west, and a distinction was made in the field between "the only real correspondents in the party" and "others who vaunted their pretensions." An Associated Press story claimed many unofficial reports were exaggerated because they emanated "from parties interested in keeping up the excitement and misleading the public." The Tribune, which ran the story, carefully pointed out their own correspondent was completely trustworthy.

But the end of the Civil War brought not just correspondents to the frontier. The government found itself with a large military force needing employment—all that was needed was a reason for concerted military action. The reason came on 21 December 1866, with the news of the Fetterman Massacre. At Fort Phil Kearney, troops disobeyed orders and charged after Indians attacking an incoming wood train. Out of sight of the fort they fell into an ambush, where all were killed and their bodies later found badly mutilated.

On 27 December, the Times ran a small notice on page 4 that a massacre had occurred; the wire account appeared the next day on page 1. A "grand coalition" of twelve tribes was blamed. On 19 January 1867, the Times published two letters from an unnamed correspondent at Fort Laramie. The first clarified in fact that only Sioux and Northern Cheyenne were involved in the attack and gave the road being constructed through their hunting grounds as the motive. The second added no facts, only commentary: "... that horrible butchery of friendly Indians by Colonel Chivington did not mend matters much. We must now have a war of extermination, I suppose." Four months later they ran a letter from an enlisted man giving a straightforward, if rather gory, account of events.

Leslie's published their account on 19 January. Although no one survived who saw the fight, they included a full-page illustration of the attack: soldiers reaching imploringly up to Indians who hold knives in their teeth and wave hatchets and scalps overhead. The wife of the Fort Kearney commander later wrote a scathing criticism of the coverage:

There was certainly no difficulty as to historical precedents or illustration of Indian warfare from which to combine a proper

39. Knight, Following the Indian Wars, 4.
41. 2 October 1866, 2.
42. See Coward, "The Fetterman Massacre," for a full study of the reporting of this event.
43. There was some confusion over the spelling of "Kearney." Although most newspaper reports spelled it with a second "e," it was named for "Kearny," which is the spelling used today.
44. 27 December 1866, 4; 28 December 1866, 1.
45. 19 January 1867, 1.
sketch, and accordingly the work was begun, even before the couriers had reached Laramie with details of the transaction itself.47

She said of Dr. Hines, who furnished an eyewitness account to Harper’s, he “saw of the fight...nothing.”48 Harper’s account did not appear until the 23 March issue. It included a fullpage engraving and the observation that “so apparently determined are [the Indians] to force a war on the Government that General Sherman has been led to remark officially that the only way to keep peace with them is to exterminate them.”49

On 4 April, the Tribune reported that the commanding officer, his family, and the entire garrison at Fort Buford had been killed by a force of two-to three-thousand Indians, but they retracted the report five days later.50 Harper’s ran the story on 13 April as “Another Terrible Indian Massacre.” Leslie’s story on 20 April began, “The public mind has scarcely calmed down from the horror excited by the Fort Phil Kearney massacre when it is roused by another, if possible, still more dreadful.” The article reported the commander’s wife was subjected to “every atrocity” and “tied on the back of a wild horse and turned loose on the plains.”51 On 10 May, the Tribune labeled the story a hoax; Harper’s and Leslie’s never did print retractions.

Instead, Leslie’s blamed the massacres on the federal government, and the question of whether to keep the Bureau of Indian Affairs within the Department of the Interior or to transfer it to the War Department began to dominate coverage. Leslie’s observed that “an Indian war offers contractors, favorites, and Government swindlers generally a rich booty,”52 and they suggested that things could be better managed.53 Times correspondent “C” concluded his Fetterman Massacre report: “The fact is that Indian matters out here have been horribly bungled, and they will be in a mess until they turn over the Indian affairs to the army, as it was years ago.”54 The Times ran two editorials calling for reform. They noted that while “a policy of extermination would receive almost universal support from the white settlers on the Western plains,” what was needed was stronger governmental action, in particular, putting the military in charge to see that justice was done.55 The Tribune called for reform, but they laid the blame with the railroad companies, whom they accused of getting rich at the expense of the Indians.56 The Nation now joined the debate, asking that the War Department be put in charge of “corralling” the

48. Ibid., 222. Hines’ account claimed the Indians responsible were Sioux, Crow, and Blackfeet.
49. 23 March 1867, 188. Harper’s ran a similar generic Indian massacre illustration on 13 October 1866, 644.
50. 5 April 1867, 1; Ibid., 9 April 1867, 4.
51. Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, 20 April 1867, 66.
52. Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, 1 February 1868, 306.
53. 27 July 1867, 291.
55. 16 May 1866, 4; 20 May 1866, 4.
56. 15 March 1867, 4.
Indians to avoid mass slaughter: "We do not justly discriminate between the tribes themselves; and our practice is usually first to massacre, by the wholesale, all the redskins we can get at—brave, squaw, and papoose..."57

The Senate ultimately refused to make the transfer, but it did pressure the Army to punish the Indians. The Tribune correspondent wrote: "The Indians lately have horrified the people of the United States by diabolical and cruel massacres. These call for instant retaliation and severe punishment."58 But the Tribune, announcing the upcoming military campaign, noted: "Death or Indian agents; what an alternative!"59 The Times ran a string of editorials, five in the first five months of 1867. They lambasted the corruption of the Indian agents and the belligerence of the army, noting that neither one would lead to "civilization."60 They regretted that force seemed to be the only answer, asking that the upcoming campaign be "short, sharp, and decisive."61 In the last of the set they concluded:

The example set by Colonel Chivington, in massacring in cold blood, without provocation and without subsequent rebuke, a whole camp of Indians, old and young, male and female, has given the cue to settlers and others, until an Indian has come to be regarded by them as of no more account than a prairie dog or coyote, and to be shot down with as little reluctance...How much more to the credit of the country and this generation would it be if, instead of killing off these red men because they do not think and live as we do, we undertook their education and civilization.62

**Hancock's Summer Campaign**

General Sherman sent out Major General Hancock and fourteen hundred troops with the ambiguous orders to find the Indians and treat with them if friendly, punish them if not Both the Times and Harper's, which published little about the early events of the war, ran lengthy articles reviewing events from mid-1864 up to the announcement of the Hancock campaign. Both blamed white settlers for the war; the Times called Sand Creek a "wholesale slaughter" and said Hancock was leading the military into the field to set relations straight.63 Harper's declared the settlers "sought and made opportunities for war, and have persistently forced that issue on the Indians,"64 although they concluded the Fetterman Massacre had evened the scales following Sand Creek.65 Harper's also sent out a correspondent to cover the action: Theodore R. Davis.

Davis, an artist-correspondent for Harper's during the Civil War, wrote lengthy pieces for the Monthly, demonstrating a keen eye for ethnographic

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57. 17 January 1867, 51-52.
58. 13 April 1867, in Stanley, My Early Travels and Adventures in America, 35.
59. 23 March 1867, 4.
60. 10 January 1867, 4; 23 April 1867, 4; 28 April 1867, 4.
61. 30 April 1867, 4.
62. 26 May 1867, 4.
63. 2 June 1867, 8.
64. 15 June 1867, 371. See also Harper's Monthly, July 1867, 263-264.
65. Ibid., 264.
detail, a didactic bent, and a cynical disposition. On his way west he was already
drawing conclusions:

An Indian, like a rattlesnake, may be trusted only when his
fangs are removed; otherwise it is well to give him a wide
berth or be prepared to kill him on sight...[An Indian] will
shake your hand all day and at nightfall will take your scalp. It
is simply a way that he has of expressing his brotherly
sentiments toward the white man.66

Davis included sketches he drew of Indians killing and mutilating settlers based
on second-hand atrocity stories—as of yet he had not made it into “Indian
Country.” With Davis was a second correspondent: Henry M. Stanley of the
Missouri Democrat, St. Louis, and New York Tribune. Stanley, born the
illegitimate John Rowlands of Wales, wrote up the naval battles he witnessed as
a soldier during the Civil War for the Democrat, New York Herald, New York
Tribune, New York Times, and others.67

Hancock, his troops, and the two correspondents set out to confront the
Cheyennes because, Hancock said, they “appear to be as deserving of
chastisement as any other.”68 The Times agreed, saying the actual number of
hostile Indians was not great, with the Sioux and Cheyenne being “our worst
foes.”69 Hancock asked to meet with the Cheyenne, promising to return to them
a child taken captive at Sand Creek. But Davis reported it was hoped “that the
savages may be prevailed upon to leave the boy with his present friends, that he
may be properly cared for and educated.”70 What Davis failed to mention was
that the boy’s education and friends among the whites consisted of a stunt as an
exhibit in a traveling circus.71

But when Hancock’s troops approached the Cheyenne village, the
Indians feared another Sand Creek and started evacuating their women and
children. Word spread that the Indians were abandoning the village, and General
George Armstrong Custer and the Seventh Cavalry surrounded the village to
prevent anyone from escaping. But they were too late—the village was
abandoned, although most household belongings remained. Custer said his
command “at once resolved itself into individual plundering committees”; Stanley reported the scene more like a farce: “The soldiers rummage and pick up
things in the most senseless manner, and after carrying them a few yards throw
them away, when they are soon picked up by somebody else, and thrown away
again.”72

142-144.
67. Knight, Following the Indian Wars, 57-58.
69. 17 June 1867, 4.
70. Harper’s Weekly, 27 April 1867, 270.
71. Also, the child was an Arapaho, not Cheyenne. See Hyde, The Life of George
Bent, 256.
72. Custer writing as “Nomad,” in Brian W. Dippie, ed., Nomad: George Custer in
Turf, Field and Farm (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980): 20-26; Stanley, My
Early Travels and Adventures in America, 39.
Within the camp was a young girl, about 10, who had been raped. Davis reported her a half-breed, outraged by Cheyennes; Stanley reported her as white and "outraged no less than six times," although he fails to say how the number was determined. Stanley later reported she was Cheyenne and "not in her right mind" and that she had been intact when the Indians were forced to leave her behind.\(^{73}\) Probably the best contemporary press rendering of the affair was the wire report published in the *Tribune* that the girl was called Indian by some, white by others, and had been raped either way.\(^{74}\)

Hancock's controversial order to burn the village and its contents was supported by the correspondents. Stanley wrote for the *Democrat* that "the Indians deceived him and commenced hostilities, and he was compelled to burn their village," optimistically concluding "Kansas is now free from all hostile Indians, and is open to the immigrant." For the *Tribune* he wrote that the Indians had "taken everything of value with them."\(^{75}\) Davis reported that the destroyed property easily could be replaced by the Indians in a single summer.\(^{76}\) *Harper's* editors gloomily concluded peace had failed and now a full war was begun.\(^{77}\) But the *Times* declared the burning unwarranted, saying the Cheyennes had been friendly toward the troops and that "the Indians have been tormented and assailed in every conceivable way, until in retaliation they have taken to pillage and murder."\(^{78}\) An article from *Times* special correspondent "G.B." in Denver published six days earlier, however, said the locals would "soon sweep the Indians from these latitudes" and at a low cost compared to the mineral wealth to be gained.\(^{79}\) The *Nation* agreed the frontier needed to be opened, but they suggested treating the Indians like "U.S. citizens" and not "foreign nationals."\(^{80}\)

On 20 July, Congress formed a Peace Commission to meet with the Plains tribes, including the Northern and Southern Cheyennes. Stanley reported: "We present quite an imposing appearance, and with the formidable number of newspaper correspondents [11], the expedition to the Indian sachems becomes important."\(^{81}\) James E. Taylor, of *Leslie's*, drew the Indians as imposing figures, towering over the commissioners.\(^{82}\) Stanley described "their faces painted and

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74. 25 April 1867, 1.


76. Theodore R. Davis, "A Summer on the Plains," *Harper's Monthly Magazine*, February 1868, 295. In actuality, the Cheyennes would have had to kill three thousand buffalo, tan their hides, and journey to the mountains to chop down 2,400 poles just to replace their lodges. Both Stanley and Davis greatly underestimated the extent of the loss.

77. 18 May 1867, 307.

78. 23 June 1867, 4.

79. 17 June 1867, 5.

80. 31 October 1867, 356; 9 January 1868, 22.


82. 6 November 1867, 133.
their bodies bedizened in all the glory of the Indian toilette. To the hideous slits in their ears were hanging large rings of brass."^3

At the conclusion of the treaty, *Harper's Monthly*, not wanting to appear unduly optimistic, said "hostilities are, for the present, at least, concluded."^4 *The Weekly*, having declared Hancock's campaign ineffective, concluded it was cheaper to civilize them than to kill them.^5 Stanley exhibited his usual boundless optimism, however, and a bit of inaccuracy. He noted the commissioners had "solemnized a treaty of peace and friendship with the scourge of the plains—the Southern Cheyennes," somehow missing the point that the Southern Cheyenne, once again under the leadership of Black Kettle, had pushed for peace while the Northern Cheyenne had been belligerent. Stanley grandly surmised: "Peace has been concluded with all the Southern tribes. Civilization is now on the move, and westward the Star of Empire will again resume its march, unimpeded in the great work of progress."^6 *The Times* ran the wire story, which noted that the Cheyennes "acted very independently,"^7 and offered the opinion that all that was now required to bring about the downfall of the tribal system was civilized treatment.^8

However, the Senate was slow to ratify the treaty. The Indians held to its terms until 16 August, when raiding began again, and the Army was ordered to discover and destroy them.^9 At the end of August the *Times*, which had asked the Senate to speed up ratification,^10 published an editorial on the "war of extermination against these particular tribes [Arapaho and Cheyennes] [which] seems to have been authorized and inaugurated." But no longer was their answer a simple plea for civilization—now the *Times* suggested the guilty tribes be punished.^11 *Leslie's* printed a letter from a frontiersman declaring his countrymen's hatred of the Indians justified: "Would that the people could see the Indian as he really is. I think they would demand a war of extermination." The editors noted that although they printed the letter as received, they could not support the massacre of "squaws and the pappooses [sic]." They also published a letter from an army officer saying the military only killed "squaws" in self defense, "nor have I known a child to be killed under any circumstances."^12 *Harper's* was more resigned; the government had tried everything else, the only choice left was to fight a war of extermination.^13

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85. 7 September 1867, 564; 25 January 1868, 51.
87. 1 November 1867, 1.
88. 3 November 1867, 4.
90. 29 July 1868, 4.
91. 30 August 1868, 4.
92. 12 September 1868, 407.
93. 19 September 1868, 601, 606.
Late in September, a warring band pinned a party of scouts down on an island for days until relief troops came.\textsuperscript{94} The story of the fight appeared in the \textit{New York Herald}, marking the appearance of DeBenneville Randolph Keim as an Indian War correspondent. Keim wrote the story from interviews obtained after the fact, a device he was to use many times. The discomforts of the forced march were not for Keim; he attached himself to Sheridan's camp, ate in the officers' tent, then penned his stories from the tales that came back. Knight described Keim as "an eastern gentleman on a well-equipped camping trip."\textsuperscript{95} Keim, who had covered the Civil War for the Herald, wrote in accordance with the views of the Herald's publisher, James Gordon Bennett Jr., who was in favor of a military solution to "the Indian problem." The Indians, Keim said,

certainly display the most perfect contentment in their low condition, and it is a problem, yet to be solved, whether civilization will not supplant their present contentment for a life of squalid poverty, intoxication, immorality, disease, and inevitable extermination.\textsuperscript{96}

The \textit{Times} blamed the misbehavior of whites for the continuing raids: "Settlers and Indian traders undermine our policy and debauch the Indian. Never, until we scour these vermin from the Plains, shall we be able to govern the savages."\textsuperscript{97} But on 14 October, they published Sheridan's lengthy report in which he termed the Indians "insolent and overbearing" and stated that "these Indians require to be soundly whipped."\textsuperscript{98} To do so, a winter campaign was to be inaugurated because the Indians' grass-fed ponies were in no condition for battle. Davis drew two pictures for \textit{Harper's} readers: the Indian pony in spring, showing a bone-thin, head-down nag; and the Indian pony in August, looking like a prize carriage horse.\textsuperscript{99} \textit{Harper's} also cheered the leadership of Sherman and Sheridan, whose reputations were such that they promised to be thorough and vigorous in their pursuit and punishment of the Indians.\textsuperscript{100} The \textit{Nation} explained the necessity of the campaign to its readers as follows:

They cannot have what they want in the way of hunting grounds without staying the march of civilization on the plains...whether we want to exterminate them or plant them on a reservation, we have first to catch them, and this, it seems, must be done in the winter.\textsuperscript{101}

Sherman wrote to the commander of Fort Cobb, Indian Territory, "General Sheridan [may] be forced to invade the reservation in pursuit of hostile Indians. If

\begin{enumerate}
\item See the full account in Brown, \textit{Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee}, 166; Grinnell, \textit{The Fighting Cheyennes}, 282-288.
\item Knight, \textit{Following the Indian Wars}, 101.
\item Keim, \textit{Sheridan's Troopers on the Border}, 200.
\item 26 September 1868, 4.
\item On page 8. Versions of this report also ran in \textit{Harper's Monthly}, the \textit{Tribune}, and the \textit{Herald}.
\item Davis, "A Summer on the Plains," 294.
\item 10 October 1868, 641.
\item 26 November 1868, 430.
\end{enumerate}
so, I will instruct him to do all he can to spare the well disposed..." 102  The reply: "The Indians of this agency are in a destitute condition, and think they have a claim upon this country...I have written to [their agent] to come here and place his Indians on their own lands, wherever that may be..." 103 In fact, the Indians, including the Southern Cheyennes, were exactly where the lands ceded to them by the treaty were. But on 20 November, Black Kettle appeared at Fort Cobb to tell the commander he wished to move his camp closer to the fort for protection. The commander refused permission, saying he could not permit a move. 104

The Battle of Washita

On 18 November Camp Supply was established in the northern edge of Indian Territory as a base of operations for the winter campaign. 105 Sheridan ordered Custer and the Seventh Cavalry to find the hostile tribes and "to destroy their village and ponies; to kill or hang all warriors, and bring back all women and children." 106 Custer wrote, "We are going to the heart of the Indian country where white troops have never been before." 107

On 26 November, Custer's troops picked up an Indian trail heading south and followed it throughout the night. About 3 a.m. they reached their target, a winter camp. The soldiers surrounded the village; they would attack on Custer's signal at dawn. 108 The village was Black Kettle's, who had returned to camp from Fort Cobb just the night before. He discussed with his wife his concerns over the safety of the camp; they decided the next day they would move down river to be closer to their allies. 109 It was now the next day, and it was too late. At daybreak, the attack began. Within ten minutes, the cavalry had control of the village. 110

Both Black Kettle and his wife were killed. Many women and children were gunned down while trying to hide in the surrounding brush. In all, Custer's troops killed 103 Indians, of which only a few were warriors, and took fifty-three women and children prisoner. They set fire to the lodges and killed most of the

106. Hoig, The Battle of the Washita, 82.
Custer's scout brought the news back to Camp Supply that Custer was returning victorious. It was from this scout that Keim, the only accredited correspondent with the campaign, got his story. The military report of the battle was carried over the wire and printed by most papers on 2 or 3 December. It reported Black Kettle and 150 Cheyennes killed, fifty-three taken prisoner: "The victory was complete and will be a wholesome lesson to the Cheyennes."

Keim's story for the Herald was not published until 26 December because the messenger carrying it was killed. Keim had Black Kettle rushing from his bed to the door of his lodge as the battle began: "He looked around him, and witnessing the frenzied columns, fired his rifle and gave one wild whoop." That Black Kettle was war whooping was as probable as Keim's report that Black Kettle's son was killed—he had no children. The soldiers faced "death by the horrible torture which the hellish ingenuity of the savage alone can invent."

The Times, on 4 December, stated that although they were sure it was "a pretty murderous affair," a hard blow was necessary. "The fight on the Wachita [sic] is a proof of the theory that a Winter campaign, and that alone, can avail against the Indians...one or two repetitions of Custer's victory will give up peace on the Plains." Harper's said: "Sheridan's harvest is one which could only be garnered in the winter season, and thus far he has proved himself an efficient reaper." They berated the Interior Department for the "sad bungle of this Indian matter," and congratulated the War Department for demonstrating how to get things done. They even managed to put a favorable spin on the number of Indian children killed: "The desperation of the fighting at the battle of the Washita may be judged from the fact that no male prisoners over eight years of age were taken." Leslie's full page illustration of a village full of dying Indians was drawn solely from wire accounts.

Peace commissioners and Indian agents who resigned in protest wrote letters to the press, including the Times and the Tribune, angrily denouncing the battle and comparing it to the Sand Creek Massacre. They warned that "the practice of holding an entire race responsible for the alleged criminal acts of a few, must be speedily abandoned, or an alarming state of war will continue to exist on the Western border." But Harper's printed Sheridan's report to Sherman, which emphasized the expediency and necessity of winter campaigns on villages, while disclaiming any responsibility for the results: "I have to select that season when I can catch the fiends, and if a village is attacked, and women and children killed, the responsibility is not with the soldier, but with the people whose crimes necessitated the attack." Davis praised the superiority of the

112. Keim, Sheridan's Troopers on the Border, 111.
115. 4 December 1868, 4.
117. 26 December 1868, 233.
Army to civilian agents, noting that Custer proved whites could endure hardships that Indians would not.120

The Nation gave a good report of the southern reservations the next year, reporting that agriculture was in place and the Indians were being introduced to civilization. Keim closed his Herald report of the campaign with the following rosy picture.

All the tribes south of the Platte were forced upon their reservation. Thus, by the powerful and efficient aid of Sheridan’s Troopers, the wild tribes were made accessible to the generous heart of humanity, and the tempering influences of industry, education, and christianity.121

In fact, the majority of Indians around Fort Cobb surrendered to Sheridan on 31 December, begging for peace on his terms because they were destitute.122 When the Comanches surrendered several days later, their chief, Tosawi, approached Sheridan and said, “Tosawi, good Indian,” to which Sheridan replied, “The only good Indians I ever saw were dead.”123

Conclusions

Revisionist history has shown that Black Kettle and his Southern Cheyenne were peaceful except for the short outbreak after Sand Creek when Black Kettle was temporarily removed from power.124 Yet the first massacre of this tribe was largely ignored by the New York media, although they viewed it after the fact as a gross miscarriage of justice. But Custer’s similar action against this same tribe just four years later was judged a “battle” and not a “massacre” and was presented by the media as a justified solution to a long-term problem. What produced such a marked difference in outlook in just four years?

During the Civil War the eastern media paid little attention to events on the frontier while the fate of the nation was at stake elsewhere. Only after the war, when investigation of Sand Creek became a Congressional matter, did it become part of the media agenda. But at that point it had lost immediacy, and Indians were viewed as helpless children rather than as feared enemies. As such, it was easy for the New York media to conclude, along with officials in Washington, that Sand Creek had been a sad massacre of innocents.

With the end of the Civil War, however, events on the frontier gained renewed prominence. The frontier provided a common front after the divisiveness of the war and a chance to once again demonstrate the manifest destiny of a reunited people. As Harper’s noted, “Think of this vast expanse of territory nearly two-thirds as large as all Europe, and filled with mineral wealth, and behold what a field is opened for the enterprise of the world.”125 The frontier also provided a

121. Keim, Sheridan’s Troopers on the Border, 308.
122. Berthrong, The Southern Cheyennes, 332; Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee, 170.
123. Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee, 170.
124. See Berthrong, The Southern Cheyennes; Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee; and Hyde, The Life of George Bent.
stage for the heroes of the war at a time when the country needed heroes to recover purpose and self esteem. Certainly the men who had rescued the country from its worst crisis to date could also restore a united sense of purpose. And what better place than the frontier, which still embodied the common democratic ideal of Jefferson and the expansive manifest destiny of Jackson, to serve as the birthplace and primary shaper of the new American spirit, a cultural mythos Frederick Jackson Turner would formally articulate thirty years later. Finally, the frontier provided an opportunity for the correspondents who had gotten a taste of war journalism and for newspapers and magazines that were battling for readers. Three of the early accredited Indian war correspondents had reported the Civil War for the same media; only the face of the enemy had changed.

Davis, of Harper's, possessed keen anthropological insight, but his ethnocentrism and cynicism prevented him from putting events into their larger, cultural context. He praised the skills used by Indian women to tan and decorate buffalo hides, but added: "A result is obtained which is highly creditable to the uneducated and somewhat savage wives and daughters of 'Nasty Elk,' or whatever euphonious term the master of the lodge may see fit to designate himself by." He told his readers it was dangerous to venture too far from a ranch or post "for the flesh is weak, and the red baby must be made familiar with the different varieties of hair, and blonde tresses are highly prized among the Indians."

Stanley, writing for the Tribune, had an active curiosity and a sense of historical significance, but his adventuresome nature and overwhelming optimism often undermined his import. He wrote in the British colonial spirit, noting the grand march of civilization across the Plains. When James Gordon Bennett could not reach Keim, he called on Stanley to be his emissary to Africa to find Livingstone—a task well suited to Stanley's adventurous nature and flair for the dramatic. Keim, writing for the Herald, was an elitist who enjoyed his personal comforts and took care not to offend his military hosts, often at the expense of a factual accounting of events. Keim aspired not to accuracy but to producing a good adventure tale that glorified the viewpoint of authority.

Leslie's fielded a variety of correspondents with no one predominating, but with the help of the editors in New York they shared a flair for imagination over facts, excitement over reality. An engraving of Indian atrocities labeled "Vengeance on the Trail" was accompanied by the following notice:

In fact, it may be considered in part a picture of the imagination, although it represents many a stern reality of the Indian War...It is a scene that time and time again has been repeated in this irrepressible conflict between the white men and the red.

128. Ibid., 154.
129. 9 January 1869, 267.
Of this formulaic approach Coward noted that coverage in the illustrated papers followed a model guaranteed to produce an "exciting tale for a public all too willing to believe in the grit and glory of Indian warfare in the West."\textsuperscript{130} The \textit{Times} and the \textit{Nation}, which did not have correspondents, relied on government-issued reports for the news, then took issue with the same in editorials. The \textit{Times} ran seventeen editorials on the war from 1865 through 1868, many more than any of the other media studied. Their position, much like that of the \textit{Nation}, was uninformed. They viewed the Indians as troublesome children who needed a firm hand to control and discipline them until they could learn to act like responsible adults. Similarly, the \textit{Nation} asked, "What shall we do with the Indians?" and concluded that if they were treated like citizens, they might become upstanding Americans with time.

Despite these differences, however, the coverage evidenced many similarities. In some sense all news originated with the military: Most wire stories were official military reports; accredited correspondents had to fight alongside the troops; and media without accredited correspondents depended on special correspondents who often were military men. It is not surprising, then, that the coverage presented events from the military perspective, framing the resolution of the "Indian problem" in terms of military solutions. And when Hancock's summer campaign failed, illustrating the downfall of a military hero, much of the coverage became a search for a scapegoat. In particular, the Interior Department came under fire for not giving the military a free hand to put a definitive end to Indian depredations.

Only two ultimate solutions to the "Indian problem" were ever presented—extermination or assimilation. Most viewed extermination as the probable ultimate fate of the Indian, but assimilation into civilization was the preferred action until such time as the Indian inevitably—and naturally—vanished. The \textit{Nation} closed 1868 with a long editorial on "The Indian Difficulty," asserting that Indians had their good points, but they were also "cruel and treacherous, filthy and dishonest." Whatever it took to civilize the Indian was necessary and good, although it was to be regretted that "perhaps even under this treatment the Indians could not be saved; but if they cannot bear civilization, it will at least kill them decently, and be a humane substitute for the revolver, the small-pox, and the whiskey-bottle."\textsuperscript{131} The \textit{Times} said, "The collecting of all Indians, friendly or hostile, on reserved locations, is the only proper issue of the Indian question. It is the leading of the Indians out of temptation; it is delivering them from evil."\textsuperscript{132} It was in this climate of fear and the perceived need for decisive action on the part of the military that the Battle of Washita took place. With the bold action of Custer, the military regained status, the country again had a military hero, and the Indians had been disciplined, which should assure their further good behavior. In a country weary of war, the action held promise of a speedy end to another conflict. Little wonder the news of Custer's actions was presented as a victory in the media.

The coverage also was similar in that it evidenced an overwhelming ethnocentrism. Indians were Indians; they needed punishment as a race, even though depredations were committed by a few. Thus, many reports did not

\textsuperscript{130} Coward, "The Fetterman Massacre," 58.
\textsuperscript{131} 31 December 1868, 544-546.
\textsuperscript{132} 19 April 1868, 4.
include any mention of tribal affiliation. Even when reports did include tribal distinctions, they tended to ignore intratribal differences. For example, Keim, who had demonstrated knowledge of the various branches of the Cheyenne tribes, still wrote: “In the war with the government, all the Cheyennes and Arapahoes took the warpath,”\(^{133}\) ignoring the fact that throughout this period the Southern Cheyenne were peaceful and cooperative while the Northern Cheyenne were often aggressive. It was a rare editor, like that of the New York Daily Tribune, who was able to ascertain this stereotypic attitude, but even then it was attributed only to others.

The war code which prevails among the whites is that for an offense committed by any one Indian, all other Indians are liable to be shot; and that if no offense at all has been committed, nevertheless, an Indian, like a black snake, deserves death on general principles...These sentiments may be read in any border newspaper.\(^{134}\)

It was this lack of distinction among the Indian peoples that allowed the country to celebrate the Battle of Washita as the solution to the “Indian problem.” The import of having almost exterminated a friendly tribe on their own land was lost, overshadowed by the need for punitive action versus the Indian race. And this action versus one tribe was considered sufficient punishment for the race as a whole. But by making all Indians the enemy, the climate of public opinion, as reflected in the New York media, set the stage for the long years of war to follow. Indeed, some of the remaining Southern Cheyenne fled north and joined with the Northern Cheyenne. They would avenge their families eight years later at the Little Big Horn, making the dominant ethnocentric viewpoint mirrored in these media a self-fulfilling prophecy.

_The author is a doctoral candidate in mass communication at the University of Georgia. She would like to thank Dr. John M. Coward, Tulsa, for guidance on an earlier version of this article._

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133. Keim, _Sheridan’s Troops on the Border_, 189.
134. 21 November 1867, 4.
'News in Which the Public May Take an Interest':
A Nineteenth-Century Precedent for

By Richard Digby-Junger

Some eighty years before the new standard for libel was written, Michigan jurist Thomas M. Cooley was laying down the principles of free speech utilized in this opinion. The author discusses Cooley's career and the libel cases that influenced his views.

On 9 March 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court issued what has been called the most important free expression opinion in American jurisprudence and perhaps the most important libel decision ever written. In New York Times v. Sullivan, Associate Justice William J. Brennan Jr. created a new standard for libel, advocating nearly absolute protection for matters of speech related to self government. While scholars have pointed to the influence of free speech philosopher Zechariah Chafee Jr. on the Times v. Sullivan decision, they have overlooked another inspiration, a Michigan jurist who advocated a similar position some eighty years earlier. Thomas McIntyre Cooley, one of America's first lawyer-academicians, repudiated hundreds of years of English and American libel law when he wrote in a 1883 libel case, "The mere publication of items of news in which the public may take an interest as news merely, and the discussion of matters which concern the public...are their own affairs." It was Cooley's legal thinking, as cited in a 1908 Kansas Supreme Court decision,
Coleman v. MacLennan, that Justice Brennan invoked in principle, if not in name, in his Times v. Sullivan opinion.1

Thomas Cooley's ideas on free speech, articulated in the many legal text books he wrote, have been examined by legal scholars, but the actual libel cases that influenced him have not been studied. In particular, the adversarial relationship that developed between Cooley and the Detroit Evening News illustrated Cooley's evolving thoughts on free speech, the dilemma between protecting free speech and tolerating sensationalistic news coverage in society, and the price that each individual pays to be a public figure. In the end, Cooley warrants historical recognition as an advocate of free speech on public issues at about the same time that another judge was ordering the execution of three journalists for allegedly instigating Chicago's Haymarket Square bombing. He also deserves to be remembered not strictly as a constitutional conservative, as some legal historians have cast him, but as a proponent of individual rights. It was Cooley's goal to update libel law. His wish to preserve Thomas Jefferson's belief in free speech and limited government and Andrew Jackson's concern for equal rights inspired his decisions, not blind obedience to a yellowing document.2


Cooley’s Early Years

Thomas McIntyre Cooley was born in 1824 near Attica, New York, one of fifteen farm family children. “I was brought up as a poor boy, with hard work,” he wrote of his childhood, “gave myself such education as I possess; began married life with absolutely no means whatever; [and] lived the first ten years with greater economy and fewer of the comforts of life than beginners now think they can possibly consent to.” As a child working on his father’s farm, he learned an appreciation for individual rights that had been characteristic of upstate New Yorkers since before the Revolutionary War. He hated farming, and apprenticed for a lawyer in Palmyra, New York, where he acquired a taste for the law that he never outgrew. Seeking to make his own name, he moved to the still sparsely-settled state of Michigan in 1844, studied with a lawyer in Adrian, and was admitted to the Michigan bar in 1846 at the age of 22. He briefly edited two political newspapers, which provided him with an appreciation for the state’s partisan press, and he reorganized Michigan’s hodgepodge system of statutes during the 1850s. Otherwise, he spent his early years practicing law.3

That changed in 1859 when he was hired as a faculty member for the newly founded University of Michigan law school. He quickly established himself there as a legal scholar without rival. He introduced the now familiar lecture-and-case method form of study to Michigan, a technique in use in only a few other American law schools at the time. It was said that his teaching technique impressed his student’s minds “so indelibly that not only what had


been said but the precise words used were easily retained.” He wrote two of the first American law textbooks, Constitutional Limits in 1868 and a Treatise on the Law of Torts in 1879. Both were widely adopted by other law professors and influenced an entire generation of American lawyers and judges. It was Cooley’s Constitutional Limits text that Justice Brennan cited in New York Times v. Sullivan. It remains on law school book shelves to this day.4

Even before he became a law professor, Cooley entered politics as a Jacksonian Democrat and Free-Soiler, and he remained a Democrat at heart for the duration of his life. Unfortunately for him, Michigan, along with the rest of the West, went Republican during the 1850s, and Cooley had to align himself with the new party or face political oblivion in his adopted state. He was elected to the Michigan Supreme Court as a Republican in 1864, more for his appearance than his politics. Tall, lean, rugged, and sporting a full black beard, Cooley bore enough of a resemblance to Abraham Lincoln that people would stop and stare at him on street corners. His ties to Lincoln’s party were always tenuous. In his diary, he defended Lincoln’s predecessor, Democrat James Buchanan, as “a true patriot...[who] managed public affairs during the last days of his administration quite as wisely as they were managed during the early days [of Lincoln].” Instead of Lincoln’s belief of a strong central government, Cooley remained an individualist at heart, in the style of Jefferson and Jackson. Anyone who cared to notice discovered that it was their political and legal legacies, not Lincoln’s, that Cooley evoked in his judicial decisions.5

Joining Cooley during his years on the Michigan high court were three justices of lesser but still formidable stature. James V. Campbell was a dyed-in-the-wool Republican who also taught at the Michigan law school. Not only was he the ideological opposite of Cooley, the two disliked each other personally. In their more than twenty years working together on the bench, they rarely ate together, spoke to each other, or even stayed in the same hotel. Cooley later wrote of their relationship, “I cannot attribute this to any fault of either, and indeed I think our friends believe the contrary to be the fact, but somehow the sympathy from which intimacy must spring has never seemed to be present.” Campbell was a simple-minded frontier man who had little interest in political philosophies or ideologies, depending upon simple equity decisions whenever possible. He also resented the intrusions of public life, especially those from newspaper reporters. In contrast, Cooley loved the law and all its nuances, and enjoyed social events and the trappings of a public life. In spite of their mutual dislike, Cooley and Campbell found themselves in occasional agreement on decisions, including some involving libel.6

Beyond these two intellectual leaders, there were other, lesser figures on the state’s highest court. Thomas Sherwood, a one-time circuit court judge, was

more of a politician than a jurist. Isaac Marston, an Englishman and former law student of Cooley's, often agreed with his mentor on matters of libel and helped form a majority for him on significant decisions. It was Campbell, Sherwood, and Marston who were significant in Cooley's decisions.7

Newspapers of the Period

In contrast to the distinguished Michigan Supreme Court, the Detroit Evening News was one of the most sensational and irreverent newspapers in Gilded Age America. Throughout Michigan's earliest history, the state's newspapers were largely partisan in nature, especially the Detroit press. Often edited by aspiring politicians such as Cooley, they served primarily as propaganda vehicles for political parties, their candidates, or their partisan opinions. Few functioned as genuine sources of news or entertainment. Under such circumstances, circulations were limited and subscriptions were expensive, averaging between five and ten dollars a year. Most were read by a very narrow segment of Michigan society: educated, politically-active, affluent, white, upperclass males. By no coincidence, the entire Michigan Supreme Court was made up of such individuals. Cooley and his colleagues had grown up reading the partisan newspapers, and no doubt they would have lived happy lives if Michigan's press stayed as it was.8

But it changed, and in a significant way. Beginning in the 1830s, a new type of newspaper, the penny press, began appearing in American cities. These new newspapers differed from their partisan counterparts largely because they made a profit on the sale of copies, not through party support. To avoid alienating readers of differing political persuasions, they filled their columns with nonpolitical news, crime, human interest, and society stories. In doing so, they appealed to more readers, but tended to ignore and even denigrate the same educated, affluent, upperclass white men who had been celebrated in the partisan newspapers. As sociologist Michael Schudson has observed, the penny press were less concerned if it hurt a few prominent citizens because as commodities, not propaganda, the more copies that were sold to the emerging middle class, market societies of nineteenth-century America, the more profit their publishers made.9

The publisher of the new Detroit Evening News wanted to produce such a penny newspaper for Detroit. The half-brother of the more famous E.W. Scripps, James E. Scripps cut his teeth in journalism on the highly-partisan Chicago Tribune and Detroit Tribune. Tired of their political propagandizing, Scripps envisioned a new newspaper for Detroit based on the New York Sun, a popular penny press newspaper which made an annual profit of more than

$100,000. In 1873, he started the Detroit Evening News with a $2,000 investment; the paper began generating a profit within six months even though Detroit was in the depths of a recession at the time. By 1875, the News’ circulation had climbed to sixteen thousand, more than any other Detroit newspaper. It employed more than six hundred persons in 1877, including thirteen reporters and editors, twenty-three printers, 114 correspondents, and more than two hundred newsboys. In his diary, Scripps reported yearly profits of $13,000 in 1876, $18,000 in 1877, and $14,000 for 1878. By contrast, Michigan Supreme Court Justice Thomas M. Cooley made an annual salary of $9,000 and another $1,000 in royalties, teaching fees, and related legal work in the late 1870s. In 1880, the News’ daily circulation stood at nearly 39,000 copies, making it the seventh largest circulating newspaper in the United States. By 1882, Scripps could legitimately claim that he had a larger circulation than his one-time employer, the Chicago Tribune.  

Scripps’ secret of success was that he made his newspaper affordable, timely, and sensational. Late in life, he explained, “Had I held everything down to my own views, I should have produced a good but dull paper, which I do not doubt I would have made succeed, but which probably would have not risen much above the dull prosiness of the Detroit journalism of that day.” Instead, his motto was to “cram the News down everybody’s throat.” His better known half-brother E.W. worked briefly as a News reporter and remembered the paper as “about as wild and reckless a bunch of newspapermen as I have ever known gathered in one room.” E.W. went on,

The Detroit Evening News was practically the founder of what is known as “personal journalism.” Rich rascals found that, as far as the reporters of the News were concerned, they were living in glass houses, and they had no means of protecting themselves from public exposure. This applied to rich men who were affected with petty meannesses, so-called respectable men in political office who were doing wrong, clergymen who had faults that unfitted them for church service or even decent society, professional men—doctors, lawyers, and even judges on the bench—who had depended upon the cloak of their respectability, or position, to cover a misdeed.  


As it worked out, Detroit was a fitting locale for Scripps' new newspaper. An unprecedented crime wave had struck the city beginning in the 1850s, and the organization of a professional police force in 1865 had only changed the crime by establishing a system of payoffs and bribes. By 1873, Detroit had emerged from a tiny Native American settlement to a modern, gas-lighted metropolis of almost 100,000 people, with all of the problems attendant upon a modern city. This transformation made excellent filler for the Evening News. Scripps pitched his newspaper to Detroit's growing middle class, which was hurt by the crime, but enjoyed few, if any, of the payoffs. That on occasion, honest public servants like Thomas Cooley might be hurt by the Evening News was unfortunate, but it was not a concern of Scripps. His two goals in life were to make Detroit a better city and to sell as many copies of the Evening News as he could.  

Cooley's Views on Libel

The first libel suit to be tried before Cooley, Detroit Post v. McArthur, developed in 1868, five years before the News was born, but it marked the start of Cooley's thought process on a free press. Two different newspapers, the Detroit Post and Detroit Free Press, had predicted that a Detroit man would be charged by the police with a serious crime, but he never was. In appealing a trial court judgment of $1,100 in favor of the man, the newspapers admitted the defamatory nature of their articles, but argued that it was a mistake brought about by the tremendous expansion of the mid-nineteenth century newspaper business. With growing staffs of editors, reporters, and writers, no publisher could know of or approve everything that appeared in his paper, and therefore could not be completely liable. Cognizant of the division of labor then underway in other American industries, Cooley and the Michigan high court agreed with the Post's argument to some extent. Writing for the majority, Justice James Campbell noted, "When it appears that the mischief has been done in spite of precautions, [a publisher] ought to have allowance in his favor which such carefulness would justify,...," especially if the publisher could prove that everything possible had been done to prevent a libel from appearing. However, Campbell also reminded publishers that "there is no doubt of the duty of every publisher to see at all hazards that no libel appear in his paper" and ultimately upheld the lower court verdict.  

McArthur stimulated Cooley to organize his thoughts on the press in the newly developing American industrial society. Writing in his first textbook, Constitutional Limits, which was published the same year as McArthur, he

noted, “The publisher of a newspaper...though responsible for all the actual damage which a party may suffer...cannot properly be made liable for exemplary or vindictive damages, where the article complained of was inserted in his paper without his personal knowledge....” Still, McArthur did not have all of the elements necessary for Cooley to remake Michigan’s libel law. At the time, libel damages were based less on the content of the speech and more on the amount of harm that had been done to an individual’s reputation. Logically, well known persons such as public officials had more reputation to damage and were therefore entitled to larger awards. McArthur involved a private person. As he discussed the McArthur decision, Cooley posited that the press should be able to “bring any person in authority, any public corporation or agency, or even the government in all its departments, to the bar of public opinion,” but he had no case to validate his point.14

In contrast to Cooley’s thinking on the subject, James E. Scripps had another idea about libel. If he was to expose and correct the official corruption of Gilded Age Detroit, he knew that he would have to break a few eggs; thus, libel became one of the costs required of a successful newspaper publisher. Beginning in 1875, Scripps routinely chronicled his many court appearances, legal meetings, verdicts, and settlements as seemingly minor disruptions in his diary. By his own account in 1878 and 1879, the last two years that his diaries have been preserved, Scripps, the Evening News, or one of his reporters were named in at least ten different libel suits, not counting appeals or rehearings. That was more than all of the libel suits heard in Michigan courts in the decade before the Civil War. The verdicts and settlements ranged from nothing to $2,300, but Scripps apparently did not mind. By 1878, he had become so accustomed to both being sued for libel and fatherhood that he jotted down “paid judgment in Cavanaugh case $104.10” before he observed the birth of his fifth child.15

The first Scripps libel case to be heard by the Michigan Supreme Court came in 1875. One of Scripps’ star reporters, Robert E. Ross, had accused a Detroit circuit court judge named Cornelius J. Reilly of adultery. Reilly, enraged at what he considered to be an unprovoked attack upon his character, sued the newspaper for $25,000 and was awarded a jury verdict of $4,500, a significant amount at the time. Writing for a not unsympathetic high court, Justice Isaac Marston noted that the newspaper had produced a “sensational and wholly unjustifiable article,” but ruled for the paper, noting that it had used “the very latest and most reliable news” from official public records, and “that on such occasions the same careful scrutiny cannot [be] exercised that would at others.” Cooley considered the decision open and shut and did not contribute to it. Despite his loss, Reilly continued harassing Scripps, and the publisher finally settled with him in 1878 for $2,500, money Scripps probably considered well spent.16

15. Scripps diary, various entries, 1878 and 1879.
16. Scripps v. Reilly, 35 Mich. 371 (1877) and Scripps v. Reilly, 38 Mich. 16 (1878); Player, “Scripps,” 168-169; Scripps diary, various entries March and April 1878; and Cooley diary, 22 April 1883.
Scripps’ second supreme court case developed in 1878 when a reporter for the competing *Detroit Tribune*, James E. Tryon, was alleged by the *Evening News* to have revealed a confidential source in a story on police corruption. The *Evening News* noted, “There is not a patrolman on the force who does not...condemn the reporter who made public a private conversation.” Tryon sued Scripps for libel, arguing that the story had hurt him in his profession. The trial court ruled for the *Evening News*, holding that the charge of breaking a confidential source was not a crime in Michigan and therefore could not be libelous, even if it hurt an individual’s career. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice James Campbell overturned the lower court verdict, ruling that an individual’s reputation could be hurt by a claim that was not in itself criminal. According to Campbell, “The general public to whose entertainment or instruction all newspapers are supposed to be devoted, has no concern whatever with the lawful doings and affairs of private persons.” The *Evening News* vainly argued that a spoken accusation had been found in another case not to be defamatory, but Campbell observed that a printed libel was more serious than a spoken slander and sent the case back to a jury. At a second trial, Scripps was ordered to pay Tryon $100.\(^\text{17}\)

That same year, the *Evening News* was sued by a physician over a story claiming that he had negligently vaccinated a one-year old child for scarlet fever, unintentionally killing the child in the process. The newspaper argued that the doctor’s public prominence gave it the right to report the information, a position Justice Campbell denied in his majority decision. Campbell held that the doctor was not a public official because he had volunteered to administer the injection and therefore had no official status. Cooley concurred with Campbell in his opinion, but renewed his call for leniency toward the press in reporting public issues. According to Cooley, “There are many cases in which the public benefits of free discussion are so great that privilege must be admitted even though individual injury may be serious.” The case went to a third jury before it was ultimately settled out of court.\(^\text{18}\)

The case Cooley needed to articulate his opinion on the free discussion of public issues finally materialized in 1881. *Atkinson v. Detroit Free Press* did not directly involve the *Evening News*, but the newspaper was an indirect party to the proceeding. The case began when a Detroit lawyer named John Atkinson filed a libel suit on behalf of a client accused of murder by the *Evening News* in 1880. In the resulting trial, the *Evening News* was exonerated of the charge, in what the newspaper modestly characterized as a ringing victory for the press. In their glee, the *Evening News* and the rest of the Detroit press set out to destroy Atkinson’s reputation, but when the *Free Press* ran a series of articles charging him with fraud and theft, Atkinson sued for libel and won. The jury verdict was appealed on a variety of technical grounds, and the majority of the state supreme court upheld it. Justice James Campbell noted that the article was libelous since it was not “connected with any matter concerning which it could be regarded as

\(^{17}\) *Tyron v. The Evening News Association*, 39 Mich. 636 (1878) and Scripps diary, 21, 25 June, 21 November 1878 and 9 September 1879.

\(^{18}\) *Foster v. Scripps*, 39 Mich. 376 (1878); Player, “Scripps,” 169; and Scripps diary, 20 February, 5 March, 22 October 1878, 3 April 1879.
privileged” and the paper could not prove any of its charges in court even though
evidence strongly implicated the plaintiff.19

In a lengthy dissent, Justice Cooley sided with the newspaper. “No doubt
[the Free Press] might have used more carefully-guarded language, and avoided
irritating headlines,” he admitted, “but in a case of palpable fraud, which this
seemed to be and was, something must be excused to honest indignation.”
According to Cooley, it was Atkinson’s “misfortune that it was impossible to
deal with the case without bringing him into the discussion,” or in other words,
that he was an involuntary public figure. Cooley wrote,

If such a discussion of a matter of public interest were prima
facie an unlawful act, and the author were obliged to justify
every statement by evidence of its literal truth, the liberty of
public discussion would be unworthy of being named as a
privilege of view....[the Free Press] would have been unworthy
of the confidence and support of commercial men if its
conductors had shut their eyes to such a transaction.

Although Cooley could not point to any specific precedence for his opinion, he
noted that the principle of open discussion of public ideas was “embodied in the
good sense of the common law, where it has constituted one of the most
important elements in the beneficent growth and progress of free States.”20

Although a dissenting opinion, Atkinson v. Detroit Free Press was
Cooley’s magnum opus on a free press, and it became one of the most ringing
defenses of the First Amendment to emerge from a century that had an otherwise
feeble record regarding free expression. It was Atkinson and Cooley’s textbook
that were cited and quoted in the 1908 Kansas libel case, Coleman v.
MacLennan, which in turn was cited by Justice William Brennan in Times v.
Sullivan. Cooley’s response did not receive much attention at the time, but it did
not pass without notice altogether. A few months later, an editor friend wrote
Cooley, “Your ideas of successful journalism are essentially those I have always
held....[my newspaper] will be devoted to the highest good of the community
and advocate the right in a dignified but fearless manner.”21

Cooley repeated a portion of his argument a year later in Miner v.
Detroit Post & Tribune. The Post & Tribune accused a municipal judge of
violating judicial ethics by failing to properly enforce liquor and gambling laws.
The judge sued for libel, and the newspaper made what has come to be known in
the twentieth century as a fair comment defense, arguing that it was stating a
true opinion on a matter of public interest. The high court disagreed, citing the
newspaper’s imputation of “specific moral delinquency” as a claim that was
provable and therefore not a simple opinion. Writing for the majority, Justice
Cooley tried to make a distinction between newspapers “of grave public concern”
and newspapers which specialized in gossip and scandal. To equate both,
according to Cooley, was to place “the reckless libeler...in the same company
with respectable and public spirited journalists.” Although it seems out of

19. Atkinson v Detroit Free Press, 46 Mich. 341, 9 N.W. 501 (1881), and Player,
character with Atkinson, Cooley never intended to give the publishers of mere private gossip the same protections that he envisioned for public controversies. Only in discussing matters of true public interest would newspapers be protected from libel.22

Cooley was pleased with his Atkinson and Miner opinions. He wrote fellow Justice Isaac Marston in August 1882, “I think we have got on the right track at least in libel cases and I am pleased to see that [new Justice] Shipmann approving heartily the Atkinson and Miner cases.” However, the Evening News remained an irritant to him. Based upon his diaries, he read Detroit’s three other dailies, but he never mentioned the Evening News in any of his entries, suggesting that he never read it. He avoided the Evening News’ reporters whenever he could as well, providing the late nineteenth-century equivalent of “no comment” to their questions. His behavior was reminiscent of the so-called “moral war” that had been waged by New York City’s upper class against James Gordon Bennett’s penny press New York Herald in 1840. Interestingly, Scripps’ circulation, just as Bennett’s, continued to climb during Cooley’s years on the bench. Even though Cooley did not read the paper, it was clear that many others of his class were probably out of the public eye.23

Cooley’s final libel case on the Michigan Supreme Court occurred in 1883, revealing more of his disdainful attitude toward the Evening News. In MacLean v. Scripps, the Evening News accused a University of Michigan medical professor and one of Cooley’s personal friends of forcing a consensual sexual relationship upon a female patient. The front-page story appeared under the headline, “Debauchery and Ruin: The Sad Story of a Crazed Husband and Broken Family, The Wreck of a Canadian Home Charged to a Michigan University Professor.” The paper complained that “the good name of [the University of Michigan] is being seriously compromised” by the affair and accused the professor of sending love letters to the woman filled with language that “was most disgusting.” There was little to the case beyond the accusations of the two parties, but the trial court found for the professor, granting him $20,000 damages, the largest libel verdict in Michigan history at that time. In its story on the verdict, the Evening News implied that the jury had been bribed. A Scripps’ biographer observed, “As was the case in other news libel suits, sympathies of people were with the paper and an immense crowd waited before the court building...until 9 p.m., discussing the case and speculating on what the verdict would be. When the result was announced there were many expressions of disgust.”24

The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the jury verdict on appeal. With Cooley’s concurrence, Justice James Campbell wrote, “Private reputation cannot be left exposed to wanton mischief without redress.” He held that “a person may publish falsehoods of another who occupies a position in which his conduct is open to public scrutiny and criticism, without any referent to the object to be secured by the publication, is a doctrine which has no foundation that we have been able to discover.” Only newly elected Justice Thomas Sherwood dissented,

23. Cooley to Isaac Marston, 7 August 1882, in Cooley Papers and Cooley diary, 4 November 1882 and various entries.
noting that Scripps had shown no signs of malice in his testimony. Instead, Sherwood wrote, "If the charge was true, the defendant, as editor and publisher of a paper with 35,000 or 40,000 subscribers had not only the right, but faithful journalism made it his duty, to publish the facts; to 'cry aloud and spare not.'" Cooley was not pleased with either the case or the verdict. He noted in his diary, "the libel case of MacLean & Scripps...came in with a most extraordinary farrago of nonsense in favor of reversal."  

MacLean was unusual for several reasons. As previously indicated, both Cooley and Campbell were colleagues and friends of the plaintiff, fellow faculty members of the still small University of Michigan. Former Justice Isaac Marston represented Scripps before the high court. Cooley wrote in his diary,

Judge Marston in the course of his final address to the jury took the liberty of drawing comparisons between the manager of the News and the conductors of other Detroit papers to the prejudice of the latter; and they were so grossly—I may say grotesquely—unfounded that they only excited derision. There is quite a general feeling, I think, among [Judge Marston's] friends that he made a mistake in engaging in the case at all.

To top things off, the plaintiff MacLean was represented by Justice Campbell’s son. Today, judicial canons would require a judge to recuse himself from such a case, but nineteenth-century judges operated under a less stringent ethical code. Former Justice Marston, Scripps’ counsel, wrote a letter to Cooley eight days after the high court verdict complaining about the decision. In his diary, Cooley noted, "The opinion is certainly not one to do Judge Campbell credit; but he had the excuse that he prepared it in the night between 10 & 3. Nobody praises it, and those who like the conclusion regret that it was not more satisfactorily expressed."  

James E. Scripps was furious with the ruling, especially the ethical improprieties, and demanded a rehearing. Cooley wrote in his diary, "In court through the day. Among the motions was one for a rehearing in the MacLean v. Scripps; the principal ground being that Justice Campbell, by whom the opinion was prepared, was the father to one of the attorneys in the case. In point of law the motion has nothing whatever in it; but I have always felt the awkwardness of sitting in cases under such circumstances, and generally have refrained from doing so." By the consensus of the other justices, Cooley was asked to review the case. The one-time newspaper editor dismissed Scripps’ contention that Justice Campbell had been prejudiced in his verdict, but recast portions of his hastily written decision. Instead, Cooley argued there were satisfactory "proofs from which the jury might infer that the publication was made in entire disregard of the plaintiff’s rights, and from interested motives." At the end of his patience with Scripps and his sensational journalism, Cooley also observed,

25. MacLean v Scripps, 52 Mich. at 220, 230, 17 N.W. at 817, 829(1883) and Cooley diary, 12 October, 20 December 1883.
26. Isaac Marston to Cooley, 29 December 1883, Cooley Papers and Cooley diary, 28 February, 16 April, 30,31 December 1883.
No court has gone further than has this in upholding the privileges of the press, and very few so far. If there has, by oversight or otherwise, been any failure to recognize and support them in this case, the court would be prompt to make the correction....But there has been no such failure.

In Cooley’s mind, there was no doubt that the First Amendment had never been written to protect James E. Scripps and the Detroit Evening News.27

Cooley’s Later Years

Even though Scripps lost the MacLean case, he had an important say in Justice Cooley’s future. Cooley was up for reelection to the high court in 1885 and as previously indicated, his ties to the state’s Republican party were tenuous at best. Privately, Cooley hated most politicians. He thought that judges should not to have to run on a political ticket, noting in his diary in 1884, “Andrew Campbell, an ambitious farmer living in Pittsfield, called to see what I thought of his becoming a candidate for Congress. I sent him to the politicians.” He was also angered when petty bickering among the Michigan Congressional delegation denied him a seat on the U.S. Supreme Court twice in the early 1880s. Although he never confided his feelings on the matter to his diary, Cooley held Michigan’s Republican Party responsible for derailing his bids for the ultimate judicial post in the country.28

Cooley’s disgust evidenced itself through his support of Democrat Grover Cleveland in the 1884 presidential election. “I voted for Cleveland as a protest against public dishonesty,” he benignly noted in his diary. Although he never denied voting for Cleveland, Cooley did not publicize the fact for obvious political reasons. Somehow, the Evening News and the other Detroit papers learned of his defection and launched an attack on him for his lack of party allegiance. The Evening News predicted in February 1885, “Should the Republicans nominate Cooley, there will be a fair, square fight in this state. It will not be a partisan fight in any sense, for Cooley has not been a Republican since 1876. He voted for [Democratic candidate Samuel J.] Tilden that year and Cleveland last year.”29

The Evening News attacked him in other ways as well. In the same February issue, it documented what it alleged was favoritism in Cooley’s decisions toward large monopolies and against individuals. Another article alleged that he was a prohibitionist, an unpopular political position in Michigan, which had a large immigrant population who had grown up with alcoholic beverages. In an editorial titled “Not a Question of Motive,” Scripps also wrote,

29. Cooley diary, 4,12,29 November 1884, 10 February, 5 March 1885, and “Cooley and the Corporations,” Detroit Evening News, 26 February 1885.
At the close of the famous suit of MacLean against Scripps...after the supreme court—upon which sat two fellow professors of the plaintiff and the father of the plaintiff’s attorney—had refused to open the case again...after Judge Cooley’s friend and fellow professor had received the cash from his judgment, and after Judge Campbell’s son had received a portion of his contingent fee—in a word, after the robbery had been consummated...there was but one opinion of the transaction among the unprejudiced masses of Michigan. The press of the state almost unanimously condemned the affair as a travesty on justice, as a disgrace to the courts, an indelible blot upon the highest court.30

Cooley was disconcerted but not overly concerned by the Evening News’ campaign against him, especially in light of what he considered to be nearly twenty years of unselfish, devoted public service to the state. He briefly considered resigning, but friends talked him out of the move. The day before balloting, he wrote in his diary,

The election in progress is a very warm one, and so far as I am concerned has been perfectly unscrupulous from the first. I feel no confidence in the result, and while most of my friends are confident there are many fears. One thing is certain: the best men of the state are supporting me almost to a man; and it is equally certain that the worst elements of the state are very active against me.

On election day, the Evening News gloated, “Thomas M. Cooley is being pasted unmercifully in almost all sections of the city.” The early report was accurate; Cooley lost the election by a margin of nearly 30,000 votes. After the election, one of his supporters noted, “The course of wholesale dealing in falsehood and villainy adopted by the Detroit News did us great damage no doubt.”31

Thoroughly disheartened by the electoral repudiation, Cooley resigned from the high court in September 1885. No longer needing to restrain his disgust at the Evening News for political reasons, he gleefully noted in his diary in late July 1885, “A reporter for the Detroit Evening News called on me for an ‘interview’ and was told I was too busy to talk with him.” A month later he wrote,

Two newspaper reporters have been after me to ascertain the truth to reports appearing in [the Evening News]...I told them that because some scribbler had run to a gossipy paper with a rumor would be no reason with me for following him there.

31. Detroit News, 26 February, 12 March, 6 April 1885; Cooley diary, 6, 18 April 1885; A.J. Sawyer to C.T. Kimball, 5 March 1885; J.F. Lawrence to George Jerome, 26 March 1885; E.A. Cooley to Thomas M. Cooley, 7 April 1885, and Philip T. Van Zile to Thomas M. Cooley, 10 April 1885, all in Cooley Papers.
Several days later, Cooley slighted James E. Scripps by personally delivering review copies of a new book he had written on Michigan government to the newspapers. Only one Detroit paper did not receive a copy, the *Evening News.*

**Discussion**

Knowing the personal anguish that Cooley felt in the aftermath of his 1885 reelection defeat, his free press philosophy as echoed some eighty years later by Justice William J. Brennan in *New York Times v. Sullivan* is surprising. After all, his entire identity as a lawyer and legal scholar was tied to his judicial work. He stuck to his beliefs because Cooley was a nineteenth-century man of character and principle, and he reserved his bitterness for his tormentor, the sensationalistic *Detroit Evening News,* not the American legal or political systems. He continues to be a seminal figure in American legal history today. The University of Michigan Law School is named in honor of Judge Cooley, and lawyers still occasionally consult his textbooks.

Cooley's theories remain significant for a couple of reasons. Most importantly, his views on libel and public speech, as first expressed in *Atkinson v. Detroit Free Press,* are an important, if forgotten, precedent for *New York Times v. Sullivan.* There is a similitude in thought between *Atkinson, Coleman v. MacLennan,* and *New York Times v. Sullivan.* In his torts textbook for example, Cooley observed in 1888,

> We unhesitatingly recognize the fact that in many cases, however damaging it may be to individuals, there should be legal immunity for free speaking, and that justice and the cause of good government would suffer if it were otherwise. With duty often comes a responsibility to speak openly and act fearlessly, let the consequences be what they may; and the party upon whom the duty was imposed must be left accountable to conscience alone, or perhaps to a supervising public sentiment, but not to the courts.

In quoting Cooley, the Kansas Supreme Court observed in *Coleman v. MacLennan* in 1908,

> There are social and moral duties of less perfect obligation than legal duties which may require an interested person to make a communication to another....Any one claiming to be defamed by the communication must show actual malice, or go remediless. This privilege extends to a great variety of subjects and includes matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for office.

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34. *Coleman v. MacLennan,* 78 Kansas at 723, 98 P. at 285(1908).
In citing Coleman, Justice Brennan noted in 1964,

A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions—and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount—leads to a comparable “self-censorship” . . . . Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so.  

Cooley also deserves to be recognized as an advocate of individual rights, at least as far as the First Amendment is concerned, and not strictly as a Social Determinist, laissez-faire capitalist, or constitutional conservative. He was not responding to “the increased professionalism of the press,” as Todd F. Simon has suggested, because journalism had few professional standards to respond to in the late-nineteenth century, and as evidenced in this paper, the Detroit Evening News had even fewer. Nor was he at all supportive of the “arrival of popularly oriented evening newspapers,” as libel historian Neil Rosenberg has stated, or “flamboyant journalism” as George Edwards has called it. Cooley detested sensationalism, especially the gossipy journalism of the Evening News, preferring a vigilant, watchdog-style press, a model that the framers of the Constitution may have envisioned, but certainly not in vogue during the Gilded Age.  

Instead, Cooley was trying to accommodate the new profit-driven commercial press of the late nineteenth century. He believed that all Americans, even journalists, should have an opportunity to share in what he conceived to be the traditions of individualism and egalitarianism. Those traditions may be less at odds with what the late twentieth-century considers them to be than one might imagine. Legal historian Alan Jones has explained, “Cooley illustrates in an exceptional way the travails of the doctrine of equal rights from the age of Jackson to the age of McKinley . . . . [He is] less the villain of Progressive historiography than an ironic example of its tenet affirming a vital equalitarian tradition that stretched from Jefferson to Wilson and beyond.” Cooley’s defense of the unbridled discussion of public issues in the press as a vital element of American democracy came at a personal price to him. His feeling was shared by the publicity-shy former Justice Brennan, but it was in response to a changing America, not a lament for a time long gone. Had Cooley chosen a more conservative course, he would have found himself in agreement with his colleague James V. Campbell, other members of the Michigan Supreme Court,

or the judge who ordered the execution of the Chicago Haymarket anarchists in 1886.37

Although Cooley never again sat on the bench following his 1885 re-election defeat, he did not retire from public service altogether. In 1887, Democratic President Grover Cleveland appointed him as the first chairman of the newly-created Interstate Commerce Commission. Although the I.C.C. was a frail, ineffective bureaucracy in its earliest years, Cooley’s self-determination turned it into a model for other federal regulatory agencies. Feeling unappreciated and disenchanted with Gilded Age Washington politics, Cooley resigned from the agency following the death of his wife a few years later and lived his final years at his home in Ann Arbor, dying in 1898. Today, a free press and effective governmental regulation, like many of Cooley’s oft-stated beliefs, remain elusive but respected ideals in American society.38

The author is an assistant professor in the Department of Journalism, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb.

Archibald Grimké: Radical Writer in a Conservative Age

By Roger Schuppert

Often overlooked when studying African American history, Archibald Grimké was one of the most radical writers and outspoken leaders against racism and disfranchisement following the Civil War.

Following Reconstruction, African Americans were still trying to secure the rights which had supposedly been guaranteed them by the Constitution. Helping them in their fight were a number of prominent black leaders who used the press and the podium to complain long and loud against the outrages being committed in the South. The most prominent and influential personality was Booker T. Washington (1856-1915), whose conservative, conciliatory approach to racial issues was not only attractive to many African Americans but acceptable to influential whites as well.

Other African Americans of the period, however, were dissatisfied with Washington’s approach. One of these men was Archibald H. Grimké (1849-1930), a Harvard-educated lawyer, diplomat, newspaper editor, and for most of his later adult life, one of the more radical writers on issues affecting African Americans.

Grimké sought to look at the issue of race relations in a more visible and radical way, through agitation and strong criticism of the government, as he did in a piece written in 1900 entitled “The Negro’s Case Against the Republic.” In no uncertain terms, Grimké accused the government of treating African Americans as “an alien race, allowed to live here in strict subordination to the white race.” He went even further and lambasted the preamble of the Constitution, calling it a “piece of consummate political dissimulation and mental reservation,” made by men who “raise above themselves huge fabrics of falsehood, and go willingly to live and die in a make-believe world of lies.”

1. The original piece is found in the Archibald Grimké papers, located at the Moorland-Spingarn Research Center at Howard University, Washington, D.C., which were unavailable to the author. The piece is cited in Bruce, Archibald Grimké, 95. The published piece appears as “The Shame of America, or the Negro’s Case Against the...
Much has deservedly been written about Washington and his work, but little mention has been made until recently about the writings of Archibald Grimké. Yet through the pages of the New York Age, various magazines and numerous public speeches, Grimké was one of the most outspoken voices of black protest in the early part of this century.

One of the issues which Grimké felt very strongly about was the disfranchisement of African Americans in the South. This article will discuss selections from Grimké’s major writings on this issue. Though each piece may stand on its own as a strong and passionate statement of Grimké’s philosophy, taken together they represent one of the earliest and most vociferous departures from the dominant conservative view of the period. To put Grimké’s writings in perspective, a few words need to be said about the issue of disfranchisement and the source of his disagreement with Washington about this issue.

The Grimké-Washington Debate and Its Importance

The years 1890-1915 represented, as one commentator has put it, “the nadir of the Negro’s status in American society.” Disfranchisement measures were enacted in state after state in the South, and the status of African Americans there was reduced to that of second-class citizen.

Such devices as literacy and property clauses required potential voters to be able to read and own property of a certain value. Grimké had no real complaint against literacy and property clauses as long as they were applied equally and fairly to all races, but he believed this was not the case below the Mason-Dixon line. A similar restriction on the ballot in the South was the “understanding” clause, which said that potential voters must be able to read and understand any paragraph of the state constitution. Many illiterate whites, of course, were also disfranchised under this law, but according to Grimké, it was only being used against African American voters.

Not surprisingly then, Grimké spent much of his time opposing disfranchisement, and in doing so he became embroiled in an intellectual and personal debate with Booker T. Washington. The difference was not so much on substance—both men agreed that disfranchisement was wrong—but in how they articulated the issue.

In speeches such as the “Atlanta Exhibition Address,” delivered on 18 September 1895, Washington said that African Americans were largely responsible for their own problems, and he advocated industrial and vocational education and separate-but-equal schools. He believed that rights, including the right to vote, must be earned through hard work and adherence to Christian ethics.

Republic,” in American Negro Academy Occasional Papers, No. 21, 1924, 5.
5. Booker T. Washington, Up From Slavery, 1908, 218-225. See also August Meier,
Archibald Grimké’s approach to the issue could not have been more different. He blamed white people for the racial problems in the South and elsewhere, and though he supported the vocational training advocated by Washington, he felt that a higher form of education would produce better results for the African American race. As for the right to vote and other civil rights, he believed they were guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments to the Constitution.

For Grimké, the possession of the ballot was of paramount importance, because, as he wrote in 1913, “wanting the ballot, no amount of education and wealth in the South and of agitation in the North will make the Southern governments responsive to the needs and wants of the Negro as laborer and citizen.”

The philosophical difference with Washington on this issue goes back to at least 1899. Having just returned to the United States from Santo Domingo, where he had been consul from 1894-1898, Grimké wasted no time articulating his position on civil rights. On 3 October 1899, in a strongly worded letter to President William McKinley, Grimké lashed out at the president for his inaction during the recent spate of lynching in the South. “We ask for the free and full exercise of all the rights of American freemen, guaranteed to us by the Constitution and the laws of the Union, which you were solemnly sworn to obey.” The letter only hinted at the issue of disfranchisement, but the intent was unmistakable.

Such boldness, the audacity to criticize even the president, was unusual at this time and fostered not only an interesting and spirited intellectual debate, but eventually led to a permanent estrangement between Washington and Grimké. Though both men tried to support each other professionally (Grimké introduced Washington to many influential African American leaders and Washington financially supported the New York Age, for which Grimké wrote regularly), their relationship deteriorated rapidly. Washington began to criticize Grimké for his outspoken stance, at one point accusing him of being among a group of “noisy, unscrupulous men bent upon notoriety and keeping up discord.” Matters reached a head in 1907, following President Roosevelt’s action following the Brownsville incident, which Washington opposed privately but supported publicly.

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7. “An Open Letter to President McKinley from the Colored People of Massachusetts,” Henry P. Slaughter Collection, Woodruff Library, Atlanta University, Atlanta, Ga.
Grimké’s Writings

Despite criticism from Washington, Grimké continued to attack racial injustice at the podium and with his pen. One of his first important pieces on disfranchisement was published in Atlantic Monthly in July 1904. In “Why Disfranchisement Is Bad,” Grimké pointed out three reasons. First, he said African Americans would never consent to such a practice because their right to vote was written “with [their] blood in the history of this country in four wars and [they are] of the firm belief that [their] title to them is a perfect one.” Second, disfranchisement would demean the labor force in the South, cheapen the quality of labor and make it impossible for the South to compete industrially with the rest of the country. Finally, Grimké argued that disfranchisement would be bad for the rest of the country because what hurt the South would inevitably hurt the rest of the nation.10

Grimké wrote another article about disfranchisement the following year for the New York Age on 16 March 1905, in which he criticized President Theodore Roosevelt for failing to enact legislation to uphold the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments to the Constitution. “According to some who have seen him since his election last November,” he wrote, “he has not left it in doubt as to his stand in the matter of enforcing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. He does not view favorably, for the present at least, to the efforts looking to the enactment of appropriate legislation to enforce those amendments.” He admonished the president as well, saying that the question “demands something more than noble words, it demands noble actions as well.”11

Related to the issue of disfranchisement was the idea of whether or not the South’s representation in Congress should be reduced as a result of such a practice. In two separate pieces, Grimké argued that the South’s representation should be reduced. In a short piece in the New York Age in 1905, part of a symposium on the subject, he argued that since the South had violated both the spirit and the letter of the Fourteenth Amendment, it should be punished according to the provisions set forth in the Amendment; but he predicted that, under current Republican leadership, such an event would not likely take place because “the Republican party is looking out for itself in all this race and sectional question—and not for the Negro.”12

He discussed this issue in greater detail in a much longer piece that same year, this time for the American Negro Academy, of which Grimké was president from 1905-1919.13 “The Meaning and Need of the Movement to Reduce Southern Representation” outlined the history of the Slave Representation Clause. During the Civil War, this clause counted five slaves as three freemen in statewide elections. Though the South lost that power after the Civil War, it regained it following Reconstruction by instituting what Grimké

called a system of African American serfdom, thereby creating a “master class.” Even though each freed slave was now counted as a whole person, he was not given the right to vote. So the South had now technically increased its population, thereby also increasing its representation in Congress, while denying a large portion of its population the right to participate in the election of those representatives. In short, the South had, as Grimké eloquently put it, “achieved the extraordinary feat of eating its political cake and keeping it too.”

The only solution to this problem, Grimké argued, was a reduction in Southern representation (there was debate before Congress about that issue), which, he argued, would produce some interesting results. Here Grimké demonstrated some original thinking.

First, he said a reduction of Southern representation would reduce the political strength of a section of the country which he viewed as “insolent, exacting and aggressive” toward the question of equal rights for African Americans. Reduce the number of representatives, however, and more power would swing toward the North, causing that section to act more favorably toward African Americans.

According to Grimké, reducing Southern representation would also put an end to the spirit of good will between the South and the rest of the nation, causing undue strife between the two sections of the country. Such a struggle would draw attention to the problems in the South, with the result that the rest of the nation would look more sympathetically toward African Americans.

Grimké’s ideas in this piece are intriguing, but perhaps somewhat simplistic. One of the reasons the country fought the Civil War was, as Grimké admits in the article, to “reduce to a minimum the peril to its industrial democracy.” But the end of that conflict did not effectively change the attitudes toward African Americans, especially in the South. Readers may wonder whether a similar struggle, as the one Grimké suggests in the article, would change the attitudes of the South. Enforcing the voting rights law might not necessarily change the condition of, or the attitudes toward, the people for which the law was intended. Although the situation has improved somewhat, there is still much race hatred in the South despite the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and other civil rights laws. The piece does, however, offer an unusual perspective on one of the major issues of the period.

During this period, 1905-1909, while Grimké was breaking away from the influence of Washington, he began to attract the attention of the more radical elements in the civil rights debate. One of those whom he met and by whom he was influenced was W.E.B. DuBois, an Atlanta University professor and one of the founders of the Niagara Movement, which became the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in 1909. While Grimké’s writings still contained the militant tone of previous years, a different element was added to the mix.

This idea is especially true of "The Ballotless Victim of One-Party Governments," which Grimké presented to the American Negro Academy in 1913. The tone of the piece is still angry and outlines a litany of complaints against the government, such as unfair and discriminatory treatment aboard the Jim Crow cars on railroad trains. Grimké attributes all of these injustices to the lack of the ballot "in those states of one-party governments in which [the Negro] is denied a voice."

Later in the article, however, a strong social Darwinistic tone is seen, perhaps influenced by DuBois, who was an avowed socialist. In a particularly strong passage, he compares the disfranchised African Americans to a herd of sheep being inexorably devoured by wolves. "The wolves will devour the sheep and the enfranchised class will prey on the disfranchised class. To the wall the weak will be driven and harried and destroyed whether they be sheep or men, and this the strong will do every time whether they be men or wolves."\(^{17}\)

Whether Grimké was a socialist or not is not entirely clear; he certainly knew DuBois and others who were, and he doubtless would have encountered the writings of Darwin in educational training. There is some evidence that, at least in principle, he supported the socialist cause. He wrote articles for *The Messenger*, the newspaper of the Socialist party, and in 1920 he became a member of the Friends of Negro Freedom, which was thought to be a Communist-supported organization. There is no compelling evidence, however, that Grimké was a member of either the Socialist Party or the Communist Party.\(^ {18}\) In any case, the article shows the broad range of ideas that Grimké incorporated into his writings.

**Analysis and Commentary**

The articles discussed above seem to have had some impact on his contemporaries. Grimké was the featured speaker at numerous rallies and conferences about race issues. In 1910, he was named president of the Washington, D. C. chapter of the NAACP, a post he held until just before his death. Further, his testimony before a House subcommittee on the Civil Service in 1919 prevented legislation that would have continued discrimination in that organization. He even received the coveted Spingarn Medal, the highest award bestowed by the NAACP. In short, his accomplishments were many, and he left a significant body of journalistic writing that was both thoughtful and thought-provoking. He seemed to be able to articulate better than most the anger and frustration of his race, and he constantly sought to develop "new perspectives on the old problem of racial injustice and oppression in the post-emancipation United States."\(^ {19}\)

*The author is a part-time writer and state employee in Atlanta. This article is adapted from his master's thesis at Georgia State University.*

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17. Ibid., 8.
18. See Bruce, Chapter 17, especially 243-246.
19. Ibid., 48.
Clarity as a ‘Linguistic Theory’

By William Stimson

A group of intellectual historians called the “linguistic school” or "literary theorists" wants to change the way history is written. Working with tools developed for use in formal literary criticism, these historians examine historical texts word by word and even comma by comma to see what gaps they can find in meaning. Historian Sande Cohen, for example, compiled a whole book of ambiguities he found in Peter Gay's book, Weimar Culture. Cohen pointed out that when Gay wrote the sentence, "The Weimar Republic was proclaimed on November 9, 1918, by the Social Democrat Philipp Scheidemann," he actually should have written it, "As I hope to prove, what was called the Weimar Republic by x was proclaimed...."¹ This would have been more exact. If Gay should protest that to make such caveats explicit in every sentence would slow the book to a crawl, Cohen would reply -- good! Cohen argues that the very smoothness of a stylist like Gay invites "passive cognition" in readers and what is needed is "a discourse that slows reading."² Similarly, Dominick LaCapra, perhaps the number one theorist of this school, criticized well-known stylist Robert Darnton for being "too accommodatingly readable."³ The literary historians are true to their principles in their own prose. They write with an insider’s terminology and pay no attention whatever to the sound of sentences. As critic Russell Jacoby pointed out in an article in the American Historical Review, the literary theorists may have managed precision, but they have done so at the price of becoming almost indecipherable. In his 1992 review of the literary theorists, Jacoby said Sande Cohen's book Historical Culture almost defies evaluation because it cannot be understood. "His prose is so opaque that the book comes with a glossary, but unfortunately the glossary needs a translator or an editor." Thus, says Jacoby, if those who read Cohen stumble over the word "actantial," they turn to the glossary and get this definition: "Actantial/actant refers to the complex exchange between what a 'historical' narration allows to be the subject of doing (for example, capitalism treated as the actant of innovation or capitalism presented as the subject of dialectical transformations) and the reader's ability (generally) to acknowledge primary roles of action as necessary to a culture." ⁴

In a spirited response to Jacoby's essay about the literary theorists, LaCapra made no apologies for such complexity. In fact, his own prose, in an essay specifically meant to explain linguistic theory to outsiders, was defiantly abstruse. Consider the following three passages from LaCapra's essay, all drawn from a single page:

Defensible complexity is related to dialogism in the

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2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 418.
4. Ibid., 419-20.
basic sense of the interaction of mutually implicated yet
often contestatory traditions or tendencies that have
provocative relations to one another.

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Highly dialogized texts and contexts may, however, be
argued to require a dialogic and self-critical response
from the reader that is intimately related to the
subject-positions he or she occupies and is attempting to
forge. The basic point here is that one should not
hypostatize the text, the
context, or the reader but
attempt to understand the
relations among them in
tensely interactive terms.
Even more basically, one
should construe one’s own
position as inserted within
that interaction in relation to
which text, context, reader,
and subject are themselves
more or less useful
abstractions.

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It is, I think, important to
distinguish between
canonization—a basically
conservative practice in the
reception and appropriation
of artifacts—and the
potentials of those artifacts
to be brought out through
critical readings that, in
Walter Benjamin’s words,
brush history against the
grain. It is only through an
essentializing and misplaced
ritual process that one
apprehends canonization as
totally and irredeemably
contaminating texts or
artifacts. By contrast, it is
necessary to understand
canonization critically as a
historical process through
which texts are made
(however problematically) to
serve hegemonic interests in
ways they both invite and
resist more or less
compellingly.5

Traditional historians resist "more
or less compellingly" this kind of
writing. Clarity and some elegance of
style generally have been assumed to
be important to the practice of
history. This assumption is now
challenged directly. Does clarity show
a lack of intellectual rigor?

It may be that clarity and its
corollary, style, have never been
defended as a full-blown "linguistic
theory." But thousands of writers in
every field of nonfiction writing have
affirmed the importance of these
qualities. Interestingly, the arguments
for clarity and style tend to mirror the
arguments of the linguistic theorists.
The linguistic theorists say that "good
writing" seduces and deludes;
thousands of writers have warned the
same thing about jargon-filled prose.
The linguistic theorists argue that
specialized terminology shows the
truth best; traditional historians have
said the same for the clear sentence.

Innumerable defenders of clear
prose have pointed out that the first
victim of obscure writing is the
writer. The habit of specialized terms
is supposed to be scientific, yet
literature is full of scientists who
wrote in the plainest language and
warned that special terms, though
unavoidable at times, are always
risky. W.I.B. Beveridge, for example,
in his classic, The Art of Scientific
Investigation, suggested scientists

5. Dominick LaCapra, “Intellectual
History and Its Ways,” American
start their investigations by purifying their language.

Careful and correct use of language is a powerful aid to straight thinking, for putting into words precisely what we mean necessitates getting our own minds quite clear on what we mean....The main aim in scientific reports is to be as clear and precise as possible and make each sentence mean exactly what it is intended to and be incapable of other interpretation. Words or phrases that do not have an exact meaning are to be avoided because once one has given a name to something, one immediately has a feeling that the position has been clarified, whereas often the contrary is true.6

This "truth function" of plain writing was the message of George Orwell's famous essay, "Politics and the English Language." He wrote: "If you simplify your English, you are freed from the worst follies of orthodoxy. You cannot speak any of the necessary dialects, and when you make a stupid remark its stupidity will be obvious, even to yourself."7 That is also, of course, an argument against clarity. Richard Lanham, a professor of literature at UCLA says that many or most writers know exactly what they are doing when they write in the "Official Style"--"dominantly a noun style; a concept style; a style whose sentences have no design, no shape, rhythm, or emphasis; an unreadable, voiceless, impersonal style." To those who have grown accustomed to the Official Style, "plain prose sounds simple minded."8 So why bother to learn the difficult skill of being clear? Because, Lanham answers, while the Official Style is a sometimes useful and harmless pretense, true style creates society. When we go through the writer's agony of probing what we mean, then imagining how others will react to it, then trying to reconcile the two by changing our own opinion or our reader's, we are sewing ourselves into the common mind. Lanham contends this is as close as we can come to binding together the tragically isolated mind and the rest of the society. "[T]his is why we worry so much about bad prose. It signifies incoherent people, failed social relationships."9

Peter Gay, the historian accused of inviting "passive cognition" with his fluid style, is one of the few historians to have written a whole book in defense of "good writing." In Style In History, Gay concludes that genuine style, because it calls upon the greatest imagination, the clearest thought, and the deepest empathy, is the one of the links we have with the past. Literary devices, he wrote, are not separate from historical truth, but the precise means of conveying it....The objective function of Gibbon's irony, whatever its psychological origins, is to give appropriate expression to the irony pervading Roman history.

9. Ibid., 64.
The objective function of Burkhardt's energy, whatever its origins, is to express the energy informing the age of the Renaissance....What should prevent the historian from offering his findings in the dry, deliberately graceless manner of a paper, say, in clinical psychology, is not literary aversion but his recognition that such a mode of presentation would be not merely less delightful than a disciplined narrative -- it would also be less true.\(^\text{10}\)

Essayist E.B. White makes the most elementary argument of all for clarity. He points out that writing, after all, is sending messages, and it takes a generous view of the human intellect to assume messages will get through without some care in sending them.

Muddiness is not merely a disturber of prose, it is a destroyer of life, of hope: death on the highway caused by a badly worded road sign, heartbreak among lovers caused by a misplaced phrase in a well-intentioned letter, anguish of a traveler expecting to be met at a railroad station and not being met because of a slipshod telegram. Usually we think only of the ludicrous aspect of ambiguity; we enjoy it when the *Times* tells us that Nelson Rockefeller is "chairman of the Museum of Modern Art, which he entered in a fireman's raincoat during a recent fire, and founded the Museum of Primitive Art."

This we all love. But think of the tragedies that are rooted in ambiguity; think of that side, and be clear!\(^\text{11}\)

Almost thirty years ago, Barbara Tuchman, speaking to the convention of the American Historical Association, warned her colleagues against "the jargon disease" that had stricken sociologists and psychologists. "Their retreat into the arcane is meant to set them apart from the great unlearned, to mark their possession of some unshared, unsharable expertise." The tragedy is they succeeded, and now they are cut off from the larger intellectual life. "Their condition," Tuchman observed, "might be pitied if one did not suspect it was deliberate."\(^\text{12}\)

The lucid styles of Tuchman and Gay -- and of Herodotus, Gibbon, and most other historians through history -- are an important part of the historical enterprise. Simple clarity is never put forth as a "linguistic theory," but it could be, and these would be among the theory's tenets: Clear writing forces the writer to understand his or her own work, it makes it more difficult to delude others, it is the truest instrument for probing the human condition, and it lets the widest possible audience critique and benefit from the communication.

*The author teaches journalism at Eastern Washington University, Spokane.*


Research for Visual Communicators

By Keith Kenney

Visual Communication Quarterly offers useful and timely information about visual communication research to both professionals and educators in the news photography, graphics, and design fields. It presents summaries of scholarly research and samples of creative projects, as well as essays, book reviews, and critiques of images and designs. Topics such as news photography, news videography, visual newsgathering, documentary photography, digital imaging, publication design, information graphics, typography, color, aesthetics, and journalistic ethics are of primary interest.

Unlike most publications produced by scholars, Visual Communication Quarterly is primarily targeted to professionals. Research articles should include practical, timely information. Other journals publish "pure" research that contributes to a developing theory, but Visual Communication Quarterly publishes "applied" research that has immediate relevance to visual communicators. Not only the editorial focus, but also the writing style differs. Authors write clear, direct, short sentences. They avoid jargon and complicated statistical tests. Authors minimize discussion of methods and previous literature and include only the portion that is directly related to the paper's purpose. They focus on results and implications. Whenever possible, photographs, graphics, and other visuals accompany the articles. To ensure that Visual Communication Quarterly serves its professional audience, respected leaders in photojournalism and graphic design serve of the advisory board alongside scholarly researchers and together they provide feedback to the editors about the relevance and impact of the journal's contents.

The process of publishing research articles in Visual Communication Quarterly differs from other journals. Within only one month of submission, authors' full-length manuscripts will be blind reviewed by three prominent researchers. If their manuscripts are accepted, authors then will be asked to write a summary (no more than 2,500 words) of their research for publication in Visual Communication Quarterly. Reviewers and the editor often recommend changes and suggest area of revision. We are reviewing full-length, rather than summaries, to ensure that only quality research is published. Authors are asked to take extra time and rewrite their articles to ensure the readability of their texts and to meet the strict space limitations of the journal.

Other features distinguish Visual Communication Quarterly. Visual communications professors and their students can now publish their creative projects. Original visual presentations such as photo or film documentaries, a newspaper redesign or a computer software program are welcome. Visual Communication Quarterly also is one of the few places, outside of newsrooms, for critiques of practitioners' work. Each issue will feature informed opinions about controversial and important images in the print and broadcast media. The editors hope that the balance of research, creative projects, essays, and opinions will bridge the scholarly and professional communities in an interesting, beneficial manner.

If you would like to submit a research article, creative project, or
Call for World War II Research Papers

Continuing in their tradition of sponsoring annual, multidisciplinary conferences commemorating World War II, the Siena College has announced that the 1996 conference will focus on two levels: 1936, World War II — The Preliminary Period and 1946, World War II — The Aftermath.

The college is seeking to attract interesting and informative papers concentrating on some aspect of these broad concepts. The conference will be held at Siena in early June, 1996.

In the first focus, papers discussing the rise of Fascism, Japan and China, Italy, and Ethiopia, The League of Nations, Arms and Armament, Military Doctrine, the Spanish Civil War, Pacifism, and the impact of World War I would all be appropriate, as well as many others.

In the second focus, papers dealing with displaced persons, War Crime Trials, Literary and Cinematic studies of the war, veterans affairs, the G.I. Bill and economic reconversion, as well as papers dealing with broad issues of earlier years would be welcome.

In either focus, art, music, women’s, and minority studies would be of interest.

Anyone who would like to submit a paper for the conference should send a brief (1-3 pages) outline or abstract of the proposal with some sense of sources and/or archive materials consulted and a recent c.v. or brief current autobiographical sketch to:

Thomas O. Kelley, II
Professor of History
Co-Director World War II Conference
Siena College
515 Loudon Road
Loudonville, NY 12211-1462

The deadline for submissions is 1 December 1995.
American Journalism Book Reviews

Thomas Connery, University of St. Thomas, Editor

52 REVIEW ESSAY: Four Authors on the Trail of a Hunter
Four books on gonzo journalist Hunter S. Thompson are discussed. Authors are: E. Jean Carroll, William McKeen, Paul Perry, and Peter O. Whitmer.

55 CLARK, CHARLES E. The Public Prints: The Newspaper in Anglo-American Culture

56 DAWKINS, WAYNE. Black Journalists: The NABJ Story

57 FOGO, FRED. I Read the News Today: The Social Drama of John Lennon’s Death

59 FORTNER, ROBERT S. Public Diplomacy and International Politics

60 FRUS, PHYLLIS. The Politics and Poetics of Journalistic Narrative: The Timely and the Timeless


64 KERN-FOXWORTH, MARILYN. Aunt Jemima, Uncle Ben, and Rastus: Blacks in Advertising Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow

65 KOCHERSBERGER, ROBERT C., ed. More Than A Muckraker: Ida Tarbell’s Lifetime in Journalism

66 LIEBOVICH, LOUIS W. Bylines in Despair: Herbert Hoover, the Great Depression and the U.S. Media

67 MERRILL, JOHN C. Legacy of Wisdom: Great Thinkers and Journalism

69 MURRAY, MICHAEL D. The Political Performers: CBS Broadcasts in the Public Interest

70 POSEY, ALEXANDER. The Fus Fixico Letters

71 SMALL, MELVIN. Covering Dissent: The Media and the Anti-Vietnam War Movement

73 SUMMERS, MARK WAHLGREN. The Press Gang: Newspapers and Politics 1865-1878

74 VOSS, FREDERICK S. Reporting the War: the Journalistic Coverage of World War II
REVIEW ESSAY: Four Authors on the Trail of a Hunter


The myth has taken over. I'm really in the way as a person. I've always felt like a Southerner. And I've always felt like I was born in defeat. And I may have written everything I've ever written just to win back a victory. My life may be pure revenge.

Hunter S. Thompson.

In the postmodern iconography of American literary spectacle, four biographies of gonzo maestro Hunter S. Thompson in less than three years is itself a commentary on mediated myth making more than the impulses that produced his distinctive New Journalism Style. The myth has taken over, and these fan-written biographies reinforce it. Even so, readers of these flawed biographies can glean insights into a writer whose violent comic genius produces in his doting biographies an incapacity to probe beneath the superficial pyrotechnic of his outlaw persona.

The gonzo repertoire of booze, drugs, guns, madness, paranoia, politics, sex, violence, and vitriolic rhetoric fill out the Thompson resumé in these biographies: middle class boyhood days hobnobbing with uppercaste adolescents in Louisville, Kentucky; a tour of duty in the Air Force in lieu of extended juvenile incarceration; freelance *National Observer* correspondent in South America; struggling unpublished novelist at Big Sur; instant notoriety with *Hell's Angels: The Strange and Terrible Saga of the Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs* [1967] at the not-to-be-trusted Aquarian age of thirty; a venture in “Freak Power” politics as candidate for sheriff in Aspen, Colorado; a stint with *Rolling Stone* magazine that yielded two “classics” in the New Journalism canon, *Fear and
Loathing in Las Vegas: A Savage Journey to the Heart of the American Dream [1971] and Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail ’72 [1973]; caricature as “Uncle Duke” in the Doonesbury comic strip and in the film “Where the Buffalo Roam”; misanthropic spouse whose wife divorces him on grounds of mental and physical cruelty; dissipation of mind body and talent in the 1980s, including a stint as a San Francisco Examiner columnist; and finally, trial and acquittal in the 1990s for sexual assault, then semi-retirement as a “freelance county gentleman” at his Woody Creek, Colorado, estate.

William McKeen’s content-thin, 130-page biography presents the conventional view of Thompson and gonzo journalism. A March 1990 interview with Thompson reprinted as an appendix offers suggestive insights that are largely ignored. In Thompson’s own assessment, Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas is a “masterwork” and “a very pure piece of writing. It’s as good as The Great Gatsby and better than The Sun Also Rises.” Such hyperbole invites deeper analysis and comparison with F. Scott Fitzgerald and Ernest Hemingway. Yet this biography fails to probe the implications of that self-assessment, offering only a paragraph to briefly suggest affinities to H.L. Mencken’s “assaults on the mountebanks of his day” and Hemingway’s penchant for “spare prose.”

Paul Perry’s Fear and Loathing claims to be “an unauthorized biography,” asserting without explanation that “unauthorized biography is the truest form of history.” The former editor of Running magazine, in 1980 Perry hired Thompson and his British illustrator sidekick, Ralph Steadman, to cover the Honolulu Marathon. The Running article, “Charge of the Weird Brigade,” later torturously revised and expanded, became the lowly-regarded The Curse of Lono [1983]. The level of historical and literary insight may best be limned in Perry’s suggestion, gratefully unconsummated, for a follow-up piece of gonzo reportage: “Wouldn’t it be interesting, I thought, to subject Hunter to a voyage of discovery through the world of fitness?”

Another “unauthorized biography,” E. Jean Carroll’s Hunter, presents a hybrid form that jacket-copy hype describes as “knockout biography in a fictional framework.” Hunter is oral biography—in this case, quotations from interviews more or less loosely lashed together without analysis, explanation, or interpretation. Introductory chapters by the author under the fictional persona of Laetitia Snap flamboyantly fail to parody her subject’s often-imitated-rarely-achieved writing style with a plotline that has this innocent trapped and debauched at “The Beast’s” Owl Creek hideaway. Readers are advised to skip “Miss Tishy’s” wearisome “fictional framework” and proceed to salvage what they can from the oral biography.

More than a few of these quotations offer provocative biographical clues—again, unexplored—that could prompt interpretative insights into Thompson’s literary corpus. For example, boyhood companions’ descriptions of growing up in Louisville’s often violent class-ridden Southern subculture that generated Thompson’s youthful alienation, machismo, and moral outrage suggest subtextual explanations of gonzo journalism’s major themes. With it’s mythic decadence, gothic dark humor, defeatism and revenge, gonzo journalism represents another expression of distinctly Southern literature. His wife’s revealing comment that their son’s middle name “ Fitzgerald” was for F. Scott Fitzgerald reinforces the linkage to the American dream, decadence, and failure of an earlier generation.
Peter O. Whitmer’s “very unauthorized biography,” *When the Going Gets Weird*, offers the most extended treatment of Thompson’s early youth in Kentucky, revealing that his Herculean boozing has produced a distended liver, a fact that inquiring minds presumably find essential to their depth of appreciation and understanding. The former drummer of the 1960s rock group The Turtles turned clinical psychologist and author of *Aquarius Revisited*, Whitmer offers cultural context missing in other biographies. He briefly sketches suggestive comparisons to other writers. For instance, Thompson’s fledgling efforts at writing included typing long passages of the *Great Gatsby* beneath a banner with F. Scott Fitzgerald’s “Action Makes Character” motto, Whitmer writes, because he wanted to know “in his own neurological system how it felt to write that kind of prose.” For years Thompson carried around his three-page outline of Fitzgerald’s novel so when the right time came, the East Egg of *Gatsby* was reconstructed as the Las Vegas of *Fear and Loathing*.

Another early influence was J.P. Donleavy’s *The Ginger Man*, whose brawling main character Whitmer calls “the spiritual lost brother of Thompson.” According to Whitmer, Thompson internalized *The Ginger Man* to the point of turning the fictional character into his own persona. In a *National Observer* review of Donleavy’s follow-up book, *A Singular Man*, Thompson may have presaged his own work when he wrote that the novel was “like sitting down to an evening of good whiskey and mad laughter in a rare conversation somewhere on the edge of reality” where “humor is forever at war with despair.”

*When the Going Gets Weird* is the best of the Thompson’s biographies to appear so far. Still, a thorough-going literary biography that plumbs both the writer and the work and situates both within an historical and literary tradition has yet to be written.

The major flaw of these biographies is their incapacity to penetrate beneath the surface of their subject and his works. Like the postmodern sensibility, these “unauthorized” biographies feast on the spectacle of Hunter S. Thompson with something of a tattle-tale tabloid mentality. A striking though undeveloped approach to understanding the Prince of Gonzo well might begin with the insight that, make no mistake, Hunter S. Thompson is a distinctly postmodern exemplar of Southern literature. In *The Great Shark Hunt*, he described gonzo journalism as “a style of reporting based on William Faulkner’s idea that the best fiction is far more true than any kind of journalism.” His major themes—death, decadence, despair, doom, failure—are the linchpins of Southern literature played out with gothic black humor on the tragic stage of post-1960s America. He is a Southerner, by birth, upbringing, sensibility, and moral voice that mediates fear and loathing with avenging laughter.

Meanwhile, Thompson seems to be winding down. Jacket copy for his most recent work states that *Better Than Sex: Confessions of a Political Junkie* (1994) is “his final book on politics. He will be gone by the year 2000.” If that premonition holds true, Hunter S. Thompson finally will be out of the way as a person and then, perhaps, the myth can be penetrated to find out what really made him Southern literature’s postmodern moralist. A definitive literary biography of Hunter S. Thompson may be possible only after he has ceased creating his own mythology.

Arthur J. Kaul, University of Southern Mississippi

This book treats the beginnings of the American newspaper from its origins in London’s burgeoning journalistic activity in the 1690s through three decades of formative development in colonial America’s major urban centers in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. Charles E. Clark approaches his materials as a cultural historian interested in colonial American newspapers for the light they can shed on Anglo-American culture. His thesis is that from the emergence of John Campbell’s *Boston Gazette* in 1704, through the rise and decline of literary journalism in the 1720s and ‘30s, and finally to the appearance of a mixed format of foreign news and essay journalism in the late 1730s, the early American newspaper acted as a powerful vehicle for transforming the consciousness of New Englanders. Clark sketched this argument in his contribution to the essay collection *Three Hundred Years of the American Newspaper*, published in 1991. In *The Public Prints* he is able to render it more full, both at the documentary and conceptual levels.

His book is organized into three parts. Part I begins with an overview of the origins of the English newspaper. As Clark notes, the medium came into prominence in London in the 1690s, a decade marked by such favorable conditions for City journalism as a foreign war and crowds of aspiring literary wits. The dominant content of these early newspapers was, Clark stresses, foreign news—which was relatively safe to publish, easy to collect, and welcome in a society in which foreign policy had become a matter of great importance. In the early decades of the eighteenth century, these papers of foreign intelligence supplied the model for provincial newspapers which came to thrive in such towns as Norwich, Bristol, and across the Atlantic in Boston.

Part II of *The Public Prints* presents the history of the provincial American newspaper to 1740. Chronicling the genre’s emergence under the guidance of a series of postmaster editors like the pioneering John Campbell, Clark goes on to provide an account of a rash of experiments in literary journalism in the 1720s and early ‘30s, such as the *New-England Courant* and the *New England Weekly Journal*, which imitated polite British essay journalism, especially that of Addison and Steele.

In Clarke’s account, the cultivation of a mixed presentation of foreign news and literary performance occurred in the 1730s and is illustrated by John Boydell’s work on the *Boston Gazette* and the young Benjamin Franklin’s entrepreneurial and literary efforts with the *Philadelphia Gazette*. Throughout this section of the book, Clark uses evidence of format, arrangement, content, advertisements, and stated and implied goals to point up the early American newspaper’s indebtedness to London models and its gradually increasing content of local controversy and “inter-colonial” discussion.

In Part III, he attempts to use these two observations to discuss consequences. Herein he sums up his thesis, stating that early American newspapers gave the reader a “broadened awareness of the colonial hemisphere and his place in it as well as a heightened sense of his identity as a Briton,” and “the newspapers narrowed the cultural gap between the learned and the merely literate, and the information gap between the privileged and the merely competent.” (253)
Not all readers of *The Public Prints* will find its thesis compelling. Questions arise relating to the diversity of Clark’s primary materials. Was the audience for papers of foreign intelligence really the same kind of audience for the literary journals? Has a heterogeneous corpus of material been too reductively synthesized? Scholars engaged in recent work in cultural studies will wish that Clark had taken his argument about newspapers and the closing of a cultural gap a bit further, so as to present ideas about the way an audience outside a small world of privileged, learned gentlemen responded to a medium which reflected the interests and values of that elite society. I would predict that Clarke’s narrative history—with its cast of interesting characters such as the Couranteers, Samuel Keimer, and John Boydell, and its discussions of advertising and the representation of women and slaves—will spawn numerous monographs and booklength studies from historians of colonial American journalism. Clark has written an important book. It is the most comprehensive and informative study to date on the early American newspaper and its origins.

*D.N. DeLuna, The John Hopkins University*


Wayne Dawkins’ book on the National Association of Black Journalists answers one critical question for those who have observed the group over the years: If the organization is suppose to have begun so small that the first meeting could have been held in a phone booth, how can so many people claim to be founders?

The answer is that on 12 December 1975, forty-four journalists met at the Sheraton Park Hotel in Washington, D.C., and founded what has become the largest organization of journalists of color in this nation.

Dawkins’ chronicle is a family reunion for those familiar with NABJ. Well-known names flood the book, often with snippets on background and character. For those who know little about African-American journalists the book offers a roster of interesting, impressive journalists and bits on the issues that unite them.

NABJ founders are the heart of Dawkins’ book. Their headshots fill the front and back covers; their profiles form a section at the end of the book; their expectations and outcomes parallel the development of the organization they founded.

About half the founders are still active with NABJ, the author states. A dozen others practice journalism, but bypass NABJ. Some have left journalism for other careers, and at least one, former ABC-TV anchor Max Robinson, is dead. Dawkins interviewed forty-two of the forty-four founders.

The group includes Pulitzer Prize winners Les Payne of *Newsday* and Acel Moore of the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Maureen Bunyon, WUSA-TV anchor, Paul Delaney, chairman of the University of Alabama Department of Journalism, Curtis Riddle, a senior group president for Gannett newspapers, and Leon Dash, *Washington Post* writer.
It also includes media pioneers and mentors: Claude Lewis, *Philadelphia Inquirer*; Mal Johnson, former White House correspondent, Cox Broadcasting; Chuck Stone, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill; Vernon Jarrett *Chicago Sun-Times*, and Luix Overea, formerly of the *Christian Science Monitor*.

Other nationally known journalists had roles in NABJ’s history including Merv Aubespin, *Louisville Courier-Journal*, and Alice Bonner, the Freedom Forum.

The book also presents young journalists who have since moved toward leadership. The 1977 convention in Baltimore attracted three hundred journalists, most in their twenties with less than five years newsroom experience. They included Gale Pollard, now of the *Los Angeles Times*; Michael Days, *Philadelphia Daily News*, and his wife Angela Dodson, *New York Times*. Reginald Stuart was twenty-eight, covering the convention for the *New York Times*. He is now at Knight-Ridder News Service and president of the Society of Professional Journalists.

Dawkins traces NABJ through the 1983 convention, the first year in which the board did not include a founder. By then, the group had grown to more than four hundred. (For the 1994 Unity convention, NABJ registered more than 3,000 participants.)

Dawkins’ book is limited in several areas. It covers only the first eight years of the organization’s 18-year history (through the book’s publication in 1993). It gives little more than passing attention to the key NABJ issues of recruiting, promoting, and retaining minority journalists. It only glances at the background of political and social changes affecting NABJ members.

Instead, the focus is on people. Dawkins is faithful to his purpose: to capture the stories of NABJ’s past and to preserve those events for younger journalists and others.

Karen F. Brown, *The Poynter Institute*


Unlike the deaths of other pop and rock music figures, John Lennon’s violent end outside the Dakota brought together the 1960s, ’70s and ’80s in ways that few other events do. In addition to being the kind of story that, like a good pop song, immediately reminds us of where we were when we first heard it, the confluence of images of peace, violence, music, politics, and murder made this story almost too poignant and painful for many to recall even today.

Fred Fogo examines the journalistic coverage of Lennon’s death by relating it to the 1960s and the images and feelings about that decade evoked by that coverage. This book is as much about the disintegration, and subsequent reformation, of meanings and feelings associated with the 60s, as it is about events surrounding Lennon’s murder. Fogo’s focus on opinion and commentary, in some sense, is a limitation, but a useful one for his purposes. Nevertheless, it would have been illuminating to discover what forms of opinion and
commentary concerning Lennon and the ‘60s (and ‘70s/’80s) were present in the hard news coverage as well.

To understand the evocative nature of Lennon’s death, Fogo turns to Victor Turner and social drama theory to argue that, as with other social drama, Lennon’s death consists of three distinct phases: a breach, crisis, and redress. It is not difficult to discern those phases in this instance, and Fogo does a fine job of fitting the pieces, in this case newspaper and magazine stories about Lennon and his murder, into a coherent picture of the drama he sees enacted. Still another potentially illuminating avenue to explore is to discover whether or not opinion writers and commentators share that view of their work and to ruminate on the cultural implications of such a formulation for journalistic commentary.

Some of the weaknesses of this account of Lennon’s death and its accompanying “end of the ‘60s” tagline lie in the many assumptions about the values of all appertaining symbols. Though Fogo claims to be “analyzing a segment of American society called the ‘60s generation and its relationship to the conflicted cultural symbol of John Lennon,” (159) there are many unanswered, and sometimes unasked, questions. Among the most important of those are questions concerning the definition of “the ‘60s generation” and the many permutations it has undergone as the youth of that era has metamorphosed. For Fogo, such permutation takes the form of a “tension between idealism and irony.” (158) But it is necessary to take into account contemporary youth interpretations of the ‘60s to find that tension acted out, and it is not enough to examine only the evolution of ‘60s youth.

The meanings Lennon and other sixties figures continued to be contested, not only by those of Lennon’s generation, meticulously examined by Fogo, but by those generations of youth who have come after (and Lennon himself was an important figure of the ‘70s). By the time of Lennon’s death, the ‘60s were obviously over in many ways other than the chronological, and beyond the symbolic, as associated with Lennon. To an extent, Lennon’s death gained symbolic value as a hook on which to hang the end of the 1970s also. And, it is important to note that the ‘60s have not ended, at least in terms of symbolic value and usefulness (to marketers, youth, musicians, etc.), nor has that decade’s history been written. (Though David Halberstam may yet take a crack at it.)

That aside, I Read the News Today is a fine study of journalistic commentary that connects journalism, social criticism, and social drama. Fogo’s sense that there is something very valuable in studying the ways in which journalists keep afloat significant news stories for purposes of analysis and interpretation is on target and ought to be applied through use of other critical analytical tools, in addition to social drama perspectives. This book is a useful model with which to understand social processes and dynamics present in journalism and to guide further inquiry into the interplay of journalism and social drama.

Steve Jones, University of Tulsa

Robert Fortner's book explores the last years of the Cold War as reported by the major international shortwave radio services. Yet, for those of us anxious for any scholarly treatment of this little reported medium, he waits until the last paragraphs of this detailed analysis to suggest one of his most intriguing points: the variety of perspectives available on international radio counters charges of Western dominance heard in the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) debate. He notes that, surprisingly, given its long history, international radio communication is not generally considered in the NWICO struggle, which has focused on international wire service and domestic news reporting. The data suggests that the variety of perspectives available on major international events is substantial. Of all information technologies, radio has been, and remains, the one most likely to provide the people of developing countries with the ability to receive alternative points of view.

*Public Diplomacy and International Politics* reaches such a conclusion following an exhaustive content analysis of the coverage by the Voice of America, Radio Moscow, BBC, and others of the 1987-1990 superpower summits. This volume, part of the Praeger Series in Political Communication, spends the first three chapters establishing the methodological foundation of the study. It offers superb discussion of public diplomacy (using media to promote a country's policies) versus propaganda (influencing through the manipulation of symbols), and of outlining the symbolic constructs in international broadcasting. Fortner says the U.S. media (including VOA) create symbolic constructs based on a technology-driven, personally focused, reactive (or event-driven) orientation. On the other hand, Radio Moscow is less dependent on technology and depicts events in a more contextual framework—giving more time to the specific summits and covering more subjects.

His analysis shows that coverage intensity was not affected by either distance from the country broadcasting or the friendly, hostile, or neutral location of the summit. As would be expected, VOA and Radio Moscow carried longer summit stories than did the BBC.

But beyond the detailed results, supported by four extensive appendices, Fortner maintains that the shifting of linguistic frames brought about by the end of the Cold War was more important than proximity, news traditions, funding, or government oversight in understanding radio news judgment. Understanding and reporting such a major event required transformation of symbolic constructs. Events required a radical reordering of how audiences saw their world; reporters had to accept such a paradigm shift and structure their reports within new political realities. For example, the significance of summitry diminished during the period of study as it became clear that superpower rivalries were declining with ebbing Soviet power.

Fortner concludes that while diminishing Soviet fortunes, which reduced news budgets and technical facilities, may have affected Radio Moscow summit coverage, Western radio reportage changed very little. The Western radio services were able to remain independent from government and resist covering U.S. foreign policy issues they deemed to be too parochial. For example, the National Security Council in the United States did institute a public list of
talking points for each summit following the Reykjavik in 1986 when President Reagan startled the Western allies by considering unplanned cuts in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. All radio services struggled to make sense of evolving political realities, which required new constructs to interpret and understand.

Public Diplomacy and International Politics does an excellent job of integrating a complex methodological analysis with the linguistic underpinnings necessary to better comprehend the role of international shortwave radio in reporting the last years of the Cold War. One slight shortcoming, however, was placing the attempted coup against Gorbachev in 1990 rather than 1991.

Kent Sidel, University of South Carolina


Because all narratives have the same status as texts, and because the language structures of formal realism take priority over the reality they produce, 'true-life' narratives ought to be judged as fictional ones are: according to their coherence and correspondence to a world we recognize, that is, as they correspond not to the events themselves but to other narratives. (Phyllis Frus, xiv)

When David Eason was writing his essay on the "realist" and "modernist" approaches to nonfiction, he said the LitCrit community prefers the modernists. Frus is an example. She loves "texts in which the writer-narrator is reading some kind of text reflexively" and is exposing the process of creating the report.

Frus proposes a process of "reflexive reading." She argues "that as readers we produce what we call 'literature' when we read to discover how a text, through its style, 'makes' reality, that is, when we read its content through its form." (5) Her reflexive reader makes literature, not the writer. Obviously any text demand's the reader's reaction. But the reflexive reader apparently needs to have the whole LitCrit argument in mind, rather than just enjoying a book or learning something from it.

She examines some of the most notable literature of the twentieth century, including works by Stephen Crane, Ernest Hemingway, John Hersey, Truman Capote, and Tom Wolfe. The only woman writer she considers is Janet Malcolm. Her primary materials, especially for Crane and Hemingway, are fascinating.

Theory dominates everything, however, a theory of composition that has come to power in English departments and that once again marginalizes nonfiction writing. First, the theory denies any critical differences between nonfiction and journalism—both are merely texts. Frus makes the uncommon mistake of referring to Tom Wolfe's Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test as a novel. (xiii, 3) Second, it emphasizes the creative imagination of the reader over the
creativity of the writer, or the “author function,” as she and Michel Foucault call writers. Third, content and form are reduced to political judgments that cling solely to the critic’s perspective.

Frus’ idea that nonfiction is equivalent to fiction is not new. Zavarzadeh described the New Journalism of the 1960s and ‘70s as being neither fact nor fiction, but mythology (The Mythopoeic Reality, 1976); Hellman called the New Journalism “new fiction” (Fables of Fact, 1981). But Frus adds some of her own recent twists and, as noted, looks back past the so-called New Journalists.

She encourages the reflexive reader to imagine alternative texts, even if they are made up, politically-biased, or dream-like. The factual basis of nonfiction is irrelevant, she says, because “the credibility and authenticity of nonfictional narratives...cannot be resolved by comparing the narrative to the events and characters themselves...This is because the facts are not there before the narrative about them; what secondary revision confirms is that there are no descriptions of events apart from narratives” (214). In her last chapter about Freud and Tom Wolfe, Frus proposes a psychological analysis of nonfiction: “the text, not the character and not Wolfe, or his persona as narrator, has an unconscious which can be analyzed,” she writes (215). This sort of thing drives writers nuts.

As a reader who holds an opposing view—and whose perspective is criticized by Frus—I found it a remarkable book. It stands as a coherent and valuable statement of the theories of the LitCrit establishment in English departments. The strongly felt oppositions between Frus’ theory and the beliefs about nonfiction held by journalists and most of the public can be examined through such a book.

On the other hand, her analysis of Hershey’s Hiroshima exposes most of the controversial aspect of her theory. Frus asks the reader to create alternative interpretations of what Hershey reports. After Frus applies a faulty view of history to Hershey’s book, we realize that while some alternative readings may be interesting, others are simply wrong. The process also completely discounts the value of having reporters visit a scene and report their findings because the reader can substitute alternative readings from a distance of several thousand miles and five decades.

Back when David Eason was writing that essay, he said he emphasized the modernist approach too much. There’s no evidence to indicate that modernist texts tell us more about the world than realist texts, he commented. Such texts are easier to analyze and frankly are often more fun to read, but as Frus admits they can produce “a version of events that corresponds more closely to our experience of the world” and our own political biases. As Frus reads them, they affirm her political biases and her view of the world, rather than producing a new vision of obdurate reality.

Norman Sims, University of Massachusetts-Amherst

The *Journal of Newspaper and Periodical History* has been transformed into an annual. Its editor does not explain the reason for the change except to make a vague statement about a decision to “slow its trajectory” and renegotiate its position in the market. My guess is that the decision reflects the vicissitudes of library serials budgets. For those unfamiliar with *Journal* before this transformation, its purview included research on the history of the newspaper and periodical press of the world, with a concentration on Europe, Great Britain, and the Americas. Most of the authors are British or American scholars at universities here and abroad.

Among the topics covered in this annual: censorship and London curantos in the 1620s; a study of letters written to eighteenth-century essay-journals; the response of the English literary community to the first review journals and literary critics; French literary digests during the 1700s; the relationship between the early European newspapers and Protestantism; sports journalism in 1920s America; Theodore Roosevelt’s relationships with White House correspondents during his presidency; the first newspapers in small-town New Zealand in the late 1800s; a profile of a socialist newspaper in pre-World War II Vienna; and the role played by a prominent English magazine in the defeat of a plan to build a channel tunnel in 1882.

Also included is a bibliography of recently published work in the field drawn from American and international journals, a book review section, and a section on sources for studying the history of newspapers and periodicals. The volume is indexed.

Of the ten studies included, those I found most interesting and stimulating share a common trait: They locate their topics within a broader social, cultural, or political context. Goran Leth’s study of early European newspapers discusses a “public sphere” within which the newspapers played an important role in the debate between Protestantism and Catholicism. Bruce Evensen’s study of how tabloid and standard newspapers in New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia covered the Dempsey-Tunney heavyweight championship bout of 1926 shows how coverage of the bout raised issues about journalistic excesses in a time of growing concerns with professionalism, as well as the influence of the tabloid style on standard, establishment papers such as the *New York Times*. Bob Spellman’s study of how Roosevelt cultivated relationships with reporters as a means of news management demonstrates that the practice long preceded the naming of that concept. Ann Parry examines the *Nineteenth Century*, an influential British magazine that helped defeat a channel tunnel project by appealing to imperialistic attitudes and a sense of growing national identity among its readers. The other studies, although more narrowly focused, are very well done and informative.

*Joseph P. McKerns, Ohio State University*
"...an essential book for anyone interested in the structural impact of advertising on American newspapers in particular and the American media in general."

—Financial Times

Advertising and a Democratic Press

C. EDWIN BAKER

C. Edwin Baker argues that print advertising seriously distorts the flow of news by creating a powerfully corrupting incentive: the more newspapers depend financially on advertising, the more they favor the interests of advertisers over those of readers. Advertisers reward both the print and broadcast media for avoiding offense to potential customers while punishing the media for criticism of the advertisers' products or political agenda. These effects raise troubling questions of both direct and indirect censorship. Baker proposes a variety of regulatory responses to promote the press's freedom from advertisers' censorship.

"Newspapers, Baker insists, operate mainly as businesses, secondarily as businesses, and, occasionally—when they're sounding patriotic and devoted to the public interest—as businesses. . . . The main problem, explains Baker, is that advertising now accounts for some 65 percent of the average daily newspaper's revenue. In such a fix, he believes, advertisers replace readers and editors in determining editorial content. . . ."

—Carlin Romano, The Philadelphia Inquirer

"This is one of the most important books on free speech in recent years."—Cass R. Sunstein, University of Chicago Law School

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Marilyn Kern-Foxworth has given us something sorely missed—a rich and provocative compendium that chronicles blacks in American advertising from the colonial period to the present. While numerous works have focused on various aspects of blacks in advertising throughout history, Kern-Foxworth’s *Aunt Jemima, Uncle Ben, and Rastus* is the first to provide a comprehensive historical survey of advertising’s stereotypical portrayals of blacks.

Kern-Foxworth begins with slave advertisements, indicating how they grounded later stereotypes that became prevalent in early twentieth-century advertising, such as Quaker Oat’s Aunt Jemima and Cream of Wheat’s Rastus the Chef. After detailing such historical developments, Kern-Foxworth explores recent decades. She investigates how the early stereotypes of African-Americans have helped to perpetuate racial inequality in American society and how various civil rights organizations, especially during the 1960s and 1970s, organized to eliminate such negative portrayals. She then shows how most of the extremely offensive slave-oriented stereotypes have been eliminated or restructured, such as the revamping of the Aunt Jemima image in 1989 from the overweight, bandanna-laden “servant” to the slimmer, attractive, and affluent “cooking instructor.”

But such cosmetics do not mean the problems of blacks in advertising are resolved. For example, Kern-Foxworth explores how the old stereotypes have been replaced by new stereotypes. Instead of black servants, one now sees black athletes or entertainers. What is missing from most mainstream advertising is the mainstream image of the African American middle-class consumer. The advertising industry continues to use white models in campaigns for most products, despite years of research indicating black models in ads do not alienate white consumers, but do attract black consumers. And this inability of advertisers to incorporate black models continues, despite significant increases in the population and overall annual disposable income of African Americans.

Although Kern-Foxworth’s discussion is enough to make her work a worthwhile read, she provides more. *Aunt Jemima, Uncle Ben, and Rastus* includes an appendix listing more than sixty African American museums and resource centers, as well as a selected bibliography listing more than one hundred-fifty works. In short, this book serves as a valuable resource for those interested in diversity issues related to advertising. In addition, another attractive feature of the book is the selection of twenty-one ad images used to illustrate her discussion. Such visuals add clarity and emotional impact to her critical arguments.

The book, however, is not flawless. Because Kern-Foxworth provides a survey, the book at times reads like a detailed literature review. This tends to sometimes needlessly complicate her ideas. Chapters 6 and 7 in particular suffer from this malady. They detail frequencies of blacks in late twentieth-century ads, as well as reactions to ads featuring blacks. Kern-Foxworth stuffs these chapters with bits of information from dozens of mostly quantitative studies, which tends to confuse rather than clarify some points.

And although Kern-Foxworth clearly addresses the demeaning aspects of black stereotypes in advertising, she does not fully articulate her own theory and
analytic strategy, meaning her perspective and assumptions about advertising’s effects appear, at times, limited. For example, is the stereotype of Aunt Jemima completely negative? One would think so after reading Kern-Foxworth’s discussion. But such an approach disavows much theory and research into the many ways words and visuals are “consumed” by various audiences.

Chuck Lewis, Mankato State University


Ida Minerva Tarbell has long been the darling of journalism history books—the only nineteenth-century woman journalist who has routinely merited a sentence without riding a hot air balloon, posing as a lunatic, or traipsing solo around the world. It was Tarbell’s role in helping to bring down the monopoly of Standard Oil that placed her, the lone women, among the men who have been studied as muckrakers (although historical evidence clearly indicates that other women journalists were involved in reform writing in the early twentieth century, but that must be left for another book). Robert C. Kochersberger, a journalism professor at North Carolina State University, sets out to demonstrate in this well-edited book that, as the title suggests, Ida Tarbell was much more than a muckraker.

Kochersberger has carefully selected examples of Tarbell’s writing from her early career at The Chautauguan, a thoughtful and intellectual monthly designed to promote self-education. He organizes the writing so that the reader can see how Tarbell progressed as a journalist. He demonstrates her breadth as a writer with excerpts from Tarbell’s biographical works of Abraham Lincoln and figures from the French Revolution. Of course, he includes the business writing that made Tarbell a muckraker. However, perhaps the most interesting articles focuses on Tarbell’s writing about “Woman.” As Kathleen Brady’s 1984 biography, Ida Tarbell: Portrait of a Muckraker, the first serious study of Tarbell’s life and work pointed out, Tarbell was indeed ambivalent about “The Woman Question.” One would assume that a woman born in 1857 who never married, supported herself by writing, exposed the wrongdoing of a major oil company, and raised funds for the purchase of a magazine would certainly support a wider sphere for women, but Tarbell was ambivalent at best about the evolving roles for women.

Kochersberger’s selections of her writing underscore this ambivalence. “The most essential obligation in a Woman’s Business is establishing her household on a sound moral basis. If a child is anchored to basic principles, it is because his home is built on them. If he understands integrity as a man, it is usually because a woman has done her work well,” Tarbell wrote in 1912. She who had no husband or no children asserted: “The central fact of the women’s life—Nature’s reason for her—is the child, his bearing and reading. There is no escape from the divine order that her life must be built around this constraint, duty or privilege, as she may please to consider it.” With the sweep of a pen,
Tarbell undermined her own raison d’être (to borrow the French, as Tarbell herself liked to do). Kocherberger’s selections from Tarbell’s many articles highlight her confusion and the complexity of her thinking about women and career.

This book of Tarbell’s writings, while interesting and enlightening, works best as a companion text to the Brady biography. The biographical sketch here is brief, and although Kocherberger explains Tarbell’s motivations in an introduction to each section, he largely lets her writing speak for itself. Where Brady’s book explains, Korchersberger’s book illustrates. That is not to weaken the importance of this new text. More Than a Muckraker adds one more link to our own understanding of the role women played in journalism a century ago and helps recapture and preserve writing that is worth saving.

Anne Hooper Gottlieb, Seton Hall University


Historians too often follow what is perhaps a human tendency to emphasize success, leaving key historical problems obscure and succumbing the “whig” tendency of viewing history through the optic of the present. Louis W. Liebovich’s latest work is a refreshing counterpoint to this trend.

Bylines in Despair describes a magnificent and ironic failure at an important juncture of politics and press relations. Herbert Hoover, the “great engineer,” a man of competence and compassion who rose to prominence for his work on relief efforts for post-World War I Europe, could not rally America relief because he could not communicate through the news media. At a moment when Americans looked to Washington for confidence and leadership, Hoover gave them a nasal monotone on the radio and news handouts delivered to an increasingly alienated White House press corps. This failure to communicate blackened the already dark mood of the Great Depression and underscored the changing nature of the relationship between the president, the people, and the news media.

Hoover’s problems with the press were complex, Liebovich argues in this meticulously researched book, and not simply the product of inept public relations noted by some Hoover biographers. Hoover was a nineteenth-century man with a nineteenth-century concept of a politically partisan news media. This meant that some in the media were Hoover admirers who didn’t need courting; on the other hand, some would undermine him no matter what he said. Thus, Hoover played favorites with the press and cut off anyone who criticized him.

Hoover did not understand the rise of objective reporting. He failed to consider that reporters had begun to put news gathering far above political partisanship. Due to his disdain for the press, he permitted no direct quotes in personal interviews and no questions in press conferences. He often required reporters to submit stories for review before publication and criticized reporters who wrote “unauthorized” articles.
To some extent, this was in keeping with the existing political tradition. Coolidge, for example, took only written questions in press conferences and insisted that answers be attributed only to “a White House source.” But even “silent” Cal Coolidge answered questions. While this level of avoidance and manipulation served Hoover well when he was Secretary of Commerce under Harding and Coolidge, it was deeply out of touch with both the desperation of the times and with the growing influence of radio news, newspapers, and talking movies.

Hoover’s friends and supporters in and out of the news media were concerned and repeatedly advised him to exhibit some leadership. “The people are like one crying in the wilderness,” Henry L. Stoddard, the former owner of the New York Mail, wrote Hoover personally in 1930. “Silence is no guide, and calm statement, however sound, has no inspiration.” Hoover, who hated what he considered salesmanship, treated this kind of appeal with disdain.

This is not to say that Hoover thought the news media unimportant. On the contrary: He kept meticulous files on “misrepresentation” and “smears,” writing frequently to publishers complaining about news articles. Once he even complained about a news statement that his motorcade was “speeding” through the countryside, as if he had endangered lives.

Liebovich concludes that Hoover was the last of the old line presidents and the first, because of the crisis of the Depression, to be faced with demands of the emerging twentieth-century system of public information that Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt would use to such advantage. A success at organization and analysis, Hoover failed to realize how much a part of politics the art of persuasion had become. While later presidents might personally hate the press, no president after Hoover could rise to power without understanding how to persuade the average person and promote his programs through the news media. Thus, Hoover’s failure marked the final collapse of the old political information system.

Bill Kovarik, Radford University


John C. Merrill, professor emeritus at the University of Missouri School of Journalism, has picked the work of 40 “great thinkers” to summarize and apply to contemporary journalism in Legacy of Wisdom. From Confucius to Socrates, from Aristotle to John Milton, from Voltaire to Karl Marx, and from Ayn Rand to Jacques Ellul, a broad variety of thinkers is represented.

The book is an interesting idea: In succinct profiles, tell journalists who haven’t been widely exposed to philosophy and ethics how a duty-oriented philosophy like that of Immanuel Kant would apply to the work of the reporter, or how an approach modeled on Niccolo Machiavelli would affect the mission of journalism. What is not clear after reading the book, however, is why some of Merrill’s choices seem to have little to do with philosophy, how he arrived at
his choices, and why some of his chosen thinkers are subjected to more detailed criticism than others.

Merrill clearly tells his readers that his selections are personal and perhaps "imprecisely or erroneously interpreted and applied to the practice of journalism." Yet he has little to say about why he chose the "great thinkers" he did, although he does say he aims to emphasize their moral and ethical stances: "Most attention in this book is given to the ethical ideas of these thinkers... because an ethical or moral foundation is direly needed in today's journalism." This is without a doubt a laudable goal for a book.

Unfortunately, Merrill occasionally strays from that goal. For example, he includes Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Barbara Tuchman in his collection, but instead of focusing on her moral and ethical beliefs, the chapter detailing her work and its application to journalism emphasizes that Tuchman "has more to say to today's journalist about the craft of writing that any other twentieth-century American thinker." Certainly writing is an activity that includes an ethical component. It is too bad, therefore, that Merrill focuses on these more technical aspects of Tuchman's thinking about writing and journalism: "Eliminate wordiness, banish obscurity, select critically, have an element of suspense, and research carefully."

The inclusion of Tuchman points out another problem in the book: Its failure to adequately explain how Merrill made his choices. It is not evident why Barbara Tuchman qualifies for inclusion with "great thinkers" from philosophy and ethics, while such thinkers as these do not: the early Christian philosophers Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, the casuist Blaise Pascal, the American pragmatists Thomas Dewey, William James, or Charles Sanders Peirce, the situation ethicist Joseph Fletcher, or the care ethicist Nell Noddings. A thorough discussion of how Merrill made his selections and why he excluded philosophers such as these would be an illuminating addition to the book.

Furthermore, it is not clear why some thinkers who were included were subjected to much more detailed and harsher criticism than others. For instance, Merrill spends the bulk of his chapter on contemporary American philosopher John Rawls and his "justice of fairness" concept citing specific criticisms—down to the authors and dates—of Rawls' ideas. Nowhere else in Legacy of Wisdom is Merrill so specific. It isn't evident why he applied a stricter standard to Rawls than others.

Legacy of Wisdom is not unlike Herbert Altschull's 1990 book, From Milton to McLuhan: The Ideas Behind American Journalism, which explores how American journalism has been influenced by great thinkers from the libertarianism to the present. What is better than Merrill's approach, though, is that it spans a longer period of time, and while it sticks mainly to male Western philosophers, it does include a few non-Western thinkers (Lao-tzu and Buddha, for example) and some female thinkers (Simone de Beauvoir, Iris Murdoch, and Sissela Bok, for example).
Legacy of Wisdom is well-written and useful, a good place to refer the beginning student of journalism ethics for a brief look at a specific philosopher. It is particularly interesting when it applies that philosopher's ideas to today's journalism. With a little more explanation from Merrill about his choices and interpretations, the book would have been more interesting and ultimately more helpful to the philosophy neophyte and to the journalism historian hoping to be introduced to the philosophical ideas that underlie the practice of journalism.

Kristie Bunton, University of St. Thomas


When Ann Sperber published her tour d'force biography on Edward R. Murrow in 1986, and Joseph Perisco followed with another authoritative Murrow work two year later, it seemed the final words of the renown broadcast journalist who instilled excellence at CBS. Michael Murray's history of CBS news, devoted to Murrow's accomplishments and legacy, demonstrates that the Murrow historiographical torch continues to burn brightly. The premise of The Political Performers is a "search for some concrete models of excellence in the field of broadcast news." Murray's search carries him deep into the Murrow domain, which originated "an impressive and ongoing body of work at CBS News." Those at CBS beginning with Murrow "are to be commended."

The Political Performers is no substitute particularly for the Sperber book in tracing from root level what Murray calls the "CBS tradition." Nevertheless, Murray makes a significant contribution by focusing almost entirely on the fruits of this activity, the actual CBS broadcasts, which are described in illuminating detail. Programs such as "See It Now—Radulovich, "See It Now—McCarthy," and "Harvest of Shame" have been revisited again and again in literature. Murray's descriptions are among the best, reflexive of his considerable research at the CBS Archives. Impressive are Murray's accounts of some of the lesser known CBS broadcasts, including Murrow's radio documentary, "Who Killed Michael Farmer," one of the first broadcast examinations of gang violence.

Accounts are less inspired as the book leaves the Murrow period and considers CBS News less in the context of documentaries and more in the context of evening news broadcasts. Murray's disdain for what he calls the "anchor chair" causes him to wince in suggesting that Walter Cronkite "sometimes takes precedence even over Edward R. Murrow" as a role model for today's broadcast journalists. Still, the later part of the work contains excellent descriptions of the CBS documentaries "The Selling of the Pentagon" and "Of Black America." The book noticeably weakens in the end with sketches of current CBS programs, including "Street Stories" and "48 Hours."

Potentially useful to historians are four appendices containing transcripts of interviews that Murray conducted with Fred Friendly, Bill Leonard, and Cronkite.
While Murray is surefooted in his accounts and descriptions, his unbalanced perspective on CBS is certain to bother readers familiar with recent writings on broadcast journalism. Murray does not seek to challenge the thesis offered in the 1991 Three Blind Mice by Ken Auletta, who forcefully showed that CBS was a company with serious difficulties. Another useful source is Peggy Noonan's What I Saw at the Revolution. In it, Noonan, a former CBS newswriter, quotes none other than Dan Rather as saying, "This place has all the tradition of a discount shoe store." Indeed, Murray's own interview with Bliss, who says, "there are far too many things being done wrong" deflates the book's finding that CBS "continually expressed a desire to maintain standards" set by Murrow and others. There remains much evidence that Hercules had feet of clay.

This book will be warmly received by Murrow devotees. In addition, despite its stand-up-and-cheer approach, it is a vital resource to broadcast historians and their students from its success in bringing life, texture, and color to one network's "Golden Age."

Craig Allen, Arizona State University


Fus Fixico was a fictional full-blood Creek correspondent who used a native dialect as well as comic misspellings, slang, understatement, and other devices to comment on life in Indian Territory. The creation of Creek journalist and editor Alex Posey (1873-1908), Fus Fixico became famous for his satirical barbs of Indian and white officials. He was, the Kansas City Times said, "the Dooley of Indian Territory politics."

Seventy-three Fus Fixico letters, published from 1902 to 1908 and collected here for the first time, illuminate native life at a time when the federal government was preparing Indian Territory for statehood and forcing tribes to give up their governments and their lands. These dramatic changes threatened traditional Indians and sparked a frenzy of land speculation, graft, and political shenanigans in Indian territory.

As an ambitious Creek journalist and publisher, Posey was uniquely qualified to comment on this cultural clash. Although he was steadfastly progressive, Posey had deep respect for his traditional friends, people known locally as "Snakes." Fus Fixico—in English, "Heartless Bird"—and his full-blood friends, Hotgun and Toofpaftka Micco, offered Posey a way of representing Snake views and lampooning the greed and hypocrisy of tribal as well as white politicians.

Posey's technique included the comic misspelling of names: Theodore Roosevelt became "President Rooster Feather," Secretary of the Interior Ethan Allan Hitchcock was "Secretary Itscocked," and so on. Fus Fixico also mangled such common words as auditorium, writing it "Ought To Told them." More importantly, Fus Fixico wrote in an "este charte" or "red man" dialect, a form of English characterized by the use of "to be" to determine tense and the phrase
“maybe so” to indicate possibility. Commenting on the death of his friend Choela, for example, Fus Fixico wrote: “He was gone to be a good Injin, like white man say when Injin die. It was look like all old Injuns die now and make good Injin that way. Maybe so pretty soon Fus Fixico was make good Injin too.” This style gave Fus Fixico and his friends a humanity and apparent authenticity that made them interesting to readers in Indian Territory and surrounding states.

Fus Fixico’s principal interest was Indian territory politics. When Secretary Hitchcock called for the renaming of Indian families, for example, Fixico responded:

So, if the Injin’s name is Wolf Warrior, he was to call himself John Smith, or maybe Bill Jones, so nobody else could get his mail out of the postoffice. Big Man [Hitchcock] say Injin name like Sitting Bull or Tecumseh was too hard to remember and don’t sound civilized like General Cussed Her [Custer] or old Pa Harry’s Son [William Henry Harrison].

The letters also reveal Posey’s antipathy towards blacks. A 1903 letter, for example, referred to Booker T. Washington as “Booker D. Washingtub” and criticized President Roosevelt for inviting Washington to a White House dinner. Posey, the editors note, reflected the racism of many Indians and whites in Indian Territory.

The humor in Fus Fixico is less effective today than in Posey’s time. Yet, the letters remain strong examples of a distinctive native voice. The editors, Daniel Littlefield and the late Carol Petty Hunter, provide extensive explanatory notes as well as a useful introduction to Posey’s life and work. They trace the origins of his home-spun satire and make a convincing case that Posey’s fictional full-bloods represent a genuine literary achievement. The Fus Fixico Letters highlights the talents of an important but almost forgotten native writer. In concert with Littlefield’s 1992 biography Alex Posey: Creek Poet, Journalist & Humorist, scholars now have significant new evidence about the richness of Indian Territory culture and a full record of the life and work of its most interesting journalist. Unfortunately, Posey drowned in a rain-swollen river at age 34, an accident that ended what might have been an outstanding literary career.

John M. Coward, University of Tulsa


Once and for all, Melvin Small demolishes the myth that during the Vietnam War, dovish U.S. journalists lionized antiwar protesters, speeding the war’s end. Acknowledging the historically unprecedented size and effectiveness of
the anti-Vietnam War movement, Small shows that "Despite its successes in influencing opinion leaders, decisionmakers, ordinary citizens—and Hanoi—it never captured the support of a majority of the American people, even when a majority began expressing opposition to continued American involvement in Vietnam."

Well researched, Covering Dissent builds on work by Todd Gitlan (The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the American Left, 1980), Daniel C. Hallin (The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam, 1986), Clarence R. Wyatt (Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War, 1993), and others. Secondary sources are extensive and up-to-date, including important recent work such as Charles DeBenedetti with Charles Chatfield, An American Ordeal: the Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era (1990). Archival sources are extensive, including materials from the CBS News Archives, the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, and the Nixon Presidential Materials Project at the National Archives. Small also conducted several interviews and used archival oral histories of such principles as Dan Rather, Katherine Graham, Harrison Salisbury, Tom Wicker, and Stewart Alsop.

Small’s sampling methodology differs from more usual approaches that seek to balance "liberal and conservative, highbrow and lowbrow, and regional interests." Instead, he chooses to focus on the news media to which Presidents Johnson and Nixon nervously, even obsessively attended: New York Times and Washington Post, among newspapers, Time and Newsweek among magazines, and the three national television networks’ evening newscasts. As Small explains, rather than a balanced cross-section of the media, he is concerned with "the relationship between the antiwar movement, the press, and public opinion." Such influential media as these seven “either affected the perceptions of opinion leaders directly or affected other media, which in turn affected their readers, some of whom were local opinion leaders.” He also examined content of the wire services, two suburban Michigan dailies (to see how they handled wire service coverage of antiwar events), and the Village Voice and the National Guardian, two weeklies with many antiwar movement readers.

Especially concerned with story placement and prominence, Small analyzed in detail how these media reported on several major antiwar movement events, such as the SDS 17 April 1965 Washington demonstration and the 15 October 1969 Moratorium. He found, for example, that the media frequently communicated an expectation of violence associated with antiwar demonstrations. In addition, the presence or absence of “bizarre or countercultural behavior” was frequently cause for comment, whereas most journalists completely missed the political intricacies of the antiwar demonstrators’ rationales. According to Small, “most Americans, including journalists, are leery about marches and rallies sponsored by organizations not associated with the major parties, no matter the cause they advocate.”

Ultimately, Small demonstrates that during the period 1965 through 1971, elite media tended to frame the news in a way that reinforced the status quo, as research by Gaye Tuchman and others has shown in other venues. During the Vietnam War then, media coverage of antiwar activities was not especially flattering and certainly did not hasten the war’s end.

An interesting issue Small addresses is the impact on U.S. political culture of the tenacious persistence of the opposite view, in the face of at least five excellent studies that show the contrary. So pervasive is the view “that the
United States could have won the [Vietnam] war had it not been for the press's embrace of antiwar arguments and perspectives,” Small argues, that “the media themselves were nervous about offering favorable or extensive coverage of antiwar activities during the Gulf War in 1991, particularly the January 1991 rally in Washington that drew at least one hundred thousand doves.” Covering Dissent contributes strongly to the task of debunking this myth.

Nancy Roberts, University of Minnesota


The Press Gang is a valuable book, flawed primarily by lack of scholarly context and a meandering narrative. But its strengths are considerable, bringing to our attention what were the familiar names of the leading political journalists of the Gilded Age and reminding us that political correspondents were influential in their own right. Summers writes the “great men” of journalism were not just Horace Greely and the James Gordon Bennetts, but political writers such as “Gath,” George Alfred Townsend of the Chicago Tribune, and “H.V.B,” Henry J. Ramsdell of the Cincinnati Commercial. Men, and occasionally women, who wielded great power by their interpretation of the political events of the day.

Summers, a professor of history at the University of Kentucky, frames his work as a study of the professional journalist “fresh out of eggshell just as its discovering itself as a profession and before it has established standards of conduct and freed itself from the legacy of the past.” In his vulnerable betwixt-and-between stage, prompted by the journalists’ and their readers’ experience in the Civil War, eradication of corruption became established as a major value. This was the value, the author believes, that dominated the journalist’s evaluation of Radical Reconstruction. Reconstruction was working, Summer writes, if considered on the basis of the adaptation of the former slaves to free labor or the growth of the freedman school system. But journalists framed the effort only in terms of the ethics and efficiency of those in power. “Because corruption became the lead story nationally, it became the lead story in the South,” writes Summers.

The topic alone could be an important study, but Summers chooses to devote one of the book’s eighteen chapters to the subject. In an uneven, sometimes even lurching manner, other chapters go in new directions with insufficient integration with the major thesis of the book. In one departure, Summer examines the role of journalists in bringing Andrew Johnson’s presidency to a close, which according to Summers, was less because of a cabal of the Radical Republican press than Johnson’s inability to manipulate a new independent press. Grant, hardly a supporter of the press, came to face not a press that was increasingly thinking of itself as a fourth estate, and would have no more success at press-handling than Johnson.
In addition to these broad interpretations, Summer sketches the careers of a few of the period's correspondents, men and women whose names are now barely known (even among communication historians) despite their celebrity (or notoriety) in their own time. Uriah Hunt Painter, a correspondent for the Philadelphia Inquirer, made his real living by using his pen to extort. Painter's blackmail was so well known that one of the new breed of professional Washington correspondents, George Washington Townsend, publicly declared that Painter was a "striker," a shakedown artist. Similarly, W.B. Shaw, "Nestor of the Boston Transcript," lived in a grand manner thanks to the sale of useful financial information obtained from his press connections. Spurred by the example of Painter and Shaw and the attempts of Jay Cooke to buy a favorable press, Washington reporters in 1877 established a set of rules for correspondents, which are still in effect. That self-regulation helped the credibility and influence of the Washington correspondents, but it also set in place "boys on the bus" mentality, Summer says. Don Piatt, the cynical correspondent of the Cincinnati Commercial, helped to set the standards for Washington correspondents: "Piatt's propensity to see conspiracies, to portray life in the darkest of colors, helped set a fashion in Washington."

Communications historians will particularly appreciate Summer's examination of numerous manuscript collections that inform his research on the correspondents. Despite the importance of the journalists of the period, few secondary sources exist, and Summer's bibliography can serve as a tool in further research.

One of the book's significant weaknesses, however, is that the author has no scholarly context except for a reference to Donald Ritchie's 1991 overview, Press Gallery: Congress and the Washington Correspondents. Further, although the book is enriched by the considerable use of Thomas Nast's illustrations, there is no examination of Nast's role in making celebrities of the journalists and editors (readers were expected to identify editors by their likenesses) or of Nast's contribution, by making accessible to a wide audience, the correspondent's interpretation of events.

Patricia Bradley, Temple University


The golden anniversary of World War II has spawned a flood of histories of the time and the event, and Reporting the War is in that category. The Smithsonian handout accompanying the book is accurate in describing what the book is. It "celebrates the lives and work of the great journalists..." and "details the experiences of photographers, combat artists, reporters, censors, and broadcasters" involved in bringing "news from the war front to the American public almost as soon as it happened."

Thus, the book is people-centered, primarily tackling its title from inside out. The familiar names from previous literature of war correspondence are there—Carl Mydans, William Shirer, Helen Kirkpatrick, Richard Tregaskis,
Edward R. Murrow, and of course, the soldier's reporter, Ernie Pyle, who covered one battle too many and wound up on the list of thirty-seven correspondents killed in action.

Happily there are surprises in what might otherwise be a predictable book. The combat artist, for instance, is nearly forgotten, but remembered here. One of them, Aaron Bohrod (1907-1992), was known to us as an artist at the University of Wisconsin who opened his studio to elementary school classes (including that of our eldest daughter) while we slogged through graduate school in Madison. Bohrod, like Pyle, covered the two major theaters of war, first the Pacific and then Europe, producing sketches and paintings that caught the stark horror of war as only an artist can.

Voss, an historian and curator at the National Portrait Gallery, also tackles thematic issues and problems: censorship and propaganda, women correspondents, and the African-American press and correspondents, for instance. These chapters do a decent job in broad-brush treatment of the topic, but can lull the reader into simplistic conclusions at times. For instance, the Office of Censorship and its capable administrator, Byron Price, an Associated Press Veteran, were not quite so benign as one might think after reading about them in this book. Although Price played a middle ground between restrictions and freedom on the home front, he and his office were involved in intelligence gathering and back-channel pressure on publishers and writers when it seemed necessary to further the war front.

All in all, though, this is a book which might be a first reading for newcomers to World War II journalism, one to have in a selected library of the period. The bibliography is excellent, and author Voss's selection of illustrations is impressive. One can move from Reporting the War to any number of media studies of World War II people, themes, issues, and problems.

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From the Editor’s Desk...

THE RUNNING argument between me and a cyperpunk telecommunications department professor at the Grady College goes something like this. He says: “Real newspapers are dead on their feet; we’ll all get them in the electronic mode before the end of the century.” I say: “You’ve been inhaling too much ozone while reading your e-mail, young man. Print — to include The Newspaper — is here to stay.” Lately I’m not so sure who’s going to be the winner in this long-running debate. The uncertainty is fueled both by getting our feet wet in the electronic waters and a premonition about predicting the future from the past.

We finally tapped into e-mail and the Internet and all that stuff early this year. E-mail alone has proved to be a blessing, curse, and omen. It facilitates contacting media history colleagues everywhere from Australia to Liverpool to Chicago and in between. A note on the JHISTORY list of about 250 members provides more response than one can handle; the “chat” about media history issues is lively, ranging from the curiosity questions (where did the term “bulldog” edition come from?) to a more important dialogue about changing definitions of news. But there is as much junk mail on the information highway as there is in the typical American mailbox.

The reality of an academic electronic infoahn raises issues that neither editors nor organizations that sponsor their journals can ignore. For instance: A new book review journal co-sponsored by the Popular Culture and American Culture Associations will be made available in print and electronic form. The Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication will make research papers presented at the national convention available electronically shortly after the end of the convention at which they were presented. Electronic magazines are by no means novelties.

It’s too early to write a history of this phase of human communication. But this is a time when all of us in the academic trade need to decide how to turn the new tools to our best advantage. Should AJ become a print-electronic journal? Should we get the book reviews on line as fast as we can? Or should we, can we, continue to retreat to a private place where we turn pages in our own good time? Keep those cards and letters — and e-mail — coming, folks.

WBE (aka CMSEBER@uga.cc.uga.edu)
The Proceedings of the Rebellious Negroes: News of Slave Insurrections and Crimes in Colonial Newspapers

by David A. Copeland

Slaves were vital to the success of American colonies in the 1700s. Slaves also presented one of the greatest dangers to success. As a result, America's newspapers followed closely slave rebellions and crimes throughout the New World.

If one or more...Slaves...shall, in the Time of Alarm or Invasion, be found at the Distance of one Mile or more from the Habitation or Plantation of their Respective Owners...it shall be adjudged Felony without Benefit of Clergy in such Slave or Slaves; and it shall and may be lawful for the Person or Persons finding such Slave or Slaves...to shoot or otherwise destroy such Slave or Slaves, without being impeached, censured or prosecuted for the same.

_Boston Evening-Post, 10 March 1755._

In 1755, the colony of Massachusetts was waging a war against the French and Native Americans who inhabited Canada and the backcountry areas of New England. While the colony turned its military attention toward stopping this formidable alliance, Massachusetts legislators focused their legislative attention on another potential enemy of the colony, an internal enemy—the slaves of the colony. Why would Massachusetts pass such a law? Were some of the slaves in Massachusetts already in league with the French and Indians? Had the colony's slaves previously rebelled against their white masters? The _Boston Evening-Post’s_ report of the act passed by the General Assembly gave no reason
for granting citizens the right to kill slaves on the spot under certain circumstances and not face any repercussions for doing it, but the citizens of Massachusetts Bay and every other British colony along the Atlantic seaboard knew the reason such an act might be necessary.

Weekly newspapers for years had been supplying readers with news of “the Proceedings of the Rebellious Negroes,” accounts that related insurrections by African slaves throughout the New World and even in Africa. If white colonists were forced to focus their attention upon an invader like the French and Indians, the slaves might seize the opportunity to rebel, join with the enemy, or wage war themselves upon white colonists. It had happened before in the colonies, in 1740 when invading Spaniards from Florida incited Georgia slaves to revolt, and Massachusetts leaders evidently were not willing to give the French and Indians the opportunity to do the same. The colony, therefore, declared that at certain times all slaves more than a mile from their home were enemies of the colonies.

This research deals with “the Proceedings of the Rebellious Negroes,” the news in colonial newspapers that concentrated upon two principal topics: slave insurrections and slave crimes. For this study, approximately 7,400 editions of all colonial newspapers available on microfilm were read. Newspapers were read in their entirety to discover news concerning slave revolts, slave crimes, and attitudes toward slaves. This research reveals that colonial

1. Boston Evening-Post, 10 March 1755, 1.
2. See, for example, American Weekly Mercury (Philadelphia), 14 January 1734-35, 3; South-Carolina Gazette (Charleston), 18 January 1735, 4; New-York Weekly Journal, 20 January 1735, 2; Weekly Rehearsal (Boston), 3 February 1735, 2; Boston News-Letter, 22 February 1735, 2; New-England Weekly Journal (Boston), 30 June 1735, 2; Boston Evening-Post, 25 August 1735, 2; Virginia Gazette (Williamsburg), 18 January 1739-40, 3; Boston Gazette, or Country Journal, 28 January 1755, 2; Pennsylvania Gazette (Philadelphia), 5 June 1760, 2; Pennsylvania Journal, or Weekly Advertiser (Philadelphia), 5 June 1760, 3; and Massachusetts Gazette (And Boston News-Letter), 18 July 1765, 2.
3. South-Carolina Gazette (Charleston), 26 January 1740, 2.
4. During the colonial period, printers published approximately 36,000 weekly, biweekly and triweekly editions of newspapers. Because of the large number of newspapers in existence, a method was devised for this study that would provide comprehensive coverage of all colonial newspapers while holding the number of editions that needed to be read to a manageable number. All extant editions prior to 1720 were read, and from 1720-1775, newspapers were read at five-year intervals—1720, 1725, and so on. Every extant and available newspaper edition printed in the study years from 1720-1755 was read. From 1760-1775, the large number of newspapers and total editions printed during each of the study years necessitated using a method of sampling. A method of selecting newspapers for these years was devised that ensured a low margin of error, less than 4 percent, meaning that less than four chances in one hundred existed for missing a news item dealing with slaves. More than two thousand newspapers were read for the years 1760-1775 or between 500-600 for each year of the study. Even though sampling occurred in selecting years for this study and newspapers to be read from 1760-1775, sampling was not involved
newspapers carried numerous stories that reflected the attitudes of white colonists toward African slaves. In these news stories, the inferior nature of blacks, as viewed from a European perspective, is evident. These news stories reflect another aspect of the relationship between blacks and whites in colonial America. White colonists were afraid of slaves, and that fear is apparent in many items in colonial newspapers that repeated the activities of slaves from many locations in the New World. Fear of slaves is also reflected in the silence some colonial newspapers maintained concerning slave rebellions within their own colony or in their failure to mention revolts in other colonies, insurrections that found their way into the reports of many other colonial newspapers.

Slavery was big business throughout the colonial period. Although beyond the parameters of this study, the advertisements of colonial newspapers reveal the booming slave trade in the colonies and the problems that slave owners had with runaway slaves. Scholarly research into slave advertisements forms the basis for media literature that deals with slaves and colonial newspapers.\(^5\) Studies about the news of slaves, except for research into the antislavery literature of the later colonial period,\(^6\) however, have not been


6. The antislavery literature of colonial newspapers from 1770-1776 has been discussed by Patricia Bradley, “Slavery in Colonial Newspapers: The Somerset Case,” Journalism History 12 (1985): 2-7. Bradley explores the issue of slavery with questions about the formation of the nation as they revolved around newspaper coverage of the case of an American slave who escaped while in England. The slave was declared free by a British court in 1772 and not ordered returned to America. In Bradley, “Connecticut Newspapers and the Dialogue on Slavery: 1770-76,” paper presented at the American Journalism Historians Association annual convention,
undertaken. This is a mistake according to historian Milton Cantor, who said that colonial literature "touching on the Negro is explicit."\(^7\) Colonial newspapers, while not specifically considered literature, do comprise one of the largest bodies of written material of the period, and this research seeks to uncover the way news stories reported on the activities of African slaves and Anglo-Americans' perceptions of slave activity and conduct.

Many readers of colonial newspapers no doubt felt that slave news provided life-or-death information. Although news in Boston of an attempted slave insurrection in South Carolina appeared in the Massachusetts city's newspapers weeks after the fact,\(^8\) the news kept Bostonians on guard. It reminded them that similar revolts had occurred in Boston\(^9\) and that the potential for similar rebellions still existed in their city just as much as on the plantations of the Tidewater region of South Carolina. This fact helps also to explain Massachusetts' harsh law passed against slaves in 1755 and announced in the Boston Evening-Post. Understanding attitudes toward slavery in America as represented in colonial newspapers, however, requires understanding the origins of slavery and some of its economic repercussions. The following discussion of slavery in America should help in that understanding.

**Slavery in America**

Slavery for Africans in the British colonies of America began with the arrival of twenty Africans via Dutch ship to Jamestown, Virginia, in 1619. Although those twenty Africans were not considered to be slaves by the Jamestown residents and they worked as indentured servants in the tobacco fields of the growing English colony, the concept of perpetual slavery of blacks grew about as quickly as the populating of the Atlantic seaboard by whites.\(^10\) Blacks from Africa were not the only ones to serve as slaves. Europeans attempted to force Native Americans into servitude as well, but this practice was not

St. Paul, Minn., 1987, Bradley discusses the antislavery dialogue of Connecticut newspapers from 1770-76, the principal newspapers involved in the antislavery literature of the colonial period. See also, Bradley, "Slavery in Colonial Newspapers on the Eve of the Revolution 1770-1775" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1988). Antislavery commentaries did appear in newspapers prior to 1770. An antislavery address in Virginia was published in the Virginia Gazette (Williamsburg), 19 March 1767. This address, however, was an exception in Southern colonial newspapers. The earliest antislavery piece to appear in the papers of colonial America was written by George Whitefield in 1740 (See, for example, Pennsylvania Gazette [Philadelphia], 17 April 1740, 1).

9. Ibid., 13 June 1720, 4.
successful because Indians lacked experience with any intensified agricultural methods such as those used in Europe and West Africa.\textsuperscript{11}

The whites who arrived from Europe were not establishing a new practice when they used African slaves to assist with the difficult manual labor needed to survive in America. As early as 1300, Europeans forced Africans into slavery in order to work the sugar plantations of the Mediterranean Sea region of the continent.\textsuperscript{12} The use of Africans by the English followed, and during the ill-fated attempts at English colonization on Roanoke Island in the 1580s, blacks, in some capacity of servitude, were left with the colony in 1586.\textsuperscript{13}

The restriction of slavery to blacks rested ultimately upon the principle that racially inferior beings belonged in servitude to their superiors. Carried further, this concept made the servitude of Negroes in American inheritable.\textsuperscript{14} The boom period for tobacco during the 1620s fostered this kind of thinking. As the colony of Virginia achieved more and more financial success through the exportation of tobacco, the greater the need became for a large, inexpensive labor supply. Imported Africans filled that need, and this system of labor developed into a system that treated humans as things.\textsuperscript{15}

The tobacco plantations of Virginia, however, were not the only places in colonial America where slavery existed. Boston was only eight years old when slaves were brought into the town of 1,500 citizens, and by 1690, slaves were just as numerous in northern urban centers as they were in the tobacco-growing regions of the Southern colonies.\textsuperscript{16} Slaves comprised just over 13 percent of the

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
total population of the colonies in that year with slaves present in all twelve colonies.\textsuperscript{17}

During the seventeenth century, the slave trade in America was a monopoly run by the Royal African Trading Company, but in 1698, Parliament opened African slave traffic to independent merchants and traders.\textsuperscript{18} Americans quickly discovered just how profitable slave trade could be. The main American traders for slaves were shippers from New England, specifically Rhode Island and Massachusetts. Their ships left America loaded with rum that was used to purchase slaves along the African coast. With their ships loaded with slaves, the New England captains sailed to the West Indies or Southern colonies and sold the cargoes of slaves for a considerable profit, thereby continuing the cycle of slave trade.\textsuperscript{19} Slaves in this trading scheme generally brought £21 for males, £18 for women, and £14 for children in the Caribbean.\textsuperscript{20} Slaves sold in the Southern colonies averaged higher prices, around £30 in 1730 to as much as £60 by 1750.\textsuperscript{21} The slave trade became so profitable for New England merchants and shippers that two-thirds of Rhode Island’s ships and sailors directly participated in the trade.\textsuperscript{22} In fact, from the first decade of the eighteenth century to 1740, the yearly value of the slaves imported into America grew from £28,000 to £118,000.\textsuperscript{23}

The growing profits made by those dealing in the slave trade—in conjunction with the desire for cheap labor—helped to increase the number of slaves being brought into the colonies in the eighteenth century, estimated at

\textsuperscript{17} Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, 1975), 1168.
\textsuperscript{18} Elkins, Slavery, 48-49.
\textsuperscript{19} James Truslow Adams, Provincial Society 1690-1763 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1927), 229-30. Various shipping triangles are also discussed in Ian K. Steele, The English Atlantic 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). It should be noted that Gary M. Walton and James F. Shepherd, The Economic Rise of Early America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 91, say that describing the trading patterns of colonial America as triangles is inaccurate. Walton and Shepherd base their conclusions on data from the years 1768-1772 only. Triangular trade is a simplified explanation for the trading patterns that were used in the eighteenth century. American ships sailed several triangles. Besides the African triangle, ships ran from America to England to the Caribbean. Often there were many more stops along the way, but the basic configuration of the trade routes was triangular. Eric Foner and John A. Garraty, eds., The Reader’s Companion to American History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), s.v. “Triangular Trade.”
\textsuperscript{20} Oscar Theodore Barck, Jr. and Hugh Talmage Lefler, Colonial America (New York: Macmillan Company, 1958), 305.
\textsuperscript{22} Deyle, “‘By farr the most profitable trade,’” 112.
1,000 per year from 1700-1720, 2,500 per year from 1720-1740, and 5,000 per year from 1740-1760. By 1770, more than 450,000 slaves resided in the thirteen colonies, with one-quarter million Africans being taken from their homeland and sold into American slavery during the century. More than 35 percent of the immigrants entering New York City in the middle third of the eighteenth century were African slaves, and the Massachusetts slave population doubled from 1700 to 1750, blacks accounting for 8 percent of Boston’s total population in 1755. By 1720, more than half of South Carolina’s total population was comprised of Africans, and blacks outnumbered whites in the colony for the rest of the century. Slavery and slave trading were, by the eighteenth century, a regular part of American life with slaves in every colony.

The success of the slave trade for New England merchants and the necessity of it for crop production on Southern plantations firmly entrenched slavery in eighteenth-century American society. Success and necessity helped produce a domestic slave trade in addition to the overseas ventures. The major expositor of this trade became the colonial newspapers, which provided a wider and more readily available market by helping to bring buyer and seller together. Newspaper printers realized, too, that slavery was a means to a profit for them as well. But the content of colonial newspapers, other than advertisements that presented the economic aspects of slavery, reveals few feelings about slaves other than fear and inferiority of Africans in their relationship with white colonists. News of slave revolts and slave crimes occupied the bulk of colonial news about slaves, probably for the above reasons.

The Rebellious Negroes and Colonial Newspapers

On 21 April 1712, the Boston News-Letter announced to the citizens of Boston that seventy Negroes were in custody in New York following their “late Conspiracy to Murder the Christians” in that region. A wholesale extermination of rebellious slaves followed in New York. The colony initiated a string of executions that burned, broke on the wheel, and hanged up alive to be left to die those slaves who had assumed an active role in the insurrection. Many of the slaves arrested hanged themselves or slit their own throats rather than face such

31. Deyle, “‘By farr the most profitable trade,’” 115-16.
painful deaths.\textsuperscript{32} It is likely harsher treatment for slaves not involved in the revolt followed as well. The \textit{News-Letter}'s account of the New York slave revolt was one in the long list of slave rebellion reports to appear in colonial newspapers, and according to the papers, slave revolts occurred with great frequency and throughout the New World.

When colonial newspapers reported "the Proceedings of the Rebellious Negroes," they could have been talking about slave revolts in Boston, Charleston, Kingston, or almost any other locale that had a slave population and contact with the British colonies of North America. In fact, in the years of this study, forty-seven slave revolts were reported by newspapers to have taken place or have been planned in twenty-six locations in the New World.\textsuperscript{33}

The frequency of slave rebellions and the amount of news they generated attests to the concern white colonists up and down the Atlantic seaboard shared about the potential danger that slave insurrections represented for whites in the towns and regions containing relatively large concentrations of slaves, the areas not incidentally where newspapers were published. News of slave revolts and slave crimes was no doubt very closely connected in the minds of the readers of colonial newspapers. Both slave revolts and lawlessness were acts of defiance by those in subjugation against those in authority.

Reports of slave insurrections were not confined to the colonies of the New World either. Colonial newspapers carried accounts of slave rebellions onboard ships that were bringing Africans to the colonies for servitude. Outnumbered whites had to be constantly on guard for their lives because of the great number of blacks being transported, even though the Africans were generally in irons and kept below deck most of the time. A London letter concerning an uprising upon a ship was printed by John Holt in the \textit{New-York Journal}: 

\begin{quote}
On Sunday last, about three in the morning; we were all (who lay in the cabbin) alarmed with a most horrid noise of the negroes, which was succeeded by several dreadful shrieks from Mr. Howard and several of the people upon deck. Surprised at such an uncommon uproar, I Strove to awake Capt. Millroy, but before I could make him sensible of what had happened I received a stroke over my shoulders with a billet of wood, as also a cut with a cutlass on the back of my neck. The cries of
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Boston News-Letter}, 21 April 1712, 2.

\textsuperscript{33} The locations and dates of slave rebellions listed in the newspapers of this study are: New York (1712, 1765, 1775); Williamsburg (1730, 1770, 1775); Jamaica (1730, 1735, 1745, 1750, 1760 [two], 1765, 1770); Antigua (1740, 1765); Indies (1750); Georgia (1740); Charleston (1740, 1745); Surinam (1750, 1765); Curaçao (1750); Kingston (1750, 1760); Boston (1720); South Carolina (1730, 1740, 1745, 1760, 1775); St. Jago (1760); South America (1750); St. Kitts (1750, 1770); Santa Croix (1760); Saint Marys (1760); Honduras (1765); Annapolis (1740, 1770); Saint Eustatia (1770); New Bern (1770); Malta (1750); Saint Thomas (1760); Cayenne (1750); James River, Virginia (1730) and Esopus (1775).
Mr. Howard, who was murdered under the windlass, as also those of several of the people, whom the villains were butchering on the main deck, had thrown me into such a state of stupidity, that I did not in the least feel the wound I had received.34

Reports of slave revolts on land or sea no doubt stirred the imaginations of readers and provoked thoughts of fear by describing the activities of slaves or by just mentioning that a revolt had taken place. Both types of rebellion news stories found their way into colonial newspapers. When slaves revolted in the middle of the night and killed families in their beds in Surinam,35 Boston readers had a clear picture of the potential danger they might face from the sizeable slave population in their city should enough slaves become discontent. When the Boston Weekly Post-Boy, however, announced to its readers that “a new Negro Plot is just discovered” in South Carolina in 1740,36 nothing else was said. Readers could supply the details of what might have happened had the revolt taken place. South Carolina had suffered through the worst slave revolt to have occurred in the colonies just months before, the Stono Rebellion,37 and the vast differences in the white and black populations of the colony were well known, at least to Boston readers, who as early as 1730 were informed of the population disparity between slaves and whites in South Carolina. In a letter from Charleston that was printed in the Boston News-Letter, a South Carolina resident noted, “For take the whole Province we have about 28 thousand Negros to 3 thousand Whites.”38 When the Stono Rebellion and the disparity in white and black population were taken into account by Boston newspaper readers, no real details of a revolt were needed to reach a conclusion about what might happen if an uprising were to occur.

Because of the threat large numbers of slaves presented for the white population, any activity by slaves that had the potential to lead to an insurrection was closely scrutinized.39 Almost every report of a slave rebellion

34. New-York Journal; or the General Advertiser, 23 June 1770, 1 supplement. Similar reports of slave revolts on board ships may be found throughout the colonial period. See, for example, New-York Weekly Journal, 5 October 1735, 3; Pennsylvania Gazette (Philadelphia), 13 January 1730, 4; 9 August 1750, 2. The revolt, even though slaves murdered several whites, was not successful.
35. Boston Evening-Post, 13 August 1750, 2.
37. The Stono Rebellion took place in September 1739. Slaves, estimated at sixty to one hundred, fought whites after breaking into a store and stealing guns and ammunition. The Stono Rebellion will be discussed more fully later. For a full discussion of the Stono Rebellion, see Peter H. Wood, Black Majority (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), 314-23.
39. The idea of a slave insurrection was always a concern for white colonists, but when accounts of rebellions mentioned the fact that blacks planned only to murder
ran in multiple colonial newspapers, but two of the most repeated accounts of slave insurrections appeared in the colonial newspapers in 1745 and 1750 and discussed massive rebellions by slaves in the Caribbean.

In 1745, slaves on Jamaica prepared to stage a large insurrection on the island. This attempt was not the first by Jamaican slaves nor would it be the last. Jamaican slaves attempted approximately 250 rebellions during the period that slavery existed on the island, and those rebellions were never small. The average number of slaves taking part in Jamaican revolts averaged between three and four hundred in the eighteenth century, and six years before the 1745 revolt, thousands of Jamaican slaves had rebelled against servitude in what Jamaicans called the first Maroon war. The ratio of ten slaves to one white on the island further exacerbated relationships between whites and their black slaves.

In January 1745, a plot where the slaves planned to “destroy all the Whites” on the island was “very near accomplished.” The rebellion was thwarted just as the slaves planned to attack, however, and the whole affair was made known to Americans by a letter received in Boston dated 2 February 1745, and printed in the *Boston Evening-Post* on April 1. Within a week, the letter was reprinted in newspapers in New York, and it ran twelve days later in Philadelphia. The *Virginia Gazette* presented the letter in May. The letter provided readers with an account of what had nearly happened on Jamaica, explaining the slaves’ proposed plan to kill the whites and how the plot was sabotaged. Slaves on plantations were to murder their masters and mistresses and then proceed to the near-by town, where they would set fire to both ends of the town and shoot or stab whites as they ran in fear from the smoke and flames. The plot was revealed by a sympathetic slave who did not want to see her mistress killed. The white woman then sent news of the planned rebellion to her husband, away for several days of card playing. He ignored the note from his wife until the last minute, so the wife got help from a neighbor, who gathered the local militia and surprised the slaves in their hideout. The letter from Jamaica, which appeared in all cities with newspapers except Charleston,

white males and keep white females for mating and marriage purposes, white hysteria was often heightened. See, for example, *Essex Gazette* (Salem), 8 May 1770, 2.


42. Patterson, “The General Causes of Jamaican Slave Revolts,” 212.


45. *Virginia Gazette* (Williamsburg), 23 May 1745, 2.
reminded white citizens of the deviousness of slaves and the potential for harm if one let one’s guard down as did the card-playing husband.

When a newly arrived lot of slaves in Curacao revolted in 1750, whites reacted quickly. A July 25 letter from the Dutch settlement in the Antilles told that the settlers “had done nothing in our island but racking and executing a parcel of new Negroes, who had plotted to destroy all the whites.” After being racked, the letter stated and newspapers related, the rebellious slaves had “their hearts taken out and dash’d in their faces.”

The letter quickly ran in newspapers north and south of New York. In Boston it appeared in two papers, and it ran in both Philadelphia publications. The identical letter with a New York dateline appeared in the *Maryland Gazette* the first week of September. And just as the card playing account of insurrection in Jamaica failed to appear in the *South-Carolina Gazette*, so, too, was the news from Curacao concerning the slave revolt absent.

Interestingly, another letter from Curacao dated July 27 concerning the slave revolt that ran in the *New-York Evening-Post* was not picked up by any of the other colonial newspapers. In the *Evening-Post’s* expanded version of the insurrection, colonists and free Negroes were killed by the slaves. The killing of whites by the rebellious slaves may have been the reason that other newspapers picked up the *New-York Gazette* version as opposed to the *Evening-Post* account. Other factors may have entered into the decision, too, including availability of the two papers in other towns and the quality of writing. The *Gazette’s* report was much more succinct. Whatever the reason for the omission of the *Evening-Post*’s version, the inclusion of the *New-York Gazette* letter again points out the danger that many whites felt from slaves, be they newly imported as in Curacao or lifetime chattel.

The same repetition of slave rebellion stories took place continually in the colonial period. When Spanish soldiers from Florida invaded Georgia during the War of Jenkin’s Ear late in 1739, for example, slaves seized upon the opportunity to revolt in the newly organized English colony, and newspapers related the news up and down the Atlantic seaboard.

50. The noticeable omission by the *South-Carolina Gazette* of numerous slave revolt news items that appeared in many colonial newspapers will be discussed later in this article.
51. The story may have appeared in the *Virginia Gazette* like the Jamaican rebellion story of 1745, but the 1750 editions of the paper are no longer extant.
53. *Virginia Gazette* (Williamsburg), 18 January 1740, 3; *South-Carolina Gazette* (Charleston), 26 January 1740, 2; *American Weekly Mercury* (Philadelphia), 4 March 1740, 2; *New-York Weekly Journal*, 10 March 1740, 1; and *Boston News-Letter*, 28 March 1740, 1.
from one source that was received by one newspaper and copied by others. This method of obtaining news items created a problem for colonial newspapers. Accuracy was sometimes lost; innuendo was acceptable for news; and verification of a news story often came weeks or months later. This problem could be applied to all news in colonial newspapers, but it appeared to be especially true of news of slave revolts. Verification was important for a news story, but confirmation could wait when an item of interest to the welfare of colonists had reached the hands of a printer. Newspapers had no way to verify the accuracy of a news story of a slave rebellion in Jamaica, Curaçao, or Georgia, unless a second account from a different source was available. Newspapers generally assumed that a news item was true, but the large number of slave rebellion stories from many different locations made verification nearly impossible.

One of the best examples of the printing of inaccurate information concerning slave revolts occurred in 1760. Slaves in Jamaica, at least 1,200 of them, had revolted, and news about the rebellion made its way to America. A letter from Saint Mary's on Jamaica addressed the issue of misinformation: "I am informed you have received several erroneous and contradictory Accounts of the Proceedings of the Rebellious Negroes; which I am not surprized at, as the Truth is difficult to come at here on the Spot. The following is the best Information I can give you thereof."54 Whether the letter writer provided accurate information is doubtful because it contained numerous comments about the actions and thoughts of the rebelling slaves, including the revealing way in which the slaves persuaded one of their leaders to continue the revolt even after he was wounded.55 The letter did, however, provide newspaper readers an interesting account of the way in which whites sought "to reduce the Blackymores to obedience."56

Colonial newspapers printed numerous reports from Jamaica that dealt with the insurrection for the remainder of 1760, one often contradicting the other. In July, for instance, newspapers reported that the rebellion had been entirely quelled with "no Apprehension of their [the slaves] coming to any Head again"57 and that "a second Insurrection of the Negroes had been attempted."58

The sons of printer Thomas Fleet, who continued to print the Boston Evening-Post after their father’s death, no doubt felt they had finally received accurate information on the activities in Jamaica in November because the pair prefaced the Evening-Post's latest news from Jamaica with "we have prints to the 4th of

54. Pennsylvania Gazette (Philadelphia), 5 June 1760, 2; Pennsylvania Journal, or Weekly Advertiser (Philadelphia), 5 June 1760, 3; and Boston Weekly News-Letter, 19 June 1760, 1.
55. Part of the letter reported, "There were such Dissentions among them that several were killed in their own Quarrels." Since no trials for the rebelling slaves had yet been held, this type of news was grounded in rumor.
58. Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), 10 July 1760, 3.
October,”^59 referring to copies of the newspapers of Jamaica, the Jamaica Gazette, the Kingston Journal, and the St. Jago Intelligencer. The Fleets were relying upon printed, public news rather than letters from citizens or the hearsay of a ship’s captain and probably felt this information was more accurate for that reason, despite the fact that the Jamaican newspapers may have received their news from letters and hearsay as well.

The news of the Jamaican slave revolt played continuously to the readers of newspapers from Annapolis to Boston in 1760, but in South Carolina, news about the Jamaican slave revolt—or any slave revolt for that matter—was a rarity. The omission in 1760 by the South-Carolina Gazette may be blamed on the fact that the colony was in the midst of a fierce war against both the Cherokees and smallpox, but after 1739, the Gazette carefully avoided mention of most slave revolts, especially those that were reported to have taken place in South Carolina. When the Maryland Gazette stated “that an Insurrection was apprehended in the Providence [sic] of South-Carolina” in 1760,^60 it was printing a piece of news that would not appear in a South Carolina newspaper. In South Carolina, news of slave revolts was seldom printed, and the reasons for the omissions stemmed directly from fear of a concerted effort by the colony’s large slave population.

From 1720 onward, African slaves outnumbered whites in South Carolina. By 1730 there were approximately two slaves for every white inhabitant of the colony, and the ratio did not dip below that average for the remainder of the century.61 In 1730, colonial newspapers in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia reported that a large slave revolt in the province had been uncovered and stopped. The slaves, according to the account in the New-York Gazette, failed because the slaves could not decide whether they “should destroy their own Masters” or “Ris[e] up in a Body, and giv[e] the Blow once in Surprize.”^62 No newspaper existed in South Carolina in 1730 to print the news of the revolt, but when similar rebellions occurred in 1739 and 1740, the South-Carolina Gazette printed no information “that a new Negro Plot is just discover’d” in the colony.63

59. Boston Evening-Post, 24 November 1760, 2.
60. Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), 26 June 1760, 3.
62. New-York Gazette, 9 November 1730, 2. The Gazette’s information about the insurrection was obtained from a later and different source than that printed in other colonial newspapers. The other papers referred only to “an Account of a bloody Tragedy which was to have been executed here.” Boston News-Letter, 22 October 1730, 2; New-England Weekly Journal (Boston), 12 October 1730, 2; and Pennsylvania Gazette (Philadelphia), 22 October 1730, 4.
63. Boston Evening-Post, 7 July 1740, 3; Boston Weekly Post-Boy, 7 July 1740, 2; Pennsylvania Gazette (Philadelphia), 26 June 1740, 3. Another suspected slave rebellion was uncovered in 1745, according to the Pennsylvania Journal, or Weekly Advertiser (Philadelphia), 22 August 1745, 2. The news of this suspected slave revolt was not reported in Charleston either.
Besides the obvious fear of slaves because of the overwhelming odds they possessed in numbers versus whites, news of slave rebellion activity in South Carolina was omitted by the colony’s only newspaper because of the Stono Rebellion of 1739.64 In September 1739, slaves broke into a store, robbing it of guns and ammunition. In the process they murdered the shop owner, severed his head, and left it on the steps of the store. The slaves, who had started the revolt twenty miles from Charleston, began moving southward toward Florida picking up rebellious slaves and killing whites along the way. The slaves soon numbered between sixty and one hundred and were met by a group of white planters of approximately the same size. A battle ensued that successfully halted the main thrust of the rebelling slaves. Small groups of slaves continued their revolt, but the insurrection was doomed. The death toll for the rebellion was estimated at twenty-one whites and forty-four slaves, and the legislature granted total immunity to all persons who aided in the suppression of the rebellion.

Because of the Stono Rebellion, South Carolina enacted a strict slave code in 1740 that decreed that “the extent of...power over...slaves ought to be settled and limited by positive laws, so that the slave may be kept in due subjection and obedience.” Slaves were required “to submit...or undergo the examination of any white person,” and if the slave dared to react with violence, the slave code stated that “such slave may be lawfully killed.”65 The South-Carolina Gazette never mentioned the slave code during the year.

The South-Carolina Gazette may have ignored slave revolts, but the newspaper did not ignore slaves. In direct reaction to the activities of slaves in the colony, the colony passed strict laws banning slaves from congregating for any purpose. The Gazette, under the guidance of Elizabeth Timothy, printed this news. The colony made it illegal for slaves to gather in Charleston to play “Dice and other Games,” and it prohibited “gathering together such great Numbers of Negroes, both in Town and Country, at their Burials and on the Sabbath Day.”66 The law was an obvious attempt to keep slaves from congregating in large enough numbers that a revolt could occur.

The South Carolina law as reported in the South-Carolina Gazette was just one of the numerous efforts during the colonial period to control African slaves. Increasingly, colonial laws recognized slaves as chattel or property, and newspapers printed these laws and correspondence that revealed how white colonists looked upon the black slaves. Because of the growing number of slaves in America, the slave laws that colonial governments enacted, the many reports of slave revolts, and the omission of slave rebellion news in South Carolina, many white colonists developed a fear of slaves. Reinforcing this increasing fear was the white perception that people of color, specifically blacks, were inferior

64. The information on the Stono Rebellion is taken from Wood, Black Majority, 314-23 and Higginbotham, In the Matter of Color, 192-95.
66. South-Carolina Gazette (Charleston), 15 April 1745, 1.
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and incapable of obtaining a high moral or intelligence level. This understanding led to a particular depiction of slaves that appeared in colonial newspapers.

Attitudes toward and Perceptions of African Slaves

The fear of slaves and the concept that people of color were inferior to whites manifested itself in a number of ways in colonial newspapers. Laws continually restricted the activities of slaves, and letters written to newspapers concerning slaves often advocated keeping Africans in the lowest positions of society. Both of these practices developed as a result of slave rebellions, slave crimes, and the feelings of superiority that white colonists possessed, and often there was no masking the fear that whites had of those whom they held in servitude. As a result, the laws of colonial legislatures and the correspondence sent to newspapers concerning slaves often advocated harsh treatment to slaves.

In 1740, for instance, a writer to the Boston Evening-Post criticized slave owners for their lack of control of slaves, something that created an untenable situation in Boston. “The great Disorders committed by Negroes, who are permitted by their imprudent Masters, &c. to be out late at Night,” the letter writer complained, “has determined several sober and substantial Housekeepers to walk about the Town in the sore part of the Night...and it is hoped that all lovers of Peace and good Order will join their endeavours for preventing the like Disorders for the future.”

Freedom and leniency were items writers to newspapers felt were evils for both slaves and their white owners. Being less than severe in a relationship with slaves was dangerous for whites as a letter from Williamsburg explained:

Some time about Christmas last, a tragical affair happened at a plantation...the particulars of which...are as follows, viz. The Negroes belonging to the plantation having long been treated with too much leniency and indulgence, were grown extremely insolent and unruly....The Steward’s deputy...had ordered one of the slaves to make a fire every morning very early; the fellow did not appear till sunrise; on being examined why he came not sooner, he gave most insolent and provoking answers, upon which...the fellow made a stroke at him with an ax.

Slaves on the plantation had been given some leeway earlier, and because a less than severe approach had been taken with them, an overseer had been axed. After the axing, a revolt broke out between the slaves and whites on the plantation that resulted in numerous deaths on both sides.

Because leniency could lead to danger from slaves, colonial governments, according to reports in colonial newspapers, passed numerous laws

68. New-York Journal; or the General Advertiser, 22 February 1770, 2.
to suppress any kind of leisure activities for slaves. These laws, as Leon Higginbotham pointed out, were a concerted effort on the part of colonies to halt conspiratory actions by slaves, something that was very likely if slaves were given any free time. Again, fear of slaves was the underlying motive behind these laws. Wherever governments felt that the potential for slave problems existed, stringent laws to inhibit slave activity were enacted. In 1730, for example, the governor of Virginia placed the militia on active duty and ordered that the quarters of slaves in the region surrounding Norfolk be inspected each night. In Boston, the city passed laws that prohibited any slave from leaving the home of his master after nine o'clock at night, and if slaves were caught on the street after that hour, they were to be publicly whipped. In New York, slaves were not allowed to congregate in groups larger than three because slaves with free time had been on the streets of the city uttering “very insolent Expressions, and otherways misbehaved themselves.”

Repressive laws were only one way that whites attempted to suppress slaves. Newspapers echoed the views of colonial society that African blood produced inferior beings in numerous ways. This fact, according to some newspaper reports, was very obvious if one observed mulattos. Even though mulattos were the product of one white parent, they were still considered inferior because of their mixed racial ancestry. The company of mulattos was to be avoided by all whites, and one writer to the South-Carolina Gazette remarked, “none appear to me so monstrously ridiculous as the Molatto Gentleman.” Slaves were thought of as inferior to whites. By reaffirming this concept, colonial newspapers helped colonial society keep order. If whites could continually reaffirm their dominance over blacks in both physical and emotional ways, they could hold on to their tenuous position as masters over another, and sometimes more populous group.

A poem, On a Negro girl making her Court to a fair Youth, spoke of the impossibility of white and black existing together. In the poetry, the slave girl desired a physical relationship with a white boy, but the reply by the young man addressed the fact that such an action would cost the whites their property as black would overshadow white. In putting down the slave as foolish for such a request as a relationship on par with whites, the underlying fear of black dominance of whites was being addressed. The importance of white over black may also be detected in the poem through its capitalization, white being capitalized while black remains in lower case. The poem stated:

Negro, complain not, that I fly;  
When Fate commands Antipathy.  
Prodigious might that Union prove.

70. Boston Gazette, 7 December 1730, 2.  
72. New-York Gazette: or, the Weekly Post-Boy, 10 February 1755, 3.  
73. South-Carolina Gazette (Charleston), 22 March 1744-45, 1.
When Day and Night together move.
And the Communion of our Lips,
Not Kisses make, but an Eclipse;
In which the mixed black and White,
Portends more Horror than Delight.
Yet, if thou wild my shadow be
Enjoy thy dearest Wish,
but see You take my shadows Property;
Which always flys when I draw near
And don’t so much as drop a Tear,
And nothing shew of Love or Fear.74

The view of the inferiority of blacks in colonial society was greatly enhanced by the white belief that slaves, specifically black slaves, were property. As early as 1706, that concept was appearing in news stories. In 1705, forty-four African slaves died in Massachusetts, and the Boston News-Leffer reported that those deaths amounted to a loss “to the Sum of One Thousand three hundred and Twenty Pounds.”75 Parliament reported England’s earnings on the importation and exportation of slaves in the nation’s economic report.76 Drownings in North Carolina of four slaves were not lamented as a loss of life but as the loss of “most Valuable Slaves,” whose monetary significance was the only true forfeiture.77 Slaves were property, and as such they could be put on display as a mulatto slave was in Boston because “a White Negro was such a Novelty in America that one was exhibited Night by Night at the Sign of the White House.”78 All of the efforts of the colonies to suppress slaves through laws and all newspaper accounts of the inferiority of African slaves were of little value, however, when slaves actually decided to revolt against whites. African slaves, who had been free before being sold into captivity, sought freedom. This desire for freedom manifested itself in the form of slave insurrections, but slaves sought freedom in another way as well, through acts of violence in crime.

Slave Crimes in Colonial Newspapers

As long as whites maintained physical superiority over slaves, control belonged to them. When the balance of power swung to the slaves, criminal violence was often the result, which is exactly what happened to a Maryland overseer who walked alone into the woods with a group of slaves to chastise them. The overseer never retumed alive.79 Such actions by slaves were acts of defiance against whites and created yet another fear of slaves that colonial

75. Boston News Letter, 10 June 1706,4.
77. North Carolina Magazine; Or Universal Intelligence (New Bern), 4 January 1765, 3.
79. Massachusetts Gazette (Boston), 19 July 1770, 2.
newspapers reported. Not all slave crimes were overt attempts at self-manumission. Some of the slave crimes reported in colonial newspapers were simply criminal activity. Psychological analysis might reveal that all violent attacks by slaves were still caused by their forced bondage, but rapes and burglaries do not fit into the pattern of reactionary violence like rebellions and murders of slave owners, acts that offered slaves at least temporary freedom from those in direct control of them. Regardless the reasoning for the crimes, criminal activity by slaves produced news for colonial newspapers, and slaves, with few exceptions, received harsher punishments than whites for the same crimes. Slaves, despite colonial efforts to keep them from communicating with one another as witnessed in many of the laws already discussed, evidently were able to overcome such decrees against them. In South Carolina in 1735, a crime ring operated by slaves was uncovered. Apparently, slaves had successfully robbed stores and storehouses of more than £2,000 in goods and had funneled the goods through an underground network for months before authorities were able to discern the robbers’ identities or even that they were slaves. In 1775, a similar group of slaves in Virginia known as “Dunmore’s banditti,” worked the region around Norfolk, robbing homes and taking away slaves.

he rape of a white female by a slave was a heinous crime according to colonial newspaper reports. Although slaves were sometimes whipped and shipped out of a colony for such acts, execution was the usual fate for slaves who committed a rape. A New Jersey slave, the Pennsylvania Gazette reported, was executed for the attempted rape of a white girl. Whites who committed similar acts of violence against comparable victims usually received much more lenient sentences. An attempted rape by a Quaker against a four-year-old near Philadelphia, as reported in the Boston Evening-Post, earned the Quaker only “a Month’s Imprisonment,” “a fine of 101.,” and a short stint “in the Pillory.” The sentence came down after testimony that the Quaker “had torn open the poor Creature with his Fingers and most vilely used her.” The same types of strict punishments that were handed out for rape were also meted out to slaves convicted of burglary or attempted burglary, according to colonial newspapers. Slaves were hanged in Annapolis and Charleston for house breaking and horse stealing. Whipping was the general mode of punishment for whites

81. Dunlap’s Maryland Gazette; or the Baltimore General Advertiser, 28 November 1775, 2; and Virginia Gazette (Williamsburg, Dixon and Hunter), 2 December 1775, 3.
83. Pennsylvannia Gazette (Philadelphia), 4 June 1730, 4.
84. Boston Evening-Post, 12 November 1750, 1.
85. Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), 29 August 1750, 3 and 19 December 1775, 3; and South Carolina Gazette (Charleston), 8 April 1745, 2.
committing the same crimes.\textsuperscript{86} While rapes and burglaries were serious offenses, slaves seeking freedom from whites through murder and arson posed much more danger to the whites of colonial America. Newspapers reported these crimes and trials closely. Arson by slaves was a continual source of danger for whites. The diversion created by the fire also allowed slaves time to escape. Slaves, according to colonial newspapers, had discovered arson as a means of getting even with or for eliminating their owners by the early 1720s,\textsuperscript{87} and a rash of New York fires in 1712 and more in Boston in 1723 were attributed to slaves.\textsuperscript{88} In 1730, a Massachusetts slave used fire as a means of retribution for his being sold and as a screen for his attempted flight to freedom. The report, as presented in Philadelphia, stated:

We are inform'd, that on the last Lord's Day a House was burnt at Malden, we are further told, that the Owner of the said House lately Sold a Negro Man to a Person in Salem, which the Fellow not liking, to be reveng'd on his Master at Malden, came on the said Day from Salem to the said House, and finding the Family were at meeting went up into the Chamber thereof, and stole 50L in Money, and then set the Chamber on Fire, and ran away . . . and accordingly was pursu'd after, and was taken up in or about Lyn.\textsuperscript{89}

Fire remained an effective means of retribution for slaves throughout the colonial period, as one female slave admitted in 1760 was her intent after she was taken into custody for burning her master's barn and house.\textsuperscript{90} Outright attempts at murder, however, offered a much greater chance for retaliation against white owners than arson did. Long Island slaves murdered their owners in 1712 to achieve freedom of movement on Sundays, something the slaves' owners had recently taken away from the slaves.\textsuperscript{91} The avenues for murdering either master or master and family were wide for slaves, and the most popular means of removing white slave-owning families by slaves, according to colonial newspapers, was through poisoning. Slaves were in charge of the cooking and daily maintenance of households. Slaves entering the local apothecary and purchasing ratsbane in order to remove rodents from homes was no doubt a common practice. The rat poison—or some other lethal substance—could be easily placed in the food of the whites by the slaves to eliminate them. Chocolate was the means to the end for one Boston family in 1735. The family of Humphrey Scarlet was treated to chocolate for breakfast, but the chocolate had

\textsuperscript{86} See, for example, Ibid., 10 October 1750, 2 and 20 March 1755, 3.
\textsuperscript{87} Although the dates of the newspapers consulted are outside the time parameters of this study, see Higginbotham, \textit{The Matter of Color}, 76, for more on slaves and arson.
\textsuperscript{89} \textit{American Weekly Mercury} (Philadelphia), 27 August 1730, 3.
\textsuperscript{90} \textit{Boston Evening -Post}, 28 January 1760, 3.
\textsuperscript{91} \textit{Boston News -Letter}, 9 February 1707-08, 2.
been laced with “Arsenick, or Rats-bane” and fed to Mrs. Scarlet and her children. In telling of this act by the Scarlets’ slaves, the news report called for all poisons to be available only to whites. “If this Method had been observed,” the report concluded, “Mr. Scarlet’s Negroes would not have had such a Stock of Arsenick by them.” Poisonings by slaves, according to the Boston Evening-
Post in the summer of 1755, made life dangerous for all whites who owned slaves. Just across the Charles River from Boston, a man, whose “lower Parts turned as black as a Coal,” died after ingesting “calcined Lead, such as Potters use in glazing their Ware.” When the murdered man’s slaves were put on trial, it was discovered that the murder was a conspiracy, and his servants, who committed the crime because they discovered that their master’s will called for their manumission at his death, were either burned at the stake or hanged. In addition to the Massachusetts poisoning, the Evening-Post reported that a woman slave, with the assistance of a black doctor and a white man, poisoned the slave woman’s master in Annapolis. Slaves also murdered their owners with guns, axes, butcher knives, or bare hands. One of the most graphic of these kinds of stories appeared in 1755 when a Kittery slave realized the best way to obtain retribution against his owner was to extract revenge through his master’s children. The report spread quickly in America as newspapers from Boston to Annapolis published the report, which stated:

A Negro Fellow . . . having behaved ill to his Master, he had corrected him, which the Fellow resented so highly, that he resolved to take away his Master’s Life; but judging him not fit to die, he got up in the Night, took a Child [of the Master] about 6 or 7 Years old out of its Bed, and threw it into the Well, where it perished.

A “wilful murder” conviction in colonial America carried with it the death sentence, and when slaves were convicted of murder, the execution was often

92. Weekly Rehearsal (Boston), 4 August 1735, 2; Boston Weekly Post-Boy, 4 August 1735, 4; American Weekly Mercury (Philadelphia), 14 August 1735. 3; New England Weekly Journal (Boston), 2 September 1735, 2; and South Carolina Gazette (Charleston), 20 September 1735, 2.
93. Boston Evening -Post, 7 July 1755, 4.
94. Ibid., 25 August 1755, 3.
95. Ibid., 21 July 1755, 1.
96. See, for example, Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), 18 July 1750, 2.
97. Boston Evening -Post, 16 September 1745, 4.
99. Boston Evening -Post, 11 August 1755, 4; Boston Gazette, and Country Journal, 11 August 1755, 3; Connecticut Gazette (New Haven), 16 August 1755, 3; New York Gazette, or the Weekly Post-Boy, 18 August 1755, 1; New -York Mercury, 18 August 1755, 3; Pennsylvania Gazette (Philadelphia), 21 August 1755, 3; Pennsylvania Journal, or Weekly Advertiser (Philadelphia), 21 August 1755, 2; and Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), 28 August 1755, 2.
carried out in an effort to deliver a strong statement that would inhibit similar acts by other slaves. A Virginia slave found guilty of murder, the Pennsylvania newspapers reported, was hanged, and then as a warning to other slaves, the convicted slave was drawn and quartered and left on exhibition. The Maryland slave convicted of poisoning her master with the assistance of a black doctor and a white man was hanged in chains along with her accomplices for all passersby—especially slaves—to see as their bodies decomposed in the July heat. In 1750, after a pair of New Jersey slaves shot their mistress to death, the court sentenced them to be burned to death. The harsh punishments handed out to convicted slaves as described in colonial newspapers might lead one to the conclusion that a court date for a slave in colonial America was little more than a formality and that a guilty conviction was a foregone conclusion. Punishments may have been harsher and guilty pleas more common for slaves than for white citizens, but according to colonial newspapers, neither took place as a matter of fact. A day in court was, in colonial America, a serious affair, and evidently free men and slaves approached it in that manner. As a result, slaves were not always found guilty. In February 1735, for instance, two slaves were acquitted on charges of burglary and arson in Boston. The acquittals at the Superior Court trial were handed down because “the Evidences on the part of the King not being strong enough to convict them in the apprehension of the Jury.” And even though the legal codes of most colonies in the eighteenth century categorized slaves as property to be corrected by owners as deemed necessary, slave owners, according to court reports in colonial newspapers, might occasionally inflict too severe a punishment upon a slave. One Matthias Auble, a New York slave owner, found this out after mortally beating his slave. Newspapers reported that the Auble’s

106. This conclusion is affirmed by Hoffer, *Law and People in Colonial America*, 91. Hoffer, in looking at colonial court records discovered that slave owners were tried for murder in Virginia after beating a slave to death.
man died suddenly.... And a Jury being called, and his Body opened by the Physicians, it was judged his Death was occasioned by the Cruelty of his master a few Days before in chastising him for some Misdemeanor; and Auble was immediately taken up and secured in the County Goal in orderto be brought to Trial for the same.107

The concept that killing a slave could be a felony slowly found its way into the laws of some colonies during the colonial period, North Carolina, for example, adopting the principle in 1774.108 Acceptance of this idea was, as colonial newspapers demonstrate, neither universally approved nor even foremost in the minds of legislators when they created laws for a colony. Massachusetts lawmakers evidently felt that under certain circumstances it was better to shoot a slave rather than find out if a slave was dangerous, and the law guaranteed that the person killing the slave could do so “without being impeached, censured or prosecuted.”109

Conclusion

Slave news provided readers of colonial newspapers with information about a commodity that many European colonists deemed absolutely necessary to their survival. This attitude was firmly entrenched in colonial America by the eighteenth century. As Edward Downing wrote to Governor John Winthrop concerning the colony of Massachusetts Bay in 1645, “The colony will never thrive untill we gett . . . a stock of slaves sufficient to doe all our business.”110 Even though colonists viewed slaves as indispensable for the success of the colonies, that fact was not discussed in the colonial newspapers studied. Colonial newspapers painted a much different portrait of slaves. African slaves revolted against their owners. Slaves murdered, robbed, raped, and burned out whites. Slaves were an inferior necessity that required stringent legislation to control. As inferior beings, slaves became the object of ridicule and ultimately were considered to be property by those who owned them and by the legal systems of the colonies. Colonial newspapers rarely printed a positive word about slaves, except for the few charitable acts by slaves who wamed their owners of impending slave revolts. Even the antislavery literature of the 1770s usually viewed Africans as inferior to whites, and argued that if slaves were manumitted, without the continued guidance of whites, they would become a “manifest hazard to the province.”111

The slave news of colonial newspapers was important because slaves, despite the fact that they were considered an irreplaceable labor source, ironically

107. Pennsylania Journal, or Weekly Advertiser (Philadelphia), 21 January 1755, 2; and Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), 13 February 1755, 2.
108. Hoffer, Law and People in Colonial America, 92.
109. Boston Evening -Post, 10 March 1755, 1.
111. Essex Gazette (Salem), 19 June 1770, 2.
also represented a potential danger to the very survival of colonists. This dual nature of colonists’ view of slaves made information concerning slaves mandatory for Americans in the eighteenth century. The fact that news of slaves was reprinted by newspapers throughout the colonies affirms this. As seen when a Kittery slave threw his owner’s child down the well as retribution, eight colonial newspapers representing all cities printing newspapers from Boston to Annapolis ran the news.\textsuperscript{112} And the citizens of Charleston, Williamsburg, Philadelphia, New York, and Boston—every colonial city with a newspaper in 1740—read of the slave insurrection in Georgia during that year. Newspaper news of slave rebellions and of slave crimes was some of the most often repeated news in all colonial newspapers. Repetition speaks to the importance of news to colonists.

But just as much as the repetition of slave news speaks to its importance, the omission of slave news does the same thing. In South Carolina—where news of slave activity should have been most prevalent based on the black-to-white ratio of inhabitants—there was a noticeable lack of news of slaves. Following the Stono Rebellion of 1739, news of slave activity in South Carolina or almost any other place in the New World disappeared with only a few exceptions from the \textit{South-Carolina Gazette}’s pages. This omission of slave insurrection news in the \textit{Gazette} may have been a case of self-censorship or it may have been imposed upon the Gazette.\textsuperscript{113} The question is probably moot because the omission, whether self-imposed or politically mandated, speaks to the fear whites felt concerning blacks.

The insertion of slave news into the local newspaper served two vital functions: it allowed the sharing of news in all the major towns of America, and it made the news of an event “official.” A ship leaving Boston, for example, heading for Philadelphia with a print of the latest Boston newspaper carried information unknown to Philadelphians, and these papers from other parts of the colony were greatly desired by printers. News of a slave crime or revolt in Boston would have been, as Richard D. Brown maintains, common knowledge among the city’s residents through a network of oral communication that

\textsuperscript{112} Boston Evening Post, 11 August 1755, 4; Boston Gazette, or Country Journal, 11 August 1755, 3; Connecticut Gazette (New Haven), 16 August 1755, 3; New York Gazette, or the Weekly Post-Boy, 18 August 1755, 1; New York Mercury, 18 August 1755, 3; Pennsvllania Gazette (Philadelphia), 21 August 1755, 3; Pennsylvania Journal, or Weekly Advertiser (Philadelphia), 21 August 1755, 2; and Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), 28 August 1755, 2.

\textsuperscript{113} David A. Copeland, “Covering the Big Story: George Whitefield’s First Preaching Tour: News Manipulation, and the Colonial Press,” paper presented at the American Journalism Historians association annual conference, Lawrence, Kansas, 1992. Suppression of the news in the \textit{South Carolina Gazette} took place. The government did imprison Elizabeth Timothy briefly in 1741 for printing a letter attacking the Anglican clergy of the colony. The announcement of the arrest was made in the \textit{Gazette}, 15 January 1741. Elizabeth Timothy, followed by her son Peter, may have also involuntarily suppressed news of the Stono Revolt and other slave activity.
included taverns and peer groups, but its presentation in the newspaper of the city somehow made it official, in much the same way that the Boston Evening-Post's printers John and Thomas Fleet considered news of slave insurrections in Jamaica authoritative once they received notice of them from the Jamaican newspapers.

Slave news from 1730-1760 was much more prominent in newspapers than at any other time during the colonial period. The rapid influx of slaves into America no doubt created some alarm for white colonists. The slave population of America grew from 100,000 in 1730 to more than 325,000 in 1760, an increase to 20 percent of America's total population from 14 percent, and less than twenty-nine different slave revolts were reported to have taken place during this period according to the newspapers studied.

Slave news in colonial newspapers was almost always wrapped in fear, fear that the slave population would rise up and destroy—or at least hinder greatly—the success of the colonies. The printing of this news no doubt helped keep white Americans ever vigilant to "the Proceedings of the Rebellious Negroes" in America.

The author is an assistant professor of mass communication at Emory & Henry College.

The Brownsville Affair and the Political Values of Cleveland Black Newspapers

By Felecia G. Jones Ross

The reaction of two black newspapers in Cleveland to an incident in Texas reflected the complexities of black political thought as well as changes occurring within the black community’s middle class, involving politicians up to the President.

On the night of 13 August 1906, about a dozen men went on a shooting rampage through the streets of Brownsville, Texas killing one citizen and wounding two. Witnesses claimed that the armed men were the black soldiers of the 25th U.S. Infantry Regiment stationed at the nearby Fort Brown military establishment. The results of a three-month investigation concurred with the witnesses’ allegations. Although there was no trial, President Theodore Roosevelt ordered Secretary of War William H. Taft to issue dishonorable discharges to each of the 167 men in the regiment. The order also prohibited the men from ever serving the government in a military or civilian capacity.1

Roosevelt was widely criticized for the way he handled the incident, which became known as the “Brownsville Affair.”2 Black and mainstream newspapers criticized the president for ignoring the standards of American justice. For example, the Washington Post wrote, “Punishment is supposed to follow a

2. Scholars have also labeled the incident the “Brownsville Affray” and the “Brownsville Raid.” These were the titles respectively of Tinsley’s article and Weaver’s book.
trial.” But when Ohio Senator Joseph B. Foraker called for the Senate to investigate the administration’s handling of the affair, a case of questionable justice turned into a political battleground.

The decision concerning the affair posed a particular dilemma for blacks because their civil rights spokespersons considered Roosevelt to be “a friend of the race.” Prior to the incident, Roosevelt had made significant gestures of racial liberalism. He closed a Mississippi post office rather than comply with whites’ demands to dismiss the black postmistress. In the midst of criticism, he dined at the White House with black educator Booker T. Washington. Thus, to blacks, Roosevelt’s Brownsville action not only represented a betrayal from a single politician, it also represented the growing rift between the race and the Republican Party.

Since Emancipation, blacks had supported the Republican Party because this was the party in power when amendments were enacted ending slavery and granting citizenship and voting rights. After Reconstruction, however, the party became interested in building political support in the South. In order to appeal to white southerners, the party distanced itself from its black constituents which often meant excluding them from party participation and endorsing the southern practices of denying their civil rights. Roosevelt’s handling of the “Brownsville Affair” symbolized the low value the party placed on blacks’ interests and concerns. Thus, for blacks, the Brownsville Affair was more than an incident of

5. Black leaders and black newspapers used this phrase to describe whites who have catered to the interests of blacks.
6. This was not the first time that Washington had been a guest at the White House, but this was the time that received the most attention. After this incident, Washington was never invited to the White House again. See Matthew Rees, From the Deck to the Sea: Blacks and the Republican Party (Wakefield, N.H.: Longwood Academic, 1991), 100-101. Also see August Meier, Negro Thought in America, 1880-1915: Racial Ideologies in the Age of Booker T. Washington (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1964), 108, 112-113, 115, 164-165; August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976), 210.
7. These were the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
8. See Rees, From the Deck to the Sea: Blacks and the Republican Party, 60. It was also important for candidates to secure support from southern Republicans in order to obtain nominations at national conventions. Thus, candidates had to appeal to southern sentiments concerning race relations. See James E. Haney, “Blacks and the Republican Nomination of 1908,” Ohio History 84 (Winter-Spring 1975): 209-210.
injustice for the soldiers. It became a catalyst for the race to assess its relationship with the Republican Party.9

This article focuses on the reactions of the black citizenry to the Brownsville Affair as reflected in two black newspapers: the Cleveland Gazette and the Cleveland Journal. The reactions of these newspapers not only reflected the complexities of black political thought, but also the changes occurring within the race’s elite or middle class.10

The article sheds important light on the nature of the black press between Reconstruction and World War I. This was a transitional period for the press in which it moved away from partisanship toward political independence. As competing papers, the Gazette and Journal represented a growing, diverse readership. While the papers primarily catered to the educated elite, their political independence, competitiveness, and relative stability symbolized the stage set for the modern black press that catered to a mass readership.11

The limited scholarship on the papers of this era has tended to label them as being partisan and Republican.12 This research shows that these papers, as well as their readers, were far more diverse and that the papers were moving toward more modern journalistic practices, including political independence. As with the development of mainstream papers, black papers’ transition from partisanship to mass readership and political independence represented the growing importance of media in black society. This importance was driven by higher literacy rates, higher disposable income, increased urbanization, and diverse interests. Thus, black newspapers began adopting modern journalistic principles while advocating the interests of the black race.13

Black newspapers are appropriate vehicles for studying the reactions to the Brownsville Affair because their proprietors and readers were part of the elite

9. These sources do not specifically call Brownsville a catalyst, but they do state that blacks started considering other political avenues because the Brownsville decision added to their increasing disillusionment with the Republican Party. See Haney, “Blacks and the Republican Nomination,” 212; Meier, Negro Thought In America, 186.

10. The definition of middle-class is based more on influence than on income level. Ministers, educators, newspaper editors, small business owners, and elected officials were considered the influential segment of the black race.


class and were active in Republican politics. The newspapers’ reactions to the Brownsville incident exemplify the dilemma that blacks faced in virtually being forced to rely on a political party that had taken them for granted. They could not turn to the Democratic Party because of its tradition of opposing civil rights gains accrued through Republican support. This article shows the different approaches blacks used to cope with this dilemma and also reveals that the approaches were based on the experiences of politically active individuals with the Republican Party, as well as their experiences with race relations.

The newspapers in Cleveland were chosen because they vividly reflected these approaches to black political activity. The Gazette believed that politics should be the vehicle for obtaining and safeguarding blacks' civil rights. The Journal believed that politics were important, but that the race should not solely rely on them to secure civil rights. The Cleveland papers were also chosen because of the involvement of Senator Joseph B. Foraker. He was often the focal point of the Gazette’s and Journal’s responses to the changing political atmosphere represented by the Brownsville Affair. Moreover, Foraker’s challenge of Roosevelt’s decision not only affected national politics but Ohio and Cleveland politics as well.

Black Society During the Brownsville Affair

The Brownsville Affair occurred during a time when blacks were experiencing brutal discrimination. In direct violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, southern states enacted laws prohibiting blacks from sharing public facilities with whites and from voting. In northern communities, racial lines were drawn in business, social, and residential patterns. Furthermore,

16. Other studies have reviewed black press reaction to Brownsville. Ann Lane devotes a chapter on black press reaction in, The Brownsville Affair: National Crisis and Black Reaction. The chapter primarily focuses on how some black newspapers softened their criticisms of Roosevelt after they became subsidized by Booker T. Washington. Lewis Wynne’s article, “Brownsville: The Reaction of the Negro Press,” Phylon 33 (1972), only focuses on black newspapers’ reaction to the decision. It does not deal with how Brownsville influenced their reactions in subsequent political campaigns. Neither study explains the ideological underpinnings influencing the newspapers’ reactions.
17. Cleveland and Ohio were, and continue to be, strongholds of Republican politics. Of the eight Republican presidents, between Lincoln and Roosevelt, four were from Ohio. A fifth president, Benjamin Harrison, was born and raised in Ohio, but his political activities took place in Indiana. Furthermore, the black vote in Ohio made the difference between the victory and defeat of Republican candidates. See Charles O. Jones, Republican Party in American Politics (New York: MacMillan Co. 1965), 33; Kusmer, 7-8; Tinsley, “Roosevelt, Foraker, and the Brownsville Affray,” 47.
blacks who dared to assert their civil rights were subjected to violent confrontations in the form of lynchings, beatings and race riots. While the Republican Party did not promote discriminatory treatment, it took no leadership in stopping it. Blacks’ reactions to this oppressive climate and Republican indifference were interrelated with the race’s class structure and the ideologies of black elites.

Historians have divided this elite into segments based on occupation and length of time in urban communities. The “old elites” were physicians, lawyers and proprietors of service trades who resided in urban communities before the turn of the century. They had to rely on white patronage because the black population was too small to support them. Racial lines had not yet been drawn, so it was not unusual for blacks and whites to interact on an equal basis. Those who were politically active expected the Republican Party to protect their civil rights. Old elites believed in total integration of the races and that blacks should not settle for having less than egalitarian relationships with whites.

After the turn of the century, racial lines became more rigid as the black population increased and became more distinctive. A new business and professional segment of the elite emerged relying on patronage from the

21. These were the barbers, skilled artisans, blacksmiths, and tailors. See August Meier, “Negro Class Structure and Ideology in the Age of Booker T. Washington,” 259.
23. This does not intend to suggest that race relations were totally harmonious. In many northern communities, there were not enough black residents for racial lines to be drawn. The gentle interracial encounters observed in the South have been attributed to philosophies that rejected the notion of extreme racism. See C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 15-26; Kusmer, A Ghetto Takes Shape, 54.
26. These were the undertakers, realtors, bank owners, as well as physicians and lawyers. See Meier, “Negro Class Structure and Ideology in the Age of Booker T. Washington,” 259-260.
growing population. Unlike the old elites, these “new elites” had little comraderie with the white population. The politicians of this class were of a younger generation and had no memories of the Republican Party’s role as a vanguard for civil rights. Instead, they realized that it was the party that offered the best opportunity for blacks to advance politically and that it was least likely to try to revoke their civil rights.

The Brownsville Affair also occurred during the period labeled “the age of Booker T. Washington.” Washington was founder and principal of Tuskegee Normal Institute for Negroes. He was considered to be one of the most influential black people of the period because he overtly advocated self-help and economic solidarity over enforcement of civil rights. This view made him popular among white philanthropists and politicians who sought his advice on matters concerning race relations. Washington also subsidized newspapers and magazines to promote his views.

Washington’s economic solidarity principles were particularly appealing to the new elites because they encouraged blacks to patronize black-owned businesses. The old elites also supported economic solidarity, but they rejected Washington’s downplaying of civil rights enforcement. The radicals who challenged Washington’s principles in organizations such as the Niagara Movement and the NAACP came from the old elite class. The Niagara Movement, considered to be the forerunner to the NAACP, was a meeting of blacks and whites to develop strategies for asserting blacks’ civil rights and to

30. Ibid.
31. This was the period of Washington’s prominence which started in the 1890s and ended with his death in 1915. August Meier uses this label in his studies of Washington and of black history at the turn of the century.
32. Its current name is Tuskegee University.
33. Covertly Washington was involved in efforts to prevent disfranchisement and other forms of discrimination. These activities were not revealed until after his death. See Meier, *Negro Thought in America*, 110-111.
35. Although he would never confirm subsidizing newspapers, Washington was believed to have underwritten the *New York Age*, the *Colored American Magazine*, the *Boston Colored Citizen*, the *Washington Colored American* and perhaps the *Washington Bee*. See August Meier, “Booker T. Washington and the Negro Press,” *Journal of Negro History* 38 (1953): 68.
38. See Meier, *Negro Thought in America*, 179-180; Meier and Rudwick, *From Plantation to Ghetto*. 
counter Washington’s principles. It was called the Niagara Movement because the meeting was held in Niagara Falls, Canada.39

Politics and the Brownsville Affair

To avoid alienating black voters before the 1906 congressional elections, Roosevelt announced his decision to discharge the soldiers shortly after the elections. An unhappy black electorate may have jeopardized the maintenance of a Republican majority in the House. It should be noted that Secretary of War William Howard Taft initially disagreed with the decision and had asked Roosevelt to withdraw it pending further investigation. However, Taft’s eventual support of the decision was evident when he suggested that Roosevelt send a special team of private investigators to specifically seek stronger evidence linking the soldiers to the affray.40

After Senator Foraker publicly challenged the Brownsville decision, Roosevelt attempted to win back black support by offering an appointment to a black political loyalist. Roosevelt sought recommendations from Booker T. Washington who had earlier tried to dissuade Roosevelt from discharging the soldiers. Despite failing to change Roosevelt’s mind, Washington remained loyal to the administration and considered its decision “an unfortunate mistake.”41

Roosevelt specifically wanted to offer an appointment to a man from Ohio, preferably Cincinnati, the home and political base of both Foraker and Taft. Roosevelt was also in the midst of grooming Taft to succeed him as president.42 Thus, he wanted to ward off any possible challenge from Foraker who also had presidential aspirations.

Washington recommended Ralph Waldo Tyler, a journalist from Columbus with some twenty years experience as a reporter on newspapers including the city’s two white dailies, the *Columbus Evening Dispatch* and the *Ohio State Journal*. Tyler was also actively involved in the Republican Party. He had participated in the Ohio campaigns for the McKinley-Roosevelt ticket.43 Roosevelt had originally wanted Tyler to serve as collector of the Port of

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42. Rees, *From the Deck to the Sea*, 106.
43. This included McKinley’s successful 1896 and 1900 campaigns and Roosevelt’s 1904 campaign. Roosevelt had served as McKinley’s vice-president and completed McKinley’s unexpired second term upon his assassination in 1901.
Cincinnati, but because of early opposition, he nominated Tyler as fourth auditor of the Navy.44

Black Newspapers’ Reactions to the Brownsville Affair

Black newspapers expressed outrage at Roosevelt for the way he handled the incident and praised Senator Foraker for seeking justice for the soldiers. But as the incident became a political issue, several newspapers modified their reactions based on political ideologies and economic interests.

Booker T. Washington was a major factor in the reactions of newspapers he either subsidized or influenced. This was especially true with the *New York Age* and the *Washington Bee*. From November 1906 to September, 1907 the *Age* and the *Bee* denounced Roosevelt and even considered defecting from the Republican Party. But because of subsidies from Washington, the papers virtually reversed their stances.45

On the other hand, papers and journals that represented the “integrationist” values of the old elites never wavered from their criticisms of Roosevelt. The *Boston Guardian*, a newspaper edited by William Monroe Trotter and the *Horizon*, a journal edited by W.E.B. DuBois, F.H.M. Murray, and L.M. Hershaw, were established to challenge the doctrines of Washington. As a result of Brownsville, both publications supported Democratic candidates in the 1908 and 1912 elections.46

Ideologies of the *Gazette* and *Journal*

The ideologies of the *Gazette* and *Journal* in Cleveland provided the basis for their reactions to the Brownsville Affair and the political aftermath. The *Gazette* reflected the values and ideologies of the old elites while the *Journal* reflected the values of the new elites. Although both papers initially criticized Roosevelt’s decision, their reactions over time began to reflect their ideological differences.

The *Gazette* was established in 1883 by Harry Clay Smith who had lived in Cleveland most of his life. Smith was politically active, having served three terms in the Ohio legislature. He was closely allied with Senator Foraker who while governor of Ohio appointed Smith to a position as a state deputy oil

44. There were indications that Tyler’s Senate confirmation would be jeopardized because of his race and because he was not from Cincinnati. As fourth auditor for the Navy, Tyler would serve in Washington, D.C. See Gerber, *Black Ohio and the Color Line*, 400-401; James E. Haney, “Blacks and the Republican Nomination of 1908,” *Ohio History* 84 (1975): 213-216.
Smith, who grew up in the integrated environment of Cleveland, championed the ideologies associated with old elites, such as Trotter and DuBois. Like the Guardian and Horizon, the Gazette never forgave Roosevelt for his Brownsville action. The Gazette did return, however, to the Republican fold in 1916.

The Journal, established in 1903 by Welcome Blue, Thomas Fleming and Nahum Brascher were representatives of the new, younger generation of black leadership in Cleveland. Unlike Smith, they did not grow up in Cleveland, but rather in northern communities outside of Ohio. As with the new elites of other cities, the Journal owners embraced the philosophies of Booker T. Washington. Although Washington did not subsidize the paper, it ran advertisements promoting Tuskegee and articles written by Washington.

Like the Gazette’s Smith, the Journal owners were active in Republican politics; however, they did not rely on the party for the protection of their rights. They looked to the party as a means for rewarding blacks for their loyalty and counted on the party not to make matters worse for the race. Thus, the Journal muted its criticism of Roosevelt as he made efforts to redeem himself with the black citizenry.

Reactions To Brownsville and the Political Aftermath

The Gazette initially reacted to Roosevelt’s decision with disbelief and called the Associated Press reports of the decision lies. As more information about the decision unfolded, the Gazette continued to express confidence in Roosevelt, and said that he was misled by prejudiced southerners and would eventually reverse the decision.

The Journal, ironically, reacted more negatively than the Gazette did toward Roosevelt. The newspaper said his decision was based on “square prejudice” instead of a “square deal” and that he was in a bad light with the “Afro-American people.” It also predicted doom for the Republican Party.

49. Cleveland, Ohio maintained integrationist environment much longer than other communities. Brascher was born and raised in Connersville, Ind. Fleming was born and raised in Meadville, Penn. No information was provided on the background of Welcome Blue. Kusmer, A Ghetto Takes Shape, 56; Gerber, Black Ohio and the Color Line, 375.
52. Gazette, 10 November 1906; 19 January 1907.
When political forces became involved, the ideological differences between the two papers became apparent. The *Gazette*’s attitude toward Roosevelt began to change after Senator Foraker’s open criticism of Roosevelt. The *Journal* virtually reversed its negative attitude toward Roosevelt after its mentor, Booker T. Washington, issued a statement that discouraged complaints against Brownsville because it was not the way for the race to win any battles.54

Both papers realized that Ohio was a pivotal state in the upcoming 1908 presidential campaign and that black voters were an important factor. The *Gazette* did not hesitate to make its political commitment to Senator Foraker.55 On the other hand, the *Journal* advised readers against committing to any candidate and pointed out that the Republican Party was no longer the party of Lincoln and Grant.56

As with the Brownsville decision, the *Gazette* did not believe the early reports of the impending appointment of Tyler. But when the reports of the appointment were confirmed, the outrage was as personal as it was political. Smith’s personal dislike for Tyler was obvious in an editorial that called Tyler the “most disliked member of the race...” and said that Tyler had posed as a newspaperman but was really a stenographer.57 The outrage against Roosevelt and Taft was evident in the mocking names Smith called them: “President ‘Brownsville Texas’ Roosevelt” and “Secretary ‘Disfranchisement Brownsville’ Taft.” The disfranchisement label came from a speech Taft made in North Carolina condoning the state’s denial of black voting rights.58 The *Gazette* never forgave Roosevelt for the Brownsville decision. When Roosevelt died in 1919, it reprinted a cartoon portraying him and Taft kicking the Brownsville soldiers into a creek.

The *Journal*’s strong language against Roosevelt’s Brownsville decision turned into compassionate language after the Tyler appointment. Instead of accusing Roosevelt for basing the decision on “square prejudice,” the paper called Roosevelt’s action a mistake stating: “We do not believe the president would purposely harm the people of our race.”59

Like the *Gazette*, the *Journal* was grateful to Senator Foraker for his stance on behalf of the soldiers, but declined to make a commitment to him. As for the Tyler appointment, it expressed confidence that Tyler’s integrity would not allow him to betray the race. It also acknowledged the appointment as Roosevelt’s way of showing interest in the race’s concerns.60

55. *Gazette*, 19 January 1907.
56. *Journal*, 6 April 1907.
57. *Gazette*, 9 February 1907; 20 April 1907.
58. *Gazette*, 3 August 1907. The *Gazette* often attached mocking names to individuals to either represent actions Smith did not like or to represent a general negative attitude toward the individual or entity. For example, Smith at one time referred to W.E.B. DuBois as “Professor ‘Alphabet’ DuBois” because he did not agree with an action he took on behalf of the NAACP.
59. *Journal*, 20 April 1907.
60. *Journal*, 20 April 1907.
Local and National Politics

The upcoming mayoral and presidential campaigns became battlegrounds for the way the newspapers defined Republican values. The Gazette’s approach to the campaigns was based on its editor’s desire to promote and maintain the political career of Senator Foraker. To Smith, Foraker’s defense of the Brownsville soldiers represented one of the last vestiges of Smith’s brand of Republicanism. He was dismayed with the way the party, led by Roosevelt and Taft, had abandoned the interests of blacks in order to gain the support of whites in the South.61

Thus, the Gazette did not support the Republican candidates in the 1907 and 1908 mayoral and presidential campaigns. It opposed Congressman Theodore Burton’s mayoral candidacy, stating that he was part of a Taft-Roosevelt conspiracy to end Foraker’s senatorial career. As mayor of the state’s largest city, Burton would control the largest party delegation which could influence the nomination of the senatorial candidates.62

From early 1907 through the 1908 presidential election, Smith campaigned vigorously for Foraker. Each issue of the Gazette included a large, bold-faced headline reading “Foraker For President.” Smith also spoke in several towns and cities throughout the state urging support for Foraker, as well as for justice for the Brownsville soldiers.63

Although Foraker publically supported Burton, the Gazette still considered a vote for Burton to be a vote against Foraker and urged blacks to show their “manhood” by not voting for Burton. After Burton lost to Democrat Tom Johnson, the Gazette called the defeat “a great rebuke” to Roosevelt and considered it a victory for black Clevelanders.64

The Gazette joined other old elites like DuBois and Trotter in urging blacks to vote against Taft. In one editorial, it suggested that blacks either not vote or consider minor party candidates such as Eugene Debs whom the paper claimed had expressed friendly sentiments toward the race:

That he is the candidate of the Socialist party is of no consequence, as far as we are concerned, just at this time. That he is RIGHT on the questions of vital interest to us is all that is necessary this year at least. 65

Smith organized the Ohio Afro-American League whose members defined themselves as Republicans who believed in the principles of equality and justice not “because of office or emolument.” The membership, which included old elites from throughout the state, resolved to protest the candidacy of Taft and

62. Gazette, 21 September 1907; 12 October 1907.
64. Gazette, 12 October 1907; 9 November 1907.
65. Gazette, 11 July 1908.
to support Foraker for any office he sought. The Ohio league was a chapter of the national Afro-American Council which had organized in 1890 under the name of the Afro-American League to protest the growing withdrawal of black civil rights. In 1908, the council and other protest organizations such as the Niagara Movement and the Boston Constitutional League opposed the party’s nomination of Taft and urged black partisan independence.

The Gazette denounced the Journal and other black leaders for supporting Taft. The Gazette, known for attacking its competition, did not hesitate to excoriate the Journal, often calling it the “Cleveland Toilet Paper (Journal)” and accusing it of being Taft-subsidized. It rejected arguments that Taft’s defeat would result in the outwardly bigoted Democrats coming to power. The Gazette asserted that the race’s power and respect in the Republican Party was more important:

All we ask is that every manly Afro-American voter have too much self and race respect, and interest in the future progress of the Republican party and his people to vote for a man (Taft) who openly indorses [sic] disfranchisement and “Jim Crow” cars...

The Journal, in turn, attacked Smith and other old elites for not respecting viewpoints different from theirs. Unlike the Gazette, it accepted and apparently wanted to make the best out of the changing relationship between blacks and the Republican Party. While calling for a new, younger generation of black leadership to deal with this new relationship, it criticized those older leaders for their obstinacy:

He is narrow, selfish, always ready to find fault; he is “a bone of contention,” a “thorn in the flesh.” There is no hope for regeneration or rejuvenation. The “Old Ace” should be dropped in Cleveland and elsewhere, respectfully, but assuredly. This is the day of the young man. The young men of Cleveland are seeking to “make good.” Will they do so? May they do so?

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66. Gazette, 20 July 1907; Gerber, Black Ohio and the Color Line, 401.
68. In its near 60-year existence, the Gazette printed negative items about the numerous papers that competed with it over the years. For example, it accused an early competitor, the Cleveland Globe, for being Democratic because it had sought financial assistance from a member of that party. See Davis, Black Americans In Cleveland: From George Peake to Carl B. Stokes, 1796-1969, 115.
69. Gazette, 11 January 1908.
70. Gazette, 31 October 1908.
71. Gazette, 6 June 1908.
72. Journal, 13 July 1907.
Because of their unproductive relationship with older leaders such as Smith, the Journal’s owners had organized the Twelfth Ward Republican Club in 1903. Around the time of the Tyler appointment in 1907, the organization became the Attucks Republican Club, which expanded its membership to include young, black men from throughout the city and promoted the city council candidacy of Journal co-owner Thomas W. Fleming.\footnote{Gerber, \textit{Black Ohio and the Color Line}, 404; Journal, 3 August 1907.}

The Journal also said that Smith’s criticism of Roosevelt was too harsh. While it may not have agreed with all of Roosevelt’s decisions concerning the race, it did not feel that Roosevelt was akin to bigots such as Democratic Senator Ben Tillman of South Carolina.\footnote{Meier and Rudwick, \textit{From Plantation To Ghetto}, 198.} Tillman had built his political career by appealing to racial prejudice. Under his leadership, South Carolina became one of the first states to enact constitutional disfranchisement.\footnote{Journal, 24 August 1907.}

Unlike the Gazette, the Journal supported the Burton candidacy largely because Roosevelt and Taft supported him and because it expected Burton to support Fleming’s city council candidacy. The Journal also did not believe the Gazette’s claims that Roosevelt was trying to end Foraker’s political career and did not take the Gazette’s view that a vote for Burton would mean being ungrateful to Foraker’s crusade on behalf of the Brownsville soldiers.\footnote{Journal, 7 September 1907; 14 September 1907; 9 November 1907.}

The Journal’s support for and obvious forgiveness of Roosevelt was clear during the mayoral and presidential campaigns. It reminded the readers of Roosevelt’s favorable decisions concerning the race and pointed out that he was likely to continue his square deal policies “in the ranks of those who uphold his hands rather than among those who would pull them down.”\footnote{Journal, 21 March 1908.} During the presidential race, the paper expressed confidence that Roosevelt would render justice to the soldiers.\footnote{Journal, 16 November 1907; 11 January 1908.}

While the Journal appreciated Foraker’s defense of the soldiers, it realized that he could not win the Republican nomination for President and said it would support Foraker’s reelection bid to the senate. In its subsequent endorsement of Taft, the Journal criticized those who, like Smith, condemned those who did not endorse Foraker.\footnote{Journal, 28 September 1907.}

The Journal’s criticisms of Smith were just as harsh as Smith’s were of the Journal. Throughout the mayoral race, it constantly denounced Smith for his belligerent attitude toward those who disagreed with him.\footnote{Journal, 28 September 1907; 19 October 1907.} The criticisms were at times personal:

True, we have not all “inspected coal oil barrels” neither did we all attend STERLING SCHOOL, or compose music after
someone else had written it, but we do know enough to stand for those who stand for us and our rights and to unalterably oppose those who are against us and our rights, and this is more than he knows or does.81

In the presidential race, the Journal denounced Smith, Trotter, and DuBois for even considering Democratic candidates under any circumstance.82 It believed that the overall record of the Republican Party served the interests of the race better and implied that the Democratic Party sanctioned the atmosphere that led to Brownsville in the first place. While it still considered Brownsville a blot on the race record of Roosevelt and Taft, it did not want to condemn them, and the party, forever.83

After Taft won the election, the Journal called his victory a vindication for the Republican Party.84 The Gazette, on the other hand, predicted defeat for the party in the next election if Taft did not redress the injustices that occurred against the race during the Roosevelt administration. The Gazette did concede, however, that it was unlikely that blacks would abandon the party because it was the lesser of two evils.85

Conclusion

Despite their opposing philosophies and harsh criticism of each other, both papers realized that they could no longer rely on the Republican Party to protect black rights. Smith and the Gazette wanted to restore the old connections between the party and the race. The Journal and its owners wanted to make the best out of the new relationship with the party because it was the best option available.

The episode highlights a pivotal era in the development of black journalism: its movement from partisanship to modern journalistic principles including political independence. The evidence shows that the reaction of the two black Cleveland newspapers to the Brownsville Affair represented more than a reassessment of black participation in mainstream politics. As the black population in Cleveland and other urban communities grew and diversified, black newspapers had to review their relationship with their readership. No longer did the readership consist of the educated, partisan elite. The newspapers had to deal with the myriad of interests and issues associated with the black mass audience.

As race relations deteriorated, it became insufficient to advise readers to put their faith in Republican politics. Black newspapers had to promote different

81. Journal, 19 October 1907. Smith served as a state deputy oil inspector and was known for his musical talents while in high school. See Summer E. Stevens and Owen V. Johnson, “From Black Politics to Black Community: Harry C. Smith and the Cleveland Gazette,” Journalism Quarterly 67 (4): 1093.
82. Journal, 21 March 1908; 15 August 1908.
84. Journal, 7 November 1908.
85. Gazette, 7 November 1908; 12 December 1908.
ways to combat and cope with the brutal discrimination of the early twentieth century. As black newspapers continued to develop as a mass medium, their strategies against racism included encouraging migration from the South, advocating black nationalism, and considering violent retribution.86

Black newspapers did not abandon the Republican Party. However, the party’s continued indifference toward black interests strained their relationship.

The prediction about the Republicans losing the 1912 election came true when Democrat Woodrow Wilson defeated Taft in his bid for re-election. Though the defeat was largely because of a party split as a result of Roosevelt’s candidacy, the Brownsville Affair fueled the conflict that had grown between him and Taft.87 Furthermore, the Democrats obtained a higher portion of the black vote than ever before.88

Although Republicans eventually returned to the White House, blacks’ loyalty to the party of Lincoln was based largely on the party being the lesser of two evils. This loyalty continued until 1936 when Democrat Franklin Roosevelt received overwhelming black support. Ironically, Smith maintained his Republican loyalties and never supported Franklin Roosevelt. The Journal ended publication in 1912; however, its successors also continued to support Republican candidates.89

Although Foraker was not re-elected to the Senate, he was successful in having the black soldiers exonerated and restored to military service eligibility before his term ended in 1909. This may have well been one of the last major gestures of Republican advocacy on behalf of the race.

Foraker’s attempt to seek justice for the soldiers continued after his unsuccessful re-election bid. Prior to the election, Foraker had proposed a bill that would have allowed the soldiers to re-enlist if they submitted a formal application that included an affidavit proclaiming their innocence. However, when the senate acted on the bill after the election, it revised Foraker’s version by requiring the soldiers to present evidence of their innocence before a five-member court of inquiry. The court, which was made up of retired army officers appointed by the Secretary of War, only considered the cases of eighty-two

88. Rees, From the Deck to the Sea: Blacks and the Republican Party, 112.
89. Some of the same owners were involved in establishing and/or operating subsequent papers including the Cleveland Advocate (1914-1924), the Herald, the Call, and the Post. Their merger became the currently operating Cleveland Call and Post. See Kusmer, A Ghetto Takes Shape, 270.
soldiers. It refused to hear any additional cases and subsequently, in December 1909, decided to exonerate fourteen soldiers.90

For about sixty-three years, the cases of the Brownsville soldiers were considered to be officially closed. However, in 1972, the Army, claiming that it was acting to right a wrong, cleared the records of the remaining soldiers. In 1973, Congress passed a bill granting the only surviving soldier $25,000 as compensation and providing him with medical care and veterans’s benefits.91

The author is an assistant professor of journalism at The Ohio State University.

91. The last Brownsville survivor was Dorsey Willis, 86, who told the New York Times that the dishonorable discharge had kept him from having a better life. See Foner, Blacks and the Military, 103.
The Conservationist as Journalist: P. S. Lovejoy and the Fight for the Cutover

By James Kates

During the early 1920s, a university professor took to the uncertain world of full-time freelance to promote a radically new vision for remaking the forest of the Great Lake states. Through the pages of a farm magazine, his ideas helped bring about the rejuvenation of forty million acres.

From its beginnings, the conservation crusade was a war of words. With the ascendancy of Theodore Roosevelt to the presidency in 1901, diverse strains of American sentiment toward the environment – including forestry, wildlife protection, and the harnessing of rivers for flood control and irrigation – coalesced into a compelling social movement whose prime component was publicity. TR and his lieutenants, notably the chief forester Gifford Pinchot, courted the popular press and utilized public-relations techniques to win support for conservation policies. The outlines of the early movement were simple, focusing on the need to assert the primacy of the federal government as protector of the public interest. The quest was distinctly human-centered, with orderly development of resources to preserve American prosperity for generations to come. In The Fight for Conservation, his manifesto for the movement, Pinchot boldly announced his creed: “The first duty of the human race is to control the earth it lives upon.”

Conservation was never so simple again. In the years after World War I, Pinchot's faith in subduing the planet must have rung hollow. Amid the general prosperity of the 1920s, a deep depression plagued American farmers, focusing attention on a gross imbalance in land utilization throughout the United States. The remedy for this imbalance was to be found not in passionate rhetoric of the Progressive sort, but in a new science of land economics. Nowhere was this new science more badly needed than in the "cutover" regions, the former forest lands where farmers were making halting efforts at planting food crops. The crisis in cutover agriculture was a crucible for public policy, generating both the scientific methodology and the political rationale for the massive reforestation efforts that would follow in the 1930s.  

Publicity was a key agent in 1920s conservation, perhaps even more so than in the movement's early years. The new policies had their basis in science, not in moralistic precepts of right and wrong. The writers who extolled the new conservation practices had to be exceptionally adroit at recasting scientific terminology in ways the general public would understand and support. The new age called for publicists who were steeped in scientific knowledge, yet highly skilled in winning attention in an age of media proliferation and competing demands on audiences' time. The Progressive Era - with its distinctive faith in the power of sheer facts - had given way to a far more challenging climate. The arid prose of scientists had to be recast as polemical social fables for a mass audience. In a fundamentally conservative age, the writers of the 1920s had to appeal directly to people's interests if they were to gain support for policies that entailed greater power for government.

These writers worked in every mass medium - newspapers, magazine articles and nonfiction books, short stories, and novels, even radio and motion pictures. Most of them had formal connections to the policy apparatus, often alternating between narrow professional work and writing for a general audience. In the process, they melded the increasing methodological sophistication of science in the 1920s with emerging techniques of popular persuasion, focusing on psychological appeal. Their impact is difficult to measure, but certainly among the most influential of their number was a forester-turned-free-lancer named Parish Storrs Lovejoy.  


3. In addition to Lovejoy, notable conservation authors of the period included the novelist James Oliver Curwood, whose tales of the Canadian woodlands were adapted for the screen, and Harold Titus, who campaigned for reforestation in the popular novel Timber (1922). Both served on the Michigan Conservation Board.
From the Campus to the Woods

In the summer of 1919, Michigan’s Upper Peninsula welcomed an odd visitor: a frail and bookish-looking man from the university at Ann Arbor, an urban specimen who talked of Paul Bunyan and loved to play the banjo. For several weeks, Professor P.S. Lovejoy was squired around the region like visiting royalty.

Upper Michigan had been stripped of its trees, but local boosters now sensed that something new and better was growing. Bumping down the logging roads in model-Ts, they treated Lovejoy to a display of emerging agricultural splendor. “They showed me silver linings and sweet clover ... Finns and Polanders with their women barefoot in the fields ... towns coming up out of the wrecks of logging camps ... all manner of interesting things,” Lovejoy recalled. But the tour was hardly representative of the larger country, and Lovejoy knew it. As he journeyed through the former north woods on his own, Lovejoy found mostly “brushy wastes of scrub, fireweed forests, bleached snags, and charred stumps.” The boosters’ dreams for “Cloverland,” as they optimistically called it, clearly were not coming true.

Beginning that summer and for the next several years, Lovejoy unleashed a barrage of magazine articles on the subject of northern development. His focus was the “cutover,” the vast landscape that had been ravaged by lumber companies, then abandoned or sold to speculators. The cutover of the Lake states comprised forty million acres – roughly the northern half of Michigan, the northern third of Wisconsin, and the northeastern third of Minnesota. Most of the cutover stood idle and desolate, littered with stumps and brush that fed periodic wildfires. Wisconsin alone had thirteen million acres of cutover, an area bigger than the state’s entire improved acreage in farms.

Agricultural progress in the region had been slow. Lovejoy found a handful of settlers trying to grub a living from sandy, acidic soil. Pockets of rich land were interspersed with poor, but the settlers had tried to farm the bad soil as well as the good. The record of their failure was written in the tax rolls. Vast areas of “Cloverland” had reverted to county or state ownership for nonpayment of property taxes. “Millions of acres of it have reverted for taxes and have been peddled out again for pennies an acre,” Lovejoy noted. In many cases, land valuations were so low that counties spent more to collect the taxes than they received in revenue. The slick patter of the “land boomers” would not alter a central fact: “A good part of Cloverland is starvation poor, because the soil naturally is nothing but lean and hungry sand.”


6. Ibid.
To remedy the imbalance between land and farms, Lovejoy prescribed harsh medicine. The cutover region had a glut of land, he wrote, and no amount of scheming would fill that land with farmers. On much of this land, agriculture simply didn't pay. Soils were poor, growing seasons too short, and markets too distant. In the early 1920s, even the most prosperous American farmers were haunted by persistent surpluses and falling prices for their products. Against that backdrop, sending an unknowing settler into an unforgiving region like the cutover seemed unwise – even cruel. Government agencies and private firms, Lovejoy declared, had no business promoting settlement in areas where farmers were likely to fail. "Nearly everybody has always taken it for granted that the more land there is in farms and the more farmers there are on the land, the better off we all are," he wrote. But the mounting farm failures in the cutover had proved this maxim wrong. States now had a duty to inventory their rural lands and to classify them according to best use: for farming, grazing, recreation, or the growing of timber as a crop. The goal was to make all acres productive in some form, but to discourage farming on the millions of acres that would not support it. "The old land-booming days are just about over," Lovejoy declared. "Land-booming methods have failed and worse than failed. Something new and different and better is coming up."^7

Lovejoy, perhaps more than any other person in the United States, was equipped both to recognize this fact and to proclaim it to the masses. In the small and rarefied world of 1920s conservation, Lovejoy was a genuine rarity: a trained scientist with a flair for the backwoods vernacular. Schooled in the German forestry tradition at the University of Michigan, he had worked for Gifford Pinchot as a forest supervisor in Wyoming and Washington state, then became a professor at the Forestry School in Ann Arbor in 1912. But the academic atmosphere left him restless and dissatisfied. In 1920 he quit the Michigan faculty, embarking on a three-year odyssey of prolific and profound free-lance writing.8

Most of his work appeared in The Country Gentleman, a weekly farm magazine owned by the powerful Curtis Publishing Company of Philadelphia.


8.Lovejoy's professor and mentor, the noted forester Filibert Roth, was German-born, as were many other prominent figures in the forestry movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as Carl Schurz. The German "historical school" of economic analysis posited that economic practices were not rooted in unchanging laws, but could and should be adapted to changing times. A key adherent of this school was the German-educated Richard T. Ely, who helped found the discipline of land economics. Harold T. Pinkett, Gifford Pinchot: Private and Public Forester (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), 10-11; Robert J. Gough, "Richard T. Ely and the Development of the Wisconsin Cutover," Wisconsin Magazine of History 75 (1991): 3-38.
In several dozen articles, Lovejoy hammered away at the need for land-use planning, replanting of cutover areas with a new “crop” of trees, and regulation of real-estate sharks in the North Woods. Each article was an engaging lesson in land economics, delivered in the folksy tones of a cracker-barrel philosopher. But Lovejoy’s easy manner veiled a fierce and tireless intelligence, one that was pushing the boundaries of both popular and academic thought on land-use questions.9

In retrospect, his freelance work of the early 1920s amounts to nothing less than a total refiguring of the social contract under which Americans had subdued, reshaped, and employed the American landscape. Rugged individualism had worked well to open up the Ohio Valley and other areas suitable for agriculture. But Lovejoy recognized, earlier than most, that the cutover would not yield to individual effort. He also realized that the idea of forestry could not be sold to the general public through emotional appeals alone. The cutover polemics had to forge a clear economic argument for their work. The cutover had to be “re-imagined.” The idea of “imagination” here refers not to mere fantasy, but the ability to take the abstract and to make it concrete. Lovejoy and his colleagues shared a vision of rational land use, and they invented the legal measures and the bureaucratic apparatus that made that vision real.10

The Country Gentleman made a good venue for his campaign. Its owner also published The Saturday Evening Post and The Ladies’ Home Journal. The company’s pockets were deep. Lovejoy received $350 for each feature article—a sum that allowed him to travel as he wished, while making a better living than he had as a college professor. The magazine circulated about 800,000 copies a week in a nation whose principal occupation still was farming. Lovejoy’s editor, John E. Pickett, shared Lovejoy’s passion for forestry and urged the author to attack the issue head-on. Some of Lovejoy’s peers questioned his move away from academia and into journalism. But Lovejoy believed that questions of land use—particularly the reforestation of the cutover—depended heavily on popular support. Freelancing, he told a fellow forester, “has gotten me into contact with entirely new men and agencies through which to sell the timber-crop idea” and “has caught me a fine set of enemies that I am proud of.” He was confident that he was reaching “a new audience and a big one.”11

10. For the idea of “re-imagining,” I am indebted to Father Michael Himes of Boston College, who employs the term in a theological context.
An agricultural audience was a logical choice, because the fate of the cutover was largely an agricultural question. Land speculators, farmers, local boosters, extension agents, and agricultural-college scientists tended to assume that former north woods would give way to farms, much as Ohio or Indiana had. Lovejoy found that prospect unlikely, arguing instead that a crop of new trees was the region's best hope for long-term stability. In this respect, The Country Gentleman was an ideal forum for what Lovejoy called "banana-peel engineering" – the placement of key ideas in places where people were likely to slip on them.

Lovejoy’s crusade coincided with a rising interest in science reporting. The publisher E.W. Scripps, concerned that scientists’ work was not being translated for a general audience, endowed his Science Service in 1920. Edwin E. Slosson, the first director of the nonprofit news syndicate, was both a trained chemist and a talented writer. Scripps apparently recognized earlier than other opinion leaders that science and public policy were destined to become intertwined. In addition, he believed that the scientific method could be brought to bear on questions of governance and daily life. The only way “to make democracy safe,” he declared, “is to make it more scientific.” About the same time, scientific associations hired publicity agents and even formed their own press bureaus to disseminate news about research and development work. Perhaps as a result, science journalism enjoyed a mild boom in the 1920s, particularly in the pages of mass-circulation, general-interest magazines. The stories usually conformed to a heroic model, portraying individual scientists as bold innovators and the scientific establishment as an agent of national progress and prosperity. For all its flaws, such reporting doubtless increased the credibility of science in the public mind.12

The Pioneer Land Bargain

Lovejoy’s challenge was daunting: He had to employ scientific rationale to debunk popular thought about land use dating from America’s pioneer days. Interwoven with the mythology of individualism, these beliefs were deeply ingrained in the national psyche. The old land ethos consisted of three elements:

1) A belief in the efficacy of widespread land dispersal and private, atomized decision-making. As recently as the 1880s, governments had used land as an economic tool for mobilization of capital and labor, both of which were in chronically short supply in most of the United States. Hundreds of millions of acres in the federal domain had essentially been given away (the price ranging from nothing to a dollar or two an acre) in hopes that settlers would occupy the land. Once in private hands, acreage became a form of wealth and collateral, thus substituting for scarce hard capital. Federal, state, and local governments undergirded this effort with a matrix of laws designed to establish property rights and to encourage economic risk-taking. Farms gave rise to towns, which attracted newcomers from the more settled areas of the East. A continued belief in Jeffersonian ideals of yeomanry only encouraged the quick dispersal of the public lands.13

2) “Town building” as a means of economic uplift. For the individual settler, the prime motivator – and, over time, the prime expectation – was the prospect of capital gains in land. The pioneer faced years of isolation and back-breaking labor, but he could count on his land rising in value as others joined him on the frontier. In time, schools, churches, and other amenities of settlement would spring up around him. The hardships of pioneer life thus were offset by the expectation of growing wealth and civility as communities expanded. The economic historian Gavin Wright has referred to this phenomenon as “town building.”14

In 1931, geographer Isaiah Bowman noted with some dismay that this characteristic American optimism over land values had persisted well into the twentieth century. Bowman acknowledged the innate attractiveness of the town building ideal and, in describing it, seemed to have succumbed to some of its charms himself. The pioneer, he wrote,

had poorer schools and roads, less social life, a cheaper house, indeed oftener not a house at all but a hut. But he had land that was his own, and he had enough of it for a living. The comforts could wait, and he could be cheerful because he knew that he could secure them in time. A well-defined cycle of benefits, in the period between 1840 and 1890 in the Middle

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13. James Willard Hurst, Law and Economic Growth: The Legal History of the Lumber Industry in Wisconsin, 1836-1915 (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap / Harvard, 1964). Hurst argued that the public-lands policy of the nineteenth century was not a laissez-faire stance, but a calculated effort by the government to use its most plentiful resource to further the goal of opening the continent to settlement.

West country, was widely expected. Land was bound to increase in value.\(^{15}\)

3) A continued official belief in the advisability of “incremental” farming. The closing of the frontier around 1890 spawned numerous anxieties, not the least of which was the fear that the United States would not be able to feed itself. This anxiety lingered into the early 1920s. Agricultural scientists and extension agents thus committed themselves unconditionally to helping farmers grow more crops. The “technical agriculturalists,” as Lovejoy dubbed them, thought not in terms of whether farming was wise in a given situation, but simply whether it was possible. Every farmer added at the margin of settlement was regarded as a net gain for the larger society. In 1916, for example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture reported on a study of 801 farms in the cutover districts of northern Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota. The federal researchers found that many of these farms were operating just a notch above subsistence level. Nonetheless, they endorsed cutover agriculture as a sound proposition: “From a strictly business point of view these farms do not appear to be successful, but they furnish a home for the family and offer an opportunity to earn a living.” The College of Agriculture at the University of Wisconsin emphasized land-clearing in the cutover. Dynamite and, later, war-surplus TNT were touted as the best means for ridding the land of stubborn stumps.\(^{16}\)

The local press in cutover towns was a key ally in the drive for agriculture. Northern editors resented suggestions that their lands would not support farming, and they railed against proposals for the planting of forest reserves. “This is not a barren wilderness,” the Rhinelander News of northern Wisconsin declared in 1912. “We have as good soil and as fine a climate as any locality in the state.” Even in the face of the farm depression, this boosterism endured well into the 1920s. Not coincidentally, such stories meshed nicely with advertising from land hustlers, who were striving to sell the millions of northern acres that had been stripped bare by lumber companies. The agricultural colleges augmented this effort with a barrage of press releases and farmers’ bulletins praising the agricultural potential of cutover lands. H.L. Russell, University of Wisconsin dean of agriculture, extolled the possibilities of the Wisconsin cutover in 1921. More than 100,000 farms of eighty acres each awaited settlers in the north, he proclaimed, adding: “Wisconsin is only beginning to develop her

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untamed empire, but in it she has rich resources whose value as yet can only be estimated.”

A New Formula for the Cutover

Lovejoy was 35 years old when, in 1919, he made his first serious foray into magazine work. In a three-part series in The Country Gentleman, he introduced readers to the basic contours of the cutover situation. Millions of acres in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota stood vacant, even as the nation faced the possibility of a timber shortage. The Lake States, whose timber had built the settlements of the Great Plains, now had to import most of their wood products from states in the South and the Pacific Northwest. Whole counties in the former lumbering districts were “practically bankrupt,” Lovejoy asserted. Contrary to boosters’ assurances, the plow would not follow the axe. It was time to talk of reforestation.

Even as the series hit the newsstands, Lovejoy was back in the north for his grand tour of “Cloverland.” The trip was a whirlwind introduction to the booster mentality of the cutover region. John A. Doelle, secretary of the Upper Peninsula Development Bureau, escorted Lovejoy through the region and introduced him to extension agents, newspaper editors, businessmen, and settlers. Everywhere the talk was of agriculture. The lumbering days were remembered with a certain wistfulness, but the passing of the forest was not lamented. The developers of “Cloverland” were casting about for opportunity, seeking a magic formula that would make the region bloom. The latest idea was grazing. Cutover cowboys, adorned in appropriate hats, chaps, and spurs, roamed the stump-filled range that summer. The one crop that was never thought of was timber. Indeed, the forest seldom intruded on the minds of anyone in “Cloverland,” even when its scruffy remnants caught fire and threatened to turn the entire region to cinders:

17. Rhinelander News, 31 May 1912; H.L. Russell, Farms Follow Stumps, University of Wisconsin Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 332, April 1921. Russell’s enthusiasm may have been fueled by the fact that he was an active speculator in cutover lands.

The visit of an uncredentialed western ranchman set the whole district agog and clacking, but a 10,000-acre fire or a town packed into boxcars and ready to abandon homes to the ubiquitous smoke was accepted as a mere temporary discomfort or nuisance. And kindly to observe our rutabagas. Are they not excellent rutabagas?

No agricultural fantasy seemed to be too extreme to be acceptable. My inquiry as to the prospects for a tomato canning factory on the shores of Lake Superior was seriously accepted and debated.\(^{19}\)

The above paragraphs were written for \textit{American Forestry}, whose readers presumably shared Lovejoy’s views on the futility of cutover agriculture. In \textit{The Country Gentleman}, Lovejoy’s tone was far more circumspect. His years in academia had not blinded him to the social and political mores of the north country. While a forestry student at Michigan, he had worked alongside rugged lumberjacks in the fast-disappearing woods; Lovejoy had been measuring and otherwise studying the trees as the lumbermen cut them down. He understood the lumberjacks’ disdain for “college boys” and for reforestation, which presumably would prevent honest homesteaders from establishing farms in the wilderness. Lovejoy realized, too, that “many farmers have followed their dads and granddads in hating the trees and the stumps which kept their plows from the good fields.” Lovejoy knew he would have to acknowledge popular beliefs before offering something in their place. He wrote many of his cutover articles as running dialogues, often with himself in the role of innocent rube conversing with a skeptical reader. In one piece he extolled the virtues of “Cloverland” at great length until the exasperated reader told him, “Lay off the poetry and get down to it.” At which point, of course, he did.\(^{20}\)

Lovejoy was a skillful and patient polemicist. He never scolded his readers. Rather, he outlined the conventional wisdom about land-use questions – then systematically tore it apart. One article in the 1919 series, for example, included a picture of a young family arrayed in front of a rude log cabin in the woods. To readers old enough to remember the pioneer era, the picture must have struck a chord of nostalgia and sympathy. Perhaps the frontier was not gone after all! Lovejoy recognized such yearning himself:

\begin{itemize}
\item Lovejoy, “In the Name of Development,” 392.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, 387; Lovejoy to John E. Pickett, 18 March 1920, Box 4, PSL papers; Lovejoy, “Cloverland: A Part-Time Empire,” \textit{The Country Gentleman}, 28 February 1920, 3-4; 42; 44.
\end{itemize}
We are still close to the old pioneer days. Everybody takes a sympathetic interest in the new regions and, on occasion, helps out the fellows who have the nerve to pioneer it to-day. Didn’t Lincoln live in a log cabin?\(^{21}\)

Indeed he did, Lovejoy assured his readers. He had lived in several of them. In one instance, the Lincoln family had spent fourteen years farming “niggardly” soil in Indiana before realizing that the situation was hopeless and moving to Illinois. Lovejoy checked the census data for that Indiana county and found that its population had fallen by 8 percent from 1910 to 1920. Apparently farmers there were still learning hard lessons, just as the Lincolns had. Wouldn’t it be sensible, Lovejoy asked his audience, for government to lend a hand by identifying lands where farming would pay, and lands where it almost certainly would not?\(^{22}\)

Despite the relatively gentle approach, Lovejoy’s early cutover articles drew an avalanche of mail. A lumberman-turned-land-seller complained that Lovejoy must have been “blindfolded and had his ears stuffed with cotton, to write many of his statements.” The man threatened to “tell on” Lovejoy to the dean of his state’s agricultural college. A Minnesota real-estate operator called the articles “venomous and exaggerated.” A chamber of commerce official said they were “calculated to do us tremendous damage.” Yet, as if to suggest that attitudes in the north country were vulnerable to persuasion, the mail was not entirely hostile. One reader enclosed a clipping telling how an Iowa man, who had bought a Michigan cutover farm in the dead of winter, killed himself when he saw what the land looked like with the snow off.\(^{23}\)

Lovejoy knew it was fruitless to argue that the huge majority of the cutover was suited only to growing trees. The idea of “town building” was too strongly ingrained at the local level; to tell local boosters that their land should revert to forest was to invite a fistfight. It is noteworthy that local boosters sometimes referred to the forest as a “jungle,” and reforestation as “re-jungle-ization,” as if it were something that flew entirely in the face of common sense. Perhaps the toughest task for today’s cutover historian is to realize that the modern-day conception of the forest as “beautiful” or “rejuvenating” is very much a social construction, one that was in its infancy in Lovejoy’s day. The

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22. Ibid.
more common attitude during the 1920s was best summed up by the ecologist Aldo Leopold: Stumps, he noted, were considered to be a sign of progress.24

Instead of simply pushing forestry, then, Lovejoy embraced an alternate strategy: the idea of “service in land deals.” Lovejoy urged governments to inventory the land, and to clearly identify the areas that were most likely to provide a decent living to farmers. It was a clever message, for Lovejoy was taking the farm community’s traditional hostility to forestry and turning it on its head. If the “best” lands were identified, by extension the “worst” ones – those more suited to forestry – would be too. No longer would the cutover farmer toil for years on unpromising soil. Instead, he would invest his time and energy in places most likely to repay the investment. Certainly there was a hint of government paternalism here, but to Lovejoy the proposal also smacked of plain common sense. Unless a plot of land could guarantee “a genuine and first-class chance for a good, safe living and reasonable profits,” he wrote, its development constituted “mere wild-catting and something to be stopped.”25

In a 1921 article, Lovejoy applauded Wisconsin’s state government, which had taken tentative steps to warn prospective settlers against land fraud. He also endorsed the idea of planned communities in the woods, whose developers would provide roads, farm houses, and outbuildings, even livestock. “Ways must be found to let the pioneer settler get on his feet and going.” Lovejoy probably doubted that many land-sellers would make such an investment of time and money. In fact, few of them did. But he was astute enough to know that, while he built his case for forestry, he could not appear hostile to the farmer.26

Schools of Thought

Agricultural colleges earned their keep by helping farmers. Not surprisingly, scientists at the University of Wisconsin and at other schools regarded the cutover as a distinct challenge. An “atmosphere of glowing optimism” pervaded the UW’s agricultural labs in the early 1920s, one student of the period wrote. Extension agents and experiment stations focused special attention on the north, dealing with problems such as stump-pulling, selection of farm sites, and the search for hardy crop varieties. With help from the experts, it was believed that individual effort by the farmer would succeed in expanding the margins of settlement. Each new acre that yielded to the plow was regarded as a victory. The problem, in Lovejoy’s view, was that the agricultural colleges had failed to distinguish “between agricultural possibilities and agricultural

25. P.S. Lovejoy to John E. Pickett, 8 August 1922, Box 5, PSL papers; Lovejoy, “Agricultural Development,” unpublished manuscript, circa 1922, Box 5, PSL papers.
practicabilities. The real issue is not one of farming technology but one of land economics. The agronomist and farmer ‘might,’ but have they?"\(^{27}\)

The solution, as Lovejoy saw it, was not just individual initiative or local boosterism, but the collection and application of aggregate data regarding the cutover. This, in short, was the new science of land economics. Without the facts, land-use problems were certain “to snarl worse and worse,” Lovejoy believed. Wisconsin’s Richard T. Ely, one of the foremost academics of his era, pioneered in land economics and applied many of his findings to policy formulation for the cutover. “The thrust of these policies,” one historian has written, “was to use scientific planning and government-directed coordination to induce efficiency, profitability, and social stability.” Lovejoy repeatedly applauded Ely’s work, including his efforts to discourage settlement on substandard crop land. “From now on,” Lovejoy declared about 1922, “instead of merely guessing or lying about it, we are due to get the facts as to the use of land and to base land use and land development on those facts.”\(^{28}\)

Until about 1925, thought regarding the cutover was in flux. Land economists and agriculturalists often worked at odds. The confusion and conflict in academic circles was replicated elsewhere. One barometer of such confusion was the Tri-State Development Congress. Called by the governors of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, the Congress met annually from 1921 to 1924 to discuss cutover development. C.L. Harrington, Wisconsin’s chief forester, attended the meeting at Milwaukee in 1922. Most of its sessions, he told Lovejoy, “dealt with carloads of dynamite, 450,000 new settlers,” and optimistic forecasts for land-clearing. The role of forestry was acknowledged, but “no one has yet been found to pay the bill.” Other camps were boosting the region as a tourist haven, the “Playground of the Middle West,” still, “there will soon be no playgrounds left, if everything is busted up with trainloads of dynamite,” Harrington noted sardonically. A.D. Campbell, Wisconsin’s former commissioner of immigration, assured Lovejoy that farmers could make a go of it in the cutover if they only got a boost from government, a “grubstake” that would tide them over until they cleared enough land to start making profits. Millions of federal dollars were being spent on Western reclamation projects; why not divert some of that cash to cutover settlers? Lovejoy’s blunt dismissal of the scheme indicated his growing exasperation for those who assumed cutover prosperity was just around the corner: “If the lands are ‘supreme’ and ... there is a


widespread desire on the part of small farmers to acquire land for farming, just why should it be necessary to involve federal tax money in developing these lands?”29

Lovejoy defined conservation as “reason applied to environment.” His arguments for reforestation relied on methodical, rational explication of the cutover problem and its possible solutions. The strategy was deliberate. Lovejoy recognized that conservation, in the early 1920s, drew its support from myriad sources: women’s clubs interested in questions of aesthetic beauty and moral uplift, sportsmen concerned with the propagation of fish and game stocks, and tourism promoters with visions of northern riches, to name just a few. He was keenly aware that the well-meaning agitation of all these groups might succeed only in muddying the waters of the conservation movement. Lovejoy fashioned his argument as a no-nonsense, common-sense appeal to the farmer, phrased in economic terms. Not once in his Country Gentleman writings did Lovejoy mention the beauty of the forest, or the power of a wooded landscape to refresh the soul of an urban dweller. Even the term forestry had a “sort of taint” about it, he believed, mixed as it was with “old and sticky sentiment and sickly old-maid ideas.” Blaming lumbermen for the waste of the north country served no good purpose, since it involved “moral considerations rather than economic.”30

Lovejoy’s mission was to lay out the cutover problem in clear, simple terms for a mass audience. By the end of 1922, he had largely succeeded. What remained was to link the cutover question to a larger crisis in land use in the United States, and to issue an unambiguous call to action. In “Settling the East,” a seven-part part series in The Country Gentleman, Lovejoy revealed that the lake states’ problems with idle land were hardly unique. Despite a barrage of promotion by state governments and private interests, some 200 million acres east of the Mississippi River lay idle and unproductive. Aggregate data told the story of this swelling acreage in stark terms that boosterism could not refute. Just weeks after the series concluded, Lovejoy traveled to Menominee, Michigan, where he was keynote speaker at the Tri-State Development Congress for 1923. “The old ways and formulae and slogans have failed abominably,” he told an audience of several hundred boosters, agriculturalists and government officials. In Michigan, 600,000 acres had already reverted for nonpayment of taxes. Forest and farm development should proceed in tandem, but for anyone to hope that farms could possibly fill forty million acres in the lake states in the foreseeable future was a fantasy. Lovejoy’s frank talk “proved a revelation to many,” a reporter noted.31

29.C.L. Harrington to P.S. Lovejoy, 9 March 1922, Box 4, PSL papers; A.D. Campbell to Lovejoy, 18 September 1922, Box 5, PSL papers; Lovejoy to A.D. Campbell, 14 September 1922, Box 5, PSL papers.
30. Lovejoy to John E. Pickett, 18 March 1920, Box 4, PSL papers; Lovejoy to Austin Cary, 1 November 1922, Box 4, PSL papers.
31. Lovejoy, “Settling the East: Its Empire of Idle Acres Is Increasing,” The Country Gentleman, 30 September 1922, 1-2; 16 (series continued through 18 November
In the pages of *The Country Gentleman*, Lovejoy recalled later, he had tried to play the role of “translator of the technician to the barbershop.” Without gush or sentiment, he had issued a challenge to many of the prevailing ideas about land use in the north. To be sure, the old ideas – particularly the Jeffersonian belief in yeoman farming and the local emphasis on “town building” – would not yield easily. With the struggle in progress, Lovejoy could not be sure to what extent his ideas were being heard or accepted. In 1922 he summed up his experience for a fellow forester:

It’s a queer experience – this being out of the roil of forest things, looking in, trying to pick out the typical phases and make pictures of them; trying to discuss them without rancor and still accent whatever seems to need accent. Nobody can hope to do a perfectly balanced job of it, I suppose, and I shall be blamed and cursed and thanked tearfully no doubt – but don’t much care – so long as the idea of timber-the-crop begins to get over, and especially to the farmers of the country.\(^{32}\)

During his years as a journalist, Lovejoy had never really left the academic or professional realms. The cross-pollenization of scholarly, professional, and popular ideas, in fact, had lent his writing a certain energy and insight that few other magazine scribes could muster. In 1923, professional conservation work called again: Lovejoy was asked to help organize the Michigan Land Economic Survey, a project closely mirroring his desire for data collection in the cutovers. It was too good an opportunity to pass up, so Lovejoy left the uncertain world of full-time free-lancing in exchange for a brand of government work that was close to his heart.\(^{33}\)

**Coda: The Vision Fulfilled**

“If words would make trees grow,” the *Journal of Forestry* observed in 1926, “the United States would be the most thickly wooded country in the world.” Everyone, it seemed, was talking of forestry – “Women’s Clubs, Rotarians, Kiwanians, hundreds of Civic Clubs of every description ... sportsmen, nature lovers,” even real-estate promoters and, lately, lumbermen themselves. Yet the destruction of the woods proceeded apace, reforestation was in its infancy, and efforts at systematic forest-fire suppression had proved barely

1922); Lovejoy, “Farm and Forest Development in the Cutovers,” paper prepared for Tri-State Development Congress, Menominee, Michigan, 18 January 1923, Box 5, PSL papers; *Menominee Herald-Leader*, 18 January 1923, Box 5, PSL papers.

32. Lovejoy to Austin Cary, 1 November 1922, Box 4, PSL papers.

adequate. The forestry movement, it seemed, had degenerated into a Babel of well-meaning talk without depth, coherence or effectiveness. "We are off either on our economics or ... psychology," the Journal concluded.34

Actually, what forestry needed in the later 1920s was a convergence of harsh economic reality and diffuse public sentiment. Lovejoy had predicted as much in 1922, in a letter to his editor at The Country Gentleman. Americans had to be "shocked out of the old notion" that all vacant lands would yield to the plow, and that individual initiative was sufficient to solve the land-use problem.35 Rejuvenation of the cutover would require government-coordinated social engineering on a scale never before seen, except perhaps in wartime.36 Public sentiment, while useful to the foresters' cause, focused mostly on individual initiative. Voluntary, small-scale, feel-good efforts such as Arbor Day tree plantings would not suffice. Citizens would need hard evidence before assenting to an expansion of government authority and centralized planning in a culture that had epitomized rugged individualism. Regrettably, the catalyst for meaningful action would have to be a crisis.

The crisis was tax reversion. In Wisconsin, whose experience was typical of the Lake States, the population of the cutover was less in 1930 than it had been in 1920. Land values in fourteen of the eighteen cutover counties fell during the decade. Lagging crop prices meant that many of the settlers who had taken on debt during the land-selling boom after World War I now could not make payments. The federal clampdown on immigration had dried up a stream of potential pioneers. At the urging of land economists, the agricultural college and state government had stopped promoting settlement in the mid-1920s. In 1927, a mortgage banker reported that farm land in northern Wisconsin was "not saleable." Property-tax bills, small as they were, became too much for landowners to bear. Slowly at first, then at an accelerating rate, individual settlers and large-scale speculators abandoned their lands and stopped paying their taxes. The lands reverted to county governments in Wisconsin, and to the state governments of Michigan and Minnesota.37

The statistics were nothing less than staggering. Two-and-a-half million acres of Wisconsin cutover land, about one-quarter of the land in seventeen northern counties, were put up for sale for nonpayment of taxes in 1927 alone. Only 18 percent of the land was resold. The rest remained with the counties, where it sat idle, fed forest fires, and produced not a penny in tax revenue. Large areas of the cutover seemed to have "little present market value for any purpose," a team of researchers reported. The growing tax delinquency meant that the cost

35. Lovejoy to John E. Pickett, 19 June 1922, Box 5, PSL papers.
36. Lovejoy had no direct experience in World War I, but he did serve on a panel whose existence was largely due to war-inspired anxieties about potential shortages of timber. This was a committee of the Society of American Foresters, chaired by Gifford Pinchot.
of government services, such as schools and roads, was borne increasingly by a declining number of citizens. As a result, delinquency itself threatened to cause more delinquency, in a ruinous spiral whose end could only be guessed at. Land economist Benjamin Hibbard saw an ironic turnabout of policy in the tax-reversion crisis: After years of giving away the public domain, governments now were getting that domain back, whether they wanted it or not. The challenge was what to do with it.\textsuperscript{38}

By the end of the 1920s, the nineteenth-century “land ethos” had completely unraveled in the north. Widespread land dispersal had not been an engine for economic growth or for the attraction of capital or labor. The promise of “town building” and its attendant capital gains in land had proved to be a cruel joke for the area’s pioneers. In many places, the frontier of settlement actually was receding; thus the settlers who had hoped for an influx of social amenities increasingly found themselves isolated from neighbors and markets. And despite the push for incremental agriculture, the cutover had not become a land of farms.

With the coming of the Great Depression, the lake states embraced reforestation and a host of related land-use innovations for lack of any visible alternative. These measures included public acquisition of northern lands for state and national forests; rural zoning to discourage scattered settlement in forest areas; and special tax abatements and state assistance to encourage the growing of timber as a crop by local governments and private owners. Government-financed fire-control efforts assured long-term protection for such previously overlooked assets as young forests, recreational ventures, scenic beauty and wildlife. All of these measures, according to James Willard Hurst, “used law to install social accounting alongside the private books of account which the nineteenth century had thought sufficient for calculating the input and output of the economy.” Rural zoning, for example, recognized the “social overhead costs” of providing roads and schools to widely dispersed residents in remote areas. It curtailed the individual’s freedom to live where he wished in favor of a larger societal interest in economic efficiency. And while nineteenth-century lumber companies lacked any motivation to grow timber as a crop, governments by the 1920s had come to recognize the forest’s potential role in regional rehabilitation and economic stability.\textsuperscript{39}

What role did Lovejoy and journalism play in this reordering of ideas? Even before 1920, Lovejoy had recognized that most of his fellow conservationists were too isolated and too parochial, focusing on narrow matters of technical proficiency. Silviculturalists, for example, specialized in the growing of trees, but many of them lacked the political or economic savvy to


make winning arguments for extensive reforestation. Technical proficiency had to be joined with economic rationale and political muscle, Lovejoy believed, if the longstanding "land ethos" was to be toppled in the north country. The ethos, in fact, might have lingered for years if not for the coming of an economic triple whammy: the nationwide farm slump in the 1920s, the tax-reversion crisis in the cutover, and the onset of the Great Depression, with its attendant mandate for widespread social planning and public-employment programs. A handful of conservation writers could not bring on the revolution by themselves. But they could tutor the public and the experts alike on what to do when the crisis boiled over.

After 1923, Lovejoy never returned to fulltime magazine work. Instead, he practiced his "banana-peel engineering" from within, as a staff member at the Michigan Department of Conservation. After working on the Land Economic Survey, he helped establish a system of game refuges. In 1930 he suffered a disabling stroke, and afterward his health was precarious. Until his death in 1942, Lovejoy served as a gadfly-at-large within the Conservation Department. His focus ranged from fisheries to forests to fire protection and public education. His constant enemy was the "sacred cow," the tired or trite conservation practice that did not conform with Lovejoy's zeal for efficiency. Harold Titus, a prominent Michigan conservation writer, summed up Lovejoy's contribution: "It was P.S. who was everlastingly leading and prodding until the plan was more than wish or lines on paper and had become reality."40

"The parentage of ideas about men and land is seldom recorded at all," Aldo Leopold wrote shortly after Lovejoy's death. Leopold noted that any person could go the Patent Office and discover the intellectual lineage of such mundane inventions as "egg-openers, iceboxes, and cigarette lighters." But the history of ecological ideas was not nearly as discernible. Still, Leopold offered a bold pronouncement on the subject: "I believe that P.S. Lovejoy sired more ideas about men and land than any contemporary in the conservation field." Two decades earlier in The Country Gentleman, Lovejoy had entrusted the general populace with a set of profoundly radical ideas about the forest, confident that the

40. Harold Titus, "Conservation Loses a Leader," Michigan Conservation 11(February-March 1942). An example of Lovejoy's constant war on "sacred cows" was his crusade leading to the establishment of the Institute for Fisheries Research at the University of Michigan. The institute's first director, Albert S. Hazzard, was my maternal grandfather.
public, when armed with the facts, would take the right path. His guiding principle—and enduring contribution—was insistence that conservation was not so much a technical endeavor as a social one. He skillfully employed the journalist’s tools to that end.

The author is a doctoral student in mass-communication history at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. The paper on which this article is based was judged one of the three best presented at the 1994 National Convention of the American Journalism Historians Association in Roanoke, Virginia.

41. Aldo Leopold, “Obituary: P.S. Lovejoy,” Journal of Wildlife Management 7 (1943): 125-128. Leopold became the best-known conservationist of his generation, while Lovejoy faded into relative obscurity. There are a number of reasons for this. Lovejoy, unlike Leopold, never enunciated his principles in a book. He also dealt with problems, such as reforestation, that were largely tackled within his lifetime. Lovejoy also wrote in the characteristic snappy patter of the 1920s, a prose style that has not worn well with time. By contrast, Leopold’s masterpiece, A Sand County Almanac (1949), has a timeless meditative beauty about it; the book was not widely discovered until the 1960s and today seems more relevant than ever.
Lesbian and Gay Press: Raising a Militant Voice in the 1960s

By Rodger Streitmatter

A trio of 1960s publications published for the gay and lesbian community in America reflected a new aggressiveness on the part of those demanding equal rights for homosexuals.

Because the decade of the 1960s was one of the most turbulent in the history of the United States, it was a period of unparalleled growth and advancement for the country’s alternative journalism. African-American newspapers documented the explosive events of the Civil Rights Movement. Women’s liberation journals spoke for a segment of the population long denied its rightful voice. Counterculture newspapers burst onto college campuses as never before. Encouraged by the increasing visibility of these other repressed segments of society, American homosexuals not only began to paint placards and organize picket lines; they also translated their protests into militant magazines.

This article documents the rise of the first militant lesbian and gay publications in the United States. Examining this phase of this genre of the alternative press increases the scholarly understanding of a diverse American media.1 Based on the content of the original publications and personal interviews

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with half a dozen women and men who produced them, this article first describes three news magazines published during the early to mid 1960s. The study also analyzes the major themes in the magazines’ editorial content—promoting public demonstrations, reporting from a gay perspective, and fighting back against the establishment media. Finally, this article discusses 1960s gay and lesbian journalism in the larger context of the alternative press, suggesting ways in which this nascent journalistic genre was both similar to and different from other alternative presses that have been the subjects of previous scholarship.

The lesbians and gay men who raised their journalistic voices in the 1960s were not the founders of this particular genre of advocacy journalism, because the first generation of the gay press had appeared a decade earlier. But the three 1960s magazines—The Ladder, Drum, and the Homosexual Citizen—were distinctive in that they were the first militant publications, reflecting a new aggressiveness being demonstrated by the tiny bands of picketers who were demanding equal rights for homosexuals. For the first time in the history of the United States, lesbians and gay men were displaying open defiance of the


2. The method employed for this study included reading the 115 issues of the three magazines that were published. Those issues consisted of forty issues of The Ladder published from 1963 to 1966 during the editorship of Barbara Gittings, all fifty-eight issues of Drum published from 1964 to 1969, and all seventeen issues of the Homosexual Citizen published from 1966 to 1967. Archives visited to complete this study included the Rare Books Room of the Library of Congress, the Rare Books Room of the New York Public Library, and the International Gay and Lesbian Archives in West Hollywood, Calif.

3. The first widely distributed gay magazine in the United States was ONE. The monthly magazine was founded in Los Angeles in 1953 by One, Inc. The second was Mattachine Review, founded in San Francisco in 1955 by the Mattachine Society. The first widely distributed lesbian publication was The Ladder, founded in San Francisco in 1956. ONE continued to be published until 1969 and was briefly revived in 1972. Mattachine Review was published until 1967. The Ladder was published until 1972.

dominant social order—and a handful of publications was simultaneously creating a new form of dissident journalism.

Written and edited by the same women and men who organized and marched in those early protests, the monthly magazines articulated the political philosophy that fueled the new defiance. They helped shift gay America’s focus away from conforming to the dictates of heterosexual society and toward building a unified and vocal gay community with values often in conflict with those of heterosexual America—and proudly so. That the three magazines built a combined circulation of less than 12,000 belies their impact on the hundreds of thousands of men and women who were frightened and isolated in their individual closets in a society hostile to homosexuality.5

Although “cower” was not part of the vocabularies of the journalists who produced these pioneering publications, homophobia certainly created impediments for them. Marketing the magazines was a problem, as professional magazine distributors refused to touch a gay publication. Each month staff members serviced the handful of newsstands that they had persuaded to carry their magazines. That meant delivering copies at the beginning of each month and retrieving the unsold copies again at the end of the month. Despite their daunting commitments of time and energy that totaled more than forty hours a week, none of these journalists was paid. Finances were a recurring problem. The publications depended on the membership dues of their respective homosexual-rights organizations for financial support, because heterosexual-owned businesses refused to advertise in them and few homosexual-owned businesses yet existed. Nor did staff members receive the public recognition that is an incentive for many journalists; because homosexuality was grounds for dismissal from all jobs in the government and most jobs in the private sector, most lesbian and gay journalists hid their identities behind pseudonyms.6

The monthly publications looked like scholarly journals. The founders chose a five-and-a-half by eight-and-a-half-inch format as a cost-saving step; the magazines could be created by simply folding sheets of standard-size typing paper in half and stapling them at the crease. In length, the magazines varied from sixteen to forty pages. In content, they were dominated by personal essays and news articles, along with book reviews and letters to the editor. All three publications originated on the East Coast, the products of editors living in New York, Philadelphia, and Washington. But more important than the magazines’

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5. In 1965, The Ladder’s circulation was 1,000. This figure came from the author’s 10 September 1993 telephone interview with editor Barbara Gittings, during which Gittings was in her home in Philadelphia. Drum’s circulation was 10,000. This figure came from a statement by Clark P. Polak, founder and editor of the magazine, in a memo to the board of directors of the Janus Society, the organization Drum represented, dated 28 October 1964. The memo is in the Janus Society file at the International Gay and Lesbian Archives in West Hollywood, Calif. The Homosexual Citizen’s circulation was 400. This figure came from the author’s 7 January 1993 interview with editor Lilli M. Vincenz, at her home in Arlington, Va. 6. Author’s interview with Gittings, 10 September 1993.
vital statistics was the goal members of the journalistic triumvirate shared: to secure equal rights for American homosexuals.

The Ladder Sets the Pace

The Ladder was the oldest of the three publications. It had been founded in 1956 in San Francisco, although its 1,000 monthly copies were distributed nationally.\(^7\) In 1963, the editorship shifted to Barbara Gittings, a young woman who was to have profound impact on both the Gay and Lesbian Liberation Movement and that movement’s press. Gittings lived in Philadelphia, earning her living by operating a mimeograph machine for an architectural firm. In 1958, she founded New York’s chapter of the Daughters of Bilitis, the national organization for lesbians.\(^8\) She hitchhiked from Philadelphia to New York each week to preside at the meetings. Although Gittings did not have a journalism background, her growing collection of lesbian books and articles demonstrated her commitment to the written word. A year after Gittings began editing The Ladder, she quit her job and began devoting all of her time to the magazine.\(^9\)

The other driving force behind The Ladder was Kay Lahusen, who served as assistant editor, reporter, and photographer. Lahusen had worked as a researcher at the Christian Science Monitor during the late 1950s and early 1960s. She and Gittings became lovers in 1961, although their relationship remained a commuter one with Gittings in Philadelphia and Lahusen in New York. During the mid 1960s, Lahusen worked at a variety of short-term jobs. She later recalled: “The activism was the main thing. Our careers weren’t careers

\(^7\) Phyllis Lyon was the founding editor of The Ladder. Del Martin, Lyon’s lover, served as assistant editor of The Ladder from 1956 to 1960 and as editor from 1960 to 1962.

\(^8\) Phyllis Lyon and Del Martin founded the Daughters of Bilitis in San Francisco in 1955. Bilitis is the heroine of the “Songs of Bilitis,” erotic poems published in 1894 by Pierre Louys. In the verses, Bilitis is portrayed as a contemporary of Sappho who lived a lesbian lifestyle on the island of Lesbos in the seventh century B.C.

\(^9\) Gittings was born in 1932 in Vienna, Austria, where her father was a member of the American Foreign Service. Cities she lived in while growing up included Tryon, N.C.; Annapolis, Md.; Montreal, Canada; and Wilmington, Del. She enrolled at Northwestern University in 1950 but became so obsessed with researching homosexuality that she dropped out of school after only one year. When she was not earning an income, Gittings survived on a small trust fund. She edited The Ladder until 1966. After leaving that position, she remained active in movement activities. In particular, she led the effort that resulted in formation of the first gay and lesbian contingent within a professional organization, the American Library Association’s Task Force on Gay Liberation. She also served as a member of the board of directors of the National Gay Task Force. Today, Gittings lives in Philadelphia with Kay Lahusen, her lover since 1961.
at all. They were really just dinky little jobs—totally subsidiary to the movement.”

_The Ladder_ soon became the leading voice of gay militancy. Gittings accomplished one of her boldest changes through a mere three words: “A Lesbian Review.” Throughout its first nine years, _The Ladder_ had never explicitly stated that it was aimed at lesbians. But in 1964, Gittings added the subtitle to the cover. During the next two years, she gradually altered the design so the title _The Ladder_ shrank while the subtitle “A Lesbian Review” grew larger and larger. That subtitle signaled a new frankness about how lesbians felt about their sexuality. Gittings recalled: “Adding those words to the cover helped our readers gain a new sense of identity and strength. They said, very eloquently I thought, that the word ‘lesbian’ was no longer unspeakable.”

Lahusen proposed another pivotal change when she suggested replacing the line drawings on the cover with photographs of beautiful gay women. Gittings recalled: “Heterosexuals, as well as many lesbians themselves, had weird ideas of what lesbians looked like. We wanted to show them that lesbians were normal, happy, wholesome people – every mother’s ‘dream daughter.’”

By 1966, _The Ladder_ was celebrating the new assertive spirit through a lesbian “cover girl” who appeared each month. Gittings said: “It definitely was a political statement. Every one of those women was saying, ‘We’re here, we’re proud, and we’re beautiful!'”

Another element in Gittings’s transformation of the magazine into a voice of militancy involved who spoke for lesbian and gay America. During the 1950s, homosexual publications had looked to heterosexual psychiatrists, psychologists, and ministers as the experts who could most effectively talk about homosexuality. Gittings said: “We were so grateful to have anyone at all pay attention to us that we accepted everything they said, regardless of how demeaning it was.” But in the mid 1960s, Gittings revolutionized this concept by insisting that gay people were the true authorities on homosexuality. She said:

The publications of the 1950s gave undue deference to “authorities” and “experts.” The true experts on homosexuality

10. Author’s telephone interview with Kay Lahusen, 15 September 1993, during which Lahusen was in Wilmington, Del. Lahusen was born in 1934 in Cincinnati and earned an education degree from Ohio State University. After working on _The Ladder_ during the mid 1960s, Lahusen, during the early 1970s, worked as reporter and news editor for _GAY_, a New York City weekly. She later co-authored one of the earliest books about the movement, Kay Tobin (Lahusen) and Randy Wicker, _Gay Crusaders_ (New York: Paperback Library, 1972). Both in her journalistic work and her book, Lahusen wrote under the pseudonym Kay Tobin. Lahusen now sells real estate in Philadelphia.

11. Author’s interview with Gittings, 10 September 1993.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.
were homosexuals. We could speak perfectly well for ourselves, thank you very much. And we also expected to be talked with, not at.  

Instead of publishing research by heterosexuals, Gittings turned her magazine into an editorial forum in which lesbians and gay men could share their first-hand knowledge of homosexuality. The Ladder showcased lengthy interviews with gay women who were living open and fulfilling lives; the interviews carried the thinly-veiled message that all gay women should vacate their closets.

Typical was Gittings’s eight-page interview with Ernestine Eckstein. An African-American lesbian and veteran of the Civil Rights Movement, Eckstein expressed strong feelings about the path that gay people should follow: “The homosexual has to call attention to the fact that he’s been unjustly acted upon. This is what the Negro did. I feel homosexuals have to become visible and assert themselves politically.”

*Drum* Raises a Voice from Philadelphia

In 1964 a new magazine aimed at gay men began sounding many of the same themes. *Drum* was published by the Janus Society, a homosexual-rights organization in Philadelphia. The magazine signaled its unabashed frankness with the subtitle emblazoned across the cover: “Sex in Perspective.”

Editor Clark P. Polak, who wrote and produced the magazine virtually single-handedly, was a member of a prominent Philadelphia family. He rebelled against his upperclass background by founding and operating a bookstore and mail-order company specializing in homoerotic books and photographs.

*Drum* was the first gay publication that proudly announced its intention to amuse as well as inform. Polak wrote: “I began DRUM Magazine as a consistently articulate, well-edited, amusing and informative publication. I envisioned a sort of sophisticated, but down-to-earth magazine for people who dug gay life and DRUM’s view of the world.”

That view included homoerotic images. Partly because of homosexual repression, appearance and physical attributes play a major role in the gay male

15. Ibid.
17. Janus was an ancient Roman god of gates and doorways, depicted with two faces looking in opposite directions.
18. Polak was born in 1937 in Philadelphia and attended Pennsylvania State University. Polak’s business was the Trojan Book Service. He served as executive secretary of the Janus Society in the early 1960s and as president later in the decade. In 1969, Polak moved to Los Angeles where he founded an art gallery, wrote art criticism for the *Los Angeles Weekly*, and invested in apartment buildings. Polak committed suicide in September 1980 in Los Angeles.
Polak recognized the profound importance of homoerotic images to gay men, and saw publishing such images as a political statement. He wrote: "I have attempted to produce a magazine that illustrated—rather than pontificated on—the philosophy that, to use a cliche, it's OK to be gay." So Polak refused to hide male genitalia behind the togs that draped the models appearing in physique magazines of the same and earlier eras.

Polak published full-page photographs of naked young men. Although none of the photos showed men engaging in sexual activity, they clearly were aimed at bringing sexual pleasure to readers. The eight-page inserts were stapled in the center of the copies of Drum that were distributed by mail. The photo inserts did not appear in the copies sold on newsstands, presumably because local newsstand and bookstore owners refused to sell publications containing photographs of naked men. Even so, Polak did not escape censors. Postal authorities seized copies of the March 1966 issue of Drum and sent them to Washington, D.C., to be reviewed by federal officials. After a three-week delay, the officials allowed the magazine to be mailed.

Letters to the editor clearly indicated that readers approved of the homoerotic images. A Los Angeles man wrote: "You are the best combination of knowledge, humor, and a healthy-minded approach to sex and homosexuality around." Polak's journalistic formula was a smashing success. After two years, his magazine had jumped from thirty-six pages to sixty-six and his circulation had reached 10,000—surpassing that of all other gay publications combined. Jim Kepner, who has written for the lesbian and gay press since 1954, said: "Clark was the first editor in the gay press to put real punch in his publication. Drum was factual in its content, but it was never dull. It sparkled with wit and style. People loved it." Drum's assertive editorial stance, similar to The Ladder's, criticized the anti-homosexual disdain that had permeated the gay community during the 1950s. Polak wrote of fellow gay activists: "There is a group of Aunt Marys who have exchanged whatever vigorous defense of homosexual rights there may be for a hyper-conformist we-must-impress-the-straights-that-we-are-as-butch-as-

22. Barbara Harris, For Members Only, March 1966, 1.
24. Polak, memo on the Janus Society board of directors meeting, 28 October 1964. The memo is held in the Janus Society file at the International Gay and Lesbian Archives.
25. Author's interview with Jim Kepner, 8 September 1993, during which Kepner was in his home in Los Angeles. Kepner is founder and curator of the International Gay and Lesbian Archives, the largest collection of lesbian and gay material in the world.
they-are stance. It is a sellout.”26 Polak also attacked gays and lesbians who said they had no problems as long as they did not flaunt their sexual orientation: “Individuals who pass for straight in the way that light-skinned Negroes pass for white are paying an extremely high price for their homosexuality.”27

**Homosexual Citizen Speaks from the Nation’s Capital**

In 1966, a third militant voice began speaking for the lesbians and gay men of Washington, D.C. The *Homosexual Citizen’s* 400 monthly issues were produced by volunteers from the Mattachine Society of Washington.28 The editor was Lilli M. Vincenz, who had two years of experience working as a production editor for Prentice-Hall Publishers in New York City. While editing the *Homosexual Citizen*, Vincenz worked as a technical typist and editorial secretary.29

In the first issue, Vincenz discussed the juxtaposition of “homosexual” and “citizen” to create the magazine’s title:

> These words must seem irreconcilable to the prejudiced. All we can say is that these people will be surprised—for patriotism and responsible participation in our American democracy are certainly not monopolized by white Anglo-Saxon Protestant heterosexuals.30

The dominant voice in the *Homosexual Citizen* was that of Franklin E. Kameny, one of the most strident advocates of gay and lesbian liberation in the history of the Gay and Lesbian Liberation Movement. Kameny earned a doctoral degree in astronomy from Harvard University and began working for the U.S.

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26. Polak, “The Issue,” *Drum*, September 1966, 52. Some gay men refer to other gay men in female terms, such as “Aunt Marys.” The action is a form of thumbing their nose at conventional gender roles. Likewise, some gay men use the term “butch” to describe mannerisms of masculine men.
28. The Mattachine Society was founded in Los Angeles in 1950 as the first national organization for gay men. It dissolved as a national organization in March 1961. Franklin E. Kameny and Jack Nichols then founded the Mattachine Society of Washington as a local organization. “Mattachines” were court jesters who performed during medieval times and today are thought to have been gay.
29. Vincenz was born in 1937 in Hamburg, Germany. She received her Phi Beta Kappa key while earning bachelor’s degrees in French and German from Douglas College in New Jersey and her masters degree in English from Columbia University. While editing the *Homosexual Citizen*, Vincenz used the pseudonym Lily Hansen. After the *Homosexual Citizen* ceased publication, she wrote a column for GAY, a New York City weekly newspaper. Vincenz opened a psychotherapy practice in 1976 and earned a Ph.D. in human development from the University of Maryland in 1990. She practices psychotherapy in Arlington, Va.
Army Map Service in Washington in 1956. But after a year, he was fired from his job because of his sexual orientation. Kameny fought the case all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which in March 1961 refused to hear his case. Eight months later, Kameny founded the Mattachine Society of Washington, the first organization in the country to take a pro-active stance on securing homosexual civil rights. Kameny then earned his livelihood working for private government contractors that would hire someone who could not obtain a security clearance. None of the jobs challenged Kameny intellectually, allowing him to pour his considerable talent and energy into gay rights efforts. Looking back on the 1960s, a gay newspaper of the 1970s said: “Kameny is to the United States Government with respect to homosexuals what Ralph Nader is to General Motors with respect to automobile safety.”

Kameny’s assertiveness was reflected in the *Homosexual Citizen*’s editorial content. Speaking with the unwavering self-confidence that has characterized his many contributions to the movement, Kameny recently recalled:

> The ideology of the *Homosexual Citizen* can be perfectly summarized in three words: Activist. Militant. Radical.

> Those were dirty words in 1966, but that’s who we were. We were at the cutting edge of the movement. Washington set the pace and wrote our own agenda. The *Homosexual Citizen* reflected our activism—the unifying and protesting mindset on the vanguard of the movement. That sums it up completely.

The other powerful voice in the *Homosexual Citizen* was that of Jack Nichols. Nichols helped Kameny place the Mattachine Society of Washington at the forefront of the Gay and Lesbian Liberation Movement, serving as co-founder and vice-president of the society. In the 1960s, Nichols, a handsome man who stands 6-foot-3-inches tall, became a spokesman for gay and lesbian America. He lectured on university campuses and appeared on radio and television programs – often in the face of public hostility. In 1967, Nichols appeared on a CBS television documentary about homosexuality. The next day he was fired from his job as a sales manager for the International Inn in Washington.


32. Author’s interview with Kameny, 24 January 1993.

33. Nichols was born in 1938 in Washington. He dropped out of school before receiving his high school diploma. While writing for the *Homosexual Citizen*,...
Nichols’s intense passion and graceful writing style combined to create rousing messages reminiscent of the inspirational words written by Thomas Paine two centuries earlier. Nichols wrote:

When homosexuals stand up in a positive fashion for their rights, when they take their destiny into their own hands to make a world for themselves and for their fellows that is free of fear, confusion, and discrimination, they are casting aside their own fear and confronting the forces of darkness and despair with a healthy vigor. They cannot help but benefit from their assertion of human freedom and dignity.  

**Promoting Public Demonstrations**

The most visible expression of the new gay aggressiveness came through direct-action protesting. Beginning in the spring of 1965, Gittings and Lahusen from *The Ladder*, Polak from *Drum*, and Vincenz, Kameny, and Nichols from the *Homosexual Citizen* all engaged in a new type of social activism. In addition to crafting defiant prose at their typewriters, they also began carrying hand-painted signs in picket lines. They became the first women and men in American history to conduct public demonstrations to protest unfair treatment of lesbians and gay men. Their protests should be viewed in the context of the times. Only a month before they formed their first picket, some 20,000 Americans participated in a massive march on Washington in protest of the Vietnam War.

Nichols organized the first history-making gay march in the nation’s capital on 29 May 1965. He recently recalled:

That was the first public demonstration by members of a gay organization. It signaled a new direction in our struggle for equal rights. We were leading the country by, for

Nichols used the pseudonym Warren D. Adkins. In 1968, Nichols and his lover, Lige Clarke, began writing the “Homosexual Citizen” column, the first gay journalistic work to appear in a mainstream publication, for *Screw* newspaper in New York City. A year later, Nichols and Clarke became founding editors of *GAY*, one of the spate of sensationalistic tabloids that burst onto the sidewalks of New York in the wake of the Stonewall Rebellion. They published the weekly newspaper for four years. Nichols has published four books, *I Have More Fun With You Than With Anybody* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1972) and *Roommates Can’t Always Be Lovers: An Intimate Guide to Male-Male Relationships* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1974), both co-authored with Clarke; *Men’s Liberation: A New Definition of Masculinity* (New York: Penguin, 1975); *Welcome to Fire Island: Visions of Cherry Grove and the Pines* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1976). Today Nichols works as a motel clerk in Cocoa Beach, Fla.

35. The Vietnam War march took place 17 April 1965, organized by the Students for a Democratic Society.
the first time, actively seeking to secure our civil liberties. We were finished paying lip service to heterosexual America.\(^{36}\)

The goal of the first group of marchers—three women and seven men—was to raise the public profile of homosexuality and pressure federal officials to lift the ban on employing gays in the government and military.

Such protests are commonplace today, but the first one was extraordinary. Vincenz recalled:

> People had no idea that homosexuals look just like everyone else. And we went out of our way to dress properly—skirts and stockings for the women, suits and ties for the men—so that no one could say we were disgusting rabble, the way they did about the anti-Vietnam protesters. We were well dressed and well groomed. So we defied all the myths. Pedestrians just stopped and stared at us. They were absolutely awe-struck.\(^{37}\)

The protest was the first in a series—May at the White House and then the United Nations Building in New York, June at Civil Service Commission headquarters in Washington, July at Independence Hall in Philadelphia and the Pentagon in Washington, and August at the State Department. By the time the marchers returned to the White House in October, their numbers had swollen to sixty.\(^{38}\)

But a much larger audience was available through the publications written by the same activists. Although the mainstream press largely ignored the demonstrations and their underlying themes, they became major news in *The Ladder, Drum,* and the *Homosexual Citizen.* Gittings showcased the protests by placing photos of the picket lines on her cover, and all three editors provided in-depth coverage that included statements by participants, detailed accounts of how the police and public responded, and summaries of what the mainstream news media published—when they reported the events at all.\(^{39}\)

The advocacy journalists wrote editorials about how direct action would advance the movement. Polak said in 1965: “Picketing is, to date, the most effective method yet found to promote the movement, and it serves to show homosexuals in every corner of the country that someone is sympathetic to

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36. Author’s 10 March 1993 telephone interview with Jack Nichols, who was in his home in Cocoa Beach, Fla. For coverage of the April march, see *The Ladder,* “Cross-Currents,” May 1965, 22.
39. For an example of *The Ladder* highlighting the picket lines by publishing cover photos of them, see the October 1965 issue.
them.” Gittings recently recalled: “Those pickets were our earliest form of confrontation. As a lesbian, I felt very proud that I was able to be on the vanguard, both as a participant and as an editor who could spread the word to thousands of others who weren’t yet ready to take to the streets.”

The journalists expanded far beyond who-what-when-where coverage. They reproduced the messages on the placards — “Employment Based Upon Competence, Ability, Training; NOT Upon Private Life” and “Equal Opportunity for All Means ALL” — and the supportive comments from passers-by—“I give them credit for what they’re doing” and “That’s a good-looking group. I’m surprised.” Lahusen concluded her five-page account of the Fourth of July picketing by saying: “This dignified protest, which startled many a citizen into fresh thought about the meaning of Independence Day, might well have been applauded by our Founding Fathers, who were intent on making America safe for the differences.”

The publications were soon able to report on yet another angle of the public demonstrations: impact. Since 1962, Kameny had tried repeatedly to meet with U.S. Civil Service Commission officials to discuss the ban on gays in the federal workforce. Finally, two months after the picketing at the commission headquarters — four years after Kameny had begun his effort—he had his meeting. It was another decade before the ban was officially lifted, but gay journalists could rightfully boast that their public demonstrations and editorial pressure had hastened the process.

Reporting from a Gay and Lesbian Perspective

The articles written to promote public demonstrations led the journalists to commit more of their time, energy, and editorial space to news. The publications of the 1950s had summarized news events in columns of news briefs; the new generation expanded coverage to full and comprehensive news articles. For the first time in American history, gay people began reading the news of the day not from the hostile viewpoint of mainstream newspapers, but from the supportive perspective of their very own press.

41. Author’s interview with Gittings, 10 September 1993.
43. Tobin (Lahusen), “Picketing: The Impact & The Issues,” The Ladder, September 1965, 4-5.
45. Franklin E. Kameny, Homosexual Citizen, “MSW Meets with Civil Service Commission,” May 1966, 7-8; “Security Clearances for Homosexual Citizens,” March 1966, 12-13. On 3 July 1975, the U.S. Civil Service Commission announced that homosexuals would no longer be excluded from federal employment. At the same time, some divisions of the federal government began granting security clearances to gays. There has never been a formal announcement of that change, however, and the CIA and FBI are still reluctant to grant clearances to gays and lesbians.
While news items were neither flowery in style nor hysterical in tone, they followed the advocacy tradition established by the early nineteenth century African-American press and revived by the twentieth century feminist and counterculture press. In short, lesbian and gay writers saw news columns as an appropriate arena for interpretation.

Rather than simply reporting that residents of Brooklyn Heights, New York, were attempting to force gays out of their neighborhood, the Homosexual Citizen characterized the residents as “initiating a vendetta” against gay residents.\(^\text{46}\) Likewise, in an article about the FBI, Nichols referred to agents as “Federal Bedbugging Investigators.”\(^\text{47}\) And when Nichols reported that Baltimore officials had banned dancing between members of the same sex, he did not stop with that fact. The agile writer quoted a city official as saying he was not opposed to homosexuals having a good time but, “‘We just want to control it.’” Nichols then added his own aside to the reader— “whatever that may mean.”\(^\text{48}\)

On the rare occasion that the new aggressiveness led to a judicial victory, the advocacy journalists used the opportunity to point out the progress that could occur when people asserted their rights. After lesbians and gays who were refused accommodations at a Washington hotel filed a discrimination suit and won a $500 out-of-court settlement, Kameny wrote boastfully of the incident:

> It demonstrates, clearly, that homosexuals are not going to tolerate abrogation of their rights, or treatment as second-class persons. The Manger-Hamilton [Hotel] apparently felt that a formal contract, entered into with a homophile organization, could be violated with impunity. They have been shown otherwise.\(^\text{49}\)

The gay perspective was particularly important when sensational incidents sent the mainstream press into overdrive. In 1964, Walter Jenkins, an aide to President Lyndon Johnson, was caught in the bathroom of a Washington YMCA with another man. Jenkins’s arrest created a national scandal, ultimately forcing him to resign from the administration. As mainstream reporters around the country recited the lurid details of the incident, Drum’s Polak raised a question that had not appeared in other publications, although it was on the minds of gays and lesbians nationwide. He asked rhetorically: “Will this bring

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\(^\text{49}\) Kameny, “Hamilton Hotel Settles,” Homosexual Citizen, June 1966, 3. “Homophile” was a term used, largely during the 1950s and 1960s, to describe an organization dedicated to the study of homosexuality.
another McCarthy witch-hunt."^^50 Unrestrained by the limitations of objectivity, the advocacy journalist went on to insist that the climate of the times had changed radically in the ten years since McCarthyism had subsided. In a firm response to his own question, Polak wrote, "Let those who might attempt such a witch-hunt clearly recognize that homosexuals are NOW prepared to take a stand."^^51

The Homosexual Citizen's Washington location resulted in a plethora of items documenting the inhospitable attitude toward gays in the nation's capital, such as congressmen ridiculing gay men during congressional hearings.^^52 News accounts also described events in other parts of the country. Extensive coverage was allotted to gay leaders meeting in New York and Kansas City to set a national agenda and to Illinois becoming the first state to decriminalize sodomy.^^53 Nichols also reported that New York City activists had filed a complaint charging that Julius's Bar in Greenwich Village discriminated against gay patrons and that a Miami man had challenged a city ordinance prohibiting gay men from gathering in bars.^^54

The Ladder adhered most closely to the conventions of mainstream journalism, with Gittings as editor and Lahusen as ace reporter emerging as a formidable journalistic team. Their professionalism was illustrated by an incident that occurred at a 1964 conference of militant East Coast activists in Washington. As the leaders prepared to begin a panel discussion on gays and the church, a member of the American Nazi Party entered the conference room. Relying on her Christian Science Monitor experience, Lahusen later recreated the incident in The Ladder, using the telegraphic style of a professional reporter:

He is blond, good-looking, well-built, quietly dressed. He is self-confident and smiling. He speaks with a southern accent. He carries a huge pink gift-wrapped box marked QUEER CONVENTION. Two of his cohorts wait outside the door. A LADDER reporter flips a switch and makes the only tape recording of the Nazi incident.^^55

51. Ibid.
The article reproduced the verbatim transcript of the altercation that Lahusen had taped, complete with the intruder’s references to “kikes” and “queers.” The alert newswoman followed up on the story by reporting that the young Nazi was arrested by a plainclothes police officer, charged with disorderly conduct, and fined $10.56

Fighting Back Against the Establishment Media

While such events were the stuff of headlines in the gay press, mainstream newspapers generally ignored them. Neither the New York Times nor Kansas City Star covered the national gay planning conferences in their respective cities, even though the events marked the largest meetings of homosexuals in American history up to that time,57 and neither the Washington Post nor Washington Evening Star covered the White House or Pentagon demonstrations in 1965.58

Gradually, however, the establishment media began to yield to a curiosity about the mysterious world of homosexuality, and a smattering of articles began appearing in the country’s leading publications. In 1963, the New York Times published an alarmist front-page article titled “Growth of Overt Homosexuality In City Provokes Wide Concern.”59 In 1964, Life magazine gave readers a titillating ten-page glimpse into the secret lives of gay men.60 In 1965, a five-part series on the front page of the Washington Post took readers on a voyeuristic tour of gay life.61 In 1966, Time magazine used the essay format to vilify homosexuality, writing: “It deserves no encouragement, no glamorization, no rationalization, no fake status as minority martyrdom, no sophistry about

56. Ibid.
58. No articles about the 29 May 1965 White House picketing were published in the Washington Post or Washington Evening Star, 29 May-4 June 1965. No articles about the 23 October 1965 White House picketing were published in the Post or Star, 23-27 October 1965. No articles about the 21 May 1966 White House and Pentagon demonstrations were published in the Post or Star, 21-25 May 1966.
simple differences in taste—and, above all, no pretense that it is anything but a pernicious sickness.”  

As such denigrating articles began to appear in mainstream publications, journalists working in the gay press grew increasingly concerned with the quality of the emerging mainstream news coverage. They were particularly frustrated by the hostile tone in which articles were written. In an attempt to counteract the influence of the articles, the advocacy journalists began analyzing and de-constructing articles appearing in establishment publications, alerting their readers to the techniques that reporters and editors were using to communicate negative messages about homosexuality.

In response to the essay in Time, The Ladder published a scathing letter to the editor by Kameny—a letter that Time had refused to print. Kameny wrote: “The entire essay is pervaded by loose, superficial reasoning used to justify pre-determined conclusions, and by a dread of seeing change in an outmoded and gravely harmful status quo.” Life’s article prompted Lahusen to write: “Those homosexuals who are quiet-living, constructive people get short shrift in the article. The most sensationalistic touch was the big chunk of space devoted to depicting police entrapment techniques in Los Angeles.”

Perhaps the most remarkable of the rebukes was The Ladder’s detailed critique of the front-page New York Times article. The author walked his readers through the story paragraph by paragraph, dissecting each phrase:

From a journalistic viewpoint, this passage is shocking. “A homosexual who had achieved good progress toward cure through psychoanalysis”—note the plug for analysis, the pat-on-the-back air of “good progress,” the implication that here is a worthy witness because he’s going to the doctor to be cured—“recently told his analyst”—unnamed even though he is being cited as an authority. This is news reporting?

The advocacy journalists also fought back against the mainstream press through satire. After Life published its “Homosexuality in America” article, Polak published an article—written under the name “P. Arody”—titled “Heterosexuality In America.” Employing hyperbole to achieve his satire, Polak wrote: “Heterosexuality shears across the spectrum of American life—the professions, the arts, business and labor. It always has. But today, especially in big cities, heterosexuals are openly admitting, even flaunting, their deviation.”

End of an Era

Despite their groundbreaking efforts, the outspoken gay magazines were not destined for long life. Gittings’s and Lahusen’s tenure at The Ladder was the first to end. As they used the publication to lead the Gay and Lesbian Liberation Movement toward a more assertive stance, their relationship with the leadership of the Daughters of Bilitis became acrimonious. One issue surrounded the words “for adults only” that had appeared on the magazine’s cover since its founding. As part of her revamping of the magazine, Gittings wanted to remove the disclaimer. She recalled: “But the Daughters of Bilitis was still running scared—stuck in the past.”67 The procedures were for Gittings to have the magazine printed on the East Coast and then to send the printed copies to DOB headquarters in San Francisco to be distributed. So in January 1965, she simply removed the disclaimer from the cover, had the copies printed, and sent them west. When the magazines arrived in San Francisco, DOB officers were outraged. They chastised Gittings for making such a radical change without their approval, and then hand stamped “for adults only” on every copy before distributing them. After three-and-a-half years of such disputes, the old guard removed Gittings from the editor’s position in 1966 and reverted to a more conformist editorial philosophy.68

Drum’s difficulties were legal. In March 1967, Polak was arrested and charged with publishing and distributing obscene material, and the charges ultimately led to an eighteen-count indictment by a federal grand jury.69 To avoid a prison sentence, Polak agreed to cease publishing Drum and move to California.70

The Homosexual Citizen’s fatal conflicts were, like The Ladder’s, internal. Throughout the publication’s first seventeen issues, Vincenz had free rein to determine the editorial content of the magazine. After the May 1967 issue had been published, however, Kameny and other members of the Executive Board of the Mattachine Society of Washington voted to reject an article that Vincenz already had accepted for the next issue. The article involved astrology—a subject that most astronomers, including Kameny, denounce. Vincenz thought the article’s application of astrological interpretation to gay men and lesbians would amuse readers; Kameny said the article was irrelevant to the struggle for civil rights. Rather than discuss the difference of opinion, Kameny and the board simply rejected the article without allowing Vincenz to defend her decision.

67. Author’s interview with Gittings, 10 September 1993.
68. Author’s interview with Gittings, 10 September 1993; D’Emilio, Sexual Politics, 171; Tobin (Lahusen) and Wicker, Gay Crusaders, 215. According to the author’s 8 September 1993 interview with Del Martin, she and Phyllis Lyon saw the dispute in somewhat different terms. Although they acknowledge that they differed over the editorial philosophy of The Ladder, Martin said Gittings was chronically late sending copies of the magazine. After Gittings was removed as editor, Martin temporarily resumed that position.
70. Author’s interview with Kepner, 8 September 1993.
Vincenz resented Kameny’s unilateral action, prompting her to resign from her editorship. The *Homosexual Citizen* never published another issue.71

**Conclusions**

The lesbian and gay press of the early to mid 1960s defined the beginning of militancy within the Gay and Lesbian Liberation Movement; the same leaders who lifted hand-lettered signs against homophobia also employed their skills as communicators to spread an ideology of defiance and promote direct-action protests in the pages of *The Ladder*, *Drum*, and the *Homosexual Citizen*. In addition, this new breed of advocacy journalists broke fresh ground by creating the first news articles written from a gay perspective and by exposing the homophobic reporting that dominated mainstream news media.

When these first defiant lesbian and gay publications are considered in the broad context of alternative presses, several important themes emerge. First, the magazines which promoted picketing were reminiscent of nineteenth century African-American newspapers which were a driving force in the rise of protests against racial injustice.72 Likewise, protest leaders also served as editors of movement publications, similar to the duality of roles among the early black press, women’s suffrage press, and women’s liberation press.73 And, finally, lesbian and gay press coverage of events from a perspective unique to their

71. On the editorial dispute, see Lilli Vincenz memorandum to the Executive Board, Mattachine Society of Washington, 1 June 1967, file marked “Homophile Correspondence,” Lilli Vincenz personal papers; undated manuscript marked “Astrology and the Homosexual,” file marked “Homophile Correspondence,” Vincenz personal papers; Richard A. Inman letter to Vincenz, 13 August 1967, file marked “Inman Correspondence,” Vincenz personal papers. Inman was president of the Mattachine Society of Florida.


readers paralleled the same theme that has been identified as one defining the women's liberation press of the same decade.74

At the same time that the gay and lesbian press was reinforcing these various themes that had defined other forms of alternative journalism, it was simultaneously breaking new ground by demonstrating characteristics that were unique to it. This new journalistic genre clearly had no intention of merely mimicking what had come before it. The most visible difference was the eight pages of photographs of naked men that appeared each month in *Drum*. This insert foreshadowed the prominence that homoerotic images would have in the gay press of future decades. Clark P. Polak, like the gay journalists who would follow him, understood and was committed to reflecting the value gay men placed on homoerotic images. To a lesser degree, Barbara Gittings’s decision to place images of beautiful lesbians on the cover of *The Ladder* reiterated this same value, as those more restrained photographs also were published for the pleasure of the magazine’s readers. Another theme distinctive to the gay press that was introduced by the 1960s magazines was that of seeking to amuse as well as to inform. Polak’s commitment to putting a creative punch into *Drum* showed that gay publications, unlike most advocacy journals, do not always confine themselves to polemical rhetoric but also include a smattering of columns and other editorial material—spiced with wit and style—that add a light-hearted, whimsical tone to them.

Other distinctive themes in the gay and lesbian press that surfaced during the 1960s were less positive. The sexual content of *Drum* raised the specter of the censor and showed that the collision of homoerotic images and the government’s legal arm would be a continuing troublespot for the gay press. In addition, the experiences of the militant publications demonstrated that a high level of discord from inside the gay and lesbian press also would be a recurring problem. Fractious ideological disputes within the staff of the *Homosexual Citizen* killed that publication; Lilli Vincenz allowed her magazine to die rather than accept Frank Kameny’s dictatorial style. Internecine battles with the old guard also resulted in Gittings’s departure from *The Ladder*, ending the editorship that had, three years earlier, led the lesbian and gay press into its aggressive phase.

Although the gay militancy of the early to mid 1960s was soon eclipsed by the dramatic events that erupted in 1969 when the Stonewall Rebellion ignited the modern phase of the Gay and Lesbian Liberation Movement and sensationalistic tabloids burst onto the streets of New York, the era and the publications that led it played a crucial role in the evolution of the movement.75 Kameny recently stated:

75. The Stonewall Rebellion began the night of 27 June 1969 when New York City police raided the Stonewall Inn in Greenwich Village, and hundreds of drag queens and other gay men and lesbians fought back, first by jeering at the police and then by throwing coins, rocks, bottles, and a parking meter or two. Several days of rioting followed the incident. On the rebellion, see Martin Duberman, *Stonewall* (New York: Dutton, 1993), 181-212.
It was very much a continuum. Expressing our outrage in those early publications laid the psychological groundwork for what was to come. The Ladder, the Homosexual Citizen—they created the mindset. Everything builds on everything else.

If we had not aroused the consciousness of gay people, it is very likely that Stonewall would not have occurred. We simply would not have had the riot at Stonewall—nor the beginning of the modern Gay Movement—had it not been for the work that was initiated by the militant gay press of the mid 60s.  

The author is a professor of journalism in the School of Communication, American University. His book, Unspeakable: The Rise of the Gay and Lesbian Press in America, is scheduled to be published by Faber and Faber in November.

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76. Author’s interview with Kameny, 24 January 1993.
Research Essay:

Dorothy Thompson as ‘Liberal Conservative’ Columnist: Gender, Politics, and Journalistic Authority

By Loretta Stec

In the most effective of feminist writings Mrs. Virginia Woolf has said that to write books one needs five hundred a year and a room of one’s own; but it is unfortunately nearly as true that one needs five hundred a year and a room of one’s own to read The Times thoroughly and intelligently.

—Rebecca West, 1932

Virginia Woolf asks in Three Guineas, “What possible satisfaction can dominance give to the dominator?”1 In one of the extended footnotes to her argument about the psychological motives of male dominance, Woolf suggests one method women can use to combat dominance in the home and, by analogy, dominance by political dictators. In her typically understated way, Woolf says: “Laughter as an antidote to dominance is perhaps indicated.”

In the year after Three Guineas was published, 1939, Dorothy Thompson, a highly influential syndicated columnist and political journalist in the United States, found herself on the way to a speaking engagement near Madison Square Garden. She decided to “drop in” on the rally in progress of the German-American Bund, a pro-Nazi association, which had drawn an audience of 22,000 to the Garden that night. Thompson took a seat “in the front row of the press gallery and commenced to interrupt the speakers with strident gales of

raucous laughter,” infuriating the American Nazis to the point that their Storm Troopers, aided by New York City policemen, evicted her from the hall.2 This protest against fascist dominance was an atypical and yet effective strategy of resistance for Thompson, a leader of anti-fascist thinking in the United States before and during World War II. What is strikingly different about this protest from her usual methods of resistance is its non-linguistic character. The New Yorker, in its report about this incident3 claimed that the response of the Bund members was indicative of “the irritation any group of solemn men [feel when] confronted with a lady laughing in a superior and exasperating manner.” I take this to be Woolf’s point exactly. The New Yorker then suggests that this situation “came down to a war of sex rather than ideology,” as if the two were somehow separable; the New Yorker comment clearly undermines Thompson’s political critique by interpreting the incident as primarily “about” gender rather than a dramatization of conflicting political ideologies.

The entanglements of gender and ideology compromised Thompson’s ability to protest and act as a progressive force when she participated in the linguistic realm of political journalism: the possibilities and limits of her voice were defined by her position as a woman trying to gain power in the male-dominated media, as a columnist (rather than a news correspondent), and as an advocate of particular political affiliations. Thompson had run European news bureaus, and had interviewed Hitler in 1931; in 1934 she was the first American journalist to be evicted from Germany, by edict of Hitler himself. She was hired in 1936 to write a column three times a week for the New York Herald Tribune. This column, called “On The Record,” reached a peak syndicated circulation of 10 million; through it, Thompson enjoyed a tremendous amount of what we might see as indirect political power, or ideological power. She used her column to argue in strong terms for the positions she believed in, and in this way commanded an influence few women in the United States at the time enjoyed. In 1940, the cover story of Time magazine remarked that next to Eleanor Roosevelt, Thompson “was undoubtedly the most influential” woman in the United States.4 Thompson’s ability to reach such a wide audience, to achieve and maintain the power she had in the 1930s and 1940s was, however, dependent upon the media establishment. Her role as a leading political voice in the nation involved her in a series of contradictions and difficulties that demanded she uphold a conservative ideology, in response to the negative changes of fascism, but also in response to positive changes in women’s roles. In her writing, Thompson was unable to make so pure a protest against dominance as laughing in the face of Nazi sympathizers.

As Roger Fowler argues, “what is overwhelmingly important” to the content of the journalism we read “is the fact that newspaper publication is an industry and a business, with a definite place in the nation’s and the world’s

economic affairs." What newspapers print and what range of opinions they tolerate depend to a large extent on their need to make a profit. It is no surprise that newspapers, as an industry, most often inscribe a conservative politics and point of view. Roger Fowler explains that, "[T]he British press is almost without exception strongly Tory in its political views . . . there is no successful socialist newspaper: the latter would be a contradiction in terms." This conservatism was certainly true of newspapers in the United States in the '30s and '40s, especially the New York Herald Tribune. The Herald Tribune was for years "the most prominent and respectable right-wing newspaper in America, 'a blindly conservative foe of social change,' and the tool, generally speaking, of the eastern Republican establishment."

The New York Herald Tribune, like most other newspapers beholden to their advertisers for revenue, printed fewer and fewer controversial editorials, along with fewer and fewer news stories about controversial issues, as the century progressed. During the Depression, newspapers became even more concerned with not offending advertisers. The newspapers tended to sanitize the news, under the guise of "objectivity," as they became more and more the tools of capitalists. This was true even of the editorial pages, whose function was, ostensibly, to provide space for interpretation, opinion, and controversy about the news. Newspaper editors tended to follow the doctrine of "Praise God and Support the Republican Party." In 1944, Charles Fisher called this process the "emasculating of the country's editorial pages." He claimed that editors might take "a positive stand . . . for the hygienic home, and for legally certified motherhood. But for the rest, docility was counseled, and resistance to change." This "emasculating" of the editorial pages was not a "feminization" of those pages; rather, the role of women, according to Fisher, was the one thing editors felt a safe topic upon which to pronounce. Women should keep clean homes, and not have babies (i.e., sex) out of wedlock. There was no danger of losing advertisers with these opinions, for who would disagree about women's place and tasks? The home cleaned by a woman without wages, and the institution of marriage were beneficial to capitalism, and no advertisers would protest against these editorial opinions. The New York Herald Tribune and other papers acted on these opinions by hiring very few women journalists.

As the editorial page became a site of less and less controversy, the page opposite the editorial, or Op-Ed, page, was charged with the function of providing independent and engaging opinions to readers. "The syndicated columnist . . . was a magic answer for an industry made cowardly by the quest
Ironically, Thompson was one of the columnists hired by the New York Herald Tribune to “remasculate” the editorial pages with her authoritative voice. Thompson was chosen for the column by Helen Rogers Reid, undoubtedly because of her international fame, but also because her opinions tended to adhere quite closely to the conservative affiliations of the New York Herald Tribune. The paper billed her as a spokesperson for a new “liberal conservatism” – an ambiguous phrase that attempted to cover the range of her thinking, and which I believe indicates some of the contradictions in her voice and political affiliations. Throughout her years of work as a columnist, she continually negotiated her shifting political views with those of the New York Herald Tribune policy, necessarily negotiating the progressive possibilities of a woman’s voice reaching a large audience and the limits on those possibilities by institutional structures, and the discourses of the institutions through which she spoke.

The bold statements of Thompson’s column were interpreted differently than those of the male editors and publishers whose editorials were replaced by syndicated columns. While the male editors were “virile,” Thompson was often called “hysterical” and overly emotional and was subject to jibes about her insistent and authoritative style. For example, the collection of some of her columns from 1936-39, entitled Let the Record Speak, was renamed by a reviewer “Let the Record Shout.” “She was dismissed as a ‘woman’. . . when she could not be dismissed any other way.” Let the Record Speak is a moving, blow-by-blow account of the diplomatic and political incidents that led up to the official start of World War II. It records in strong terms Thompson’s anti-fascism, along with her early, anti-isolationist position which was unpopular with Democrats and Republicans alike. For example, seven months before the appeasement of Munich, after Hitler’s coercion of the Austrian Chancellor into a consolidation of the two countries, Thompson began her column in this way:

Write it down. On Saturday February 12, 1938, Germany won the world war. . . Write it down. On Saturday, February 12, 1938, Naziism started on the march across all of Europe east of the Rhine. Write it down that what not even the leaders of the German army could stomach – they protested, they resigned, they lost their posts—so-called Christian and democratic civilization accepted, without risking one drop of brave blood. Write it down that the democratic world broke its promises and its oaths, and capitulated, not before strength, but before terrible weakness, armed only with ruthlessness and

11. Kurth, 220.
audacity. . . And it never needed to have happened. One strong voice of one strong power could have stopped it.¹⁵

Thompson clearly refers to the United States as one of the “strong powers,” in addition to England and France, who could have prevented the incorporation of Austria by Germany.

The New York Herald Tribune agreed with her anti-fascism, and tolerated her anti-isolationism, I believe, because of the discourse she used to make these and other arguments in her column. Along with providing a forum for her anti-fascism, Thompson used her column to argue for the preservation of American conservative values such as the sanctity of the Christian religion, family, individual self-sufficiency and “self-realization.”¹⁶ According to Thompson, the basis of democracy is “the conception of man as a child of God, that is to say, as a soul capable of choice, capable of reason, capable of developing and perfecting himself in the image of the ideal.”¹⁷ She opposed this idea to the notion of humans as the products of economic conditions or genetic characteristics. The daughter of a Methodist minister, Thompson saw democracy as providing opportunities for the fulfillment of individual potential. Her attitude was presented in discourse common to conservative thinkers. Her reliance upon Christian religion and morality also provided a foundation for her authority as a woman leader. She based her own claims of a voice on the moral righteousness of her position, in the way many women did in the abolition, temperance, and suffrage struggles. She dramatized this role, for example, when she sent a telegram to Harold Nicolson, British M.P., on the eve of World War II calling for a prayer session in Parliament to strengthen Britain’s “glorious Christian resistance.” She sent a similar telegram to Truman in spring of 1948, calling for a “day of national prayer” in response to the spread of communism in Europe.”¹⁸ This spiritual foundation for her politics led her to espouse views much less progressive than her anti-fascism.

For example, Thompson’s belief in individual achievement led to a stubborn hostility to organized labor, and an antipathy to the methods and purposes of FDR’s New Deal – often spying “fascism” behind them. Because of these opinions, “she was accused of having deserted her own liberal principles in the interest of winning fame and the approbation of the rich.”¹⁹ The level of conscious choice involved in this “desertion” is impossible to determine; I suggest however, that Thompson was only able to achieve the fame, audience, and influence she did by modulating her progressive opinions with conservative ones that appealed to the “rich” who ran the media world.

¹⁵ Thompson, Let the Record Speak, 133-36.
¹⁷ Ibid., 278.
¹⁸ Kurth, 395.
¹⁹ Ibid., 234-36.
In addition to an insensitivity to class issues, Thompson demonstrated a remarkable conservatism in gender politics, despite her position as a professional, authoritative woman. An article entitled “The World-- and Women” written for her column in The Ladies’ Home Journal demonstrates this aspect of her conservatism. In it she argues that women will eventually be the saviors of the world by reviving what she calls “the liberal spirit”:

For what is common sense except sense and community, the individual and society, the person and humanity, not in contradiction, but in union, organically united, as the family is, or once was? Someday, when women realize that the object of their emancipation is not to make them more like men, but more powerfully womanly, and therefore of greater use to men and themselves and society, [they] may break through as the most important influence upon history and bring with it a renascence of liberalism and humanism.20

Thompson here advocates the doctrine of separate spheres as one of the fulfillments of the American liberal tradition. Thompson wanted women to fulfill their function as a “conservative influence, cherishing, nurturing, and developing the best that we have in our individual and social experience.”21 Thompson clearly played a conservative function herself in gender relations by advocating that women play first and foremost a maternal role in society, a role she is often accused of neglecting in her personal life. (Her marriage with Sinclair Lewis can by most measures be considered less than successful; their son Michael had a quite difficult childhood.)22

Interestingly, Thompson did not follow the pattern of separate spheres that the New York Herald Tribune set out for her. Helen Reid imagined her column as one about domestic and international problems, “written so that women could easily understand it and would not always have to be seeking information from their husbands.”23 Thompson took on the assignment, but did not follow Reid’s vision; she spoke to all potential readers, regardless of gender. Except in the cases in which she addresses women directly, even her columns in the Ladies’ Home Journal show little if any mark of gender difference in their mode of discourse or address. In this sense, Thompson refused to create a separation of spheres in the production or consumption of her own journalism while at the same time arguing for it in those very columns.

Thompson hewed to the conservative line on most domestic issues, and the years from 1936 to 1940 were the years of her greatest influence. When

21. Quoted in Kurth, 239.
22. See Kurth, passim.
Thompson strayed from the conservatism of the New York Herald Tribune too widely, she ran into trouble. Despite her anti-New Deal sentiment, in 1940, with World War II in its early stages, Thompson decided that the U.S. should elect Roosevelt for a third term to see the war through with an experienced leader. When she switched her allegiance from Republican Wendell Willkie to FDR, “Ogden Reid, her boss at the Herald Tribune [was] nearly driven to apoplexy.”

He refused to print Thompson’s rationale for her opinion, and several months later the Tribune refused to renew her contract for the column. She had “calculated the risk” in supporting FDR, but decided to stick with her conscience and assert her opinion in the face of the institutional limitations of her position as a columnist. She moved to the less prestigious New York Post, where she felt she would now be “preaching to the converted.” She ran into the same dilemma after World War II when she espoused an anti-Zionist position in response to a visit to Palestine in 1947. Thompson lost all of her New York outlets as a result of this opinion, including the Post and marked this incident as the beginning of her decline in influence.

In a column written before her retirement in 1958, Thompson said: “When events have proved me right, I’ve been most unpopular. And when they have proved me wrong, I have been most popular.” Her belief in 1932 that Hitler was a small man who wouldn’t amount to anything was popular; her belief in 1937 and on that Germany would overrun the Western world if the United States did not rearm and stop it, was very unpopular. Another way to say what Thompson said of herself is that when she spoke in a conservative voice she gained power; when she spoke in an oppositional voice she lost power. It is difficult to generalize to all women with public voices, but we suggest that this is a factor in the recent rise of conservative women in prominent positions, including the government, and is a danger for women reliant upon established institutions for their influence (such as academia).

Thompson’s response of laughter to the German-American Bund in Madison Square Garden points up the difficulties of free speech: In a column Thompson called for the outright suppression of the Bund, and then pulled back from that demand for fear of being fascist herself, and going against the Bill of Rights, a fundamental text for her. If she had tried to argue directly with the Bund members, she would have been forced to use the discourse of democracy in trying to dissuade them of their beliefs. Thompson rightly admits that the words in that vocabulary were being used by the Nazis to mean things

24. Kurth, 322.
completely different from her meanings, and she did not want to allow the Nazis to set the terms of the debate as they had at the negotiating sessions of diplomats. As a journalist who was to learn the limits of allowable linguistic protest, she did what she could, and laughed.

The author is an assistant professor of English at San Francisco State University
BROWNE, MALCOLM W. Muddy Boots and Red Socks: A Reporter’s Life

Corry, John. My Times: Adventures in the News Trade

Endres, Kathleen L., ed. Trade, Industrial, and Professional Periodicals of the United States

Gamsong, Joshua. Claims to Fame: Celebrity in Contemporary America

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Salwen, Michael B. and Bruce Garrison. Latin American Journalism

Sloan, William David and Julie Hedgepeth Williams. The Early American Press, 1690-1783

Tucher, Andi. Froth and Scum: Truth, Beauty, Goodness, and the Ax Murder in America’s First Mass Medium

Short Takes. Moving Targets: Women, Murder, and Representation ... American Regulatory Federalism & Telecommunications Infrastructures ... Mass Media in the Middle East ... and more


Foot soldiers rarely write fully realized autobiographies. Rather, the memoir form is probably better suited to retrospection from the trenches. There are perhaps two aspects which make this pair of personal recollections of a lifetime of professional experiences worth reading: (1) Both Browne and Corry attempt to come to terms with working lives spent largely in the service of the *New York Times*. And if one accepts the fundamental importance of the *Times* in determining the terms and tenor of the nation's political and sociocultural discourse, then all insiders' views, even perhaps, especially those from the newspaper's reportorial trenches, are deserving of consideration. (2) Even though the authors' central topic, the self-examined life of a journeyman journalist, is the same, their reflections on whatever meaning might be found therein could not be more different. Hence, they are profitably read together, for there is in some sense a certain symmetry to their unshaped perspectives.

After almost three decades of service to the *Times* (and before that the Associated Press), Browne remains a romantic. There is no question that he clearly regards journalism as an honorable, perhaps even noble, calling. Writing with verve and economy, he often invokes the plucky bravado of the seen-it-all working reporter to make his points. Of his colleagues in the craft, for example, he writes, "More than most people we admire honesty and courage, because we know how rare those qualities are." Similarly, he is unabashed in his claims to believe "deeply in the need for direct personal experience as a prerequisite to rounded reporting."

As one who spent much of his early career as a foreign correspondent, often in war zones, Browne has a wealth of experiences to call on. What is unique in his retelling of them, however, is his enviable ability to strike highly romantic poses without ever seeming to swagger. The first half of the book's title, for instance, is explained with the following passage: "In Vietnam, it was said that there were two kinds of observers, those who heard about the war from others and those with muddy boots. I preferred the latter." (The other half of the title, we are told, refers to the author's trademark sartorial obsession; his passion for red socks apparently matches that of George Will for bowties.)

Mostly though, Browne tells stories - often engagingly, with a sure command of color, description, and narrative. He was the only Western reporter present on the Saigon street corner in 1963 when the Buddhist monk Thich Quang Duc publicly immolated himself to protest the religious persecution of the United States-backed South Vietnamese government. Few of his contemporaries were surprised when, a year later, his reportage on the war won him a Pulitzer Prize. Later assignments took him to South America, Pakistan, and Eastern Europe, and then a second career as the *Times* science correspondent. All in all, the work can perhaps best be regarded as a tale well told of a life well
lived, for which the author is genuinely thankful to both his good fortune and his employers on 43rd Street.

In contrast, Corry is far more reflective than celebratory, more thoughtful than thankful. He, too, is a romantic, but his sense of drama is shaded by an almost involuntary need to wrestle with larger questions. He too also has good stories to tell, but he is more concerned with theme than plot. Perhaps part of the reason for this is that most of his thirty-one years as a reporter at the Times – and, briefly, at the Harper's Magazine of Willie Morris – were spent not in exotic foreign locales, but in a home-office ringside seat dealing with the changing realities of the news trade. A writer of sharp insight and, at times, fierce self-honesty, he traces both his own progress as a journalist and the changing nature from the late 1950s through the late 1980s.

As he documents a working life spent closely studying the ebb and flow of power in the New York cultural scene, both high and low, and, most importantly, the Times newsroom, Corry builds a persuasive case for regarding journalism not as a calling, but rather as a craft. The problem, as he sees it, is in effect a social one, and he very may well be right. In his view, the heart of the issue may be journalists' growing desire over the last three decades for respectability and power themselves, a topic his own passage from an Irish neighborhood in Brooklyn to the rarefied world of the Fifth Avenue salon may have illuminated, "Although respectability is nice, it neither inspires or engages," he writes. "The sole function of journalism is to inform and entertain, and while this is honorable, it is not elevated, and abstruse moral discussions about the trade are for the birds. On the other hand, journalism could be, and should be, worthy of a journalist’s best efforts." Spoken, it probably need not be noted, like a damn fine soldier.

David Abrahamson, Northwestern University


This reference work, says editor Endres, provides a look at a cross section of the specialized business press. It consists of profiles of seventy magazines that have “played a role in shaping our trades, our industries, our businesses, our professions – our economic way of life.” These seventy were selected from a list of three hundred and were chosen because of their “historical importance, dominance in the field and editorial excellence.”

The A through W list begins with ABA Journal, The Lawyer’s Magazine and ends with Wood Technology (formerly Forest Industries). The oldest publications profiled are The New England Journal of Medicine (1812) and The American Banker (1836), while the most recent are Inside Media (1989) and Environmental Protection (1990).
Publications from all sorts of businesses, industries and professions make up other entries. A number will be familiar to most readers: American Demographics, Publisher's Weekly, Progressive Farmer, Variety, Aviation Week, Progressive Architecture, The Chronicle of Higher Education, to name a few. Others will be familiar to those who work in or study media: Editor & Publisher, Advertising Age, Broadcasting, Folio, Cablevision, Electronic Media.

Each entry concludes with a bibliography, index information, and the magazine’s publication history, all of which should prove useful to researchers.

For the most part, these entries are not mere recitations of facts and dates. The entries have both substance and style.

Most contributors seem to have captured the essential facts of each publication’s development, but they also allude to, and often spend considerable time, suggesting the economic, social and cultural forces that contributed to a publication’s birth, influence, and change over time. Consequently, they provide a certain amount of assessment and analysis.

For example, Sammye Johnson describes American Demographics as “refreshingly anticipatory and proactive.” According to Johnson, the publication “projects and forecasts demographic trends with as much balance and information as possible, telling readers to rejoice that the future is what they choose to make it.” She shows us just how American Demographics has done that, giving readers an interesting look at the publication’s character, purpose and accomplishment.

Occasionally, an entry’s lead will pull the readers in with a direct, unexpected perspective. Tom Schwartz, for instance, begins his essay on Variety with this surprising declaration: “The significance of Variety in the history of American entertainment is more easily overestimated than underestimated. Given the glittery nature of the industry the trade publication covers, Variety has understandably encouraged the mystique in which much of its history is shrouded...”

Many readers will bemoan the absence of publications they believe have been particularly influential. In fact, Endres tells us that several publications that were supposed to be included – ENR, Women’s Wear daily, Journal of the American Medical Association, Billboard, Power, and Machine Design – were omitted because contributors dropped out when it was too late to find replacements. Other publications that were deemed important were omitted because of a lack of a complete run of the publications.

Despite these omissions, the reference makes a contribution to journalism history. The very publication of this type of reference is an acknowledgment of the importance of such magazines to specific fields and to the greater culture.

Thomas B. Connery, University of St. Thomas
In recent years, empirical work in the production and consumption of culture has done much to complicate the generalizations of cultural critics. Ethnographic studies of media organizations and audiences have tumbled many of the content-based generalizations that had marked cultural criticism. Joshua Gamson’s book operates in this lineage and does for the study of celebrities what Janice Radway has done for the study of popular books and what David Morley, Todd Gitlin, and others have done for the study of television.

Gamson, a sociologist, draws on both the empirical and critical traditions in media studies to fashion a balanced study of the process whereby entertainment celebrities are produced and consumed in this culture. Gamson situates the celebrity phenomenon historically by looking at narratives about film stars, finding in these stories a shift from stories about the stars’ special qualities in the early days of the studio system to contemporary stories. These look at the process through which stars are produced and balance an emphasis on the star’s individuality with an emphasis on the publicity system that creates them. This historical account serves to frame a later discussion of the complex responses of the audience, based largely on interviews with focus groups. In between is a solid section on the production process, based on interviews with journalists, publicists, actors, personal managers, columnists, television talent coordinators, talent agency personnel, and others connected to the celebrity process.

Gamson shows that the process for the manufacture of celebrities is hardly a well-oiled machine where all parties collude, but it is a process in which various participants pursue their own goals with inevitable conflicts between the needs of stars, film producers, publicists, and journalists. And he shows that the audience to the image-making work of the celebrities assumes varied positions in the interpretation of this process and uses the celebrity image to varying ends.

Gamson argues that audiences to the celebrity “text” interpret it on the basis of their perception of the reality of the text, the level of production awareness, and the mode of engaging the text. These distinctions are very useful. They allow Gamson to show that traditional interpretations that judge the image of the celebrity as being either true of false and postmodern interpretations that find the celebrity a model of the fictions inherent in all media representations, commonplaces in the critical literature on the celebrity, are only two of the possible interpretive positions that audience members construct. Far more prevalent is the game player who finds in the celebrity a game to entertain. One type of game player, which Gamson calls the gossip, refuses to be drawn into consideration of the reality underlying the text but focuses instead on the celebrity as a good or bad story. Another type, which he calls the detective, lines up the possible truths of a celebrity’s text and makes choices about what to believe in a world where, obviously enough, little is believable.
This is a useful book in an area where generalization predominates. It is empirical in outlook and measured in evaluation, a book whose thoughtful discriminations complicate our understandings of a process that is easy to trivialize. The book is less satisfying in terms of locating the celebrity phenomenon in a broad social context, but that is a minor fault of an otherwise very solid study.

David Eason, Middle Tennessee State University


I first encountered Vance Packard’s The Hidden Persuaders at about age 12, at the Morgan Park Library in Chicago. The details now dim, but my overall impression remains vivid. Everything about Packard’s book – its dust jacket, its promise of inside information, its style of writing – struck me as bold and worldly. I had grown up in a four-newspaper household and had read most of my mother’s novels, but Packard was something new – a social critic.

As it happens, I was not alone. The Hidden Persuaders (1957) topped the best seller list for a year; The Status Seekers (1959) and The Waste Makers (1960) soon followed, making Packard one of the most popular nonfiction writers in the world. His work was translated into over a dozen foreign languages, and by 1962 Packard earned $2.6 million – in 1994 dollars – from the sales of just those three books. His catchy titles snuck into popular parlance, showing up in captions of New Yorker cartoons, the headlines of Newsweek articles, and the tag lines of magazine advertisements. His books became popular icons whose very appearance could invoke the neuroses and ambitions of middle-class Americans. My favorite example: a 1960 Mad Magazine parody of a Gillette razor ad portrayed “Slick Dick” Nixon, Hidden Persuaders in hand, returning home “after a hot day of campaigning” for a shave and a blood transfusion.

That parody captures the ambiguity that attended Packard’s work. Though intended as a critique of advertising, Hidden Persuaders lent credibility to the suspect claims of motivational researchers like Ernest Dichter; though presented as a jeremiad against consumerism, the Status Seekers offered many readers a how-to guide to upward mobility. One of the many virtues of Daniel Horowitz’s Vance Packard and American Social Criticism is that it explores these contradictions with great skill and subtlety, showing how Packard’s own ambivalence invited divergent readings.

But this is no typical biography. Even though Horowitz consulted Packard’s public and private papers and interviewed the writer and his family, friends, and business acquaintances, Packard as a person remains elusive and solitary. Nor is this book exactly the “intellectual biography” that the publisher promises, for Horowitz seems not to take Packard that seriously as a thinker.
Though respectful and fair-minded, Horowitz summarizes most of Packard’s books briefly and with little detail.

This book is better read as a cultural history of the years following World War II. For Horowitz the reactions of intellectuals, reviewers, readers, and sociologists to Packard’s work illustrate the larger American debate about morality and culture. In this sense Vance Packard continues a story Horowitz began in his earlier book, The Morality of Spending: Attitudes Toward the Consumer Society, 1875-1940 (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985). Horowitz hopes to explain how we American reconcile the contradictions of our experience – how we symbolically close the gap between our individualism and our communitarianism, our respect for free enterprise and our suspicion of corporations, our quest for wealth and our disdain for merely material pleasures, our praise of capitalism, and our condemnation of advertising.

Packard serves as a wonderfully apt symbol with which to think about these contradictions. Growing up in rural Pennsylvania, he absorbed the populist “producer ethic” of his farmer father as well as the social ambitions of his schoolteacher mother. A child of the Depression, Packard worker hard to be a good provider but thought that the fascination with consumer goods was corrupting American life. He entered journalism in order to satisfy his liberal political impulses but trimmed his work, as necessary to fit the formulas of the popular magazines that employed him. Even after the success of Packard’s books made him self-sufficient, he remained cautious and emotionally dependent on marketplace opinion.

Horowitz uses book reviews to explore professional readers’ reactions to Packard’s work. Not surprisingly, mainstream sociologists dismissed Packard as a mere popularizer. New York literary intellectuals despised his middle-brow sensibility; as Horowitz notes, “Packard was neither a Jew, a city-dweller, nor, in any strict sense of the word, an intellectual” (200). By any account Packard lacked the theoretical depth of C. Wright Mills, John Kenneth Galbraith, or David Reisman, and his politics proved too mushy to suit either conservative or radical critics.

Nonetheless the general public often resonated with Packard’s work, though not always in ways that he would have predicted. Of the dozens of letters Packard received following publication of The Hidden Persuaders, fully a quarter came from readers who hoped to employ for their own purposes the manipulative techniques exposed in the book. Yet Packard did genuinely inspire other. Betty Freidan, for example, credits him with making The Feminine Mystique plausible, by showing her that she could publish in a nonfiction book the controversial essays that popular magazines has refused to touch.

Media historians will find much to ponder in this book, for it constantly portrays Packard as trapped by the economics and sociology of the literary marketplace. Packard at first hoped to position himself as a social critic, in order to escape the constraints of magazine journalism. But he found that social criticism, as an occupation, was governed by its own cultural hierarchy – in part by the academic professions, in part by New York literary culture, in part by the new power of television talk shows in promoting books. Packard’s style
of sentimental moralism found no home in any of those world. Too partisan to
be a journalist, too popular to be a scholar, too happily middle-class to be a
radical, too tender-hearted to be an intellectual, too dull and distracted to be a
talk-show regular, by the 1980s Packard had resigned himself to being simply an
observer.

Though he might have more thoroughly described Packard’s arguments
and more closely analyzed the rhetorical strategies invoked by Packard’s critics,
Horowitz tells this story with wonderful grace, care, and polish. Vance Packard
is a mature and accomplished work of cultural history.

John J. Pauly, St. Louis University

Svennik Hoyer, Epp Lauk, and Peeter Vihalemm, eds. Towards a Civic
Society: The Baltic Media’s Long Road to Freedom. Tartu, Estonia:

The history of the press in the three Baltic countries – Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania – resounds with fascinating themes: the preservation of a sense of
nationhood during centuries of foreign domination, the role played by the mass
media in gaining independence from the Soviet Union, and the bewildering
environment facing journalists in post-Communist states. Towards a Civic
Society, a collaborative effort between university scholars in the three countries
and Norway, is the first comprehensive account of that history, starting with the
appearance of the first printed books in the Baltic region in the late fifteenth
century and ending with today’s media trying to adjust to the uncertain
conditions of a trio of newly independent nations.

As Svennik Hoyer points out in the book’s concluding essay, the
history of the Baltic press differs significantly from that of other European
nations. Newspapers in present-day Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania began and
developed under foreign rule. Before the early 1990s, the press has functioned in
independent nation-states for only two decades, the period between the world
wars. As a consequence, today’s Baltic media have few traditions to look back
on when it comes to relations with the government and the role they should play
in democratic society. On the other hand, the press performed a unique and
significant function when it came to keeping a sense of Estonian, Latvian and
Lithuanian nationhood in the face of the determined policies of both Tsarist
Russia and the Soviet Union to eradicate such allegiances.

As the first extensive study to tell the history of the Baltic press to a
foreign audience, Towards a Civic Society must by necessity provide a great deal
of basic information such as newspaper names and publication dates, but the
book avoids overwhelming the reader with data by presenting much of it in table
form. Along the same line, a brief introductory chapter relates the general
history of the region immediately east of the Baltic, but the brunt of such non-
media background information is in the tables of the extensive appendix.
Another of the book’s strengths is that its twenty-two contributors opt for a coherent narrative rather than individual contributions. As a result, *Towards a Civic Society* does not read like a collection of loosely related papers from the conference that spawned the study.

The shortcomings are minor. One is a lack of notes in the text, which makes it hard to discern whether the authors rely solely on secondary sources, the only kind listed in the bibliography. Another weakness is the differing lengths of the sections dealing with the post-independence years. The chapter on Latvia is extensive, but Estonia and Lithuania get rather scanty treatment. As a result, the problems facing the media in those two countries today become somewhat sketchy.

Still, it is in that last section of the book that the authors raise interesting questions about the role of journalism in a democratic society, the education needed to create good journalists, and the threat from old totalitarian habits on the one hand and from increasing media commercialization on the other. Most of these questions are pertinent not only to the Baltic countries but to journalists in all democratic nations.

*Jonas Bjork, Indiana University - Indianapolis*


The principal problem with this book is its subtitle. It claims some developed insight into the means by which Grantland Rice and other jazz age sportswriters created heroes during the decade of the Twenties. The author’s introductory chapter on Rice promises precisely that and holds out Rice as the most influential sportswriter of the period. The book’s nine chapters, however, amount to an anecdotal recitation of Rice’s writings on various sports celebrities with an occasional comment from Rice’s autobiography describing his relationship to those personalities.

Had the author consulted either of Jack Dempsey’s autobiographies, for instance, he would not have made the claim that Grantland Rice “made a legend” of the Manassa Mauler. The author does cite Dempsey’s biographer, Randy Roberts, but this is a claim Roberts never makes. Dempsey was a product of publicity, but not principally Rice’s. The Twenties fighting champ was boosted by a wily manager, a gifted promoter, and early converts in the press, including syndicated sportswriters such as Damon Runyon, Gene Fowler, and Hype Igoe. Rice was a relatively late convert to the cause, and was no more hyperbolic than any of the other “gee whiz” sportswriters who stimulated circulation by the poetry of their metaphor-making.

Nor does the author establish Rice’s influence in creating other sports legends of the period — Babe Ruth, Red Grange, Bobby Jones, and Bill Tilden.
Inabinett claims Rice’s intimacy with these athletes humanized them to readers in ways that eluded other sportswriters of the period. But recent work on Ruth and Grange fails to give Rice any preferred place. Inabinett comes closest in indicating Rice’s importance in his chapter on Knute Rockne. There he offers evidence that Rice’s writing on “the four horsemen of the Apocalypse” helped promote Notre Dame’s smallish backfield into nationwide recognition.

The book benefits from many of Rice’s best lines and most sustaining images, including his description of Red Grange as the “galloping ghost” and his description of George Gipp’s dying words to teammates urging them to “win one for the Gipper.” Inabinett notes the veteran writer’s personal affection for the men and women he puffed in the pages of Collier’s and his nationally syndicated newspaper column. And Inabinett captures Rice’s interminable enthusiasm in finding the virtuous and the valiant in sports. But Rice’s place in the history of sports journalism, and an answer to the author’s own question of whether Rice’s frequent gushing furthered or hindered the development of sports journalism needs further analysis than Inabinett gives it here.

The author offers a short chapter on what made the golden age of sports reporting golden, but needs to deepen the context within which Rice wrote, particularly explicating the rise of the leisure culture and the growing sophistication of sports promotion that informs current scholarship of sports historians and mass media scholars. This would enrich our understanding of Grantland Rice’s unique contribution to the development of sports journalism during the American jazz age while helping to explain the stories he told, why he told them, and the impact they had on readers who eventually withheld or conferred celebrity status on the sports heroes of America’s interwar era.

*Bruce J. Evensen, DePaul University*


In this fascinating revisionist history and analysis, Marcus Klein sheds new light on three major strands in American popular culture: the rags-to-riches story popularized by Horatio Alger, the Western, and the hard-boiled detective story. Klein’s achievement in *Easterns, Westerns, and Private Eyes* is to historicize these three popular narratives. Implicitly arguing against the view, dominant in American Studies since the 1950s, that popular genres such as the Western are best studied as “myth,” “symbol,” “legend,” or “folklore,” Klein makes a convincing case that all three of the forms he studies originated in a particular historical moment: the Gilded Age, that violent, tempestuous period during which modern America was forged.

Klein’s historicist approach yields the most unexpected results in his chapters on the detective story, which would seem to have little connection to
the Gilded Age. Dashiel Hammett’s tough-guy heroes such as Sam Spade and the Continental Op seem thoroughly modern in their origins. Most critics look to post-World War I alienation to explain the private eye’s cynicism, and they trace his literary origins to Poe. But Klein argues that all of Hammett’s heroes, including the dapper Nick Charles, were born of the gritty, violent coal fields of Pennsylvania during the 1870s.

Klein devotes a chapter to James McPharlan, a Pinkerton detective agency operative who worked undercover as a miner, gathering evidence against the Mollie Maguires. McPharlan worked, fought, drank, and caroused among the miners and their families for two-and-a-half years, then took the witness stand and gave testimony that sent twenty of his comrades to the gallows. Klein suggests that the moral ambiguity exemplified by McPharlan and dozens of other Gilded Age labor spies, publicized by their employer Allan Pinkerton in a series of ghost-written books, lies behind the cynicism of the hard-boiled literary detectives of the 1920s and ‘30s.

Klein’s approach to the Western is less strikingly original than his chapter on private eyes. Other critics before Klein have noted that the Wild West is in large part the creation of Easterners, notably Theodore Roosevelt, Frederic Remington, and Owen Wister. Nevertheless, Klein’s consistent focus on the Western as a response to industrialization, incorporation, immigration, and labor unrest makes for engrossing reading.

A high point of this section is his summary of Frederick Remington’s Harper’s Weekly article on the Pullman strike of 1894. Klein reproduces one of Remington’s illustrations, which shows U.S. cavalry troops riding through a Chicago stockyard; the picture could be set in Wyoming, except that those fleeing from the horsemen are not Indians but railroad workers. Klein writes eloquently in the conclusion to his Western chapters that when the Western hero rode into the sunset, “it [was] really to the East that he was traveling, ominous and armed.”

Klein’s historical argument about the Horatio Alger books consists of little more than the unsurprising assertion that Alger’s novels are rooted in the actual conditions of late-nineteenth-century New York City. But his interpretation of Alger’s message is provocative. Klein argues that the Alger novels, usually regarded as quintessential Victorian endorsements of the virtues of thrift and hard work, are actually cynical, modernist, and subversive texts, “chilling parod[ies] of the American Dream.”

Individually, each of Klein’s three sections offers fresh, intriguing readings of an important cultural narrative. And Klein’s lightly footnoted, stylish prose make this book accessible to a wide range of readers. Unfortunately, the book’s disjointed structure means that the sum is never greater than its parts. Each of the sections stands in isolation; Klein fails to make links among the three genres or to extend his history into the present. At the very least, the book seems to cry out for some sort of synthesizing conclusion that would draw together the book’s disparate arguments and clarify their significance. Klein’s book has the potential to affect the practice of anyone
concerned with popular culture, but he leaves it up to his readers to decide what that effect might be.

Michael Robertson, Trenton State College


Much has been written about the history of America’s first weekly picture magazine, but few scholars have explored how well *Life* reflected or helped create the American culture it began depicting in November 1936. By using both cultural studies and feminist perspectives, Kozol explores the role this mass circulation magazine had in creating or reinforcing a national sense of “family values.” As she explains, “This book explores the origins of the visual portrait of domesticity that has dominated American culture since World War II.”

Kozol argues that *Life* appealed to middle-class readers by using human interest techniques in its photo essays of everything from civil rights demonstrations to social and economic mobility. Kozol, a visiting assistant professor of history at Oberlin College at the time the book was published, emphasizes the magazine’s focus on white, suburban, and middle-class families.

Five chapters plus a conclusion cover a wide range of topics, including: photographic realism and *Life’s* families, a historical profile of the magazine’s photojournalism, nationalism and *Life’s* family ideal, the politics of merging public news and private lives, and news coverage of domestic social change. Historians interested in major themes of the 1940s and 1950s, such as suburban development, Richard Nixon, nationalism, labor activism, Hollywood cinema, domestic ideology, ideologies of consumption, consensus culture, the Cold War, civil rights, civil defenses, the baby boom, anticommunism, the American Dream, African Americans, and advertising, will want to examine this text.

Unfortunately, the only endnote on Kozol’s methodology is brief and not as explicit as it should be. She says she “examined The Week’s Events section as well as advertisements and letters to the editors for all issues of *Life* from 1936 to 1960.” Kozol goes on to say she, “studied all the special issues devoted to a single topic. These issues occurred intermittently throughout the calendar year, and since they usually did not include a news section, I examined them in their entirety.”

With quantitative research, it is critical to explain why certain sections were examined and not others. It also could be argued that various other themes could have emerged from this examination, so some indication of how much of the sample she studied fits her thesis would be appropriate.

Kozol includes twenty-four images from *Life* plus two government photographs to illustrate her points. No doubt the high fees charged by Time, Inc. for reproducing its copyrighted material made the use of even more images
prohibitive, which is unfortunate since so much of what Kozol is arguing would be strengthened by being able to judge for ourselves.

Because this book is based on Kozol’s 1990 dissertation (“Documenting the Public and Private Life: Cultural Politics on Postwar Photojournalism”) from the University of Minnesota, it includes nearly thirty pages of notes and index of great use to researchers. Adding a bibliography would have been more helpful.

C. Zoe Smith, University of Missouri-Columbia


This edited work presents oral history, once considered a plebeian cousin in the lofty court of analytical historical study, as a complicated process of negotiating meaning between the interviewer and the interviewee. In one of the most interesting chapters, titled, “Intersubjectivity and Interviewing,” Allan W. Futrell and Charles A. Willard contend that the oral history interview should not be viewed, as it traditionally has been, as a record of reality revealed by the narrator. Instead, they argue, the interview represents a “mutual construction of reality” between two individuals who attempt to reach agreement on manufacture of a document. This view, which encompasses ideas from literary criticism and interpersonal communication, sees oral history as a unique form of face-to-face communication that results in a record.

McMahan and Rogers say that this volume brings together for the first time essays that illustrate the “interpretive perspective of inquiry,” which has marked scholarship in oral history since the 1970s. There’s no how-to-do-it instruction here. The book’s eight chapters deal with complex subjects such as these: power relationships between interviewer and interviewee; self-construction by narrators of an altered past to fit their present circumstances; incorporation of traumatic events into the narratives produced; racial and ethnic values in interviewing, the use of photographs to stimulate dialogue. A chapter on “Interpreting the Complexity of Women’s Subjectivity” by Susan E. Chase and Colleen S. Bell draws on feminist theory to demonstrate the difficulties involved in asking women to describe their own subordinate status.

One strength of the book is that the excerpts of oral history interviews used are compelling in their own right, in addition to serving as examples of discourse. Through verbatim use of segments of transcripts we are introduced to participate in the effort to desegregate the University of Alabama, African-American civil rights activists in the 1960s, women school superintendents, male prisoners in maximum security prisons, and Japanese-Americans forced to live in “relocation” camps during World War II.
Only one chapter actually offers a new approach to oral history interviewing. It is "Envisioning Homestead: Using Photographs in Interviewing (Homestead, Pennsylvania)" by Judith Modell and Charlee Brodsky, on the use of photographs to help jog the memory of interviewees.

The book is well-worth reading even if some of the material is a bit repetitious. The journalism historian may be somewhat daunted by the language, which borrows from postmodern and other intellectual theories. Yet the book makes a convincing case that oral history should be perceived as much more than what it may seem to be — a rather formless outpouring of reminiscences that may or may not be accurate in the literal sense. The work also could be a useful supplement for advanced reporting classes, since many of the questions raised about the production of the oral history interview can be applied to the journalistic interview.

Maurine H. Beasley, University of Maryland - College Park


This engaging book relates, at the most basic level, a long overdue account of violence against the press in America from the Revolutionary War era to the present. Probing the nature, extent, and degree of that violence and what it has meant about the press and about American society, author John Nerone refutes the idea that violence is a "product of antique prejudices and outmoded values," and obstacle "overcome on the road to pluralism" in America. Instead of being sporadic, Nerone says, anti-press violence has been a systematic response to "recurring crises in an evolving system of public expression" (9).

On a theoretical level, the book is about the changing public sphere in American society, more particularly about the shifting boundaries of public discourse: what was permissible at given times, who controlled it, and how control was manifest. Emphasizing that media always carry powers other than those associated with truthtelling, the author, who teaches communications at the University of Illinois, argues that most violent acts against the press were about permissible substance and limits of public discourse: "Violence was both a way of declaring some public expression illegitimate and ... expressing the legitimate" (214). Concluding that anti-press violence has accompanied every great national debate in U.S. history, Nerone ponders what its decline over the last half-century (detailed in chapter eight) signifies about the contemporary American polity.

Closely related, but at still another level of analysis, the book is about the complexity of shifting ideologies in America over time. A central thesis emphasized the shift from republicanism to liberalism and the role of individualism in American history. The post-Civil War constitutional
revolution represented the "the triumph of liberalism over republicanism," signaling a reconstruction of U.S. society on the basis of liberalism, which embodied a change in attitudes toward the political process and a reshaping of "the arena of public discourse" (124). Noting that in republican ideology, liberty belonged to the polity whereas in liberalism it belonged to the individual, Nerone suggests that nature of anti-press violence changed at this juncture.

Identifying four kinds of such violence as 1) among individuals, 2) against ideas, 3) against groups, and 4) against an institution, Nerone says these converged twice in American history — at times when the system of public discourse changed significantly. In the late nineteenth century, violence against ideas gave way to violence against reporters. The second shift came in the early twentieth century, when violence emerged against the media as an institution.

Most of the book addresses violence against ideas. Chapters two through five, for example, detail anti-press violence as a product of the struggle between competing idea systems. Chapters four and five, "The Crusade Against Abolitionism" and "The Civil War and Civil Liberties," are strongest and form the centerpiece of the book. The book seems to "break" into a second part after these, which may explain why the analysis in ensuing chapters seems less convincing. Those chapters, "Violence and Minority Media," "Labor-Related Violence," and "Recent Violence Against the Mainstream Press," are no less compelling or scholarly, however, and each is powerfully instructive.

As all engaging books do, this one provokes many questions. For example, is violence inevitable in public discourse about American society's most important issues? And has not all anti-press violence been about ideas? What distinguishes the different kinds of violence as other than variations of attacks against ideas? How was violence against groups after the Civil War more indicative of liberalism than were ante-bellum attacks on groups? And, in an analysis that seems to assume a consistent, monolithic arena of public discourse across the country, one wonders how the violence may be related to the differing ideologies, permissible boundaries and substance of discourse among regions and communities. What is the order — and more importantly, the agency-of-change — in the phenomena suggested here: ideological shift, reconstituted discourse, anti-press violence?

The book merits study also for the many subanalyses embedded in larger explanations throughout the book. For example, a thoughtful discussion of anti-slavery activities distinguishes the struggle over the Kansas-Nebraska Act from the earlier abolition movement. Notable, too, are appendices, two of which document anti-abolitionist violence from 1827 and mobbing of the press during the Civil War, and the fact-laden footnotes. Of special interest among the latter, a half-dozen charts and tables depict violent acts, especially against labor and radical publications, around the turn of the twentieth century.

In sum, the analytical perspective and the account of a culture of violent "debate" revise knowledge about the circulation of ideas in America. The thorough treatment of assaults against the press is invaluable. Familiar cases, well-known as anecdotal examples in numerous journalism history sources, loom with startling power when read in fuller detail and in relation to each other
and the larger culture. More importantly, a larger story emerges through these and the countless other cases unearthed; in the process, anti-press violence appears as all too common in U.S. history. Indeed, the book links anti-press violence with hegemonic opinion — the views, whether of the majority or a powerful few, that determine discourse.

Hazel Dicken-Garcia, University of Minnesota


Culture and the Ad is an excellent book that will be useful for undergraduates studying how media represents foreigners and ethnic groups. Courses in visual communication, social issues in advertising, and mass media, culture, and society will be well-served by it. The book takes complex scholarly concepts, such as Otherness, semiotics, difference, discourse, political economy, and ideology, simplifies them for beginning students, and applies them to the study of advertising images.

Author William O’Barr, professor of cultural anthropology at Duke University, asks the reader to go beyond advertising’s primary level of discourse — the sale of products — to study its secondary discourse, which is about advertising’s ideological construction of social relationship. This book examines how advertising presents non-American groups — African-Americans, Africans, Native Americans, Japanese, Chinese, Indians, Arabs, and others — to white Americans. O’Barr takes interesting theoretical, historical, cultural, and methodological byways through the subject, resulting in an artful pedagogical approach.

In the initial chapter, O’Barr situates “meaning creation” in the reader rather than the text. At the same time, however, he positions the advertiser, text, and reader in the historical economic, cultural, and social settings, which condition meaning production. Throughout the book, O’Barr asks whether readers perceive the recurring patterns he isolates. He does not solve this problem directly but makes his readers confront it in powerful ways.

Most of advertising’s foreign Others appear in three kinds of ads: travel, product endorsement, and international business. Not surprisingly, representations of Otherness change with these contexts, and latter being much more sensitive and flattering to cultural differences.

Chapter Two is historical. Starting in the nineteenth century, it weaves together brief histories of travel and tourism, the invention of portable photography, and the development of consumer society and advertising, showing their complementariness. O’Barr uses Kodak ads from the 1890s to 1970s to show how the photo industry promoted the sale of still and movie cameras as essential travel accouterments. At the same time, the ads’ secondary discourse
"instructed" tourists about how to take pictures of the people and places they visited.

O'Barr argues that these photo industry ads, and images in travel and tourism ads, films, and promotions, established the ideological parameters of the imaginary social relationships between Us, the American traveler, and Them, the photographed Other. In the dichotomous social hierarchy of "photographic colonialism," we are rich, modern, technological, and normal. We have the leisure time to travel. In fact, We are never shown working. They are poor, backward, natural, quaint, and exotic. They have no leisure time and don't travel. They are shown working with rudimentary tools. We observe and They are the naive, happy, and willingly observed. They produce, We consume. The two groups never interact in advertising's images.

Chapter Three reiterates these findings but takes a different historical tack through a comparative analysis of National Geographic magazine advertisements from 1929. Here images of travel to visit native Americans, Hawaiians, South Americans and South Africans are compared with images of travel to Europe. This rounds out the ethnocentric picture: We have important persons, history, and civilization. They only have folk traditions.

Advertisements from the 1970s and 1980s are analyzed in Chapter Four. They add to the substance of O'Barr's thesis by showing how advertising images respond to the treats of the unknown, promote American dominance, and venerate the West. Another interesting analysis shows how the usual portrayal of western women as submissive is transformed when they are shown with foreigners: women move up and foreigners replace them at the bottom of the social order. Also discussed are typical stereotypes such as the wise and mysterious Chinese, the oversexed black woman, the aristocratic English, and how advertising narratives help create and regenerate such myths.

The theme of readers reading returns in Chapter Five. Here O'Barr discusses the results of several seminars in which he and his students researched the meaning and form of tourist photographs. Using the qualitative method of image elicitation, they asked people to discuss the meaning of the travel photos they had taken. They found that tourists essentially reproduce the codes and conventions of imagery that they have seen in advertising and other media. O'Barr encourages readers to examine their own photographs and those of family and friends along similar grounds. By shifting attention to familiar picture taking practices, O'Barr addresses the fact that advertising's secondary ideological meanings do get internalized and reexpressed in the creative process of picture making by everyday readers, as witnessed in their ability to reproduce advertising's codified views.

In Chapter Six, O'Barr asks readers to pretend they are in a museum, and with minimal didactic material he displays forty-three advertisements of African-Americans. While this chapter shows interesting images, it lacks a structuring narrative for discussing the contradictory role that images of African-American ethnicity have played from Jim Crowism to the present in contributing to liberal dichotomies such as segregation and integration. Neither
does it deal with the irony of current, prevalent images of African-American success within the context of continuing economic discrimination.

Chapter Seven is interesting for its pedagogy. It first analyzes western advertising images of the Japanese, and then it analyzes Japanese advertising’s images of the west and westerners. Analysis of the Japanese ads is historical, emphasizing how advertising images derive from larger socio-historical concerns. Images of the Japanese change: from the exotic of the 1920s, to the villains of World War II, to the backward dependents of the post-World War II period, to the images of the Japanese as a threat because of economic, technological, and managerial advances in the 1970s and 1980s, and finally, to recent portrayals of the Japanese as civilized men in western business suits, marking increased collaboration between U.S. and Japanese corporations.

Overall, instructors will find this book helpful. It is clearly organized and written. It reproduces 127 full-page magazine ads in black and white, and it employs several research methodologies to analyze advertising images.

The book would be better if it restored some complexity to the concepts it simplifies so well at the outset (especially Jacques Lacan’s concept of Otherness); reviewed more of the literature dealing with representations of the Other; gave complete source citations for advertisements; and made a more rigorous attempt to deal with one of America’s enduring problems: racism and the media’s representation on non-Euro-Americans. However, its usefulness far outweighs these shortcomings.

Robert L. Craig, University of St. Thomas


The radical shift on the Supreme Court of the United States toward the conservative end of the political spectrum comes into stark focus when Justice John Paul Stevens is placed, as one reporter recently put it, at the “helm of the liberal wing” on the court. Justice Stevens is a fine jurist, but at least in the area of free speech and press, he is no William J. Brennan.

Justice Brennan’s retirement in 1990 marked the end of an extraordinary era in the history of the speech and press clauses of the First Amendment. When President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed Brennan to the Court in 1956, First Amendment doctrine provided relatively little protection for expression and was only marginally relevant to law in a many speech-related areas, such as obscenity, libel, commercial speech, access to courts, and restraints on prejudicial publicity, and the free speech rights of students. Today, all of these areas and more cannot be addressed without reference to the First Amendment.

Brennan’s contribution to the development of a strong First Amendment protection of speech and press was substantial; and as the post-
Brennan court stumbles about trying to sort out complicated First Amendment questions, his voice is sorely missed. It may be a very long time before a Supreme Court justice writes an opinion that speaks for and about free speech with the passion and clarity of Brennan in *New York Times v. Sullivan* (1964) or *Texas v. Johnson* (1989).

The first wave of books and law review articles evaluating the careers of U.S. Supreme Court justices of Brennan’s tenure and stature tend to be dominated by laudatory reviews. Criticism is muted and all but the most adversarial writers are careful to acknowledge the jurist’s contributions. After some period of time, the best authors are able to take advantage of the perspective provided by time and distance and, if all goes well, more complex treatments appear.

*Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide Open: Mr. Justice Brennan’s Legacy to the First Amendment* joins several other recent books in the first wave of scholarship evaluating Brennan’s free speech and press jurisprudence. Robert D. Richards, an assistant professor of journalism and law at Pennsylvania State University, makes no secret of his admiration for Brennan and his jurisprudence. No reader will be surprised or argue too vigorously when the author concludes that Brennan’s work will “remain the bedrock of modern First Amendment jurisprudence for generations to come” (151).

After a brief overview of Brennan’s life, the chapters are loosely organized by areas of law. The author provides an introduction to the legal topic, e.g., libel, and then discusses cases in which Brennan authored an opinion. Brennan has allowed greater access to his personal papers than many of his colleagues on the court. Some of the correspondence among the justices used by the author offers interesting insight into the internal discussions among the justices as they work to build majorities in difficult cases.

Readers not familiar with Brennan’s years on the court will find this book provides an accessible introduction and description of his free speech and press decisions.

*Tim Gleason, University of Oregon*

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Michael B. Salwen’s *Radio and Television in Cuba, the Pre-Castro Era* is an entertaining and informative read. Replete with dramatic incidents such as the on-air suicide of a popular radio political commentator, this page turner traces the development of Cuban broadcasting from the inauguration of Cuban
radio station PXW on 10 October, 1922, to Castro’s eventual nationalization of all forms of mass media in the early 1960s.

Although his focus is on pre-Castro years, Salwen’s final chapters not only include valuable information about the plight of the radio and television industries during the early years of the Castro regime, they also describe how Castro’s government clamped down on the island’s print media. Throughout the book Salwen also includes background information about some of the ties Cuban broadcasters had with their counterparts in the United States.

While Cuba’s broadcasting history had many parallels with the history of radio and television in this country, Salwen’s book also points out the many ways in which Cuba’s electronic media diverged from that of the United States. Salwen, while not dwelling on any of the following, also compares the electronic media in Cuba with that of other Latin American countries, mentions other Latin American media moguls such as Romulo O’Farrill of Mexico, and brings up some intriguing points about the role of the Inter American Press Association, especially during the regimes of Fulgencio Batista and Fidel Castro.

Salwen’s focus, nonetheless, is on Cuba and her pioneering broadcasters. He has done a thorough job of researching his subject and utilizes some unusual sources – declassified documents from the U.S. embassy in Havana and interviews with early Cuban broadcasters who are still living. The inclusion of the oral histories enlivens the narrative and provides important insights that might not have been available in other types of primary sources.

There are some minor problems with this otherwise fine study. As seems inevitable in this age of computers, Salwen’s book has its fair share of typos and cut-and-paste problems. From a purist’s point of view, it is also disconcerting that the publisher decided not to include Spanish accents in proper names. With computerized typesetting, their inclusion should not have been difficult.

Finally, the book would have benefited from a little more historical context, especially in regard to the various administrations that were in power during this period. Salwen does a fairly good job with the Batista and Castro years, but most readers would benefit from a little more background about earlier political regimes. Although the book touches on both subjects, it would also have been interesting to have had more in-depth information about how radio networks such as NBC and American soap companies such as Proctor and Gamble interacted with Cuban broadcasters.

These criticisms are minor. Salwen’s book is an extremely valuable contribution to the history of international communication and belongs in the library of serious media historians.

Salwen, along with co-author Bruce Garrison, has made another important contribution to the literature of global communication in his book, *Latin American Journalism*, which was published in 1991. However, this book, which looks at the state of Latin American journalism at the beginning of the 1990s, suffers in comparison with Salwen’s book on Cuba. The scope of this project is much broader, yet the page count (190) is slimmer and so is the
content, although it attempts to cover thirty Latin American nations. Less than
two pages on Mexican newspapers is not sufficient.

In addition, the authors occasionally look at the reality of Latin America through North American eyes. For instance, they write as follows: "In a society where everyone naturally expects journalists to accept indirect bribes and be easily compromised, there is reason to suspect that journalists may not be committed to their profession." This statement fails to recognize that Latin America is an area where economic necessity has often forced workers to hold two, three, or perhaps even more jobs just to keep their families together. It is easy to be ethical and "committed to (your) profession" when your children have enough to eat.

The book's biggest problem, however, is its topical organization. Some of the topics the authors, both professors at the University of Miami, analyze include press and government relations, the practice of journalism, the New World Information and Communication Order, news agencies, newspapers, magazines and books, broadcast media, and advertising and public relations. This topical approach unfortunately is too limited, leads to generalizations, and fails to recognize that Latin America is a very large, diverse area.

While these countries share similarities, there are many dissimilarities. Thus it is dangerous to make blanket statements, with the assumption that they apply equally to countries such as Portuguese-speaking Brazil, French-speaking Haiti, and Spanish-speaking Venezuela. Argentina, which had a huge influx of European immigrants, is very different from Paraguay with its large indigenous population, and Colombia, which has experienced years of political and drug-related chaos, is quite different from Mexico, which recently has been relatively stable politically.

A country-by-country approach, which included more historical context, would have been a better choice. There is, of course, no perfect solution to the dilemma of structuring a book such as this. While there is built-in redundancy in a country-by-country approach, at least it acknowledges the lack of homogeneity in this region.

Despite problems with structure, the book provides a good overview of journalism and mass communication in Latin America, especially for the uninitiated. However, because it presupposes some knowledge of the area, it may leave some readers in the dark. Still, the authors are to be commended for distilling massive amounts of writing and research in a balanced fashion, incorporating all viewpoints, including chapter abstracts, case studies, useful tables, and "spotlight" sections. One such spotlight profiled Nicaragua's *La Prensa* and its owners, the Chamorro family. Other pluses include the use of interviews with Latin American practitioners and owners and its extensive bibliography. Although the information on development journalism and the NWICO was a little weak, its inclusion was vital in a study of this part of the world.

This valuable addition to Latin American and communication studies addresses many problems and issues facing journalists in Latin America and raises many important questions as well. It would be a good text to use for an
international or comparative communication class. Hopefully, both this book and Salwen's *Radio and Television in Cuba* will encourage young scholars to broaden our knowledge of journalism and mass communication in this important part of the world.

**Victoria Goff, University of Wisconsin - Green Bay**


The colonial press of America has always been considered important by scholars because it began the history of the mass media in the United States. Recognizing importance, however, has not produced much careful and analytical study. Historians have catalogued the early press and recorded the events of its story of who, what, when, and where. In *The Early American Press*, authors Sloan and Williams seek to go beyond these obvious questions to also address the issue of why newspapers came into existence and prospered in the American colonies.

In an effort to broaden the scope of their study, Sloan and Williams actually narrow it in some ways. Because it is impossible to look at all of the newspapers printed between 1690 and 1783 without getting lost in a mire of details, they consider portions of the period through a topical case study approach. Beginning with the essential early newspapers of Boston prior to 1735, the book moves to the press of Philadelphia as the second most important center of American newspaper publishing during the colonial era. A consideration of the development of freedom of the press concentrates on the John Peter Zenger trial in New York. Press growth after 1735 is covered with a broad sweep except for a detailed study of the Stamp Act Crisis and its role in awakening the media to their growing political function. The study ends with an overview of the Revolutionary press as it played its partisan role in the fight for independence.

Overall, Sloan and Williams conclude that the American colonial press was more complex than previously granted by historians. Early newspapers did not come into existence solely as "the automatic result of huge, impersonal forces such as economics that were at work in the milieu of the time." (199) Evidence indicates that individual printers began publishing newspapers in response to particular events or particular situations. In Boston, the dominance of Puritan ideas created a context conducive to the discussion of ideas that could be carried out in a newspaper, but they did not appear until certain individuals — such as Benjamin Harris or John Campbell — turned to a regular publication to answer a specific situation. These might include the chaos after the overthrow of Governor Andros or the perception that communicating the news was part of the job of the postmaster. Elsewhere in the colonies, newspapers generally appeared
because different printers saw them as a means to increase their income, but the background circumstances for each one varied from place to place and time to time.

The authors also declare that, in general, colonial printers supported the idea that newspapers should be neutral and impartial, but they also believed that the press should be on the side of "right." Such an implicitly contradictory outlook makes it much easier to understand the severe partisanship which developed by the time of the Revolution as the definitions of "right" became more rigid and divisive. Involved in the issue of impartiality were ideas about freedom of the press. Here, the authors give great credit to the impact of the Puritans and their creation of a societal context in which the discussion of ideas was not only accepted, but generally expected to be part of the normal routine.

In considering the impact of the colonial press, Sloan and Williams conclude that many different things influenced what the printers did, but all of them perceived themselves as providing useful information for their readers. One cannot truly measure the press's impact, but eighteenth-century Americans clearly maintained "a strong belief in the importance of the role the press played in the affairs of society. They used it as a means to keep them informed of the world around them and to express their most fundamental beliefs." (209)

Sloan and Williams successfully investigate the history of the colonial press without getting bogged down in details. The choice of Boston and Philadelphia as vignettes for study in the early period provide an appropriate introduction to the early development of the media in America. The broader sweep applied to the latter half of the period produces a solid picture of the media during the Revolutionary era. The authors' research produces interesting conclusions concerning the role of religious beliefs in the colonial press and the role of the Puritans in the development of freedom of the press. Based on detailed research in both primary and secondary sources, The Early American Press is an excellent overview of the American newspaper during the formative years of the eighteenth century.

Carol Sue Humphrey, Oklahoma Baptist University


Perhaps in the future, a scholar will see the O.J. Simpson trial as a turning point in American journalism. The elements are there: sensational information first disclosed by once scorned supermarket tabloids has been echoed in the mainstream press, the case has been hotly debated among discussion groups on the Internet, coverage on cable television has been non-stop, to perhaps an unprecedented degree the case has been tried in the court of public
opinion. Each may someday be seen as a significant new beginning in journalism fifty years from now.

The Robinson-Jewett murder trial in New York in 1836 riveted the public’s attention much as O.J. Simpson’s does today. A respectable clerk was accused – and ultimately acquitted – of murdering his prostitute lover, a well known demimondaine. As the newspapers in New York battled to scoop each other, the case received extensive coverage throughout the country and was on the lips of all of New York, if the newspaper accounts are to be believed.

In *Froth & Scum*, Andi Tucher revisits the coverage of the Robinson-Jewett case in the newly emerging penny press and compares it with the coverage of another notorious murder case five years later. In the second case, John Colt, the brother of Samuel Colt, inventor of the Colt revolver, was convicted of murdering a New York printer. In a dramatic twist, Colt committed suicide the day before his scheduled execution. Tucher’s aim is to better understand the emergence of the medium which would come to be seen as the forerunner of contemporary journalism.

Although she has a larger target in her sights, Tucher’s most noteworthy contribution to the understanding of the history of journalism is her careful research and revision of the commonly told version of the reporting on James Gordon Bennett and the *New York Herald* about the Robinson-Jewett affair. For several generations of journalism historians, the Robinson-Jewett affair has been a major exhibit as they made their case that Bennett’s *Herald* was dramatically different than its contemporary competitors and laid the foundation for modern journalism. Scholars point to the publicity that case generated, the visit Bennett claimed he paid to the scene of the crime, the extensive, vivid details reported in the columns, and Bennett’s assertion that Robinson was innocent in the face of overwhelming public opinion that he was guilty as evidence that the Herald was blazing a new trail in journalism.

Tucher convincingly casts doubt on the accuracy of the conventional understanding of Bennett’s reporting on the Robinson-Jewett affair. Far from an example of fearless, enterprising, objective reporting, Tucher powerfully argues that the best explanation why Bennett reported the Robinson-Jewett case as he did is he was paid to do so. He demanded, and received, extortion money from Robinson’s supporters and other patrons of the bawdy house Jewett called home. “The blackmail theory,” Tucher writes, “would explain several curious circumstances of Bennett’s reporting about the Jewett case,” (43).

And while Bennett’s account of the Robinson-Jewett affair was tainted, Tucher suggests that the information in another penny press, the *Sun*, which devoted as much attention to the case as the *Herald*, was probably the closest to accurate. If Tucher is right, why then, is the *Herald* remembered as the forerunner of modern journalism, a reputation based in part on its performance in this case, and not the *Sun*?

Unfortunately, that is not the question which interested Tucher. Instead, she compares Bennett’s coverage of the Robinson-Jewett case to his reporting on the Colt affair to explore what she sees as a shift in journalistic authority and the relationship of journalism to truth. In short, her contention is
that in 1836, Bennett and the penny press may have played looser with the facts than in 1841 but may have arrived closer to the truth. Or, as she puts it, “They replaced humbug with authority,” (187). But the switch brought penny press editors no closer to the truth.

This is an extremely difficult argument to mount based on only two trials. As Tucher acknowledges, the simplest explanation for the difference in coverage may be that the circumstances were quite different. And they were.

Nevertheless, even when the arguments are not entirely convincing, Froth & Scum is provocative throughout. Well written and based on a wide range of journalistic and non-journalistic sources – more extensive footnotes would have been welcomed by scholars – even if perhaps it does not achieve its most lofty ambitions, this book provides important new insights into one of the emblematic episodes of the conventional history of journalism.

Elliot King, Loyola University - Maryland

Short Takes


Ten essays that look at what Birch, a British writer and journalist, calls a new Hollywood cliche, “the rampaging female ... stabbing and shooting her way to notoriety.” The essays compare real accounts of female violence with fictional accounts and in the process investigates the role of women in society and tries to answer why there is such an increase in, and fascination with, depiction of female violence when actual incidents have not increased. Although most of the movies discussed are from the United States, most of the actual cases and coverage considered are British.


First published by Houghton Mifflin in 1981, former New York Times sportswriter Koppett has provided an updated preface but otherwise the book remains the same. Koppett claims little has changed in the thirteen years since the book first came out, primarily because “the mass-entertainment spectator-sports business and daily journalism” are strong and stable. Most of the content came from a course Koppett taught at Stanford in the 1970s called “Sports Culture.” Koppett tries to break down preconceptions – and misconceptions – by explaining the business of sports and the nature of sports journalism.

This book is designed “to focus mainly on the political economy of state regulation (of telecommunications) in the 1990s.” But the first part of this book provides background and historic context, and looks at “federalism” while providing a brief history of state rather than federal telecommunications regulation. One chapter considers the federal-state friction “built into” the 1934 Communications Act.


Shumway says his book is to a degree a history of ideas, the ideas that have dominated the shape, purpose and nature of an academic discipline. He attempts to “trace the constitution and reconstitution of the object of American literature by examining the discipline’s practices and techniques, discourses, and structures, paradigm and unstated assumptions.” American literature, according to Shumway, is a product of the discipline’s study. The discipline, he says, chose the literature that would legitimate a specific type of American civilization.


A look at the mass media in twenty-one countries in the Middle East, consisting of the Arab countries plus Afghanistan, Cyprus, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Turkey. The editors note, “the use of channels of communication as an important vehicle for mobilization” in the Islamic resurgence, as well as the integration of modern communication into “the old social networks” in the region. This book is needed, they say, because little has been done to examine the “diverse mass media systems of the Middle East in a single volume.”

Each entry follows the same basic structure: first, an overview of each country, including its economic, cultural, and religious position in the region; second, brief looks at the print media, electronic media, technologies, film, ownership and financial support patterns, media regulation, external media services, news agencies, and the role of mass media in the national development of a country. A glossary is included.
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Research notes typically are four- to eight-page manuscripts, written with less formal documentation. Such notes, which are not blind refereed, may include reports of research in progress, discussion of methodology, annotations on new archival sources, commentaries on issues in journalism history, suggestions for future research, or response to material previously published in American Journalism. Authors who wish to contribute research notes are invited to query the editor.

(Continued on inside back cover)
A special issue devoted to
The Media and World War II

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Joe Alsop’s Cold War: A Study of Journalistic Influence and Intrigue
....and many more.
The Watershed Event of the twentieth century – World War II – has been marked in a variety of special ways this year, the golden anniversary of the end of that war. Scholars have held special symposia or devoted parts of their regular meetings to the event. Newspapers and magazines have presented us with recollections of the people who fought the war or made the wheels turn in the Arsenal of Democracy that this nation became for a time. The remembrance has turned to rancor now and then, as the debate over the Enola Gay exhibit at the Smithsonian Institution illustrates. How do we honor the memory of those who sacrificed so much in the cause of freedom in this country and around the world, while we rethink the interpretation of the course of the war, based on fresh evidence? Doing history ceases to be a harmless vocation when it crosses the path of shared remembrance of difficult times, as the Smithsonian leadership found.

We join the celebration of World War II memories and interpretation with this special issue. We have never subscribed to the tendency to label an armed conflict as a "media war," as is frequently done. Wars are not fought for the media, although the media are an integral part of political communication in war or peace. The interplay of politics, personality, free expression, and other factors inescapably touch media forms and content. So it was with World War II. By the printed and broadcast word, the unfolding tragedy of combat replacing diplomacy was brought to our homes through the thirties. Finally, on a quiet December morning in 1941, radio broadcasts were interrupted to let us know of surprise, treachery, death, and a national call to arms.

The research articles published herein cover the communication gamut: military newspapers, advertising revenue, magazines for women, the development of television during the war, plus other topics. The historiographic essays give an overview of what we know about certain areas of the media and World War II, and what critical research needs may be unmatched. We are indebted to the contributors and reviewers who have provided us with a starting point for a new appraisal.

A reappraisal of the media in the war – far overdue in our estimation – may lead us to ignore the consequences of the war itself. Terror and death were unleashed on a scale unseen before or
since. Whatever the causes of the worldwide conflict, restoration of peace and freedom were foremost in the minds of everyone who worked or fought to defeat the Axis powers. Andy Rooney, 60 Minutes’ skeptical, sometimes cynical commentator, put it best in his recent volume of World War II reminiscences, My War. Rooney was drafted in 1941 and was a reluctant soldier until he caught on with Stars and Stripes after his artillery unit was shipped to England. As a reporter he went to Buchenwald to banish his own incredulity about what he had heard from other journalists about what was behind the gates. Once there, he writes, “I was ashamed of myself for ever having considered refusing to serve in the Army. If my conscience objected, it hadn’t paid much attention to my brain...For the first time, I knew for certain that any peace is not better than any war.”

Rooney and millions of others in and out of uniform put a stop to the madness that engulfed the world half a century ago. They gave us yet another chance to enjoy freedom and an obligation to build a different and better world. A reexamination of the past is a step in that direction.

—WBE
Daily Newspaper Advertising Trends During World War II: IRS Tax Rulings and the War Bond Drives

Edward E. Adams and Rajiv Sekhri

Consumer rationing was introduced in America almost immediately after the bombing of Pearl Harbor and by the spring of 1943 had been extended to commodities which in 1941 accounted for 20 to 25 percent of consumer expenditures.1

Automobiles, tires, gasoline, bicycles, fuel oil, stoves, dairy products, sugar, coffee, shoes, and typewriters were among products rationed or affected by the conversion from consumer goods to war products in 1942. With these products rationed and subject to price control, the amount consumers could spend on products was limited. Accordingly, a larger share of consumer income was available to buy other products which resulted in an ever widening area of shortage of those products. The increase in consumer spending on other products extended rationing to those products. On the supply side, producers and wholesalers had limited need to advertise when consumer demand was great and products were in limited availability.2

The economic trend developing was leading to a decrease in advertising linage among daily newspapers. H.K. McCann, president of McCann-Erickson, one of the world’s largest agencies during the second world war stated, “In the case of products which have been restricted, advertising of these products must be curtailed....Doubtless advertising’s total volume will shrink during the war.” This feeling was echoed in a report by the New York agency, Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn, which reported, “To a great extent newspaper advertising by stores and dealers will be curtailed.”3

The impending downturn in advertising appeared so threatening to agencies that ad executives mobilized and formed the Advertising Council in 1942 to respond to the shocks prompted by the advent of World War II. The Ad Council began a campaign to promote advertising as a way to maintain company image in the minds of consumers during a time of shortage and rationing.

An area neglected by researchers and historians concerns the analysis of advertising during wartime, particularly an encompassing national involvement, as in World War II. Despite rationing and wartime conversion by manufacturers, daily newspapers reflected a marked overall increase in national advertising linage in the latter part of 1942 which continued through 1945.

Sentman and Washburn, in their hypothesis, attributed the increase in advertising during World War II to the 1940 excess profits tax and a subsequent Internal Revenue Service ruling in 1942. Their examination of the Pittsburgh Courier found that the number of national ads placed in the paper rose more than 60 percent during the war.

This article expands the Sentman and Washburn study by extending their hypothesis on advertising during World War II from the black press and specifically the Pittsburgh Courier to the entire daily U.S. newspaper industry as recorded in Editor & Publisher. It argues that despite the economic circumstances of rationing and wartime conversion, which should have created a decrease in advertising, the IRS rulings in 1942 and the emphasis on war bond drives combatted the economic effects of the war on goods and services, and created an increase in advertising linage in daily newspapers during World War II. Discussion of advertising and excess tax rulings during World War II has been the subject of books and studies, but none of these works have attempted to analyze whether the industry actually experienced an increase.

To analyze the daily newspaper industry, the advertising section of Editor & Publisher was utilized. Editor & Publisher published articles specific to challenges faced by newspapers in the advertising industry. Specifically, the

publication ran monthly and semi-annual reports of ad lineage of dailies in fifty-two cities. Furthermore, the E&P Index provided a gauge to compare advertising against previous levels. As in the case of World War II, daily newspaper advertising levels during the war could be compared to prewar levels.

Advertising Linage

By fall 1941, media organizations and advertising agencies were concerned with national developments. The approach of war seemed especially threatening. Conversion to wartime production would eliminate many consumer durables and with them the need for large advertising budgets; the government, through defense contracts and tax rulings, might have disallowed advertising as a business expense altogether.7

By May 1942, retailers were already predicting the worst. To control the public purchasing frenzy, and to prevent prices from rising on scarce goods, the Office of Price Administration issued an order to freeze prices. Freezing prices, which would prevent skyrocketing increases on scarce goods, created another complication for agencies during an already crucial situation. One retailer stated, "There will be an acute scarcity of many items, and it is only natural that the same degree of advertising will not be necessary. Newspapers will probably take a hell of licking."8

The first six months of 1942 turned ad agency concerns into reality. Six-month totals of dailies in fifty-two cities revealed an 8.5 percent drop in advertising lineage. The greatest period loss was a 64 percent drop in the automotive classification.9

War news for the first six months of 1942 was disastrous. The Japanese forces captured the Dutch East Indies with its oil and rubber resources. They swept into Burma, took Wake Island and Guam, and invaded the Aleutian Islands of Alaska. They pushed American forces out of the Philippines and onto the tiny island of Corregidor, where General Jonathon Wainwright surrendered more than 11,000 U.S. soldiers to the Japanese. The entire nation, including advertisers, thought that the war would last longer than first anticipated.10

A July 1942 survey by the North Carolina Press Association revealed a grim picture of advertising in dailies. The North Carolina daily press lost an average of 33 percent on national advertising, with individual paper losses ranging from 11 percent to 75 percent. Weeklies lost more national ads than dailies, but they were successful in increasing local advertising and commercial job printing to recoup some of the losses.11

11. "Effects of War on N.C. Press are Surveyed," Editor & Publisher, 8 August 1942, 8.
August 1942 offered a glimmer of hope when the American Newspaper Publishers Association sought clarification by the War Production Board on their published ruling titled, “Principles for Determination of Cost Under Government Contracts.” The ruling discussed the possibility of ads related to the war effort as being an admissible cost and thus deductible under tax codes.  

The Association of National Advertisers took the initiative and met with the Internal Revenue Service in an attempt to seek clarification and resolve the issue. The outcome was a victory for advertisers and the media. Secretary of the Treasury Henry E. Morgenthau Jr. stated,

Advertisements featuring the sale of war bonds, conservation, nutrition or other government objectives and are clearly signed by their corporation, the advertisement will be considered as institutional or goodwill advertising of the manufacturer and hence, deductible, provided, of course, that the expenditure is reasonable and not made in an attempt to avoid proper taxation.

Advertisers did not respond immediately. Although advertising did increase to levels comparable to the previous year, there was still confusion whether certain types of advertising met the IRS criteria, and if a company would qualify. In late September 1942, the IRS released the Helvering statement which answered the question in a six-point declaration:

In determining whether such expenditures were allowable, cognizance will be taken of (1) the size of the business, (2) the amount of prior advertising budgets, (3) the public patronage reasonably to be expected in the future, (4) the increased cost of the elements entering into total advertising expenditures, (5) the introduction of new products and added lines, and (6) buying habits necessitated by war restrictions, by priorities and by the unavailability of many raw materials.

Advertisers and officials of the War Bond Savings Program of the Treasury Department welcomed the IRS clarification. The failure of volunteer bond buying prompted the Treasury Department to consider implementing compulsory purchase of bonds. Tax revenue could not sufficiently cover the demands of financing the war, so bond sales were necessary to finance the increased demand for war materials. The Treasury Department had hoped to avert from the mandatory purchase program because of hardship upon families, and the

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army of staffs that would be required to police the system. The Treasury Department realized that the potential solution lay in the promotion of bonds and stamps by advertisers, only if they would take up the cause.15

Two weeks after the Treasury Department's report on poor War Bond sales, the Newspaper Advertising Executives Association met in Chicago to adopt a plan with the Advertising Council to launch a complete newspaper advertising campaign for a war loan drive.16

The plan would require newspaper ad men to contact local and national advertisers to create image ads with a wartime message or theme, particularly the sales of War Bonds and Stamps. The primary benefit was that advertisers would receive a tax deduction for the advertising expense. Furthermore, they would keep their product or service name in front of the public, and show a strong sense of patriotism, even though, in some case such as the automobile industry, no product existed at all.

Virtually every industry was changed by the war. Production in 1941 was 20 percent for war and 80 percent for civilian purposes. By the end of 1942 it had become 55 percent for war and 45 percent for civilians. The projections for 1943 were that production for civilian consumption would decrease even more.17

By December 1942, the print advertising lineage index revealed a gain of 0.3 percent for 1942 over 1941 advertising lineage.18 The IRS ruling in August had averted a crisis situation for advertising. The ruling was so effective that automobile lineage in November 1942 matched the lineage in November 1941, even though the entire industry had stopped producing civilian automobiles by February 1942. Most automobile manufacturers resumed advertising in late summer, with Nash, Hudson, and Crosley resuming in fall 1942.19 The First War Loan Drive manifested its effects as advertisers returned, although some advertisers had no products to advertise.

By January 1943, surveys on the War Loan Drive revealed that between 800 and 1,200 full pages of newspaper space were devoted to the campaign. Daily newspapers and agencies urged national and local advertisers to promote the war effort. Mandatory sales of stamps and bonds was averted at the end of

16. George A. Brandenburg, “NAEA Hears of Appreciation in Washington for Advertising,” Editor & Publisher, 17 October 1942, 3. Peter Odegard, assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury stated. “We are confident that with your cooperation we shall go over the top on our projections. I can think of no greater gift to our fighting forces in the year of crisis than the news of success on the home savings front.”
19. L.M. Hughes, 18.
1942. However, the Treasury Department was still considering the compulsory purchase of war bonds as an option in 1943.20

The Second War Loan Drive opened on 5 April 1943 with advertisements appearing in more than 3,000 dailies and weeklies.21 Newspaper advertising associations and ad agencies mobilized to support the Treasury Department's drive to raise $13 billion. After three weeks, more than thirty million lines of advertising appeared in daily newspapers supporting the War Loan Drive. Victor F. Callahan, director of advertising, press, and radio for the War Savings Staff of the Treasury Department, stated, "Even before the Second War Loan campaign started, we believed it was destined to be the biggest advertising promotion in history, but we never did imagine coverage as astounding as that shown by the final figures."22

The figures were impressive. Advertising linage increased 11.3 percent for the first six months of 1943. This became the highest figure for six months since 1937.23 In June 1943, newspaper linage registered a 16.7 percent increase.

A considerable portion of the increase came about because of the advertiser's willingness to adopt image ads that promoted the war loan drive. The American Association of Advertising Agencies and the War Advertising Council surveyed advertisers and revealed that war bonds and stamps was the major theme adopted by advertisers (see table 1).24

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20. "Newspaper War Bond Ads Totalled $26,000,000," *Editor & Publisher*, 23 January 1943, 10.
21. "You've Done Your Bit—Now Do Your Best, Bond Theme," *Editor & Publisher*, 20 February 1943, 12.
22. "72 Million Ad Lines Used for 2nd War Loan Drive," *Editor & Publisher*, 22 May 1943, 8. Thomas H. Lane, chief of the Treasury Department's advertising section stated, "The fact that the ads were widely used is due to the untold thousands of local advertisers, whose efforts were rivaled only by the many national advertisers who bought space in great quantity to put over the Second War Loan."
23. "Six Months' Linage Ahead 11.3%," *Editor & Publisher*, 7 July 1943.
Table 1
War Ad Themes and Number of Advertisers
(January - June 1943)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War Bonds &amp; Stamps</th>
<th>749</th>
<th>Economic stability</th>
<th>78</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>Household Conservation</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationing Stamps</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Farm goals</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tire/car conserve</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>Absenteeism</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower-Womanpower</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>Black markets</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victory gardens</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>Scrap salvage</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel conservation</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>Fat salvage</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Editor & Publisher, 3 July 1943.

While advertisers and newspapers were analyzing the results of the Second War Loan Drive, the Treasury Department announced the theme for the Third War Loan Drive, “Back the Attack—Buy War Bonds.” The Treasury Department stated that the next drive would begin 2 September 1943, and they set a goal to raise $15 billion. It was estimated that it would take 100 million lines of advertising in daily and weekly newspapers to accomplish the goal.25

To meet the challenge, newspaper ad executives appealed to department stores to adopt institutional advertising. Despite scarcity of goods, department stores were encouraged to do their “patriotic duty” and promote war themes. According to Richard Meyborn of the National Retail Dry Goods Association, “Department stores account for almost one-quarter of all national advertising and their participation would be needed to make the next drive successful.”26

The addition of institutional advertising by department stores made a marked difference in the Third War Loan Drive as linage soared to more than sixty-one million lines of advertising for the three week campaign, again exceeding the projections of the Treasury Department, and doubling the linage of the Second War Loan Drive.27

Advertising reports at the end of 1943 revealed the success of the advertising campaigns as advertising increased 13.2 percent over 1942. More important than the increase were the figures in the E&P Index published in Editor & Publisher. The index presented a fifty-two city survey measuring the percentage of advertising in 1943 as it compared to prewar levels (see table 2). The index provided an accurate comparison on advertising’s increase or decrease.

25. “Newspapers to Cooperate in Third War Bond Drive,” Editor & Publisher, 31 July 1943, 10.
27. “Newspaper Ad Value Doubled in Third War Loan Drive,” Editor & Publisher, 6 November 1943, 14.
Table 2

**Editor & Publisher Index Comparison**
Percent of 1943 advertising by category with prewar levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>E&amp;P Index %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Display Only</td>
<td>101.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>130.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department Store</td>
<td>104.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>129.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>71.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>91.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A percentage rank of 100 indicates that it matches prewar levels.

Source: *Editor & Publisher*. 22 January 1944, 10.

All categories exceeded prewar levels except automotive and financial. Automotive returned to 70 percent of its previous advertising even though no product existed. Financial institutions were in a similar position. Since the public was investing in war bonds and stamps there were few investments or substantial savings plans on which banks and investment companies could draw upon.

Newspapers continued to be an integral part of war loan drive campaigns during 1944. War bonds and stamps continued to be the dominant theme of advertisers by more than two-to-one over the second ranked theme of fat and grease salvage.28

Advertising in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth War Loan Drives in 1944 matched the levels of 1943. However, total linage for the year experienced a decrease. The first six months of 1944, ending in June, showed a 2.2 percent decrease in total newspaper advertising, even though the financial category had returned to its prewar level.

The decrease in ad linage is primarily attributable to the spectacular news events of early 1944. In January and February 1944, the Marshall Islands fell to American forces, giving the United States landing strips for bombers. Long-range bombing of Japan began in May 1944, with expansive media coverage of the raids.

As strategically important as these events in the Pacific Theatre were, nothing could surpass the news coverage given to events in Europe with the fall

28. "Bonds Still Top War Ad Themes in Press, Editor & Publisher, 12 August 1944, 48."
of Rome and the invasion of France on the Normandy Coast, both in early June 1944. Newspapers gave vast coverage to these events, and in some cases because of newsprint shortages, all advertising was eliminated from dailies to provide adequate news coverage of the event. The result was a slight decrease in advertising for the first six-month period of 1944.

The Fifth War Loan Drive exceeded the success of previous drives. This time the success was attributed to local advertisers and many small ads. Treasury Department official Ted Gamble stated,

"The overwhelming success of the drive could not have been achieved without the truly amazing support of America’s advertising industry and advertisers. Never before in history has so much of a product been sold in so short a time. This tremendous record represents an amazing contribution to the war financing effort on the part of the newspapers for which the Treasury is sincerely appreciative."

The laudatory tone of Treasury Department officials turned to concern when the Sixth War Loan Drive resulted in the first decrease in bond sales experienced during the war loan drive campaigns. Newspaper advertising linage dipped as well (see table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drive</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Linage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First War Loan Drive</td>
<td>Nov. 1942</td>
<td>Between 20-25 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second War Loan Drive</td>
<td>Apr. 1943</td>
<td>30 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third War Loan Drive</td>
<td>Sep. 1943</td>
<td>61 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth War Loan Drive</td>
<td>Feb. 1944</td>
<td>58 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth War Loan Drive</td>
<td>Jul. 1944</td>
<td>66 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth War Loan drive</td>
<td>Nov.-Dec. 1944</td>
<td>56 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Editor & Publisher, 14 April 1945, 9.

30. "Total Linage Off," Editor & Publisher, 8 July 1944.
31. "Record Ad Linage Marked in Fifth Loan." Editor & Publisher, 19 August 1944.
A fear of complacency on part of the American public and advertisers because of recent victories in Europe and the march to Japan apparently affected the success of the Sixth War Loan Drive; the American public could sense an end to the conflict.

By mid-December, the Soviet surge had penetrated Eastern Germany and allied aerial bombing occurred around the clock. As the allies continued to win victories in the war in late 1944, the Treasury Department renewed its campaign for daily newspapers to support the continued War Loan Drives. Ted Gamble, national director of the U.S. Treasury War Finance Division, stated,

Regardless of what happens in Germany, the need for extra bond sales will continue for some time. The public generally feels that we have passed the worst of the war, whereas we are going to have to borrow to meet war expenditures. It is going to be a shock to the people to learn that they are going to have to continue expenses during the twelve months ahead. It is a psychological problem that will have to be combatted by advertising.32

By the year's end, 1944 revealed a 0.5 percent increase in ad lineage over 1943. Linage in principal cities varied from city to city with papers reporting slight losses or small increases.33

The Seventh War Loan Drive presented the biggest challenge to advertisers. The 14 May to 10 June 1945 drive represented the largest selling assignment to date in the war. Don Bridge, advertising director of Gannett Newspapers, outlined the problem before a group of Boston advertising and newspaper executives:

The quota for daily newspaper advertising for the Seventh War Loan Drive is the biggest selling assignment in history and calls for the most extensive newspaper advertising in history....It is unnecessary to tell a group like this why the Seventh war loan must succeed. No bond sales, no money; no money, no weapons; no weapons, no victory; no victory, no freedom.34

One week before the Seventh War Loan Drive was to begin, Americans were celebrating V-E Day, May 8, 1945, the day after the unconditional surrender of Germany.

The Treasury Department and daily newspapers were preparing for the 14 May 1945 launch of the Seventh War Loan Drive. The emphasis for war advertising came from the theme, "Germany's Defeated, Don't Forget Japan!"

33. "Advertising Linage Up .5%," Editor & Publisher, 19 December 1944, 18.
34. "Advertising Must Be Geared to Sell 85 Million E Bonds," Editor & Publisher, 14 April 1945, 9.
Advertisers and Americans weren’t forgetting Japan, but they were forgetting about the Seventh War Loan Drive. Three weeks into the war loan drive, Okinawa, a Japanese island fell to American troops. The allies had already overrun Iwo Jima, and bombing attacks of Tokyo were annihilating.

The Seventh War Loan Drive did not catch the pitch of previous war loan drives as advertisers were welcoming GIs home from Europe, and promoting future consumer goods after the reconversion. After six war loan drives, and what seemed like imminent victory in Japan, it appeared that the American public was ready to settle back into peacetime. Newspapermen and advertisers displayed a similar reaction when no analysis appeared of the Seventh War Loan Drive in the trade journals Editor & Publisher and Advertising Age as it had on previous campaigns. Mention of The Seventh War Loan Drive disappeared amidst articles on postwar advertising conversion and the promotion of peacetime products. The war would labor on for two more months until V-J day on 14 August 1945.35

Advertising was gradually declining as victory in Europe approached. After the victory, there was a sudden but brief surge as advertisers took out ads complimenting troops on the victory. After V-E day, ads promoting war themes disappeared and ad linage in daily newspapers declined as manufacturers and retailers were planning reconversion and anticipating a return to plentiful consumer goods.

Ad linage in 1945 ended with a decrease for the year as the transition to peacetime began. Advertisers had planned campaigns for after the war when their companies returned to traditional products. However, the ads had to wait for the availability of goods before launching the new campaigns.36

Conclusion

The IRS ruling and clarification in August 1942 cleared the way for advertisers to benefit from a tax deduction as long as the company did not promote a specific product or service and carried a war theme. Speaking in 1942 before a joint congressional committee, Henry G. Morgenthau Jr. stated that the Treasury Department planned to “adhere to its policy regarding as permissible deductions for tax purposes advertising expenses which bear a reasonable relationship to the activity in which the enterprise is engaged.”37

Advertising increased in late 1942 and maintained a strong surge throughout 1943. Spectacular news events pushed ads aside in favor of news coverage, but the emphasis on the War Loan Drives created a stabilized position for ad linage and 1944 ended with a comparable level with 1943.

Bond and stamp sales emerged and remained the dominant theme throughout the war. This theme carried into the specific war loan drives provided

35. See issues of Editor & Publisher and Advertising Age for June and July.
36. “Ad Linage Down as Advertisers Await Product Availability,” Editor & Publisher, 18 December 1945.
a continued reason for advertisers to run ads because of the great needs of the Treasury Department to finance the war.

This study supported the Sentman and Washburn hypothesis that the IRS ruling of 1942 created a boost to newspaper advertising. Their findings with the black press, and specifically the *Pittsburgh Courier*, relate closely to the trends found among dailies in fifty-two cities in this study. The effect on the bond sales by newspapers provided a badly needed boost for the Treasury Department. In turn, the ruling by the IRS, an arm of the Treasury Department, saved many jobs in the daily newspaper industry and many newspapers from potential failure through the ad revenue increases.

*Adams is an assistant professor at Angelo State University, and Sekhri is a graduate student at Ohio University.*
American Armed Forces Newspapers in World War II

By Alfred E. Cornebise

By the coming of World War II, the armed forces newspaper was a commonplace, having been around for well over a century. With the great influx of men into the armed forces after the passage of the conscription act in September 1940, soldier papers proliferated, and personnel in the training camps were soon being enlightened, entertained, informed and encouraged by their own unit's sheets. Good examples were the Camp Haan Post Beacon, published at Riverside, California, and the Panorama, produced for the benefit of the trainees at Fort Ord, California, which began as early as 20 September 1940 as a ten-page tabloid. Similarly, at Mineral Wells, Texas, The Camp Wolters Longhorn was established, first appearing on 24 July 1941. It was joined on numerous bases by hundreds of others, and innumerable "Windsocks," "Prop Blasts," "Flight Patterns," not to mention various and sundry "Observers," "Bulletins," "Sentinels," and "Reveilles," were speedily on the scene.

Inevitably, wherever American service personnel were engaged, their own papers were not far behind, following the course of conflict around the globe. When American troops were sent to Iceland months before Pearl Harbor, they soon established The White Falcon. However, the involvement of American troops in Iceland was secret, and it was not until 1943 that the paper could even mention the island at all. Early American activity in World War II also involved anti-submarine operations in the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the

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Atlantic. The large sixteen-page *Caribbean Sentinel*, published on the presses of *El Mundo*, in San Juan, Puerto Rico, was representative of the genre serving those so engaged.2

Another prominent early paper appearing outside of the continental United States was the *Kodiak Bear*, published by officers and men, both Army and Navy, at Fort Greely and the Naval Air Station, Kodiak, Alaska. A full-sized, four-page paper printed in Anchorage, it gained considerable attention, *Life* magazine once reporting on its numerous accomplishments.3

All armed forces papers appeared with official sanction. According to a War Department Circular, “in all posts, camps, and stations of sufficient strength to render proper support, the publication and maintenance of a news periodical...is to be encouraged.”4 In addition, Gen. George Catlett Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, strongly endorsed the concept of soldier newspapers, expressing his views in a memorandum to the editors of the first edition of *The Stars and Stripes*, in London. The paper printed it on the front page: “A soldier’s newspaper, in these grave times, is more than a morale venture. It is a symbol of the things we are fighting to preserve and spread in this threatened world. It represents the free thought and free expression of a free people.”5 Gen. Dwight David Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, well aware of their morale value, repeatedly insisted upon more-or-less untrammeled papers for service personnel, only asking that they be “honest papers,” which would not undermine confidence in the high command.6 At Pearl Harbor, Fleet Admiral Chester William Nimitz similarly gave support to service publications.7

As to what they printed, there were at once many similarities and differences among the plethora of sheets that appeared. Many papers relied mainly on locally-developed material; others leaned heavily on copy from civilian news agencies, such as the International News Service, the United Press and the Associated Press. However, most utilized the resources of the War Department’s Camp Newspaper Service, which supplied syndicated materials from its offices in New York City, and those of the Army News Service. The latter, also based in New York City, used the facilities of the Army Signal Corps to transmit radio press copy around the world to military papers. The Camp Newspaper Service was a news and feature syndicate operated by Army personnel for the free distribution of copy and art to service papers in the field. In

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2. A later paper appearing in the Caribbean was one of the best of the GI papers to emerge anywhere during the war. It was the Antilles Air Command’s *Thunderhead*, serving men of that outfit engaged in the continuing war against the U-boat as part of the Caribbean Defense Command.
7. See note in the *Navy Times*, Guam, 25 July 1945.
addition, it produced a monthly magazine, *GI Galley*, which included news, features and letters from service papers everywhere, and distributed a weekly *Clip Sheet*, as well as the *Army Editor’s Manual*. All of these publications assisted the hard-pressed, often novice, editor in the field seeking to create, where possible, a professional-appearing paper. The Camp Service also sponsored an annual competition for the best service publication. This was won one year by the Persian Gulf Service Command’s weekly, the *United States Army Dispatch*, while the Fort Niagara, New York paper, *The Drum*, won the coveted award twice. The Navy Department’s Bureau of Personnel operated a Ships’s Editorial Association (SEA) which, among other things, made available Associated Press and United Press news dispatches to Navy publications.

The difficulties under which most of the papers operated were legion and frequently noted. While some enjoyed a large staff and modern printing equipment, they usually had in common the problems of publishing in the field, ranging from shortage of paper and ink supplies to inadequate publishing and printing facilities. Sometimes civilian presses were taken over, complete with staffs, many of whom knew no English. Working with these naturally proved difficult. For example, the *United States Army Dispatch*, of the Persian Gulf Command, was set by non-English-speaking Iranians, while the engravers were Armenians and the printers Turks. Some papers were published on mobile presses mounted on Army trucks.

Sometimes they were produced under fire, as was the case in Belgium when the Germans began to use “buzz-bombs” to bombard Liège, where one of the continental editions of *The Stars and Stripes* was being produced. Circulation problems naturally abounded, and every means of transport, ranging from pack mules to aircraft, were used to get papers to a migratory body of readers.

Other difficulties almost invariably included the obtaining of sufficient financing. Government regulations provided that no funds appropriated by Congress could be used in defraying the cost of publishing installation or unit newspapers, and neither could they accept advertising. Some few papers got around this by being produced by civilians, as was the case with the Camp Lee (Virginia) *Traveler*—named for General Robert E. Lee’s famous horse—which as a civilian publication could use advertising. However, official service papers could be financed out of entertainment funds or the profits from the post exchanges. Nevertheless, some charged enough for the papers to make themselves self-sufficient.

The military press incorporated many kinds of features. Cartoons and comic strips were staples, and frequently included Milton Caniff’s “Male Call,” a rather “racy” version of the comic strip “Terry and the Pirates,” with such characters as the well-endowed and overexposed “Miss Lace,” and “Burma,” which were calculated to titillate the prurient interests of the GI readership. One widely-circulated cartoon was Staff Sergeant Leonard Sansone’s creation, “The Wolf.” Its popularity was attributable in part “to Sansone’s knowledge of the GI mind but particularly to the happy inspiration which led him to place on the shoulders of his hero, who personified the wolfish tendencies alleged against all
GI's, a faithfully-drawn wolf's head."8 Many papers carried Bill Mauldin's cartoon "Willie and Joe"—definitely "Up Front"—which emerged as one of the artifacts of the war, an icon of the combat troops to which they could wholeheartedly relate. Not inconsequentially, Mauldin won a Pulitzer Prize for his efforts. Sergeant George Baker's "Sad Sack," and Chic Young's "Blondie," were also popular, as were other comic strips familiar to the folks at home. The perennial "salt-peter-defying" "cheesecake" pinups were common features. Photographic sections were sometimes added, as in the Cairo edition of Stripes, for example, called "Focus Pocus." Columns, such as "Hash Marks," in the Algiers edition of Stripes, served as outlets for bons mots and short items of humor and wit, which among other things, were aimed at the discomforts, "snafus" and redtape common to military service. Ernie Pyle's popular column regularly appeared in some of the papers, notably The Stars and Stripes. Other features included entertainment schedules and sports pages, which sometimes used such syndicated material as Grantland Rice's "Sportslight" column, familiar to sports fans in the United States. Cultural matters were discussed, such as new books and movies. The soldier press served as a forum for the battle of the sexes, a venue for discussions of racial matters, and a means of following developments on the home front—war production, rationing, and strikes. The latter were universally and vociferously deplored by the soldiers. The course of the war was followed, often with the lavish use of maps. Various branches of service were featured, and the hardware of war was prominently displayed, especially aircraft. To a surprising degree, and rather early in the course of the war, armed forces papers focused on the postwar period, often including elaborations as to how life would be lived in a better world at peace.

Poetry figured in many newspapers, under such headings as "Verse and Worse," "The Poets Cornered," and "Puptent Poets," collections from the latter being published as an anthology by The Stars and Stripes in Italy in 1945.9 There seemed little doubt, according to the compilers of this collection, that in the U.S. armed forces during World War II, it was "respectable to be a poet," and men in uniform "who might once have regarded poetry as a matter for 'long hairs' and 'softies'," were writing poetry themselves and "what's more, signing [it]," as one editor marveled. All were encouraged to write what they felt, and "if the meter was wobbly and the rhymes eccentric or missing, no one got excited." The usual critical standards normally observed by newspapers regarding poetry were not adhered to; indeed, "poetry critics were not allowed on the premises." No great war poetry resulted, but what the "Puptent Poets" department did was to provide an "open forum whose only requirements [were] a poetic leaning and an interest in writing about the war as well as living it."10

The emphasis on reader participation was a characteristic of GI papers throughout, though there were exceptions. Certainly The Stars and Stripes owed

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10. Ibid., from the foreword.
much of its popularity to such provocative features as “Mail Call,” “Mail Bag,” and “B-Bag” columns, which published critical letters from readers, causing no end of controversy and sometimes alarm in certain quarters. In fact, much of the opposition that the soldier press generated frequently was focused on the letters-to-the-editors columns. This was especially true regarding missives that attacked the brass and the concept of a less-than-democratic modus operandi that characterized the military. Despite the support that a relatively open soldier press had at the highest levels of command, numerous officers were never reconciled to the very notion of a press that sought to accommodate the interests, the well-being and complaints of enlisted personnel which most troop papers addressed. Even the desires of Generals Marshall and Eisenhower and other senior commanders could not always stem the tide that often ran against an open and free soldier press. Thus, despite official endorsement at the highest levels, the habits of command were too strong to be easily laid aside by such dynamic leaders as General Douglas MacArthur and General George Smith Patton, both of whom had pronounced reservations about troop newspapers, especially when published by enlisted personnel. MacArthur, for example, ever-jealous of publicity regarding himself and his command, would not permit The Stars and Stripes in his area until late in the war. General Patton had a famous interview with the originator of the “Willie and Joe” cartoons, Bill Mauldin, in which the crusty commander insisted that Mauldin tone down his starkly-realistic, generally anti-establishment creations, all to no avail.\(^1\)

Many times it was the seemingly omnipresent Information and Education officers of more modest rank, often in charge of the papers, who frequently put pressure on editors and staffs. Especially if they were enlisted men, staffers were constrained to pay heed to the demands of their commanders mainly interested in seeing that the exploits real or imagined of themselves or their units gained a prominent place in the papers. These forces within the military would eventually erode away the foundations of a free soldier press to the extent that by the war’s end, many papers had been reduced to mere trade journals that had little of the ebullient bite that might have alleviated or altered questionable circumstances or practices often plaguing enlisted personnel. Certainly, there would be little inclination to change the caste system, a sacred cow most officers regarded as beyond attack.

Nevertheless, certain provocative papers and editors did make some headway in assaulting other venerable institutions, such as when the outspoken, influential CBI Roundup attacked the heretofore unassailable: USO shows, featuring stage and screen luminaries who entertained troops around the world. The editor charged that “big-name entertainers, drawn from Hollywood and elsewhere, turn up in CBI with accompanying ballyhoo here and back in the States, stay around long enough to send out their laundry, and then truck off for home.” His sally resulted in several spirited exchanges with such stars as Ann Sheridan, who retorted that “I’ll fight boy-fashion, and no holds barred, with

\(^{11}\) Bill Mauldin, The Brass Ring (New York: W.W. Norton, 1971), 253-64.
anyone who thinks I, or any of the gang I accompanied, dogged it in the overseas theaters."  

At issue in all of this was the definition of a free press within a military setting. To be sure, even the most sanguine editors recognized that there would be limits in wartime as to how far a free press could go. A certain measure of censorship was an understandable and generally accepted fact of military life; nevertheless, there was always the possibility—and even necessity—of a degree of freedom. Just what these limits were was perennially tested in the course of the war, with every commander and soldier-editor having to arrive at some modus vivendi in order for the papers to appear at all. The trend was, however, for the commanders and their minions steadily to make advances against the usually more liberal editors. These were often draftee citizen-soldiers, who, as the war wound down, were more concerned with their impending discharges and their return to civilian life than with their newspapers. They were therefore unwilling to risk very much on behalf of a free soldier press. Consequently, many of the most vocal editors and readers were eventually out of the way. With the draftees being discharged in ever-greater numbers, the regulars were once more in the majority and regular armed forces ways, more restrictive and conservative, prevailed. Regarding the GI gazettes, the results were a foregone conclusion. As two former Stripes's staffers once rather ruefully admitted, "the Army knows what sort of newspaper it wants. And it knows how to get it, even if it has to fight all the enlisted men on the staff and a few sympathetic officers."  

Around the globe, some famous controversies ensued in this regard, most concerning various editions of Stripes, but also involving such papers as the Air Transport Command's scrappy North Star, which, among other things, often hotly questioned and debated the rights and privileges of the brass.

The Stars and Stripes remains the most important of the World War II GI gazettes and the standard by which all others were judged. It began on 18 April 1942 as a weekly for the first American troops in Northern Ireland,

12. Later called the India-Burma Theater Roundup, the Roundup was a twelve-page, five-columned weekly appearing every Thursday off the presses of The Statesman in New Delhi. It served personnel in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater of Operations. For the controversy with the USO, see the CBI Roundup, Vol. III, Nos. 3, 6, and 14, 28 September, 19 October and 14 December 1944. This particular incident continues to rankle USO veterans. See Maxene Andrews and Bill Gilbert, Over Here, Over There. The Andrews Sisters And The USO Stars In World War II (New York: Zebra Books, 1993), 174-76. Gen. Joseph Warren "Vinegar Joe" Stillwell, in whose Theater the Roundup appeared, generally supported the concept of a free GI press. His basic guideline was: "If you can prove it, print it." There is a discussion in Geoffrey Perret, There's a War to be Won: The United States Army in World War II (New York: Random House, 1991), 482-83.


14. The North Star, which served the Command's Alaskan Division, circulated widely throughout Canada, Alaska, and the American northwest.
published by the printing firm of Hazell, Watson and Viney in London. One
newspaper observed that, "it was a pretty good country weekly, but in the first
months of 1942 that was about the kind of army we had in Europe, a sort of a
country weekly kind of army." 15 Soon, however, many more Americans arrived,
and were scattered throughout the British Isles. U.S. Army Air Force men of
the burgeoning 8th Air Force were especially numerous. Indeed, The Stars and
Stripes emerged as virtually that unit's private paper, priding itself, with
considerable justification, on its coverage of the air war. The first subscriptions
cost 18 shillings, which included Yank, the Army magazine. 16 The paper
became a daily on 2 November 1942, beginning Vol. 3, and moved to Printing
House Square in London, home of the famed London Times, whose presses took
on the task of printing the GI paper. It soon became the center of much attention
and fame. As one of its staffers has recorded, "before [long], every newspaper in
Fleet Street was sending a messenger boy to wait at The Times' pressroom, not
for a copy of the Thunderer, but for The Stars and Stripes. So, too, the American
news agencies. The British press picked up leads on stories, and frequently
stories intact, albeit injecting into them the unique style of London
journalism." 17

As the war progressed, The Stars and Stripes sought to keep pace, and a
chronological account of the paper's history closely parallels the course of the
conflict. 18 On 8 November 1942, the Allies landed in North Africa, and a month
later, on 9 December, The Stars and Stripes Mediterranean edition began life in
Algiers. A weekly, it was printed on the presses of L'Echo d'Alger. On 15 April
1943, it was joined by a daily edition, which continued until 15 July 1944,
when many of the Algiers staff adjourned to Rome. Also in the spring of 1943,
three additional editions of Stripes appeared. On 16 April, the Africa, Middle
East and Persian Gulf weekly, published in Cairo, emerged. On 3 May, the
North Africa daily began publishing at Oran, and on 19 May, the Casablanca
daily was launched. A biweekly edition of Stripes was established in Tunis on
21 December 1943, lasting until 2 June 1944.

With the mounting of the Sicily invasion, a thirteen-issue, mimeographed
edition of The Stars and Stripes appeared on shipboard. After the
Allied conquest of the island, a twice-weekly edition of Stripes was issued in
Palermo, beginning on 12 August 1943 and continuing until 2 June 1944. On 6
September 1943, with the opening of the Italian campaign, a few issues of a

15. Bud Hutton and Andrew A. Rooney, The Story of The Stars and Stripes (Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1946), 22.
16. Ibid., 23, 196.
17. Ibid., 26.
18. One essential source for unravelling the paper's history is: C.E. Dornbusch,
Public Library (July 1948): 331-40. Also useful is John Sharnik and Gregg Howard,
eds., Stripes: The First Five Years of the GI's Newspaper (Pfungstadt: The Stars and
Stripes, 1947), and Robert Meyer Jr., ed., The Stars and Stripes Story of World War II
(New York: David McCay, 1960). See also the absorbing and informative memoir by
special Fifth Army edition of *Stripes* were produced temporarily by a mobile unit for men in the front lines. Soon a regular combat edition of *The Stars and Stripes* was established, continuing for much of the remainder of 1943.

More substantial editions subsequently appeared in Italy. On 10 November 1943, the Naples version first came from the presses of *Il Mattino*, and continued until 12 June 1945. When the Allies entered Rome on 4 June 1944, staff members of the Naples edition were with them. On the following day, they published the first issue of the Rome paper. It was destined for an illustrious career as one of the most important of the *Stripes*’ editions.

With the Normandy landings on 6 June 1944, men from the London edition were on hand to launch the first *Stripes* from the continent. The first issue was a mimeographed production, published in the village of Ste. Marie du Mont. The staff then moved to Cherbourg where on 4 July, a two-page paper appeared. Pursuing its readers as they advanced across northern France, the Cherbourg paper moved to Rennes, first publishing there on 21 August. A few days later, following the liberation of Paris on 26 August, the Paris daily edition, listed as Vol. 1, No. 54, was printed on 5 September 1944. Coming off of the presses of the Paris branch of the *New York Herald Tribune*, it lasted well beyond the end of the war, to February 1946, becoming the most important of the continental versions of *The Stars and Stripes*.

Other editions of *Stripes* that appeared in Europe included the Northern Ireland daily, published from 6 December 1943 to 29 January 1944, to benefit the men gathering for the invasion that came in June. Later, with the Allies in Belgium, the Liège edition appeared, continuing from 20 January to 17 April 1945. Paralleling the Liège example, the Nancy, France paper was published as a daily from 22 January to 16 April 1945. When war spread to southern France, various other editions were published: one in Grenoble; another in Besançon; a twin Nice-Marseille edition; the Dijon paper, and the Strasbourg sheet. The latter had a short but exciting career, as the war ebbed and flowed in the area, extending from 4 December 1944 to 20 January 1945.

Inevitably, *The Stars and Stripes* followed the armies into Germany, the first German edition appearing on 5 April 1944, in the village of Pfungstadt, near Frankfurt. The Southern Germany *Stripes* was launched on V-E Day—8 May 1945—in Altdorf, Bavaria, lasting to 15 December 1946, when the Pfungstadt paper was resumed, after it ceased operations 17 April 1946. This final version of the European *Stars and Stripes* has continued to the present, though it later moved to the village of Griesheim near Darmstadt, being first issued from that site on 26 September 1949.

*The Stars and Stripes* was late in coming to the Pacific war. Its first incarnation was the Middle Pacific edition, published in Honolulu, from 14 May 1945. It replaced the successful *Mid-Pacifican*, which had been on the Hawaiian scene since February 1942. This version of *Stripes* soon had a wide readership stretching from Australia to the Aleutians, into the China-Burma-India Theater, and eventually to Japan and Korea. Its daily circulation route extended over 20,000 miles. The paper ceased operations on 30 January 1946.
After the end of the war against Japan, two other editions of Stripes were established. One was a daily appearing in Shanghai. Printed at the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, it continued from 28 September 1945 until 13 April 1946. Longer lasting was the Tokyo daily, still being published. Its first issue came out 3 October 1945.

Nevertheless, the Pacific editions did not mature as did the European versions. One reason was the dominance there of General Douglas MacArthur. Though he permitted the paper to be published in Tokyo, as one observer has noted, the fact of his presence and attitudes “is important to an understanding of the soldier press in the Pacific,” and consequently, “the Pacific Stars and Stripes never really had the guts and the representative opinion of the servicemen.”

The Shanghai paper, mainly due to the presence of Lieutenant General Albert Coady Wedemeyer as Theater commander, fared much better. Wedemeyer was an advocate of a free and open soldier press and cooperated with the paper’s editors to make the paper viable as a representative sheet for personnel under his command, though misgivings and misunderstandings sometimes surfaced.

Stripes was not the only GI paper that mattered in the war years, however. Eventually thousands of troop papers appeared throughout the world. In Iran, for instance, American soldiers keeping the Lend-Lease lines open to Russia, published The 3rd Mrs. Red Ball, while the Persian Gulf Service Command produced an excellent weekly newspaper, the United States Army Dispatch. A Coast Artillery publication, The Jungle Mudder, together with its Spanish-language edition, el junglero, served its readers in the Panama Canal Zone. In New Guinea, the Fourth General Hospital produced The Mortem Post. Outfits in the China-Burma-India Theater published the Tiger Rag, the Yankee Doodler, and the lively CBI Roundup.

On the besieged beachhead at Anzio, troops in Italy founded the Beachhead News and continued to publish it as they slowly and painfully advanced up the Italian peninsula, later into Germany. Another Anzio paper was the mimeographed Anzio Echo, produced by an artillery unit. The 45th Division News was an important Mediterranean Theater paper that had been established in the United States in 1940 and launched the career of the renowned “Willie and Joe” cartoonist, Bill Mauldin.19 Always concerned with publicity, the Army Air Forces were well represented by papers and in the Mediterranean published such

20. See Emanuel Goldberg, “G.I. Editors in China Given ‘Magna Charta’,” Quill, March 1947, 9, 12. The “Magna Charta” was an agreement worked out by Wedemeyer and editors of the Shanghai Stripes giving the editors considerable latitude.
21. Mauldin, The Brass Ring, 90, and passim. Other interesting Mediterranean-area papers included The Compressor, published by some engineers in Sicily; DeBunk, a lively paper living up to its name; the Engineerful; and a hand-printed, one-sheet paper, the Emily Post, the handiwork of a solitary nurse who produced the entire paper, drawing the cartoons, and writing the poetry and the editorials.
sheets as Sortie Fifteenth Air Force, an eight-page, five-column weekly, and The 12th Air Force Weekly Mission.

In Africa, in the Cairo area, Camp Huckstep published Sand Script, while Payne Field produced the Skymaster, named for the four-engine Douglas C-54 Skymaster, which the Air Transport Command regularly flew out of that field. A communications unit’s Dah-Dit, and another Air Transport Command paper, Wadi Yo Know, with its gripe column, “Tough Sheet,” were typical of the papers appearing in that theater. The Air Transport Command fielded several interesting papers in many parts of the world.

In France and Germany, papers sprang up in great numbers after the end of hostilities when the men had time to produce them at their leisure. The 407th Fraternerizer, with an eye to the local female population, was one late 1945 paper published in Germany. The provocative Bars and Gripes—parodying the Stripes’s venerable title—benefitted personnel of the 788th Field Artillery Battalion, also in Germany, and in Munich The Blotter appropriately served the 508th MP Battalion. In France, La Bannière de Biarritz was published by the School of Journalism at the Army University Center Number 2, under the direction of the well-known University of Missouri journalism professor, Frank Luther Mott.

Beginning on 14 June 1945 in the Philippines, the provocative Daily Pacifican appeared. In the Ryukyus, Tough Sheet bragged that it was the first American soldier paper appearing on Japanese home soil, though others claimed that distinction. A colorful Korean paper was The Daily Lost Battalion, published by men of the Forty-ninth Field Artillery Battalion, who clearly felt themselves neglected and abandoned in foreign fields.

The Navy and Marine Corps were not lacking in papers. Sailors published them both on shipboard and on land. For instance, men on the destroyer USS Norris produced Open Fire, changing its name to Cease Fire! when the war ended. The Blue Print was a mimeographed product of USS Blue, while the USS Salem appropriately named its paper the Witchcraft. A prominent publication appearing on shore was the widely-circulated Navy Times, issued from Guam after 25 July 1945.

Marine Corps papers reflected the firm control of their Marine commanders. Most were rather bland affairs, and such publications as The Camp Lejeune Globe; the Flight Jacket, published at the Marine Corps air base at El Toro, California; Quantico’s The Leatherneck; and numerous others, were calculated to inculcate further the Marines’ famed esprit de corps into the rank and file.

22. Many troop papers often engaged in battles with others, claiming to be the first or the best, and, as was true of their civilian counterparts, eagerly engaged in attempts to scoop each other. One of the clearing houses for such battles was the letter columns of GI Gallery, the publication of the Camp Newspaper Service. The soldier editors fought over which paper was the first to publish in World War II, the first to appear after the activation of its outfit, or the first to publish in former enemy territory. See discussion in Peery, “The GI Fourth Estate,” 277-78.
In World War II, the American military services were racially segregated. Black troops, frequently feeling that they were kept out of the center of things, sometimes produced their own papers. One was The Carryall of the Third Engineer Aviation Unit Training Center at MacDill Field, Florida, which intended to “uplift morale, enlighten and give to the colored soldiers...a source of inspiration.” Black troops of the 25th Infantry Regiment of the Ninety-second Infantry Division stationed at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, published The Bullet, while the parent organization, the Ninety-second, kept alive the traditions of the frontier cavalry manned by black troops by bringing out The Buffalo.

Women, who also often felt neglected, published as well. For example, WAVE and SPAR trainees, stationed at the Hotel Victoria in Boston, designated for the duration the good ship SS Victoria, launched their own training camp paper, the Rough Roll. ‘Their aims were clearly stated: “our foundation stones are amusement, the well-loved institution of scuttlebutt, and information not to be found on bulletin boards.” More significant were WAC News, published at Fort Des Moines, Iowa, and the WAC Newsletter, both serving the Women’s Army Corps, eventually numbering more than 100,000 people. The Service Woman, a large sixteen-page bimonthly published in New York, was a general publication for all women in the armed forces.

Many military papers began—and sometimes continued—as mimeographed productions, some consisting of a single sheet. Others were more elaborate from the beginning, while some of the mimeographed creations grew into professional-style papers. Sometimes the procedure was reversed, and top-flight papers became mimeographed sheets when units were shipped overseas, being unable to take their printing presses with them. Such was the case with The Bealiner and the Wildcat, a respectable eight-page paper published at Camp Beale, California, for the Eighty-first Division. When the outfit was ordered to the Philippines late in the war, it reemerged as simply The Wildcat, by then reduced to a two-page mimeographed paper.

Mimeographed papers appeared around the world throughout the war, remaining one of the most common types of armed forces newspapers. For example, many materialized along the Alcan Highway, enlightening the troops engaged in that monumental engineering venture. These included Calgary’s Chinook, The Tanatimes of Tanacross, Galena’s Sourdough Express, and Big Delta’s imaginatively-titled Ah Wilderness. Perhaps the best known in Alaska was the Adakian, the post paper of the Army base on Adak, launched and edited by Corporal Dashiell Hammett, the famous detective novelist. After the end of hostilities, many of the troops on occupation duty in Japan, Korea, and elsewhere had recourse to the mimeographed format. For instance, The Liberty Torch’s “Sapporo Edition,” appearing as a six-page sheet, served the men of the Seventy-seventh Division on occupation duty in Japan late in 1945 and early in 1946.

Mimeographed papers were also popular as shipboard handouts for troops both going overseas and returning home. Typical of the latter was the MR. Daily News. With its Mid-Pacific dateline, it appeared in January of 1946, benefitting troops making their way home from Japan on board the USS CCNY
Victory. The title, “MR.”, was no doubt to emphasize the long-desired, and now rapidly-approaching, civilian status of most of the passengers.

In the last analysis, the soldier papers of World War II are of enduring value for the student of that era. In the first place, they effectively conjure up the ambience of the times. They convey the characteristic flavor and details of a distinct era in American life, lived to the hilt by that generation which, in President Roosevelt’s prophetic words, “had a rendezvous with destiny.” Much that was commonplace then, in the waging of the war at its numerous, complex levels, now often forgotten, can be retrieved, as well as the parameters of far more dramatic events that also stand revealed in high relief. Not least is the fact that countless budding journalists served apprenticeships on soldier newspapers, some finding their life’s work in this way. All things considered, it is difficult to quarrel with the conclusions of an official report drafted at the end of the war. Assessing the soldier press and its effectiveness, especially The Stars and Stripes, the document concluded that whatever the paper’s faults, the story of The Stars and Stripes “is a saga of modern journalism.” The publishing of a newspaper of the magnitude of the Stripes, even under the best of peace-time conditions, would have been an outstanding feat, the report continued, while publishing it during the height of full-scale military operations “was a fantastic experience, not to be believed by any who did not live it.”

William Peery, also writing at the end of the war, concurred, asserting that the “uniformed editors, reporters, photographers, artists, and printers wrote a new and not unworthy chapter in the history of the American Fourth Estate.”

The author is a professor of history (emeritus), University of Northern Colorado.

Press Coverage of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team (Separate—Nisei): A Case Study in Agenda Building

By Patricia A. Curtin

The most decorated unit of World War II was the 442nd Regimental Combat Team (Separate—Nisei), one of the few units in U.S. military history to carry a separate racial designation. Comprising three-thousand Japanese-Americans—nisei literally means “second generation,” American-born children of Japanese immigrant parents—the unit was awarded 18,143 individual decorations, forty-three division commendations, thirteen Army commendations, and seven Presidential Unit Citations. They took every objective assigned them, never retreated in battle, and never had a man go AWOL. But the cost was high; they suffered 9,486 casualties.^1

This article examines sources of press coverage of the 442nd during World War II, a time of great prejudice toward American citizens of Japanese ancestry. Previous studies of coverage of Japanese-Americans during World War II have examined the issues of evacuation from the west coast and internment in various inland detention centers. Historians, focusing on the outspoken Hearst and McClatchy papers on the West Coast, have credited the press with serving as an active political pressure group against Japanese-Americans.^2 In their survey of

1. See Campbell C. Johnson, Special Groups, Selective Service System Special Monograph 10, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1953), 141. “Nisei” appeared both capitalized and not capitalized in the writings of the period. Quoted material is faithful to the source in this regard. Otherwise, the modern usage, which is lower-cased, is used. Japanese immigrants to this country are termed issei (first generation); at the outbreak of World War II they were classified as enemy aliens. Immigrants who returned to Japan were termed kibei.

2. See for example Morton Grodzins, Americans Betrayed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949); Jacobus tenBroek, Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd W. Matson, Prejudice, War and the Constitution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970); Kevin Allen Leonard, “Is This What We Fought For?”: Japanese Americans and
the national press, Okihiro and Sly rejected this active interpretation, asserting
the press reinforced the government power structure by emphasizing elements of
Curtin: Press Coverage of the 442nd Combat Team
crisis rather than by providing an analysis of events.3 Chiasson, in a content
analysis study of editorials in three California papers, concluded that no matter
what their editorial stance at the start of the war, the papers accepted the federal
internment order without question. The papers acted not as government
watchdog, but as government publicists and partners.4

Seigler examined New York Times editorials during the war and reached
a similar conclusion. Despite a commitment to civil liberties at the beginning of
the war, the Times accepted the necessity of the internment order without
questioning its morality.5 Stromer, a professional journalist, reviewed the media
his Midwest family received during this period to determine why the internment
did not raise more public outcry. He concluded the general lack of information,
coupled with its unalarming tone, reassured mid-America that internment was
not an issue of concern.6

Media studies, then, conclude the press did not play an active agenda-
setting role in the internment of Japanese-Americans, although it did confirm and
support the government’s policy. The differences that do emerge among the
media are geographic: West Coast papers were much more vehemently anti-
Japanese-American, reflecting public concern in the area of the country where the
threat was most immediate; Midwest and East Coast papers carried less coverage
and were more passively tolerant of government action. None of these studies,
however, examine press coverage of those Japanese-Americans who served in the
American armed forces.

This article demonstrates that coverage of the 442nd was uniformly
favorable, with three main sources supplying information to the media: the
Army, the 442nd itself, and the War Relocation Authority (WRA). In each
instance, the government-provided information supported a larger-than-life
stereotype of the Japanese-American troops, although each group served differing
perceived public image needs in doing so.

At the time of Pearl Harbor, more than five thousand nisei were serving
in U.S. uniform. Following Pearl Harbor and the charges—later proved false—of
fifth column activity by Japanese-Americans, the Army peremptorily discharged
most nisei.7 As one wrote: “As tears streamed down my face, an awful

Racism in California, The Impact of World War II,” Western Historical Quarterly 21
4. Lloyd Chiasson, “Japanese-American Relocation During World War II: A Study of
7. James Oda, Heroic Struggles of Japanese Americans: Partisan Fighters from
America’s Concentration Camps (KNI, Inc., 1980), 43; Robert A. Wilson and Bill
realization slowly dawned on me—I am an American with the face of the enemy.”

But Army officials knew their ban on Japanese-Americans would not withstand a legal challenge. In May 1942, they approved a plan to begin training the 1,404 nisei discharged from the Hawaiian National Guard in training to determine if they could be used for fighting in the European theater. They so excelled in training that the Army agreed to allow nisei to volunteer for service. On 1 February 1942, President Roosevelt announced the formation of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team (Separate—Nisei). In Hawaii, 9,507 nisei responded to the call for 1,500 volunteers. But mainland nisei, having lived behind barbed wire fences for a year, were not so enthusiastic. One said incredulously:

They rob us of our property, throw us into concentration camps, knock us down and spit on us and then invite us to ‘prove’ our loyalty by volunteering to go into an all-Nisei suicidal combat team to be thrown into front-line fighting. In all, only 5 percent of eligible internees volunteered, and many of them did so under cover of night for fear of reprisal.

In September 1943, the first nisei troops were sent to Italy to join the Fifth Army under Gen. Mark Clark, where they fought in the battle of Cassino and the liberation of Rome. They were then sent to France, where they liberated the towns of Bruyeres and Biffontaine and rescued a “lost battalion” of Texans. They returned to Italy and had fought their way up to the Po Valley when V-E Day arrived. In July 1946, they returned stateside, where they were given a hero’s welcome. In August, the 442nd Regimental Combat Team was formally deactivated.

This article provides a descriptive overview of selected major print media coverage of the battalion. Using the indices for the New York Times and Time magazine, inclusive coverage of the unit in these two media from mid-1941 through 1946 was determined. Additionally, all issues of Newsweek and the Stars and Stripes (the military newspaper) for this same time period were examined. This search revealed that coverage in these four sources clumped around the same time periods, such as when the unit was formed, major battles, and awards ceremonies. Using these dates as anchor points, other newspapers and magazines—including the Washington Post, the New York Herald-Tribune, the Los Angeles Examiner, the Los Angeles Times, Colliers, Harpers, Life,

9. Murphy, 105-106.
11. Nakagawa, 391.
Newsweek, the New Yorker, and the Saturday Evening Post—were searched for at least three weeks prior to and three weeks following these dates. For reasons explained below, there was little enterprise reporting on the group, lending credence to the search strategy and the conclusion that it provides a faithful snapshot of the coverage.

Controlling the Flow: the Army, the 442nd, and the WRA

Of particular interest is who carried coverage of the 442nd; whether coverage appeared at all was an issue of ownership. The Hearst and McClatchy papers, which were vociferously anti-Japanese-American, carried no news of the 442nd per se. When the formation of the 442nd was announced, Hearst’s San Francisco Examiner said only that the patriotic Native Sons of the Golden West opposed its formation and that Representative John E. Rankin denounced the proposal on the House floor. While other papers were mentioning the Japanese-American troops’ bravery and performance, a photo cutline in the Los Angeles Examiner suggested that “Japs” were “swarming into the state; evacuees supplied with guns.” A 1946 story in the Saturday Evening Post noted the standard reporting method used by these two news groups was “to run, side by side, a routine story of some Japanese-Americans returning to the Coast and an atrocity story about acts of Japan’s army in the Western Pacific.”

Both Hearst and McClatchy stressed that their papers reflected the patriotic ideals essential to a successful war effort. Hearst ran two-page advertising spreads for his papers in Newsweek, stressing their patriotic nature. Given the patriotic idealism expressed by these owners during wartime, it follows that they recognized as news only those items that clearly identified the enemy race as the enemy. The exemplary combat record of the 442nd made negative coverage of the outfit difficult; therefore, no coverage was given at all.

At the national level, Newsweek carried only one mention of the 442nd in a signed column, while publishing numerous stories outlining anti-Japanese-American sentiment. In contrast, Time carried frequent mention of the 442nd and suggested that while the United States was going through Yellow Peril hysteria, in Italy the nisei were “fighting well in the front line.” The New York Times, which stressed the inherent rights of all citizens regardless of race, carried the most coverage of the unit. A balanced amount of coverage of both the 442nd and anti-Japanese-American issues appeared in the other media studied. These results

12. These sources were chosen based on geographic diversity, varied ownership, reach, and availability.
16. 20 December 1943, 18.
suggest a directly inverse relationship existed between the amount of coverage of the 442nd and the amount of anti-Japanese-American coverage carried by a paper or magazine. The media that were the most vociferously anti-Japanese-American carried no news of the team, while those media that downplayed incidents of racial prejudice carried the most.

Even more revealing is the source of the news. Results show three main sources were responsible for the vast majority of coverage: the Army, the 442nd itself, and the War Relocation Authority.

When the experimental unit of nisei was formed and sent for training, the War Department hushed up all national news reports of it to “avoid stirring up a public fuss.”\(^{17}\) But when the nisei troops first arrived in Italy in 1943, they found themselves knee-deep in journalists who were intrigued by the novelty of Japanese-American soldiers. As one nisei vet protested to his hometown paper, the Hawaiian Times:

Because we were a unique group, we made good newspaper copy. This, gentlemen, was not of our asking or doing. We simply did our duty as did thousands of other sons of Hawaii, as did millions of other Americans, and we as an ethnic group do not claim credit.\(^{18}\)

But although soldiers from the 442nd spent two days giving interviews, none of the stories saw print until at least one month later; the Army held all information about the new battalion until they had proven themselves on the front for a month.\(^{19}\) Only the Hawaiian Times, the hometown paper for most of the men, had any news of the them during this period, and that was the casualty lists (twenty-one dead, sixty-seven wounded). When the Army did release these early stories, most of the papers and magazines studied carried them as soon as they were cleared, resulting in a sudden barrage of coverage stateside. On 18 October, the Honolulu Advertiser declared enough was enough. In an editorial titled “Less Limelight Please,” the editor complained that correspondents, particularly those of the Associated Press, were giving the Hawaiian natives of the unit “excessive publicity.”\(^{20}\)

Given the success of the nisei troops, the Army decided at this time to reinstate the draft for all nisei. But they realized they could not urge nisei to join because, given the 442nd’s casualty figures, it would look like an extermination measure.\(^{21}\) When the unit landed at Salerno, they had about 1,300 men. After three weeks of fighting in the first two waves at Cassino, the men numbered less than five hundred. But while the Army tried to downplay the casualty figures, the

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17. Duus, 55.
19. Duus, 89.
20. Murphy, 197.
United Press wire story announcing the reinstatement of the draft was not so restrained. It said the decision to draft nisei was based on the “excellent showing of Japanese-American volunteers in combat and training” and that the unit had just reported ninety-six men killed, 221 wounded, and seventeen missing in action.22

Although the Army was anxious to tell of the 442nd’s success, they were careful not to let them have too much of the limelight. The 442nd led the push to Rome, but ten kilometers south of the city they were pulled to one side and “American” troops were allowed to lead the way in. When wire photos of the liberating troops appeared on front pages across the country, Japanese-American faces were not among them.

The coverage indicates that the Army was also responsible for holding up news of the 442nd’s rescue of a lost battalion of 211 Texans from the Thirty-sixth Division in France. The 442nd began the action with 2,943 men. After two weeks of heavy fighting on the front, during which they effected the rescue, they had suffered 161 dead, forty-three missing in action, and two-thousand wounded, 882 of them seriously.23 When they were recalled from the front by commanding officer Maj. Gen. John Dahlquist, he ordered them assembled for an honor ceremony: they had been awarded two additional Presidential Unit Citations for their actions.24 Seeing the small number of soldiers before him, Dahlquist barked at their commander, “I ordered that all the men be assembled.” “Yes sir,” the commander responded, “all the men are what you see.”25 At the same ceremony the Texans declared the members of the 442nd “honorary Texans” and presented them with a plaque.

Despite the popularity of lost unit rescue stories during the war, little media coverage appeared about this one, which was to become the 442nd’s most famous action. Later stories refered to the rescue of the lost Texans, but the story itself was never fully told in the media, even though the 442nd tried to publicize the plaque. The most plausible explanation is that the Army, sensitive to the charge of using the nisei troops as cannon fodder, held all stories. It is known that Dahlquist’s command came under scrutiny for the action.26 Because casualty lists were the only news of the action that appeared in the papers, nisei back home began wondering just what part the 442nd was playing in the war.27

24. In all, the unit received five of their seven presidential citations for their fighting in France.
25. This story is told in many sources; this version is from Duus, 217.
26. Duus, 190. Duus is particularly critical of Dahlquist’s actions and accuses him of misusing the nisei troops.
The Army also kept the return of the 442nd to Italy secret. The men were told to remove all insignia, although it is hard to imagine their features would not have revealed their regimental affiliation. When the Army did release news of the 442nd’s return, it launched another avalanche of coverage. The stark contrast to the lack of media coverage of their action in France supports the conclusion that the Army was responsible for holding news of their action there.

Thus the Army exercised control over the flow of information about the 442nd not in the usual terms of wartime censorship for the sake of military security, but in terms of how they handled news of these racially separate troops and how successful these troops would appear back home. Although the Army was careful to have the men of the 442nd appear as good soldiers, they also downplayed any heroic role events might have provided the nisei in favor of the propaganda value they afforded “American” troops, such as the liberation of Rome. Even today, the Army has refused to release information about the role of nisei troops in the liberation of Dachau on 29 April 1945. At the time, the nisei troops were ordered never to reveal they had been at Dachau or face court martial. As the New York Times stated in an editorial forty-five years later, the fact that Japanese-American troops had liberated Dachau remains a “fact suppressed as somehow unseemly.” But the Army was also careful not to let the nisei appear as martyrs. The nisei could appear willing to sacrifice themselves for the cause, but they were not allowed to appear as sacrificial troops.

The second source of news about the 442nd was the 442nd itself. The combat team’s commanders impressed on the men that “one mission of the 442nd is to dramatize the loyalty of Japanese Americans.” The nisei were constantly reminded they were on a crusade to prove their loyalty and patriotism; they were fighting for their chance to be considered full citizens. Mike Masaoka, a Japanese-American Citizens League leader and later a well-known Washington lobbyist, became the unit’s one-man public relations team. All of Masaoka’s work developed this theme of Japanese-American loyalty and patriotism. As they trained, he sent out a steady stream of news releases and localized features to hometown papers. He estimated he processed over 2,700 stories during the war. Much of his work appeared only in local papers or in the Pacific Citizen, the organ of the JACL, but occasionally the mainstream media ran stories. When the 442nd got word that three of Doolittle’s Raiders had been killed in Tokyo, Masaoka sent out pictures and coverage of the men buying $101,550 worth of

28. Murphy, 251.
30. 7 December 1991, 22.
32. Masaoka, 178.
war bonds on a single day. The *New York Times* carried both the story and picture.\textsuperscript{33}

When the 442nd arrived in Italy and became the object of media attention, the commanders, and later Masaoka, controlled all media access to the troops. Whereas many correspondents would join a unit for a time and write about their exploits, the members of the 442nd were not just typical American GIs. Correspondents had to arrange interviews with the men of the 442nd, and the same few soldiers were made available to journalists. In all cases, these interviewees stressed not personal heroics or hardships, but the crusade of the soldiers as a group to prove Japanese-American loyalty. Consequently, the resulting media stories are remarkably similar. Typical is this soldier’s quote from a piece by John Lardner in *Newsweek*:

> I think our men are fighting very well here....Everyone else in the Army seems to think so, too, I’m glad to say....You know there is a cloud over all of us. So we must fight where we can to show again we are loyal Americans. We fight for our lives as good citizens. Colonel Turner calls it a crusade. I think he’s right.\textsuperscript{34}

C. L. Sulzberger, of the *New York Times* clan, arranged an interview with members of the unit outside Cassino. Obviously impressed by what he saw, he submitted a lengthy piece for publication with such phrases as “magnificent soldiers,” “tremendous bravery,” and “uncomplaining.” Sulzberger also carried the official patriotic line: the nisei “apparently feel they are serving as a sort of crusade to make the rest of America understand that they, too, are good and loyal citizens.”\textsuperscript{35}

Conversely, Masaoka controlled what did not appear. No mention appeared in the media studied of any internal dissention between the men from Hawaii and those from the mainland, although fighting between the two groups often left many of the men too injured to participate in training. The Hawaiians viewed the mainlanders as negative and calculating and termed them “kotonks” for the sound a coconut or empty barrel makes when it hits the ground.\textsuperscript{36} The mainlanders viewed the Hawaiians as unpolished, too easy going, and “like barbarians from the jungle” when they conversed in Hawaiian pidgin.\textsuperscript{37} They called the Hawaiians “buddhaheads,” referring not just to their religion but to the Japanese word for pig—“buta.”\textsuperscript{38} But Masaoka helped promote understanding

\textsuperscript{33} 6 June 1943, 33.
\textsuperscript{34} John Lardner, “The Japanese American Soldier is a Tough One.” *Newsweek*, 8 November 1943, 20.
\textsuperscript{37} Duus, 64.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 63. Although almost half the 442nd were Buddhists, the Army assigned them only Christian ministers to downplay their differences.
between the two groups, and a natural camaraderie formed during training. Kotonk and buddhahead became terms of deep affection that were reserved for private use and did not appear in the news columns. Masaoka also made available for interviews the same few soldiers, all of whom spoke excellent standard American English, not the foreign sounding Hawaiian pidgin.

What also did not appear in the coverage was the change in attitude the men experienced over the course of the war. The motto of the original training unit was “Remember Pearl Harbor.” After their first battle, the motto changed to their crap game cry of “Go for broke,” indicating a willingness to risk it all. But following the rescue of the lost battalion in France, the attitude of many troop members changed. The troops had been known for their courteous treatment of enemy soldiers; after France there were incidents of them shooting unarmed enemy soldiers and medics. Some nisei recall not stopping to aid the Texans they had rescued because they were so bitter over the cost to their own troops.39 Reflecting their change in attitude, their motto unofficially changed a third and last time to “Don’t take no sh-t from nobody.”40

But despite these changes, media coverage of the troops revealed only the same patriotic line as before. Masaoka did not let the increasing cynicism of the nisei appear in the press. The following story from reporter Harry Shershow of the Stars and Stripes on the 442nd’s return to Italy is typical. He quotes Sergeant Chester Tanaka, a frequent Masaoka source, about the team’s identifying insignia—a white arm holding a liberty torch:

For us, that patch has a double meaning. It means that we’re fighting for what all the others are fighting for. And it means we’re Americans. Anyone who looks at it knows what we’re fighting for. And this isn’t any flag waving thing. It’s the way we feel.41

Occasionally, however, a reporter managed to bypass Masaoka’s control, resulting in stories about the men of the 442nd that were distinctly different from the norm. During the fierce fighting around Cassino, a reporter was told the best troops in the area were the Japanese-Americans. Fighting his way up to where they were positioned, he jumped in a trench with a couple of the soldiers without bothering to find Masaoka and obtain his permission first. When he asked the nisei just how good their grenade technique was, one answered in pidgin: “Mister, all you gotta do is trow straight and trow first. Dat’s da numbah one theeng, trow first.”42

Another exception was a hero piece that appeared in Colliers magazine about Mac Yazawa, a veteran invalided at home. The reporter admitted he asked

39. Ibid., 214.
40. Lind, 246.
42. Murphy, 175.
for the interview because Yazawa "was from the famous [442nd], and dozens of big questions had been forming in my mind as to just what made that outfit tick." On seeing his battle star for Pearl Harbor the reporter remarked he'd "never stopped to think before that there were Japanese fighting on both sides of the war." Many of these stateside interviews with wounded veterans were the result of media pitches made by the third source of information, the War Relocation Authority.

Dillon Myer, head of the WRA, realized the heroic record of the 442nd made a good public relations tool for his program to gain wider acceptance of Japanese-Americans and to relocate the interned nisei back to their hometowns. The WRA started issuing regular press releases about the 442nd, which were often picked up by the AP wire and used by the media surveyed. Why they received such wide use could not be determined by this research, but the media may have considered the WRA newsworthy in and of itself or believed it would help the war effort to print them. Conversely, because of their small size, most newspapers may have simply used the handouts as convenient filler.

Because the WRA was limited to information on the unit available stateside, the releases were often simply the casualty lists for the unit. One critic of Myer has charged that he "treated body counts like honor rolls." But as the war went on they did heighten awareness of the role of the nisei in the war effort.

The WRA also sponsored Caucasian war officers who had fought with the 442nd to deliver speeches in problem areas to help ease acceptance for relocated internees. Stories about these speeches often appeared in the local media, including interviews with the officers, such as the following:

These Hawaiian Japanese call themselves Hawaiians or just plain Americans. They've earned the right to call themselves anything they damn well please. I've never been so mad in my life as I have been since I returned to the United States and have heard cracks made about Japs fighting on our side in Italy.

Because some media did not carry news of the 442nd a climate of ignorance prevailed in some areas of the West Coast, however, which meant these appearances did not always have the desired effect. After a well-publicized WRA-sponsored speech in California, a farmer leaving the hall was heard to say to his

neighbor, “That fellow was a damn liar. There wasn’t a single Jap in the American Army.”

In addition to pitching stories about wounded veterans to the press, the WRA collaborated with the War Department to publish a picture booklet titled *Nisei in Uniform*, which played up the accomplishments of the 442nd and included news clippings. They also highly publicized two events. One was the presentation to President Truman by four wounded nisei of $4,300 collected from the soldiers of the 442nd for a memorial to President Roosevelt. The second involved the presentation of a posthumous Distinguished Service Cross award by General Joseph Stilwell to the soldier’s sister, an internee threatened by residents when she tried to return to her hometown. The resulting pictures were carried in many of the media studied.

Virtually all coverage, then, originated with the Army, the 442nd, or the WRA. The few enterprise stories that did appear, such as the report from the trenches around Cassino, are remarkable because they present human portraits, a personal angle differing substantially from the carefully honed images crafted by the main information sources. These carefully constructed images, combined with the lack of coverage in the most prejudiced media sources, resulted in an almost uniformly favorable tone of coverage.

When the idea of a nisei unit was first proposed, the media that were more outspoken against the Japanese-Americans, such as *Newsweek*, were not enthusiastic in their response.

Advocates of the idea argue that many loyal Nisei are anxious to prove themselves good Americans and, since Japanese traditionally make good soldiers, it’s a waste of manpower not to use those fitted for service. However, there’s stiff opposition from Army men who fear that the Japs couldn’t be trusted in a pinch.

But most press reaction to the announcement was cautious to favorable. The *New York Times* ran a balanced story and made mention of the good training record of the experimental group now that nisei in the armed services were no longer a secret. An Army Signal Corps photograph of the group was released, and an AP story appeared.

When nisei recruits in Hawaii marched down the streets in uniforms to the Capitol grounds, where the largest crowd in Hawaii’s history had gathered to see them off, AP wired a story and photo of the ceremony. Both were run in the

49. 21 December 1942, 5.
New York Times, along with a favorable editorial titled “Pro Patria.” Time carried a picture of nisei enlisting with the cutline, “There Are Good Japs.” The Honolulu Star-Bulletin ran the most coverage, labeling the scene the most striking and significant of the war because of “the evident pride of the families and friends of these young Americans—their pride that the youths are entrusted with the patriotic mission of fighting for their country and the Allied nations.”

But the day the recruits arrived at training camp on the mainland, most of the media studied carried the testimony of General John L. DeWitt, speaking before a congressional subcommittee: “A Jap’s a Jap. They are a dangerous element. There is no way to determine his loyalty. It makes no difference whether he is an American citizen.” Newsweek said Westerners agreed with DeWitt and were opposed to nisei in the service.

But once the unit saw action in Europe, what coverage appeared was favorable. AP correspondent Relman Morin wrote many of the early stories about the 442nd after its arrival in Italy. One remarked on their attitude:

Their smiles brought expressions of blank amazement from veterans and officers accustomed to seeing men enter combat with tense, drawn faces. These troops acted like they were going to a baseball game.

In a follow-up a week later, Morin termed the troops the “guinea pigs from Pearl Harbor.” Of their action in battle he wrote: “Officers who witnessed the action were unrestrained in their admiration. They declared they never saw any troops handle themselves better in their first trial under fire.”

Following the battle of Cassino, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal visited the front lines. The Navy had just reiterated its policy of not accepting nisei for service, but General Clark insisted that the nisei troops be represented in the honor guard. As General Ryder showed the troops to Forrestal, he clapped Captain Sakae Takahashi on the back and said, “My best outfit.” An Army Signal Corps picture of the occasion appeared in the New York Times.

53. Ibid., 3 March 1943, 5; 6 April 1943, 3.
54. Ibid., 3 March 1943, 18.
55. Ibid., 29 March 1943, 46.
56. Ibid., 30 March 1943, 1.
58. Newsweek, 8 February 1943, 52.
60. Duus, 113.
61. Ibid., 158.
62. 25 August 1944, 5.
When the 442nd returned to the Italian front from France, *New York Times* correspondent Milton Bracker heralded the “famous” 442nd, which was now mopping up in Italy:

The Japanese-Americans got on the job here with typical dispatch and have done remarkably well in a sector where all efforts thus far have not been brilliant....It is still incredible to see these dark, slight soldiers, who so uncomfortably suggest our Pacific enemy. Yet, as Tech. Sgt. Andrew Okamura put it: “I can speak more Italian than I can Japanese.”

*Stars and Stripes* reporter Sergeant Harry Shershow also gave notice that “the slight, hard fighting, gallant nisei of the 442nd Infantry Regiment are back.”

But most wire coverage of the Italian campaign began to treat the nisei like other units. They often were mentioned only by numerical designation and not by race. This indicates either an acceptance of the troops for themselves and/or a tacit recognition that they had become so well known that identifying them as nisei was unnecessary. As the war progressed, news of the 442nd often became incorporated into larger campaign accounts rather than appearing as separate stories. In some measure, the men had won the acceptance they had been wanting with the media. What remained to be seen was whether they had won acceptance back home.

Meyer Berger of the *New York Times* reported at the close of the fighting that a company of infantry men presented the nisei of the 442nd a document pledging their support back home in appreciation of their “heroic and meritorious achievements.” The story also said that other troops had asked that the nisei be given top priority on the return list because of the adjustment problems they were expected to face.

Earlier in the year, the *Times* ran an editorial praising the nisei’s fighting ability, but foreshadowing the problems that might lie ahead for them.

But their hardest fight is still ahead and may outlast the war. It is the fight against prejudice roused by color of skin and slant of eye. It is easy to admire them while they are still in uniform. It would be kinder to remember and reward them when the battle is over.

A *Time* story quoted one of the men: “If we return home to find that we are still ‘Japs’ in the eyes of the guys who have grown fat because of this war, we’ll be plenty sore.”

63. 9 April 1945, 8.
64. Shershow, 5.
65. 19 August 1945, 11.
66. 11 April 1945, 22.
67. 22 July 1946, 22.
The 442nd returned to the United States in July and marched down the streets of Washington to receive their seventh Presidential Unit Citation from President Truman. The New York Times reported that four wounded nisei veterans were to have seats of honor in the presidential reviewing stand; the New York Herald Tribune noted that several thousand people cut their lunch hour short to cheer the men as they marched along the streets; and Time reported that the “wiry little soldiers” formed “one of the smartest, toughest fighting units the U.S. had ever sent to the battlefield.”68 The praise continued with an article in the American Mercury, later reprinted in Readers’ Digest. Showcasing the 442nd, it referred to the rescue of the lost battalion as a “story of flaming heroism and tragedy,” although details of the action were still conspicuously lacking. The authors rosily concluded:

Yet it can be safely said that the Japanese-Americans have won their battle at home as well as abroad, for such discrimination has drawn hot censure from the public generally, and especially from service men. These Japanese-American boys have volunteered to fight for their country, and are officially rated among the best soldiers in the world. After this war they will walk with honor among their fellow Americans.69

But the authors spoke too soon. One veteran who returned to the United States after being a German prisoner of war was still in uniform when a man on the street yelled at him, “Why don’t you go back where you came from?”70 Many former members of the 442nd turned to the press as a public forum for debate and to publicize their role in the war. Sergeant George Otsuka, who was told there would be trouble if he tried to purchase farmland in Texas, wrote to the Houston Post:

What I would like to know: Is that your answer for rescuing the “Lost Battalion” of your proud 36th Division in the Vosges mountains of France? Is that your answer for the terrific casualties we suffered to rescue those men of the 36th? Is that your answer to my buddies who will never come back, and who fortunately won’t feel the sting of prejudice? If it is, then the picture I am enclosing is yours. I don’t want it. There isn’t enough room inside me for this and my recent experience.71

Enclosed was a picture of the plaque awarded to the 442nd by the survivors of the lost battalion, making its members honorary citizens of Texas. A similar letter appeared in the *Los Angeles Daily News*.

Don't purple hearts [sic] and Presidential Unit Citations mean anything? Maybe some of my Nisei buddies who died in Italy, Germany, Okinawa, and other combat fronts might have been the lucky guys. They’re not home to face this kind of pushing around.72

As the press became a forum for the debate, letters poured in from all over the world as other American soldiers wrote in praise of the men of the 442nd. Typical was the letter from Corporal David Wilson in Italy, published in the *New York Times*: “Anyone who has been in this theater at all has heard of their feats; indeed, it would be hard to overpraise them.”73

But with the gradual assimilation of discharged veterans during 1946 and the formal deactivation of the 442nd in August, media coverage of the unit and of the nisei in general began to subside. Except on special anniversaries, when its memory is dusted off for a one-shot story, press coverage of the 442nd came to an abrupt end.

**Conclusion**

Because most information was controlled at the source by the Army, the 442nd, and the WRA, these three information sources were able to shape much of the content and framing of the subsequent news. The Army’s objective was to protect the perception of the handling of a sensitive racial issue. Masaoka and the commanders of the 442nd fought to have Japanese-Americans recognized as patriotic Americans, with full citizenship rights. The WRA promoted an almost larger-than-life heroic image of the men to ease their job of relocating internees. To these ends, these sources provided information subsidies to the media about the Combat Team.

"Information subsidy" is a term coined by Oscar Gandy to describe controlled access to information at little cost or effort to the person receiving the information.74 Information subsidies are, according to Gandy, often channeled through the media, directly subsidizing their news gathering activity, in an attempt to influence the mass media's agenda. Thus the role of information subsidies in the mass media has been translated into the term “agenda

73. 21 August 1945, 20.
The ultimate goal of agenda building, however, is not just to influence the media agenda, but to create a climate of favorable public opinion; consumers of the media and the public agenda are the indirect targets of the information. It is this attempt by information sources to influence public opinion and the public agenda that is evident here.

In contrast to the agenda setting studies of issues surrounding the Japanese-American internees, these results indicate that the tone and framing of coverage of the Japanese-American troops may often be attributed to agenda building efforts by the three main information sources. The immediate result of their collective manipulation was a media stereotype of the nisei of the 442nd as almost larger-than-life troops who could do no wrong. But like any stereotype, this image represented not the reality of the individuals but a shorthand reference to the meaning constructed by the sources. In fact, at the end of the war the Army felt compelled to issue a special statement on the 442nd in response to this stereotype.

Many stories circulated by overenthusiastic correspondents have given rise to a popular fiction that these were supermen. They were not. They could die and be wounded as easily as other men and were. They had the same weaknesses and shortcomings that other soldiers were heir to. Above all, however, they had the fire, the courage and the will to press forward that make crack infantry of the line. They would, and often did, drive until they fell from wounds or exhaustion; they were never driven a backward step in many months of battle against an enemy who counter-attacked skillfully and often. More than one commander acclaimed them as the finest assault troops he had ever led.

But the men of the 442nd were not just the non-entities of the West Coast press, the heroes of the wire and WRA stories, the non-heroes of the Army, or the polished, unified crusaders of Masaoka’s releases. They were members of a racial minority related to the enemy, but also American citizens eager to serve their country in time of conflict. Although the media portrayals of the men did not always convey the heartache and suffering they endured because they were Americans with the face of the enemy, they did help empower the soldiers and their families. During training Lt. Sakae Takahashi told his teammates that after the war they should use their military experience as the basis for political action: “If we don’t, going to the front and risking our lives

77. Lind, 159.
doesn’t mean anything.”  After the war, the media, as a written historical record, helped remind veterans of the 442nd of what they had accomplished. Many of their families kept scrapbooks of the war coverage, and veterans often related how these scrapbooks helped reinforce their conviction after the war that social change was necessary. For many, the crusade for recognition of Japanese-American citizenship and patriotism outlasted the war, and the media were one tool the nisei used to both assist them in their crusade and to sustain themselves during the fight.

Certainly no one factor such as media coverage can be identified as a singular cause for attitude change or even knowledge gain. But the information subsidy efforts of the Army, of the leaders of the 442nd, and of Dillon Myer and the WRA contributed to the media coverage and subsequent image of the 442nd. Eventually the image took on a life of its own. In conjunction with the silence of the West Coast press in the name of patriotism and the strategic timing of the military censors, the agenda built by these three groups helped create the larger cultural image of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team (Separate—Nisei) as a symbol of American heroism during the war. Japanese-Americans were able to use this symbol as a catalyst for change, employing the media as a public forum for their debate.

The author is a doctoral candidate in the College of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Georgia.

78. Duus, 45.
Following a Famous President: Truman’s Troubles with an Independent Minded Postwar Press

By Bruce J. Evensen

Shortly after the war President Truman admitted to reporters that he had long been an inveterate newspaper reader who began his day by a careful going-over of no fewer than a dozen of the nation’s major dailies. “I read them because I like to read them,” observed the man behind the desk at which the buck stopped. “And I find out lots of things about myself I never heard of.” Behind the efforts at high humor, however, lie a growing antagonism between the “accidental president” and members of the “sabotage press.” The Soviet challenge in the emerging Cold War, Truman insisted, required every bit of bipartisan support that had been mustered in fighting and winning World War II. “We have established a going policy,” Truman told reporters, “and you are a part

1. By his own estimation, Truman daily read each of the New York, Washington, and Pittsburgh papers, as well as the Baltimore Sun, the Philadelphia Bulletin, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the Kansas City Star, the Chicago Times, and the Chicago Sun. See a transcript of his press conference of 17 October 1947 in the Eben A. Ayers Papers, Press Conference File, Box 62, Harry S. Truman Library (cited hereafter as HSTL), Independence, Missouri. Members of Truman’s staff also provided the President with daily excerpts of press coverage. See George M. Elsey Papers, Foreign Relations, Box 60, HSTL. For a sense of the importance Truman attached to such summaries see Oral History Interview: George M. Elsey, 77, HSTL.

of that policy. It is a policy of this country, of the United States, and not simply this administration, and you are just as much in it as I am."³

This article analyzes President Truman’s failure to duplicate President Roosevelt’s success in marshaling overwhelming support in the American mass media and in public opinion for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy in the days immediately following the end of one war and the beginning of another. Neither the press nor the public initially warmed to Truman’s analogy that resisting Soviet gains in Europe and the Near East represented the same threat to national security seen in Hitler’s conquest of Europe. The reason was not simply the exhilaration and exhaustion associated with winning the war and forging the peace. It also had to do with press perception of Truman, his understanding of the role of president in generating public opinion favorable to administration initiatives, the State Department’s determination to regain its leadership in postwar foreign policymaking, and the growing determination of editors and commentators that they would now play their proper role in assuring the construction of a “people’s foreign policy” in the early postwar period.⁴

**Truman as Policymaker**

The reputation of Harry Truman as presidential policymakers has long benefited from his personal cultivation of the image of a leader who was prepared to “give hell” to those who opposed him.⁵ Early scholarship on the Truman

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3. Truman reiterated this call for bipartisan support of his Cold War policy on several occasions. See the transcript of his 17 October 1947 press conference, Press Secretary Files, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Box 62, HSTL. Also, see Truman’s remarks before the Radio News Editors Group on 13 November 1947. Papers of Harry S. Truman, Box 30, HSTL. Compare this to his statement of 17 April 1948 given at the annual meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Truman Papers, Box 30, HSTL. The sense of this comment can also be found in his memoirs. See Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs: Year of Decisions* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), 47.


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Truman, as Row, of Government: of Decisions; country policies.
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8.
Reconstruction 20
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A leading analyst of the early Cold War has written that "the domestic setting of the period has been "curiously neglected" by those seeking to understand the course of American foreign policy.\textsuperscript{10} This oversight has allowed some historians to claim that Truman initiated the Cold War in response to economic and imperial considerations.\textsuperscript{11} Their conclusions assume that in most circumstances the press and public have little effect upon the course of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{12} There is, however, substantial evidence indicating Truman's early Cold War foreign policy was aggressively contested by both the public and the press. Conflict, not acquiescence, characterizes the struggle to shape a containment policy in the first years of the Truman White House. That this was so owes as much to how the public and press perceived this "accidental" president as it does the circumstances he inherited in taking office. Truman's ability to prove persuasive in reorienting American foreign policy in the immediate postwar environment to a more assertive stand against the expansion of the Soviet Union into Eastern Europe suffered from his presentational style and the vivid contrast of that style from the man Truman replaced in the Oval Office.

Although the new president and his staff carefully cultivated Truman's public persona as an independent-minded executive, he was well aware of the necessity of press support in sustaining Cold War policy initiatives.\textsuperscript{13} Complicating and compromising his effort to win that support were divisions within his administration on how to go about it.\textsuperscript{14} This uncertainty was joined

\textsuperscript{10} Gaddis, "Post-Revisionist Synthesis," 185-186.
\textsuperscript{13} See particularly the oral history interviews of Truman aides Clark Clifford, George Elsey, and Eben Ayers in the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
\textsuperscript{14} Work on the manufacture of consent in the construction of foreign policy notes that when an administration appears disunited it greatly inhibits a president’s plan to
to a growing perception in the media that it would not serve as a public relations tool in foreign policy making in the immediate postwar environment as it had during the war. Radio newsmen had bristled during the war over government censorship that left “the enemy better informed than Americans.” Wire service reporters had privately complained that Roosevelt’s determination “to hold back and play down American casualties” was a disinformation campaign that would never have been tolerated under other circumstances. The American Society of Newspaper Editors, representing the nation’s largest dailies, complained in April 1944 that news management by government bureaucrats had only “confused” the American people. A year later Truman abruptly and unexpectedly took office. He inherited a legacy of widening mistrust between the White House and the nation’s press corps that would only be heightened by his handling of the press and public opinion at the coming of the Cold War.

“Following a Famous President”


questioners with “a chip on his shoulder” Bell thought. The more the new
president insisted he ignored his critics, the more apparent it became critics that
“got under his skin.” 17 Richard L. Strout of the Christian Science Monitor
thought reporters “decried and minimized” Truman because he had “the
disadvantage of following a famous president.” That is what made it difficult,
according to White House correspondent Raymond Brandt, for many to believe
“that Truman was up for the job.” 18

Joseph Alsop, a cousin of Roosevelt’s, admitted many reporters and
commentators had a “patronizing attitude” toward Truman but Alsop shared their
sense that the new president was “a man of average virtues” overwhelmed by the
“vast problems” of the postwar world. 19 That was also the sentiment of C.L.
Sulzberger, chief foreign correspondent of the New York Times and nephew of
the paper’s publisher. Sulzberger emerged from a private Oval Office interview
with Truman on 4 November 1947 feeling the president was “very sincere and
quite self-confident” with an unfortunate “rural knowledge of the world.” 20

Sulzberger’s judgment was shared by the paper’s diplomatic
correspondent James Reston, who criticized Truman’s failure to lead the
administration’s public relations fight to sell its postwar foreign policy. Instead
of using his news conferences as Roosevelt had to further the broad outlines of
foreign policy, Truman “decapitated you and then grinned,” Reston observed. The
effect was to further alienate the press. 21 Robert Walsh, a reporter for the
Washington Star, was certain Truman “hurt his image” by “being so abrupt”
with reporters. Truman “very rarely used the press conference as much of a tool
to get his ideas across to the public or the Congress,” noted Carroll Kenworthy,
editor of the foreign department at United Press. The result was his postwar
foreign policy, even if well-conceived, was poorly communicated and less
understood. 22

Arthur Krock, the chief Washington correspondent for the New York
Times, noted that Truman’s clumsiness in articulating the administration’s
foreign policy stood in sharp contrast to Roosevelt. Krock observed that
Roosevelt always gave the impression of wanting the news of his administration
portrayed in the most favorable possible light. Truman’s attitude, on the other
hand, seemed to be “take it or leave it.” One veteran White House observer
believed Truman came across as a “backwoods preacher laying down the law” to

17. Oral History Interview: Jack Bell, 37-39 and 45-47, HSTL.
18. Oral History Interview: Richard L. Strout, 1-2, HSTL. Oral History Interview:
Raymond Brandt, 25, HSTL.
19. Alsops, 84,120.
22. Oral History Interview: Carroll H. Kenworthy, 12-17. Oral History Interview:
Robert K. Walsh, 60, HSTL.
the press. This appearance of “arrogance and obstinacy alienated both the Congress and the public” and made more difficult Truman’s efforts to win press approval for his postwar foreign policymaking. Truman’s press handlers thought the same thing. They realized that when the president and the press met “it was to do battle.”

Truman’s problems with the press were compounded by his staff. Press secretary Charlie Ross, a boyhood friend of Truman’s and the veteran Washington bureau chief of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, shared his boss’ distrust of some reporters and Truman’s overall impatience with the press. Reporters, in turn, noted that Ross, as a news analyst, had not covered a breaking story in years and did not properly appreciate the deadline pressures that drove the wire services and big city dailies. “Everybody loved Charlie,” Bell observed, “but he wasn’t worth a damn in the practical aspects of the job.” Nor was the situation eased by Ross’ aide, Eben A. Ayers. Washington reporters found Ayers “pleasant but powerless” in his abortive efforts to clarify administration policy in terms readers could understand. “Ayes was terrible,” Brandt noted. “He had no access to anybody.” Robert Riggs, chief Washington correspondent for the Louisville Courier-Journal, thought the failures of Truman’s staff further alienated the press and contributed to the general impression among reporters that “Truman was not always in command.”

Part of the contention between Truman and the mass media was rooted in his determination to follow Franklin Roosevelt’s wartime lead in expecting press support for his foreign policy. Truman maintained that partisanship “stopped at the water’s edge” and saw media support for the broad outlines of American foreign policy as a kind of “patriotic duty.” Truman told reporters that while there was much talk about men in “striped trousers” making foreign policy, “far more influence is exerted by the baggy pants of managing editors.” For that reason, it was essential that the press embrace a bipartisan foreign

policy in the postwar period, Truman argued, to serve the national interest at a time of imminent peril.27

Building Public Opinion

Truman’s trouble in implementing his postwar policy to contain Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe was made apparent in public opinion polling taken by the State Department. Throughout 1946 it revealed that fewer than half of all Americans were attentive to the nation’s foreign policy. In the wake of the February 1947 announcement that the British were withdrawing from Greece, undersecretary of state Dean Acheson told the department’s new chief George Marshall that it would take a major public relations initiative by the president to persuade the American people and the Congress that U.S. involvement in Greece was in America’s vital security interests.28

That initiative came in the form of Truman’s 12 March speech before a Joint Session of the Congress. Truman saw the speech, and indeed the principal power of the president, as the ability to lead by persuasion. He insisted the speech “not sound like an investment prospectus” and recognized that it needed to be “clear and free of hesitation or double talk.” The final draft of what came to be known as the Truman Doctrine argued that the United States Supports free people who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures” as a means of assuring postwar international stability.29

Press response to the speech was decidedly more upbeat than the pattern of Truman’s press conferences. The New York Times accepted the

administration’s logic that “if Greece should fall under Communist domination, the effect upon the whole Middle East, and upon all European countries now struggling to maintain their freedom, would be disastrous, not only for them but for us.”30 The New York Herald-Tribune thought Truman’s speech gave hope to the “shattered peoples of the world that the American system offers a working alternative to the totalitarian order.” The Washington Post considered it a necessary “tocsin aimed at countering Soviet aggression.” And the Philadelphia Inquirer saw it as a recognition that “many harassed nations will have their liberty disappear if we fail them.”31

The nation’s radio commentators were equally supportive. The dean of America’s network commentators, H.V. Kaltenborn, had no doubt the president’s speech would “mean much to the future of global security.”32 Joseph Harsch, who had covered the Nazi blitzkrieg from Berlin to London, told his CBS listeners that the United States would either “inherit the British empire or let nature take its incalculable cost.” Clifton Utley told NBC listeners that the United States would either shape the future “to our liking or permit the Russians to shape the world to theirs.” Even the self-proclaimed liberal Cecil Brown of Mutual Broadcasting, who deplored “hysterical radio commentators,” thought the stakes too high for the United States “to desert our friends in their hour of need.”33

Praise, however, for Truman’s strategy to win public opinion in containing communism was hardly uniform. The Chicago Tribune, one of the leaders in what Truman considered the “sabotage press,” now feared “the inevitability of war. It will probably not come this year or next year, but the issue is already drawn and cannot be tempered or withdrawn.” The St. Louis


Post-Dispatch, which had editorially opposed Truman since his days as a Missouri machine politician, argued “the President’s address has committed the nation to an all out diplomatic action just as a declaration of a shooting war must necessarily follow when the president asks for it.” The San Francisco Chronicle editorially captured this sentiment when it observed that “there can scarcely be an American who doesn’t have that pit-of-the-stomach awareness of impending danger.”

Truman’s address to the nation was an effort to go over the heads of his press critics in generating public support for his administration’s Cold War policy. In a private interview with C.L. Sulzberger of the Times the president bitterly attacked those within the “sabotage press” who for private, political reasons had “failed to accurately portray our policies to the American people.” Truman told his daughter Margaret that editors and publishers of “sabotage sheets” who put partisan interests before national interests were nothing more than “traitors” who deserved the firing squad. Columnists such as Drew Pearson, Walter Winchell, Joseph and Stewart Alsop, and Walter Lippmann, who resisted Truman’s representation of the postwar danger were castigated as “ivory tower” potentates more interested in circulation than serving the national interest.

Arthur Krock of the Times, who came to know Truman better than most Washington correspondents, thought the president’s attitude made more difficult the task of building public opinion for the administration’s program. “His character curiously combined pettiness with greatness,” Krock observed. Truman could make momentous decisions “with an iron backbone,” yet “did not suffer his critics well.”

Truman was well aware of his need to mobilize public opinion if the administration’s initiative to check Soviet penetration of Eastern Europe was to be sustained. Since Truman believed the press could exert a significant influence over public opinion, particularly in foreign policy matters where public attention was limited and its convictions often ephemeral, it made press cooperation all the more necessary. George Elsey, an assistant to the president and one of Truman’s speech writers, believed Truman understood his job was “to lead public opinion rather than waiting for public opinion to tell him what to do.” That meant the mass media played a crucial educational role in policymaking. To Truman’s mind it meant explaining administration policy and enlistng public understanding and support for that policy.

35. Sulzberger, 364. M. Truman, Letters from Father, 98. Truman’s criticism of the “sabotage press” is also found in Papers of Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Press, PostPresidential, HSTL. This contains notes of his conversations leading up to the publication of his memoirs.
36. Krock, 221.
38. Truman, Memoirs: Year of Decision, 47. See also, statement made by Truman before American Society of Newspaper Editors on 17 April 1948, appearing in Papers
Truman often saw himself as "a glorified public relations man" whose primary power rested in persuading others to do what they ought. 39 "The most dangerous course a president can follow," Truman wrote when he left office, is to be dominated by actions outside his control. It meant "he is no longer a leader but an improviser who is driven to action out of expediency or weakness." 40 That is what made building public support through the mass media for his postwar plan to contain communism so crucial. In generating that support, however, Truman encountered opposition not only from some quarters of the press, but from within his own administration.

The State Department as Policymaker

Senior officials within the State Department held neither Truman nor public opinion in particularly high regard and believed those who had trained for and made their careers in diplomacy, namely themselves, were best equipped to manage the nation's foreign policy in the postwar world. The general impression within the department during the earliest days of the Truman presidency was that, compared to Roosevelt, "the accidental president" was "a very little man sitting in a very large leather chair." What particularly alarmed Loy Henderson, the director of the department's Near East desk, and other Groton-educated careerists, was Truman's "limited international background" which made him "no match" for men as "wily" as Joseph Stalin and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov. 41

Senior officers within the U.S. State Department in the immediate postwar period saw themselves as an elite corps of experienced diplomats far more capable of managing the nation's foreign policies than presidents, who came and went, and whose political instincts often overrode "the national interest." 42 Special counsel to the president Clark Clifford noted the department's

40. H. Truman, Mr. Citizen, 261-262.
arrogant attitude inhibited the administration's ability to speak with one voice on foreign matters.\textsuperscript{43} Truman put it more bluntly. The department's determination to "make an end run around me" emanated from their conviction that only "pros" knew enough about the postwar world to conduct diplomatic relations in it. "The striped pants boys warned me to watch my step," he told a visitor to the White House. "They thought I didn't understand what was going on."\textsuperscript{44} Truman's clash with the department was not only on matters of substance but style. State Department bureaucrats had "the social approach," Truman observed, "the striped pants approach." They made a show of their expertise. But Truman's long years in Congress had convinced him that "an expert's a fellow who's afraid to learn anything new because then he won't be an expert anymore."\textsuperscript{45} Truman was astute enough a politician to know that any foreign policy initiative needed the support of the American people if that policy was to be sustained in the postwar environment. That was why the department's determination to "go over my head and the heads of the American people" in making policy would doom the effort to achieve consensus in constructing the nation's postwar foreign policy.\textsuperscript{46}

When Truman named General George Marshall secretary of state in January 1947 to replace James Byrnes, he hoped Marshall would "set them right" and facilitate "cooperating within the middle and lower levels of the State Department" and the White House. But Marshall, with little experience in the art of diplomacy, quickly became a captive of the department's disdain for winning public approval in policy planning. Acheson's successor as undersecretary Robert Lovett heartily approved. "Roosevelt wanted to play every instrument in the ballad, and that's a good way to get a split lip," he observed. The combined


\textsuperscript{44} Truman's bitterness with senior officers in the State Department can be seen in Truman Papers, Memoirs, Foreign Policy, Post-President, HSTL. Also, Merle Miller, \textit{Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman} (New York: Berkeley Books, 1974), 214-217.


inexperience of Truman and Marshall, he was certain, assured departmental preeminence in crafting the nation’s course in the Cold War that was coming.47

Truman’s understanding of the importance of public opinion in containing communism was shared by Lester Markel, Sunday editor of the New York Times. Markel observed that America’s “new role in the world” required an end to the “white shuttered era” in which State Department “High Priests” sat in “velvet prudishness and metallic sternness, “while hiding the most important secrets of the world” from the American people. The man in the street would have his say in postwar foreign relations, Markel predicted, a participation made all the more urgent by the emerging postwar crisis between East and West.48

The State Department created an Office of Public Affairs to fend off rather than cultivate public opinion in the immediate postwar environment. The department’s press officer Charles Bohlen observed department veterans were determined to maintain their leading role in developing foreign policy at a time that required U.S. leadership in quarantining communism.49 The department’s actions were guided by open resentment at the idea of making the public a full partner in foreign policymaking. “We used to discuss how much time the average American citizen put in each day listening, reading, and arguing about the world outside his own country,” Acheson observed in his memoirs. “It seemed to us that ten minutes a day would be a high average.”

The outgoing Secretary of State James Byrnes heralded the creation of the department’s Office of Public Affairs as an important step in assuring “a people’s foreign policy” would guide the nation in the immediate postwar years. Its charge was to reach opinion leaders in more than two hundred organizations across the country and to seek the opinions of American voters through regular

mass media to acquiesce in State Department domination over the course of American foreign policy. During the war, H.V. Kaltenborn expressed the sense shared by many in the mass media that total war required a cooperative press. “We want freedom of speech and press for patriotic Americans whose concern is to win the war,” he told his listeners. “And we want silence from all others.”

52 But as the war went on, many in the press wearied in their role as messenger service for the Roosevelt administration. Radio reporters in May 1943 went public with a complaint that government censors often left “the Japs better informed than the American people.” Wire service reporters were convinced that a false image of the war was being communicated through the government’s determination to minimize American casualties, while exaggerating losses of the enemy. The nation’s largest dailies resented the growth of “pernicious propaganda” disseminated by government bureaucrats and charged that “news management” had deprived the American people of the real truth regarding the war effort.

53 The department’s response to this criticism was characteristically condescending. James Byrnes, who had begun his public career as an editor on the Aiken (South Carolina) Journal and Review, castigated reporters and editors for not taking their responsibilities “seriously enough.” Criticism of the government during a national crisis, he warned, could destroy the consensus that sustained policy initiatives. His point was further emphasized when Librarian of Congress and war publicist Archibald MacLeish met with reporters. Journalists needed to “accept responsibility for the opinions which resulted” from robust reporting of foreign affairs, MacLeish maintained. And that meant close

cooperation with the government "in the difficult and dangerous business of making up the public mind."55

By war's end, however, many in the media were growing impatient with the paternalism of the nation's senior diplomats. Arthur Krock charged that MacLeish had used the government's Office of Facts and Figures "to conduct psychological warfare" designed to manipulate public opinion to serve administration purposes. Markel observed that there were too many career diplomats "who look upon themselves as Brahmins and upon fact-seekers as Untouchables." Markel wrote that too many of these officials felt public opinion had no place "in the frockcoated world in which both their bodies and their minds moved." Far too many foreign service officials, Markel believed, failed to recognize the public now demanded a full accounting of their country's foreign policy and their determination to participate in its formation.56

As late as 5 June 1947, the date Secretary Marshall announced what came to be known as the "Marshall Plan" for the economic recovery of Europe, it was clear the State Department did not understand the changing topography of postwar foreign policymaking. The plan, designed to blunt Soviet gains in Eastern Europe, was made public on the weekend at a commencement exercise at Harvard University with little advance warning to the press. Marshall, in fact, went out of his way in the brief address to admonish reporters for "confusing the man on the street" with "a mass of facts presented by the press and daily on the radio." What Americans needed to understand, Marshall warned, was that there could be "no assured peace" without "economic health in the world" and that meant massive U.S. aid to facilitate the economic recovery of Europe.57

State Department bungling and Truman's tight-lipped defense of the Marshall Plan in subsequent news conferences would have its consequences. Months after the administration's surprise articulation of an activist foreign policy to combat Soviet advances in Eastern Europe, the plan languished on Capitol Hill. No groundswell of public support forced isolationist members of Congress to immediately act on the bill. Nor did the public, preoccupied by the adjustments to postwar living, feel constrained to immediately heed the administration's call that a new "crisis" enveloped the continent so many Americans had recently died to defend. Attention centered on Truman's rapid demobilization of American forces after the war, a move he admitted to Arthur Krock was "the greatest mistake of my presidency." Marshall attempted to rescue the situation in January 1948 when he told members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "the way of life we have known is literally hanging in the balance." But the press paid more attention to the testimony of Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall who estimated that it would take $2.25 billion and the

immediate training of 160,000 troops for the United States to field a force that was a match for the Soviet Red Army.\textsuperscript{58}

The mass media increasingly blamed President Truman for the apparent drift in American foreign policy in the winter of 1948 and urged him to take control of his State Department and win the confidence of the American people in meeting the demands of the postwar world.\textsuperscript{59} The March 1948 death, either by suicide or murder, of Jan Masaryk, the foreign minister of Czechoslovakia and the takeover of that nation by communist forces, gave the administration a new opportunity to win public support for the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine. The widely publicized remark by former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill that “the menace of war was now rolling toward the West” was followed by highly publicized crisis meetings involving the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the urging of Defense Secretary James Forrestal, a man with a keen appreciation of the mass media’s potential in selling the administration’s postwar defense plan, representatives of the nation’s news media were systematically brought in for what were billed as “emergency meetings” to discuss the nation’s “war readiness.”\textsuperscript{60}

The effect of the communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the administration’s coordinated response to it was to lay the groundwork for a major presidential address of 17 March 1948 before a Joint Session of the Congress that excoriated the Soviet Union and “its agents” for embarking on “a ruthless course of action” that threatened the whole of the civilized world. Truman called for immediate passage of the Marshall Plan and a strengthening of the nation’s armed forces to meet “the Soviet menace” and prevent war.\textsuperscript{61} Truman’s speech and its careful coordination in advance with members of the nation’s mass media provoked an overwhelmingly positive response in the press and paved the way for passage of the Marshall Plan. Arthur Krock, who days before had speculated


\textsuperscript{60} New York Times, 2 March 1948, 18; 3 March 1948, 4; 6 March 6 1948; 7 March 1948, 12, 18; 11 March 1948, 1, 6, 9, 17. For Forrestal’s philosophy in winning press support for defense initiatives in the postwar world, see Millis, 118; 128, 243-244, 322, which contain Forrestal’s diary entries of 14 December 1945; 11 January 1946; 7 February 1947; and 29 September 1947.

that the rapid decline in presidential popularity would doom Truman to a one
term presidency, was effusive in praising Truman's "national call to action" and
his new working relationship with the press. Other elite papers were no less
effusive. The Los Angeles Times saw the speech as "one of the most important
statements of history." The Atlanta Constitution urged the Congress to respond
to the president's call for immediate action. Even the Kansas City Star, never a
Truman admirer, now admitted he had made "a reasoned and effective plea to
preserve peace by stopping Soviet aggression." It admitted that the president's
plan involved risk, but charged that "failure to act involves greater risk." The
New Orleans Times-Picayune claimed to speak for the nation when it urged
coordinated action to overcome "the pressure of menacing events and their threat
to our national safety and institutions."62

Conclusion

This article has analyzed the immediate postwar environment in which
President Truman attempted to fashion American foreign policy and fight
communist expansion in Eastern Europe. That environment had changed since
the heady days of World War II when a popular president fought a popular war
with strong press support. Divisions within Truman's administration as well as
a more independent-minded, adversarial press contributed to the president's false
start on selling the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan for the economic
recovery of Europe. A contributing factor in the president's problems was his
own attitude toward foreign policymaking and insistence that the press perpetuate
its wartime pattern of supporting administration initiatives in the "crisis"
atmosphere of the postwar world.

What neither President Truman nor his State Department immediately
recognized is that conditions in the mass media's reporting of foreign affairs had
changed since the close of the war. A more activist press corps was insisting on
being a partner in the process by which the nation's foreign policy was
constructed. In part, this was a response to the new leadership the United States
was expected to exert in preserving the fragile peace of the postwar world. In
part, this new militancy within the mass media was a response to lessons learned
during the war. As James Reston noted, it was not only the "Red threat" that
stimulated movement toward a Western security pact, but the administration's

Star, 18 March 1948, 12. New Orleans Times-Picayune, 18 March 1948, 10. For an
analysis of Truman's shaky standing in the pre-election polls, see Frederick
Mosteller, Herbert Hyman, Philip J. McCarthy, Eli S. Marks, and David B. Truman,
The Pre-Election Polls of 1948: Report to the Committee on Analysis of Pre-Election
Polls and Forecasts (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1949), 18-27, 53,
80, 257, 298-301. Also, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The
People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign (New
ability to help "large numbers of people see the changes and convulsions in the world in which America must operate."63 In this, a newly mobilized, independently-minded press played a major role, and in so doing, changed the way in which the nation's postwar foreign policy would be fashioned.

The author is an associate professor in the Department of Communication at DePaul University.

Mother and Son: Gender, Class, and War Propaganda in Canada, 1939-1945

By Barbara M. Freeman

On a late winter day in 1940, Madge Macbeth (1883-1965), a popular Canadian writer and journalist, opened an anxiously-awaited letter from her son Douglas, an officer in the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals. He had sent it, as usual, to her home in Ottawa, Ontario, the nation’s capital city. Inside the envelope, along with his typically descriptive, somewhat discouraged account of military life in England during the “phony war,”1 was a clipping from a British magazine. It was a photo-essay of an English mother bidding her soldier son goodbye at the railway station. Unlike the petite, well-groomed, and socially-prominent Madge Macbeth, this mother, “Mrs. Ellis,” was large, stolid and, judging from her clothing, a poor, working-class woman. Her son was probably with the British Expeditionary Force which was helping to defend France against German invasion. Under the heading “My Boy’s Going Back,” the caption explained that Mrs. Ellis had “...come to see her boy go back to France. While he checked his train, she held his rifle proudly...if sadly...fingering it.” The second photo shows her son kissing her goodbye:

And when the final goodbye came, Mrs. Ellis still fingered the rifle...until the last minute. Mothers, you know, are like that...it cheers them to feel that their sons will handle, daily, something that last touched mother’s hands...mother’s caress.

1. The “phony war” refers to the first six months of the war, when there was little allied action against the Germans in Scandinavia, western Europe, or Britain. Brian Loring Villa, Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1989), 213.
2. Recorded interviews with Mike Macbeth and her mother, Ann Macbeth, Douglas Macbeth’s widow, conducted by the author by telephone 23 March 1991; several informal talks with Mike Macbeth at her home in Stouffville, near Toronto, Ontario, 28-30 January 1991.
Wrote Douglas to his mother: "The enclosed is one of the saddest pictures I think I've ever seen. I suggest that it commands as much attention from official artists as any cheering, shouting mob of young fellows going off to war." The clipping and the letter speak volumes about wartime propaganda. The representation of the sorrowful mother with her son's rifle is typical, some of today's feminist scholars will argue, of the way in which female, maternal imagery is used in wartime to encourage and justify militarism. What Douglas reacted to so strongly may well have been planted by officials of Britain's Ministry of Information, set up during the war to ensure that the media, among others, would take full part in encouraging the public to fight for victory, despite the horrors of aerial bombardments, the burden of additional taxes, and the privations of rationing. Perhaps, from Douglas' point of view, the clipping was

3. Douglas Macbeth to Madge Macbeth, 12 February 1940; unmarked, undated clipping. Madge Macbeth papers at Stouffville, hereafter referred to as the Macbeth Stouffville Collection (MSC).
4. The violent, sexual imagery of the rifle is discussed by Susan Gubar, " 'This is My Rifle, This is my Gun': World War II and the Blitz on Women," in Margaret Randolph Higonnet et al, eds., Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987).
a romantic reflection of his wartime relationship with Madge—the proud mother at home, worrying about her son, but believing in his fight—and he, the brave soldier gone overseas to the front.

Madge Macbeth did much more than sit at home, although she certainly did worry. During the early years of the war, she was to take an active role in the official wartime propaganda effort in which many other Canadian authors and journalists also took part. Although she was responding partly to Douglas’ attitudes and experiences, as revealed in his letters to her, her behavior and actions reflected certain cultural expectations of women’s roles in wartime—essentially in a supporting role to the military. This role demanded activism from women like her. In fact, she herself saw some cultural expectations of women as too limiting in a national emergency. She thought women could be heroines, even on the home front.

When World War II broke out, some North American women were working overseas as war correspondents, but most of them did not cover the actual fighting to the extent that the men did. Even so, they tended to be exceptional women who were few and far between compared with the numbers who did not go to war. As insightful as the current scholarship is on the exceptional women, a full understanding of the role of media women in wartime also demands examination of lesser-known journalists such as Madge Macbeth, who threw themselves passionately into their governments’ war efforts at home.

It is not enough to merely record their sometimes frenetic activities and their stirring words, however. The media historian Susan Henry has advised that scholars should examine media women in the context of their work as journalists and their roles as community builders, among other considerations. This article not only examines how Madge Macbeth carried out paid and voluntary work as


part of her community-building efforts during wartime, but also frames her efforts in the context of her gender, class, and ethnicity, her personal relationships, and the political and other events that occurred during the war itself.

Seen from this perspective, her case illustrates the historian Joan Wallach Scott’s contention that “gender” is a cultural concept that changes over time and in different circumstances to suit political and other needs, as opposed to biology which determines our sex, but not necessarily our behavior. Scott also argues that women’s lives cannot be split into handy, binary categories based on what is deemed appropriate behaviour for women and men.9

A feminist philosopher, Sara Ruddick, has worked out a theory of peace politics which is also helpful in examining Madge Macbeth’s attitudes and actions. Ruddick debunks concepts that equate maleness with aggression and maternity with pacifism, for war can be as distinctly “feminine” as it is “masculine.” She points out that in wartime, mothers have often demonstrated the ability to be aggressively militaristic, an attitude that often stems from their sense of maternal duty. On another level, Ruddick writes, a mother’s involvement in militarism may also spring from her desire to move outside of the mundane and the domestic to embrace real or imagined heroism for herself.10 This article will show that Macbeth’s personal and professional work, her private and public life, and especially, her maternal and militaristic impulses were not separate, but often overlapped and blended with each other.

The rich material in her private papers offers a unique perspective on the war as seen by mother and son, and on the relationship between them. Among the holdings in the National Archives of Canada is her personal wartime diary with its short, terse, sometimes painful scribbles to herself, many of them in response to the letters she received from Douglas, who was, in deference to wartime censorship of military movements, “somewhere in England.” Scores of the original letters from Douglas to her are in his daughter’s possession at Stouffville near Toronto, Ontario, among more boxes of Madge’s memorabilia.11 Anecdotal material comes from interviews with Douglas’ daughter “Mike” (Madge Margaret) Macbeth, his widow Anne, and Eric Gaskell,

11. National Archives of Canada, Madge Macbeth Papers, MG 30 D 52, Finding Aid #367, vol. 17, Wartime Diary 1939-1945. Hereafter referred to as NAC MM Wartime Diary; Macbeth Stouffville Collection. There are Archive restrictions on her diary and family restrictions on Douglas’ letters which limit what can be written about intimate details of their personal lives. It also appears that her letters to him did not survive the war.
who was the national secretary of the Canadian Authors' Association and Madge's close friend during the war years.12

In World War II, Canada government propaganda and civilian advertising were both aimed at encouraging peacetime mothers to become home front warriors.13 The public record shows that Madge encouraged writers of both sexes to get involved in producing government propaganda, and also tried to influence women in particular to take part in various aspects of the war effort. She wanted them to raise money for military equipment, work for the war effort as volunteers and not demand wages, recycle and salvage reusable materials, and guard themselves against subversives and "sentimental" thinking. To this end, she broadcast radio appeals and talks, toured women's clubs, wrote war-related short stories and magazine articles, fired off angry letters to the newspapers, and edited some of her son's letters for publication. As a private citizen, she reported at least one fascist suspect, and, perhaps, disturbing war rumors to the authorities.14

Madge Macbeth's experience can be examined from several angles; first of all, as a patriot and propagandist. Her actions were fueled by concern for her son, who saw action at the front, coupled with a firm belief that it was the duty of writers and journalists to defend freedom of speech and of the press, which she feared would be lost if the fascists overran the western world. To work against this eventuality was not cynical involvement in propaganda for her, but one's duty as a citizen. Or, in her own words, "patriotism is the religion of honest men."15 At the same time, Madge's diary, newspaper accounts of her public speeches, and Douglas' letters supply evidence of their mutual intolerance for "fifth columnists"—aliens, conscientious objectors, pacifists, and striking laborers who, in their minds, presented a real danger to the war effort.

While much of Madge's Macbeth's war work was carried out within the boundaries of what was acceptable for women at any time, her relationship with her son, as revealed in his letters and her diary, appeared to strengthen her resolve that women should be especially tough during a war. In other words, the social construction of the female gender could and should shift to meet the fascist challenge.

Gender is not the only consideration in this study. Class and ethnicity are also explicitly and implicitly a factor in Madge's efforts and those of others who produced official propaganda.16 The leaders of English Canada's war effort

12. Interviews with Eric Gaskell conducted by the author, 15 and 18 March 1991; Ann Macbeth and Mike Macbeth interviews.
14. MSC Douglas Macbeth to Madge Macbeth, 2 July 1940 and 11 July 1940; 3 April 1941.
15. Madge Macbeth, "What We Should Strive For," Canadian Author and Bookman, June 1943, cover page.
were usually prominent, Anglo-Saxon men and women, who felt it was their patriotic duty to educate “ordinary” Canadians. This elitist attitude harkened back to at least World War I and the upheaval in Canadian political and cultural identity which followed it. Among the intellectuals who assigned themselves the job of informing and rallying the public during the next war were authors and journalists, whose links with the political and economic leaders of the country were well-forged. The self-appointed propagandists believed that the general public, left on its own, might not grasp the vital importance of an all-out military and civilian assault against Hitler.

Madge Macbeth was well-placed in this intellectual and social milieu. She was born in 1883 in Maryland to a prominent family who made sure she was brought up as a young lady with all the right social graces. She came to Canada as a teenager to attend a private girl’s school in London, Ontario. After a brief career in the theater, she married and moved to Ottawa. Shortly after the birth of her second child, her husband died of tuberculosis, and Madge took up freelance writing to support herself and her two sons. Aside from her autobiographies, she published novels, short stories, and travel articles, and was a public speaker and broadcaster. Over the years, she also became well-established in Ottawa society. Among her friends was the bachelor prime minister, W.L. Mackenzie King, at whose parties she occasionally acted as hostess.

18. The classic works on these business, media, and social connections are John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), and Wallace Clement, The Canadian Corporate Elite: An Analysis of Economic Power (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Carleton Library Series, No. 89, 1975).
23. NAC MM Wartime Diary, 6 December 1939, 52.
By the time World War II broke out, both her sons had grown up. Charles had moved to the States, but Douglas stayed closer to home, a factor in the intensity of his relationship with Madge, whom he often addressed in his wartime letters as “Madam Queen.”

She was a possessive mother, occasionally insecure and not always sure of his love, who took an immense pride in his accomplishments. She could be charming, domineering, and somewhat manipulative, especially with family members, although she was also financially generous. Privately quite sensitive, she tended to hide her deepest feelings in public.

Douglas was a tough military man in his late thirties, who had been among the first reserve officers to go overseas once Canada declared war on Germany. A proud descendant of American Civil War heroes on his mother’s side, and Canadian veterans of the Fenian raids, the Riel rebellion and the Boer War on his father’s side, he had no patience for fascist sympathizers, conscientious objectors, pacifists, or strikers. His letters show that he was also a racist castigator of the Japanese, Italians, and Jews.

He had his mother’s domineering temperament, her ability to charm and manipulate others, and her literary talent. He also had a softer side, best expressed in writing, when his tenderness for his mother became apparent. The war brought them closer than they had ever been before.

His decision to volunteer for active duty as soon as the war broke out had a shattering effect on his mother. She worried about him constantly, especially during the early part of the war, when the Germans appeared to be winning. When Douglas first went overseas, she wrote in her diary:

92d day of war. Queer how life works itself up into almost unbearable grief. Douglas came today to say goodbye. I don’t know why I should write more here. Can’t think of anyone who might be interested after this horror is over. I hoped he

24. MSC Douglas Macbeth to Madge Macbeth, 24 June 1940; Ann Macbeth and Mike Macbeth interviews.
25. MM Wartime Diary, 6 December 1939, 54; Mike Macbeth interview.
27. Madge Macbeth, “And Still the Heart is Home,” Saturday Night, 15 August 1942, 158. The Fenian Brotherhood, a militant Irish-American group, conducted raids on Canadian territory during the 1860s in order to use it as a base against Britain. Louis Riel led the Metis people in two unsuccessful uprisings against white settlers on the Prairies and was hung by the authorities in 1885. Brian Jenkins, Britain and the War for the Union, vols. 1 and 2 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1974, 1980); Thomas Flanagan, Louis ‘David’ Riel: Prophet of the New World (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979).
28. MSC Douglas Macbeth to Madge Macbeth, 2 July and 8 April 1940; 21 August 1942.
29. MSC Douglas Macbeth to Madge Macbeth, 6 January 1942; 3 April and 31 July 1941.
30. Ann Macbeth and Mike Macbeth interviews.
might like to look back some day on the place I had tried to fill, in this city, in my work, in Canada. Now...things look pretty grim and dark.31

By the spring of 1940, Germany had invaded Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland. In May, the Signals prepared to go to France, perhaps to assist in the evacuation at Dunkirk.32 Douglas, who was to die at forty-seven of a heart attack a few years after the war ended,33 tried to reassure Madge that he would not be killed in this conflict:

Don’t worry about me, Mum. It’s war and all that but I WILL COME BACK. Just never forget that will you. And if I don’t, I’ll just join the other Macbeth soldiers in their officers’ mess and I’ll see you later. My dearest love...you will help things for me please by not worrying.

In his letter he enclosed a clipping from the Sunday Pictorial. Under the heading, “I Will Come Back,” and an inspirational text, there was space for the reader to place the photo of loved one.34 As it turned out, Douglas did not go to France, but headed out with the Signals for another part of England.35

The fall of France in the spring of 1940 left its citizens’ loyalties divided between the collaborationist government at Vichy and the liberationist Free French. In Canada, this event added to the anxiety about what spies and subversives might do in French-speaking Quebec, while anti-Nazi sentiment was aimed at fascists, enemy aliens, and “ethnic” Canadians, mostly of German and Italian descent, and left-leaning labor organizers. The War Emergency Act and the Defence of Canada regulations imposed censorship on the media, which they did little to resist. Members of the Parliamentary Press Gallery, the Canadian Press news agency, newspaper and magazine editors, managers at the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, and the head of the Canadian Association of Broadcasters, were among those who felt it was their duty to support the war. Professional writers and news workers were encouraged to write, edit, publish, and broadcast propaganda prepared on behalf of the Wartime Information Board. Several quit their jobs to work for the government.36

31. NAC MM Wartime Diary, 3 December 1939, 51.
32. MSC Douglas Macbeth to Madge Macbeth, 27 May 1940.
33. Mike Macbeth interview.
34. Clipping from Sunday Pictorial 19 May 1940, with MSC Douglas Macbeth to Madge Macbeth, 25 May 1940.
35. MSC Douglas Macbeth to Madge Macbeth, 27 May 1940.
Madge was, at the time, the president of the Canadian Authors Association, and it was her job to rally its members to the cause, which she tried to do in an address to its 1940 convention near Montreal, Quebec. For her, there was simply no argument: Duty to one's country came first in a war which she saw as a clear-cut struggle between democracy and fascism. At the time, Britain and the Allied forces appeared helpless in the face of Nazi expansionism.

We have a clear and definite duty to the heroic youth who are giving their all that we may be spared. And as I see it, our duty is to keep telling them -- and those who stay at home -- what they are fighting for... We must begin now, for we are in danger greater than we have ever known, and without vision, the people perish.37

Most of Madge’s colleagues on the senior CAA executive, which was largely male, were of a similar mind, and many of the women authors, like the men, insisted on taking their part, either through their writings and broadcasts, or by various other means. Almost half the speakers at the CAA’s 1941 conference in Vancouver, British Columbia were women writers.38

In their professional work, the members of the Canadian Women’s Press Club, to which Madge also belonged, were normally expected to influence women, not men. Although individuals sometimes chafed at the sex-role constraints of their profession, they worked mostly on women’s pages, women’s magazines, and women’s radio programs, or as freelancers, which allowed them to accommodate their own domestic schedules.39 Much of their journalism emphasized the importance of supportive roles for women in wartime,40 and they took on those roles themselves. The Press Club’s newsletter, the Newspacket, testifies to the efforts of its rank and file members, not just as journalists and government publicity agents but as war bond boosters, national registration volunteers, knitters and sewers, soldiers’ ditty bag stuffers, senders of cigarettes to males in uniform, and as servicewomen who left journalism to join up.

Women journalists were no different than other Canadian women. When the war first broke out, it was elite and middle class clubwomen like themselves who organized the vast, volunteer network that the federal government

37. As published in The Canadian Author and Bookman 17 (1940): 4-6. Madge spoke on a similar theme at the annual convention in Vancouver the following year, newspaper stories that were also carried in other cities: “Madge Macbeth calls Writers ‘To Arms’ in Cause of Freedom.” Edmonton Journal, Alberta, 21 August 1941, and “Big Moment for Authors in Canada,” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, Saskatchewan, 22 August 1941. Clippings in NAC MM, vol. 15, “ Scrapbook 1941-1950.”
38. Ibid.,“Prominent Women Writers Here for Author’s Convention,” Vancouver Sun, 20 August 1941 and “Authors Will Study War’s Effect on Literature,” Vancouver News-Herald, 21 August 1941.
39. The membership records of the Canadian Women’s Press Club are quite revealing in this regard. NAC Media Club of Canada, vols. 38-41.
40. Pierson, “They’re Still Women After All,” 1.
appropriated through its Women’s Volunteer Services Bureau. Soon, almost all Canadian women were engaged in volunteer activities.

In some ways, Madge worked within the same gender system as most women authors and journalists, in that much of her effort, like theirs, was meant to influence Canadian women to support the war. But in other ways, she saw female stereotypes as too limiting and tried to convince her female audiences to get beyond them. Madge considered the nurturing that women so often did in wartime—knitting sweaters and sending comfort parcels—highly inadequate in this conflict. She wrote in her diary:

War news is so awful, can’t think about it. We all do our bit of knitting, serving in tea rooms and such—making a great effort! ... The British are asking mechanical equipment. We send sweaters! Norway fell, Holland and Belgium is largely in German hands. ....We still send sweaters!41

She took it upon herself to impress upon all Canadians, particularly women, the necessity of an aggressive defense against the enemy. To defend themselves against the Nazis, the British and their allies needed war planes, not woolens. With Douglas’ encouragement,42 and the backing of the Local Council of Women, she involved herself in a campaign to raise ten thousand dollars for a Spitfire, a British fighter plane.

She wanted to get two thousand women to donate five dollars each.43 But, according to her diary, she felt that the public expected the Canadian government to supply military equipment to the Allies. “So many people are opposing our campaign. Can’t see need to save soldiers.”44 In fact, it failed to raise even half the money needed45—perhaps because Canadian women were already investing in victory bonds for Canadian military equipment, and the bonds yielded an interest rate of 3 percent, which was considered generous at the time.46 It appears that her difficulties were not due to female squeamishness but competing agendas.

Nevertheless, Madge was very frustrated by the resistance she met to her campaign and continued to blame women themselves. According to a Canadian Press news agency story out of Montreal, she told one women’s club, “The Florence Nightingale type of thinking is hampering us.” The reporter continued:

41. NAC MM Wartime Diary, 23 May 1940, 72-73.
42. MSC Douglas Macbeth to Madge Macbeth, 2 July 1940.
43. “Council of Women ready to raise funds to purchase fighting plane,” The Citizen, Ottawa, 18 June 1940 and “Mrs. Madge Macbeth Stresses Soldiers’ Need for Ammunition,” Ottawa Journal, 18 June 1940 in NAC MM Papers, vol. 16, 1940 Loose Clippings file. In her diary, she mentions making several broadcasts. NAC MM Wartime Diary, 10 July and 12 July 1941, 80-84.
44. Her emphasis. Ibid., 10 July 1940, 83.
45. Ibid., 88.
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“Personally she failed to understand why women concerned themselves more
with healing than with the prevention of the necessity.”47

In the fall of 1940, Madge went on a tour of western Canada, urging
women to get tougher with the enemy. A speech she gave to the Women’s
Canadian Club in Edmonton, Alberta was typical. This was a “woman’s war,”
she declared. Women behind enemy lines were being treated just as brutally as
the men were, a reference to the fact that women made up 48 percent of the
130,000 civilians wounded or killed in bombing attacks during the Blitz.48 In
the face of the expanding fascist threat, Canadian women must look for
inspiration to British women, who were being bombed every day. They must
arm both themselves and the soldiers sent overseas. She is quoted as saying:

Some women are horrified at the thought of buying guns,
but certainly they must buy guns and learn to shoot them, too.
Why buy ambulances and hospitals for men after they are
wounded when you might provide them with defensive
equipment or do some work that would reduce casualties to a
minimum?

Furthermore, women should not be trying to send food and clothing to
the beleaguered citizens of the Nazi-occupied territories, but should “close their
eyes to the gentler tasks and to appeals for pity” and help maintain the Allied
blockade against these countries.49 An important, and somewhat insidious part
of her message was that not only must Canadian women work hard to defeat the
enemy abroad, but they must be aware that subversive elements might be at
work in Canada, and they must guard themselves against their influence. Her
speech in Edmonton, which was entitled, “Where is Your Fifth Column,”
emphasized that any woman who recoiled from the necessary tasks in wartime—
such as honoring the Allied blockade in Europe—was helping the enemy. She
was quoted:

47. NAC MM vol. 16, 1939-1945 Loose Clippings files, unmarked, undated.
In a letter from a person in authority in the ministry controlling British food supplies, it was stated that British pacifists and humanitarians don’t know how definitely they are playing into Nazi hands. Theirs is the attitude that Hitler publicly scorned when he spoke of “pity ethics.” Theirs are the minds he plays and preys on when he begs for food that he knows will break down the blockade.50

When she was asked why she was on tour, she replied, in the reporter’s words, “almost incredulously: ‘Because I have a son at the front and because every woman in this dominion is having to fight this war!’ ”51

Fighting the war also meant getting their hands dirty. In her zealous efforts to get women involved in everything from making armaments to recycling household goods, Madge went on record in an open letter to the federal labor minister with a promise that if he would set up a munitions plant near Ottawa, she would round up fifty women who would work there at whatever job was assigned to them. She wrote:

The great majority, however, are not seeking wages. They are eager, impatient, to help speed equipment production without putting the country to extra expenses. The Hon. the Prime Minister spoke of conscripting manpower. Here, you have it ready to be conscripted.

Madge’s belief that women would willingly work without wages in wartime would suggest that despite her own experiences as a self-supporting widow with two children, she had rather strange ideas about how women survive economically. But it is clear that she was actually addressing herself mainly to middle class housewives and club women. The Depression, which had barely ended, had given rise to the cultural perception that married women with jobs were symbols in themselves of economic hardship.52 An acceptable rationale for their employment, a sense of national emergency, might have justified wages, but from Madge’s point of view, volunteer work was a necessary sacrifice in wartime for those who could afford to do it.53

51. “Is Woman’s War, Writer Declares.”
Over the course of the war, there was an increase in women in the Canadian workforce; however, most of them continued to work without wages at home.\textsuperscript{54} It was not until 1942 that women, starting with young and single ones, were recruited for civilian wartime jobs through the National Selective Service, and even then, many had economic as much as patriotic motives.\textsuperscript{55} Regardless, in her speeches and articles, Madge continued to advocate that women, children, and even men who had not joined up, do volunteer rather than paid war work, and contribute financially to the war effort as well. She also advised women to back government salvage schemes by saving or recycling everything from sugar to towels.\textsuperscript{56}

When the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Madge scribbled in her diary: "War comes hourly closer to us. I am thinking about a shelter in the basement."\textsuperscript{57} Convinced that voluntarism was not working, she had been demanding publicly that the women of Canada pressure the federal government into implementing total conscription and national service for both men and women. In this, she echoed her son, Douglas, who had wanted conscription all along, attributing its delay to "rotten politics" and "pacifism."\textsuperscript{58} By 1942, the Canadian government had finally decided to hold a public referendum on the issue, but not bind itself to the result. In a letter to the Ottawa Citizen, Madge criticized this decision as confusing for the ordinary citizen and unfair to the volunteers who had enlisted in the armed forces or were doing war work at home. The government, not the public, should decide the issue:

No people, no matter how peace-loving and loyal, has the right to permit its government to jeopardize the fate of the nation or betray the heroic men and women who are trying to hold a thin front line against an enemy 100 percent conscripted and organized for total war.\textsuperscript{59}

She also called for the abolition of strikes. According to a newspaper report, she told the Westmount Women's Club, an upper-crust anglophone group in Montreal: "Every time there is a strike in Canada, a light goes out in Europe and Hitler wins another battle. Strikers should be regarded as fifth columnists." The article further quoted her as saying that she "championed" collective bargaining,

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 81; Pierson, "They're Still Women After All," 44-48.
\textsuperscript{56} "All-Out War Effort Urged." Unmarked clipping in NAC MM vol. 16, 1941 Loose Clippings file; Macbeth, "By the Sweat of Your Brow Shall You Win the War," Saturday Night, Toronto, 15 August 1942, 20. Copy in Ibid., 1942 Loose Clippings file; Macbeth, "Don't Throw Away Your Bullets," Saturday Night, 1 November 1942, 42.
\textsuperscript{57} NAC MM Wartime Diary, 7 December 1941, 124.
\textsuperscript{58} MSC Douglas Macbeth to Madge Macbeth, 14 May 1940.
\textsuperscript{59} "A Canadian Mother's View," in the Ottawa Citizen, 4 February 1942, clipping in NAC MM vol. 16, 1942 Loose Clippings file.
arbitration, and the right of labor to present its demands, but she did not support work stoppages. She believed that it was up to Canadian workers and others to back the efforts of the soldiers at the front, a conviction Douglas shared.

By this time, Douglas was a media personality in his own right, one who represented the official version of events. The CBC had an Overseas Reporting Unit, and he was featured in several programs on Canada’s military effort. In addition, Madge carefully edited some of his earlier letters and incorporated them in an article for the Canadian literary journal, the Dalhousie Review, while her friend, Eric Gaskell, edited others into a pamphlet. Douglas’ first person version of the raid at Dieppe, which appeared in the Ottawa Evening Citizen, emphasized the glory of battle and made no mention of the fact that the assault had been a disaster for Canadian troops. Out of the 4,000 Canadians taking part, 2,700 of them were killed, wounded, or taken prisoner. His letters to Madge at the time indicate that he knew there were casualities, but was not clear on how many.

It was shortly after Dieppe that Madge appeared to stop working for the official war effort, at least as a public speaker. Her term as president of the CAA was over, and she was no longer its official spokesperson. It is clear that she was unhappy about the government’s agreement to hold a public referendum on conscription and may have become frustrated with the official political line on the war effort, especially after Canadians voted “yes” in the spring of 1942, but Prime Minister King continued to stall on the issue. Gaskell suggests that, personally, she was worn down with worry about her son’s military circumstances, especially after it became clear what a mistake the raid on Dieppe had been. Her diary, which has some restrictions on it, indicates that other personal reasons may have been factors, as well. She was, however, instrumental in helping Gaskell and others set up the CAA’s Writers’ War Committee, but

62. MSC Douglas Macbeth to Madge Macbeth, 12 February 1940; 30 October 1940; 8, 12, 15 January 1941; 20 March, 24, 26 July 1941; NAC MM Wartime Diary, 14 January 1941, 98; Peter Sturberg, The Sound of War: Memoirs of a CBC Correspondent (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).
64. J. Douglas Macbeth, Somewhere in England.
according to him, she took little or no part in its operations.\(^67\) The Committee was dedicated to getting writers to produce stories, articles, and radio scripts with storylines reflecting the concerns of the Wartime Information Board. Although there is no evident direct connection between the WIB and Madge, she did produce a few articles and stories on wartime themes, some of them for elite magazines such as *Mayfair*.\(^68\) Later on, she wrote others concerning the domestic roles of women in post-war reconstruction.\(^69\)

Madge Macbeth’s wartime story is in some ways highly individual, in other ways, very typical. While she was most active in the war effort, she fulfilled a culturally acceptable role which allowed her to take her sexually-stereotyped place among Canada’s patriotic, Anglo-Saxon elite during a time of national emergency. Her idea of leadership included a self-imposed duty to point out to other women that for the good of the war effort, they must perceive of themselves as more warlike than she thought they ordinarily would. This was their maternal duty, one which Madge accepted for herself without differentiating what she felt when she read her son’s letters in the privacy of her home from what she said in public. Although her propagandist’s voice, with its patriotic rhetoric, was lifted in a public performance, it was her private voice amplified—a culturally and professionally acceptable way for an elite woman to communicate her fears for her son, her professional concerns as an author, journalist, and broadcaster, and her political convictions as a “democrat” and a Canadian.

Her beliefs and actions were not just a response to the letters from Douglas, as important as they were, but were essential components of a personal wartime drama to which her temperament, skills, and training were well suited, and in which she played a leading—perhaps even a self-perceived heroic—role. From her point of view, she had a lot to lose: her freedom, her country, and above all, a beloved son who was fighting a war which might have parted them forever. It must not be forgotten that the danger of fascism was very real at the time, even if it appears to us in retrospect that the propagandists’ fears concerning North America were exaggerated.

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67. Eric Gaskell interview.
It is difficult to say who was paying attention to her and why, but it is safe to assume it was a female, middle-class to elite audience most of the time. The women who listened to her speeches at their women’s clubs or read them in the CAA publications were people like herself: well-educated, mostly English Canadian, many of them literary. The same is probably true of the women who read her edited versions of her son’s letters in the prestigious *Dalhousie Review*, her accounts of the female diplomatic set in the elite *Mayfair* magazine, or her exhortations to the “upwardly mobile” readers of *Saturday Night*. It is much harder to know who read the accounts of her speeches in the daily newspapers, her short stories, or listened to her on the radio, much less how they reacted. It is interesting that she did not publish articles for this period in the Canadian women’s magazine, *Chatelaine*, which appealed to a broader base of middle-class women, and perhaps, working class women who had no Canadian magazine of their own. It is a significant omission, considering that her stated purpose was to reach ordinary Canadians. It must also be taken into account, however, that the tight wartime market that writers faced, and the preferences of individual editors, may also have affected where her articles appeared.70

In conclusion, feminist analyses of media women must critically examine the complexities of each woman’s life and work during major upheavals such as war, especially on the home front. Ideally, this perspective would not stress just her paid and volunteer work as a journalist, or her contributions to her community, but also relate her place in society as dictated by her gender, class, and ethnicity, among other considerations. It should not divide her personal from her professional work, her private from her public life, or her maternal impulses from her militaristic impulses, and should take into account the real and imagined impact of the wartime events to which she responded. This is not to argue that propagandists such as Madge Macbeth should be uncritically held up as the champions of their cause. But neither should they be automatically denigrated for their commitment, much less for their political or social positions, although it is essential to point out these factors. It is much more important to try to understand each woman on her own terms, in her own times, regardless of her shortcomings and the tragedy of war itself. approached in this way, feminist scholarship can contribute a great deal of understanding to how and why the media—and individual women—react to war in the many ways they do.

The author is an assistant professor in the School of Journalism and Communication, Carleton University.

Part Of The Team: 
*LIFE* Photographers and 
Their Symbiotic Relationship with 
the Military During World War II

By Andrew Mendelson and C. Zoe Smith

*It should be understood that World War II was our war too. If we were not there photographing it or writing about it, we would have been there fighting it with guns.*

—Carl Mydans, *LIFE* photographer

*Public opinion wins wars...I have always considered as quasi-staff officers, correspondents accredited to my headquarters.*

—General Dwight D. Eisenhower

The fiftieth anniversary of D-Day in June 1994 brought with it a flood of articles and photographs commemorating that great invasion. Gracing the cover of *Newsweek’s* 23 May 1994 issue was one of the best-known images from Omaha Beach by the late Robert Capa, who at the time was a 30-year-old photographer on assignment for *LIFE* magazine. Three other photographers, including one more from *LIFE*, were on the beaches of

1. Letter from Carl Mydans, 12 November 1991, in response to written questions from Andrew Mendelson. Mydans was one of the earliest *LIFE* staff photographers, covering World War II with his journalist wife, Shelley. Both were imprisoned for nearly two years in Shanghai and Manila by the Japanese and gained their release in 1943 during a prisoner exchange.
Normandy that day as well.\(^3\) The most memorable pictures were by Capa, the young Hungarian who had gone to Normandy with a unit of the First Division on a transport ship.\(^4\) Capa’s work is representative of what was possible because photographers who were on very good terms with the military during World War II were permitted to be eyewitnesses at the front line.

The you-are-there, blurry, action-oriented images of ground-level warfare by Capa may seem older than their fifty years, not necessarily because the photographs are in black-and-white, but because so much of the coverage of war has become very technical and impersonal. Lingering in our minds from the Gulf War are the scenes from CNN which seemed more like a computer game than an armed confrontation. Many of the published still photographs that did result were courtesy of media pools which worked under highly controlled circumstances. Much of what we did get to see during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm focused on the technical nature of the confrontation, rather than on the soldiers we sent there.

Many restrictions were placed on the media, at least on paper, during World War II as well, but World War II rules and regulations were not routinely enforced, as this article will show. By going back to the sources which spelled out the regulations and comparing them to the experiences of several photographers who were governed by them, a clearer picture of the actual working conditions emerges.

This article is based in part on responses to written questions from three photographers who experienced World War II first hand: Carl Mydans, David E. Scherman, and George Rodger.\(^5\) LIFE photographers were selected, in part, because the magazine contained such extensive photographic coverage of the war and was so widely circulated during that period. “In World War II scores of photographers, correspondents, war artists, commissioned by LIFE sent back heart-clutching scenes from all the fronts,” as one writer said.\(^6\) Examining the

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4. See Robert Capa’s brief account of his D-Day landing experience in David E. Scherman, ed., LIFE Goes to War: A Picture History of World War II (New York: Pocket Books, 1977), 238. A more complete account can be found in Whelan, Robert Capa, 265-271.
5. Questions in ten subject areas were sent by Mendelson to Mydans in New York, Scherman in Massachusetts, Rodger in England, and Peter Stackpole in California. Prompt answers were received from Mydans, Scherman and Rodger, but Stackpole responded that he could not help. “We were recently burned out in the Oakland fire, and I’m very busy making many adjustments after losing everything,” Stackpole said in his note. The questions the three photojournalists answered can be found in Appendix 1.
experiences of some LIFE photographers seemed appropriate given the magazine’s extensive coverage and involvement with the military during the war.

LIFE’S “staff photographers and photographers on whose services it has first call total more than those employed by the world’s largest news picture agency,” the magazine’s executive editor, Wilson Hicks, explained in June 1941.7 As he said, “Our picture operations are farther flung than those of all the newspapers of the United States combined insofar as uses of staff in foreign fields is concerned.”8 During World War II, twenty-one LIFE photographers “spent 13,000 man-days overseas—about half the time on the front.”9

The magazine’s coverage of the war helped to increase its circulation from nearly 3.3 million in 1941 to nearly 3.8 million in 1944. As a mass circulation, general interest picture magazine, LIFE reached a broad cross-section of American readers. “The magazine certainly found a large audience in all the economic and social and racial strata of our society,” Robert R. Littman wrote in the introduction to LIFE, The First Decade (1936-1946).10

LIFE’s association with the military was not a one-sided affair. They had a symbiotic relationship from the very beginning, as evidenced by the nine-week course the magazine conducted in June 1941 to train Army photographers.11 Also, in the spring of 1944, as preparation for D-Day, Capa lectured, along with other photographers, the U.S. Army’s official photographic unit, giving advice that included carrying only equipment that would not slow down Army photographers.12

Thus, the experiences of Carl Mydans, David Scherman, and George Rodger were sought to learn in more detail about press/military relations during “The Good War.” Before concentrating on the LIFE photographers’ personal accounts, however, the conditions under which all photographers reportedly were to operate need to be explored.

Restrictions on Photographers in General

During World War II, photojournalists were in an awkward position. Their jobs called for them to visually portray the war in all of its manifestations, while needing to be accredited to the military in order to carry out their jobs. Although war photographers were under the authority of the military, there was widespread cooperation and goodwill in general between the press and the military. In many instances, the limitations set down in writing by the military

8. Ibid.
12. See Whelan, Robert Capa, 264.
for security reasons were nullified or ignored when the rules were put into practice. If these guidelines had been taken at face value, all correspondents could have been treated as subordinate players by the military in the war. As will be seen later, this certainly was not the case with LIFE photographers.

Even in the area of censorship, after initial strictness concerning what could be published, the military significantly relaxed these restrictions in 1943. Overall, the civilian photographers on the front lines were viewed as an integral part of the war effort, not as antagonists, as they often would be in subsequent conflicts.

To ensure that the pictures of the war could get the largest audience possible and to control the number of photographers at the front, a pool system was established with the three major picture services: the Associated Press, Acme News Photos, and International Newspaper Syndicate, as well as Time, Inc. This arrangement allowed members of the pool to get “priority on transportation to and at the front, on clearance through censorship, and on shipment of their stories and photos to the States,” giving newspapers and magazines across the country access to images from the war.

It was through these major news organizations that a photographer would become accredited with the War Department, which was the only way to photograph at the front lines. Capa, for example, knew he had to work for LIFE if he wanted access to the front, because he would be denied all access if he remained a freelancer. Pool photographers had to follow military regulations and were subject to military law if they did not.

Regulations were set up to guide all aspects of the photojournalists’ lives while they were with the troops; accredited war correspondents were treated as commissioned officers with respect to accommodation, transportation, and capture. The organization sending the photographer would have to pay the individual’s salary and supply cameras and film, but the military supplied everything else. The photographer even had to wear an officer’s uniform; civilian clothes were prohibited. The uniform was stripped of all military insignia, except for a four-inch wide green patch that read, “Photographer.”

Limits could be placed on the amount of baggage and equipment the photographers could bring along, but this limit was set by the commander of the unit to which the photographer was attached. There were no other specifications as to what exactly was allowed, so the details seemed to be left up to each individual commander, which was a great advantage for some photographers.

13. Ibid., 244.
14. Letters from the three LIFE photographers in response to Mendelson’s questions confirmed this.
16. Letters from the three LIFE photographers in response to Mendelson’s questions confirmed this.
18. Ibid.
When in the field, the photographers were under the direct control of and reported to the Public Relations Officer of the specific unit to which they were assigned. As the military manual explained:

This officer is to be regarded by the War Correspondent as their C[ommanding]. O[fficer], and all communications on official matters will be addressed to him. Senior Officers should not be approached either in person or by letter except through the Senior PR Officer concerned, or present.¹⁹

The photographers could talk with the soldiers whenever they wished, “subject to the approval of the officer in charge of the forces in question.”²⁰ Here again, much was left up to the discretion of individual officers at the front.

Through this PRO, all housing and transportation arrangements were made by the photographers. According to regulations, a request had to be made of the PRO to set up a separate War Correspondents’ mess. The arrangements for transportation in military vehicles had to be approved by the PRO, since the photographers could not supply their own vehicles.

The photographers reportedly had to have a PRO’s permission to leave one unit and/or join a new one. These regulations could have made it very difficult for the photographers to move around between units to photograph the best action or could have made it very easy for the government to restrict the access to certain units only. This would have hidden anything the military did not want to be documented by a camera.

It also was up to the PRO to make the necessary arrangements for film processing and censorship.²¹ Once photographers shot their film, it could be processed in the field at a Signal Corps field lab when available, or more likely shipped unprocessed to London or Washington, D.C., where it was developed and examined by the military censors.²² Because of this procedure, it would have been easy for any undesirable pictures to be delayed until they were no longer newsworthy.

The regulations that were in place to guide the action of war photographers could have been used to severely limit where and what they photographed. But in World War II, this was not the case. Since after-the-fact censorship was in place, these rules were enforced minimally so as to give photographers the most freedom to work. The attitude that the war correspondent had an important job to do came from the top of American military command.

As summed up by General Eisenhower in the Army manual for war correspondents: “With regard to publicity, the first essential in military operations is that no information of value shall be given to the enemy. The first

¹⁹. Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), Regulations for War Correspondents Accompanying Allied Expeditionary Force (1944), 16.
²⁰. Ibid., 12.
²¹. SHAEF, 22.
²². Basic Field Manual, 8.
essential in newspaper work and broadcasting is wide-open publicity. It is your job and mine to reconcile these sometimes diverse considerations."23 This and other statements from the highest officials in the military indicated that friendly and helpful relations were to be expected.

Rules Rarely Enforced

Britain’s George Rodger, who was a LIFE staff photographer during World War II, said the official restrictions were rarely experienced by pool photographers. “As I was representing LIFE magazine, I had liberal access to American troops from the High Command on down,” Rodger wrote.24 Scherman also said that in practice the military allowed the LIFE photographers almost complete freedom to move around the front to do their jobs. As Scherman explained:

Unlike many previous and subsequent wars, we were not only allowed to move freely among the troops but in the European Theater we had passes signed by Eisenhower, the boss of the operation, saying we were free to go where we wanted, that we would not be interfered with in the performance of our jobs and, quite importantly, we would not be ordered by unit commanders to take pictures we didn’t feel like taking.25

Scherman also reported that the photographers were treated like “captains and ate in the officers’ mess if there was one.”26

The photojournalists were included in all aspects of military briefings. As Mydans recalled, “since we were accredited to the units we were with and whatever we did—text or pictures—went through censorship, there were no military developments that were kept from us. We were part of the unit, and they were not concerned that we were going to break any military secrets.”27

23. Ibid., 3.
24. Letter from George Rodger, 12 November 1991, in response to Mendelson’s questions. Rodger served as a war correspondent with LIFE while also in the military and received 18 medals for his service. In 1948 he co-founded Magnum, the cooperative picture agency headquartered today in New York City. Rodger passed away on 24 July 1995 at the age of 87.
25. Letter from David E. Scherman, 16 November 1991, in response to questions asked by Mendelson. Scherman was a LIFE staff photographer from 1939 to 1947 and worked for the magazine from its beginning in 1936 until its demise in 1972. He also edited LIFE Goes to War (1977) and The Best of LIFE (1973).
added, "So we would hear from them every day what was happening. We would hear that there was a big fight going on in such and such a place." 28

Compared to the reporters, the photographers seemed to have experienced more cooperation because they were more often on the front lines with the troops while the reporters often were back at headquarters. Mydans explained, "The Army, Navy, the Army Air Corps and the Marines assisted me in virtually everything I did. They welcomed me, appreciated me, wanted me, needed me, protected me, fed me, supplied me, and gave me the same medical care and dog-tags as they gave their troops." 29

The photographers were, or tried to be, part of the units with which they were assigned. While the regulations stated that the photographers were not supposed to talk to senior officers or the soldiers without permission, the rules seem to have been largely overlooked. The photographers talked freely with both the officers and soldiers.

In North Africa, LIFE photographer Robert Capa was friends with many high-ranking officers and infantrymen. Capa's biographer, Richard Whelan, said Capa:

...made every effort to become accepted as 'one of the boys,' playing poker with them [the soldiers] and sharing the dangers of combat; their morale was much improved by the fact that this slightly comic 'friendly enemy alien,' [he was not an American citizen]... equipped with cameras but no weapons, went voluntarily into the front lines. 30

Margaret Bourke-White, one of LIFE's four original photographers, also reportedly felt accepted by the male officers and soldiers. At one point, while also in North Africa, Bourke-White threw a party in honor of Brigadier General Hampton Atkinson's promotion. She said she did not seek or have to get permission of a PRO to do this. She just did it. 31

In combat the fact that she was a women reportedly went completely unnoticed, according to Bourke-White, and caused no particular distractions to the soldiers, which contradicted the assumption that women could not be at the front. Bourke-White felt as though she was viewed as "one of the boys," 32 which was virtually the same experience for correspondent-photographer Dickey Chapelle. 33

28. Ibid.
29. Mydans letter.
32. Ibid., 230.
33. Chapelle's career as a foreign correspondent-photournalist began when she talked her way on shore at Okinawa to join a Marine combat patrol ahead of the front lines, as detailed in her autobiography, What's A Woman Doing Here? A Combat
The Military as Facilitator

Military personnel regularly aided the photojournalists in doing their jobs. Colonel Melvin Gillete, the chief of the Army Pictorial Service, urged that civilian photographers’ efforts to shoot at the fronts be facilitated. "The officers and men were almost uniformly helpful at all times in facilitating the taking of pictures, or in pointing out dangerous areas," Scherman said; the jeep driver often protected the photographers as well.

The military regularly facilitated picture taking by teaching the photographers special skills. In March 1944, Capa went to the 82nd Airborne Division camp to learn how to parachute, so he would be able to parachute into France with the troops when the invasion came. In order to photograph from a B-17 on a bombing mission, the Air Force reportedly taught Bourke-White to work at extreme heights while wearing a heavy cold-weather flight suit.

Although they did not have to supply the photographers with vehicles, when vehicles were available the military was accommodating and generous with transportation. As the war progressed, the armed forces public relations offices tried to have some jeeps available for correspondents to share, or at least transport their film back from the front.

Some photojournalists were supplied with Army jeeps to be used at their own discretion. For example, while in North Africa, Capa was supplied with his own jeep and Army driver to get him where he wanted to go, while Bourke-White was loaned a jeep and driver for her personal use during the entire time she was in Italy.

Even though regulations said that a correspondent needed the permission of the PRO to use a privately-hired vehicle, toward the end of the war many photographers in Europe used civilian vehicles when they could get them. "As the war drew to a close, most of us had stolen ('liberated') enemy civilian vehicles which were painted O.D. (olive drab) at the nearest motor pool," Scherman explained.

In the Pacific Theater, where jeeps were less accessible, other modes of transportation were made available to the photographers. Mydans said a

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34. Moeller, Shooting War, 224.
35. Scherman letter.
36. Whelan, Robert Capa, 209.
38. Moeller, Shooting War, 184.
40. LIFE photographers were not the only ones given special privileges. Even as the Allies were pushing toward Germany in early 1945, Vogue photographer Lee Miller, for example, got a jeep for her personal use to travel among the various Allied forces, according to her son, Antony Penrose, in The Lives of Lee Miller (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985), 131.
41. Scherman letter.
photographer could ask any plane to take him: "In those days a war correspondent could just go up to a plane and say hey where are you going. I am with the AP or I am with LIFE magazine. That's the way we traveled. You could always find somebody who would take you. So we flew to Okinawa."42

In reality, the military also was flexible in terms of the amount of equipment a photographer could bring along. The amount seemed to be left up to each individual photographer, rather than the Army. Some brought the bare minimum, but at the other extreme was Bourke-White. "Her clothes and personal effects alone weighed fifty-five pounds...[She] also carried an extravagant amount of camera equipment. To cover Italy, she carried 250 pounds of supplies."43

Military Censorship

The one area where the military was truly strict was censorship. The censors looked at all images and captions from the front lines before they were released for publication, but the government contended it was not to hide military mistakes. Instead, censorship reportedly was invoked to make sure the enemy did not benefit from any information contained in the pictures, according to the government. The American press should be able to "tell the story of our national successes and shortcomings accurately and in much detail," the Office of Censorship maintained.44 Early on, when the codes were stricter, the PROs and the censors worked as quickly as they could to get the film through the system to be released for publication.

Military officials carried out their jobs by following a 200-page mimeographed document of the censorship codes. These codes were updated daily with directives "known as Press Relations Censorship Guidelines and Press Censors’ Guidances, which listed items to be stopped or passed."45 Certain matters were defined as "warning areas" for photographers.

For example, photographs could not reveal anything about the placement or strength of American forces. For this reason, photographs could not show unit identifications, such as patches on a soldier's uniform. Historian Susan Moeller explained:

42. Mydans, Carl Mydans, 29.
43. Moeller, Shooting War, 196.
Some few images had street signs and uniform name tags undetectably brushed out...but most often the photographs that were passed [by the censors] were not retouched but censored [blatantly]. A flat gray bar or a flat gray field covered any objectionable portions of the image—a more honest approach to censorship because it was obvious even to the casual glance that the image had been tampered with.46

Aerial photographs were of special concern to the military. "Special care should be exercised in the publication of aerial photos presumably of non-military significance, which might reveal military or other information helpful to the enemy," as described in the Code of Wartime Practices.47

Even Censors are Obliging

As with other military regulations aimed at the press, the photographers were not given many specifics as to what could be photographed. Nevertheless, photographers "got to know what to cover and what to leave alone...Naturally security prevented photographing defensive positions or troop concentrations and one would be stupid to try," Rodger admitted.48 Photographers knew their work would pass through military censorship, as well as the eyes of a [LIFE] editor back at home. "We were allowed to show what we wanted to. It was the editors who decided what to print," Mydans offered.49

The censors tried to be as accommodating as possible, approving pictures that were potentially troublesome by obscuring the problem areas. For example, if there was an identifiable American face in a picture or a visible insignia, the censor would either brush it out or place a gray rectangle over the problem area. As Bourke-White said:

At the review desk, in the Pentagon building, the picture censors went over photographs very fairly and carefully, and often helped us to save a picture for publication where only a part of the photograph revealed restricted subjects. In this case they would indicate what portions of the picture must be retouched before publication.50

Often it was not the existence of the censorship codes that bothered the photographer as much as the fact that frequently the censors did not know what could and could not be okayed. Considering that most commanders did not know

49. Mydans letter.
50. Moeller, Shooting War, 189
what was secret and what was not, it is not surprising the censors had trouble too. At one point during the early stages of the Sicilian campaign, Capa returned from shooting paratroopers jumping into Sicily and developed his pictures in a field darkroom with a PRO with whom he was friends. Then the two of them drove straight to Tunis, where the press camp was set up with censors and transmitters to send the pictures to the United States. “The censors, without any argument, stamped my pictures through for radio [transmitting],” Capa said, apparently because he had not violated any of the rules the photographers faced.

Bourke-White experienced difficulty with a censor in Washington, D.C., who did not know what was allowable. She asked, “If a censor hasn’t learned what is not censorable in relatively simple matters, how is he going to recognize what might give ‘aid and comfort’ to the enemy?”

In another case involving Capa, a censor passed a picture that he took of a bomber which, unknown to Capa, had the top-secret Norden bombsight in it. This item was so secret that even the censors did not look for it. The oversight was caught after printing, but prior to distribution.

Including dead American soldiers in photographs was another topic about which the military had special rules. At the start of the war, the military’s policy was that enemy or Allied dead could be shown in a picture, but American dead could not. This policy was later reversed by President Franklin Roosevelt after receiving pressure, which included LIFE editors’ protest in the 22 February 1943 issue and General Eisenhower’s own public relations people.

The magazine’s editors were upset that the government had censored a photograph of three dead American soldiers on Buna Beach in New Guinea, taken by LIFE photographer George Strock early in 1943. When the President and the War Department agreed in September that Strock’s then-shocking photograph could be published, the following week the editors ran the image as a full-page vertical with a full-page editorial entitled “Three Americans, Where These Boys Fell, A Part of Freedom Fell: We Must Resurrect it in Their Name.”

From that point on, American soldiers could be shown injured and dead in American publications. Government officials thought such grim pictures could build support for the war, to stem the tide of complacency that was beginning to set in. “As stories of Allied victories increasingly dominated newspaper headlines and theatre newsreels, Roosevelt grew less preoccupied with reassuring Americans and more concerned with the threat of complacency,” said historian George Roeder Jr. “This desire to provide Americans with more

55. See LIFE, 20 September 1943, 34-35.
stimulants and fewer tranquillisers [sic] led to the September [1943] release of photographs of the American dead,” Roeder added. After this point, “taste was more important than security” to both the military and the photographers, as Rodger explained.

Releasing the Strock photograph of the dead Americans served the government’s purpose by showing the harsh realities the soldiers were facing overseas. James Byrnes, chief of the Office of War Mobilization, was “disturbed at public criticism of rationing and wage and manpower controls, suggested to the President that more photographs showing the ordeals of the men on the fighting fronts might harden morale.”

Photographers shared in the ordeals of the men at the front. Darkness and bullets, rather than the military, proved to be the two biggest impediments to the photographers. Because much of the fighting took place at night, it was virtually impossible at times for photographers to work. Even in daylight it often was difficult to take pictures without risking their lives, because photographers who raised up from their positions to photograph could get shot. As Mydans said, “You see only those photographs that a correspondent was able to take. You don’t see all the things that were happening all around him when he couldn’t raise his head.”

Photographers’ Cooperation

While the military was cooperative with the photographers, many photographers strongly supported the war effort in return. The photographers believed in America and the American cause, which probably explained why the military did not worry about the photographers. All accredited photographers had undergone a background check by the military, so it was unlikely that any of the photographers would do anything to aid the enemy.

Like most Americans, LIFE photographers felt that this war was very necessary. Capa, for instance, was an ardent anti-fascist. For many American photojournalists, being at the front was their way of helping the country win the war. “For me, there was no other choice than to offer my special skills wherever they might be useful,” Bourke-White said. Many chose to go beyond just photographing the war. “At St. Lo in Normandy, Ralph Morse put down his LIFE cameras and carried out wounded,” Scherman remembered. The positive sentiment about the war back home also made it easier for photographers to be supporters of the war effort rather than skeptical reporters, as often occurred in more recent conflicts. As Scherman explained, LIFE photographers were

57. Ibid.
58. Rodger letter.
59. Moeller, Shooting War, 223.
60. As quoted in Moeller, Shooting War, 9.
61. Bourke-White, Portrait of Myself, 196.
62. Scherman letter.
motivated to cover World War II by a variety of factors: "curiosity, pride, professionalism, sometimes plain anger."^63

**Conclusion**

Though extensive regulations were established to guide the actions of the war photographers, most were minimally adhered to, allowing photographers a great amount of freedom. For the most part, the *LIFE* photographers did not need to have rules imposed on them, since they did not wish to hurt the war effort and needed to abide by censorship policies to maintain their accreditation. Both the military and the photographers were serving the same end—namely, winning the war.

Thus, both sides were helpful to each other and seemed to appreciate the situation in which they found themselves. Some photographers, like Bourke-White, were so much a part of the establishment that they even shot assignments for the military, blurring the line between the press and the armed services even more. During World War II, the press and the military shared an enemy and a sense of patriotism, binding them together in a way which lessened the sting of the Fourth Estate. The symbiotic relationship between the press and the military may never have worked quite so well as it did in World War II.

As historian Roeder pointed out, "Precedent, the policies of other countries, and customary practices of America's news and entertainment media reinforced the government's decision to limit what Americans on the home front saw of the agonies of Americans at war."^64 Keeping the public "misinformed" about the consequences of modern warfare, in Roeder's opinion, showed a "...lack of confidence on the part of the nation's leaders in the ability of Americans to make responsible and mature decisions if presented with honest information and emotion."^65

How history would have been affected if censorship rules had been different and/or if more photographers had expressed doubt about the price American soldiers were paying on the battlefield is impossible to determine. And while the journalist-as-super-patriot became passé in relatively short order, the special bond between the press and the military continued into the Korean conflict in the 1950s. It did not continue for long, however.

As Mydans suggested, "It was not until partway through the Korean War that this understanding and appreciation of each other began to break down. And I regret it very much."^66 Mydans does not believe, however, that the bond between the press and the military is gone forever. It is his contention that "if the nation is truly threatened, our relations will be repaired at once."^67

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65. Ibid., 195,196.
67. Ibid.
APPENDIX I

Questions Sent to LIFE Photographers

1. How free were you to move around among the troops? Did you need permission, or could you come and go as you wished? Did you have an Army escort all of the time you were with the troops? How strict were any regulations enforced?

2. From what I have read, many of the soldiers and officers were quite helpful and accommodating to the photographers. Was this the case? In what ways did the troops help or hinder you?

3. To what extent were your pictures censored by the Army? As I understand it, the faces of American dead could not be shown. Also, one criticism of World War II pictures was that they didn’t show enough of the true grossness of the war. Were there subjects that you would or could not photograph for security or taste reasons?

4. How close/friendly did you get with the soldiers? Were you considered one of them? Would you assist with the wounded, etc.?

5. What did the Army supply you with and what did you have to supply yourself? How did you process your film or did you ship it back unprocessed?

6. Did the Army assist in sending your pictures back from the theatre of operations?

7. Could you choose which individual division you went with?

8. In choosing which individual battle to cover, what distinguished a battle that you covered from one you didn’t? What would you look for photographically in a battle?

9. What guidelines did your editors impose on you? Were you on your own to shoot whatever you wanted, or did your editors tells you what subjects to shoot? Were there pictures that your editors would not run? What kind of deadlines did you operate under?

10. How did you go about getting accredited to cover the war?

Mendelson is a doctoral student and Smith is an associate professor at the University of Missouri School of Journalism.
Television During World War II: Homefront Service, Military Success

By James A. Von Schilling

Television during World War II? According to the standard textbooks on American media, television was virtually non-existent during the war, with TV studios closed and the new industry’s growth stunted. Even books that focus on the history of American TV barely mention the 1941-1945 period. “Progress ground to a halt with America’s entry into World War II,” for example, begins the single paragraph on TV during the war in Michael Winship’s *Television.* And the entire period is dismissed in one sentence in *TV Book: The Ultimate Television Book:* “But within months came Pearl Harbor, and television once again went into mothballs.”

The truth is, however, that American television remained alive and active during World War II. The industry aired original programming, covered live some major events from Pearl Harbor to V-J Day, helped the war effort in Europe and the Pacific and civil defense on the homefront, and even raised a few controversies, including TV’s first case of censorship on moral grounds. Indeed, a closer look at television during the war years reveals hints to the various roles the medium would play in postwar America. Television during World War II thus becomes one of the interesting untold stories of American media, worthy at least of a journal article or two and a chapter in the texts of TV history.

Four months before Germany invaded Poland, on 30 April 1939, a regular schedule of TV programming for the American public began with a live broadcast of the opening of the New York World’s Fair. Just a few hundred sets were operating that day, and only one station—RCA’s experimental station W2XBS in New York—was on the air, televising President Roosevelt’s speech and the rest of the day’s festivities. The next morning, TV sets went on sale in New York department stores, and the age of television had begun.

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Five months before Pearl Harbor, on 1 July 1941, American television reached the commercial stage, as the Federal Communications Commission allowed sponsorship of TV programs for the first time. By then, W2XBS had become WNBC, and it was joined by CBS’s WCBW in New York and a handful of stations in New York, Philadelphia, Schenectady, Chicago, and Los Angeles. The few thousand Americans who owned TV sets were now entitled to fifteen hours of programming per week by any station that acquired a commercial license. And on that day in mid-1941, viewers could watch a variety show, quiz programs, newreels, dancing lessons, and a baseball game—typical for American TV since the World’s Fair opening—but now with commercials for Ivory soap, Spry shortening, and Sunoco oil.4

By 1 July, however, the nation was mobilizing for war, and the factories that could have made more TV sets, cameras, and station equipment in 1941 were converting to military production. On 16 October 1941, the federal government gave the broadcast industry a priority rating of A-10, making it a lower-level defense industry.5 The rating meant that TV and radio stations already in operation could repair and maintain their equipment and thus remain on the air. But the A-10 ranking prohibited constructing any new stations or improving those in existence—the raw materials were needed for the military and for industries with higher priority ratings. The overall effect was to stop the growth of America’s TV industry dead in its tracks.

President Roosevelt also called an emergency meeting of his military advisors on 16 October, following the replacement the day before of Japan’s conservative Konoe government by the militaristic Tojo cabinet.6 Later that week, both WNBT and WCBW added civil defense programs to their regular weekly TV schedule. WNBT’s program, for example, demonstrated first aid and fire control. The New York station encouraged set owners to become “television defense aids,” responsible for gathering their families, friends, and neighbors in front of the TV to watch the demonstrations.7

Now, too, a news program called “Face of the War” began airing on WNBT with commentator Sam Cuff using maps and a pointer to explain and analyze the latest developments.8 Less than three months later, on 7 December 1941, Sam Cuff was televised pointing to Pearl Harbor on the map, following the Japanese attack on the U.S. naval base there. Millions of Americans first heard the shocking news from John Daly on the CBS radio network or Hans Kaltenborn on NBC. But the far smaller number watching TV sets within range of WNBT could also read the news flashes themselves on an Associated Press

teletype machine that was shown close-up on the screen, alternating with Sam Cuff. 9

Shortly after noon the next day, Roosevelt’s famous “date which will live in infamy” speech was broadcast live on WCBW, but only the audio. For its picture the station used a photograph of a waving American flag. By 2 p.m., Congress had passed a declaration of war, and at 4:10 that same afternoon President Roosevelt signed it. To cover this news, WCBW canceled “Children’s Story” and the other programs scheduled to air from 2:30 to 3:30 p.m. 10

American television was modified only slightly during the first month of the war. Sam Cuff continued to analyze “The Face of the War” on WNBT, and WCBW added more news summaries to its schedule, often two or three times a day. But WNBT and WCBW still aired boxing and wrestling, college basketball, films, musical shows, and an occasional play—the types of shows that had filled their prewar schedule. Christmas was celebrated with a variety show on WNBT, and on the Sunday evening between the holidays the station aired a church service in Manhattan conducted by the Reverend Harry Emerson Fosdick. On New Year’s Eve, viewers could watch and listen to the festivities from the Rainbow Room in the Empire State Building for the first time. 11

The first significant change in TV programming after Pearl Harbor was on the night of 5 January 1942, when WNBT transmitted a special wartime instructional show, “Air Raid Protection—Fighting the Bomb,” on a network of three TV stations, from Manhattan south to Philadelphia and north to Schenectady. By then, East Coast residents had been alerted to the chance that weapons of war might be used in their region, and New York City alone had 60,000 civilians signed up as air raid wardens. The WNBT program included films on civil defense, a forty-minute talk by a New York police lieutenant and demonstrations of air warden tools. 12

The program struck a responsive chord among public officials, civil defense groups, and the TV industry itself. To the officials, it was an easy way to train large numbers of civilians; as to the groups of workers, they had only to find a TV set to be properly trained. For the TV industry, a civil defense training program brought good publicity and gave it a clear wartime role. It also helped fill the airtime requirements of fifteen hours a week for stations with commercial licenses, and it even offered the prospect of selling whatever prewar sets were still available.

In mid-January 1942 NBC announced that its New York station was setting up a regular schedule of training programs. WNBT would work with New York’s police department and civil defense agency to create the programs, and

10. Ibid, 16.
with Philco, General Electric, and Du Mont to transmit them to sets placed throughout New York, Connecticut, New Jersey and the Philadelphia area.\textsuperscript{13}

The first of the new series aired on 26 January 1942 and was repeated several times over the next few weeks as training groups and TV sets were brought together in police stations, firehouses, school auditoriums, homes, and even appliance stores. The program featured a New York policeman, Lt. William Maley. His lecture on civil defense was visualized by actor Maurice Wells, who, as Post Warden Arthur Smith, halted traffic and sent pedestrians to shelter during an imaginary bombing raid. This first program set the pattern for the entire series, which began with “Air Raid Warden’s Basic Course, Lesson 1” on Monday, 23 February, on WNBT in New York, WRGB in Schenectady and WPTZ in Philadelphia. The same lesson was repeated mornings, afternoons, and evenings during the week with eighteen showings in all—each one live from NBC’s Radio City studio.\textsuperscript{14}

The second and subsequent lessons featured other actors and actresses, with sets, scenery, props, and sound effects. One lesson, for example, portrayed the Browns, a city couple in whose apartment a fire bomb had landed. As Mr. Brown carefully prodded the bomb from behind a chair and on the floor, Mrs. Brown in the next room operated a stirrup pump—something like a bicycle pump attached to a bucket of water. The same lesson also portrayed Times Square hit during an imaginary bombing raid, while other lessons covered such topics as blackouts, decontamination procedures, and poison gas attacks.\textsuperscript{15}

These lessons helped train thousands of civil defense volunteers and other viewers during the first half of 1942; they were TV’s first educational series. Group leaders received teaching material beforehand, a studio panel asked questions that were answered live on the air, and each lesson ended with a sign that read “Discussion Period” on the screen. Quizzes were given. In May 1942, Radio News claimed the TV training series had created “the greatest classroom in the world—and in all history.”\textsuperscript{16} On a smaller scale, WCBW televised Red Cross programs and “homefront” shows that encouraged civilians to substitute “V” materials for rubber, sugar, tin, and other elements needed by the military. On the West Coast, an experimental station in Hollywood, W6XAO, aired government war films, such as “Safeguarding Military Information” and “Building a Bomber.”\textsuperscript{17}

In May 1942 the FCC ruled that TV stations already on the air could continue broadcasting during the war, but their minimum hours of programming would be lowered to four hours a week.\textsuperscript{18} Thus, a new era began in the history of American television. In the depths of World War II, TV’s schedule would now

\textsuperscript{13} “Television Takes On a Defense Role,” Broadcasting, 23 March 1942, 24.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 42.
\textsuperscript{17} “Television Takes On a Defense Role,” Broadcasting, 23 March 1942, 24.
be cut back significantly. WNBT had already replaced most of its studio programs with the Air Warden training course. After running the course a second time in the spring of 1942, WNBT dropped its hours down to the minimum of four a week. Its schedule now had only films and slide shows, squeezed into one or two programs a week, and soon its studio was shut down. WCBW’s schedule was similar; in fact, the one heartbeat of television that remained strong throughout the war belonged to a station in an unlikely location, WRGB in Schenectady.

Although General Electric, WRGB’s owner, was deeply involved in producing equipment for the war, the company never abandoned its television operations. In fact, General Electric tried to keep to the prewar schedule of fifteen hours per week, even after the FCC cut the minimum hours down to four. Fortunately, the company had built a new facility for WRGB before the war had begun and restrictions on building materials were implemented. WRGB could rightfully claim that it had the best equipped TV studio in the country; during the war, in fact, it attracted visitors who were planning to build postwar TV stations in other cities.

For much of 1942, WRGB transmitted the air warden’s training course from New York City to TV sets in such sites as Union College in Schenectady, which was dubbed “Television Post No. 1.” By 1943 the station was originating programs three nights a week, as well as relaying a few hours of films and other programs each week from WNBT. Many of its studio shows came from outside groups, like the Yale Drama Group, performing a one-act play, “First Came Five.” WRGB also aired news programs and war-related shows, such as promotional appearances by WAACs and WAVES. By June 1943, WRGB’s schedule was ranging from wrestling matches to fashion shows to operettas.

**Television Joins the Fight**

While General Electric kept TV programming alive as the war continued, RCA further developed TV technology to help bring the war to an end. Back in 1934, RCA’s most notable television engineer, Dr. V. K. Zworykin, sent David Sarnoff, the company’s president, a memo outlining a system in which television cameras and monitors would be used to guide unmanned air torpedos. “I was so impressed,” Sarnoff later recalled, “I went to Washington and presented his plans to the War and Navy Departments.” But the military failed to act on these ideas until the late 1930s; in the meantime,

21. Information on WRGB’s programming during the war years can be found in the Hall of History Archives, General Electric Corporation, Schenectady, NY. Of particular value are the listings for publicity photographs taken during this period, although most of the photographs themselves are not part of the Hall’s collection.
RCA engineers and scientists developed and tested some of the necessary technology, such as relatively light-weight television cameras that could be housed inside airborne weapons.23

By 1940 the U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development was sponsoring RCA’s work, now cloaked in secrecy and given such code names as “Dragon” and “Pelican.” That year RCA’s plant in Camden produced the first airborne camera system, known as “BLOCK.” In April 1941, seven months before Pearl Harbor, the system passed the Army’s field tests in California; contracts for production were awarded.24

In all, RCA built 4,000 of the BLOCK camera systems during the war, for both the Army and the Navy to use in glider bombs, drone planes, and other aircraft. The BLOCK system used a television camera that weighed thirty-three pounds and a transmitter weighing slightly less. These units were installed in the bomb or drone itself, with the camera mounted in its nose. An operator flying in a nearby “mother plane” then used a TV monitor to follow the weapon’s movement and a joystick to direct it to strike its target.25

In the Pacific, television-guided planes and bombs were put into use beginning in August 1944, as the United States Navy attacked Japanese shipping vessels in the Northern Solomon islands in the South Pacific. The Navy also used TV-guided weapons in the Fall of 1944 to destroy a lighthouse equipped with radar at Rabaul Harbor after attempts using more traditional bombs had failed.26

In August 1944, a television-guided U. S. Army airplane packed with 20,000 pounds of explosives took off from England to strike at Nazi bases in France, where V-1 rockets were being launched. The plane had a crew of two, who were to parachute into the English Channel as the crew in a nearby plane took control via remote television. But the bomb-laden plane exploded in mid-air, scattering its fragments over the English countryside; no bodies were recovered. Its pilot was Joseph P. Kennedy Jr., who was being groomed for the presidency by his father, and whose goal now passed to the family’s second son, John.27

Television also played a role in developing the most powerful weapon of the war, the atomic bomb. Scientists and engineers who worked on developing the bomb in Los Alamos, New Mexico, used TV cameras and receivers to observe the reactions of radioactive material with safety.28 Thus,
television played a role in introducing to civilization the use of both guided airborne weapons and atomic bombs. Joined together, these technologies would put the chill of mass annihilation into the Cold War years that followed.

By the fall of 1943 the programming side of the TV industry was already starting to emerge from its reduced wartime status. In October, NBC resumed live broadcasts with a 75-minute rodeo show from Madison Square Garden, and in late December came a second live program, boxing, also from the Garden. The two programs were the first in a series of live sports shows that the station promoted as entertainment for wounded servicemen, hospitalized in the New York area and around Philadelphia and Schenectady. Indeed, RCA had placed television sets in some thirty hospitals and had arranged for the programs to be picked up by WRGB and by WPTZ in Philadelphia.29

However, neither NBC nor its rival CBS resumed live programming from their Manhattan studios in 1943 or early 1944. Instead, the New York City television audience watched live programs from the only local studio in operation—a tiny one belonging to W2XWV, an experimental station run by the Allen B. Du Mont Laboratories. "For even in the darkest hour of war, when television activity has dropped to its lowest ebb," Du Mont claimed in a 1943 trade ad, W2XWV kept a schedule of live programming.30 By the fall of 1943, W2XWV was transmitting three nights a week, with programs along the lines of what WNBT had been featuring before the war, including Sam Cuff’s "The Face of the War," which had simply moved from WNBT to the Du Mont station.

For Christmas 1943, W2XWV offered a special production of "A Christmas Carol," including Tiny Tim’s famous toast, "God bless us—every one," with everyone and the turkey squeezed together on Du Mont’s now tiny stage. Two weeks later, New York area viewers were blessed with a gift from NBC when the company’s station WNBT began splitting its four hours of weekly programming—all films—into two nights, Mondays and Saturdays. Added to Du Mont’s transmissions on Tuesday, Wednesday and Sunday, and to WCBW’s films on Thursday and Friday, television was now for the first time broadcasting every night of the week, if only in one market.

In March 1944, a meeting of the Sales Executives Club of New York devoted to TV drew their largest audience in eleven years. Over one thousand businessmen heard RCA manager Thomas Joyce describe TV’s potential to drive the American public into a postwar spending boom.31 By the end of 1944, Americans were predicted to have saved over $100 billion in wartime earnings. It would be up to the sales executives, Joyce told them, helped by commercial TV, to "show consumers the advantages of the new postwar products and services and to bring about rapid buying of those goods and services on a large scale."32

32. Ibid., 11.
Before TV could sell products to a postwar America, however, it had to begin to sell itself again to the public. On 2 May 1944, RCA placed its first full-page advertisement in the New York Times in years, promoting its sets and programs. The ad was carefully worded for wartime. Its headline stated “Hospital Service Men Cheered by Television Circus Party,” and part of the text and graphics focused on NBC’s transmission of programs to wounded soldiers. But much of the advertisement promoted RCA’s plans for postwar television, when “more and more of the world’s happenings will come under television’s gaze” and “the need will be great for sets at prices millions can afford.”

TV Meets the Censor

By then NBC had begun televising a few unannounced programs from its WNBT studios, one of which actually made headlines when it became the first TV show to be censored. Eddie Cantor was to perform a song entitled “My Baby Is Having a Baby” with Nora Martin. Forty minutes before airtime, NBC officials told Cantor that the song had to go because its lyrics were offensive. He argued, and they relented. But partway through the song, NBC’s engineers cut out the audio signal so the audience would not hear the following lyrics:

Martin: Thanks to you, my life is bright. You’ve brought me joy beyond measure.
Cantor: Don’t thank me. Quite all right. Honestly, it was a pleasure.
Martin: Just think, it’s my first one.
Cantor: The next one’s on me.

Then, in an act that presaged the censorship of Elvis Presley on TV a dozen years later, NBC cameras televised Cantor only from the waist up as he performed what the New York Times described as “a modified hula-hula dance in the tradition of the Broadway stage.”

After the show Eddie Cantor said he was “blazing mad” at the “little Hitlers [who] tell you you can’t do it just as you’re going on....” The official NBC explanation came from its vice-president in charge of programming, Clarence Menser, who cited “the obligation of NBC to the public to make certain that its facilities do not bring into American homes material which the audience would find objectionable.” But Cantor claimed, “No man can be in the business for thirty-five years and do any vulgarity and last. I’ve been at it longer than NBC or television.”

Another TV highlight in 1944 was its coverage of the Republican and Democratic national conventions. Both were held in Chicago, where TV lagged behind New York. The city had two stations—one commercial and one

35. Ibid., 17.
36. Ibid., 17
experimental—but neither could transmit programs from inside Chicago Stadium, where both parties were meeting. Instead, a new TV division of RKO Pictures arranged to film the proceedings and fly the motion pictures back east for RCA to air on its NBC network.37

The day the Republican National Convention began, 26 June 1944, RCA ran an advertisement in print headlined “Television Sees Democracy in Action.” A photograph showed a TV camera facing a sea of delegates and state placards; the ad’s copy promised, “When Peace comes, a greater and more widespread television audience—expanding into millions of homes equipped with RCA television—will see as well as hear Democracy in action.”38 In fact, television viewers that day saw Democracy prior to action: RKO had filmed in advance California’s Gov. Earl Warren delivering the keynote address, and the film was broadcast on 26 June, slightly before the speech was actually delivered.

For the rest of the week, NBC transmitted excerpts each night of the previous day’s proceedings on WNBT, Schenectady’s WRGB, and Philadelphia’s WPTZ. Those viewers gathered before a TV set saw the first Republican convention held in wartime America since Abraham Lincoln was renominated in 1864. This convention, however, had little natural drama: Thomas Dewey won easily on the first ballot. Still, on Wednesday, 28 June, viewers saw one of the most controversial speeches of the era, delivered by an exceptional figure in her prime, Clare Boothe Luce.

A pioneering woman in American politics, Clare Luce had the qualities that later propelled John Kennedy into the White House: intelligence, wit, connections, and the looks of a movie star. In 1944 the forty-one year old congresswoman became the first woman in American history to be listed as a possible candidate for higher office—the vice presidency.

On 28 June, facing microphones connected to 675 radio stations and under the bright, scorching lights needed for RKO’s cameras, Luce accused President Roosevelt of lying to the nation in the months before Pearl Harbor. She described a “G.I. Jim” who represented all the war’s dead young Americans, whose “blood flecks the foam of the waves that fall on the Normandy beachheads.” Roosevelt, she said, had “promised in this very city twelve years ago that ‘happy days are here again,’ [and] promised peace, yes peace, to Jim’s mother and father.” But would not a “truthful” leader, she asked, have “prepared us better” for the war “in material and in morale, in arms and in aims? These are bitter questions.”

Women delegates gasped at her strongest statements, reported the Herald Tribune the next day, while Republican men displayed “an expression of admiration grudgingly bestowed and a small, masculine flicker of fear.”39 Watching her on TV, a New York Times reporter noted that “the addition of sight had multiplied the dramatic value...at least tenfold.”40

38. Advertisement in Broadcasting, 26 June 1944, back cover.
Although her charge that Roosevelt lied prior to World War II eventually stuck, Luce's political foes used it against her as she ran for reelection that year; the speech "was not the first time," said one opponent, "a person named Boothe treacherously assaulted the President of the United States." Even Clare Luce herself later expressed some regret for the speech. "Lying," she said about Roosevelt and America's entry in the war, "was clearly the only way to get us there."

Luce's speech was a highlight of TV's summer of 1944, in which programming began to bloom again. Indeed, postwar American television was starting to take shape; some of the programs being transmitted were the first in a long line of similar programs that would continue unbroken for decades. Live drama, for example, became a regular feature on TV in New York City, on Du Mont's WABD, and on the CBS station, WCBW, which reopened its studios in mid-1944. On 30 June, WCBW aired its first live drama, "The Favor," a 15-minute play adapted from the stage version put on by the American Theatre Wing to sell war bonds. In the story a soldier on leave talks a young woman out of spending $275 on a fur coat; instead, she buys war bonds. But he vanishes suddenly while making a phone call, and she discovers that he had been killed months earlier in France.

CBS borrowed from radio as well that summer to create one of the first television quiz shows, "The Missus Goes A-Shoppin." An audience participation show, it was hosted by radio veteran John Reed King and featured a duck named Pierre and visual, physical humor, such as a big, burly truck driver pulling a girdle on over his clothes.

TV Sports Make a Comeback

In September 1944, NBC brought back a schedule of sports programming, transmitted from Madison Square Garden on its three-station network in New York, Philadelphia and Schenectady. On Friday, 29 September, featherweight champ Willie Pep successfully defended his title in a televised bout that was sponsored by Gillette Razors. Titled "Cavalcade of Sports," the Friday night fights stayed on the air for sixteen years. As with its other programs in 1944, NBC publicized "Cavalcade of Sports" as being intended for wounded servicemen in local hospitals. Its biggest audience, however, crowded into the living rooms and bars with TV sets in 1944; out of their numbers would come the first wave of postwar set buyers. Working with Gillette, NBC nourished this

43. Review in Variety, 12 July 1944.
sporting crowd several nights a week with boxing from the Garden and both wrestling and boxing from St. Nicholas Arena.45

That fall WNBT added broadcasts of college football games, with such prominent teams as Army and Notre Dame playing in Yankee Stadium or the Polo Grounds. In Philadelphia, WPTZ was in its fifth season of transmitting college football from the University of Pennsylvania's Franklin Field, home of the annual Army-Navy game and its crowd of over 70,000. WPTZ had already built TV's first sports transmission facility at Franklin Field, suspended below the upper tier of seats along the 50-yard line, holding two cameras and a crew of seven. With its set-up WPTZ could mix play-by-play coverage on the field with "human-interest" shots on the sidelines and in the stands, as well as close-ups of the broadcaster.46

The biggest contest that fall, however, was for the presidency. Neither Roosevelt nor Dewey made use of TV during the campaign, and the 1944 presidential election would be the last one in which television played no role. But it was also the first in which a candidate booked time on TV to speak to the public. He was Senator Robert Wagner. Running for reelection in New York, he gave a short campaign speech on Sunday night, 5 November 1944, on Dumont's WABD.47 Wagner won the election, as did Clare Luce and President Roosevelt—the latter by the smallest margin of his four victories. The results of the election were transmitted live by New York’s three stations, on the air all night, and by WPTZ and Chicago’s station WBKB.

WBKB had been on the air sporadically since October 1943 and was now putting together a regular schedule of programs. As with WRGB, the Chicago station reached out into the community for local talent—so much so, in fact, that Variety wrote in November 1944, "[The] Majority of shows televised here every Tuesday-Friday are so amateurish that reviewing them week-by-week is a needless task."48 But WBKB’s production staff—all females during the war—had found a few sponsors for their programs, and by early 1945 the station was paying on occasion for professional actors and actresses.

Before WBKB could show much more improvement, and before more stations like WBKB could begin operating in other cities, the government had to lift its wartime restrictions on the industry. The FCC took an important step in that direction on 12 January 1945, when it issued a set of rulings on the electromagnetic spectrum entitled "Docket No. 6651," to be implemented after the war. This FCC document, in hindsight, was a milestone in the history of American communications. With few exceptions, it established radio and television as the country knew it for the next forty years, until cable and satellite broadcasting came into their own. It would give an edge to lower-frequency television (VHF) over higher-frequency television (UHF), as well as an edge to AM radio over FM radio, that would last for decades. It also opened up American

45. See, for example, advertisements in Broadcasting, 30 October 1944: 4-5, and 6 November 1944: 76.
48. "Chi-Tele Scene Lags Beyond N.Y.,” Variety, 8 November 1944.
culture to the technology of personal communications—pagers, beepers, CB radios and portable phones—by setting aside a portion of the airwaves for the public to use the “walkie-talkie” communications that had been developed for the military during the war.49

On the same day that the FCC issued its new ruling, 15 January 1945, the Third Fleet of the U.S. Navy sent its carriers into Japanese-controlled waters for the first time, where they launched air strikes against Japanese-held ports in China. On that day, Russian troops advancing through Poland were fifty miles from the German border. In addition, the armies of the United States and Great Britain had all but ended the “Battle of the Bulge” in Belgium and Luxembourg, which was to be Germany’s last offensive against the Allied forces that had invaded France on D-Day.

Before the war ended, however, Franklin Roosevelt died. As the last American leader not to appear regularly on TV, Roosevelt had hidden the extent of his failing health since 1944 from the public. Radio captured the powerful emotional experience of his death and funeral, but from then on television would bring such national events into America’s living rooms, beginning with V-E Day less than a month later.

President Truman had designated 8 May 1945 in advance as V-E Day. But when crowds gathered in Times Square to begin celebrating on the afternoon of May 7, WNBT sent its mobile camera there and interrupted a test pattern to broadcast the emotional moment as it happened. The next morning the station went on the air earlier than ever before, at 8:45 a.m., to transmit the V-E Day speech recorded in advance by Truman. WNBT stayed on the air all day, switching between its mobile unit covering the celebration live, films of the war, and interviews, commentaries, sermons, and discussions in the RCA studio.50

One of those interviewed live was Eleanor Roosevelt, now the widowed former First Lady. Sitting before a backdrop of flags from countries in the new United Nations, she cautioned the public not to become apathetic or too weary of war. WNBT’s coverage of V-E Day continued non-stop until the closing strains of Verdi’s “Hymn to the Nations” on film, with Arturo Toscanini and the NBC Symphony Orchestra, at 10:54 p.m.51

In Schenectady WRGB sent its mobile unit out to televise reactions in the war-industry city, and also brought local officials into the studio for interviews, all interspersed with WNBT’s coverage relayed from New York. Together, WNBT and WRGB made V-E Day in May 1945 a milestone for American television. For the first time, television went on the air to cover a major news event and stayed on the air, filling the hours with live coverage, background films and studio commentary. With V-E Day, television journalism was born.

51. Ibid., 21.
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Ike and TV Head for the Polo Grounds

Although the war continued in the Pacific, the postwar process of demobilization had begun in Europe, sending servicemen back home to America. One of those who returned in the spring of 1945 was Burke Crotty, an NBC television producer who had specialized in covering sports on location. Another returning serviceman was Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, and their paths crossed on 19 June 1945, at the Polo Grounds in Manhattan.

General Eisenhower had been given a hero’s welcome that morning, including a ticker-tape parade, but now he was having his one request for the day fulfilled: he was attending a major league baseball game—the New York Giants versus the Boston Braves. WNBT had its mobile unit at the stadium not only because Eisenhower’s presence made it a news event, although the station had been airing his visit to New York on programs sponsored by Esso Gasoline. But by now, WNBT had added baseball to its schedule of sports programming, ostensibly for wounded servicemen in area hospitals. Beginning with a Memorial Day doubleheader at Yankee Stadium, Burke Crotty and an NBC crew were transmitting live at least one game a week.52

The viewers who tuned in on 19 June for either baseball or General Eisenhower thus saw them both together. At one point, Eisenhower was asked to face the TV camera positioned on the mezzanine level above first base, about 150 feet from his first-row box seat. “Would he wave a greeting to the hospitalized veterans?” he was asked, according to the New York Times. “He did, vigorously, demonstrating again the famed Eisenhower smile.”53 The likeable Ike, his smile, his wave, the baseball game, the Esso gasoline, and of course the TV camera: if any of those watching had the premonition that they were seeing America’s postwar future, they were right. It was the 1950s—a decade too soon.

Eight weeks later, on 14 August 1945, an estimated half million people gathered in and around Times Square anticipating the surrender of Japan. WNBT's mobile camera atop the marquee of the Hotel Astor had been televising since mid-morning as the crowd swelled, anxious and noisy, and finally overcome with rejoicing when the Times Square moving news sign proclaimed at 7 p.m., “Official—Truman announces Japanese surrender.” A writer for the trade publication Television, Mary Gannon, watched the celebration on TV in an NBC viewing room. She later described how “the mob excitement became contagious. Individual expressions picked up by the close-up lens used gave an intimate note—took you right into the crowd, made you feel part of it. If people all over the nation could have seen it,” she wrote, they would have been "glued to the video screen."54

It would be another three or four years, about as long as the war itself had lasted, before TV would truly catch on with the American public. In the

52. Burke Crotty, “Televising the Baseball Game,” Television, July/August 1945, 8.
meantime, the industry would struggle with internal conflicts and with FCC hearings and rulings that would slow its progress. But the medium’s potential to keep postwar America “glued to the video screen” was in evidence as early as 1 December 1945, when WNBT and WPTZ together televised the Army-Navy football game from Philadelphia.

The game already had special significance: these two military branches had, after all, won a world war since their previous meeting on the gridiron. But added to the meaning of the day was its live telecast, perhaps to the largest audience for a single program thus far, maybe even more than the 102,000 in the stands. Press reports for the first time mentioned “television parties” with scores of fans gathered around sets in homes and bars.55 Wrote Variety, “Viewers saw the entire game from a 50-yard line seat in the warm comfort of their own homes”—and, what’s more, they also had live, close-up pictures of the most prominent fan at the game, President Harry Truman.56

WPTZ’s veteran crew—it was their sixth Army-Navy game—now had a new RCA camera to operate: the “image orthicon,” whose sensitivity to light and detail was a product of wartime development. The new camera would vastly improve the quality of TV’s pictures from both outdoors and in studios. Other technical advances from the war would bring better and less expensive TV sets into the market in 1946, and into thousands of American homes in the late 1940s and millions in the 1950s.

Television would become America’s dominant medium during the last half-century. Its history seemed to begin with Milton Berle in 1948. In hindsight, however, TV showed clear signs during World War II of the role it would play in American culture. Although strapped by the limited number of stations, cameras, and sets in operation, TV still brought to a limited audience many of the events, sights, and emotions of American life. Having been “turned on” before World War II, television remains to this day uninterrupted.

The author is a professor of English at Northampton Community College in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.

Selling Patriotism: The Representation of Women in Magazine Advertising in World War II

By Mei-ling Yang

Rosie the Riveter, the industrial heroine originally created by the War Manpower Commission in World War II, has become the most prominent icon of American womanhood in the war era. Outfitted with overalls, goggles, and a bright bandanna, the quintessential war worker with a confident “victory smile” served to rally women’s support for the nation’s war effort. Echoing the “Uncle Sam Wants You” plea in military recruitment, Rosie urged women to do their share in the war by filling the jobs men left behind. Celebrated in wartime popular culture as well as historical research as a symbol of the strength and ability of American women, she shaped the nation’s collective memory of women’s wartime experience marked by a phenomenal increase in paid employment. More than six million women joined the labor force during the war, doubling the proportion of women working outside their homes from 17.6 percent to 37 percent.¹

The war-induced changes in the employment pattern of women have been well documented by historians concerned with the social effect of the dramatic increase in paid employment on the status of women.² In the debate over whether wartime changes constituted a watershed in the history of American

women, historians have, however, largely ignored the role of mass media in the process of social change. One notable exception was Maureen Honey’s study of the influence of government recruitment propaganda on the portrayal of women in the fiction of the Saturday Evening Post and True Story. She found that although writers cooperated with the government by creating new images of women as competent workers, they maintained traditional assumptions about gender roles through hegemonic narrative forms and conventions. Honey’s work demonstrated the significance of bridging the gap between women’s history and media history. Also taking a cultural approach, this article seeks to enhance our understanding of World War II by examining how magazine advertising responded to the drive for womanpower. The historical perspective of the study also serves to enrich feminist critique of advertising, which has focused on contemporary images of women and suffered from a presentist approach obscuring the importance of the historical context of cultural practices.

The purpose of the study is to illuminate the interaction between advertising and war propaganda, examine the terms of appeal used in advertising to mobilize women for war work, and uncover the professional rationale and cultural factors underlying textual strategies devised to inspire patriotism in women. Specifically this study examines advertisements in Time and Ladies’ Home Journal in the war era. Commanding large national readerships and advertising revenues, both magazines functioned as important forums of advertising. As leading publications in their respective markets, their advertisements were representative of those in similar magazines. In addition, comparison of the two publications helps to explore differences between traditional women’s magazines and general interest magazines in relation to the mobilization of American women.

In response to the war-induced manpower shortage, government and business eagerly recruited women to fill jobs in war industries, essential civilian

sectors, and the armed forces. The recruitment effort matured in the womanpower campaign in September 1943. Another national campaign in December 1944 marked the last concentrated effort. To illustrate the interaction between advertising and propaganda goals, an analysis of the explicit content of full-page ads featuring women in the two publications serves to chart out the rise and fall of Rosie the Riveter through the course of the drive for womanpower. More significantly, a textual analysis of the ads with reference to the professional discourse in advertising trade journals illuminates the process through which mobilization strategies were formulated as well as the cultural parameters through which the meaning of women’s paid employment was articulated.

**Advertising Goes to War**

The challenge facing advertising professionals to survive wartime economic changes constituted an important backdrop in their representation of women. The Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941 shattered the advertising world. Uncertainty about changes in the economy and fear of radical government policies toward business led to an abrupt decline of 20 percent in advertising within two months. “The debacle... was so tremendous,” a market researcher observed, “and conditions so chaotic and uncertain that the advertising world was scared.” Moreover, advertisers suddenly found themselves with

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6. The focus on full-page ads was based on an evaluation of their significance. Occupying a large share of space in the two publications, these ads were highly visible and attracted the most attention from readers. The size of the ads permitted advertisers to incorporate elaborate propaganda messages in their regular sales pitch. Moreover, prominent national advertisers, who were the main sponsors of government propaganda aimed to mobilize women, tended to place full-page ads. This study analyzed the explicit content of the ads by evaluating whether women were portrayed in a decorative role in a plain background, in a family-oriented role shown, for example, with other family members or doing housework, or in an employment role outside the home. The evaluation also considered whether women workers were shown doing what were considered men’s jobs such as those in transportation, war plants, and military service.

7. In light of the development of the national drive for womanpower, this study examined a total of 400 full-page ads with women from three periods to determine if magazine advertising portrayed women differently in response to changes in the need for women’s participation in the labor market through the course of the war. The pre-recruitment period included the February, June, and October issues of *Ladies’ Home Journal* in 1941, and the first and third issues of *Time* in the three months. In the same pattern of selection, the height of recruitment covered ads from October of 1943, and February and June of 1944. The post-recruitment period included June and October of 1945, and February of 1946. Chosen to avoid holiday seasons that might have slanted the ads, the three months served to provide overviews of each period and ensure a common base of comparison between them. All of the ads with pictures or illustrations showing women were read.

nothing to sell. As manufacturers of consumer goods switched to war production, the future of advertising seemed bleak with a projected loss of 80 percent of business during the course of the war.

In addition to the plunging index of advertising activity, the industry was increasingly threatened by attacks on its practice. The consumer movement had been gathering strength before the war, and criticism from government sources was mounting as well. Defending the legitimacy of advertising, the industry contended that it helped the economy by stimulating consumption. Wartime exigencies, however, invalidated this prewar justification of advertising. Arguing that the imperative to conserve should override the encouragement to consume, a group of 209 college professors called on government officials in late 1942 to effect drastic curtailment of advertising for the duration of the war.9 In light of the overall vulnerability of advertising, Printer's Ink warned that “advertising will suffer considerably as a branch of business unless there is a practical demonstration of its value to society.”10

The war provided just such an opportunity for a timely public relations campaign. Advertising professionals believed that by contributing to the nation’s war effort they could gain the public’s good will. Furthermore, participation in war propaganda would convince the government that advertising was an essential part of the successful prosecution of the war and therefore should not be curtailed. Summing up the challenge facing the advertising industry, Walter Weir, copy director of Lord and Thomas, asserted, “If we do not sell the worthiness of winning the war, we will never be able to sell beans after it. And if we make advertising fight today, we’ll never have to defend its place in our economy.”11 In short, the general sentiment in the industry was that the future of advertising depended on what it did to help America win the war.

To promote the importance of advertising in society, advertising professionals were eager to render their service available to the government. Boasting the power of advertising to manipulate the public, they proposed to the government that “advertising, that many-edged tool of peacetime business, can almost automatically become a powerful part of united enterprise of smashing the nation’s foes.”12 In early 1942, advertisers, agencies, and media combined to form the War Advertising Council to coordinate the war effort of the industry.13 Their first task was the national promotion of war bonds. Acknowledging the contribution of advertising to the financing of the war, the Treasury Department

ruled that a "reasonable" advertising expenditure to maintain goodwill was permissible as a corporate income tax deduction. As a result, manufacturers who had converted to war production—although without consumer goods to sell to the general public—were able to continue advertising through the war years to keep their brand names visible. With the blessing of the ruling, the advertising industry made up the loss in consumer goods advertising and even prospered from the increase in institutional advertising.

The advertising industry succeeded in convincing the government that the commercial tool of moving mass psychology and influencing public emotion would make a powerful propaganda tool. With the War Advertising Council as the liaison, the government and business joined forces in the summer of 1942 when the Office of War Information was established. Gardner Cowles, director of the domestic operations of the Office of War Information, acknowledged that even with all news and editorial channels at its disposal, the government needed advertising support. Commercial advertising occupied a large share of the most conspicuous space in magazines and newspapers. Many government agencies and civilian organizations wanted the cooperation of advertisers to include messages about their war projects in regular commercial messages. Enlisting more than four hundred agencies, the War Advertising Council rallied for "a war message in every ad." In a campaign, a task force of one or more volunteer agencies would prepare the basic plan and outline the general copy approach. If the advertising was financed by media sponsorship, the task force turned out a complete job without compensation other than reimbursement for the expenses of materials. If the advertising was financed by industrial sponsorship, a new agency handled the account on a regular commercial basis based on the plan of the task force. Through the war years, advertising supported every war objective of the government ranging from rationing, recruitment, the sale of war bonds, conservation of vital materials to building national morale. The number of campaigns the Council served increased from 14 in 1942 to 62 in 1944.

16. For the attitude of government officials toward the use of advertising to support their war campaigns, see Fox, 28-29.
17. "'War Message in Every Ad' Set Up as Goal of Field," *Advertising Age*, 14 June 1943, 8.
18. Erbes, 60, 62.
Creating Rosie the Riveter

One of the most crucial campaigns engineered by the War Advertising Council was the mobilization of women on the homefront in the manpower crisis. The Selective Service drained the male labor force at a time when high industrial production was necessary to sustain the war effort. In addition, civilian sectors affected by the draft demanded the participation of women in the labor market in order to function properly. To alleviate the manpower shortage, government officials decided that married women who did not need to work would be the ideal source to provide a temporary supply of labor on the assumption that these women would return to their homes after the war.20 The exigencies of war, however, did not override deeply entrenched assumptions of the traditional sexual division of labor. The idea of opening high-paying industrial jobs historically monopolized by men to women was too radical for most people to embrace.21 For example, a survey of war industries by the Bureau of Employment Security in January 1942 revealed that for two-thirds of the jobs available, employers said on the record that they would take only men.22 The effective mobilization of women required organized media effort to eliminate the prejudice against female employment. Advertising proved to be an expedient measure to stamp social approval on the lady in overalls.

Early in the manpower crisis advertising experts identified the drive for womanpower as a key in the war effort of the industry. Printer’s Ink, for example, advised advertisers of consumer goods that “advertising that will inspire women to go to work and take over jobs left open by men, and jobs that need to be filled, will be a direct help to keeping the home front strong.”23 Targeting exactly the same segment of the female population as the War Manpower Commission, consumer advertising presented an important forum to promote the employment of middle-class white women. It is important to note that black women were largely absent from both the official plan and the advertising campaign for womanpower. The practice of cultural segregation rendered them invisible in the mass media. As a result, the highly touted female patriotism in war work was embodied in media images of white women. One exception was the recruitment effort of the Cadet Nurse Corps. Sponsored by the Pepsi-Cola Company, the campaign in April 1944 was the first national campaign to recruit black women for nursing schools.24 The ads, illustrated with black women, appeared only in publications devoted to a black readership. In general, black

21. For the general social disapproval of the employment of married women and the discrimination of women war workers, see Chafe, 124-29, 138-141.
women did not benefit from the national drive for womanpower as much as white women.25 Facing persistent racism, they were the last in line to claim the symbolic reward as well as the material gains of patriotic war work.

The initial impetus to use advertising to promote women's employment reflected the consensus among policy makers in the government and the advertising industry rather than the unanimous approval of the entire advertising profession. Those in the front line of production such as copy writers and artists often resisted advertising themes that departed from familiar appeals to conventional gender roles. A male copywriter, for example, lamented in *Printer’s Ink* that “Chivalry is dead,” and it was “no fun...writing about a stranger, a force known as ‘Woman in the Larger Society,’ a potent individual who before long may have lumpy muscles and who may even learn to hitch her jeans.”26 Elsie Johns, a regular contributor to *Printer’s Ink*, observed in October 1942: “Most men writers shrink from even thinking about wives in war industry who take only a few weeks off to have babies, and who then turn these new bundles over to day nurseries, while they go back to paying jobs like riveting and welding, to hammering, sawing, inspecting, and even to driving and firing locomotives and to acting as brakewomen.”27 In addition to the reluctance to abandon traditional gender assumptions, copywriters, knowing that the employment of women was not widely accepted, stayed away from Rosie the Riveter to avoid offending readers. As a result of these production constraints, even when women were beginning to prove their abilities in traditionally male jobs in war plants, ads were still extolling the brawny man as the hero of war production.

As total war continued to send more and more men into the armed forces, the mobilization of women on the home front became imperative. In March 1943 the War Manpower Commission and the War Advertising Council joined forces to launch a national womanpower drive. The J. Walter Thompson Company, consultant advertising agency to the War Manpower Commission and the Office of War Information on the womanpower problem, directed the publicity campaign to tell housewives of the vital need for their services in war and essential civilian industries. Despite the resistance of the creative talent, it was now necessary to move the spotlight from the domestic woman enshrined in advertising to the industrial woman, who would “help Uncle Sam and his allies deliver a lethal blow to the Axis.”28

In an all-out effort to route women from the kitchen to fill jobs men left behind, ads were designed to persuade “the virtually untapped labor market of housewives, mothers, and sweethearts to throw away their aprons and pick up the manpower slack in vital defense industries.”29 In late 1944, the Advertising

25. For the war’s different impact on the employment of black and white women, see Mary Martha Thomas, *Riveting and Rationing in Dixie: Alabama Women and the Second World War* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987).
27. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
Council and the Office of War Information stepped up the drive for womanpower in the national "Women in the War" program. The Council asked advertisers to devote at least a portion of the space to featuring women as war workers and sent out booklets advising advertisers on how to put their advertising to work for more "women at war" in war plants, essential civilian jobs, and the armed forces.

The need for greater participation of women in the labor force corresponded with drastic changes in magazine advertising featuring women. The roles women played in the ads and their occupational status changed significantly. As the figures below indicate, before the war, 3 percent of the ads with women in *Ladies' Home Journal* showed them in employment roles and none of them were in traditionally male occupations. In the recruitment period, 25 percent of the ads with women showed them in employment roles and 19 percent in jobs formerly held by men. In the prewar period, 13 percent of the ads with women in *Time* showed them at work but none in male occupations. The percentages jumped to 40 percent in employment roles and 26 percent in male jobs in the recruitment period.

Figure 1. Percentages of ads showing women in employment roles
Overall, ads in Ladies' Home Journal were less likely to represent women in employment roles than ads in Time. The differences revealed the interplay between editorial content and advertisements in the magazines. Ads for non-durable consumer goods such as food, fashion, cosmetics, and cleaning products dominated the advertising space in Ladies' Home Journal, which focused on women's concerns as wives and mothers. Reflecting the domestic tenor of a women's magazine, ads in the Journal tended to show women in the private sphere of the home. In contrast, as a news magazine, Time mainly carried ads for durable goods such as automobiles and office equipment as well as ads for services such as banking, insurance, and transportation. Targeting a general audience, these ads were more likely to show women in the public sphere. The differences also suggested that with a more vested interest in maintaining the domestic interests of women, advertisers in the traditional women's magazine did not participate as enthusiastically in the campaign to lure women into the labor market. On the other hand, it was more expedient for institutional advertising sponsored by manufacturers who switched to war production to encourage women to take up war jobs.

Corresponding with the drive for womanpower, advertisers saluted middle-class white women as home-front soldiers proving their competence and patriotism in war work. For example, an ad sponsored by Scotch tape proclaimed that "millions of American women have answered Hitler’s challenge by changing from sewing circles to swing shifts, from beauty shops to machine shops, from afternoon tea to TNT plants." The ad praised them for their "courage and efficiency" evidenced by the fact that "only 56 out of 1,900 war jobs are listed as 'unsuitable for women.'" Headlined "It’s a Woman’s World," an ad for Selby

30. Ladies' Home Journal, October 1943, 93.
31. Ibid.
shoes declared, "Hats off to the ‘weaker sex!’ Because they’re keeping things humming on the home front."32 Featuring a woman in overalls at work in a war plant, an ad for Norge household appliances declared, "Wherever American women are working at mechanical jobs in the nation’s war plants, they are doing their work well and proudly for they are serving America."33 Another ad sponsored by Chrysler extolled women as “guardians of war production quality.”34 The picture showed women in a laboratory busy analyzing the chemical composition of metals used in Chrysler’s war production. In sum, these ads aimed to boost confidence in women’s ability to fill jobs traditionally held by men.

Examined in the context of the professional discourse underlying the recruitment effort, the seemingly progressive representation of women belied derogatory perceptions of women. *Printer’s Ink* described the much needed middle-class white women as “coy and hard to please.”35 A survey by the National Industrial Conference Board in early 1943 revealed that this group of women generally did not feel the need of going to work in the factories. Concerned about their social status, many were afraid that factory work was not respectable and would invite criticism from their neighbors. “Advertising has another big job to tackle,” *Printer’s Ink* announced. “Through it, many women must learn to change their way of thinking toward factory work.”36 Women were considered lacking in fighting spirit, ignorant of the country’s need, unwilling to sacrifice domestic comfort and feminine trivialities for larger goals, and devoid of confidence in their overall competence outside the home.37 In a rueful tone, *Advertising Age* reported on the difficulty of luring women into the factory: “The nation’s war plants are frantically looking for women to fill jobs of men now in the armed forces. The companies are offering sugar and spice and everything nice if women will just peel off their aprons and roll up their sleeves to help.”38 Similarly, in planning the “Women at War” campaign in 1944, the War Advertising Council blamed its target, the 5.5 million women living in urban areas with no children under 14, for turning “deaf ears” to all the appeals for their participation in the labor market.39

Accordingly, the recruitment effort aimed to create social pressure for women to participate in war work by defining it as their patriotic duty. “Women must work as men must fight [emphasis included],” the War Advertising Council maintained.40 In case patriotism was too abstract for a woman’s mind to

32. Ibid., 77.
33. Ibid., 146.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., and “Advertising Helps Sell Women On Their Ability to Fill Men’s Jobs,” *Printer’s Ink* 15, January 1943, 46-47.
40. Ibid., 8.
grasp, advertising stressed women’s obligation to the men in their lives to fill in for husbands, sons, and brothers. For example, an ad for General Electric featuring its women employees stressed the reasons why they joined up in war work. “When her husband and brother joined the army, Mrs. Helen Diorio decided to become a production soldier...Wanda Adams has a leathernoker brother somewhere with the U. S. Marines, and she wanted war work, too!”

To combat “feminine timidity,” advertising featured role models of women war workers to “sell women on their ability.” For instance, Susan Harvey, a character in an ad for Prem meat product, wondered whether an untrained women like herself could help with the manpower problem. With her husband’s reassurance, she got a job running a power loader. “Some gal,” her husband said with approval, “Her idea’s caught on with lots of women...we’re getting plenty of help since they heard about her.” Similarly, a Pond’s ad showed five women in different war jobs including Anne Nissen, who got her first job handling explosives in a big munitions plant, and Phyllis Gray, who went straight from college into a war plant testing tensile strength of fabric for military uses. Intended to encourage other women, the caption read, “Experience is not necessary. Hundreds of thousands of girls and women who never dreamed of working before are stepping into these jobs everyday. There’s a war job for you, too.” Touting the power of advertising to manipulate women’s attitudes, advertisers claimed the credit for increasing the number of women in war work. In early 1944, the War Advertising Council attributed the increase of four million women at work and 80,000 women in the military to the effect of advertising. Through advertising, Printer’s Ink announced, “the women of America are awakening to their ability as well as obligation to fill jobs of men.”

Driven by stereotypes of women, however, the advertising promotion of women’s employment affirmed their ability and interest in being outside the domestic sphere but upheld traditional assumptions about the centrality of domesticity and romance in their lives. This double-edged representation was achieved through cajoling and patronizing captions as well as juxtaposition of new images of women as workers and servicewomen with traditional images of women as wives, mothers, sweethearts or simply decorative objects in ads. For example, in an ad for Ipana toothpaste prominently displayed on the first page of the Ladies’ Home Journal in January 1944, the foreground was occupied by a half-page facial close-up of a woman with a full smile. Earrings, a lovely hat, and a string of pearls accentuated her femininity. In the background behind her

43. Ladies’ Home Journal, February 1944, 75.
44. Ladies’ Home Journal, October 1943, 45.
45. War Advertising Council, “‘Women at War,’” 4.
47. “After Hours—Win Romance with a Bright, Sparkling Smile!” Ladies’ Home Journal, January 1944, 1.
there were six small illustrations of women smiling in uniforms or functional work clothes at various war jobs, including a chef, a bus driver, and a gas attendant. The visual arrangement suggested that no matter what kind of war work a woman was tackling, she was above all the quintessential American woman, charming, cheerful, and as the caption made clear, more interested in pursuing male attention than male jobs. Directly addressing women war workers, the text read:

THERE'S A VICTORY to win—and you're working hard! But after hours, you're you—with your girl's heart and time for romance. So wear your feminine frills and furbelows. Yes, and call on the most fetching charm of all—a radiant smile! Remember you don't need beauty to win happiness and romance. Charm counts as much as beauty. And even the plainest girl—with a sparkling, attractive smile can turn heads and win hearts!” [emphasis included]48

Dictating to women who had not joined the war effort, the blatant propaganda message included in the ad said, “YOUR COUNTRY NEEDS YOU IN A VITAL JOB!” In an almost chiding tone, the ad told women, “If your finger can press a button, you can run an elevator, or a packaging machine! If you can keep house, you've got the ability that hotels and restaurants are looking for!” Echoing the romantic sales pitch of the ad, the textual appeal for womanpower undercut the visual recognition of women’s ability outside the domestic sphere. The analogy of war work to housekeeping trivialized women’s performance in the work place. Furthermore, working to “carry on the tasks of men gone to war—to release more men for wartime duties,”49 if women demonstrated a surprising level of competence, they were, as the ad implied, driven by the divine inspiration of patriotism rather than any innate strength of the “weaker sex.”

Despite the increasing need for women in the labor force, the earlier reluctance to publicize women war workers did not completely evaporate. The threat to masculinity presented by women doing what were considered “men’s jobs” was transferred into an emphasis on their feminine appearance, romantic interest, and sexual availability. The underlying anxiety of destabilizing well-defined categories of gender surfaced as fears attributed to the women themselves of being defeminized. For example, the Hudnut series of ads keyed to the drive for womanpower in the fall of 1943 emphasized beauty shortcuts from the Du-Berry Success School with sketches showing women just how to effect such short cuts at bedtime.50 A spokesman for the manufacturer of beauty products

48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
said that the new copy theme was designed to "allay the fears of many women with regard to their personal appearances when working in defense industries."51

Other recruitment ads played up the glamour of the uniform for women in industry and the military as a drawing card of attraction.52 Featured in ads of various companies, Gay Gahagan, formerly a cover girl and now a pilot, became a symbol of the glamorous war worker in the "Women in the War" campaign.53 A recruitment ad for the Women's Army Corps featured a smiling woman standing proudly in her uniform. The caption read, "there are profoundly serious persuasions for joining the WAC, but this smart uniform is a delightfully feminine one."54 To their surprise, many personnel directors frequently discovered that women workers were less concerned than the management about how feminine they looked. Printer's Ink reported, "A common-sense, practical point of view of the woman who seriously undertakes industrial work makes her more than a little disdainful of all the fuss made about 'attractive' work clothes."55

Other ads contrasted women at work with pictures of them in romantic settings as glamorous sirens away from work. For example, a Camel ad showed a woman war worker at a party with the caption reading, "Morale experts say that it's a good idea for women in the war to be 'just women' every once in a while. So here's Betty Rice following that advice...complete with king's yellow evening dress, Prince Charming escort."56 The subtle appeal to romance in the recruitment of war workers explicitly underscored military recruitment of women. Advising advertisers on this approach, the War Advertising Council said "they [service women] receive more masculine attention—have more dates, a better time—than they ever had in civilian life."57 Instead of highlighting solidarity and camaraderie as recruitment messages directed at men usually did, the campaign promoted military careers for women as glamorous and romantic rendezvous. "Pin-Up Girl in Our Heroes’ Heart," read the slogan of a recruitment ad for the Army Nurses Corps, showing a smiling nurse bending over a soldier to take his temperature."58 "What is there about you that attracts men?" asked a nurse in an ad for the Cadet Nurse Corps. The picture showed her contemplating her uniform in a dorm room decorated by photos of male soldiers and officers. "They treat me like a queen," she announced. While rubbing a soldier's back at work, she said, "I know he thinks I'm wonderful...Here at the Navy hospital I give treatments, alcohol rubs (and how they love 'em.) A smile or a corny joke

51. Ibid.
54. Ladies’ Home Journal, June 1945, 159.
55. “Coy and Hard to Please,” 41.
56. Ladies’ Home Journal, December 1942, 46; See also another Camel ad in June 1944, 167.
57. War Advertising Council, “‘Women at War,’” 11.
58. Ladies’ Home Journal, June 1945, 80.
from me is almost like a letter from home."59 These strategies for military recruitment were based on the conviction that "women are most likely to join the armed forces because of their desire to work with and alongside their male compatriots."60 In the recruitment campaign of the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps for example, “every effort is made to convince eligible prospects that service in the WAAC means service with and in cooperation with men."61

In addition to the government propaganda drive, the buying power of women also contributed to the popularity of the theme of women as war workers in advertising. With men gone to the war front, women were doing nearly 90 percent of all consumer buying only a year after the war started as opposed to 80 percent in the prewar years.62 The rapid increase in women’s employment outside the homes made advertisers eager to woo the New Woman in overalls and bandanna with a hefty pay check.63 With the buying pendulum swinging from the lady with lorgnette to the woman in a denim uniform, the Detroit News hailed “the factory girl” as “the white hope of the retail world.”64 Manufacturers of consumer goods first glorified her as “a heroine-of-production-of-war.”65 Even industrial advertising with its traditional masculine pitch played up the woman’s angle to show how their products made the woman war worker’s job easier. Showing women working in heavy industries, the Acme ads promoted its line of tools as an economizer of time and effort for women war workers. In many war plants, the text said, “women are establishing new speed and efficiency records with the simple, easy-to-use Acme tools.”66 Institutional advertising for manufacturers converted to war production also had a vested interest in paying tribute to the industrial woman. Urging these manufacturers not to allow her to forget their brand names, Printer’s Ink maintained, “Long before the girl with a new paycheck will have the chance to spend her earnings on an automobile, a radio or a refrigerator, a preference can be planted in her mind.”67

Disarming the Soldiers of War Production

By January 1944, according to the Bureau of Census, six million women had moved into the labor market. Most of them became blue-collar workers, particularly in the booming war industries. Except in the federal government, women did not make inroads in white-collar sectors. With the Allies gaining advantage in the war, however, heated debate and general apprehension appeared about whether the female army of war production would

59. Time, 18 June 1945, 65.
60. “Army Recruiting Poster for WAC’s,” Advertising Age, 19 April 1943, 10.
61. Ibid.
stay in industries after the war to compete with men. Optimists predicted that
they would be glad to return to the true calling of women and settle into
comfortable domesticity. "Women want to be just wives and mothers," famous
advice columnist Dorothy Dix asserted. "They want to fill baby's bottle instead
of filling shells in an ammunition plant, and to push a perambulator instead of
driving a truck."68 Others warned in contrast that women would stay to vie with
war veterans for jobs. Business Week declared that "optimists who believe that
once the war is over, women will retire to the kitchen and turn their jobs to
returning war veterans, are deluding themselves."69 To absorb returning war
veterans, many women would have to give up their war jobs. "Many
industrialists," the magazine reported, "are figuring on pruning their working
force by firing women first when cutbacks come."

To achieve a peaceful demobilization of millions of men and a smooth
reconversion of the wartime economy, the government and business again joined
forces as in the mobilization of women. The Office of War Information, the
Retraining and Reemployment Administration, and the War Advertising Council
developed campaigns to emphasize "proper treatment for returning servicemen,
and to acquaint employers and the public with the military-acquired assets of
returning servicemen."71 The focus in advertising switched from the
accomplishment of women war workers to the needs of returning veterans. "No
machine tools are necessary for veterans to sell apples on the street," read the
headline of an ad for a tool manufacturer. The text asserted that "if you intend to
live up to the obligation we all have, to provide veterans with good jobs,
modern machine tools are necessary."72 Pledging postwar jobs to veterans,
similar ads of a chemical company drew acclaim from Printer's Ink as striking "a
new note in current advertising by its frank recognition of a growing important
need, i.e., employment for returning veterans."73 Echoing the editorial policy of
Printer's Ink to support returning veterans, an editorial in Advertising Age
pleaded that "these men should not be regarded as a problem, but an asset." Reabsorbing male workers was "both a moral and a legal obligation."74 In sharp
contrast to the regard for veterans, advertisers completely ignored the fact that 68
percent of all women needed paid employment to support themselves.75

Concerned with the welfare of war veterans, advertisers began to curtail
the promotion of women workers even before the war ended. As the two figures
presented earlier indicated, in the period from late 1944 to the first half of 1945,

68. Jean Austin, "Women, People?" Printer's Ink, 23 October 1942, 21-22.
1944, 8.
70. Ibid.
71. "War Theme Ads $302,000,000, Council Reports," Advertising Age, 23 April
1945, 59.
72. Time, 7 February 1944, 39, see another ad in 18 October 1943, 87.
73. "Use Ad to Pledge Post-war Jobs to Returning Veterans," Printer's Ink, 4 February
only 10 percent of the ads with women in *Ladies' Home Journal* showed them in employment roles as opposed to 25 percent in the recruitment period. None of the women featured in the ads held traditionally male jobs. In *Time* 26 percent of the ads with women showed them in employment roles and 12 percent in male occupations. Compared with the recruitment period, there was a decrease of 14 percent in terms of women in employment roles as well as women in non-traditional jobs.

In anticipation of the peacetime economy, advertisers began marching women back to the domestic sphere. Asserting that women have not been defeminized by war work, Jean Austin, editor of *American Home*, said that “a woman doing war work in slacks is a woman who is right now dreaming of going back to her life as a woman at home.”

Advertisers were quick to cash in on such domestic fantasies. “Postwar dreams of a bride with a man in the service” headlined a Westinghouse ad set in a cozy scene with a woman lounging in front of a fireplace fantasizing about her dream home filled with all the luxuries modern appliances could afford. The text told women that “when the war is over, and you and that man of yours set up a dream home of your own, Westinghouse will make all those new time-and-work saving appliances you’ve set your heart on.” Addressed to the “5,742,348 wartime brides,” an ad for Philco Refrigerators showing a woman embracing her man in uniform asserted, “It is just the refrigerator you future homemakers will want.” Apparently for Rosie the Riveter, as these ads made clear, the bliss of postwar domesticity was the reward for her patriotic service.

**Conclusion**

In World War II, the government’s need for efficient war production and the capitalist drive to sell converged to change the advertising representation of women in the two magazines analyzed in this study. Given their popularity, it is reasonable to expect that ads in other magazines followed the same trend. Within four years Rosie the Riveter completed her short life cycle in advertising. In addition to the cultural impact, the mobilization of women for war work revealed the symbiotic relationship between the government and the advertising industry in the politics of waging war. In response to the war-induced crisis, the advertising industry participated in war propaganda to win the blessing of the government and the trust of the public so that it could defend its economic interest and social legitimacy. The womanpower campaign provided an opportunity to publicize the war effort of the industry and to improve its public image.

On the other hand, to maximize total production in wartime economy, the government needed the support of advertising as a tool of cultural persuasion to counter prejudice against paid employment for middle-class white women as

76. Austin, 21.
well as to change the attitudes of women themselves regarding sexual division of labor. Historian D'Ann Campbell argued that the appeal of domesticity for women persisted through the war years and the housewife, not Rosie the Riveter, remained their core identity.\(^7^9\) Suggesting a considerable degree of resistance to changes in gender roles, the intensity of the womanpower campaign added support to Campbell’s argument. Economic needs, as Campbell maintained, motivated most of the women who took advantage of the manpower crisis in the labor market. The recruitment effort as shown in magazine advertising, however, defined wartime employment for women as an expression of female patriotism. This articulation was instrumental in neutralizing the impact of wartime increase in female employment on the social structure of male domination and female subordination. Obscuring the economic interest of women in paid employment, the prescribed connection between patriotism and war work justified the priority of returning veterans over women workers in the reconversion of wartime economy.

In addition, the gendered definition of patriotism reproduced the structural relationship between women and men. For men, patriotism, defined in public terms as their civic obligation to provide military service, entitled them to rewards such as economic and educational privileges in the public sphere of postwar society. For women, patriotism, articulated in private terms as their personal responsibility to support the men in their lives, supposedly won them rewards such as romantic love and a dream home in the private sphere. The cultural priority placed on men’s roles in society was reinforced rather than challenged by the advertising promotion of women’s employment, which represented women’s work on the home front as an auxiliary function to complement the primary function of men on the war front.

The author is a doctoral student in the School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

\(^7^9\) Campbell, Women at War with America.
World War II brought exciting new opportunities to women in journalism. With men away in military service, women discovered they were quite capable of filling reporting and editing jobs from which they previously had been excluded. An unprecedented number became war correspondents, exercising their ingenuity to circumvent military regulations designed to bar women from covering the front lines. Some pursued careers in the relatively new fields of photojournalism and broadcasting, proving that women could succeed in all aspects of journalism.

This article reviews a representative sample of material about and by women journalists in World War II and suggests directions for additional study. Although some work has been done on women in journalism during World War II, the subject certainly has not been exhausted. Women faced discrimination, harassment, and challenges to their mental and physical abilities. Still they persevered, whether motivated by patriotism, ambition, or a combination of interests that made them eager to be journalists during wartime. When peace returned, however, many lost their jobs or were forced to go back to writing women's news. The complete story of how women entered the male preserve of journalism and then, for the most part, left, still remains to be told. Basic data is hard to come by. For example, an answer to the question of exactly how many women worked as journalists from 1941 to 1945 proves elusive.

This article is divided into three sections: first, general references to women journalists in World War II; second, personal commentaries and biographical works; third, conclusions and suggestions for further research.

General References

Women journalists during World War II receive relatively short shrift in works dealing with women in the media. Their presence is noted as an exception
to the hostility toward women reporters and broadcasters that pervaded the first half of the twentieth century. In some cases the emphasis is not on what they did, but on the fact that employers were forced to hire them.

In her history of women journalists, *Up From the Footnote* (1977), Marion Marzolf devoted four pages to women during World War II. “By 1943 women made up 50 percent of the staffs of many newspapers in small cities and this trend was expected to continue,” she said.1 Marzolf’s publisher unfortunately decided not to use footnotes in the book—which was only the second history of women journalists to be written, a fact that illustrates how little attention has been given women in media history in general.2 Therefore, no exact sources were cited in the work, although it might be assumed that figures on the increased percentage of women in journalism came from trade publications.

Marzolf noted that the Congressional press galleries accredited ninety-eight women during World War II, compared to thirty before the war.3 She wrote that “a small group of women served as correspondents during the war, including Betty Wason (on radio), Lee Carson for INS (International News Service), Ann Stringer for the UP (United Press), Helen Kirkpatrick for the *Chicago Daily News*, Tania Long and Sonia Tomara for the *New York Herald-Tribune*.4 As evidence of their professionalism, she pointed out that Leland Stowe, a *Chicago Daily News* correspondent, credited the women with displaying as much bravery and ability to outdo their competitors as male correspondents.

On the other hand, Marzolf concluded that of the woman hired on the homefront, “many...who had been acceptable in an emergency weren’t really very good, and they knew it and would leave.”5 This contention is similar to one presented in a 1943 article in *The Saturday Evening Post* titled “Paper Dolls,” which described women journalists as incompetent replacements for men.6 The article, marked by a patronizing tone, estimated that there were 8,000 women journalists replacing men. It asserted the “dolls” were doing as well as they could because most of them had been recruited from the ranks of secretaries and file clerks and had little training for their demanding new responsibilities.

In his voluminous textbook *American Journalism*, Frank Luther Mott used the same term, “paper dolls,” as a subhead for a paragraph on women journalists during the wartime manpower shortage. “Controversy over the value of women on the copydesk, in administrative news jobs, or on foreign assignments, was common; but the girls actually got such jobs, and in many

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2. The first history of women journalists was Ishbel Ross, *Ladies of the Press* (New York: Harper, 1936).
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 72.
cases they held them after the war was over," he informed the reader with an air of incredulity.7 "Many women made reputations as war correspondents."8

Mott named only a few. He said that Inez Robb of International News Service and Ruth E. Cowan of the Associated Press covered the war in North Africa in 1943. He also named three others: Peggy Hull of the Cleveland Plain Dealer, who reported from the Pacific in 1944, but is remembered chiefly as the first woman correspondent accredited by the War Department in World War I; Margaret Bourke-White, a highly-acclaimed photographer for Life, and Leah Burdette, of the New York newspaper PM, who was killed by bandits in Iran in 1942. Mott pointed out there were "no less" than twenty-one women reporters in England to cover the invasion of France in 1944.9

A 1943 book, Journalism in Wartime, edited by Mott, contained a brief chapter on newspaperwomen. Written by Genevieve F. Herrick, a former Chicago Tribune reporter who worked for the War Department's Bureau of Public Relations, it stressed that the war would not benefit most women journalists, although "in a few cases the unusual woman will have unusual opportunities."10 Herrick insisted that even the "unusual woman" took care to fit the feminine mold. Mentioning only two women war correspondents by name, Inez Robb and Ruth Cowan, Herrick wrote that "Ruth who is very personable and likes a soft frock as well as a hard assignment spent a lot of money...[on] chic clothes," only to discover that she was to wear "khaki uniforms and comfortable (horrid word) shoes" as a war correspondent.11

As for women journalists on the homefront, Herrick praised their efforts on the women's pages, which she saw as vital to the wartime civilian economy because they dealt with food rationing and similar topics. In the gushy language of the women's pages themselves, she expressed an opinion that they would become stronger sections after the war: "Today the woman's typewriter is so sturdy a journalistic machine that it is not likely that it will readily soften into fluff and froth even when peace comes."12

In her 1988 book A Place in the News, Kay Mills drew on the term "Rosie the Riveter," which symbolized the millions of women encouraged to work in the defense industry during World War II. Mills coined the phrase "Rosie the Reporter" to refer to the influx of women in the nation's newsrooms. She said that newsroom doors opened "for a few years, long enough for some women to see what they could do and to realize that they did not have to be men to do what had hitherto been almost exclusively men's jobs."13

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8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 743.
11. Ibid., 127.
12. Ibid., 128.
Mills stated, "Women were in reporting jobs all over the country," and she cited nine specific examples of "wartime legacies," women who tenaciously held on to journalistic careers after men returned from military service. They focused on their determination in the face of discouragement. One woman mentioned was Marj Paxson, replaced by a man at the end of the war in the United Press bureau in Lincoln, Nebraska. She persevered and wound up as a publisher for the Gannett Company. Another was Ann Holmes, who became military editor of the Houston Chronicle and then its art critic. "I wouldn't have made it for a minute," she was quoted as saying, "if the men trained for the job and who had held down the job for years were around." 15

The prejudices against women in radio received detailed attention in David H. Hosley and Gayle K. Yamada's *Hard News: Women in Broadcast Journalism*. Hosley and Yamada pointed out that networks were "willing to use women from overseas when a man was not available or when the bulk of reports was expected to be on 'woman's issues.'" 16 They described the relatively brief, and sometimes accidental, broadcasting careers of women like Sigrid Schultz, the Chicago Tribune correspondent-in-chief for Central Europe, who also was the Mutual radio network's reporter in Berlin in the opening days of World War II; Mary Marvin Breckinridge, who broadcast for Edgar R. Murrow on the CBS network, and Margaret Rupli and Helen Hiett, who worked for NBC. The experiences of Betty Wason, CBS correspondent in Europe in 1940, were cited as particularly illustrative of the handicaps facing women: Wason was told to "find a man to broadcast [her reports] for her," on grounds she sounded too young and feminine to be a credible source of war news. 17

Hosley and Yamada also devoted a well-researched chapter to the impact of the war on domestic radio work for women. They emphasized that the shortage of men made it possible for the first time for women to be heard in numbers on news broadcasts in the United States. Still, these women met the customary discrimination of their day. Elizabeth Bemis, the first female news anchor for CBS, was fired in 1944 because the network did not try to find a sponsor for her newscast. She believed this was because she was a woman. Helen Siousett, director of non-commercial public affairs broadcasting for CBS, was unable to achieve pay parity from superiors who told her that she should be content with the "honor" of being a woman who was a department head. 18

*Waiting for Prime Time: The Women of Television News* by Marlene Sanders and Marcia Rock contained similar material on women broadcasters. Sanders and Rock quoted a publication of the Women's Bureau of the U.S. Department of Labor that cited prejudice against women as an explanation of why they faded from the air after the war: "The public...turned a deaf ear to

14. Ibid., 51.
15. Ibid., 52.
17. Ibid., 19.
18. Ibid., 47.
women announcers, except in certain sections of the South where ‘announcerettes’ were well received.”

Dorothy Thompson, the influential syndicated columnist who warned the world of Hitler’s evil intentions before hostilities began, was the best-known woman journalist on the radio, although the war failed to enhance her career. The New York Herald-Tribune dropped her column in 1941, and it moved to the left-leaning New York Post where, according to one biographer, its “internationalism...offered few surprises.” Thompson’s most remarkable contribution to wartime journalism came in 1942 when she led an anti-Nazi propaganda campaign broadcast by shortwave radio into Germany.

Five chapters in Julia Edwards’ Women of the World: The Great Foreign Correspondents dealt with World War II. In general, Edwards wrote, women managed to get overseas by insisting they were more sensitive than men journalists and could offer “the woman’s point of view,” but once there “they took off their kid gloves, put on their helmets and raced the men to the front and back to the cable desk.” The author profiled notable correspondents, chiefly picturing them as adventurous, romantic figures. She credited Helen Kirkpatrick of the Chicago Daily News for achieving a “spectacular combination of headlines and by-lines,” and stated that Kirkpatrick “encountered little of the hostility experienced by other women in World War II, her appearance as much as her expertise commanding respect.” Other women featured included Anne O’Hare McCormick, the New York Times columnist who had become the first woman journalist to win a Pulitzer Prize in 1937, and who insisted on going to the front to interview General George Patton; Sonia Tomara of the New York Herald Tribune, who reported from Chungking, the wartime capital of China; Martha Gellhorn of Collier’s magazine, who witnessed hostilities ranging from the Spanish Civil War through the invasion of Europe; Bourke-White; Cowan; Robb; Patricia Lockridge of Woman’s Home Companion, who landed on Iwo Jima with the Marines; and Ann Stringer of the United Press, whose “successful dash back to Paris with the news of the Russian arrival at the Elbe produced the best scoop” of the war, according to Edwards.

Edwards emphasized that the U.S. War Department refused to allow women journalists to go overseas in correspondents’ uniforms until a year after Pearl Harbor. This, she wrote, “left the impression that women saw little of World War II.”

23. Ibid., 105.
24. Ibid., 163.
25. Ibid., 117.
discriminatory regulations against their coverage of combat, Edwards’ book told how women overcame great odds to make substantial contributions to war reporting. Edwards called Bourke-White the “unsinkable Maggie White.” She survived the torpedoing of a ship on which she had been forced to travel because officials refused to let women fly on grounds of safety.26 Illustrated with photographs of attractive, sophisticated-looking women reporters, Women of the World described the dangers that women correspondents encountered and their most memorable reports, yet also mentioned their looks and romances.

Lilya Wagner is the sole author to write an entire book on women journalists in World War II. In Women War Correspondents of World War II, Wagner tried to go beyond a surface treatment of the subject. Her appendices list 127 women who attained accreditation as war correspondents in spite of discouragement from U.S. officials reluctant to give credentials to women.27 Wagner limited her study chiefly to newspaper and wire-service journalists who reported from the front lines, excluding broadcasters, most magazine representatives, and women journalists who received ninety-day passes to visit the war, but wrote their stories back home. She wrote separate chapters on eighteen women, gaining much of her information from questionnaires and personal interviews, and including samples of their war correspondence. Eleven other women correspondents received brief recognition in a final chapter.

Of the eighteen women whose careers were described at length, seven—Stringer, Cowan, Kirkpatrick, Schultz, Robb, Tomara, and Gelhorn—had been referred to by other authors. With the exceptions of Kathleen McLaughlin, who reported from Europe for the New York Times, and Iris Carpenter of the Boston Globe, whose feature writing was compared to Ernie Pyle’s, the remainder had received relatively little previous attention. They included: Tania Long Daniell, who reported from London for the New York Herald-Tribune and then wrote for the New York Times after her marriage to a Times correspondent; Bonnie Wiley, the sole woman correspondent for the Associated Press in the Pacific; Lyn Crost, who covered Hawaiian troops in Europe for the Honolulu Star-Bulletin; Catherine Coyne, sent to Europe by the Boston Herald; Alice-Leone Moats, a free-lance writer who made her way into Russia, Iran, Egypt and Africa; and Mary Welsh, who corresponded from Europe for Time and was married to Ernest Hemingway after he divorced Gelhorn. The remaining three, while accredited as correspondents themselves, apparently would not have been if they had not been married to male correspondents. They were Shelley Mydans, a writer/researcher for Life magazine who covered the Sino-Japanese War; Virginia Lee Warren, who reported from Italy, and Lael Laird Wertenbaker, who sent stories from England to Life magazine.

Because so much of her material came from personal interviews, Wagner pictured the women largely through their own eyes and did not dramatize their achievements. She quoted Crost as stating, “We should not be portrayed as

26. Ibid., 135.
27. Lilya Wagner, Women War Correspondents of World War II (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1989), 159-162.
Wagner noted that most of the women, like male correspondents, simply wanted to be at the scene of the world’s big story, although a few seemed motivated mainly by a desire to join their husbands.

Wagner concluded that one initial assumption of her study—that the women were victimized by discrimination against them—did not hold up in all cases. While some women stated that male biases held them back, “some didn’t sense [bias] at all, and in a few cases claims were made that men actually enhanced the women’s careers,” she wrote. Wagner also found the subjects of her book “reflected statements made by Marzolf,” to the effect that some women left journalism after the war ended because they knew they were not “exceptional.”

Personal Commentary and Biography

Women writing at the time of World War II took different views toward acting as replacements for men, depending on their individual sense of self-worth and appropriate feminine behavior. Three examples of first-person accounts from The Matrix, the publication of Theta Sigma Phi, an honorary sorority for journalism students and professionals, highlight this point. To Abbie A. Amrine, a graduate of the University of Missouri, the war represented a chance to develop self-confidence in her own abilities. A former society editor on a Kansas newspaper, she wrote, “Now, taking the place of a man who has been drafted, I am working with the more drastic complications of deaths, accidents, rains, and community speakers. My conclusion is that the men have been impressing us with a false importance of their jobs.”

On the other hand, Joy Turner Stilley, a University of Oklahoma journalism graduate employed by the Shawnee (Okla.) News-Star, pictured herself as an unqualified substitute because the “he-man ranks had been depleted by the call to arms.” She confided, “I probably hold the distinction of being the only university coed to be graduated without ever having witnessed an athletic event, yet I became the first girl sports editor of a daily paper in Oklahoma.” The managing editor felt so sorry for her that he initially covered her high school games himself, she said.

In broadcasting, Fran Harris used the war as an opportunity to fight discrimination. She persuaded WWJ in Detroit to let her switch from a shopping column on the air to newscasting in 1943, making her the first woman in Michigan to read radio news. Harris “kept after the station to let me try newscasting until they finally gave in in desperation,” she told a Matrix

28. Ibid., 4.
29. Ibid., 5.
30. Ibid.
31. Abbie A. Arrine, “This is Our Day,” The Matrix, October 1941, 15.
33. Ibid.
interviewer.\textsuperscript{34} She said she hoped to keep on newscasting even after the war ended and wanted to prove a woman could attract advertisers. “We women all know we have to do twice as well as a man to go half as far,” she commented.\textsuperscript{35}

Harris’s aspirations were fulfilled. She kept on the air for years, retiring from the station in 1974, but she never received the pay of her male counterparts. Reflecting on her career in an oral history interview in 1991, she pointed out that gender restrictions still applied to women journalists during World War II even though they took over men’s jobs. When she wanted to go out of the studio, like male newscasters, to cover local news, she was told, “You are not to go to the scene—it’s no place for a lady.”\textsuperscript{36} Other women hired during the war vanished from the station after the war ended, but “I just happened to hang in there,” she added.\textsuperscript{37}

Writing in 1992 in The Bulletin of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, four distinguished women journalists—Colleen Dishon, senior editor of the Chicago Tribune; Dorothy Jurney, a retired newspaper editor; Helen Thomas, White House correspondent for United Press International; and Mary Flannery, a former sportswriter—recalled how they got their start during the war. Their recollections of gender bias, and their own reactions to it, varied greatly. Dishon recalled 1940s newsrooms as “open and friendly,” while Jurney recounted a bitter experience of being replaced as city editor of the old Washington Daily News by an ex-copyboy at the war’s end because she was a woman.\textsuperscript{38} Flannery wrote of the “ingenuity” needed to cover sports in an era when women were barred from press boxes.\textsuperscript{39}

Thomas’s comments were the most reflective of the group. She said she was able to keep working on the local UP radio wire in Washington after the war only because the job was so poor “nobody else wanted it.”\textsuperscript{40} Although women journalists were slighted in promotions and pay, they were not more discriminated against than “women in all the so-called men’s professions,” she continued.\textsuperscript{41}

Biographies and autobiographies of World War II women war correspondents tell of women who took pleasure in maintaining their feminine identity at the same time they displayed their professional competence. In 1942 Bourke-White of Life became the first woman photographer accredited to cover the war and the first woman correspondent in uniform. The military designed a

\textsuperscript{34} Roberta Applegate, “Fran Harris: Pioneer Newscaster, The Matrix, August 1943, 6-7.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{39} Mary Flannery, “The Way we Were” section, 29.
\textsuperscript{40} Helen Thomas, “The Way We Were” section, 28.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
special outfit for her, essentially officer’s garb with an optional skirt, that became the standard uniform for all women correspondents. In her 1944 book *The Call of Purple Heart Valley*, Bourke-White described her entire wartime wardrobe, which included an evening dress from Hollywood and other feminine accoutrements. “As on all trips, I carried cosmetics in a little pigskin-fitted case. I think I would have gone to the battlefield without rations before I would go without face cream,” she wrote.42

Vicki Goldberg, Bourke-White’s biographer, called attention to the way *Life* publicized Bourke-White’s photographic coverage of a bombing raid on Tunis. Its headline said: “LIFE’S BOURKE-WHITE GOES BOMBING,” and the magazine layout included a pinup-type picture of her in a flight suit.43 In her autobiography, Bourke-White expressed her pleasure in this photograph, which, she said, “skyrocketed into a brief popularity as a pinup. The reader must forgive me if I cannot conceal my vanity about this....”44 Bourke-White’s experiences, which included surviving bombing raids in Russia as well as a torpedo attack in the Mediterranean, led to a genre of motion pictures featuring “girl photographers” and enhanced the public’s interest in photographers.45

Lee Miller, another glamorous woman who photographed the war, was an accredited correspondent for an unlikely publication, the British *Vogue*. According to the foreword in a volume of her pictures and columns, Miller covered “a dozen major engagements with her cameras...[and] filed along with pictures thousands of words of the most eloquent journalism to come out of the war.”46 Her career stands out, in particular, because it demonstrated how women discovered unexpected talents in wartime. Miller, the fashion expert and former model who never before had written anything “more elaborate than a shopping list,” suddenly found herself chronicling the siege of St. Malo and the skeletons of Dachau.47 Her eye for fashion enriched her copy as in this line from her story on St. Malo: “The soldiers emerged with grenades hanging on their labels like Cartier clips.”48

Emphasis on extraordinary courage and willingness to break barriers has characterized biographical treatment of Marguerite Higgins, another glamorous, competitive correspondent, who covered the end of the war in Europe for the *New York Herald-Tribune*. A chapter on Higgins in Schilpp and Murphy’s *Great

45. Ibid., 269.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
Women of the Press (which also included a chapter on Bourke-White) stressed the importance of stamina and risk-taking for a woman correspondent.49 In a full-length biography of Higgins, Antoinette May commented on the brevity of Higgins’ combat coverage (only about six weeks), and added “only the most envious would suggest that it was without great personal heroism.”50

Higgins received her first journalistic prize after taking part in the 1945 liberation of the Dachau concentration camp. This followed the liberation of six German villages by Higgins and a male colleague. Higgins shared a Pulitzer Prize in 1951 for coverage of the Korean War. She was determined to be taken seriously as a journalist. In a memoir she wrote that her biggest disadvantage lay in her “femininity and blond hair” that men associated “with either dullness or slyness, or both.”51

In terms of the mores of the times, both Higgins and Bourke-White stood out as uninhibited in their personal lives. They appeared sexually liberated in an era when the “double standard” still prevailed, allowing men more sexual freedom than women. Both were accused of giving sexual favors to news sources to advance their careers, as their biographers have noted. May quoted a coworker of Higgins who said, “The question always comes up about her sleeping with men to get stories. She really didn’t need to. It was enough just to roll her eyes....Maggie’s primary drive was ambition.”52 The historian of the Herald Tribune, Richard Kluger, put it differently, suggesting fears that men may have of the power of women’s sexuality: “A substantial body of evidence suggests that throughout her working life Maggie Higgins selected most if not all of her bedmates for intensely practical reasons, to add to her power or promote her career. Few men could wield their sexuality so strategically.”53 Golberg made light of such accusations against Bourke-White. She referred to Bourke-White’s ladylike demeanor and said that she “was never above sex...but she was simply too smart and too resourceful to have had to resort to selling her favors.”54

Asked during an oral history interview in 1990 if male journalists tried to undermine the copy of their women rivals by claiming the women had gained information through promiscuous behavior, Helen Kirkpatrick denied knowledge of such accusations. She added, however, that she had been told two women correspondents in Algiers “had given women reporters such a bad name because they had been demanding and they’d used their femininity...there was no suggestion of affairs....their [male] colleagues...were pretty tough characters and certainly didn’t want them there and...made life as uncomfortable as they could

52. Ibid., 103.
54. Goldberg, Margaret Bourke-White, 264.
for them."55 In her view, "there were marks on both sides—against the men and against the women."56

Described by her interviewer as a "loner," Kirkpatrick said she associated with men, not women, correspondents: "I never felt discrimination from fellow journalists," she said.57 Asked if her gender was an advantage, she replied, "No....There were some who've used it to be sort of feminine, coy and so on, that I don’t think were necessarily very successful as writers."58 When some readers protested that a woman should not be writing on war strategy and tactics, the Chicago Daily News wrote an editorial praising her competence as a military commentator, she remembered. She recalled also that "the trucks that delivered the papers had a big poster with a picture of me and [a headline] "Read our Helen from...."59 Kirkpatrick did not think she brought a different perspective to the news and considered herself "essentially one of the guys."60

Yet she had confronted the presence of discrimination. When Colonel Frank Knox, the owner of the Chicago Daily News, had been reluctant to hire her initially, she had argued, "I can’t change my sex, but you can change your policy."61 He did, giving her the chance to meet and to report on the famous figures of the day—Eisenhower, Churchill, De Gaulle, the British royalty—for the Daily News and the hundred other newspapers that used its foreign service.

For African American journalists the war brought expanded horizons of a different type. For example, a shortage of clerk-typists in the federal government made it possible for Alice A. Dunnigan, a schoolteacher and writer for the black press, to escape a confining life in Russellville, Kentucky and move to Washington.62 While working for the U.S. Department of Labor, she became a part-time reporter for the Associated Negro Press.63 After the war, she became its Washington bureau chief and the first black woman accredited to the Congressional press galleries.64

The war created a special spirit of camaraderie for Frances L. Murphy III, one of a group of young women known as the "mosquito patrol" who staffed the Afro-American newspapers owned by the Murphy family after male journalists went overseas. "Those were — I hate to say good years, but they were," Murphy told an oral history interviewer in 1991.65 Murphy later became

56. Ibid.
57. Ibid., 38.
58. Ibid., 38.
59. Ibid., 4 April 1990, 62.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., 33-34.
63. Ibid., 199.
64. Ibid., 204-209.
publisher of the Washington Afro-American. "They called us 'mosquito patrol' because we were very thin young women at that time and we had to cover everything a man would cover...."

Murphy recalled that two of her sisters, Vashti Murphy and Elizabeth Murphy Phillips, were in Europe during the war and sent back reports to the newspapers. Elizabeth Murphy was the first accredited black female overseas war correspondent. Vashti, who had gone to France as a WAC, "wrote news stories for the Afro when she was overseas and almost got disciplined for it," Murphy said. "...She...wrote back about the prejudice in the Army...."

Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Study

To simply conclude that women journalists benefitted from a temporary lowering of barriers in the World War II era obscures numerous questions surrounding their wartime role. To begin with, the concept of the term "exceptional" must be examined. What made a woman fit into this category? Who decided whether she was or was not "exceptional?"

Were women persuaded to leave journalism voluntarily because they were not comfortable with a male-oriented occupation? Was it only "exceptional" women who were able to identify with male-oriented values and thus appear to perform like men? Was the emphasis on the "exceptional" throughout the war a way of ensuring that journalism would again become a sex-segregated occupation as soon as the war ended even though it was obvious that women could do the work? To what degree did women internalize the prejudices against them?

New material has recently become available that may help to answer these questions. This article has referred to three oral history interviews from the "Women in Journalism" project of the Washington Press Club Foundation. Other interviews with women of the World War II era merit study. The project, which contains a total of fifty-four interviews, also makes it possible for researchers to gain a clearer picture of women's pages of the last half-century. A study of these interviews, which are now being made available in research libraries, should help determine if the women's pages changed as a result of women reporters being transferred back to them after working on city desks during the war.

Additional study also is needed to answer the question of whether women fared better or worse in journalism than in other occupations. Few, if any, comparative studies have been done. Yet women journalists must be seen within the context of other professional groups before any judgment can be made on their status. It may be that journalism actually offered better opportunities to women than other pursuits that took a similar amount of education.

Similarly, more attention should be directed to the question of to what degree women journalists offered a different perspective than men. For instance,

Foundation in the Oral History Collection of Columbia University and other repositories, 37.
66. Murphy interview by Ingersoll, 1 August 1992, Washington, D.C., 143.
in an introduction to a collection of Anne O’Hare McCormick’s columns this statement appeared: “Mrs. McCormick held a reading audience which included as many men as women, yet she never sacrificed her feminine nature in the expression of her thoughts and observations.... She believed in the special role of woman to restore and preserve spiritual and moral values....”68

Were such statements true in any provable, objective sense? Or were they simply the accepted wisdom of a gendered society that held women as a group to be morally superior—but at the price of being economically and socially dependent? Did the “exceptional” women who outdid their male rivals and remained in journalism after the war ended sacrifice their “feminine nature”? What about McCormick herself—how did she manage to be both a token of women’s presumed morality in a man-dominated world and one of the most significant commentators of her day? Were women journalists deemed to be voices of morality more likely to be accepted in the field than those who were not?

Finally, the image of the confident, fearless woman war correspondent as a romantic, liberating influence on women deserves more attention from media historians. It served as a counterweight to the ideology that glorified the role of wife and mother—a role officially endorsed by government agencies like the Office of War Information. This work of this agency, which employed numerous women journalists, also would be a fruitful topic for additional research.69 The ideological climate of the war period called for women to contribute to the nation’s survival by working temporarily in war industry. Nevertheless, it insisted that women be responsible for the stability of the nuclear family. One historian, Sonya Michel, expressed the dominant discourse of the day, “Women as mothers were charged with perpetuating the culture that men were fighting for; abandoning this role in wartime would not only upset the gender balance but undermine the very core of American society.”70 Against this backdrop of domestic servitude stood the woman journalists who covered World War II—Independent, resourceful, enterprising, heroic, attractive—figures who captured imagination and claimed major parts in the drama of their times. Their full importance as role models for American women remains to be explored.

The author is a professor of journalism at the University of Maryland.

69. The extensive records of the Office of War Information (Record Group 208) are scheduled to be moved in 1995 to the National Archives II building, College Park, Maryland.
Historiographic Essay:

World War II American Radio Is More Than Murrow

By Louise Benjamin

Tensions between Japan and the United States had been building for most of 1941 and finally erupted into full scale war on 7 December with the bombing of Pearl Harbor. On that Sunday afternoon, radio brought first news of the attack, when newsmen John Daly cut into CBS programming at 2:31 p.m. EST with the words, “The Japanese have attacked Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, by air, President Roosevelt has just announced. The attack was also made on naval and military activities on the principal island of Oahu.” Soon, other networks were making similar announcements. As details were released during the next hours, bulletins broke into the usual regular Sunday afternoon programming of public affairs and classical music. The next day, President Franklin Roosevelt asked Congress for a declaration of war. Millions of Americans listened as he intoned, “Yesterday, December 7th, 1941, a date which will live in infamy...” That night more than sixty-two million listeners, the largest audience ever for a radio address, heard Roosevelt again speak to the nation. America was at war, and radio shifted into high gear with its information and entertainment programming.1

This review essay will emphasize those two broad areas of programming in examining scholarship and resources in American broadcasting during World War II. While by no means exhaustive, this article will give scholars a better foundation for future research of American broadcasting of that time period. It covers articles and books investigating this era, as well as materials and archives of audio sources which detail much of the war through actual recordings made then.

Overview

During World War II, radio was a fiscal success and achieved impressive public regard. A wartime construction freeze kept the number of radio stations low, and these stations shared literally in a wealth of advertising income, while print-based media suffered paper shortages and an advertising decline. AM network radio dominated war efforts, and its potential economic ruin from FM and television was put on hiatus. Radio's wartime news role was indispensable, and its entertainment programming emphasized patriotic goals and morale building.2

Providing valuable, constructive overviews of these roles during the war is Erik Barnouw's The Golden Web. This second of his three-volume set on broadcasting's development chronicles radio's evolution from 1933 through the advent of television in the early 1950s. Of especial interest are Barnouw's assessment of radio's domestic and foreign application and service.

Complementing Barnouw's account is Lawrence Lichty and Malachi Topping's American Broadcasting: A Source Book on the History of Radio and Television. Published in 1975, this volume reprints many useful accounts of broadcasting during the war years and covers topics from economic and legal issues to programming overviews. Of special interest are "Radio War Programs" by Kenneth Bartlett, "The Soap Operas and the War" by George Willey, and "Radio Censorship 'Code,' " by H.J. Ryan.

A third invaluable resource is Stay Tuned, A Concise History of American Broadcasting. Now in its second edition, this resource by Christopher Sterling and John M. Kittross provides students and scholars alike with a highly readable rendition of broadcasting's evolution from early wireless through today. Chapter 6, "Radio Goes to War," gives readers an excellent overview of these important years.

A few years after the war, Edward Kirby and Jack Harris published Star-Spangled Radio, covering radio's role in World War II. Kirby and Harris held key posts in the radio branch of the Department of War, and their book presents insiders' anecdotes on radio's contributions to the war effort. Offered are behind-the-scenes stories of broadcasters' voluntary censorship efforts, plans for and implementation of radio's psychological warfare, and development of techniques and technology for delivering news from the front. Especially useful for the scholar is the appendix, which lists many radio reporters who covered in the European and Pacific Theaters, including those who died covering the war.

News and Information Programming

Radio commentators and reporters alike wrote their memoirs of the war. Of the more informative and engaging are Eric Sevareid's Not So Wild A Dream, H.V. Kaltenborn's Fifty Fabulous Years: 1900-1950, and William Shirer's

2. Ibid.
Berlin Diary: The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent. William Dunn, an American radio correspondent who covered the war from Pearl Harbor to the surrender on the USS Missouri, recorded his days as a correspondent in Pacific Microphone. "Good Evening!" is the autobiography of Raymond Swing, news commentator for Mutual and later NBC Blue. Largely anecdotal, the latter half of the book provides insights for scholars of World War II.

Edward R. Murrow is arguably the best known of the war’s correspondents, and This Is London presents many of his earlier broadcasts from London before the United States entered the war. Elmer Davis edited this collection for CBS. Edward Bliss edited a later volume of Murrow’s broadcasts, In Search of Light: The Broadcasts of Edward R. Murrow, 1938-1961. It also contains many transcripts of his war broadcasts. Several biographies detail Murrow’s life: Alexander Kendrick’s Prime Time: The Life of Edward R. Murrow; Ann Sperber’s Murrow: His Life and Times; and Joseph Persico’s Edward R. Murrow: An American Original. Another focuses on Murrow’s overall contributions and includes one chapter on his wartime reporting: Betty Houchin Winfield and Lois DeFleur’s The Edward R. Murrow Heritage: Challenge for the Future (1986). Each of the others contains chapters on Murrow’s wartime efforts, while R. Franklin Smith’s book focuses solely on Murrow’s wartime role, Edward R. Murrow: The War Years. Of these, Sperber’s book is the most detailed and helpful to the researcher.


In 1945, CBS provided transcripts of actual reports from both European and Pacific war theaters, describing how the reports sounded on the home front. These two volumes, From D-Day through Victory in Europe and From Pearl Harbor into Tokyo, complemented its CBS News on D-Day, which covered how the invasion reached American audiences on 6 June 1944. CBS news director Paul White also includes a chapter on radio’s reporting of D-Day in his postwar book, News on the Air, published in 1947. Additionally, this book is one of the best overviews on early radio news development. An article by Debra Gersh Hernandez, “The Simple Days of War Coverage,” published 30 July 1994, in Editor and Publisher, outlines a four-page media plan for the 1944 Normandy invasion, which was discovered in the National Archives. This plan reveals close cooperation between military and press during World War II. David Bulman provides a contemporary report of major wartime commentators in Molders of
Opinion, while thirty years later, Irving Fang in Those Radio Commentators! and David Culbert in News for Everyman: Radio and Foreign Affairs in Thirties America give further accounts of wartime radio journalists and news commentators.

Three general books of value for their discussion of wartime reporting are Robert Desmond’s World News Reporting, “Tides of War” (Volume Four); Philip Knightly’s The First Casualty — From the Crimea to Vietnam: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth Maker; and Edward Bliss’ Now the News: The Story of Broadcast Journalism. Tides of War covers the period leading to and during World War II. Here, Desmond examines the press and its wartime conditions and constraints, and describes both print and broadcast journalists’ experiences from 1931 through 1945. Knightly’s The First Casualty is a best-selling review of the wartime reporter in recent history, while Bliss chronicles broadcasters’ efforts during the war and how they contributed to broadcast journalism’s evolution. Again, issues of censorship arise. Censorship in general, with some review of radio censorship, is the focus of Robert Summers’ Wartime Censorship of Press and Radio (1942).

Audience and Entertainment Programming

R. LeRoy Bannerman reviews Norman Corwin’s wartime radio drama in Norman Corwin and Radio: The Golden Years. Corwin produced such notable programs as “We Hold These Truths,” “This is War!” and “On a Note of Triumph.” Sherman Dryer’s 1942 collection, Radio in Wartime, is a contemporary account of radio during World War II. Another 1942 volume, Radio Goes to War: The Fourth Front, by Charles Rolo, details early radio war efforts, including propaganda.


Immediately after the war, a study sponsored by the National Association of Broadcasters and conducted by the National Research Center produced The People Look at Radio. This important study assessed what people knew and how they felt about general radio policies and the way radio was
organized and operated. A second survey followed in 1947 and resulted in publication of *Radio Listening in America* by Paul Lazarsfeld and Patricia Kendall. It, too, appraised America’s attitude toward radio. Both provide constructive and helpful assessments of radio in the mid-1940s.

Little has been written on radio and minority groups during World War II. One chapter in *Split Image: African Americans in the Mass Media* by Jannette Dates and William Barlow details commercial and noncommercial radio images of and programming to Americans of African descent during the war. Barnouw’s *Golden Web* and J. Fred MacDonald’s *Don’t Touch That Dial!* also present some insights into broadcasting and the African American experience.

Little has also been written on radio’s coverage of the Holocaust. Joyce Fine’s “American Radio Coverage of the Holocaust” (*Simon Wiesenthal Center Annual, 1988*) concludes lack of extensive radio coverage of the Holocaust came because of broadcast strictures mandating “objectivity.” In 1993, the British Broadcasting Corporation produced an excellent program, “Document: The Unspeakable Atrocity,” assessing its own culpability and patterns of anti-Semitism in not disseminating information it had on the Holocaust as early as June 1942. A copy of this Peabody Award winning program is part of the Peabody Awards Collection at the University of Georgia.

Few dissertations and theses have been done specifically on radio during the war. “Hometown Radio and World War II” by Enoch Albert Moffett III, a master’s thesis (University of Georgia, 1984), assesses local radio’s contributions to the war effort. Another aspect of radio’s use on the home front is covered in Robert Miller’s 1991 Ph.D. dissertation, *The War that Never Came: Civilian Defense, Mobilization, and Morale during World War II*. Miller shows how the Office of Civil Defense used radio shows, pamphlets, posters, newsreels and documentaries to influence the lives of countless Americans during the war. Both works provide windows on Americans at home during World War II.

### Regulation and Control

Regulatory issues are covered in FCC annual reports and its *Report on Chain Broadcasting* issued in 1941. Thomas Robinson also gives a contemporary account of regulation in *Radio Networks and the Federal Government* (1943). Self-censorship and morale building were goals of “When Radio Writes for War,” a pamphlet produced by the Office of War Information in 1943. Charles Siepmann drew upon several studies he made while employed by the FCC as a special consultant in July 1945 in writing his 1946 book, *Radio’s Second Chance*. For those unfamiliar with Siepmann, he has been considered largely responsible for the FCC staff report, “Public Responsibility of Broadcaster Licensees,” better known as the “Blue Book” for its deep blue paper cover. For the record, though, while he assisted in the report, much of the work was compiled by FCC economist Dallas Smythe and others. Both the “Blue Book” and *Radio’s Second Chance* provide economic and programming details on the state of American broadcasting at the close of World War II.
Radio Propaganda


Three contemporary 1942 assessments cover Allied and Axis propaganda efforts: Charles Rolo’s volume Radio Goes to War: The “Fourth Front” (mentioned earlier); Arno Huth’s Radio Today: The Present State of Broadcasting; and Harwood Childs and John Whitton’s Propaganda by Shortwave. This volume covers British, Nazi, Italian, and French propaganda efforts, and also includes chapters on international politics and what the authors call “atrocities propaganda.” The next year Tangye Lang published another volume on wartime propaganda, Voices in the Darkness: The European Radio War.

Asa Briggs provides an excellent study of the BBC during wartime, The War of Words: The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom. The BBC itself issued War Report, with a subtitle that describes its contents “A Record of Dispatches Broadcast by the BBC’s War Correspondents with the Allied Expeditionary Force 6 June 1944 - 5 May 1945.” A comparative study of British and German propaganda is in Michael Balfour’s Propaganda in War 1939-1945:

Wartime broadcasts of enemy collaborators such as Ezra Pound, Axis Sally, and Tokyo Rose have been the subject of several academic articles and newspaper stories. A 1978 book reprints Pound’s radio broadcasts, Ezra Pound Speaking: Radio Speeches of World War II by Leonard Doob (1978). These broadcasts have been analyzed in “The Rhetoric of Ezra Pound’s World War II Radio Broadcasts” (Bernard Duffy in Rendezvous, 1988) and “This is Ole Ezra Speaking” (Humphrey Carpenter in Encounter, 1988). “Final Airing: ‘Axis Sally’ Tried Here as Traitor in ‘48” is a 23 September 1992 article in the Washington Times by Tom Kelly on Mildred Gillars, better known as Axis Sally. This story reviews her life and her trial on ten counts of high treason in 1948. A Ronald Yates’ article in the 8 December 1991 issue of the Chicago Tribune profiles Iva Toguri, accused of being Tokyo Rose. In “Prisoner of War: Iva Toguri Still Fights the Legacy of Tokyo Rose,” Yates relates the story of Toguri, the first American woman ever convicted of treason. In 1991, John Edwards published Berlin Calling, detailing American broadcasters in service to the Third Reich.

Audio Resources Covering World War II

associations and companies that sell recordings, newsletters and publications on old radio.

The Peabody Archives in the Main Library at the University of Georgia also contains audio programs from 1940 to the present. While some of the older programming may be difficult to access because of its obsolete recording format, the staff is helpful in retrieving programs and ancillary materials in the archive for scholarly endeavors. For more information, contact the Peabody Archives or the author of this article at the University of Georgia.

Audio catalogs offer collections of radio programs and news coverage. For example, *Wireless*, catalog of Minnesota Public Radio (P.O. Box 64422, St. Paul, Minn. 55164-0422), has offered cassettes of D-Day radio broadcasts; programs such as “The Shadow,” “The Whistler,” and “Gunsmoke;” assortments of radio programs in various genres such as comedy and crime drama; and collections of special occasion programs such as Christmastide presentations and “A Day from the Golden Age of Radio, September 21, 1939.” This last collection is the recording, sign-on to sign-off, of WJSV in Washington, D.C. and includes everything from station breaks and technical difficulties to all the music, comedy, drama, news, and advertisements aired as the war in Europe entered its third week.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, as this essay shows, historians have not depleted broadcasting topics in their research. Other research can build upon the foundation of research which has been completed, but research gaps definitely exist in broadcasting’s influence on the war effort and the interplay of radio and society during the war. A large reservoir of topics remains, including radio advertising, social themes in programming, news coverage of specific events, and influence of technological and economic developments of radio on the war effort. All that is needed is scholarly dedication and time.

*The author is an assistant professor of journalism at the University of Georgia.*
Histrioigraphic Essay:  
Freedom of the Press in World War II

By Margaret A. Blanchard

Researching and writing about freedom of the press in wartime presents historians with many problems. Scholarly responses to press activities and government reactions to those activities in the heat of battle often closely mirror the beliefs of the authors as to which party is correct. The essential question often becomes an ideological one: whether the government is correct in restricting the flow of information and criticism in order to preserve national security and whether journalists should willingly comply with such restrictions. Thus impartial—or, indeed, complete—evaluation of freedom of the press in wartime is often impossible.

In some wars, such as World War I, most scholars can agree that government restrictions on publications were excessive. In other wars, such as World War II, however, agreement seems to dissipate. Some scholars believe with first-hand observers of the war years that in World War II, "Americans learned the importance of controlling the news, the value of censorship in total war strategy." Other researchers concur with Elmer Davis, wartime chief of the

1. Robert E. Summers, comp., Wartime Censorship of Press and Radio, The Reference Shelf series, vol. 15, no. 8 (New York: H.W. Wilson Co., 1942), 13. Additional support for the restrictions was voiced at a symposium of journalists sponsored in 1943 by the School of Journalism at the University of Missouri. Leading journalists around the country appeared to present their views on the role of the press in wartime. Introductions to the various speakers in the printed report of the conference carefully identified most participants by journalistic roles and positions in the wartime effort to control information or their military rank. Persons not in the government at the moment or too old to fight were identified by their military rank in World War I. Participants supported press cooperation to win the war. Palmer Hoyt, the publisher of the Portland Oregonian who served a stint as domestic director of the Office of War Information, for instance, is quoted as saying, "No one who is an American or a newspaperman wants to do anything, say anything, or write anything that can be of 'aid and comfort' to the enemy." Frank Luther Mott, ed. Journalism in Wartime (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943), 36. Interestingly, the only area on which their seemed to be support for a conflict with government was when the subject of the antitrust suit against the Associated Press, which was wending
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Office of War Information, who criticized military censors by saying, "They appeared to be less aware that a democracy fighting a total war will fight it more enthusiastically and effectively if it knows what is going on, if it feels that its leaders trust it with as much information as can possibly be given without giving aid and comfort to the enemy."2

This dichotomy of views on the righteousness of government restrictions on press activities in wartime merges to a certain extent with the "World War II as good war" view of history. The latter interpretation sees the nation united in fighting foes so overwhelming that any diversion from war goals was simply unthinkable. Journalists were patriots, soldiers with typewriters, as some generals believed, and as such, they had to forego normal reportorial practices for the greater good.

The "good war" view of World War II is fading somewhat from the scene as scholars become more aware of the growing number of permutations in American life during the war years. This willingness to look at issues through a more complex lens is affecting scholars who look at free-press issues as well, as is shown below. Although the body of research on freedom of the press in World War II is growing steadily, the questions that remain are whether the issues even now are being reviewed with a sufficiently critical eye and whether there are missing pieces to the puzzle.

The problem becomes even more difficult if scholars seek to apply a legal definition of "freedom of the press" to their search for meaning. The U.S. Supreme Court was, in the late 1930s and early 1940s, just beginning to detail the parameters of the First Amendment, and few cases applied to the press per se.3 Consequently, freedom of the press had more of a societal value than a legal way through the court system during the war, was discussed. James E. Crown, editor of the New Orleans States, is quoted as saying, newspapers "must be free to criticize the actions of our elected leaders and the actions of those occupying high places. The recent suit of the United States against the Associated Press is one of the indications that the government may seek to curtail the powers and duties of the press delegated to it in the Bill of Rights." Mott, 195. For details of the press's persistent quarrel with the government on this issue during World War II, see Margaret A. Blanchard, "The Associated Press Antitrust Case: A Philosophical Clash over Ownership of First Amendment Rights," Business History Review 61 (1987): 43-85.


3. Historians generally cite Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), and Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), as the earliest free press cases to go before the U.S. Supreme Court on First Amendment grounds. The press won both cases, thus expanding First Amendment rights against prior restraint and against discriminatory taxation. The press lost a third case, Associated Press v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 103 (1937), in which the First Amendment was seen as no bar to nondiscriminatory business regulation. The Near case included language that would seem to endorse regulations on the press in wartime, when Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote, "No one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops." 283 U.S. 697, 716.
tinge; the phrase meant simply what the people of the United States would tolerate in a time of war. Government regulations and press reactions to them must be gauged in this framework, and journalists were surely constrained by those limits. No journalist then would have contemplated filing a lawsuit to gain access to military operations, as some journalists did during the Gulf War.  

To obtain a full view of freedom of the press issues in World War II, researchers must go beyond the limits of topics that are easily defined in such terms. The literature reviewed below may or may not fall under the “freedom of the press in wartime” heading in computerized indices; the books and articles cited, however, do deal with topics that the press did or perhaps should have covered during the war, and with how historians view the role of a free press in a war fought by a democracy. To historians of freedom of the press, there is indeed no clearer way to define the historic undertaking.

**Reporting the War**

Just how was World War II reported and what free-press problems did journalists attempting to do their jobs encounter? Although this may be a simple question to ask, answering it is not. Rather than looking at press-freedom problems from the viewpoint of the journalist in the field, most authors look at the issue through the prism of government censorship operations. Discussions of news coverage of World War II usually are limited to how journalists from various media outlets reported the war, rather than focusing on free-press problems. An exception to this general statement is Phillip Knightley’s *The First Casualty*, which does look at free-press problems encountered by reporters in the field.

Knightley’s title betrays his position because he does believe that truth is the first casualty of war, and he clearly disparages the attitude of the U.S.

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military censor whom he quotes early in his discussion of World War II as saying, “I wouldn’t tell the people anything until the war is over and then I’d tell them who won.”7 His discussion begins with the imposition of censorship after Pearl Harbor, which not only limited immediate dispersal of information after the attack, but which kept details of the full disaster from the American people until after the end of the war. The American people, he claims, were protected from accurate information about the situation in China and about Douglas MacArthur, who ran one of the most efficient censorship operations of the war. He notes also Dwight Eisenhower’s belief that “public opinion wins war” and Eisenhower’s statement that “[I] have always considered as quasi-staff officers, correspondents accredited to my headquarters.”8 That rapport with the press led reporters stationed in Europe to honor Eisenhower’s request that they sit on the story of General George S. Patton Jr.’s slapping an enlisted man; the story was later released by a stateside reporter. Although Knightley notes that some correspondents agreed with New York Times reporter Drew Middleton that “censorship enabled correspondents to be better informed about the war,”9 it is clear that he philosophically agrees with the Canadian journalist he quotes at the end of his treatment of World War II: “We were a propaganda arm of our governments. At the start the censors enforced that, but by the end we were our own censors. We were cheerleaders. . . . It wasn’t good journalism. It wasn’t journalism at all.”10 Regardless of whether American journalists agreed with that assessment, Knightley makes clear that his review of American journalism during the war leads him to support that conclusion.

What seems to be clear from what scholars have written about free-press issues during the war is that few journalists challenged the government on the right to report the news. Looking at the little that has been written about the free-press debate in World War II, scholars seem to have focused on the conflict between the Chicago Tribune and the U.S. government over the newspaper’s coverage of the Battle of Midway in 1942.11 Various authors do discuss how the Tribune reporter got his information and how it was presented, and the government’s abortive efforts to bring Tribune officers and staff members, including owner-publisher Robert R. McCormick, before the bar of justice for violating the Espionage Act. The issue, of course, was whether the story informed the Japanese that the U.S. Navy had broken the enemy’s secret naval code, thus allowing the Americans to fight better on the high seas. Three historians who deal with the subject painstakingly cover the details of the story

7. Ibid., 269.
8. Ibid., 315.
9. Ibid., 315 (emphasis included).
10. Ibid., 333.
and the subsequent legal encounter, often quoting from the same sources and coming to the same conclusions. Two authors even place the Tribune's Midway story in the context of the decade-long conflict between Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Colonel McCormick.  

All three conclude that the Tribune was wrong in its decision to print the story. Larry J. Frank notes that the newspaper "had gone beyond the ordinary criticism of the Roosevelt administration to the dissemination of a story that was harmful within the context of war." To Dina Goren, the release of information about communication technology was dangerous "because such information, once revealed, whether inadvertently or not, cannot be made secret again." And Jim Martin underlines the fact that portions of the Tribune story had been falsified to make it appear more important, a fact that led to the Tribune's "fail[ing] the truth test." Consequently, he implies, it deserved less protection. Tribune personnel escaped conviction under the Espionage Act because the disclosure had been localized to the Tribune and its sister publications, the New York Daily News and the Washington Times Herald; the Japanese had not become aware of the U.S. naval intelligence coup, and the official Japanese naval code went unchanged. And from what these authors say, no freedom of the press hue and cry was raised from other outlets. The Tribune was on its own in a mess of its own making.

The Tribune case is perhaps the easiest one to write about in conjunction with free-press issues and Word War II, insofar as coming to a decision in favor of the government is concerned. Although the case clearly was tainted politically on both sides, the issue of releasing confidential information that could cost the lives of American service personnel and prolong the war makes it difficult to defend the Tribune.

Government Information Policy

Government information policy during World War II was complex and complicated. The World War I experience with the Committee on Public Information had left such a bad residue in the halls of government and in American society that most Roosevelt administration officials felt that it simply could not be repeated. The president, however, believed that information, especially about war, should be controlled and manipulated. Even before American entry into the conflict, he had plans to control the facts the public

12. See Frank and Goren.
13. Frank, 303.
15. Martin, 20. Tribune reporter Stanley Johnston, for instance, put a Washington dateline on the story and attributed it to "naval sources," when he had gathered most of the information himself in the Pacific. When questioned about the source of his data, he replied that he had built his story based on his own expertise and by looking at pictures of Japanese battle ships in Jane's Fighting Ships; he had actually gotten his data from a confidential naval telegram while he was on a ship in the Pacific around the time of the battle.
Within days of the declaration of war, Roosevelt had created the Office of Censorship and had installed Byron Price, executive news editor of the Associated Press, as director. By June 1942, Roosevelt had the Office of War Information set up with Elmer Davis, a distinguished radio commentator, as its head. Most scholars looking at a potential free-press problems during World War II separate the censorship operation from the OWI, which has been seen as a propaganda operation and often criticized. The Office of Censorship, however, has generally been praised in the literature, and American journalists have been applauded for their willingness to cooperate with the voluntary censorship rules that Price imposed.

Voluntary censorship, authors contend, was the key to the success of Price’s operation. Such rules, which restricted the ability of the press to publish certain data, never would have worked on a mandatory basis, but Price appealed to the basic patriotism of each journalist, and the ploy worked. The standard historical treatment of the Office of Censorship is Weapon of Silence, written by OC administrator Theodore F. Koop, who was also a broadcaster. The volume begins with Koop declaring, “Here [the censorship operation] was a demonstration that a disagreeable but a necessary job such as wartime censorship could be performed as to gain nation-wide respect. And here, above all, was daily proof of the value of one of our greatest American treasures—freedom of expression.” The book itself tells the “inside” story of the vast operation that looked at all forms of communication, from letters and cablegrams to newspapers, magazines, and radio broadcasts.

Scholarly work that looks at the Office of Censorship’s activities that might impinge on freedom of the press generally finds few grounds on which to criticize the government agency. Wallace B. Eberhard, for example, writing in the Military Review, praises press cooperation with the Office of Censorship’s request not to print stories about balloons bearing incendiary and fragmentation bombs that the Japanese sent, successfully, toward the United States late in the war. “The press,” he writes, “was willing to do its part to ensure victory . . . even if it meant delaying or missing a story.” Since he is using the press reaction to the Japanese balloons as a contrast to Progressive magazine’s attempt to publish details of making an H-Bomb in the 1980s, his preference to the World War II mode of press-military relations is obvious.

A similar positive feeling for Office of Censorship operations is found in Patrick S. Washburn’s study of the efforts to control information about the

18. Ibid., vii.
20. Ibid., 5.
Manhattan Project.\textsuperscript{21} Washburn discusses the need for censorship in his monograph, meticulously detailing the way the operation proceeded and finding no free-press problem in the government’s efforts and the press’s cooperation. In fact, he almost automatically states that there was no such conflict, concluding that the Office of Censorship and the press “had worked together to keep the atomic bomb story reasonably quiet while proving that a free press could cooperate with the government, rather than be a hindrance, in the midst of a war that threatened the very life of the country.”\textsuperscript{22}

When persons less interested in press support of government policy look at the issue of secrecy surrounding the development of the atomic bomb, however, they often come to different conclusions. The press, excluded from knowing about the development of the atomic bomb, knew of its potential only through the pen of William Laurence, the \textit{New York Times} science writer who was drafted by military leaders to prepare press releases on the project. Laurence also had the inside track on writing the earliest stories about this potent new weapon for the \textit{Times} and won the 1946 Pulitzer Prize for his efforts. Such limited knowledge of the bomb, say historians critical of national policy, hindered the debate a free society should have had over such developments, and thus journalists failed as proper custodians of freedom of the press.\textsuperscript{23}

The question of whether a free press should have kept stories quiet during World War II is a matter that has not been debated much by media historians. The issue of a free press’s responsibility to tell the truth during wartime surfaced early after the war when Fletcher Pratt, a former field correspondent, told the nation through \textit{Harper’s Magazine} that censors had “rigged the news” during the war.\textsuperscript{24} Pratt accurately points out that “essential military information was seldom concealed from the enemy by censorship.”\textsuperscript{25} What was concealed, writes historian Richard W. Steele, was a variety of information that could have been useful to the American public, including the extent of U.S. losses at Pearl Harbor. Columnist Drew Pearson printed the figures after they had been leaked to him by an unhappy member of the Roosevelt administration. But, writes Steele, “most newspapers voluntarily declined to run his Pearl Harbor column.”\textsuperscript{26} Likewise, Pearson broke the story about General Patton striking an enlisted man.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 35.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
With censors in charge, Pratt notes that the “legend” was created “that the war was won without a single mistake, by a command consisting exclusively of geniuses.” “Thought control,” he says, “was the precise thing we were supposed to be fighting against. Not only does it make a thoroughly objectionable assumption about the childishness of the people whose morale is being kept up, but it also sacrifices one of the few real advantages democracies have in war—that the acts of the ruling power are subject to popular review.”27 Such questions are not usually asked by historians looking at the Office of Censorship, an office that was motivated, according to most historical accounts, by the greatest of all purposes—the preservation of the United States.

If the historians writing about the Office of Censorship would only combine their work with an investigation of the Office of War Information, they might come away with a somewhat different view of government information policy. On the domestic front, the Office of War Information was charged with disseminating news from various government agencies. The government, agency head Elmer Davis argued, needed to trust the American people with the facts. Instead, military and civilian officials sugar-coated facts designed to build morale. Davis’s own words in his “Report to the President” relate his battle to tell the truth, or least some greater portion of the truth, in wartime. Details about the propaganda aspect of the agency come primarily from Allan M. Winkler, who reminds readers throughout that the OWI’s primary mission was to use press, radio, motion pictures, and other avenues of communication to publicize the war at home and abroad.28 A corresponding responsibility assigned it the task of promoting patriotic fervor as well. It was, as Winkler says, to disseminate true information on the one hand, while fostering appropriate behavior on the other. This double mission led to the inherent conflict over just how much the American people should know—and over how what they knew would influence war bond sales, job performance, military enlistments, and so on. Although alluding to these problems, the Winkler study looks primarily at how the agency functioned in the propaganda mode, rather than focusing on whether this setup undermined a free press or if journalists of the day perceived such a problem.

Robert L. Bishop and LaMar S. Mackay argue in their history of the Office of War Information that the nation’s “World War II experience indicates that centralized control of information will be attacked by Congress, the press and even government agencies.” Speaking of journalists, they say, “The press sees any control as a threat to freedom of information.”29 Unfortunately, their brief study does not detail such complaints, and reading from other sources discloses that much of the opposition from governmental sources was closely tied to the fear that the OWI was disseminating a view of the war that was highly partisan and could only benefit Roosevelt. Some members of the president’s own party, as well as leading Republicans, were unhappy about such

27. Pratt, 98.
a one-sided view of the war. Press criticism seemed muted and often—or so it seems—limited to opposition to restrictions on reporting certain events, such as the trial of German saboteurs caught in the United States early in the war.

Cedric Larson’s study of OWI operations, published in 1949, indicates that journalists had protested “unreliable and incomplete” news releases coming from Davis’s agency.30 These criticisms stemmed from early in the agency’s history and likely occurred before Davis had won concessions from the military that promoted fuller dissemination of information. Such acquiescence from the military came as the tide of battle was definitely turning in the American favor. Larson also quotes an Editor & Publisher editorial that notes that journalistic concern “has been more often vocal than printed, [but that] there has been no lack of printed protest against censorship policies since Pearl Harbor.”31 Winkler’s study of the OWI also has references to generalized concerns by the press about news coverage.32

These generalized comments about press anxiety about news manipulation during the war leave the free-press historian wondering just what did go on. We do know, as a result of work done by Sydney Weinberg, that a substantial group of scholars and writers enlisted in the war’s cause quit the Office of War Information in disgust as the agency shifted more to advertising and propaganda techniques, moving away from serious and honest attempts to enlist support for the war effort and into attempts to manipulate emotions.33 When combined with what little is known about media complaints about the release of information, the writers’ struggle to be forthright with the American people lends added credence to a call for greater investigation of the impact of the Office of War Information on the quality of information disseminated during the war years, and the press’s reaction to the manipulation of information.

Most of the discussion about government involvement in wartime information practices centers on the Office of Censorship and the Office of War Information, as mentioned above. While journalists in the United States moved into the role of self-censors under Byron Price’s operation, in the territory of Hawaii, the military was directly involved in press control. One study tells of this use of martial law to directly monitor media content after Pearl Harbor.34 Jim A. Richstad tells us that the “press in the territory was licensed by the military for almost half of the war, and was under martial law for almost the entire war.”35 Such reaction by the military was surely an affront to freedom of the press, as Richstad notes, “The licensing of the press in Hawaii by the

32. Winkler, 38-72.
35. Ibid., 1.
military—a direct violation of the First Amendment—was an extreme wartime act. Not since colonial days had the American press been under license.”

Richstad’s monograph, one of the few to directly view World War II through a First Amendment prism, details the interactions between various media on the islands and their military supervisors during the war. Some of his most valuable contributions come as he shows how people of varying backgrounds viewed the military’s actions. The editor of one establishment paper, for example, felt that the military permitted publication of information that he, as a self-censor, would have blocked on the mainland. Richstad notes, however, that some of the establishment press’s complacency toward military review of their material may have been based in military efforts to make the journalist’s job easier by granting special privileges. On the other hand, there were some complaints that the military kept Hawaiian papers from publishing material about the Pacific war that was readily available to mainland audiences. He quotes a Honolulu Advertiser editorial of 21 December 1942, as saying, “We do not protest censorship as such, but we protest when our fighting forces in the Pacific are not permitted to read news and see pictures that are freely read and gazed upon by any housewife, Axis spy, inductee, bank president or war worker on the Mainland.”

In an action reminiscent of the Civil War, Richstad tells of the military padlocking the Hilo Herald-Tribune briefly on 9 February 1943, for an editorial that decried the “high pressure campaign to get young Americans [of Japanese ancestry] to enlist....Call off the super-salesmen and let enlistments be truly voluntary and sincere—not forced.” The paper was closed for four to six hours and did not miss an edition. Interestingly, Richstad found the harshest criticism of military intervention in press activities on the islands came not from journalists, but from territorial Attorney General J. Garner Anthony. He wrote in a fall 1942 report of the restrictions imposed on the press, which included bans on printing accounts of murders and rapes in Honolulu and stories about prostitution. The control mechanism, he charged, was regulation of newsprint allocations. Richstad reports disputes over the attorney general’s charges, but adds that restrictions were lessened in mid-1943, although some form of supervision remained throughout the war.

Granted, military control of the press did not exist on the mainland, but the way in which Richstad handles the debate over press freedom during the war years is enlightening. It shows, for instance, that there were problems during wartime and that press controls could be excessive. And it shows that some journalists raised some complaints. Richstad’s task of showing such problems was easier than the assignment of historians dealing with similar issues on the mainland. Hawaii offered fewer media outlets, and any action was concentrated in a few locales; researching all of the stateside media for possible complaints about press controls during the war would be a daunting task indeed.

36. Ibid., 9.
37. Ibid., 30.
38. Ibid., 31.
Blanchard: Freedom of the Press in World War II

Images of War

Another area just beginning to be researched, due to problems in developing the necessary research base and the criteria for evaluation, is the view of the war provided by visual images. Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black’s study of the manipulation of the silver screen was one of the first to look at the use of visual images as a tool of government. They tell of a substantial effort by the Office of War Information, which held the key to lucrative foreign markets, to make sure that movies helped to win the war; they quote the venerable Elmer Davis as saying, “The easiest way to interject a propaganda idea into most people’s minds is to let it go in through the medium of an entertainment picture when they do not realize that they are being propagandized.”

Motion picture writers and producers were told to make sure their movies showed that America was fighting a people’s war that involved men and women of all nationalities, colors, and religious faiths, fighting to preserve FDR’s Four Freedoms. Movies should promote self-sacrifice and unity, Hollywood was told, and they did. Tarzan subduing Nazi agents in the jungle did not provide the image OWI supervisors wanted; the self-sacrificing Mrs. Miniver, however, did. The authors tell the story of government influence on film content in great and fascinating detail, but unfortunately, they do not place their work in a free-press context. The right of government to dictate the content of films, which do have significant impact on viewers, is clearly full of First Amendment implications. The First Amendment may not have been discussed explicitly, of course, because the U.S. Supreme Court did not grant the motion picture industry protection until 1952. Even so, the manipulation of these images is contrary to the nation’s belief in freedom of artistic expression and the right of American citizens to be free from manipulation.

Nor do John Lopiccolo and Ronald Farrar discuss the First Amendment implications of the manipulation of newsreel images during the war either as they discuss how Movietone News cooperated with various government agencies to present the appropriate view of the war. Newsreels were subject to direct


40. Ibid., 64.


42. John Lopiccolo and Ronald Farrar, “Cooperation and Then Some: Movietone News and the War Effort, 1941-45,” paper presented to the History Division, Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Washington, D.C., 1989. Raymond Fielding’s standard history of the newsreel deals only in passing with World War II. Most of his coverage focuses on the way in which newsreel cameramen photographed the war and audiences at home that viewed those pictures. Two paragraphs look at censorship, one dealing with government restrictions and the second with limits imposed by theater managers. Raymond
censorship by the military, as well as the self-censorship and propagandistic efforts that affected other outlets. Military officials, for example, regularly suppressed footage taken by Movietone photographers, including exclusive footage of the devastation at Pearl Harbor, a heavily censored version of which was finally cleared for showing a year after it had been taken. In addition, military photographers took much of the footage that Movietone and other newsreel operations disseminated.

The most interesting part of their research, however, focuses on criticism of censorship being exercised on and by the newsreels. Wendell L. Willkie, the Republican who had run against Roosevelt in 1940, for example, is quoted on a newsreel as saying, “Military experts as well as other leaders must be constantly subject to democracy’s greatest driving power—the whiplash of public opinion arrived at from free, honest discussion. I am sorry to report to you that in many respects we are not doing a good job.” Edited from the newsreel was a segment of Willkie’s speech that appeared in outtakes and that was an even harsher criticism: “Men who exercise great power like to be free from criticism. When they get that way, that’s the time to increase the criticism.” And, said Lopiccolo and Farrar, a critical speech by New York Governor Thomas Dewey, who would be Roosevelt’s 1944 opponent, never appeared on the movie screens even though Dewey made his comments at a news photographers’ awards ceremony. In part Dewey said, “We need a free, informed people to fight a war for freedom. After making all due allowances for wartime conditions, it still remains that we know far too little about our foreign policies and practically nothing about our diplomatic commitments.” “The issues,” Dewey said, “are far too momentous” to continue such secrecy. Movietone, the authors imply, found such comments inappropriate for public viewing.

Taking criticism of visual presentation one step further, George H. Roeder Jr. calls World War II “the censored war” and argues that still photography was manipulated to serve unworthy government ends. The government, he said, imposed restrictions on photographs of people wounded in combat, of people involved in racial conflict on military bases, and of incidents that showed all was not harmonious between Americans and their wartime allies.

43. Lopiccolo and Farrar, 10.
44. Ibid., 13.
45. George H. Roeder, Jr., *The Censored War: American Visual Experience During World War II* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993). Peter Maslowski’s history of U.S. military photographers during the war deals primarily with their individual experiences although he does have a chapter on “reel” war vs. “real” war that focuses on the efforts to do documentary films of the war, and he does evaluate the impact of the images on the historical view of the war. He does not, however, deal with censorship issues or with the impact a selected visual experience of the war may have had on Americans. Peter Maslowski, *Armed with Cameras: The American Military Photographers of World War II* (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 65-94, 301-11.
The first picture of a dead American soldier finally appeared in print in the United States in a spring 1945 issue of Life magazine. Even then, the man’s face was blocked out.

Accredited photographers had to submit their film to military censors, who decided which pictures would clear the battlefield. Pictures would be reviewed again in the United States before they were distributed. For the first year or so of the war, few Americans were injured and none were killed—at least according to the photographs that appeared in print. Roeder notes that the government’s strategy changed in 1943 when the president’s advisers decided it was unwise to try to convince the American people that no soldiers died in combat—too many men were not coming home and that fact was widely known. These same advisers also feared that the lack of realistic pictures might contribute to a letdown among war industry workers and among civilians facing shortages of all sorts of goods. Consequently, in 1943 the first pictures of injured U.S. servicemen appeared in magazines and newspapers. Newsreel footage also became more explicit. Even so, the images never showed American personnel doing bad things such as killing civilians.

Roeder acknowledges that the issues involved in releasing such pictures raised “difficult questions concerning the sufferer’s rights to privacy, the feelings of friends and relatives, and the sensitivities and preferences of viewers.” In addition, he notes, “No common language for visual communication existed, especially for dealing with topics such as death and pain which seldom received frank discussion or straightforward portrayal in peacetime society.” One result of the policy to censor the visual experience of war, he says, “was a public seriously misinformed about the nature of modern war.”

To Roeder, such misinformation about the nature of war led to problems later in Vietnam. Interestingly, in his book-length work, which includes many controversial still photos from the era, Roeder does not talk about free press or First Amendment rights, again, perhaps a function of the time period in which the war was fought. When issues of photo coverage of later wars were discussed, the First Amendment was often prominently cited as a reason for allowing greater access to and dissemination of information.

Minority Issues

Just as some visual communication problems are being addressed directly in terms of censorship, so are at least two minority issues that center on the war: problems faced by the black press during those years and by Japanese journalists publishing papers in internment camps.

Much of the discussion of the black press during World War II comes from Patrick S. Washburn in the form of two articles and one major book, A Question of Sedition. In these three works, Washburn clearly states that

government officials were concerned about the loyalty of black newspaper editors, because those editors and their publishers refused to abandon their fight against racism in American society during the war.\textsuperscript{48} In detailing the \textit{Pittsburgh Courier}'s Double V campaign, Washburn explains how an important minority within society could strive to support both a war against racism and a war against the nation’s enemies at the same time. The issue of possible government censorship comes in as he discusses efforts by the Justice Department to investigate the campaign. He notes that the \textit{Courier} ran columns and editorials on the publication’s First Amendment rights in an attempt to rebuff government criticism. Through interviews with newspaper columnist Frank E. Bolden, Washburn notes that the publication’s leaders, in fact, taunted the administration to take action against the \textit{Courier}, something Bolden claimed Roosevelt was hesitant to do because of concerns about reactions from liberal white newspapers.\textsuperscript{49}

Although Washburn discusses the question of sedition and the black press as part of his discussion of the \textit{Courier}'s Double V campaign, free-press problems are not the focus of this work. He addresses the issue more specifically when he takes on J. Edgar Hoover’s efforts to have the black press prosecuted for sedition during the war. Washburn shows how Hoover used the presidential mandate to investigate subversive forces in the United States in the mid-1930s to collect data on the black press, which was suspect due to its continuing campaign against racism during the war. He urged the attorney general to use this data to prosecute black publications for sedition. The give-and-take between Hoover and top officials at the Justice Department shows representatives of a cabinet office trying, throughout most of the war, to preserve freedom of the press and an administrative agency through visits to newspapers and the collection of data exercising an unofficial censorship.\textsuperscript{50} The issue came to head with a meeting between Attorney General Francis Biddle and John Sengstacke, publisher of the \textit{Chicago Defender}, in which the attorney general blustered, and the publisher dared him to take action. Washburn concludes by noting that the investigations may have been warranted because of the black press’s connection with communism, the push by the Japanese to obtain support from the black community, and the need to preserve loyalty during wartime. Despite such


\textsuperscript{49} Washburn, “Pittsburgh \textit{Courier},” 81.

\textsuperscript{50} Washburn, “J. Edgar Hoover,” 27.
factors on Hoover’s side, Washburn says, the black press escaped harm because of the constitutional views of Attorney General Biddle and his Justice Department, which did not allow the prosecutions of World War I to recur.51

The broader issues of sedition in wartime, the black press, and Francis Biddle are investigated in Washburn’s book, *A Question of Sedition*, which looks at many of the points raised in the articles above in a more substantial context. The book also looks at other actors in the World War II free-press drama, including Postmaster General Frank Walker, who was just as determined as his World War I predecessor Anthony Burleson to purge the mails of materials considered dangerous to the nation’s success in wartime.52 As he concludes his study, Washburn aptly notes, “Most historians have failed to recognize the government’s strong antilibertarian feeling during World War II. It was not nearly as visible as in the period from 1917 to 1921, but the potential for suppressions was just as great.”53 The president, he notes, was more anxious to win the war than to protect constitutional liberties. The reason persecutions were not greater, he writes, was that Attorney General Biddle firmly believed that constitutional protections had to be enforced during wartime, or else the war was not worth winning.54

Although Biddle may have been able to protect some people from prosecution during World War II, he was unwilling or unable to protect the Japanese-Americans who were interned during the war. This episode in World War II history has led to an investigation of the degree of freedom of the press persons of Japanese heritage were allowed in publishing newspapers for internment camp residents. John D. Stevens, in a 1971 article, looked at the operation of several of these publications and concluded that “most editors insisted in print that they had complete freedom,” and that some editors “remember such freedom even today.” He believed, however, that “camp administrators almost always paid at least lip service to the freedom permitted the editors,” and that “perhaps the evacuees read the mood of such administrators and did not test their rights to the limit.”55

Looking at a somewhat different collection of publications and applying more sensitive standards, Lauren Kessler, writing more than fifteen years after Stevens, notes that War Relocation Administration “officials, camp newspaper editors and some of today’s historians claim that freedom of the press existed within the internment camps—and it did, in a very restricted sense: the freedom to publish what the WRA agreed with.” Claims of freedom of the press could be made, she said, “because camp journalists wrote nothing that needed censoring.”

54. Washburn makes a similar point in an article that looks directly at the conflict between FDR and Biddle, which almost cost the attorney general his position. See Patrick S. Washburn, “FDR Versus His Own Attorney General: The Struggle over Sedition, 1941-42,” *Journalism Quarterly* 62 (1985): 717-24.
To prove this point, she stressed "in the pages of the camp newspapers—but not in the barracks of the camps themselves—all inmates were happy (or at least well adjusted) super patriots who were more than willing to give up their rights
to demonstrate their loyalty."  Kessler's analysis of a more limited freedom of
the press is likely closer to the truth, given the constraints of the situation in
which the Japanese-American editors operated.

The problem of discovering the truth about internment camps is
substantial. The federal government did everything in its power to justify the
internment of persons who had given no proof of disloyalty during the war years.
It went so far as to try to shape our visual image of the camps as well, replacing
photographer Dorothea Lange, who was presenting the oppressive side of camp
life for the War Relocation Authority, with photographer Ansel Adams, whose
pictures at Manzanar showed the internment experience as uplifting for
participants. Censorship in this situation simply resulted from firing one
photographer whose world view was unacceptable to the government and hiring
another whose camera lens saw things far more compatibly with the official
view.

Conclusion

Karen Becker Ohrn concludes her study of Lange and Adams by noting,
"We have seen how the person behind the camera and the people in front of the
photograph provide the measure of 'truth' to which the camera record is held
accountable." "A photographic record," she adds, "when accepted as accurate,
reshapes popular opinion about a people's culture and history." So, too, does a
printed record that attempts to reveal the history of an era. Indeed, historians are
just beginning to explore the issue of freedom of the press during World War II.

We have many gaps in our exploration of this topic. Most of the
literature is narrow in its scope, and even the press-related issues are not
interwoven by most authors. Other wartime freedom of expression issues, such
as the sedition trials that right-wing extremists faced, persecutions of
conscientious objectors, problems faced by labor unions, victories won and
defeats endured by Jehovah's Witnesses, and a far more enlightened attitude on
free speech in wartime by U.S. Supreme Court justices, are hardly touched upon
by most authors. Washburn brings some of these points together in A Question
of Sedition, as does the author of this article in a chapter on freedom of
expression in World War II in her history of freedom of expression in the United
States. More remains to be done. The explorations undertaken thus far show a
limited understanding of freedom of the press on the part of American

56. Lauren Kessler, "Fettered Freedoms: The Journalism of World War II Japanese
58. Ibid., 32.
59. Margaret A. Blanchard, Revolutionary Sparks: Freedom of Expression in Modern
journalists. The U.S. Supreme Court in the 1930s and early 1940s was defining many of the parameters of that freedom, but whether those definitions had reached into everyday life is another question. And certainly the wartime heritage in the United States was that any right to free speech and free press was put under raps in wartime because the nation could not survive a cacophony of voices or harsh criticism when it had to fight a war.

Some scholars are just beginning to point out that dissonance is exactly what separated the United States from Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan and that silencing many voices made the United States little different from its mortal enemies. Indeed, such an argument was one that helped the Supreme Court see its way to overturning its earlier pro-flag salute decision and to grant, on Flag Day in the middle of the war, Jehovah’s Witness children the right to refuse to salute the flag. Whether the right to freedom of expression extended to criticism of government in wartime was another matter, and most journalists did not likely make the connection.

Most American journalists had no real experience with freedom of the press in wartime before they entered World War II. The World War I experience should have made them wary of government involvement in the process of information dissemination, but apparently it did not make them wary enough, for they fell right back into their old habits. Reporting of World War II, however, did lay the seeds for problems between the press and military in Korea and most notably in Vietnam. Many journalists apparently began to feel that a free press had a greater job to do in wartime than promote the government’s view of a conflict. At least that’s the way journalists acted later. But where do we find the seeds for that behavior in journalists of the World War II period? The events of the day need to be examined more critically, and the questions asked of the material need to be more pointed. Perhaps there should be less chronicling of what happened, and more asking of how these events contributed to the development of the role of a free press in society and to the present perennial conflict between the press and the national security state.

The author is William Rand Kenan Jr. Professor of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Historiographic Essay:
The Black Press: Homefront Clout Hits A Peak in World War II

By Patrick S. Washburn

Since 1986, when I published A Question of Sedition, I have watched with interest what else has appeared about the black press in World War II. There were ample clues in my book, as well as what others before me had done, such as Lee Finkle's Forum for Protest and John D. Stevens' Journalism Monographs on black war correspondents, that much remained to be written. Yet, little has appeared recently except for occasional journal articles or chapters in books on much wider topics. An example of the latter is Henry Lewis Suggs' P.B. Young, Newspaperman, which devoted twenty-two pages (out of 191 in the text) to Young's career in World War II.

Such a paucity is lamentable. The black press during World War II demands more attention from researchers simply because historically it was at the peak of its power, and that power was far from insignificant. Its circulation increased almost 50 percent during the war; several government agencies were extremely concerned about its influence with blacks, who could only get in-depth news about themselves from black newspapers because the white press virtually ignored them. The black press pushed for and obtained in 1944 the accreditation of the first black White House correspondent and a meeting of the Negro Newspaper Publishers Association with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The

latter was extremely important. This was the first time that a president had met with a group of American black journalists.

Making an even more compelling case for additional research on the black press in the war is the significance of this period to the black history that followed. A strong argument can be made that the push for equality by the black press during World War II set a solid foundation which helped make possible the Civil Rights movement in the 1950s. While this connection is not unknown to historians, my experience has been that it is all but unrecognized by what should be another major audiences for researchers—the public. I have spoken to numerous blacks about the black press in World War II, and I always conclude by pointing out why this period was important in terms of what occurred later. They usually have been enthralled and amazed. It is simply a part of their history of which they know virtually nothing. And almost uniformly, they want to know more, particularly because they are extremely interested in the Civil Rights era and anything that is tied to it. Suddenly, the black press in World War II becomes very relevant to them.

So, what are some of major topics involving the black press during the war which need further examination? Let me make six suggestions.

1. One of the most obvious is the black newspapers' coverage of black workers. I was introduced to the topic as a doctoral student at Indiana University when I took a history course on black workers since the Civil War and did a paper on the Pittsburgh Courier's coverage of black workers in 1942. In examining the paper's stories, which ran the gamut from reports on discriminatory treatment of black servicemen to the proud contributions of black women in airplane plants, I slowly realized that this was the black press' biggest story during World War II. It trumpeted the workers struggles and accomplishments week after week.

The employment gains during the war for both black men and black women were astronomical. Robert C. Weaver, who rose to become head of the black labor division of the War Manpower Commission during World War II, noted in 1946 that blacks experienced more occupational improvement between 1940 and 1944 than in the previous seventy-five years. As Pittsburgh Courier columnist Joseph D. Bibb noted prophetically in October 1942, "War may be hell for some, but it bids fair to open up the portals of heaven for us." That point was not lost on black publishers, who played up black workers' gains week after week not only because this was breaking news but because it was good for circulation.

Such gains sometimes were controversial. Particularly striking was a 1942 incident which involved the familiar separate-but-equal argument. In May, the Courier announced that Sun Shipbuilding Company in Chester, Pennsylvania, was going to build a separate plant that would hire only blacks

(from 5,000 to 6,000). The paper emphasized that this would end black unemployment in Chester and would provide some jobs for blacks who lived in nearby Philadelphia. In a subsequent issue in June, the Courier devoted almost a full page to the project, including nine photographs, and the number of workers, who would have an annual payroll of $21 million, was increased to nine thousand. The paper also noted that 69-year-old Emmett J. Scott, a Courier columnist and one of the country’s better known blacks, would be the yard’s personnel director.

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, black government officials, and the top educators at Tuskegee Institute attacked not only Sun’s obvious segregation plan but the Courier for supporting it. The paper noted that those groups called Sun’s plan a step backward, despite the large number of blacks who would be hired, because the absence of an integrated plant would make it easier to fire the blacks at the end of the war. On the Courier, only influential columnist George S. Schuyler criticized the segregated yard, and he indirectly attacked the Courier when he claimed that “even the most stupid Afro-American can see the disadvantages” of such a plan. “It must never be forgotten that segregation is only a palliative, not a solution,” wrote Schuyler. “It invariably worsens race relations and makes the subordination of Negroes to white whims and prejudices more permanent.” The Courier also printed a letter from a reader who wondered if the paper was playing up the Sun story just to increase circulation.

The Courier never backed down, however, from its support of the Sun project. In an August 1942 article, the paper argued:

Whenever a Negro or a group of Negroes can go into a project...gain administrative and executive experience, [and] learn the art of shipbuilding and manufacturing on a large mass production scale, it should be welcomed by ALL groups.... It means that we are moving a little further up the ladder of practical experience in business training and are making some financial gains, too. Regardless of what is said to the contrary, we will only succeed by letting this white world KNOW that

9. For articles noting the opposition to the Sun project, see the following in the Pittsburgh Courier: “Spooks Sought in Sun Shipyard Plant,” 13 June 1942; “NAACP Raps Shipbuilding Plan,” 13 June 1942; and Bert Cumby, “Three Pressure Groups Seek to Control the Destinies of the Negro in America,” 1 August 1942.
11. J.H. Jenkins, “Was Pegler Right?” Pittsburgh Courier, 25 July 1942. Jenkins may have been right. The circulation of large black newspapers grew rapidly in 1942, and the Sun project articles, certainly of interest to many readers, had the potential to increase the Courier’s circulation.
we have the ability, the training and the experience. The Sun project is a magnificent laboratory, if nothing more to get that training, experience and financial compensation.12

Black papers were replete in World War II with such examples involving workers, and they form a fascinating picture of a press on an important mission. It was a press that was quite willing to take gains wherever they appeared—if it meant playing up the contributions of women, for example, so be it. An in-depth look at this important coverage, and the changes which occurred over time, is long overdue.

2. Another important and absorbing topic is the connection during World War II between black newspapers and communism. Military Intelligence and the FBI noted numerous ties between black journalists and communists before the United States entered the war, and they continued to do so after the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Part of the reason for this fixation on Communists at the FBI, of course, was that the agents were conditioned to think along those lines, according to former agent William W. Turner:

Very many agents in the FBI, I learned, were hostile not only to avowed Communists but to the entire left-of-center spectrum.... Once inside the Bureau subculture, the agent was indoctrinated in the belief that only J. Edgar Hoover’s early recognition and exposure of the Communist menace had preserved the American way of life. The enemy was not only Communists and socialists, but ‘those liberals’ and ‘dangerous-thinking one worlders.’...Agents who carried these demon beliefs into the field were plainly predisposed to slant reports, subconsciously if not deliberately.13

My favorite example of just how far some of the agents would go in finding Communist connections comes from late 1942 when the special agent in charge in Oklahoma City complained about the Oklahoma City Black Dispatch. He noted in a report that the 19 September issue of the paper “is of a rather biased nature and is sprinkled with such well-known Communist phrases as ‘Civil Liberties,’ ‘Inalienable Rights,’ and ‘Freedom of Speech and of the Press.’”14

While such a report is laughable, numerous other FBI reports—as well as those from Military Intelligence—were much more damning. For instance, Military Intelligence forwarded to Hoover in July 1941 a black special agent’s report claiming that “Japanese and Communist press agents are releasing news in all available negro publications and in some cases, Communists or Communist

sympathizers are employed on the editorial staffs of these papers.” The agent labeled five black journalists (including three on the influential Pittsburgh Courier) as either Communists, Communist sympathizers, or radicals. He concluded that “the source of this subversive activity [should] be investigated at the earliest possible moment.” Then, on 21 February 1942, a Military Intelligence report listed seventeen black publications which it claimed were “carrying abnormally inflammatory articles, sponsored by Communists.” FBI reports were filled with the same type of material. In September 1943, Hoover mounted his major wartime attack on the black press, and blacks in general, in a 714-page “Survey of Racial Conditions in the United States.” Thirty pages of the report were devoted solely to the black press, looking specifically at seven newspapers. While the report did not claim that they had done anything illegal, it suggested that six of the papers were causing massive discontent among blacks and, in numerous instances, had Communist connections or were running pro-Communist propaganda.

The problem is that little is known about communist activities and the black press during World War II beyond what has been written from government records. An in-depth examination is needed to establish the accuracy of the government claims, how much and what the black press carried about communism, and the attitude of the black press toward communism.

3. The Negro Newspaper Publishers Association (NNPA), whose membership included all of the major publishers, also needs to be examined during the war years. It is best remembered for becoming the first group of American black journalists to meet with a U.S. president and for working out the details to have a black correspondent accredited to the White House.

But its influence spread far more widely than that, as indicated by its numerous correspondence and meetings with government officials in World War II. In the summer of 1943, for example, eleven members of the NNPA’s executive committee met over two days with Vice President Henry Wallace, Attorney General Francis Biddle, War Manpower Commission Chairman Paul McNutt, and Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy as well as officials from the navy, the War Production Board, the Selective Service, and the Office of War Information. The discussions zeroed in on discrimination and morale problems. Such contacts were important to the black press. Yet, little has been written about the NNPA in the war years and the group’s significance for the black press. This is a major oversight.

4. Little attention has been paid to editorial cartoons in the black press in World War II. Yet, even a cursory examination of black newspapers reveals some powerful, and sometimes unsettling, images.

15. Sherman Miles to J. Edgar Hoover, 11 July 1941, record group 165, MID 10110-2452-1174, box 3085, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
In my research on the black press, I was not paying particular attention to cartoons, but I recall two of them vividly. One was published in early 1942 in the Baltimore Afro-American following a vicious killing in Sikeston, Missouri. A mob of about six hundred whites stormed the jail and seized Cleo Wright, a black who was charged with attempting to rape a white woman. He was tied to a car, dragged at high speeds, and then hanged before being doused with gasoline and set on fire.18 The black press was incensed. The Afro-American ran an editorial cartoon showing Adolf Hitler and a Japanese soldier grinning from across an ocean as a white mob lynched Wright. The headline read: “Defending America Our Way.”19 The other editorial cartoon appeared in early 1943 in the People’s Voice, a paper that the FBI’s special agent in New York claimed was willing to follow the communist “line.” It showed a black soldier, who represented 450,000 black servicemen, with heavy chains on his wrists symbolizing the way blacks were hampered from fighting in the war. Hoover asked the Justice Department whether the cartoon violated the Espionage Act, which made it illegal to print anything that would obstruct the war effort, but he was told that it did not. Nevertheless, it resulted in an FBI investigation of the paper.

Such cartoons raise important questions about the black press. What were the most prevalent wartime themes; were the cartoons positive or negative images and was there a change that paralleled the increasingly positive tone in black press reporting as the war progressed; and what black newspapers were the most critical in their editorial cartoons and why were they like that? The answers would provide important information about an area of journalism which has received little attention.

5. An equally important content analysis needs to be conducted on the Pittsburgh Courier’s talented columnists. The paper was noted for the group, which included one woman, Marjorie McKenzie. They wrote well, they were extremely outspoken and controversial, and it was not unusual for them to express differing viewpoints.

The only one who has received much attention is Schuyler, who in World War II was one of the black press’ most famous journalists. He was fearless in attacking black inequalities without mincing his words, which was remarkable because it was well known that the FBI was closely monitoring the black press. On 10 January 1942, for example, he wrote that blacks would not be worse off if the Japanese won the war. Then, on 28 March 1942, he followed up by praising the Japanese for “their cleanliness, their courtesy, their ingenuity, and their efficiency.” As a result, the FBI investigated him heavily. But others were just as outspoken. Fellow columnist J.A. Rogers wrote on 20 February

18. Finkle, Forum for Protest, 105-07.
20. See E.E. Conroy to Director, FBI, 18 March 1943; Memorandum, John Edgar Hoover to Wendell Berge, 12 April 1943; and Memorandum, Wendell Berge to Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 30 April 1943. All are in file 100-51230, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
1943: "I am not half so scared about the Hitlers, Mussolinis, and Tojos thousands of miles across the seas as I am of the Hitlers, Mussolinis, and Tojos right here at home.... And as for what Hitler has said about Negroes I could quote you worse and in far greater volume from the Congressional Record."  

Those were strong words by strong writers. They clearly played a significant role in shaping public opinion or, at the very least, in seeing that public interest in important issues to blacks did not flag. Yet, no one has conducted an in-depth study of what they wrote during the war. Such a study is badly needed.

6. In 1987, Mary Alice Sentman and I published a Journalism Quarterly article about advertising in the Pittsburgh Courier in World War II. Using a content analysis, we showed that there was a sharp increase in the number of national ads in the newspaper in 1942-44, thus destroying the myth that there was only a mild advertising boom in the black press during the war. As the article explained, the 1940 excess profits tax and subsequent tax rulings were the major reasons for the increase.

While this article represented a major revision of what was known about wartime advertising in the black press, it did not begin to exhaust the subject. A closer examination is needed, using archives and interviews, of why the national corporations began advertising more heavily in World War II and where the advertising was placed. Did it mainly appear in the biggest and most prestigious black papers, such as the Pittsburgh Courier and the Chicago Defender, or was it also placed in smaller papers? In addition, the inside story of the part played by the black press’ advertising representatives has barely been touched. Finally, was there a connection between the dramatic increase in black press advertising, and thus burgeoning profits, and the newspapers’ less critical tone beginning in the last half of 1942? While there clearly were other major reasons for the more positive reporting, one has to wonder about the timing and the impact of the increased advertising on black press publishers who mainly depended on circulation to stay afloat.

**Conclusion**

The bottom line is that the black press was highly significant in World War II. In fact, my book suggests that it was the most significant wartime press in the United States, at least in terms of the Justice Department trying to determine how to deal with it under the Espionage Act. But such a finding only began to explore what I found to be a fascinating group of publications. It had far different ideas than the white press about what constituted objective reporting, it was far more adversarial and outspoken than the white press, and it reported a part of America that was largely unknown to those who only read the white,

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23. Ibid., 769-71.
mainstream press. Thus, instead of the few areas which have been examined so far, it is time that we have a fuller, more well-rounded picture of this press. Such research will make a clear contribution to a better understanding of twentieth-century mass communication history.

The author is a professor in the E.W. Scripps School of Journalism at Ohio University.
Historiographic Essay:
Shhh, Do Tell! World War II and Press-Government Scholarship

By Betty Houchin Winfield and Janice Hume

As historians we reconstruct past events from present evidence, and we build usable generalizations upon those reconstructions, to paraphrase Robin Winks in *The Historian as A Detective*.¹ Carl Becker’s classic “Everyman His Own Historian” points out that much of what we know about the past we know imperfectly, subject to the limitations of time and place, and that our history is in the process of becoming understood only tentatively.²

Winks and Becker could have been discussing World War II press-government histories. What we have reconstructed about that World War II era has been shaped by our priorities of what to research and by how to use newly released documents. Our research is still in the process of becoming, based on the present evidence, and is still growing through continued declassification of World War II documents as additions to the archives. Every media scholar researching this era is in one sense a generational historian as the result of new questions raised, based upon “a present,” as this essay will demonstrate.

Scholars have published hundreds of studies about various aspects of United States journalism during a world war. One generational example was well-known social psychology research about public attitudes following World War I, such as L.L. Thurstone’s *The Measurement of Attitudes* (1929); or about propaganda, such as Harold Lasswell’s *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (1927); or about public opinion, as found in Walter Lippmann’s *Public Opinion* (1922). These studies gave World War II scholars a foundation for their own research.

In many ways, the World War II publications have included American press-government influences and infringements, propaganda and censorship, particular wartime mass media and their specialists, war correspondents, gender and racial issues. While not pretending to be exhaustive—and generally ignoring the many fine post-war theses and dissertations—the authors will review the literature in these areas to help interested scholars plan for future research concerning World War II.

Press-Government Influences and Infringements

The interaction between the American government and the press during World War II has generated research in four areas: the President and the mass media of the day (mostly print media and newspapers); the institutional establishment of wartime secrecy, including communications with the Office of Censorship and the Office of War Information; military communications; and particular instances of conflict.


For an overall study within the context of the wartime crisis, see Betty Houchin Winfield’s FDR and the News Media (1990, 1994). In her comparison of the President’s interaction with the news media of the era with domestic and international crises, Winfield includes World War II chapters on the Office of War Information, the Office of Censorship, the wartime press conferences, and wartime public opinion polling.

Office of Censorship

Two weeks after Pearl Harbor, under the authority given the president by the War Powers Act, the president established the Office of Censorship (OC), Executive Order 8985. Roosevelt appointed Associated Press Executive Director Byron Price as the director. Both the President and Price were determined not to repeat the excesses of the Committee on Public Information during World War I. Instead, World War II censorship was to be at the origin of news gathering and reporting and done on a volunteer basis, prior to publication or broadcast. Censorship would be limited to defense matters, shipping data, weather conditions and details of war production. Censorship would not cover criticism and editorial comments. The radio guidelines prohibited “man on the street” interviews, special music requests, and audience participation quiz programs to stop any kind of coded messages.


During the postwar era of the 1950s, an interesting void occurred when there was scant research on censorship. Then in the 1960s, the research began on specifics. One study, for example, involves the censorship of reading matter: William J. Leary Jr.’s “Books, Soldiers and Censorship During the Second World War,” American Quarterly 20 (1968): 237-245. For specific war theaters and censorship, two Journalism Monographs came out then: Joy Schaleben’s “Getting the Story Out of Nazi Germany: Louis P. Lochner,” Journalism Monographs 11 (1969), and Jim A. Richslad, “The Press Under Martial Law: The Hawaiian Experience,” Journalism Monographs 17 (1970).

In the later ‘70s and early ‘80s, the questions of censorship had been raised by a revised FOIA, the Pike Study in Congress, and the declassification of documents. As examples, see these specific studies: Lawrence H. Larsen’s “War Balloons Over the Prairie: The Japanese Invasion of South Dakota,” South Dakota History 9 (1979); Otis E. Hays, Jr.’s “The Silent Years in Alaska: The Military Blackout During World War II,” Alaska Journal 16 (1986) and Hays’


Research possibilities on World War II censorship are endless. The theoretical gap is still there, and specific topics have yet to be covered. Soldiers’ mail, for example, could be the source of another censorship study. Another oral communication might reveal what World War II adult Americans heard, had known, and discussed about troop movements and weapons, but had not published or broadcasted. Questions could still be asked on the effects of censorship on a democracy during the war and afterward.

**Office of War Information**

Some six months after the war began, FDR reluctantly created the Office of War Information with Executive Order 9182 in June 1942. Roosevelt specified that he did not want a propaganda agency similar to the Creel Commission of World War I. Never fully having the support of the President or Congress, the OWI became the consolidation of four informational agencies: the Office of Government Reports, the Office of Facts and Figures, the Division of Information in the Office of Emergency Management and the Foreign Information Service.


Again, much after the war, in the late 1960s and into the 1970s, the more critical studies showed the ideological public fights over OWI functions, possible contradictory post-war visions, ideals of the country and portrayal of the war effort. More work is needed in these areas. One model critical examination on the domestic branch is Sidney Weinberg’s “What to Tell America: The Writers Quarrel in the Office of War Information,” Journal of American History 55 (1968): 79-83. Another is Alan M. Winkler’s detailed study, The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-1945 (1978).

Revisionism about the OWI came out in the 1980s, including a couple of noteworthy studies: David Lloyd Jones’s “Marketing the Allies to America,” Midwest Quarterly 29 (1988): 366-383, which shows the OWI manipulation of public opinion; and Richard Polenberg’s “The Good War? A Reappraisal of How World War II Affected American Society,” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 100 (1992): 295-323, which looks at how the activists, the press and Hollywood were all censored through threats and examines how the government built through manipulation the concept of “the good war.” Barbara Orbach’s “The Mirror Image: Black Washington in World War II Era Federal Photography,” Washington History 4 (1992): 4-25, 92-93, characterizes the nature of OWI efforts to present a secure democratic image of the homefront, which betrayed the inequities present in the nation’s capital.

Still open for research are the OWI overseas efforts of the Foreign Branch’s Office of Strategic Services, which became part of the postwar CIA. There has been scant work on the overseas operations, because of the
classification of documents. For one study, see Richard Harris Smith’s *OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Intelligence Unit* (1972).

### Propaganda Policies


Much of the theoretical World War II scholarship concerning propaganda either came out during the war, such as that by Paul Lazarsfeld, completed right afterwards on predictable effects, or has been done within the past twenty years.

During the war, Lazarsfeld and F. M. Stanton edited *Radio Research, 1942-43* (1944), which included such studies as H. Speier and M. Otis’ “German Radio Propaganda in France During the Battle of France,” (208-47); and J. Perry’s “War Propaganda for Democracy,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 6 (1942): 437-443.

Other studies followed, such as D. Lerner’s edited *Propaganda in War and Crisis: Materials for American Policy* (1951) which included Harold Lasswell’s chapter, “Political and Psychological Warfare,” (261-277) and C.I. Hovland, A.A. Lumsdaine, and F.D. Sheffield’s *Experiments on Mass Communication*, vol. 3, of *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II* (1949); and L.W. Doob’s *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (1948).

Specific kinds of propaganda interested 1970s scholars, including Harold Steinberg who examined art posters in *Paper Bullets, Great Propaganda Posters: Axis and Allied Countries and World War II* (1977). Robert Edwin Herzstein looks at the role of Paul Joseph Goebbels, in *The War that Hitler Won: Goebbels and the Nazi Media Campaign* (1978), which focuses on Goebbels and his uses of all forms of mass communication, along with his understanding of German life and attitudes for the creation, consolidation, and preservation of the Third Reich. Anthony Rhodes’ *Propaganda, the Art of Persuasion: World War II* (1976) and Gladys and Marcella Thum’s *Persuasion and Propaganda in War and Peace* (1974) are more critical assessments.

Among the best recent overall, general propaganda studies has been Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell’s *Propaganda and Persuasion, 2nd ed.* (1992), which includes a wider and more systematic examination of propaganda, in general, rather than its usual association with a particular war. Jowett and O’Donnell’s definition of propaganda is most useful: “Propaganda is the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognition, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.” (4)

Other useful compilations include K.R.M. Short’s edited *Film and Radio Propaganda in World War II* (1983), which covers allied and axis efforts, and the broader studies. They are Ted Smith III’s *Propaganda: A Pluralistic
Perspective (1989) and Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson’s Age of Propaganda: The Use and Abuse of Persuasion (1991). Much of the recent research has been specific by audience, by media, and by initiator. For example, see the gender specifics of Maureen Honey’s Creating Rosie the Riveter: Class, Gender, and Propaganda during World War II (1984), along with her “The Working Class Woman and Recruitment, Propaganda During World War II: Class Differences in the Portrayal of War Work,” Signs 8 (1983): 672-87. For one of the few earlier gender studies, see Jeanette Hodson’s “Propaganda Techniques Employed in the Women’s Army Corps,” Journalism Quarterly 25 (1948): 151-6. Holly Cowan Shulman shows the shift of the Voice of America from propaganda to hard news during the course of the war in The Voice of America: Propaganda and Democracy, 1941-1945 (1990).


The government used the 1938 Foreign Agents Registration Act and the 1917 Espionage Act to require all those mailing propaganda to the United States to register. Alex Nagy in “Word Wars at Home: U.S. Response to World War II Propaganda,” Journalism Quarterly 67 (1990): 207-213, examines the Post Office Department’s active role in evaluating, stopping, and burning some fifty tons of incoming materials, including those of America’s ally, the Soviet Union. As one of the few earlier studies, B.L. Smith wrote “Democratic Control of Propaganda through Registration and Disclosure,” Public Opinion Quarterly 6 (1942): 27-40. For one of the few of incoming propaganda studies, see E. Daniel Potts’ recent “American Newsmen and Australian Wartime Propaganda and Censorship, 1940-1942,” Historical Studies 21 (1985): 565-575.

World War II Advertising

Few analytical or theoretical studies have been done on war advertising; much needs to be done on the War Advertising Council, which supported the government’s wartime campaigns. During the war, two articles in this area appeared in Public Opinion Quarterly: C. Belden’s “Wartime Public Relations—A Survey,” 8 (1944):94-99; and H. Powell’s “What the War has Done to Advertising,” 6 (1942): 195-203.

One model example is Maureen Honey’s focus on the framework of the drive to bring women into formerly all-male, blue-collar defense jobs in “The ‘Womanpower’ Campaign: Advertising and Recruitment Propaganda During World War II,” *Frontiers* 6 (1981):50-56.

**Photojournalism and World War II**

World War II was the most visually portrayed war up to that time. Pictorial magazines, such as *Life* and *Look* and even *Yank*, published by the military, all had their own photographers. So, too, did the American military, not only to record the war, but for intelligence gathering. The studies also concerned the wartime visual images as descriptions in general, or specifically as to particular battles, photojournalists, and media outlets. Still needed are more theoretical, analytical studies as to media dictates, photojournalistic processes, and styles.

One excellent recent analysis within the broader context of war photography is Susan D. Moeller’s *Shooting War: Photography and the American Experience of Combat* (1989). Moeller has one section with three analytical chapters on World War II which categorize the context of “an urgent obligation,” the photographers as “a model partnership,” and the photographs as “an inspiration to sacrifice.”

For photography specifically as intelligence gathering, see Constance F. Smith’s *Evidence in Camera; The Story of Photographic Intelligence in World War II* (1974). Also concentrating on the official photographers, military historian Peter Maslowski recently examined the military documenters as providers of a much-needed record of those who were often published without credit or byline. In *Armed with Cameras: The American Military Photographers of World War II* (1993), Maslowski presents in comprehensive detail how the armed forces produced both still and motion picture photography for intelligence training, public information, and historical use. Combat photography helped in mapping enemy positions and was used to boost war-industry production and war bond drives.

In a flurry of recent descriptions of collections and photographic examples, future studies could be gleaned from the collection mentioned in Lawrence Dodd’s “Whitman College’s Photographic History of World War II,” *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 16 May 1990; or from Steven Hupp’s selections in *Allies: Great U.S. and Russian World War II Photographs* (1989); or Grigori Chudakor’s choices in *Allies: Great U.S. and Russian World War II Photographs* (1989).

Also of particular interest are the more focused geographic studies. See, in particular, Robert H. Schmidt’s *The Forgotten Front in Northern Italy: A World War II Combat Photographer’s Illustrated Memoir of the Gothic Line Campaign* (1994) or Michael D. Sherer’s, “Invasion of Poland in Four American Newspapers,” *Journalism Quarterly* 61 (1984): 422-426. For specific battles, the famous raising of the American flag on Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima, on 23 February 1945 has been the subject of one revisionist study by Lance Bertelsen
which shows the national icon, while thought to be a spontaneous take, was actually part of a planned expanded media coverage of the closing days of the war. See "Icons on Iwo," Journal of Popular Culture 22 (1989): 79-95.


Concentrations on specific photojournalists can be found in Great Photographers of World War II (1993); Jim Hughes' Eugene Smith, Shadow and Substance; The Life and Work of An American Photographer (1989) with sections on Smith's work as a Life photographer in the Pacific during the war.

For references to the photojournalistic process, see Elinor Stecker-Orel's "Fifty Years Ago: How We Looked and What We Wrote Back Then," Popular Photography December 1993; and "Photographer at War," American Heritage 36 (1985): 49-64, which features sixteen of the European theater photographs by Harvey Weber, head of the 166th Signal Photo Company in the Third Army.

For life on the homefront visually, see Richard H. Harms' more ethnographic work, "In the Mood: Grand Rapids During World War II," Michigan History 74 (1990): 25-29. Based upon a large Grand Rapids photographers' collection of portraits, commercial, and local photography for the Grand Rapids Herald, this article gives a glimpse of Mid-America homefront life.

Broadcasting and Film and World War II

Broadcasting as well as film continue to be the topic of recent studies; both areas are open to more research. The major problem has been in locating transcripts and other archives. One such archival reference would be Milo Ryan's History of Sound: A Descriptive Listing of the KIRO-CBS Collection of Broadcasts of the World War II Years and After in the Phonoarchive of the University of Washington (1963); the actual broadcasts have now been turned over to the Library of Congress. One such use of these archives has been Alfred Haworth Jones' careful analysis, "The Making of an Interventionist on the Air: Elmer Davis and CBS News, 1939-1941," Pacific History Review 42 (1973): 74-93.

A number of studies have been done on individual broadcasters. Foremost among the work done has been that about Edward R. Murrow, who helped prewar America first identify with the British war effort and then think about America's inevitable involvement. Edward Bliss Jr. edited many of the Murrow wartime broadcast transcripts for In Search of Light: The Broadcasts of Edward R. Murrow, 1938-1961 (1967). The Murrow papers are on microfilm and found at most university libraries.


A good description of wartime broadcasting and the Office of Censorship activities can be found in Erik Barnouw's *The Golden Web: A History of Broadcasting in the United States, Volume 11, 1933-1953* (1968). Other descriptions include those by Edward Bliss, a former CBS news veteran, who spans seventy years of radio broadcasting and chronicles World War II and the broadcasters in *Now the News: The Story of Broadcast Journalism* (1991); Eric Sevareid's classic best seller *Not So Wild A Dream* (1946), which gives a summary of his World War II years as one of the "Murrow boys" and tells of the transformation of his views from pacifism to intervention (the book was reprinted in 1978, and PBS made a film about it in 1988); and William J. Dunn's autobiography, *Pacific Microphone* (1988). Dunn was the only American radio correspondent to cover the war in the Pacific from 1941 until the Japanese surrender.

For broadcasts studies about particular events, see Michael C. Emery's "The Munich Crisis Broadcasts; Radio News Comes of Age," *Journalism Quarterly* 42 (1965): 576-580, 590, and Craig D. Tenney's "The Debate on Opinionated Broadcast News," *Journalism History* 7 (1980): 11-15, in which Tenney examines one dispute following the 1941 FCC ban on opinionated
broadcast news. The 1943 dispute was between CBS News Director Paul W. White and news analyst Cecil B. Brown’s editorial about Franklin D. Roosevelt’s trip to Quebec to discuss the war with Winston Churchill.

Recently, the radio studies concerned the holocaust coverage. As an example, Joyce Fine points out the lack of comprehensive coverage of the holocaust until 1945 in “American Radio Coverage of the Holocaust,” in Simon Wiesenthal Center Annual 5 (1988): 145-165. Fine explains that the omission was due to the episodic nature of radio broadcasting, as well as broadcast guidelines and codes which mandated objectivity and prohibited emotional controversy.


The more recent film studies have examined the types, the use, the origin, content, individual efforts, and war themes. The beginning categorization started with an examination of both fiction and factual American films: see Roger Manvell’s Films and the Second World War (1974). The Nazi use of film as propaganda and the “denazification”of the German film industry can be found in Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel’s The German Cinema (1971) World War II chapters. Jeanine Basinger traces the origins of combat films along with the films themselves, the individual efforts and the technological developments in The World War II Combat Film: Anatomy of a Genre (1986). Looking for facts is the subject of Robert Parrish’s “Fact Meets Fiction in World War II Celluloid Face-Off,” Smithsonian, March 1986, 164-168. Stephen Vaughn and Bruce Evensen studied wartime film portrayals of reporters as seekers of truth in a free democratic system as contrasted to fascists and their controls of information in “Democracy Guardians: Hollywood’s Portrait of Reporters, 1930-1945,” Journalism Quarterly 68 (1991): 829-839. Bernard Dick evaluates the myth of a united America by examining the films of the 1940s when the most memorable World War II films appeared. See Dick’s The Star-Spangled Screen: The American World War II Film (1985). Still needed are studies about newsreels.
News Content


The Stars and Stripes newspaper has been the topic of studies spanning more than fifty years. Right after the war, Bob Hutton and Andy Rooney describe the newspaper generally in The Story of the Stars and Stripes (1946). David Breger presented his cartoons and wartime caricatures in “GI Joe” (“Private Breger”) in From the Pages of Yank and Stars and Stripes (1945). The war according to the Stars and Stripes can be found in The Stars and Stripes Story of World War II (1960). The most recent of specific emphasis are those by Ken Zumwalt, The Stars and Stripes: World War II and the Early Years (1989) and n.a., The Pacific Stars and Stripes: The First 40 Years, 1945-1985 (1985). What the military thought would be most newsworthy can be found in The Stars and Stripes: World War II Front Pages (1985).


For print media coverage of the holocaust, the best among the 1980s studies is Beyond Belief, The American Press and the Coming of the Holocaust, 1933-1945 (1986), by Deborah E. Lipstadt. Lipstadt shows how Americans, through their news media, were told of Hitler’s developing Holocaust, but were told in such a subtle way that it made it easy for people to ignore the disaster. Robert W. Ross in So It Was True, The American Protestant Press and the Nazi Persecution of the Jews (1980) found conflicting reports and other evidence in fifty-two Protestant publications about the persecution. He interprets the resulting inattention in light of Protestant doctrines, hopes, and prejudices, resulting in a postwar moral dilemma.
War Correspondents Abroad and On the Homefront

The journalist operating under war conditions has been the fodder of many studies. The publications here are mostly about war correspondents and their coverage. The best accounting of how the correspondent operates under war conditions and becomes a casualty of truth can be found in Philip Knightly’s book, The First Casualty: From the Crimea to Vietnam: The War Correspondent As Hero, Propagandist and Mythmaker (1975). Knightly has a chapter on the American World War II correspondent, “Remember Pearl Harbor, 1917-1945.” Mary S. Mander specifies the uniqueness of the World War II correspondent in “American Correspondents During World War II,” in American Journalism 1 (1983): 17-30.

Recollections are part of many World War II correspondents’ accounts. The best known is Studs Terkel’s Pulitzer Prize winning book, The Good War, An Oral History of World War II (1984) and the chapter, “Up Front With Pen, Camera and Mike,” which quotes OWI workers, writers, photographers, filmmakers, and cartoonists, such as Bill Mauldin.

Richard Collier’s Fighting Words (1990) chronicles the works of a number of war correspondents, including Ernie Pyle, A.J. Leibling, Harrison Salisbury, Quentin Reynolds, and Martha Gellhorn, and photographers Margaret Bourke-White and Frank Capa and the censorship they faced.

For particular war correspondents, see David Nicols’ edited Ernie’s War: The Best of Ernie Pyle’s World War II Dispatches (1986), which gives Pyle’s columns and dispatches on the foot soldier, the scenes of the war-torn countries and infantry life, along with an extensive biographical essay. Lee Graham Miller’s biography gives a general overview, The Story of Ernie Pyle (1950). Ernie Pyle’s personal narratives are found in his own Ernie Pyle in England (1941) and Here is Your War (1944).


Over the years William Shirer has written numerous personal accounts of his war years. Those include Berlin Diary (1941); The Twentieth Century Journey: A Memoir of a Life and the Times (1976); “To Bring You The Picture of Europe Tonight (A Journalist’s Personal Experiences In Austria During the Rise of Hitler),” American Heritage 35 (1984): 65-81.

The individual correspondent’s stories range from Art Weithas’s edited *Close to Glory: Yank Correspondents Untold Stories of World War II* (1992) to I.F. Stone’s collected wartime columns in *The War Years, 1939-1945* (1988). Stone wrote that he tried to pressure the country to rebuke isolationism, to aid the Jewish refugees, and to avoid the monopolistic profiteers.

**Women Journalists**

Much of the work on women war correspondents has been in the last decade or so. The themes have been that women claimed news beats, despite military rules and military chauvinism, and faced the additional burdens of being patronized by soldiers and not being taken seriously by the officers. They were there during the D-Day landings, the Rhine crossing, and the linkups between the allies on the Elbe River. Much of the writing shows gender differences in story topic and reporting as the women war correspondents appeared to focus more on the human dimension of war rather than the more typical war reporting of weapons, body counts, and troop maneuvers. A general overview can be found in Lilya Wagner and M. Hodersalmon’s “Women War Correspondents of World War II,” in *The Women’s Studies International Forum*, 15 (1992): 323, based upon Wagner’s 1987 University of Nebraska thesis by the same name.

Julie Edwards, who covered both the Korean and Vietnam Wars as well as riots and revolutions in 125 countries, gives an excellent context of women correspondents during World War II in *Women of the World: The Great Foreign Correspondents* (1988). She recounts the accomplishments of such correspondents as Anna O’Hare McCormick, Dorothy Thompson, Martha Gellhorn, and Margaret Bourke-White.

For particular journalists, Dorothy Thompson has been the subject of a number of studies. The most extensive include wartime chapters and are in Peter Kurth’s *American Cassandra: A Life of Dorothy Thompson* (1990) and Marion K. Sanders’ *Dorothy Thompson: A Legend of Her Time* (1973). John N. Muresianu features Thompson along with other journalists in *War of Ideas: American Intellectuals and the World Crisis, 1938-1945* (1988).

For those women who worked for the Axis, see John C. Edwards’ *Atlanta’s Prodigal Daughter: The Turbulent Life of Jane Anderson as Expatriate and Nazi Propagandist* (1984) concerning an American newspaper
correspondent and Nazi radio propagandist, and two biographies on Toyko Rose. One translated from the Japanese is Masayo Duus’s biography, *Tokyo Rose, Orphan of the Pacific* (1979). Russell W. Howe’s *The Hunt for Tokyo Rose* (1990) contends that Toyko Rose, usually identified as Iva Toquri D-Aquino, was actually more than a dozen women who broadcasted. Howe argues that D-Aquino was the one punished, even though she was forced by the Japanese to broadcast a show with little more than chitchat and music, and even though the broadcasts were not proven to be detrimental to the war effort.

**African-American Journalists**

Since the 1960s Civil Rights movements, several excellent studies on African-Americans have added to our knowledge. Much remains to be done, including, for example, a study about the African-American soldier and press as a point of coverage. A major recent study is by Patrick S. Washburn, *A Question of Sedition: The Federal Government’s Investigation of the Black Press During World War II* (1986). Washburn shows how Attorney General Frances Biddle opposed the sedition prosecutions that FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover advocated during the first six months of the U.S. involvement in the war. Both Hoover and the President were concerned about racial dissension and demands for civil rights. Other studies include those by Lee Finkle, *Forum for Protest; The Black Press During World War II* (1975), and John Stevens, who discusses twenty-seven black newspaper correspondents who covered the war for the major black newspapers in “Black Correspondents of World War II Cover the Supply Routes,” *Journal of Negro History* 57 (1972): 395-406 and the war correspondents in “From the Back of the Foxhole: Black Correspondents in World War II,” *Journalism Monographs* 27 (1973).

**Japanese Americans**

Most studies which examine the government’s civil liberties infringements of its Japanese-American citizens have been in the past decade and focus on the Japanese-American press in the camps and general press, public reaction and indifference to the relocation. Lloyd Chiasson, in searching the editorials of three major California dailies immediately before and after the relocation order, found little support for the freedom of the Japanese Americans. Instead, the newspapers were used more in a government publicist role. See his “Japanese-American Relocation During World War II: A Study of California Editorial Reactions,” *Journalism Quarterly* 68 (1991): 263-269. Lauren Kessler found little press criticism of the War Relocation Authority, which ran the internment camps in “Fettered Freedoms; The Journalism of World War II Japanese Internment Camps,” *Journalism History* 15 (1988): 70-79. In contrast, Gary V. Okihiro and Julie Sly found little newspaper support for the west coast removal of Japanese Americans. See “The Press, Japanese-Americans, and Concentration Camps,” *Phylon* 44 (1983): 66-83.


Most useful for this area of research is the compilation of Gerald Stanley’s “Justice Deferred: A Fifty-Year Perspective on Japanese-Internment Historiography,” Southern California Quarterly 74 (1992): 181-206. Stanley examines the short period of moderation before the evacuation from 7 December 1941 until 11 February 1942, a time period neglected by historians, which points to the power of the false rumors of Japanese sabotage and espionage spread by journalists and radio commentators and the U.S. defeats in the Pacific.

Conclusion

Despite the number of war studies, historians reflect the broader scholarship and societal interests of their time. Histories about journalism and World War II are still in the process of becoming. Some fifty years later, scholars still can raise new questions and try to understand that war era with a variety of new historical methods, topics and theories to test. Each generation of media historians writes a different history, based upon new interests and subsequent knowledge. Similar to the changes in historical research, studies on journalism and World War II reflect distinct research patterns. The scholarly publications go from purely descriptive general studies after the war to specific aspects by the 1960s, to critical studies in the 1960s and 1970s, to revisionism in the 1980s and 1990s. After the Civil Rights movement scholars began focusing on African-Americans, women, and Japanese-Americans, and World War II journalism in some form. In the 1980s content studies examined coverage and non-coverage of the holocaust.

Today, journalism research is more theoretical with so much more known about the mass media news processes, decision making, news biases, and media-bound dictates. The effects research is much more refined. These bits of knowledge can help scholars focus in new ways on World War II and the press. Like so many missing puzzle pieces, research areas are still available for greater
insight into this all-out effort. Many more pieces can be added to the giant puzzle of World War II and the mass media. This essay is a modest attempt to lay the literature groundwork for that yet-to-be-done research. Many scholarship gaps continue to exist and await future historians’ questions, efforts, criticisms revisions, and additions. Shhhhh! Do tell.

Winfield is a professor and Hume a doctoral candidate at the University of Missouri School of Journalism.
Research Note:
The Conscientious Objection of Lew Ayres

By Arthur J. Kaul

Screen actor Lew Ayres achieved acclaim for his role in the “war film masterpiece” All Quiet on the Western Front (1930), an adaptation of Erich Remarque’s best-selling novel (1929), and the first American film “to show the war from the viewpoint of ordinary German soldiers.” 1 Twelve years after the debut of All Quiet on the Western Front, Ayres became the first film star to claim conscientious objection to fighting in World War II. During the week Ayres reported to an alternative service work camp near Wyeth, Oregon, Americans learned that Japanese at Bataan in the Philippine Islands had “crushed and captured” the largest military force in United States history 2 and 139,000 Japanese-Americans, who, like Ayres, were viewed as a threat to the war effort, were moved into internment camps. 3

Lew Ayres was doubtlessly the most celebrated of the approximately 14,000 Americans designated as conscientious objectors in the first year after America’s involvement in World War II. 4 He was co-starring in MGM’s popular “Dr. Kildare” series. Public reaction to Ayres’ conscientious objection was swift and damaging. Audiences threatened to boycott his latest film, “Dr. Kildare’s Victory,” and theater operators refused to screen Ayres’ movies. News accounts of Lew Ayres’ conscientious objection first appeared on 31 March 1942 and ceased a week later. News coverage, editorials, and letters to the editor devoted to Ayres’ conscientious objection in three major daily newspapers—Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune, and New York Times—between 31 March and

2. “The Bataan Tragedy,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 10 April 1942, 10. The editorial commented that “the hard truth is that never before in the military history of our country has so large a force under our flag been crushed and captured.”
4. “14,000 Conchies,” Time, 18 January 1943, 66.68.
7 April 1942 offer a glimpse into the wartime conflict between individual moral autonomy and preservation of the state.

The *Los Angeles Times' initial story appeared beneath a photo of Ayres undergoing his draft physical examination, proclaiming that the actor was enroute to a camp for "Men Who Have Scruples Against War." The article reveals an instructive attitude about an actor with "scruples against war."

Lew Ayres, actor, scored his first hit in motion pictures years ago playing the role of a bewildered German soldier of World War I unable to understand why he was in the trenches. Last night Ayres left for a conscientious objectors camp at Cascade Lockes, east of Portland, Oregon. He was still bewildered.5

The *Los Angeles Times* portrayed Ayres as a "bewildered" and "befuddled" 33-year-old divorced actor with no dependents who was classified in 1-A fighting trim. After passing his physical examinations on 19 January 1942, Ayres requested exemption from military service on "religious grounds," claiming a "religion of his own," according to the chairman of Selective Service Board No. 216 in Beverly Hills.6 The U.S. Justice Department and U.S. Attorney General’s office had investigated Ayres’ claim and granted permission for alternative noncombat service. Conscientious objection was the only course to take, Ayres said, to avoid "a nightmare of hypocrisy and deceit."7

The next day, the *Los Angeles Times' coverage ("Ayres 'Conchie Camps' Decision Stuns Hollywood") seemed to discredit the actor with extensive quotation from the 44-year-old author of *All Quiet on the Western Front*, Erich Maria Remarque, who had registered in the draft and, unlike Ayres, was "awaiting whatever summons he may receive from his draft board." Ayres had indicated that Remarque’s novel had a substantial impact on his pacifist outlook. "It is too bad the story had this effect on Ayres," Remarque commented. "I am sure he has made a mistake."8 Significantly, Ayres' rationale for conscientious objection was presented at the end of the article—after Remarque had told readers the actor "made a mistake." The newspaper quoted from Ayres’ prepared statement about his objection:

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6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
If I have learned one thing from my philosophical and theological studies, one issue on which nearly all have agreed, it is that man’s troubles are the result of himself. That is, the selfish emotions and passions within myself. And any emancipation from these conditions must be accomplished for himself—by himself. Individually and alone. Maybe collectively later, but first as man and then as mankind. Now let us consider war. Is it not strange that no one really wants war, yet few think life can be successfully, or, at least respectful lived without it? We all shake our heads sadly over our predicament, then wait for the other fellow to stop first. So in my opinion, we will never stop wars until we individually cease fighting them, and that’s what I propose to do.9

The Los Angeles Times’ report concluded with the observation that his life at Civilian Public Service Camp No. 21 near Wyeth “will be in great contrast to his work in films, a career which many think terminated with his decision.”10 Ayres’ film career was in jeopardy. The Chicago-based firm of Balaban & Katz announced that Ayres’ films had been banned in one hundred of its theaters. A company official explained: “We are not in sympathy with Ayres’ attitude, and we don’t believe the movie-going public is either.”11 An Associated Press story quoted Ayres saying that he is “not too optimistic” about Hollywood’s “investment in him as a film star,” concluding: “Of course, I understand that my film career may be over....I had tried to take all that into consideration when I decided to refuse to fight.”12 In Hackensack, New Jersey, Ayres’ latest film “was withdrawn from a double bill at the Fox Theater,” the theater manager stating that “public demand was so great I had no alternative.”13 The New York Times reported that Loew’s Inc. officials acknowledged “a few bookings of the Ayres films have been canceled” in the New York area, and other cancellations would be accepted “without question.14

The Ayres story contrasted starkly with other Hollywood movie stars. The Tribune reported that actress Mary Pickford’s husband would substitute “an airplane’s ‘stick’ for his bandleading baton and join the naval air force as an instructor.” “I think Buddy is doing what he should do,” she said, “and just what

9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
all our men are going to have to do before we win this war."15 The Pickford story put Ayres’ conscientious objection into an ideological relief, portraying Ayres as a noncontributor to the war effort and out of step with Hollywood.

Although the Los Angeles Times’ coverage of Ayres’ conscientious objection ceased after the 2 April issue—no other stories were exclusively devoted to him—the Times discredited the actor’s position by linking his name with two isolationist anti-war militants. The arrest of Robert Noble and Ellis G. Jones for alleged sedition and criminal libel of U.S. General Douglas MacArthur received front page coverage on 1 and 2 April. Accused of violating the 1917 Sedition Act, Noble and Jones were charged with publishing “seditious utterances” in the “Friends of Progress” magazine and with defaming MacArthur in speeches at a public meeting on 25 March 1942. The magazine was accused of saying “the great Gibraltar-like General MacArthur...just ran out in the dead of night.”16 Noble and Jones were accused of saying: “MacArthur’s stand in the Philippines is not bravery but damn foolishness,” “The intelligent thing to do would be to surrender,” and “We are engaged in a phony war.”17 On 1 and 2 April, the Los Angeles Times counterposed what it called “the weirdly incongruous verbal and written outpourings of the Friends of Progress” against the comments of California Attorney General Earl Warren, who started the action in the case. The newspaper quoted Warren: “If General MacArthur and his boys can protect our nation at their posts of duty across the Pacific at Bataan, the State of California can and will at least protect their good name at home.”18 The “incensed” state attorney general said it was “outrageous” that

Noble and Jones and those for whom they are mouthpieces should be permitted to tear down the efforts of 130,000,000 good Americans to protect this nation against Axis aggression....Their purpose is to destroy the war effort and with our form of government. The State of California will not permit this to be done. Neither they nor anyone else will be permitted to slander the gallant soldiers who are offering their lives to protect ours at home.19

15. “Mary Pickford To Go To Florida To Be Near Naval Husband,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 2 April 1942, 2.
17. “Noble and Jones Held for Trial,” Los Angeles Times, 2 April 1942, 1,6.
19. “Noble and Jones Held for Trial,” Los Angeles Times, 2 April 1942, 6. Twenty-two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court with Chief Justice Earl Warren considered the libel case of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), against what it called “the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include attacks on government and public officials.” The court’s majority opinion stated: “Criticism of their official conduct does not lose its constitutional protection
The Los Angeles Times’ linkage of Lew Ayres to Noble and Jones discredited Ayres’ pacifism by connecting it to subversives. The newspaper quoted Noble:

I see Lew Ayres, the movie actor, is a great shining light...I am thrilled to see anyone with such convictions, one who is courageous enough to do as he believes. I am a conscientious objector. I was in the last war.20

The Times pointed out that Noble had enlisted in the Navy before World War I, “had run away three times and was finally dishonorably discharged,” quoting Noble as saying that Ayres was “the greatest man in Hollywood today. He will come back and be a conqueror.”21 The Times used boldface subheads (“Comments on Ayres” and “Praises Lew Ayres”) in both articles to draw attention to the spurious connection between “subversives” and a celebrity “conchie.”

The Chicago Tribune’s coverage of Lew Ayres, like the Los Angeles Times, seemed to legitimate his claim to conscientious objector status, reporting that federal officials had approved his deferment. The Tribune’s page one story (“Ayres Ordered Into Camp as War Objector”) quoted the draft board chairman who said “Ayres’ objections to military service were sincere.”22 By contrast, the Tribune also published a story about the trial of a Jehovah’s Witness who refused military service on the grounds he was a minister, reporting that the “draft dodger” was sentenced to a three-year prison term.23 The Tribune described Ayres’ living conditions at the Oregon work camp supported by the Brethren and Mennonite churches as something of a roughing-it vacation. Ayres would have three “recreational leaves” from the camp each week, the Tribune reported, and he was dining rather nicely on his first day in camp: “After luncheon, which consisted of vegetable soup, curried rice, canned cherries, coffee with condensed cream, bread and butter, Ayres remarked: ‘Gee, this is an ideal spot.’”24

The New York Times’ coverage of the Ayres case portrayed the actor as an oddity in a story with the tone of an obituary for an eccentric: “Ayres seemed to live within himself. He had few intimate friends in Hollywood, save a handful of actors who appeared with him in ‘All Quiet.’ He lived alone on his mountaintop, where he composed music and made a hobby of weather

merely because it is effective criticism and hence diminishes their official reputations.”
21. Ibid.
predicting.”25 The Times presented Ayres’ rationale, quoting from the objector’s prepared statement:

It was early in childhood that I was first introduced to the Christian creed of non-resistance to evil. It is a vague and nebulous doctrine to the United States and it has taken years of gradual realization and patience for me to understand the full significance of its world-healing possibilities. Today I stand convinced that as like attracts like, hate generates hate, murder incites revenge, so charity and forgiveness reflect their kind, and the world’s brotherhood will be made manifest not through economic experiences but through man’s awakening to the irresistible power of love.26

The message from the press coverage in the Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune, and New York Times was implied though clear: Lew Ayres was not contributing to the war effort, his pacifism was out of step with Hollywood, and the movie-going public had rejected his stance and his films. Although ostensibly “genuine” and “sincere” in his beliefs, Ayres was portrayed as a “bewildered” and “befuddled” eccentric who at least one newspaper directly linked to subversives. Not only did Ayres not go to jail for his refusal to fight, he entered a work camp in which he appeared well-fed, worked forty hours a week, and enjoyed the luxury of recreational leaves—far from the front.

News coverage of Lew Ayres’ conscientious objection prompted editorials and letters to the editors of the New York Times and Chicago Tribune. Within five days of the first story on Ayres, the Tribune published a letter to the editor which purported to represent the views of fifty soldiers at Chanute Field, Illinois, in regard to conscientious objectors: “The average soldier is just as confused as to the right or wrong of war; this war or any other. But at times such as the present, every one tries to submerge his own feelings, to do his best for the majority.”27 The soldiers believed the Ayres publicity would “harm the morale of the country” and offered an alternative to sending conscientious objectors to work camps: “The best thing we can think of is to put them on everyday k.p. to wait on the men who put their own objections aside to fight for the country they love and the freedom they enjoy.”28

The Tribune’s editorial, “Lew Ayres,” commented on the actor’s contention that the only way to stop war was to refuse to fight them:

25. “Lew Ayres is a Conscientious Objector: His First Major Role was in Anti-War Film,” New York Times, 31 March 1942, 23.
28. Ibid.
That fallacy is fortunately not widespread and in embracing it Ayres has started down a hard and lonely road. His pictures have already been withdrawn by Chicago exhibitors and his action has sacrificed his profitable career as an actor, a result that he probably foresaw when he took it.\textsuperscript{29}

The \textit{Tribune} also commented on the nature of wartime objection, suggesting that Ayres was fortunate to be in a work camp:

Ayres is obviously not an object for commendation and he is fortunate that this nation with its tradition of liberty of conscience admits, while it cannot encourage, the right of a genuine conscientious objector to refuse to fight. In enemy countries a man of his beliefs would not find himself in the healthful surroundings of a work camp.\textsuperscript{30}

Again, the \textit{Tribune} begrudgingly accorded Ayres a degree of legitimacy. He was a “genuine” conscientious objector and “not the most despicable character in the entertainment business. When he decided he didn’t want to fight he admitted it and took the consequences,” unlike others in Hollywood who would “run down to Washington and get a bombproof job ‘bolstering public morale,’ or in ‘public relations.'”\textsuperscript{31}


If all Americans believed, as Lew Ayres does, the creed of non-resistance to evil, the Nazis could do whatever they wished in this country. If all humanity believed the same creed there would be no Nazis and no war. A minute handful of Americans do believe this creed. We have no reason to hope, from what we know of the human mind and human emotions, that the whole world will accept it in any time we can foresee. But let us not on that account hold back an honest tribute to a man who gives up a rich career and faces public ridicule and contempt because he will not hide the faith that is in him.\textsuperscript{32}

The editorial also urged restraint in criticism of Ayres, while distancing the actor from mainstream American attitudes: “The avowed faith of the vast majority of people in this country is that no sacrifice is too great if it will help beat down

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
the Nazi abomination.”

Nevertheless, the editorial reverted to the attitude implied in its news columns—Ayres’ position represented an eccentricity, “a doctrine for the other-worldly and for saints, and there will never be enough of those to interfere with our war efforts.”

The *Times*’ editorial and news coverage prompted letters to the editor from Socialist Norman Thomas and J. Hibberd Taylor, clerk for the annual New York meeting of the Society of Friends. Taylor was authorized to express the Society’s appreciation for the *Times*’ “tolerant and respectful” statement on Ayres’ pacifism. Thomas’ letter applauded the editorial’s “degree of understanding and insight,” suggesting that conscientious objectors be used for relief work, such as raising food and “caring for human needs,” rather than the more typical tasks that he described as “a kind of glorified and more strenuous leaf-raking.”

**Conclusion**

The case of Lew Ayres illustrates the fragility of moral autonomy in wartime. His celebrity status thrust the issue of wartime pacifism into the public domain. The press found itself in the unwieldy position of concurrently defending the interests of individual moral autonomy and the preservation of the state. Press coverage of his unpopular stance reflected the rationalization of those competing individual and collective claims.

News coverage and editorial comment in the *Los Angeles Times*, *Chicago Tribune*, and *New York Times* reflected an ambivalent moral posture in several key respects. First, the reporting protocol of quoting official sources (draft board chairman, Justice Department) tended to legitimate Ayres’ claims as “sincere” and “genuine.” Yet, he also was portrayed as “bewildered” and “bewildered” regarding the war, while Americans knew precisely why—“beat down the Nazi abomination”—they were fighting. Second, Ayres was depicted as anti-social, a withdrawn loner out of step with Hollywood and with mainstream America (“other-worldly”). The banning of his films reflected public censure. His unwillingness to “submerge” his morality, while commendable, was a position taken by an inconsequential, hence tolerable, minority. Third, while Americans were rolling up their sleeves to promote the war effort, press coverage portrayed Ayres as a non-contributor. Unlike other Hollywood celebrities eager to do their part, Ayres retreated to the remote safety of a work camp for a life of comparative luxury far from the front. Finally, under the guise of defending Ayres’ liberty of conscience, the press actively discredited him (“I am sure he has made a mistake”). Ayres’ name was directly linked, in the *Los Angeles Times*, to militants charged with “villainous” acts of wartime subversion.

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33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
Within the World War II climate of opinion, press coverage of Ayres’ beliefs and actions represent a trivialization of conscience. The press as moral arbiter portrayed him as a tolerable aberration, yet potentially dangerous to the survival of America. The obituary-like tone of the coverage and commentary represented an attempt to submerge the realities of war so the moral dimension of the western front could again be quiet.

The author is an associate professor of journalism at the University of Southern Mississippi.
Despite the enormous scholarly literature on the foreign policy of the Third Reich, the exact foreign policy aims of Adolf Hitler remain the subject of endless controversy.¹ This debate has developed into a contest between those who believe Hitler had a consistent program for aggression, and scholars who see the Nazi dictator as an “unprincipled opportunist” who responded to opportunities presented to him by foreign statesmen and the ebb and flow of events.² While this is an extremely important debate, it has increasingly narrowed into a dispute about whether the ultimate goal of Nazi foreign policy was Lebensraum in eastern Europe and a limited European war, or a bid for world mastery and the planning of a truly global conflict. Nevertheless, as a result of this concentration on the ultimate goals of Hitler’s foreign policy, important aspects have been relegated to the periphery. One such neglected area has been the link between Hitler’s views on the press and his “timetable for war.” In fact, some reflections on this question are long overdue. Indeed, any discussion of Hitler’s foreign policy aims which ignores the importance of the press is seriously impoverished.

² See, for example, Milan Hauner, “Did Hitler Want World Dominion?,” Journal of Contemporary History (1978), who suggests Hitler wanted total world mastery, and A. Kuhn, Das Faschistische Herrschaftssystem und die Modern Gesellschaft, (Hamburg, 1974), who argues that Hitler’s final aims were centered on the conquest of Lebensraum in Eastern Europe.
Adolf Hitler had a long standing obsession with the power of the press. For example, in Mein Kampf, Hitler wrote, “The most effective share in political education...falls to the press” which he defined as “a kind of school for grown ups.” This fascination with the power of the press can be traced back to his years in Vienna before 1914. It was in the Austrian capital that Hitler first observed how “the clever craftsmen” of that “machine for mass education” were “able to create a definite public opinion.” He was also sure that the press was a “great power,” with an influence over public opinion which was hardly possible to overestimate. However, Hitler always made a distinction between a democratically controlled press, which “encouraged internal division,” and a state controlled press that could produce a “unity of opinion and will” for a successful nationalist movement.

This obsession with the press was linked to his virulent anti-Semitism. Hitler was quite convinced that a free press was always at the service of “world Jewry,” or an ill-defined “worldwide Jewish conspiracy.” Moreover, the Nazi leader suspected that any free press was controlled by “Jews,” seemingly responsible for all manner of cataclysmic events. Thus, for example, Hitler believed Britain entered the war in 1914 largely because of “scaremongering” by the “Jewish controlled British press.” Similarly, he insisted that “ninety-nine percent of the British press was in Jewish hands” and controlled by “Northcliffe—a Jew!” He held similar views on the American press (“A Jewish democratic press”), and he blamed the entry of America into World War I on the press. Hence Hitler claimed: “What cause finally led America to enter war against Germany? An unwarranted press campaign and once more it was the Jewish concern of the Hearst Press which set the tone of the agitation against Germany.” It is probably worth adding that Hitler was quite convinced that the American press was exclusively in the possession of (“the Jew,”) William Randolph Hearst.

The importance of these views for the policy aims of Nazi Party is well illustrated by reference to the party program before 1933. This contained several promises to curb the power of the press. First, the Nazis promised to make the press an instrument of national self-education controlled by and working on behalf of the state. Second, the Nazis were committed to wage legal warfare against “political lies in the press.” Third, a pledge was made that all editors and contributors to newspapers must be German citizens. Fourth, non-Germans were to be prohibited from financial participation in German newspapers. Finally,

5. Ibid., 47-51.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., 66.
the Nazis promised they would "not tolerate any press whose sole aim is to destroy what we have undertaken to create."10

After 1933, these promises were quickly fulfilled. The Reich Ministry of Propaganda, in cooperation with the Reich Press Chamber, introduced systematic control over everyone involved in the writing, production, editorship, and distribution of German newspapers. On 1 November 1933, 1,473 independent publishers lost their right to publish. An "Editor's Law" and a system of secret press directives from the Ministry of Propaganda turned the German free press into a mere puppet of the Nazi will. By the end of 1933, all newspapers opposed to the aims of the regime had been closed down. As a result, everyone was subject to political vetting. A Reichspressshule became a training ground for a "new race" of National Socialist journalists.11 In a remarkably short space of time, therefore, Hitler had transformed the German press into the "great instrument" of National Socialism he had promised in opposition.

However, while the operation of the German press within the Third Reich has been well documented, the same cannot be said of Nazi efforts to influence foreign public opinion. This is unfortunate, because Hitler's obsession with the press was quite clearly linked to his foreign policy aims. For example, in 1933, Hitler defined the influencing of "public opinion abroad towards a favourable view of our foreign policy objectives" as the chief aim of Nazi propaganda.12 However, such activities had long been in motion. A significant feature was to prevent the resurgance of a "scaremongering," anti-German British press. Before 1933, the task of gaining a favorable image for the Nazi Party through informal channels was given to Alfred Rosenberg and German journalists of the Volkscher Beobachter.13 The prime objective was to persuade English newspapers to publish favorable reports on Hitler and the Nazi Party. The Times, the self-styled "voice of British government," was singled out for special treatment. For example, consider the words of Ralph Deakin, The Times foreign news editor:

The Hitler journalists or would-be journalists are extraordinarily active. We have had to warn their correspondent in London[Dr D.W.Thost] that he is not wanted at The Times as a propagandist. Nothing will displease people more than German party journalists indulging in propaganda work.14

10. Interview with Hitler, Volkscher Beobachter, 5 March 1934.
The most significant aspect of Rosenberg's activities in England, however, was a bold attempt to remove Norman Ebbut from his post as The Times Berlin correspondent. Ebbut was viewed as an important barrier in the way of a positive image for the Nazis (in the most influential newspaper in Britain). Accordingly, Rosenberg made efforts to have him replaced.\(^{15}\) He started by dropping hints to Lady Astor, a known temperance campaigner, about Ebbut's drinking habits in Berlin.\(^{16}\) He then put his plan to Geoffrey Dawson, editor of The Times, over lunch; however, Dawson resisted this pressure. Ebbut remained Berlin correspondent, much to the annoyance of Rosenberg.\(^{17}\)

And, though Dawson frequently penned soothing editorials on Hitler and the Nazis during the 1930s, they cut little ice as long as Ebbut remained in Berlin. It is, in fact, quite clear that The Times Berlin Office had strained relations with the Nazis for most of the 1930s. In January 1933, for example, Ebbut was warned by the Propaganda Ministry that his articles were viewed as critical, negative, and annoying. They even suggested he take a "more positive attitude" towards Hitler, now that he had become Chancellor.\(^{18}\) But Ebbut had no intention of following the official Nazi version of events. To the contrary, Ebbut informed The Times foreign news editor that "Certain things must be said, carefully, but unmistakably to retain my own self respect."\(^{19}\) This attitude led Ebbut to pen numerous critical articles on the Nazi persecution of the Christian Church. However, the price Ebbut paid for this independence was frequent harassment by the Nazi regime. His flat was often raided, articles confiscated, his phone tapped, and The Times frequently withdrawn from sale in Nazi Germany.\(^{20}\)

It seems clear that Hitler was never satisfied with the way his movement was portrayed in the British press. Indeed, he disliked most foreign reporting of the Nazi regime. He variously described foreign correspondents to his closest aides as "vermin," "parasites." "international liars," or just plain "liars." In this respect, Ernst Hanfstaengl, his foreign press chief recalled:

He never understood the requirements or psychology of foreign correspondents or why I could not discipline them as Goebells and Dietrich disciplined the German press. He

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15. Rosenberg Papers, Rosenberg to Thost, November 1931, BAK/117. Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Germany. I would like to thank Lord Robert Cecil for alerting my attention to this incident.
19. Times Archives, Ebbut to Deakin, April 1933.
20. Times Archives, Ebbut to Deakin, 30 December 1934. Ebbut to Times 1 April 1935.
thought they had only to be threatened with sanctions or expulsion to bring them to heel.\textsuperscript{21}

Quite often, Hitler completely lost his temper when critical articles appeared in the foreign press. At such times, he would exclaim: “I ought to send the whole bunch of them packing...They are nothing but a danger to us.”\textsuperscript{22} It appears that the Nazi leader only tolerated what he saw as “these enemies within” because of his fear of an anti-German backlash abroad in the event of their mass expulsion.

There are indications, moreover, that Hitler’s obsession with the image of the Third Reich overseas formed a key part of his daily routine. Every morning he read translations of articles in the foreign press, prepared by a dozen linguistic experts. As Albert Speer recalled:

After he had eaten breakfast the daily newspapers and the foreign press sheets were presented to him. The press reports were crucially important in forming his opinions; they had also a great deal to do with his mood. Where specific foreign items were concerned, he instantly formulated the official German position, and dictated it to his press chief Sepp Dietrich or Lorenz his deputy.\textsuperscript{23}

Similarly, Pauline Kohler, a member of Hitler’s personal staff, recalled that every member of his domestic staff was strictly forbidden from talking to the foreign press.\textsuperscript{24} A number of foreign diplomats also observed Hitler’s deep anxiety with foreign reporting of Nazi Germany. For example, Neville Henderson, the British Ambassador to Berlin from 1937 to 1939, remarked that the Nazi leader never ceased complaining about adverse foreign press reports.\textsuperscript{25} As Henderson put it:

Hitler was unreasonably sensitive to press criticism, and especially British newspaper criticism, and it did not help me in my diplomatic task if Hitler’s back was constantly being rubbed up the wrong way by press criticism, and I consequently tried on various occasions to persuade those responsible for submitting to Hitler press cuttings each day to put them in the waste paper basket before they reached him. But, I never succeeded and always suspected certain members of

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 236.
\textsuperscript{25} Nevzlle Henderson, \textit{Failure of A Mission} (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1940), 135
his anti-British extremist entourage took special pleasure in seeing that he missed nothing.  

After 1937, as Nazi foreign policy entered its expansionist phase, Hitler's paranoia about the press abroad grew increasingly more passionate. This is particularly evident as the regime moved closer to the borders of aggression. As a result, the pressure mounted on foreign journalists who produced critical reports. It seems, however, that Nazi outrage against the foreign press was carefully orchestrated. In January 1937, for example, Joseph Goebbels quite abruptly ordered all German newspaper editors to stop ignoring press criticism of Nazi Foreign policy activities abroad, and go on the offensive—in the strongest possible terms. This new direction in the Nazis' attitude towards the foreign press sheds light on the violent reaction of the German press to a report in a French newspaper in January 1937. This claimed that 20,000 German troops had landed in Morocco. Moreover, it also explains the passionate German response to The Times report of the Luftwaffe assault on Guernica, Spain, in April 1937. A German press release entitled "The Times bombs Guernica" claimed The Times had invented the whole story. A Times reporter, who was in Berlin at the time, observed:

The German press has been savage about The Times, in fact worse than in any period I can remember. The latest discovery is that if you spell it backwards it spells SEMIT which leads them to conclude that we are a Jewish/Marxist organisation... Such are the childish results of a sheltered opinion.

This carefully stage-managed Nazi hysteria against the foreign press gathered pace. In May 1937, Hitler refused an invitation from Neville Chamberlain for Von Nuerath, the German Foreign Minister, to attend the coronation of George VI unless there was a noticeable change of attitude by the British press towards Nazism. The most striking example of Nazi hostility towards the British press came in August 1937, when Norman Ebbut was quite dramatically expelled from Germany "on account of his published record of events," despite the fact that his reports had long been sanitized in London to fit the pro-appeasement sympathies of The Times editor, and the British government." Nevertheless, Angriff, a Berlin newspaper, accused Ebbut with spreading lies and distortions during his whole time in Germany. His years of

26. Ibid., 65.
29. Times Archives, Daniels to Dawson, 16 May 1937.
30. Henderson, 75.
31. The Times, 17 August 1937.
32. Times Archives, E.P.A. Report on German newspaper coverage of Ebbut's expulsion, 10 September 1937.
failing to toe the “official line.” His penchant for speaking to “secret contacts” within Nazi Germany, and his general independence of spirit singled him out as a prime candidate for expulsion, especially as the military preparations of the regime intensified.

Indeed, the role of the press in the foreign policy aims of Hitler should not be underestimated. After 1937, Hitler made control of British press criticism a prerequisite for improved Anglo-German relations, as the following speech by Hitler from February 1938 clearly illustrates:

The British government wishes to limit armaments and ban bombing. I once proposed this myself. But at the same time I also suggested that it was still more important to prevent the poisoning of public opinion in the press.33

Similarly, when Hitler met Lord Halifax in November 1937, he told him bluntly that “nine tenths of all international tension” was caused by the “licentious press” of the democratic nations. Halifax noticed during his talks that only two subjects: “Russia and the Press” sent Hitler into a passionate rage. Goebells told Halifax at their meeting that nothing would improve Anglo-German relations more than if the British press would stop attacking the Nazi leadership. Significantly, Halifax gave an assurance that: “His Majesty’s Government would do everything in their power to influence our press to avoid unnecessary offence.”34 True to his word, Halifax dutifully summoned all the leading British newspaper editors to a meeting and implored them to be extremely careful when dealing with stories on Nazi Germany in the future.

Not surprisingly, such efforts never eased Hitler’s fears over the portrayal of the Third Reich abroad. Indeed, it is noticeable that during 1938 and 1939 Hitler’s speeches return again and again to the subject. In a lengthy speech to the Reichstag in February 1938—weeks prior to the Anchluss—the Nazi leader said:

We simply cannot close our eyes to the effects of such a virulent campaign. If we do, it can easily happen that in certain countries these malicious international weavers of lies will succeed in arousing hatred in our country which if disregarded will develop into a openly hostile attitude. This is a grave menace and one which endangers peace... The crime is all the more serious when it deliberately aims at goading on nations to war... Are not these people war mongers and war makers of the worst kind... What has strengthened our feelings towards Italy is the fact that in that country the state leadership and the press follow one path. The Italian government does not

33. Volkischer Beobachter, 21 February 1938.
talk of mutual understanding while the press agitates for the opposite... An international press campaign (against Nazism) is not conductive to appeasement but must rather be regarded as a menace to peace among nations. I have decided to carry through the strengthening of German armed forces as a security against the day when these wild threats of war might actually turn into bloodshed and violence.35

Moreover, Hitler often used what he saw as the negative portrayal of Nazi foreign policy aims in British and French newspapers as a justification for the escalation of Nazi rearmament. Equally significant, he also used such criticism to explain violent outbreaks of anti-semitism in Germany. Indeed, Hitler placed most of the blame for international tension, not on his own actions, but at the door of “the Jewish international weavers of poison who fabricate and spread their lies in the press.”36

In 1939, Hitler led Nazi denunciations of the foreign press. For example, during a speech in January 1939, Hitler said:

The German nation has no feeling of hatred towards England, America or France. But these nations are continually being stirred into hatred of Germany by Jewish and non Jewish agitators. And so, should the warmongers achieve what they are aiming at our own people would be psychologically unprepared. Our propaganda and our press should always make a point of answering these attacks and above all to bring them to the notice of the German people. The German nation must know who are the men who want to bring about war by hook or by crook.37

In an April 1939 speech to the Reichstag, Hitler claimed:

The reason for fear of war lies simply and solely in an unbridled agitation on the part of the press... I believe that as soon as responsible governments impose upon themselves and their journalistic organs the necessary restraints and truthfulness as regards the relations between various nations the fear of war will disappear.38

Finally, consider a speech in May 1939, when he derided all foreign correspondents in Germany as “a special breed of brain parasites” who “pour

35. Volkischer Beobachter, 21 February 1938.
36. Ibid., 24 February 1938.
37. Ibid., 1 February 1939.
forth lies day after day,” adding that this was the “old trick of the Jew.”39 Horst Michael, a man with close contacts within the Nazi regime, claimed that these speeches were linked to Hitler’s psychological preparation of German public opinion for war.40

It is clear, therefore, that Hitler’s views on the role of the press are far more important within his “timetable for war” than has been acknowledged. Indeed, it is worth noting that Hitler viewed the press as a “great power” through which public opinion could be molded. The great efforts expended to gain a favorable image of the Third Reich in British and American newspapers is a significant feature which requires more careful consideration.

Quite literally, Hitler believed newspapers could do more harm to cordial relations between nations “than any poison or incendiary bombs.”41 Such a view helps to explain why Hitler quite consistently felt control of the German press, plus sympathetic treatment of Nazi foreign policy aims abroad, were essential ingredients in his “new order” for Europe. After January 1937, Hitler’s desire to control the views of foreign correspondents grew more intense. The symptoms of a carefully concocted Nazi antagonism towards the democratic press are, moreover, noticeable in a number of ways. First, Nazi pressure on democratic governments to encourage sympathetic coverage of German aims is far more passionate. Second, there is a ceaseless psychological drive to blame all international tension on the foreign press. This takes the form of wild attacks by the Nazis on “unfair foreign reporting of Germany.” Third, high profile expulsions of prominent foreign journalists start to occur more frequently, the aim being to convince foreign opinion that the real cause of international tension is unfair reporting in the free press, not the actions of the Nazi regime. However, all these tactics did not come out of thin air. For as Goebbels explained: “Every action of German propaganda is examined from a psychological point of view.” The chief concern: “What impact is this information having on the public.”42

Given all this, it is not unreasonable to conclude that any consideration of the foreign policy aims of Adolf Hitler which fails to assign due importance to the role of the press within those aims is in need of qualification.

The author is a senior lecturer in modern political history at Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, England. He would like to thank Professor Wallace B. Eberhard for his encouragement, Melanie Aspey for permission to quote from the private archives of The Times, Professor David McEvoy, Director of the School of Social Science, Liverpool John Moores University for support, and Dr. Nicholas J. White for his helpful and incisive advice.

39. Volkscher Beobachter, 2 May 1939.
40. Times Archives, Michael to Barrington Ward, 1 April 1946.
41. Volkscher Beobachter, 21 February 1938.
42. Berliner Tageblatt, 5 December 1937.
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On a “beautiful, brisk November weekend at Northwestern University,” editor David Abrahamson writes, seeds for a book that would weave together “brilliant fragments” of American magazine scholarship were planted. Research and theory on the magazine’s place in journalistic culture were missing, and there was a need, Abrahamson writes, “to survey and organize the field of magazine scholarship.”

Three months later, the Electronic Journal of Communication/ La revue electronique de communication published a special edition on the subject. The book is the subsequent hard-copy version of that journal.

Five broad research and theoretical areas are covered in the book. Part one discusses typology, quantitative studies, and political content research, while the essays in part two cover magazine publishing. Pedagogical and curricular issues compromise the third section of the book, and the geographic dimension of magazine journalism on local and global scales complete part four.

The final section, however, is of particular interest to journalism and mass communication historians. The three essays in the fifth section discuss the literary and historical content of magazines, while giving examples of outstanding historical magazine research.

In his chapter “Magazine and Literary Journalism, An Embarrassment of Riches,” Thomas B. Connery of the University of St. Thomas urges scholars to consider the exploration of “nonfiction prose” as a research subject. Calling literary journalism an “academic orphan with no clear ancestry or home,” Connery writes that much of the scholarly writing in literary journalism has been limited to Tom Wolfe, Joan Didion, John McPhee, Norman Mailer, Truman Capote, Gay Talese, and Hunter S. Thompson. His own book, A Sourcebook of American Literary Journalism in the Twentieth Century (Greenwood Press, 1992), expanded on the traditional subjects, but there is vast room for research into a gold mine of riches.

In addition to offering a thorough bibliography of existing texts and scholarly articles which discuss literary journalism and journalists, Connery also includes some thought-provoking potential research questions. One question, for instance, asks, “Does a specific type of publication yield a specific type of literary journalism?” Connery also suggests examining linkages between writers’ suggestions, for instance, a comparison of Mark Twain and Hunter S. Thompson, both of whom, Connery writes, employed “Gonzo” journalistic techniques.

The final two chapters are prime examples of historical research on magazine topics and serve as another example of the “riches” available in magazine scholarship. These papers won top prizes from the magazine division at the 1993 AEJMC national conference in Kansas City, Missouri.

Agnes Hooper Gottlieb’s chapter, “The Reform Years at Hampton’s; The Magazine Journalism of Rheta Childe Dorr, 1909-1912,” discuss two-and-a-
half years in Dorr’s life largely ignored in the existing scholarship. Gottlieb, an
assistant professor at Seton Hall who won the top faculty paper award, writes in
this engaging chapter that during this period, Dorr’s crusading articles in
Hampton’s Broadway magazine encouraged women to fight community
corruption. Dorr also publicized the plight of the poor and promoted educational
reform. The articles, Gottlieb writes, were Dorr’s “most effective reform work.”

Carolyn Ann Bonard’s “The Women’s Movement in the 1920s; American Magazines Document the Health and Progress of Feminism,” documents how the women’s movement was a “vibrant force, a new attitude that was shaping the beginning of a new social order.” The essay, which won the top undergraduate award in 1993, suggests that the women’s movement was an undercurrent potentially ignored by historians who focused on the vote and women’s accomplishments.

Abrahamson writes in the introduction that this book should serve a
variety of purposes while it organizes and furthers the “scholarly engagement
with the magazine form.” Abrahamson and his colleagues have created a
successful tool for scholars across our discipline.

_Ginger Rudeseal Carter, Northeast Louisiana University_


In this informative but uneven book about media convergence, Christopher Anderson examines how three studios—Warner Bros. Pictures, David O. Selznick Productions, and Walt Disney Productions—made the transition to television. The three studios adopted different strategies. Warner Bros. was slowest to make the transition, as it tried to retain the advantages it held during the studio era. Selznick and Disney, disadvantaged by the studio system, were more innovative and saw television as a way to improve their economic situation. Anderson also attempts to explain why certain kinds of television programming emerged as a result of this transition. Not until Hollywood moved into TV production did television become America’s “principal postwar culture industry.” (5)

In explaining Hollywood’s response to television, Anderson eschews
the narrative structure that has traditionally viewed motion pictures, television,
and radio as distinct entities. He sees more value in the work of Michele Helms,
William Boddy and Tino Balio, who have questioned approaches that isolate film
and broadcasting from each other and from other institutions of culture at a given
time. When one looks closely, Anderson writes, the “distinctions between the
media quickly blur.” (14)

This work rests largely on research in the Warner Bros. Archives at
USC and in the Selznick Collection at the University of Texas. Because of this
archival base, this book is most informative and interesting when dealing with Warner Bros. and Selznick. Contrary to accepted wisdom, Anderson argues that “Warner Bros. actually began television production only after recovering from the financial instability of the late 1940s and early 1950s.” (157) But the studio lacked innovation and concentrated mainly on film production, failing to diversify into such areas as program distribution. Throughout the 1960s, Warner Bros. Television declined. It became little more than an assembly line for disenchanted writers and actors, and by the early 1960s had lost its more valuable actor (James Garner) and producer (Roy Huggins).

Among Anderson’s most interesting chapters are the two on “Light’s Diamond Jubilee” in 1954, a celebration that joined a film studio, television, and advertising to promote electricity and Atoms for Peace. Selznick’s program, which appeared in October, used history to endorse American industry’s idea of progress, and to develop a sense of national participation. It was believed to have been seen by more than 75 million people, was “rooted deeply in the campaign for the peaceful atom,” and “orchestrated by the most powerful and economic forces in America during the 1950s.” (100)

Less satisfying is the author’s treatment of Disney. Anderson did not have access to the Disney Archives, and his chapter on Disneyland rests on a less than comprehensive reading of secondary accounts. Readers interested in Disney might also turn to Steven Watt’s work, including his recent article in the Journal of American History (June 1995). Watts did gain access to the Disney Archives.

This worthwhile book is weakened by a less than comprehensive bibliography and occasional factual errors. For example, Andrew Feldman’s research might have provided historical context for “Light’s Diamond Jubilee,” James Baughman’s fine work on television is ignored. The Warner brothers are misidentified in a picture (27), and the Warner Bros.’s film Hollywood Hotel (1938) promoted Louella Parsons, not Hedda Hopper. (31)

Stephan Vaughn, University of Wisconsin, Madison


Margaret Blanchard charts the ebb and flow of freedom of expression in the United States since the 1870s. In this masterful survey, she initially attempts to place the cycles in social, economic and political contexts, culminating with legal analysis rather than concentrating on it.

She frankly acknowledges that her major problem was narrowing her topic, since the scope of her inquiry could make “almost all of the American experience a candidate for inclusion in a history of free expression.” Indeed, between two covers, she traces the evolution of labor unions, the American Civil Liberties Union, the civil rights movement, broadcasting, the Communist
Party, motion pictures, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, anti-war movements and sexually explicit speech, as well as a host of other topics related to expression.

Blanchard solves her dilemma of thematic excess by confining her survey to those topics and groups related to free speech that have ended up in the courts, and a substantial amount of the book recounts the judicial pronouncements. But her aim is not to use three-part tests and legal doctrines to convey the meaning of free expression. Rather, she seeks each era's common understanding—the "community standard"—of free expression on the topics that ultimately and inevitably ended up before the High Court.

Focusing on the free speech themes that eventually lent themselves to litigation is appropriate. The Supreme Court forum is the nation's parlor room in which all issues of significance sooner or later are addressed, if not always satisfactorily resolved. Blanchard notes occasionally that the justices were products of their times in restricting speech, and at another point she observes that they led the way in esteeming freedom of speech. This dynamic of community-court interaction on issues of speech freedom is just one of the fascinating issues upon which this work touches. Others that arise time and again throughout the period studied include the impulse to censor, the eventual acceptance of many ideas once considered radical and dangerous, the phenomenon of movements spawning counter-movements, and the irony of calls for suppression in the name of patriotism.

Blanchard suggests additional study, in particular, of why our attitudes toward free speech tend to lurch from one extreme to another. "Although Americans indulge themselves in great paroxysms of fear from time to time, eventually they return to the rationality that the founding fathers expected of them," she writes.

One finds little with which to quibble in Blanchard's characterization of the flowering of free speech in the 1930s and 1960s or of the traumatically repressive periods leading up to and immediately following World War I and during the McCarthy era. But while acknowledging President Richard Nixon's passion for intimidation and suppression, which Blanchard eloquently details, one might wonder if "the nation is still strongly shaped by his prejudices," as she contends. Nonetheless, the reader must approach this work realizing that conclusions are necessarily impressionistic, since freedom of speech does not lend itself to scientific measurement nor even agreement as to its meaning.

Blanchard's recurrent themes—that Americans tend to be intolerant of ideas outside the mainstream, periods of extreme repression or liberality tend to foster their opposites, and contractions in freedom accompany times of internal or external challenges—are extensively documented and undeniable. The wealth and variety of authorities in her more than 1,400 footnotes, the uniformly impeccable interpretations across the entire spectrum of First Amendment law, but most of all the ability to capsulize coherently so many different episodes
touching on free expression over more than a century mark this as a singular work of a preeminent historian.

Steve Helle, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign


Literary scholars have long disdained periodical literature. Acceptance of the argument that vernacular (i.e., as opposed to classical) “literature” was worthy of formal academic study depended on maintaining an unbreachable divide between literature and “journalism,” a divide that marginalized and “subjugated” the latter. This insistence itself suggests the importance of this historical work by Laurel Brake, a lecturer in literature at the University of London. Here Brake addresses several late nineteenth century debates over the periodical press, including the nature and value of literary criticism and the functions and relationships of authors and editors.

An interesting chapter shows how expectations about women’s interests were inverted in *The Woman’s World*, a magazine born in 1887 of what previously had been *The Lady’s World*. As editor, Oscar Wilde managed not only to introduce into the reconstituted magazine male homosexual discourse, but also to construct a new “cultivated” woman reader who was economically worse off but intellectually superior to readers of the magazine in its previous incarnation. Here and in other chapters, Brake’s analysis is highly sensitive to gender implications, carefully indicating when and how assumptions were made about gender differences in reading and writing preference. I would challenge Brake’s casual comparison to the twentieth century: she claims “men now openly read women’s magazines such as *Cosmopolitan* or *Vogue*.” (146) Nonetheless, her analysis of Wilde’s highly coded references to homosexuality (these “coterie terms” apparently addressed male readers who knew Wilde, if only by reputation) has many research implications for contemporary periodicals.

This book is frustrating, in great measure, because it collects ten articles, most of them published before, which are somewhat overlapping in their specifics and sometimes even redundant. On the other hand, neither as individual articles nor as a group do they address a set of problems comprehensively or effectively. Two of the most interesting chapters are not about journalism, but rather about biography and the options available to biographers. For most U.S. readers, the difficulty of this book is compounded by its British writing style and punctuation, and by certain assumptions about what will be known or important to readers. Although in undertaking serious research in the sociology of serious text Brake begins with the intertextuality of literature and journalism, she directly and exclusively addresses literary scholars. Yet the reader willing to wade carefully and patiently through thickets of dates and names
will be rewarded with some very provocative arguments, as well as lovely quotes from archival material unlikely to be familiar with U.S. mass media scholars.

Suggestive twentieth century parallels emerge in the discussion of criticism and its place in the Victorian periodical press. Brake outlines several debates over whether professionalism on the part of the critic in writing or in subject is more appropriate, whether general or specialist knowledge is preferable, and over the advantages and disadvantages of writer anonymity or “signature.” She knows how the literary criticism appearing in periodicals was shaped by the specific periodical, including the house style and intended audience of that journal; by critical debate ongoing in other periodicals; and by editorial control. Algernon Swinburne, for instance, preferred the journalistic critic who “retains a liveliness and spontaneity which elude the more staid author of the book whom, it is implied, tends to pedantry.” (18) This raises a question: What about the process of assigning reviews of literature and piece of criticism, including book reviews, in contemporary academic journals?

*Linda Steiner, Rutgers University*


Because of William Lloyd Garrison’s role as one of American media history’s most outspoken editors, his life, both professional and personal, has been chronicled in numerous publications. Some of the earlier versions were written by family members, friends and colleagues who attempted to illustrate the many facets of his personality. However, unlike other works on Garrison’s contributions to U.S. media development and the abolitionist movement, William E. Cain’s book attempts to display the full range of Garrison’s activist philosophies—from his position on violence to his fervent political stance—as presented in his newspaper, The Liberator.

Cain’s offering on Garrison is divided into two main sections. Part One is a survey of Garrison’s life and career—examining his motivations and his progression from a boy in Newburyport, Massachusetts, to his role as an activist in various movements until his death in 1879. Part Two provides documentation of Garrison’s philosophies, taken directly from the pages of The Liberator. The book’s appendix provides portraits of Garrison, a chronology of his life and key events that affected his life, and a list of discussion questions about his philosophies, beliefs, and political arguments.

Cain’s work is invaluable because of the emphasis on the significance of Garrison’s work as a speaker/writer. The introduction in Part One clarifies much of the ambiguity about the convictions and principles that guided Garrison’s actions, such as the charge that Garrison was “insincere and hypocritical” because of his broken friendship with black abolitionist Frederick
Douglass. Cain argues that some historians criticized Garrison’s attacks on Douglass, declaring that Garrison was like many other white abolitionists who balked on their commitments to support true equality. Cain points out, however, that Garrison’s quarrel with Douglass stemmed not from the issue of racial equality, but from Douglass’ refusal to remain completely loyal to Garrison’s opinions. This incident illustrates a key, but negative, facet of Garrison’s character: a rigid and narrow-minded opposition to anyone who disagreed with his conceptions.

Although Cain admits in the preface that he has concentrated primarily on Garrison’s abolitionist writings, more analysis of how the editor’s abolitionist fervor affected his positions on war, women’s rights and reform would have added other dimensions to the overall profile. However, Cain does not supply examples of Garrison’s writings on these other topics and allows the readers to draw their own conclusions.

Part Two’s selection of documents provides excerpts from Garrison’s writings—a mixture of well-known and obscure pieces—that appeared in The Liberator from 1831 to 1865. The only piece included that did not appear in The Liberator is Garrison’s 4 July 1829 address to the American Colonization Society. The chronological arrangement of the speeches and essays allows the reader to examine the development of Garrison’s stances on key issues—positions that altered only slightly as his life experiences expanded.

While Garrison is probably one of the more widely known individuals in American media history, Cain’s book offers new insight into the reasons behind why he became such a famous, and infamous, public figure.

Bernel E. Tripp, University of Florida


Both sportswriters and scholars involved in the sports-mass communication phenomenon have suffered from biases, institutional and otherwise, against their work. At newspapers around the country, sports departments are sometimes disparagingly called “toy departments,” although the importance of the coverage of athletics to newspapers and their readers is not in dispute. Former Supreme Court Justice chief justice Earl Warren was fond of saying he turned to the sports section over his coffee and eggs before reading any other part of the paper. Warren read some of the best writing in the newspaper, including what many reporters consider the best newspaper lead ever written, from Ring Lardner on the death of a young boxer: “Stanley was twenty-four years old when he was fatally shot in the back by the common law husband of the lady who was cooking his breakfast.” (As quoted in Peter Andrews, “The Art of Sportswriting,” Columbia Journalism Review, May-June 1987: 27.)
Academics struggle with scholarship on the subject, because research on sports subjects is not always taken seriously in the Ivory Tower. Jules Tygiel, author of an outstanding biography of former Dodger and civil rights pioneer Jackie Robinson, wanted earlier to write on the man who broke baseball's color line for his dissertation in history at UCLA. "I dared not...mention my idea to too many people," Tygiel said. "Baseball is not the stuff upon which successful careers in history are normally made." (As quoted in Michael O'Brien, "In Search of Vince Lombardi: A Historian's Memoir," Wisconsin Magazine of History, Autumn 1987: 7.) Tygiel regained his senses in time to write his dissertation on 19th-century working-class San Franciscans.

In an attempt to remedy the lack of scholarship in sports journalism, Heinz-Dietrich Fischer, a German scholar, steps up to the plate with a compilation of Pulitzer Prize-winning articles, photographs and cartoons. Sports Journalism At Its Best examines the 19 Pulitzer Prize-winning articles, photographs and cartoons between 1934 and 1993. (There is no Pulitzer category devoted to sports, so the material was gleaned from other categories, such as photography, distinguished criticism, etc.)

Fischer organizes his book into three main parts—"fact-Oriented Genres," "Background-Oriented Genres," and "Opinion-Oriented Games." Each part contains reprints of all or parts of the winning entries, including the first sports Pulitzer, William H. Taylor's coverage of the America's Cup yacht races in 1934 for the New York Herald-Tribune. Also included are the dramatic sequential photographs taken by Don Ulatang and John Robinson of the Des Moines Register of Drake football player Johnny Bright getting his jaw broken from intentional hits by Oklahoma A&M's Wilbanks Smith in 1951. Other stories include the New York Journal-American's coverage of the point-shaving scandal at Long Island University in 1952, columns by Los Angeles Times writer Jim Murray and a Herblock cartoon from the Washington Post. Fischer presents interesting documents, such as Murray's contest entry form, newspaper ads heralding winners, and a letter from the New York district attorney thanking Max Kase, the Journal-American sports editor, for the point-shaving stories.

The book is a logical supplement to texts such as Douglas A. Anderson's Contemporary Sports Reporting in the undergraduate classroom. If the book has a flaw, it is a lack of background and context. After reading the material, students are bound to ask, "What happened?" The Johnny Bright incident, for example, caused Drake to drop out of the Missouri Valley Conference in November 1951 because the school was not satisfied with official investigation of the brutal play; Bright, who had twice led the nation in total offense at Drake, left the United States to star in the Canadian Football for eleven years, after which he was inducted into the CFL Hall of Fame. He became a high school principal in Edmonton.

Nonetheless, Fischer's book contributes to a small shelf of scholarship on sports journalism. One awaits detailed social and cultural analyses of the subject.

Mark Neuzil, University of St. Thomas

The serious study of sports journalism has been, at best, a marginalized field within American journalism history, even among those scholars working in the American cultural studies paradigm. For that reason alone, Charles Fountain’s *Sportwriter: The Life and Times of Grantland Rice* is a welcome addition to the gradually growing cannon of works in the field.

For those interested in the history of American sports journalism, Grantland Rice is a good and logical place to start. His career spanned the first half of the twentieth century, from his start in Nashville, Tennessee in 1901 to his death in New York in 1954. Rice was, Fountain notes, “a man who influenced mightily the ebb and flow of sportswriting, and colored and shaped our perception of an entire era of American history as well.” Fountain is given to making such large claims. That Rice’s influence on sportswriting was mighty is indisputable; that he “colored and shaped” the public’s perception of American history is debatable. Regardless, the question that haunts the Rice legacy remains: was his influence on sportswriting and on the sportswriter’s and reader’s perception of events and their heroes more positive or negative?

While acknowledging arguments such as Robert Lipsyte’s that Rice’s mythologizing style ultimately dehumanized athletes, Fountain comes down squarely on the positive, noting that “one cannot separate Grantland Rice from his time.” Fountain argues persuasively that Rice “made the playing fields respectable;” and, by extension, he made writing about the playing fields respectable.

Rice was an anomaly among sportswriters. He was an educated (Vanderbuilt) gentleman whose demeanor helped to bolster the shoddy, rummy reputation of sports reporters. Moreover, his longevity and range promoted both sports and sportswriting. Rice worked in print, radio, and film, and he covered a wide variety of sports. Fountain’s chapter on Rice’s golf coverage and his relationship with amateur champion Bobby Jones is especially strong because Fountain shows how Rice helped democratize a patrician sport.

Also noteworthy is chapter 2, “The Blue-gray October Sky,” which deals with Rice’s famous Four Horseman story on the 1924 Army-Notre Dame football game. Fountain analyzes Rice’s lead, contrasting it with leads turned out that day by Paul Gallico, Heywood Brown, Damon Runyon, Alison Danzig, and Frank Wallace. Rice succeeds where others falter, Fountain maintains, because “he never let the artistry overwhelm his duty as a journalist.” However, Fountain’s claim that Rice “liberated the sports page from the limits and rigors of inverted-pyramid journalism” is overstated. The contrasting leads from the Army-Notre Dame game offer ample evidence that sports journalism was one section of the paper that needed little liberation from the inverted-pyramid style.

The bulk of the book offers a detailed chronology of Rice’s career, connecting events and stories with Rice’s attitude and philosophy about the world around him. To a great extent, Fountain’s book is a counter-revisionist view of Rice’s work, but in the final analysis, it falls short of convincing us
that Rice was much more than a prolific, gifted popularizer, who, unlike some of his more cynical comparisons, did not analyze his "times" as thoroughly as a first-rate journalist should have.

Dennis Gildea, Springfield College


In this book, Roderick Hart uses the 1992 presidential elections and other political events to show that while many Americans believe that politics has become more immediate and personal through television, in reality television makes us feel knowledgeable, but diverts us from political realities. He offers a new explication of how television has changed American voters and how this affects our citizenship, both collectively and personally. Watching political debates, Congressional hearings, political scandals, and summit meetings in the comfort of our homes and calling in to "Larry King Live" as Al Gore and Ross Perot slug it out over NAFTA make us feel a part of the process. These feelings, Hart says, fall into one or more of five categories: feeling intimate (with the politicos), feeling informed (about the issues or politicians, for instance), feeling "clever" (about contemporary politics' moves and countermoves), feeling busy (or the frenzy of establishment politics), and feeling important (in the ability to sustain media attention). But, he argues, such "feelings" actually distract us from the realities of political power in the United States.

Hart shows how television's apparent viewer empowerment is artificial and bogus. He credits our current malaise of doubt and disenchantment with the political system as stemming from the false sense of familiarity television craters. Television makes viewers feel informed when they are not, "busy" when they are politically inactive, and "clever" when they adopt the cynicism of political insiders. But, he adds, the most unsettling result of this viewer/television intimacy is supplanting genuine power with these figurative illusions of power and media access. Consequently, more Americans than ever have become disillusioned with politics. This disenchantment can jeopardize democracy, he argues, because Americans do not know what they think they know, and they do not care about what they do not know. He charges television with miseducating the public in a terribly tragic, yet seductive, manner. Using examples from recent American political coverage, Seducing America reveals how this process works and, more importantly, explains what can be done to transform voter apathy and dissatisfaction.

To Hart, answers to problems come from much needed "New Puritanism." As he defines it, this Puritanism is not a new form of bourgeois values or class prejudice that denounces entertainment. Instead, Hart champions a
number to duty, community and hope through reclaiming civic consciousness for all. He asserts the Old Puritans believed in participatory citizenship, which means being informed and making choices. He also argues that Puritans were “communalist” with a sense of mutual obligations, and “millennialists” with life having purpose and hope. Puritans drew upon duty, community and hope—qualities Hart argues must replace television’s five feelings. He argues his points convincingly and thoughtfully. Anyone interested in improving political discourse, as well as university or college students in courses in political communication, would benefit from his insights. I recommend his work wholeheartedly.

Louise Benjamin, University of Georgia


Through the practice of consumption, writes Lori Loeb, the Victorian angel “became a shrewd exchequer of the family purse.” Loeb, an assistant professor of modern British history at the University of South Carolina, draws on an impressive sample of a quarter-of-a-million print advertisements between 1880 and 1914, finding in them gender- and class-specific messages about the pursuit of pleasure through consumption. Roughly 90 percent of advertisers had given up on targeting men by this time, she argues, choosing instead to hone their techniques for addressing women and, more specifically, middle-class women.

While one might suppose that images of women in late Victorian advertisements would focus on their dependent, stereotypical feminine qualities, Loeb finds something different occurring in a substantial number of ads. Strong women, based on images of Greek goddesses, present models of female strength. In contrast to the mid-nineteenth century, when men’s presence in advertisements provided a paternal context for consumption as part of the creation of a whole and happy family, men are almost entirely absent from family scenes in these later advertisements. Competent women run households, control purse strings, and provide role models of proper consumer practices. Consuming women in these ads are also sexual beings, although advertisers clearly struggled with a moral image that could be sensual as well. Through the use of the “twin themes of material grandeur and moral angst,” argues Loeb, advertisers expressed an ambivalence characteristic of their society. In the process, they defined and redefined women alternatively as experts or seductresses, but always as consumers.

Men are not the target audience for these advertisements, but they do find their way into ads as “heroes for sale” in advertising testimonials. Heroes of the Romantic Period might have been farmers or medieval craftsmen, but the ideal citizen of the Victorian era was the capitalist. Like the consumer culture he
offers his readers, this hero embodies the democratic promise: pleasure is accessible to all, wealthy and commoner alike, through the proper exercise of commercial choice. Loeb's central argument, in fact, is that advertisements of the late Victorian period provide democratic rather than aristocratic appeals. The acquisition of goods forms a means of democratization, and the book's many photographs demonstrate that advertising messages are more complex than appeals for the middle-class to emulate the wealthy.

Loeb also discusses images of progress, cultural anxiety, and community in the advertising. She mentions, but would do well to explore further, the ways in which the Victorian materialistic hedonism the ads inspire propels consumers onward toward further purchasing, but does little to satisfy their real needs. This reader would have liked to have read more about what those needs were and the degree to which advertising addressed real concerns. In all though, Loeb provides historians with an intriguing analysis of those late-Victorian angels of advertising.

Jennifer Scanlon, SUNY Plattsburgh


Beau Riffenburgh crafts a compelling narrative in his *The Myth of the Explorer: The Press, Sensationalism, and Geographical Discovery*, one which is based on hugely toilsome work in the archives, yet reads briskly. As the fruit of his doctoral work, it's all been reconstituted here for the motivated or professional reader. Because of both the content and the method, *Myth of the Explorer* should be recommended reading for journalism scholars, communication specialists and historians of culture or social historians, as well as being eminently consumable by folks with vigorous intellectual appetites.

Riffenburgh's scholarship sets about to establish the relationship between press coverage of the so-called heroic age of exploration and the historic record. In the process, Riffenburgh unpacks what amounts to two separate, if not parallel, stories being generated. Unfortunately for fans of the period and the figures involved, some of the high-profile names take a bit of drubbing. On the other hand, important under-reported elements see light of day.

The exciting tone of *Myth of the Explorer* belies the method: combing through piles of old press materials to cull out the appropriate articles, correlating them to primary and secondary heroic personalities, somehow orchestrating a cohesive program of organization.

Yet Riffenburgh manages to do this. For the most part, *Myth of the Explorer* follows a straightforward, chronological design. This author opens the work with a thorough explanation (the index itemizes the print media he mentions in passing here) and then proceeds through eight chapters, each
generally devoted to an explorer or small cluster of individuals. At last, he offers closure, explaining his understanding of the place of nationalism, the rapidly growing popular press of the time, and such large ideas as what constitutes the "hero."

Perhaps because the author was a journalist himself for years, he shows special interest in, and sensitivity to, vignettes designed to provide thumbnail bios of such princes of the third estate as James Gordon Bennett and H.M. Stanley. These vignettes, along with capsule discussion of important technological breakthroughs of the period, provide a solid setting into which the main theme is embedded. And that theme involves the apparent fact that a good deal of latitude exists between the reported and what might be called the real story.

As typical of his closure, Riffenburgh tells readers that, "Perhaps the most striking aspect of the linking of the press and explorers in the nineteenth century was that its origin lay in the realization by just one remarkably astute individual—James Gordon Bennett Jr.—that the public could be intoxicated by exciting reports about heroic struggles...,"(196) especially those taking place in the exotic realms of Africa, the Poles, and the like. For Riffenburgh, press of that day was part entertainment, part public ego display, part information diffusion and largely fictive.

This sort of content analysis is by no means new, but too often the result of jejune stuff, bereft of the vitality inherent in the subject topic. Here Beau Riffenburgh offers readers a superb analytic investigation, with vital interest intact, based on apparently rigorous methodology. The Myth of the Explorer may be read as cultural studies without the babble and, hold your socks, actual proof to support the themes.

Jon Griffin Donlon, University of Illinois


During the years when Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst were raising to art form imaginative ways to market a newspaper, John Brisben Walker was applying similar techniques to sell his Cosmopolitan magazine. Though certainly less sensational than Elizabeth Cochrane’s trip around the world as Nellie Bly for Pulitzer’s paper, Walker, too, sponsored a global jaunt by Elizabeth Bisland, one of his staff writers. While Pulitzer concocted campaigns to put the Statue of Liberty on its pedestal and both he and Hearst printed posters to advertise the Yellow Kid in the comics, Walker dreamed up fantastic schemes to bolster his magazine’s circulation. He sponsored a contest with a $3,000 prize in 1896 for the best “horseless carriage.” He promoted a correspondence school of higher education, the Cosmopolitan University. While
this idea to educate the masses who could not consider the luxury of a college education had to be abandoned, it was only for lack of funds, not for lack of interest on the part of the public. And, while Walker tends to rate only a line or two in journalism history books compared to chapters devoted to the antics of Hearst and Pulitzer, his motivations were similar.

Sociologist Matthew Schneirov's book, The Dream of a New Social Order: Popular Magazines in America 1893-1914, focuses on Walker, his magazine and his vision, to discuss the work of "mugwump editors" who wanted to reform American society and improve the quality of life by taking government control out of the hands of partisan politicians and political parties. Schneirov advances the argument that popular magazines, including Munsey's, McClure's, and most especially Cosmopolitan (not to be confused with the steamy Hearst publication of today), promoted a dream of a better future during this 21-year time frame. "Walker was not content to report the news but also sought on occasion to make it," Schneirov argues. "Like Pulitzer, Walker defended some of his more sensational journalistic devices as necessary in order to create a large circulation so that readers would benefit from some of the more serious, educational features." Thus, Walker envisioned his university as an opportunity to reach the masses and promote education. As Schneirov sees it, this vision fit nicely with the goal of other mugwump editors who saw it as their duty to educate the public.

Schneirov's book is an interesting read on several levels. First of all, from a journalistic standpoint, it is well-written and anecdotal. While the author relies on some statistical analysis to make his points and provides the obligatory graphics to bolster his argument, this book is, most importantly, a narrative. Too often for my taste, aggregates can replace the story. Schneirov, however, takes writing firmly into the world of the turn-of-the-century reader and describes the articles, both fiction and fact, that made up these magazines. Schneirov, an assistant professor of sociology at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, tells us he wants to suck the reader, "like poor Dorothy in the Kansas tornado... into the exciting world of 'Human interest,' a world of zealous crusaders against corruption, and jingoistic advocates of war; of optimistic faith in progress and nervous anxiety over health, of photographic realism and illustrations of artists' models."

Also, Schneirov tracks the development of health reporting (and America's own preoccupation with good health) to the 1890s when such magazines as McClure's debated the causes of "neurasthenia," the nervous exhaustion that forced many, especially women, to take to their beds. Articles about health and how to stay healthy found their way into many of the popular magazines. At the same time, magazines also became preoccupied with sports. Popular publications promoted the status of the "New Woman," who was involved in education, useful occupations and reforms. Schneirov compares the journalistic approach of the newer popular magazines on these topics with the older family house magazines, including Harper's Monthly, Century, Scribner's, and Atlantic Monthly. Modern life was seen, from the older perspective, as the root cause of health problems and nervous disorders. But, from the philosophy of
the popular magazines, "[m]odern life was no longer the problem—causing a range of physical and psychological disorders—but was in fact part of the solution," Schneirov asserts. He describes, for example, how "New Women" were encouraged through magazine articles to involve themselves in reforms, athletics and urban life.

Schneirov also tracks the popular interest in new technologies through these publications. Walker's Cosmopolitan supported the trendy expositions of the day, including fairs in Chicago, St. Louis, Buffalo and Paris, to promote new technologies and idyllic visions of urban life. The magazines themselves benefited from this boom in modern products because advertising for typewriters, cameras, bicycles and phonographs, among other things, helped increase revenues. These new magazines also embraced the new technologies of printing—the development of photoengraving, for one, which significantly reduced production costs—and, in turn, made magazines more available to the masses.

Thus, Schneirov constructs his argument that magazine editors embraced technology and new ways of seeing urban life, and promoted this "dream" through the pages of their periodicals. While this discussion of his "dream" theory might seem too touch-feely for an audience of journalism and social historians, Schneirov actually borrowed the term from texts of the articles themselves (remember this was the heyday of Freud). As Schneirov sees it, these were "cultural dreams" of a new social order. As he puts it, "The dreams of abundance, social control, and social justice became the cornerstones of a post-Victorian mass culture and through the pages of popular magazines attained a legitimacy and a national audience."

Agnes Hooper Gottlieb, Seton Hall University


Having decided on this organizational structure, the author confronts a contemporary scholarly dilemma. How does one write what is essentially a Great Man history of a magazine in this era of compensatory history? Much of the really good work in American journalism history now addresses the people left out by historians of the past—who told the story of journalism history solely through the lives of influential white men. Very fertile work is now being done
about African American and women journalists and really good cultural and social history is taking the field away from the chronological narration of a publication’s history.

The author addresses this dilemma by acknowledging that the magazine’s editors were white men who were members of the “new England cultural elite.” As the nineteenth century progressed, social and cultural power in America shifted away from New England, he notes. The author argues that the Atlantic’s editors struggled to respond “to larger changes within American society, such as the rise of industrial capitalism, increasing ethnic pluralism, their waning influence as a high-cultural elite, and the dominance of mass culture.”

Sedgwick finds the high points of the magazine in its early years under the editorship of James Russell Lowell and James T. Fields. Notes the author, “The fact that professional writers contributed so substantially to founding the magazine, editing it, and establishing its early policies gave it a much different tone from other general periodicals such as Harper’s that were initiated and often edited by their publishers.”

By the end of the nineteenth century, though, under the editorship of Bliss Perry, the Atlantic Monthly was in danger of becoming the irrelevant home of “self-appointed nabobs of culture.” Despite declining circulation, the magazine survived by moderating its “cultural elitism and bookish tendency” and by offering thoughtful criticism of popular culture, he says.

Ironically, the most interesting and valuable sections of the book come when Sedgwick gives us glimpses of his famous editors at work. Not much has been written about the relationship between editors and their writers beyond the well-known relationship of Scribner’s Maxwell Perkins to his famous stable of writers in the 30s, including Thomas Wolfe, Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings, and others.

Sedgwick provides some fascinating bits on this subject. For instance, he tells the tale of James T. Fields’ two-year attempt too woo Nathaniel Hawthorne into writing a serialized novel for the Atlantic. A deeply depressed Hawthorne agreed to try, but only if Fields would agree not to read the draft until Hawthorne completed “the final sentence” of his manuscript. Fields only received one chapter, and it was late. Then a few weeks later a letter arrived from Hawthorne saying, “I hardly know what to say to the public about this abortive Romance, though I know pretty well what the case will be. I shall never finish it.”

Horace Elisha Scudder, on the other hand, had published short stories by Kate Chopin, but in 1897 he rejected a book of short stories by her with this prescient advice, “Have you never felt moved to write a downright novel? The chance of success in such a case is much greater than with a collection of stories.” In 1899, Chopin produced The Awakening, now recognized as a classic American novel.

Catherine C. Mitchell,
University of North Carolina at Asheville

The roles played by American journalists during the crucial years after World War II still remain largely unexplored by historians and media researchers, even forty years later. A gifted writer and journalist, Yoder combed the Alsop papers at the Library of Congress for correspondence and memos to provide some answers as to how one of America’s most influential columnists gained information and reported on burgeoning world antagonism from 1945 to 1963. Yoder’s goal is to provide a vision of both Joe the person and Alsop the powerful New York Herald Tribune columnist, who sought to inform an anxious public about an increasingly confused world.

The book’s most effective insights concern American policy and the 1940s civil war in China and later, Alsop’s personal agony over the Soviet KGB’s efforts to blackmail him with pictures of his homosexual liaisons in the early 1950s. Yoder, a former Washington Star editorial editor and now a columnist with the Washington Post Writer’s Group, quickly informs that he is an unabashed admirer of Alsop, but he unflinchingly delineates the columnist’s blind biases on China. He also offers a straight-forward, refreshingly honest depiction of Alsop’s difficult role as Soviet analyst, who knew that not only the KGB, but FBI director J. Edgar Hoover and the demagogic Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy might retaliate to his criticism by revealing publicly his homosexuality. Yoder does not dwell on the sad and sordid blackmail incidents, but reports the details crisply and then concludes that Alsop’s writing was not affected, though the surreptitious gossip surely weighed heavily upon him.

Yet, this book is more biography than historical study. Its revelations are confined to anecdotes about Alsop’s personal life and about his reportorial skills. Yoder’s meager efforts to analyze Alsop’s impact upon American and Soviet foreign policy or upon U.S. journalism are infrequent and usually unsupported. He concludes that Alsop was an effective force in opposing McCarthyism, but he appears to base this judgment largely on the evidence of a single column written during the Army-McCarthy hearings in 1954. Yoder consults only Americanist secondary works that supply arguments in support of Alsop’s strongly pro-American contentions. Yoder dismisses revisionists without discussion and thus, withholds himself from the debate over the effects of both American journalism and Soviet and American diplomatic initiatives during the early cold war. He concludes only that Alsop’s “sense of civility” restrained any anti-communist excesses that may have hurt America internally, but his “sense of national responsibility mandated a strong hand abroad.” The chapters dealing with the Kennedy era and America’s earlier cold war involvement in Southeast Asia in the 1950s are sketchy and particularly disappointing.

This book is a must for a better understanding of the quirks and personalities of post-World War II Washington and for heightened appreciation of Alsop himself. However, it is not, as promised, a significant contribution to the
debate over journalistic influence during the early cold war era. Yoder may have been better served by writing a simple biography.

Louis W. Liebovich, University of Illinois

Short Takes


Public opinion and mass communication researcher Bogart has added a 50-page preface to his 1953-54 study of the U.S. Information Agency. Bogart’s report was classified until passage of the Freedom of Information Act, and the first edition was published in 1976 by the Free Press as Premises for Propaganda: The United States Information Agency’s Operation Assumptions in the Cold War. The new edition is part of The American University Press Journalism History Series, edited by Sanford Unger.

The original report was six volumes and the book version contains about two-fifths of the report’s full length. Bogart says the result of his research remains “a case history in the sociological study of bureaucracy.” The purpose of the study was “to assess the practices of the agency in the light of scholarly knowledge of communication and persuasion,” and, according to Bogart, social science study “has not advanced sufficiently during the last forty years to make the original concept irrelevant.”


Foster and Simons apply feminist theory to close readings of eight novels considered “girls’ fiction.” The novels are The Wide, Wide World by Susan Warner, The Daisy Chain by Charlotte Yonge, Little Women by Louisa May Alcott, What Katy Did by Susan Coolidge, The Railway Children by E. Nesbit, Anne of Green Gables by L.M. Montgomery, The Secret Garden by Frances Hodgson Burnett and The Madcap of the School by Angela Brazil. The author’s introduction provides a brief historical discussion of the genre of girls’ fiction. Among the questions the authors explore are: What exactly is girls’ fiction? What makes it distinctive? Do ‘classic’ books for girls promote significant aspects of women’s culture in an attempt to bridge the divide between patriarchal realities and the appeal to female individualism?

Lipstadt’s study, first published in 1986, provides a detailed analysis of coverage in the U.S. press of the Nazi attempt to exterminate the Jews. She begins by asking what the public would have known about the Holocaust, what would the typical American citizen have learned from the press? Beginning with the Nazi rise to power in 1933, Lipstadt looks at articles’ placement in newspapers, article size, and editorial opinions. She relies on the *Press Information Bulletin*, prepared daily by Franklin Roosevelt’s Division of Press Intelligence, for much of the coverage. The *Bulletins* contained articles from 500 U.S. newspapers. But Lipstadt also examined coverage in 19 major metropolitan dailies and 13 magazines as well. She also reviewed news clippings collected by the American Jewish Committee.

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A post-modern analysis of a wide range of writing on the Vietnam War, including fiction, poetry, drama, and Michael Herr’s *Dispatches*. Ringnalda says his book is not “a work of literary criticism,” but rather he says he uses literary words “to engage in broader cultural criticism.” The central thesis of the book is that America’s attempt to make sense of the Vietnam experience is futile and misguided, playing into American paradigms of simplification that make America evil and most literary attempts that interpret the war wrong. Consequently, Ringnalda’s analysis not only attempts to destroy American myth, it also fights realism. It is impossible to make sense of the mayhem, confusion, and atrocity of American’s actions in Vietnam, according to Ringnalda. He describes the Vietcong as “blue-collar postmodernists,” and claims that the Vietcong strategy and organization during the war were “more in terms of postmodern literature,” unlike the U.S. approach.

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Eleven essays look at gender roles and images in women’s literature, comic books, detective novels, film, theater, sports, fashion, and entertainment. Madonna, blues and gospel singer Edith Wharton and Dorothy Parker, feminist detective Spenser (a creation of Robert Parker), cross-dressing, and the Judy
Bolton mysteries are some of the topics covered. The publisher claims the essays are free of jargon and designed for the general reader, being the editor's attempt "to bridge the gap between professional and readers."


This is Servareid's first-person account of his life and times through 1945 (he was born in 1912 and died in 1992). Or as he puts it in the book's introduction, written in 1976, this is a "book of youth, adventure and war, and a troubled love of life." Although he covers his family and his early years, as well as his reasons for studying journalism and getting into newspaper work, Sevareid was one of "Murrow's boys" and much of the account deals with covering World War II and international affairs for CBS.


Hutchins Hapgood and Neith Boyce were journalists who met while working for Lincoln Stephens at the New York Commercial Advertiser in the late 1890s. His work has survived through reprintings of his Spirit of the Ghetto: Studies of the Jewish Quarter in New York (1902) and through his theory and practice of literary journalism. This book represents selections from Hapgood's The Story of a Lover, published anonymously in 1919, Boyce's autobiographical novel, The Bond, two plays Boyce and Hapgood wrote for the Provincetown Players, and letters Boyce and Hapgood wrote one another.

Hapgood and Boyce were major figures in a radical intellectual group living in Greenwich Village and Provincetown before World War I. That group included John Reed, Max Eastman, Floyd Dell, Susan Glaspell, and Eugene O'Neill. Among their concerns was how to "integrate sex, intimacy, and work in satisfying, equitable and stable marriages, or personal relationships." Trimberger presents selections that document the Boyce-Hapgood struggle to redefine marriage in a way that would allow for personal and artistic growth and individuality.
Those who wish to review books for *American Journalism* or propose a book for review should contact Professor Thomas B. Connery, Department of Journalism and Mass Communications, University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minn. 55105.

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All submissions are blind refereed by three readers. The review process typically takes about three months. Manuscripts will be returned only if the author includes a self-addressed stamped envelope.

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From the Editor’s Desk...

THE YEAR’S END ISSUE IS A natural for editors. Assess. Review. Evaluate. Prognosticate. In the case of our field — media history — this editor views with satisfaction, rather than pointing with alarm, what has gone in our niche of academe in 1995. Although the federal government seems in a bit of a muddle, it is also the same government that gave the country a magnificent new National Archives II, toured by many of us at the recent Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication convention (the world’s largest, says a plaque somewhere on the gleaming premises). The role of women journalists in World War II and the centennial of the history of cartooning in America were both marked by the Library of Congress. A cable channel recently produced a credible and interesting video biography of Joseph Pulitzer, featuring two from the ranks of media historians, James Boylan and Daniel Pfaff. The flow of research and writing seems to increase, and the quality with the rising tide. History is an avocation of many of our citizens, and the contribution of media historians to our understanding of the past is real. We can enjoy what’s been accomplished in 1995, savoring success while avoiding complacency.

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WE ANNOUNCE a forthcoming special issue with the theme, “Investigative Journalism in the History of American Journalism,” to be published in early 1997. Co-editors will be James L. Aucoin, South Alabama, and Fred Blevens, Texas A & M. They are assembling a review board with special expertise in this area. Manuscripts are solicited that examine the principles and standards of investigative journalism, factors that affected the viability or visibility of investigative journalism, contributions by individual journalists to the craft, the development of the craft over time, or other significant aspects of the subject. Authors should submit four copies of their manuscripts, following the Chicago style manual. Suggested maximum length is twenty-five pages, plus footnotes. Send manuscripts or queries to Professor Aucoin at the Department of Communication, University of South Alabama, Mobile 36688-0002. Deadline for manuscripts is 15 September 1996.
The Early Years of IRE: The Evolution of Modern Investigative Journalism

By James L. Aucoin

Investigative reporters—although not new to American journalism—reached out in more formal ways beginning in the 1960s to establish a community of interest in newsrooms across the country. The struggle to establish that community involved a complex set of issues that had to be dealt with as investigative journalists formed that community...

The craft of investigative reporting emerged as a dominant practice of American journalism during the turbulent 1960s. By the mid-1970s, in fact, it had matured significantly, yet it could not envision itself apart from the institutions—the news organizations—that published the work of investigative reporters and editors. To be sure, individual projects such as the Donald Barlett and James Steele investigation of criminal justice in Philadelphia for the Philadelphia Inquirer and the investigation of police corruption in Chicago by the investigative team of the Chicago Tribune pushed the craft forward both in technique and in standards of excellence. However, investigative reporting remained an unfocused commodity and lacked a community structure.

Even among journalists, uncertainty remained about whether investigative journalism was different from other forms of journalism; whether, in other words, investigative journalism was a separate journalistic practice or an unnecessary label attached to what had always been just good, solid reporting. Textbooks and trade books were published on investigative reporting and reporters during the mid-1970s, but while they zeroed in on this particular type of reporting, they usually wavered when they defined the craft. "Investigative reporting differs from routine reporting in degree of thoroughness," one 1978 text insists. "While all reporting utilizes the same basic tools (questions, interviews, research), these weapons are wielded more skillfully for an investigative piece."\(^3\)

To use terminology proposed a decade later by philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, journalists by the mid-1970s were, in effect, asking whether investigative journalism was a distinct "social practice." It is a question that remains relevant in the 1990s and one that can be answered now with more precision because of MacIntyre's work. MacIntyre has not discussed journalism directly, but on a more general level he has discussed how social practices can be analyzed using philosophy, moral philosophy, history, and sociology.\(^4\)

MacIntyre defines a social practice as a coherent, complex, cooperative human activity in a social setting. He says that members of a practice obtain goods that are specific to the practice by carrying out activities in the pursuit of standards of excellence. These standards of excellence are appropriate to and partially define the practice. MacIntyre argues that a social practice develops and is sustained through the efforts of practitioners to meet and extend the practice's standards of excellence.\(^5\) The key here is the contention that a distinct social practice has goods and standards of excellence that are specific to it, and that individual practitioners cooperate to obtain the goods, meet and extend the standards of excellence, and advance the practice.

Prior to the founding of the service organization Investigative Reporters and Editors in the mid-1970s, investigative journalism did not meet MacIntyre's test for being a distinct social practice. The founding of IRE in late 1975, however, in and of itself established the foundation for the development of investigative journalism into a social practice. In other words, to the extent that modern investigative reporting in the United States can be considered a social practice as defined by MacIntyre, the establishment of IRE was pivotal.

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2. Paul Williams related the following story in the introduction to his textbook, *Investigative Reporting and Editing* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice Hall, 1978), xi: "One of my oldest newspaper friends wrote to me after he heard I was teaching investigative reporting and asked: 'What's the difference between investigative reporting and just good reporting?' I was to hear a dozen variations of his question as I worked on this book."


5. Ibid., 175.
This article examines the founding of IRE as revealed through the records, meeting minutes, memoranda, and other materials available in the files of IRE and in the collected, unpublished papers of key participants in the organization's founding, as well as the history revealed through interviews with investigative journalists knowledgeable about the organization's founding.

The Modern Investigative Tradition

Prior to the mid-1970s, investigative journalism was a solitary, individualistic pursuit. The extent of this can be seen in the biographies, autobiographies, and other accounts of investigative journalism published in the mid-1970s. Political reporter Jack Anderson, for example, published his autobiography in 1973 under the title of *The Anderson Papers*, emphasizing his solitary role as an investigator.6 Reporter Joe Eszterhas profiled investigative reporter Seymour M. Hersh for *Rolling Stone* magazine and called him "the toughest reporter in America"—like Anderson, picturing the investigative reporter as a lone operator.7 And John C. Behrens published a book about individual investigative journalists, *The Typewriter Guerrillas: Closeups of 20 Top Investigative Reporters*.8 In these works and others, there was little reference to investigative journalism as a community of practitioners with its own unique set of standards and skills.9 Instead, the individual reporter was heralded as a lone hero, gunning for the bad guys.

The myth that developed around the lone investigative reporter is recounted by Benjaminson and Anderson in a text on the craft:

Everybody knows what an investigative reporter is. He's the guy with the dangling cigarette, the grim visage, the belted trench coat, and the snap-brim fedora. He slinks in and out of phone booths, talks out of the side of his mouth, and ignores other, lesser reporters.

He never had to learn his trade. He was born to it. He sprung from his mother's womb clutching a dog-eared address book and his real father's birth certificate. He has an interminable list of contacts. His job consists largely of calling the contacts and saying 'Gimme the dope.'...He appears in the city room only every two or three months to drop his copy on the desks

of his astonished editors, mumble a few words, and disappear again into the night. 10

Anyone who has watched any television serial about a hero investigative reporter will recognize this description. 11

This image is not to say that investigative journalist teams did not exist. Indeed, Francke documented the late nineteenth-century use of such teams by Frank Leslie, editor of Leslie's Weekly, and by the New York Times and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. 12 And the stars of Watergate in the early 1970s were Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, a team some referred to as "Woodstein." 13 But these teams were individualistic in that each team worked for a single newspaper or news organization and rarely communicated with muckrakers or investigative reporters beyond those on their own staff concerning story leads, background information, reporting techniques, or other issues relating to the craft of ferreting out corruption and malfeasance.

There was some cooperation when two or more reporters happened onto the same story. Jack Newfield of The Village Voice, for example, told an interviewer in the mid-1970s of cooperation among himself, John Hess of the New York Times, and Steve Bauman of WNEW-TV during an investigation of New York nursing home operator Bernard Bergman in 1974. The three reporters did not work together, Newfield said, but did exchange ideas. Because stories were appearing on Bergman in three local media outlets at the same time, the findings of Medicaid fraud by Bergman could not be ignored by the power structure, Newfield said. 14 While the benefits of working together were recognized, there was no formal structure to encourage cooperation, and it was not common. "Too often," Newfield said, "if one paper breaks a story, rival papers will purposefully ignore it, or even make an effort to knock it down." 15

One reporter remembered an isolation among those wanting to do investigative reporting. Steve Weinberg, an investigative reporter prior to becoming director of IRE in 1983, recalled that it was not easy to know other investigative reporters or of their work during the early to mid-1970s:

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11. For example, in 1977, CBS launched "The Andros Targets," modeled after the exploits of Nicholas Gage of the New York Times. The show was roundly criticized, even by Gage, as being unrealistically dramatic. See Jimmy Breslin, "Breslin Walks Andros Beat: Reporter Show Found Lacking By Vet of Saloon Interview. Oh, What the Script Left Out!" (MORE), April 1977, 48-49.
15. Ibid.
I'd paid attention in journalism school to some of the contemporary investigative reporters—I guess you'd call them—but I didn't know that many, by reputation or otherwise. I mean, I guess you'd put Jack Anderson in that category and Drew Pearson was still alive when I started out. Clark Mollenhoff at the Des Moines Register was somebody I'd heard about and occasionally got to read some of his stuff, and some of the stuff coming out of Vietnam, especially the work of David Halberstam, and, later, Seymour Hersh. So I was aware of that, but there weren't very many models....

I didn't know very much about broader standards. I just hoped it would be fair and accurate and thorough—those were kind of elusive words, elusive concepts, but ever since I became a journalist in high school, I followed fairness and accuracy and thoroughness. I don't know where it came from exactly.16

Another remembered that he saw investigative journalism in a negative light in the early to mid-1970s because of what—he acknowledged in 1993—was a misconception of the craft. Joe Rigert's experience suggests that the isolation of investigative reporters resulted from a lack of communication among those interested in investigatory journalism. Rigert, a reporter for the Minneapolis Star-Tribune, was doing "in-depth" or "project" reporting in the mid-1970s, which essentially was investigative journalism, but Rigert did not realize this:

I had kind of a dim view of investigative journalism. I felt that it was kind of a cult. [I considered them to be] reporters who had a cynical view about society, and they were probably making more out of these things than they were worth....A lot of words about very minor things.17

This isolation of investigative reporters and the confusion about investigative journalism existed even though there was some attempt by journalism educators and by some journalists to teach the skills of investigative journalism. Some schools of journalism included classes in investigative journalism, and some professional organizations offered workshops on the

craft. For example, the American Press Institute, beginning in 1961, offered periodic seminars on investigative journalism.

But investigative journalism remained defined, like environmental reporting, travel reporting, and political reporting, as a beat within journalism, and not clearly a journalistic practice. A conference on public affairs reporting in 1973 was electrified by the investigations of the Watergate scandal, and the speakers preached that investigative reporting was a reporter's "highest calling." But the conference participants viewed investigative reporting as an extension of public affairs reporting, as reporting that beat reporters did while covering the state legislature, the environment, and education. Two years later, at another conference called to assess the "lessons of Watergate," investigative reporter Joe Heaney of the Boston Herald-American suggested that all reporters should be recognized as investigative reporters. Robert Maynard, editorial writer for the Washington Post, urged his colleagues not to "get caught up in the business of thinking in terms of investigative reporters and the rest of us. I'm worried about the mystique of the term—it's what all of us are supposed to be all the time."

At the height of the resurgence of investigative reporting after Watergate, many journalists drew no clear distinction between what investigative reporters did and what all reporters did. At the same time, scholars were rushing to study the work of early twentieth-century muckrakers to unearth the roots of investigative reporting and prove a continuous history of the craft, and popular writers were declaring investigative reporters as the new American heroes.

Lurking beneath this mythic vision of the investigative reporter as individual and folk hero, as well as the seemingly contradictory but ultimately compatible notion that investigative journalism is not a unique genre, was an institutional bias. Investigative reporting was seen as a product of a news

21. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
organization staffed by individual journalists, not as the product of those individual journalists. For example, the main theme of a seminar on expose’ writing in 1973 that was reported by the trade press was that management is key to investigative reporting. Speakers, including the head of investigative teams for the Los Angeles Times and the Riverside (California) Press-Enterprise, stressed that all newspapers, whatever their size, can do investigations if management commits to them and assigns the necessary staff — any staff — to it. No special skills, knowledge, or training is required. If all reporters are investigative reporters, then investigative reporters do nothing unique. Investigative journalism is not a genre in this view, but an extension of routine public affairs reporting.

The tension between the dominance of the institution and autonomy of the individual journalist that has been discussed by Boylan and others applies equally to the relationship between management and investigative journalists. Without a community of investigative journalists outside the institutional structure of the news media, the fate of the craft remained determined by the institutions, a factor that MacIntyre argues is detrimental to development of a social practice. Without a focus on the practice, without recognition that investigative journalism was in fact a craft requiring specialized skills and producing stories and series of a different character than other journalism, no sustained, systematic development of the craft could occur.

The Founding of IRE

Perhaps the best indication of the lack of community among investigative reporters during the early 1970s comes from the founders of IRE. Records show that frustrations with feelings of isolation and the perception that a national organization could enhance the practice of investigative journalism were key motivating factors in the founding of IRE.

In 1973, Harley R. Bierce and Myrta J. Pulliam were members of the new investigative team at the Indianapolis Star. Along with Richard E. Cady and William Anderson, the two other members of the team, they began as their first investigative project for the Star a six-month investigation of Indianapolis’ police department. The team uncovered bribery, extortion, and thievery by police in Indianapolis and won a Pulitzer and other prizes. In subsequent reporting, the team attempted to report nationwide on police corruption. It was this larger project that germinated the seeds for a national organization of investigative journalists, seeds that had recently been planted by Chicago Tribune reporter Ron

Koziol in consultation with journalism educator Paul Williams, himself a former Pulitzer-Prize-winning investigative editor.  

Bierce and Pulliam, while working on the national police corruption story, experienced first-hand the limitations on skill and knowledge facing investigative reporters embarking on a new investigation. The lack of reliable contacts among reporters across the United States proved to be a detriment. They perceived that a network of reporters willing to help one another would simplify the reporting of stories that were not confined to a single locale. Consequently, they began discussing the usefulness of a national service organization for investigative reporters.

That discussion culminated in a $3,128 planning grant from the Lilly Endowment and a 1975 organizational meeting in Reston, Virginia, on 22 and 23 February 1975. The planning meeting had two goals: to determine whether there was interest for a national meeting of investigative reporters, and to determine whether there was support for establishing a national organization of investigative journalists.

Present at the meeting as invited participants were reporters, editors, educators, publishers, and others known to have practiced or encouraged investigative reporting. The name of the proposed organization — Investigative Reporters and Editors, or IRE — was chosen at this meeting.

It was quickly agreed that a national meeting and an organization would be beneficial to investigative journalism. “An association could be useful,” Jack Anderson, the syndicated Washington, D.C. columnist, remarked during the early discussion. “It’s helpful just to know investigative reporters at other papers. An
annual meeting would be a good chance to meet people."

In addition, participants identified training and maintenance of standards as important needs. "The greatest need is the lack of training," said Anderson. "I see my mistakes being repeated." "There needs to be an upgrading in penetrating reporting across the board," said John Colburn, executive vice president of Landmark Communications, Norfolk, Virginia. "We leave too many unanswered questions because we don't know how to find the answers." "The real need is a general upgrade of investigative reporting and regular reporters," Robert Peirce of the St. Louis Globe-Democrat added.

The question of whether to limit the organization to experienced investigative reporters or to open it to all reporters in an attempt to spread investigative techniques into routine reporting became a crucial consideration that ultimately decided the fate of the organization. There were some participants, particularly those who had already gained recognition as investigative reporters, who wanted the organization to be an elite association of reporters who had proven themselves. "I suggest we accept only the experienced reporters," said Jack Anderson. "There are very few of the type of reporters I'm talking about."

The purpose of such a select group, according to David Burnham of the New York Times, would be to publicize investigative journalism in an attempt to change the definition of news from just reporting what the mayor said to reporting what is going on behind the public announcements.

Malcolm Mallette of the American Press Institute acknowledged a sympathy for John Colburn's desire to reach out to all reporters, but also saw the benefits of an elite group as proposed by Jack Anderson: "If you want to go Jack's way for a prestige thing, then you are aspiring to something. There is a ripple effect in this industry."

"I wonder about being too selective," countered Robert Friedly, director of communications for the Christian Church, Disciples of Christ, Indianapolis. "It's the guy in Kokomo who needs this to rub off, but if it's too exclusive, you won't get the ones who need the help."

"How about writing Kokomo and asking the city editor to nominate someone?" Les Whitten, a Jack Anderson associate, suggested. "That's still selective, but you avoid some yo-yos."

Clearly, some among the participants wanted to establish authority over the craft by excluding reporters who had not proven themselves as investigative journalists. This position would surface again at a later meeting when it was discussed who would be listed in a directory of investigative journalists. But at

33. Notes taken by Myrta Pulliam during Reston meeting, Williams papers.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
Reston, the consensus shifted to openness. Burnham suggested, for example, that to limit the organization would exclude reporters who are not assigned to investigative beats, but who nonetheless produce tough, investigative reporting. Later, when publicizing formation of IRE in a trade magazine in March 1975, Harley Bierce of the Indianapolis Star reported the Reston meeting’s decision that the organization would provide services to any reporter handling an investigative assignment. “We want to stress that this won’t be an exclusive organization. Good reporters naturally fall into this classification [of investigative reporter],” he said.

Participants of the Reston meeting agreed to serve on a steering committee. Koziol, who could not attend the initial meeting but who expressed an interest in the organization, also was added to the steering committee. Those who attended as observers and advisors, however, were not included. Because of the inclusion of such noted investigative journalists as Jack Anderson, David Burnham, and Jack Landau, the group immediately gained credibility. The steering committee’s charge was to further explore interest in a national organization and to plan a national conference, during which the national organization could be established. In addition, the early organizers created an executive committee composed of Robert Peirce, Ronald Koziol, Paul Williams, Myrta Pulliam, Harley Bierce, Edward O. DeLaney, an Indianapolis attorney, and Robert Friedly.

Among the conclusions reached during the Reston organizational meeting were that reporters on investigative assignment can benefit by sharing their information and ideas, and that the channel for this sharing could be through a service organization that would provide an annual national meeting, a national directory, a newsletter, and a databank of published investigative stories. In an organizational letter sent to prospective members, Harley Bierce elaborated on the goals of the new organization: “We believe an organization providing useful services could be beneficial; it could make us [investigative reporters] more efficient, more successful and reduce costs.” He pointed out that one major goal of the organization would be to find a way to identify and encourage “standards that should be upheld.”

42. Ibid.
43. “Investigative reporters form own service association,” Editor and Publisher, 8 March 1975, 10.
44. Myrta Pulliam et al., “Report to Lilly Endowment.” Robert L. Friedly resigned from the IRE executive committee on 28 May 1976, “in the interest of IRE’s being exclusively a reporter-editor organization and with the understanding that the church’s role essentially was that of a repository for funds during the preincorporation period. We feel we have fulfilled our role.” Friedly to Pulliam 28 May 1976, IRE files.
45. Pulliam et al., “Report to Lilly Endowment.”
47. Ibid.
There was concern at the Reston meeting that IRE not duplicate services provided by other journalism organizations.\(^{48}\) API’s seminars on investigative reporting techniques had developed a systematic approach to investigative reporting and encouraged interest in such reporting.\(^{49}\) But API’s representative at the Reston meeting pointed out that as a service organization, API’s priorities could change as interests among its members changed, indicating that there was no guarantee that its seminars on investigative journalism skills would continue.\(^{50}\) In addition, other services, such as a directory of investigative reporters, a data bank of investigative stories, and an annual meeting open to all reporters interested in investigative journalism were not being met by the API seminars.\(^{51}\) Questions of working with Sigma Delta Chi, the professional journalism society, API, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, and the American Newspaper Publishers Association were raised.\(^{52}\) It was agreed, however, that while coordination with other groups was important, independence from them would ensure perpetuation of the organization and also better serve to create a “community of temperament,” to use Les Whitten’s phrase.\(^{53}\) And, indeed, shortly after the Reston meeting, S.R. Macdonald of the American Newspaper Publisher’s Association Foundation raised concerns that ANPA should not be associated with a group such as IRE because it posed the possibility of becoming a reporters’ group which could at times be at cross-purposes to newspaper management.\(^{54}\)

In the months following the Reston meeting, members of the IRE steering committee met several times to plan a national meeting, write proposed by-laws, and apply for grants to fund the national meeting and a permanent resource center at Ohio State University, where steering committee member Paul Williams was an associate professor. At a 22 March 1975, meeting, the IRE executive committee decided to apply for not-for-profit incorporation under the laws of Indiana, apply for an additional $5,000 grant from the Lilly Endowment, and seek grants from the ANPA Foundation, the Philip Stern Foundation, the Henry R. Luce Foundation, the Twentieth Century Fund, and other foundations.\(^{55}\) The committee set a fund-raising goal of $20,000, an amount later revised upwards to $100,000, then $250,000, then back down to $90,000.\(^{56}\)

\(^{48}\) Pulliam, notes of Reston meeting.
\(^{49}\) Christianson, “New Muckraking,” 12.
\(^{50}\) Pulliam, notes of Reston meeting.
\(^{51}\) Christianson, “New Muckraking,” 12.
\(^{52}\) Pulliam, note of Reston meeting: Paul Williams, notes of Reston meeting, Williams papers.
\(^{53}\) Williams, notes of Reston meeting.
\(^{54}\) S.R. Macdonald, “Memorandum to the file,” 27 February 1975, IRE files.
\(^{55}\) “Report to the steering committee on IRE executive committee meeting held March 22 (1975) at Indianapolis,” IRE files.
\(^{56}\) Ibid.; “Request for American Newspaper Publisher Association Foundation support for IREG,” undated; executive committee report to steering committee, 25 April 1975; and Bierce letter to Curtis, 6 February 1975; all are in IRE files; see also “1977 Budget A” and “1977 Budget B,” Williams papers.
By the end of 1975, IRE had raised $5,278, including the original Lilly Endowment planning grant of $3,128. Other donations came from Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. ($1,000); the Omaha World-Herald ($350); Capitol Newspapers of Albany, New York ($200); Bob Bolitho, a newspaper broker ($200); Eugene S. Pulliam, publisher of the Indianapolis papers ($100); Muncie (Indiana) Newspapers ($100); the Huntington Herald ($50); and Les Whitten ($50). Office and travel expenses amounted to approximately $3,290, leaving a balance of $1,987.92.\(^7\) Initial plans were to fund the organization through membership dues and grants from newspapers and journalism-related or philanthropic foundations.\(^8\)

By 10 April 1976, IRE's assets had grown to $18,453.87, reflecting a matching grant of $14,045 from the Lilly Endowment; membership fees of $770 (from 68 members); newspaper contributions of $3,087.50; and other unidentified funds totalling $3,150.\(^9\)

The national conference was scheduled for 18-20 June 1976, in Indianapolis. The conference was attended by approximately two hundred paid participants from thirty-five states, approximately thirty speakers (who waived their speaking fees), and forty students. The annual meeting held in conjunction with the conference was chaired by Ron Koziol, president of the IRE board of directors. Other officers were Paul Williams, vice president; and Edward DeLaney, secretary.\(^6\) The membership voted to seek funds for establishing a resource center at Ohio State University by 1 July 1977. Rejecting earlier arguments that the IRE directory of investigative reporters should be limited to those who had been nominated to the directory because of outstanding work, the membership adopted a resolution that all members of IRE would be included.\(^61\)

Indicating a concern for a topical issue of the time, the membership approved a resolution strongly urging any reporter, editor, or news agency under employment to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or other law enforcement agencies to resign immediately because by “accepting payment from such agencies, news persons demean the principles of American journalistic independence.”\(^62\) The membership also voted to establish an ethics committee “responsible for raising in a continuing way the

\(^{57}\) “Year End Balance Sheet,” Investigative Reporters and Editors group, submitted by Harley Bierce, treasurer, 31 December 1975, IRE files.

\(^{58}\) “Minutes of the meeting of the membership of Investigative Reporters and Editors held on June 20, 1976,” IRE files, 2. The resolution reads, in part, “The board shall seek funding from private, tax-exempt philanthropic foundations: first from those foundations which owe their existence to journalistic enterprise, second from educational or research foundations, and third from such other foundations which due to their political affiliations or the sources of their money are not likely to compromise the integrity of IRE.”

\(^{59}\) Treasurer's Report, 10 April 1976, submitted by Harley Bierce, treasurer, IRE files.

\(^{60}\) “Minutes of the meeting of the membership,” 10 June 1976.

\(^{61}\) Ibid.

\(^{62}\) Ibid.
ethical questions which confront journalists” and to be “responsible for examining the assumptions that underlie” investigative journalism.63 Finally, the membership voted to establish a committee of broadcast journalists to advise the board of directors about problems specific to broadcast investigations.64

The first IRE conference and annual meeting was the culmination of seventeen months of organizing, fund-raising, and community-building. The founders had taken an informal group of interested people through incorporation into a fully constructed organization with by-laws, a board of directors with officers, an established funding structure, an identifiable community of interest, and a clearly established set of goals. Plans were in place for setting up a resource center, seeking funds from foundations and media companies, and providing a communication network among journalists interested in investigative reporting. During the next two to three years, the officers, board of directors, and members would work to implement, with some alterations, the goals set out during this first national conference and meeting.

The Early Years

Organizers of IRE expressed early concern that the definition of investigative reporting should be as broad as possible.65 Adopting a definition written by Robert Greene of Newsday, IRE defined an investigative story as one that results from the initiative and personal work of a reporter (i.e., one that does not result from an investigation by law enforcement or other institutions); that concerns a matter of importance to readers/viewers; and that reveals information that someone or some organization wants to keep secret.66 While the definition remains controversial, particularly its emphasis on exposé of secrets, it represents the first time investigative journalists established an official and generally agreed-upon definition of their craft.

During the first annual meeting, IRE members approved a proposal to locate the IRE resource center at Ohio State University. Williams’ death in November 1976, however, brought into question the association between IRE and Ohio State. The executive committee sought another site for IRE offices. In addition to Ohio State, interest was shown by Michigan State University, Northwestern University, Indiana University, Boston University, the University of Missouri, and, later, Arizona State University. Ultimately, in 1978, two

63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Pulliam and Bierce to Stu McDonald, American Newspaper Publisher’s Association, 13 February 1975, IRE files; Friedly to Pulliam, 28 May 1976; Ron Koziol and Bob Peirce, IRE membership committee, draft of membership solicitation letter, undated, IRE files; and “IRE-Background,” informational flyer handed out at first IRE conference, 1976, IRE files.
66. John Ullmann to IRE board members, 30 May 1979, IRE files tabbed as “1979 Original awards criteria.”
formal proposals came to the IRE board of directors: one from Boston University and one from the University of Missouri School of Journalism.  

UMC School of Journalism Dean Roy M. Fisher, in proposing his school as the IRE headquarters, stressed the school's tradition of service to professional journalists and its twenty-year affiliation with the Freedom of Information Center. He also attempted to quiet the fears of IRE president (later, chairman) Robert Greene that IRE would get "overshadowed" by other UMC programs and that locating at Columbia, Missouri, would isolate the organization from urban centers outside the Midwest. At the June 1978 IRE board meeting and annual meeting, the University of Missouri was chosen over Boston University and investigative reporter John Ullmann was named executive director. The vote by the membership was unanimous.

From 1976 to 1980, IRE established the resource center in cooperation with the University of Missouri School of Journalism, hired a permanent staff, founded a publication (The IRE Journal) to communicate with members, held annual and regional conferences, set up an annual awards program with detailed criteria that represent clearly delineated standards of investigative journalism, adopted a definition of investigative journalism, and completed the Arizona Project, during which IRE members investigated corruption in Arizona and

69. Ibid.
70. Jack Nelson to John Ullmann, 29 June 1978, IRE files. Harley Bierce of the Indianapolis Star was IRE's first full-time executive director. He handled the day-to-day affairs of IRE from office space rented from the Indianapolis Star. His position as temporary executive director was eliminated and the office was closed 11 February 1977, when financial problems developed for the organization, Harley Bierce letter to IRE board members, 3 February 1977.
71. Ibid.
72. The Criteria for the IRE annual award program are:
   1. The work must be substantially the product of the entrant's initiative and efforts.
   2. The originality of the topics shall be considered.
   3. The secrecy others wish to impose shall be considered.
   4. It must be about matters of importance to the publication's circulation or broadcast area.
   5. It must be fairly and accurately presented.
   6. The quality and quantity of support and documentation will be considered.
   7. It must be well-written. Clarity and effectiveness of presentation will be considered.
   8. Difficulty, peril, sacrifice, and resources of the entrant will be considered.
   9. Actual or potential impact of the story will be considered.
   10. It must meet all the generally accepted craft standards.

"Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of IRE held at the University Hilton Hotel, Los Angeles, 12 October 1984," submitted by Myrta Pulliam, acting secretary, IRE files.
published a series of articles on their findings. The Arizona Project, which was carried out from November 1976 to March 1977, was instigated in response to the June 1976 murder of fellow investigative journalist Don Bolles of Phoenix, Arizona. The project brought IRE national recognition as well as a host of legal and financial problems and internal controversies that nearly destroyed the organization. But it was an integral part of IRE's attempt to establish a community of investigative journalists.

Establishment of a Social Practice: Discussion and Conclusion

During the early years of IRE, organizers and leaders of the association were in the process of building a community of interest to further the practice of investigative journalism. MacIntyre asserts that community-building itself is a social practice and can be assessed like other social practices. When the community-building affects the creation of a social practice, such as with IRE's founding and the practice of investigative journalism, it would seem even more important to analyze the process of community-building.

The fostering of cooperation to create a cohesion among the nation's investigative journalists was critical to the development of investigative journalism as a social practice. In addition to the Arizona Project, which provided a unifying cause to rally around, IRE also fostered cooperation by hosting regional and national meetings where investigative reporters could learn from one another and make contacts for future cooperation on individual stories.

MacIntyre maintains that cooperation is central to furtherance of a practice:


74. Pulliam and Bierce to McDonald, 13 February 1975. Six libel suits were filed against IRE because of the Arizona Project, which threatened the group’s financial survival. However, IRE eventually won all the suits and the costs of litigation were paid by its libel insurance carrier. In addition, acrimony developed among board members and officers of IRE when it was revealed that one member of the Arizona Project team, Michael F. Wendland, contracted to write a book about the project contrary to understandings that no one member of the team would write a book about its experiences. Ron Koziol, president of the board, was forced to resign because of allegations he was corroborating with Wendland. The existence of the Wendland book caused a major publisher to cancel a contract with IRE for a book about the Arizona Project, and without its own book, IRE was unable to sell rights to a movie on the project. The organization was counting on income from the book and movie.

75. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 181.
...[G]ood can only be achieved by subordinating ourselves to the best standard so far achieved, and that entails subordinating ourselves within the practice in our relationship to other practitioners. ... Every practice requires a certain kind of relationship between those who participate in it.76

L. Gregory Jones, writing on MacIntyre’s notion of community, says this relationship among members of a practice is a “communion that exists through the time spent . . . sharing in practices.”77 Out of this shared communion comes “a shared vision of and understanding of goods,” according to MacIntyre.78

The notion of goods internal to a practice, in contrast to goods external to a practice, forms an important component of MacIntyre’s definition of a social practice. MacIntyre asserts that members of a practice carry out activities “through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are definitive of that form of activity.”79 Lambeth has pointed out that among journalists, internal goods would include telling the truth and telling the whole story.80 Using the definition of investigative reporting established by IRE, one can identify additional internal goods specific to investigative journalism, including the generation of knowledge or information on one’s own rather than relying on a government agency or other institution to reveal it; the revelation of information that is important for the public to know, i.e., telling stories that have significant impact on people’s lives or on society generally; and the uncovering of information that has been hidden by institutions or people.81

Prior to the formation of IRE, no formal means of identifying and reaffirming internal goods to investigative journalism existed, for, as MacIntyre points out, it is only through communion that goods can be decided upon.82 MacIntyre stresses that the central bond of a community is a “shared vision of and understanding of goods.”83 He refers to the “cooperative care for common goods of the practice.”84 IRE, through its annual meetings, regional conferences, establishment of a clear definition of investigative journalism, and its annual contest, generates a continuing dialogue among practitioners about the internal goods of the craft. The IRE Journal, founded in October 1978, became a

76. Ibid., 178.
79. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 175.
82. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 177-178.
83. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed., 258.
84. MacIntyre, After Virtue., 181.
sounding board for discussions of the practice and standards of investigative journalism. Early issues carried articles on the prudence of accepting stolen documents, the ethics of cooperating with legal authorities, and the propriety of using deception in news gathering, as well as detailed articles on case studies of investigations, specific investigative tools, and other skills issues.

Without an independent service organization that generates community beyond the institutions—the news organizations that employ the investigative journalists—a craft remains susceptible to the trappings of the external goods which MacIntyre identifies as those goods which inhibit moral development of a craft, goods such as celebrity, power, and money. “Institutions are characteristically and necessarily concerned with what I have called external goods,” MacIntyre asserts. “Without justice, courage, and truthfulness, practices could not resist the corrupting power of institutions.”  

IRE itself became entrapped in a quest for external goods as it struggled to raise funds for operating expenses. During the early years, the organization was sustained through grants from foundations and individuals that raised questions among IRE members and others. Eli Lilly, a pharmaceutical firm, provided through its foundation seed money and first-year matching grants for IRE. When the issue of accepting money from a drug manufacturer came up at the first annual meeting, the membership adopted a resolution to seek funds from noncompromising sources and accepting the Lilly Endowment funds only with the understanding that the money came with no strings attached. The organization also was embarrassed when the Wall Street Journal revealed that it had accepted individual contributions from the Louis Wolfson Foundation, whose creator was imprisoned for securities violations; and from attorney Julius Echeles of Chicago, who often represented Mafia clients and who was himself an ex-con. Board members could respond only that it was impossible to know who all the contributors were.

In addition, IRE accepted two anonymous donations during its early years. In 1983 and 1984, the IRE board accepted $5,000 donations from Fiduciary Trust Company of New York. In 1983, when the first donation was proposed, board members contacted the trust company and were satisfied that accepting the money would not compromise the organization. But the danger of such donations were not lost on the board, and the acceptance of such gifts halted.

MacIntyre also requires of a social practice that it be imbued with a history, a tradition:

85. Ibid., 180.
86. “Minutes of the meeting of the membership,” 10 June 1976,
88. Ibid.
89. “Minutes of a Meeting of the Board of Directors of IRE,” 24 February 1984.
Practices of course . . . have a history. . . . We have to learn to recognize what is due to whom. . . . To enter into a practice is to enter into a relationship not only with its contemporary practitioners, but also with those who have preceded us in the practice, particularly those whose achievements extended the reach of the practice to its present point.90

Prior to establishment of IRE, there was no readily accessible depository of investigative journalism reports, both printed and broadcast. In essence, IRE has documented the history of investigative journalism since its establishment through its maintenance of an “investigator's morgue,” which contains examples of investigative journalism done in the United States. This library of data, in addition to the educational seminars held during regional and national meetings, and its publications, provides investigative journalists with a continuing dialogue with the past of their practice. The library and the seminars provides a means to “recognize what is due to whom.”91

MacIntyre’s definition of a practice also requires that practitioners establish and maintain standards of excellence, and when one enters a practice he or she must “accept the authority of those standards” and be willing to have one’s own work judged in relation to those standards.92 IRE, through its awards presentations, its seminars, and its publications, teaches, assesses, and rewrites the standards of excellence for investigative reporting. Prior to IRE, standards existed, of course, but they were unofficial standards in that they were not sanctioned by a national organization dedicated to the improvement and maintenance of the craft.

From the beginning, the identification and promotion of standards of excellence was listed as a goal.93 At IRE’s first national conference in 1976, in fact, the program was designed to educate investigative journalists on standards of excellence as well as on specific skills. Workshops on “The State of the Art of Investigative Reporting,” “Doing the Job Ethically,” and “Responsible Alternative Media,” were provided along with skills-based workshops on “Precision Journalism,” “Investigative Interviewing,” and “Investigative Teamwork.”94 In addition, creation of the IRE awards program in 1980 further contributed to the establishment of standards by holding up the best work as examples of how the craft should be carried out.

90. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 177-181.
91. Steve Weinberg and Jan Colbert, The Investigative Journalist; Morgue (Columbia, Mo.: Investigative Reporters and Editors, 1986). This is an index to the database of the stories and is updated regularly. A new edition was published in 1991.
92. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 177.
93. “IRE- Background,” 1976; Pulliam and Bierce to McDonald, 13 February 1975; and Bierce to Curtis, 6 February 1975.
Throughout its early years, IRE worked to bring journalists interested in investigative reporting together in a community of interest. And beyond the community-building was a conscious effort to generate a discussion among practitioners about methods, skills, ethics, values, and, to use MacIntyrean terms, “internal” versus “external” goods. The formation and early efforts of IRE contributed to a self-consciousness among investigative reporters and editors. A sense of the practice separate from the news organizations developed and, instead of looking to the institutions for leadership in skills and ethics, investigative journalists began looking to IRE for leadership as a representative of the practice, not the institutions.

The author is an assistant professor in the Communication Department, University of South Alabama.
Rediscovering Zona Gale, Journalist

By Elizabeth V. Burt

Zona Gale was a journalist, short story writer, novelist, and playwright who achieved success and professional independence in the early decades of the twentieth century. Her biographers have given little attention to her early years as a newspaper reporter. In an attempt to rediscover Gale as a journalist, this author examined archival materials, examples of her journalistic and literary work, and reminiscences of her contemporaries.

In 1921 Wisconsin writer Zona Gale was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for her play “Miss Lulu Bett.” The forty-eight-year-old author had, after thirty years of writing, achieved what many regard as the pinnacle of success, the guarantee of fame and recognition. But in the moment of her glory, Gale did not forget her beginnings as a writer — the days she had spent going from newspaper to newspaper in search of an assignment. “Day after day I presented myself before the city editor, and day after day he assured me there was no opening for me,” she told a New York journalist after receiving the Pulitzer.

I kept applying to that city editor, until finally, out of sheer fatigue, I imagine, he stopped me once as I was going out, told me that a flower show was opening that day, and asked me to cover it. I never shall forget my thrill at the phrase ‘cover it.’ Later, when I was actually a reporter, I used to go about my work saying to myself, ‘I’m out on assignment, I’m out on assignment!’ People talked about the ‘newspaper grind,’ but I was more than happy in it. I was ecstatic!

1. Sumner Keene, “The Everlasting Persistence of This Western Girl,” American Magazine, June 1921. In Zona Gale Papers, Box 5, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin. (Hereafter the Zona Gale Papers will be referred to as ZG Papers; the State Historical Society of Wisconsin will be abbreviated SHSW.)
This was one of Gale's favorite stories about her search for a job as a reporter. In later years she often recounted it when advising would-be writers how to get a start in writing, whether in fiction or newspaper work. Her advice for success was persistence, hard work, and plenty of writing, writing, and more writing. And the best place to gain that experience, she advised, was on a newspaper.

For the most part Zona Gale's career as a journalist has been quickly passed over by her biographers, who have, instead, focused on her career as a fiction writer. In his 1940 biography, Still Small Voice, August Derleth, for example, devotes just one brief chapter to Gale's years as a newspaper reporter and none at all to her later years as a writer for publications such as The New York Times and the Nation. The chapter, entitled "That Good-Looking Reporter," dwells on the adventures and excitement Gale experienced as a reporter first in Milwaukee and later in New York City, pointing always, however, to her "true" ambition to write fiction. Her work as a journalist gets even shorter shift twenty-two years later in a critical analysis of her fiction by biographer Harold Simonson, where only two pages are devoted to the newspaper work of "the little charmer from Portage." And in a 1986 study by graduate student Dianne Paley, Gale's newspaper career is discounted as a brief attempt to escape the smothering attentions of an over-protective mother rather than the conscious career choice of an independent woman.

This article seeks to rediscover the nature of Zona Gale as a professional journalist, taking into account the cultural context of the period in which she lived, the work she produced, and her reflections upon it. As contextual analyst Dominick LaCapra points out, however, the reading of such material often depends on the perspective of the researcher as well as a host of shifting facts, interpretations, and values that constantly reconstitute perceptions of reality. In examining such texts, LaCapra asserts, historians must consider not only the questions that have been asked but also the questions that have not been asked; not only the facts that have been given but also those that have not been stated, that have, perhaps, been deliberately silenced.

Thus, the life of any individual can be considered a text to be examined in the far larger contexts of time, place, and social and historical ideologies. To use LaCapra's terminology, such a text can be studied from the inside by examining the subject, in this case Zona Gale, through her own actions, writings, and statements, and from the outside by examining the things others do and say about her as well as what was happening around her at the particular period of time she was living. Finally, the researcher must create a dialogue among these various states of reality to reconstruct an understanding of the past — realizing all the time, however, that even while this is being accomplished, a new text is being created to continue the dialogue.\(^6\)

By sorting out the different accounts of Zona Gale and by placing these accounts in the context of time, place, and motivation, another understanding of the past will be constructed, a dialogue created between what has existed before and what comes into being through this reconstruction. That is the goal of this study of Zona Gale, in the hope of casting a new light on her in her role as a female journalist in the late 1890s and early twentieth century.

Women in Journalism: 1895

Zona Gale grew up during a period in which what historian Barbara Welter termed the “Cult of True Womanhood” held strong sway over the lives and education of middle-class American women. This ideology, which became firmly established during the early 1800s, defined separate spheres of existence for men and women. Men were expected and encouraged to enter the public sphere of the competitive world of trade, commerce, and politics, while women were expected to remain in the private sphere of the home where they would devote themselves to the comfort and well-being of the family and would be protected from the evil and vice of the outside world. Historians debate the degree to which women conformed to this ideology, but the fact remains that under the rubric of separate spheres, free American women of all classes were for generations denied the opportunity to pursue equal education, to enter the professions, to vote or hold elective office, and to earn salaries equal to men.\(^7\)

Not all women accepted these restrictions, however, and by midcentury some rebelled — either covertly, as did those who extended the sphere of the home to include work for benevolent and reform organizations, or overtly, as did those who joined woman's rights organizations and the woman's suffrage movement. Access to education, the right to speak in mixed audiences of men

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\(^6\) LaCapra, “Rethinking Intellectual History,” 49-51.

and women, property rights, and entrance into some of the professions were gradually won.\(^8\)

By 1895 women in a handful of states in the West had the right to vote. Women's colleges had been established, a few public universities had opened their doors to women, and the first female graduates in medicine, law, education, and divinity were working in some of the country's more enlightened institutions. A new model, that of the "new woman," was beginning to compete with that of the "angel of the hearth," but for women attempting to adopt this model, a determined struggle with the old ideology was required. The vast majority of middle-class women were still directed toward a career as wife and mother and few respectable professions were open to them. Teaching was the first of these; it was soon joined by the literary profession and then journalism.\(^9\)

Journalism was accessible to women partly because it was one of the few professions that did not require either a university degree or a license and, in those days, did not call for any particular training. Hiring practices were unregulated and, where a woman could find an editor who believed she could do the job, she had a chance of getting a job. According to the 1890 Census, there were 888 female editors and reporters in the country — 4.1 percent of the profession. By 1900, that number more than doubled. Most of these women worked on newspaper society or fashion pages, but some wrote for the news pages and some were even editors of their own publications, usually women's publications or reform papers. For those women who sought female role models in the daily general circulation press there were a few who stood above the rest — muckraker Ida Tarbell of McClure's, stunt reporter Nellie Bly of the New York World, Kate Field of the New York Tribune. They were the exceptions, however, rather than the rule, for few women journalists even received bylines. Most not only failed to achieve the fame of these few stars, they also rarely won recognition as journalists.\(^10\)

Despite these limitations, journalism was a profession that allowed women to stretch their possibilities in a world that otherwise severely restricted their options. It legitimized behavior that under other circumstances would never have been socially acceptable to the tradition-bound middle class. It permitted them to leave their families, move to big cities, live alone, attend a wide variety of events, and remain unmarried, if they wished, without the stigma of spinsterhood. It not only gave them the opportunity to report what was

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10. Maurine Beasley and Sheila J. Gibbons, *Taking Their Place: A Documentary History of Women and Journalism* (Washington, D.C.: American University Press, 1993), 8-11. This author's study of trade publications during this period reveals that women journalists were rarely, if ever, acknowledged. See, for example, *The Journalist, The Fourth Estate, and Editor and Publisher*, passim.
happening in the world, following the dictates of beats, assignments, and job requirements, it also gave those who wanted it the chance to voice their concerns about social and political issues — outright through the stories and columns they were able to chose to write and subversively through their selection of language and material.\textsuperscript{11}

### Early Years: Milwaukee

Zona Gale was one of these women who saw journalism as an opportunity for independence. Born in 1874, the only daughter of a former schoolteacher and a retired locomotive engineer, she grew up in Portage, a small town in central Wisconsin. She was one of the first generation of midwestern women to attend a public university and in 1895 received a bachelor's degree from the University of Wisconsin. After a brief return to Portage after graduation, she decided that Milwaukee was the place to find the kind of mental stimulation she craved. As for what she would do when she got there, there had never been any question about that. It was her purpose to write. “Nobody destined me for anything excepting the work to which I should be drawn,” she wrote a would-be writer in 1924. “I did not turn to writing. I always squarely faced it.”\textsuperscript{12}

Gale had written fiction throughout her childhood and during her college years. Then, while she was a student at the University of Wisconsin, she was approached by a reporter from the Milwaukee Sentinel who asked her to write two articles on university societies. Although her first thought was that she wouldn’t be able to do it, she was urged by her mother, who was with her that day, to try. She did; the stories were published. That experience reinforced her sense of inevitability that writing would be her career, and the next year, after her graduation, she went after it. She had at first returned to her family’s home, but soon found “there wasn’t any romance in Portage... I was still possessed by the idea that I must write of things beautifully romantic — or romantically beautiful,” she said years later. “So my one idea was to escape from what seemed to me an unpromising field. The only way I could think of to accomplish this

\textsuperscript{11} Although there might have been little latitude for most reporters to chose their beat or assignments, they still would have had some control over their selection of sources, how they developed the story, and the language they used. Although newspaper reporters at the turn of the century were beginning to adapt to the mold of “objective” reporting, these choices would all clearly determine the nature of the text. Some reporters, depending on their position and reputation, were granted greater independence in selecting stories. Ida Tarbell, for example, became most known for her investigative reporting of the Standard Oil Company for McClure’s Magazine and later published a book based on her stories. Theodora Winton Youmans, a suffragist and reporter for the Waukesha Freeman in Wisconsin, married the owner, became editor, and established a page devoted to suffrage.

\textsuperscript{12} Zona Gale to Frederick VanDeWater, 27 May 1924, ZG papers, box 3, folder 1, SHSW.
was to get into newspaper work in a city. So that was what I determined to do.”

In the fall of 1895, Gale went to visit a school friend, Edith Rogers, in Milwaukee and for the next few weeks went daily to the newspapers on Milwaukee Street to see if they had a job for her. Because the *Evening Wisconsin* had, during her college years, published one of her short stories, she “laid special siege to that office.” Day after day she presented herself to the city editor, and day after day she was told there was no work for her. Then, her luck changed. It was the day of her mother’s birthday and the first snowfall of winter, she remembered years later. She had asked for work and had once again been turned down, but just as she was turning away, the city editor called her back to ask her to cover an opening flower show. “They let me do a stunt,” she later wrote her mother. “Wasn’t that a nice story?” That was only the first of many stories for the newspaper. She continued to show up daily at the editor’s desk and finally, after several months, was taken onto the staff at a salary of $15 a week. Her first story was only a flower show, and many of her assignments were society events, but by this time it was clear that Zona Gale was no timid girl waiting for a lucky break. She managed to get in and get her assignment wherever she was sent, and on one occasion, crashed a society wedding and came back to the paper with both the story and a picture of the bride, an assignment several male reporters had failed to fulfill earlier in the day.

During the next four years, Gale reported for the *Evening Wisconsin*, enrolled in the master’s program at the University of Wisconsin, switched jobs to the *Milwaukee Journal*, and received a master’s degree in letters in 1899. During the same period, she took several breaks to go to Chicago to ask for work at the *Tribune* and to New York to seek work with various papers there, providing editors with story ideas and occasionally succeeding in publishing a “special.” In October 1899 her efforts paid off. After trying her usual tactics of laying siege to the city editors at several New York papers, she succeeded in landing an assignment at the *New York Evening Post*. Just as in her first assignment with the *Evening Wisconsin*, this assignment came quite unexpectedly. On October 8 she wrote her mother: “Today — Sunday — I staid [sic] at home all day. Never went to church in big New York at all. And I did two specials with which I shall approach the Post tomorrow.” When she brought in the specials, however, the editor, a Mr. Clarkin, abruptly gave her an assignment — to “find the Woman’s Health Protection Association, and ask them about the water supply.”

13. Keene Sumner, “The Everlasting Persistence of This Western Girl,” *American Magazine*, June 1921, ZG papers, box 5, SHSW.
14. Sumner; Zona Gale to Eliza Gale, 4 o’clock Tuesday, n.d., ZG papers, box 4 folder 2, SHSW; Edith Pollard interview with August Derleth, August Derleth papers, box 101, SHSW.
15. Sumner; ZG to Eliza Gale, 8 October 1899, ZG papers, box 4, folder 2, SHSW; ZG to Eliza Gale, Tuesday, 8 p.m., n.d., ZG papers, box 4, folder 2, SHSW. These “specials” were apparently freelance pieces paid for by the word or the inch.
This request led to Gale's first story in the *Evening Post* and an adventure worth repeating to any news reporting class. In his very gruff instructions, Clarkin told a mystified Gale to specifically ask the association about the "Ramapo affair." If Gale had read the previous day's newspaper, she would have known that the Ramapo Company was a water company that had proposed to solve Brooklyn's water supply problem for the price of $200,000,000. (The proposal later turned out to be a fraud against which the *Post* crusaded.) But she had not read the entire story and knew nothing of the company. Instead, she understood Clarkin to say the "gramofer affair." Rather than admit her ignorance, Gale proceeded to track down the nonexistent "gramofer" and by afternoon had succeeded in reaching the association's president in Brooklyn. "She, having told me seven times that her husband was sick upstairs in the spoken when Evening for Protective OPPOSES announcing season 'Yes,' she said, 'Ramapo.' And lo — it proves that my gramofer is the offer of the Ramapo Company to buy the city's water plant for $200,000,000. Hooray for gramofers!"  

Gale's sleuthing resulted in a four-inch story on page three of the *Evening Post* headlined: "BROOKLYN WATER SUPPLY/ WOMEN'S HEALTH ASSOCIATION TO ADVOCATE ITS EXTENSION, BUT OPPOSES RAMAPO GRAB." The story begins, "The Women's Health Protective Association of Brooklyn is expected to turn much of its attention this season to the question of the local water supply. Cards were issued yesterday announcing the first meeting of the year..." Not much of a story, a critic might say, but Oct. 11, 1899 was a big day for news, with the *Post*’s front page devoted to stories on the Boer war, the rebellion in the Philippines, a local investigation into police bribery, and the latest clues in the case of the dismembered body of a woman found wrapped in old copies of the *Evening Post*. Apparently unconcerned with the state of the world, however, Gale completed her assignment, returned to New York for a meeting with a friend and a stroll up Riverside Drive, and then went back to her hotel to write her story and a letter to her mother.

It is unclear whether Gale wrote any more stories for New York papers during this period, for in June of 1900, she was back in Wisconsin as a staff member of the *Milwaukee Journal* and as chair of the local press committee of the General Federation of Women's Clubs which was to hold its biennial convention in Milwaukee. In this role she wrote a two-page article, "Milwaukee's Most Notable Gathering of Club Women," for the convention's publication and at the convention read a paper on the relations between club

16. *New York Evening Post*: 10 October 1899, 15 October 1899, 28 October 1899; ZG to Eliza Gale, Tuesday, 8 p.m., n.d., ZG papers, box 4, folder 2, SHSW.
17. *New York Evening Post*, 11 October 1899; ZG to Eliza Gale, Tuesday, 8 p.m., n.d., ZG papers, box 4, folder 2, SHSW.
women and newspaper women. The convention was covered by the Milwaukee Journal, which reported that Gale had “administered very telling thrusts to the opposition, bringing several protesting club women to their feet,” but failed to report exactly what it was she said that was so controversial.  

At this point, it should perhaps be repeated that, while women journalists had made definite inroads in newspapers, their presence was still tenuous. The vast majority of female reporters and editors were relegated to society and gossip columns, and the few who held positions as editors were for the most part editors of either the woman's or the fashion page. By the year of the Milwaukee convention, women journalists were beginning to protest the marginalization of both female writers and the female audience. This protest was voiced at the convention's session on the press, in which at least one woman editor criticized the ghettoization of “women's” news. “I do not see why there should be a page for women readers any more than a page for blue-eyed people, or for those who have only black hair. I can assure you that newspaper women are not responsible for it,” announced Mrs. Hamilton Welch, an editor for Harper's Bazaar. “It is the male editorial idea of what a woman wants to read... It is tradition with him as strong as that women are afraid of mice and that he must ‘shoo’ all his women readers into one corner of the paper, there to revel in the riches of the women's page.” Welch went on to say that a woman editor might publish “recipes for salad” or “her instructions how to make a new sofa pillow,” but these were “so many sops to the managing editor” and that her real intent was to satisfy “the male powers that be” in order to fulfill her real mission — to tell of the progress and work of the country's women's organizations and federations.

Gale's mission during this period was to get as many news stories and front page scoops as possible — apparently with the encouragement of her editor, who wrote: “Miss Gale: I forgot to tell you this morning that the Goldman interview was the best thing in yesterday's paper.” It was also during this period that she received her first byline, a fact unusual enough for 1900, when newspaper stories rarely carried the name of the writer unless they were regular columnists or celebrities. The story was an exclusive interview with a young woman who had just returned to the United States after being trapped for weeks in Pekin during the Boxer Rebellion. The story received prominent display, covering the top half of the front page and topped by a banner headline, “FOR WEEKS SHE HEARD THE BOXERS’ AWFUL CRY,” followed by a

20. Mr. E. McIntosh to ZG, n.d., ZG papers, box 2, folder 3, SHSW. The Goldman interview might have been with socialist Emma Goldman who, in that period, was speaking at rallies throughout the country.
three-deck headline, "MISS CECILE PAYEN OF MILWAUKEE TELLS OF THAT SURGING SEA OF SOUND WHICH CAME FROM THE HORDES OF CHINESE DEVILS WHICH WAS BESIEGING HER AND OTHERS AT PEKIN -- THE SMOKE OF FIRES DARKENED THE SUN -- BULLET S WERE WHIZZING THROUGH THE AIR AND SHELLS WERE CRASHING EVERYWHERE." The story is full of color and detail, alternating the young woman's words with background and description. It begins with a quote, much like many used to begin Gale's short stories and novels in later years:

"It is like a resurrection from the grave," said Cecile Payen reverently.

At the end of a journey back from the grave indeed, and from horrors to which the grave are an hundredfold to be preferred. Miss Cecile Payen, miniature painter, stepped to the platform in Chicago early yesterday morning, and held out her arms to the little mother in black with whom half the country has for months shuddered and hoped. Miss Payen is the first American woman to reach Chicago from Pekin since the siege. She will arrive at her home in Milwaukee on Wednesday.

It was no white and emaciated daughter welcomed with thanksgiving by a mother. It was a daughter who seemed strong and healthy. It was a somewhat athletic and altogether attractive girl, ready to admit that since it is all over she is glad to have had the experience, who bent over the pale little woman to whom the months of her daughter's danger have been almost death....22

New York, New York

Shortly after her scoop on Cecile Payen, Gale left her job at the Journal and went to New York to seek her fortune on Newspaper Row. She landed a job at the New York Evening World and was soon writing her family of her exploits in the big city. Her mother, however, was not sure about the value of this success at the World. "I got a paper from New York with your Mrs. Cain and Mary McLeane articles," Eliza Gale wrote. "I did not like the Mary story very well. You will have to be very careful or your writings will drift into the sensational trend of style and you will talk of things and be misunderstood." Eliza's advice, however, was unrealistic, for sensationalism and yellow journalism were at their height in 1901 — in no other city more than New York and in no other paper more than Pulitzer's World, which at that time was in the throes of a circulation war with Hearst's New York Journal. Gale got her share of sensational stories to cover and apparently revelled in them. In February 1901, for example, she was assigned to the appeal of Staten Island dentist Samuel J.

Kennedy, who was accused of bludgeoning to death with a lead pipe his paramour Dolly Reynolds. Kennedy was a married man who claimed to have been on his way home to his wife when the murder occurred. Found guilty, he had spent two years in the death house at Sing Sing before new evidence emerged and he was given the chance to appeal.23

It was while she was covering preparations for Kennedy's retrial that Gale was reassigned to get the inside story on the shooting of an Arlington, New Jersey, clergyman by an enraged husband. By the time Gale arrived in the scandalized town, it had already been established that the husband, Thomas G. Barker, had shot the Rev. John Keller after Mrs. Barker had told him the minister had sexually attacked her several months earlier. The town had quickly divided in two camps, with one defending the honor of the critically wounded clergyman and accusing Mrs. Barker of hysteria and an overactive imagination, and the other demanding Keller's removal and upholding Mrs. Barker's credibility and her husband's heroism. The press was printing anything anyone would say, and by the time Gale arrived in town, four days after the shooting, those close to the Barkers were no longer talking.24

Gale displayed her usual persistence and ingenuity in getting the story. "I arrived here Wednesday night at 7:30 and tried to get in at the boarding house where the woman [Mrs. Barker] was staying, but I couldn't — she was cautious," she wrote her mother several days after her arrival. "The whole town was alert and warlike against reporters and detectives." On the next day, the reporter went out and cased the village, tracked down a woman who was a member of the church guild to which Mrs. Barker belonged, brought her back to her rooming house for supper, fed her pastries and pumped her for two hours. "I sat up and wrote 17 pages — finished about 11, got up Friday morning and had breakfast at 7:30 — mailed my letter on the 8:30 train to the address of the city editor of the World so as not to use the name of the newspaper on the envelope and went on working..." That afternoon the Evening World carried Gale's story on the front page:

PREACHER SHOT FOR WOMAN'S QUARREL/ WAR BETWEEN MRS. BARKER AND CHURCH WORKERS LED TO MANY ROWS IN PASTOR KELLY’S CHURCH/ THE EVENING WORLD'S SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT DESCRIBES THE TRAGIC STEPS LEADING UP TO THE SHOOTING OF THE EPISCOPAL MINISTER.25

23. Eliza Gale to ZG, n.d., ZG papers, box 4, folder 5, SHSW; ZG to Eliza Gale, Sunday night, Arlington, ZG papers, box 6, folder 2, SHSW; New York Evening World, 1 February-19 June 1901. The "Mary McLeane" article referred to in Eliza Gale's letter may well have been Zona Gale's colorful story about Montana writer Mary MacLane which is discussed below.
After her coup with the Barker story, Gale continued working at the *Evening World* for approximately eighteen months. During this period, she was one of the few reporters on the newspaper whose name frequently appeared on her stories, which were often given prominent display on page three of the newspaper, a page often devoted to stories about women.\(^{26}\) She wrote articles on a wide range of subjects from a long bitter strike of New Jersey millgirls to poverty in the city tenements to the difficulties of travel in the overcrowded Brooklyn trolleys. Her stories often carried a modern byline ("By Zona Gale") at the beginning of the story, or a signature byline at the end. She attained a certain popularity with readers, for on several occasions, her name was actually included in the story's headline. On 23 March 1901, for example, her story on the Patterson millgirl strike was headed: "ZONA GALE ATTENDS A SESSION OF THE BATTLING WORKERS WHO WON'T GO BACK TO THEIR LOOMS UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS." It was also during this period that she wrote several signed editorials on women and women's professional issues.\(^{27}\)

It was while she was working at the *Evening World* that Gale hit her stride as a journalist, regularly turning out assignments while at the same time submitting short stories and poems to the numerous literary publications in New York. Regardless of the topic, her newspaper stories had a distinctive style that was highly descriptive and created a certain sense of intimacy with the people she wrote about that proved compelling to her readers. "For always and always you are the poet," wrote author and former admirer Richard Gallienne in 1922. "Now, as long ago when fulfilling assignments for the *World* in a chimney stack on Staten Island, for instance, or the mess-room of a tiny tug!" She also had a knack for drawing people out and then revealing their hidden qualities or eccentricities to her readers through tiny details. Of the MacLane story, to which Eliza Gale had objected on the grounds that it bordered sensationalism, magazine editor Charles Hanson Towne later wrote: "Miss Maclane [sic] came to New York and Miss Gale was quick to interview her for the *World*. She took her, of all places, to Coney Island; and there it was that Miss Maclane [sic] ordered ten or a dozen Manhattan cocktails, so the story ran." Mary MacLane, the Montana writer who had caused a sensation in the literary world with her unorthodox autobiography, did not, however, drink the cocktails, Gallienne recalled. She told Gale that "she merely wished to look at them as she talked, entranced by the red cherry in each glass, absorbed in the brilliant color of the concoction. She made, as one might readily see, what newspapers call 'good copy,' and Zona Gale knew how to make the best use of it. Her reporting was perfect."\(^{28}\)

\(^{26}\) The *World* did not yet have a page specifically labeled a "Woman's Page."

\(^{27}\) *New York Evening World*: 23 March 1901, 21 February 1901, 22 March 1901, 29 March 1901. These columns addressed women's work, women's wages, and the need for women to save money.

\(^{28}\) Richard LeGallienne to ZG, 21 October 1922, ZG papers, box 2, folder 2, SHSW; Charles Hanson Towne, excerpt from *Adventures in Editing*, in August Derleth papers, box 2, SHSW.
In 1902 Gale began to attain some financial success in publishing her fiction. When in 1903 she sold two stories to *Success* for $125 each and then a third for $65, she decided to leave her fulltime job at the *World* and write on a freelance basis. The move proved to be economically sound. In 1905 she sold eight pieces of fiction and nine in 1906 to such popular magazines as *The Smart Set*, *Ainslee's*, and *Harper's*. During a period when reporters' salaries were about $15 per week, she was earning well above this with her fiction and freelance work and was able not only to support herself but to send regular contributions to her parents in Portage.  

Gale continued writing occasional pieces for the *World* and the profession she had worked in for the last ten years remained very much a part of her life. In 1906 she published her first novel, *Romance Island*, whose main character was a newspaper reporter. The novel was panned by some for its lightweight plot and praised by others for its "grace and brave originality" and "luminous language." The harshest criticism came from the *Newark Advertiser*, which commented that the novel read "as if it might have been written by one who had done occasional space-work for a newspaper. Whenever such people venture into fiction," the critic professed haughtily, "they almost invariably sprinkle their pages with all sorts of newspaper slang and jargon, and assume an easy familiarity with editorial ways that would put to the blush a desk-man of life-long experience."  

Gale apparently never wrote about newspaper men or women again in fiction, and began instead to write about the kind of people she had grown up with — solid middle-class, midwestern men and women. Between 1906 and 1911, she published twenty-three short stories and another novel, *The Love of Pelleas and Etarre*, as well as a collection of short stories about a fictional midwestern town, *Friendship Village*. During this period she frequently visited her parents in Portage and took trips to places like California and Mexico with friends. But New York was her base — the center of literary activity where she would be in constant contact with the editors and publishers who published her work. It was the right place to be at this time in her life. But Gale's parents were aging and she began to feel concern for them. In October 1911, when she won a $2,000 first prize for best short story in a

29. ZG to Mr. Stahl, 20 March 1925, ZG papers, box 3, SHSW; Zona Gale Account records, August Derleth papers, box 100, SHSW; Charles Hanson Towne, in *Adventures in Editing*, August Derleth papers, box 100, SHSW. Gale divided her income into thirds — one third for herself and one third for each of her parents. In addition to this, in 1908 she financed the construction of an addition to the family's home in Portage. Derleth's notes are based on materials he used in Gale's home after her death. Many of the documents referred to in his papers are not contained in the Gale collection, however, leading to the speculation that after Derleth used them for his biography they were lost, misplaced, or destroyed before being archived.  

30. Reviews of *Romance Island* from *Chicago Journal*, 24 November 1906; *San Francisco Bulletin*, 2 December 1906; *Newark Advertiser*, 17 November 1906. These and others were recorded by Derleth in his notes on Gale. August Derleth papers, box 101, file 4.
competition run by the *Delineator*, she decided she was well enough established in the literary world to return to her native community. She was thirty-seven. She had accomplished what she had set out to do — establish herself as a writer — and now found herself in the rare situation of being able to support herself and her parents comfortably on her earnings in her chosen profession. She left New York to reestablish her home in Portage, but this was no escape and, indeed, it was no final departure. She continued to spend long periods of time in New York City, where she had carved a permanent foothold among the city's literary and intellectual elite.31

**Portage and Beyond**

Although Gale left full-time employment as a journalist when she quit her job at the *World* in 1902, she had, by that time, made the connections and gained the reputation necessary to define her career as a writer on her own terms. In the years after her return to Portage in 1911, she turned out freelance articles in a wide range of magazines, including the *New York Times Sunday Magazine*, the *Nation*, *New Republic*, and *Ladies Home Journal*. In this period, she was also able to devote herself to some of the social issues that concerned her — woman's rights, suffrage, prohibition, education reform, and the peace movement — and increasingly devoted her freelance work to those issues.

In 1912, she became an active member of the Wisconsin Woman Suffrage Association, working as press chairman of the Columbia County Association to win passage of a state suffrage referendum in November 1912. She wrote suffrage columns, organized press work, and organized a suffrage edition of the *Portage Daily Register* which published the pro-suffrage endorsements of more than forty of the county's leading figures.32 After the referendum failed, she continued to work for the cause both as a writer and a speaker. In 1914, her story, "The Knight and the Lady" appeared in the nation's most prominent suffrage paper, the *Woman's Journal and Suffrage News*. The story, which is written in a style that sixty years later was to become known as "literary journalism," begins in her usual descriptive style: "To a little town five miles from the railroad, the village postmaster, who had volunteered to be my guide, drove me in a seven-passenger car along a wide macadam road." The story quotes the postmaster, who tells the author how he, an antisuffragist, had bought the car to impress his lady love, the Widow Flint, and then had proceeded to drum up support to build a new macadam road that would pass her farm so he could drive by with the car. While making the rounds with his committee, however, he was told not to bother stopping at the widow's (whom he wanted to

31. Charles Hanson Towne, *Adventures in Editing*, August Derleth papers, box 100, SHSW. The prize story, "The Ancient Dawn," is about the turmoil of emotions experiences by a young woman as she contemplates an offer of marriage — the abandonment of an aging father, the loss of freedom, the taking on of new responsibilities.

32. Susan Miller Quackenbush to Crystal Eastman Benedict, 7 October 1912, box 15, file 6, Ada Lois James Papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin Archives.
impress with the car) because she had no vote on the proposition. "No vote!" the postmaster had exclaimed. "Well, no," his friends responded. "But if it carries, she's got her share of the taxes to pay, ain't she?" The postmaster quickly converted to prosuffrage, he confessed to the author. The story, told in his words, is charming, and amusing, and displays many of the characteristics of Gale's newspaper style. It combined all the characteristics of fiction — style, description, rhythm — but told a story that could have very likely been — and perhaps was — true.33

This was a prolific period for Gale. From 1911 to 1921, she published dozens of short stories, a score of novels, and many magazine articles, many of which dealt with social issues such as pacifism, woman suffrage, women's education, the birth rate, women's work in the home, and Wisconsin politics. The topics of her fiction and her freelance work often overlapped and sometimes were rejected on the grounds that they were too advanced for the times. In 1915, for example, the editor of Everybody's Magazine rejected a short story, "The Reception Surprise," explaining:

I had the feeling that you are a little too far ahead on this story and as a nation we aren't quite ready for it. I suppose there can be as big a mistake in publishing a story with a thesis five or ten years ahead of time as there might be in publishing it five or ten years behind the times.

During the same period, the editor of Atlantic Monthly rejected a story that touched on race relations, writing, "Somehow I can't imagine living side by side with a negro family.... It's a good idea and all that, but in good conscience, I can't see myself presenting this story to my readers."34

In 1920, Gale published her twelfth novel, Miss Lulu Bett, and the following year wrote the script for the play by the same title which opened to rave reviews in New York. Despite the fame the play brought her, she apparently continued her work as a journalist and in March 1921 received a telegram from Herbert Bayard Swope, executive director of the New York World. Dated March 5 and addressed to Gale at the Hotel Willard in Washington, D.C., the telegram says cryptically: "Good work in every way stop I am proud of my star reporter stop The paper thanks you Swope." It is unclear what "work" Swope was referring to in this message, but there was no doubt of what he was talking about in a second telegram two months later: "Am officially informed you've won Pulitzer for best play of the year with your Miss Lulu Bett Heartiest congratulations I share the pride of all your friends Herbert Bayard Swope The World." With the prize came a flood of recognition in the form of

34. List of Zona Gale publications, August Derleth papers, box 100, SHSW; Gilman Hall to ZG, 23 March 1915, ZG papers, box 2, SHSW; editor, Atlantic Monthly to ZG, n.d., ZG papers, box 2, SHSW.
congratulations, more fan letters than usual, interviews, speaking engagements, and requests for hints on how to get started as a writer.  

In giving advice, even on writing fiction, Gale always referred to her experience as a journalist. “For me, newspaper work benefitted creative writing in two particulars,” She wrote an aspiring novelist in 1925. “One was a confirmation of my feeling that one must do whatever work one set out to do. And the other was the habit of writing. This habit or second nature or whatever it is, it is absolutely necessary to acquire.” In the same year a woman wrote her asking how to get an opening on a newspaper. She responded:

[T]here is virtually never an ‘opening’ for a beginner on any newspaper. The only way for a beginner to begin is to write something or at least outline some definite suggestion and take it to the city editor... The only way... to find out whether or not you can write is to write and submit, write and submit, endlessly.

This, then, was her advice, and she repeated it over and over again to dozens asking how to get started.

In the next two decades, Gale remained as prolific as ever, turning out several short stories and magazine articles every year and a novel every two years. Her magazine articles tended to be progressive, espousing liberalism, civil liberties, freedom of speech, women's rights, pacifism, and her own particular political favorites, the LaFollettes of Wisconsin. During this period, she wrote several articles for the Nation, including such pieces as: “What Women Want in Wisconsin” (1922); “Shall Universities Take Tainted Money?” (1925); “The United States and the Artist” (1925); and “Charlotte Perkins Gilman” (1935). She also continued writing for the Woman’s Journal, which had taken up a host of social issues since the passage of the woman suffrage amendment in 1919. In 1928, she published an article in that magazine in support of the continuation of Prohibition that was later reprinted by the Milwaukee Journal in a “package,” with an opposite view argued by Ida Tarbell.

She became politically involved and was an avid supporter of Progressive Senator Robert LaFollette. When, in 1924, “Fighting Bob” declared he would run for president on the Independent ticket, she threw herself wholeheartedly into his campaign, speaking and writing on his behalf. Four years later, in February 1928, she wrote an article for the Nation in which she

35. Swope to ZG, 5 March 1921, ZG papers, box 2, folder 4, SHSW; Swope to ZG, 23 May 1921, ZG papers, box 3, folder 1, SHSW.
36. ZG to Miss Gleason, 21 May 1921, ZG papers, box 2, folder 1, SHSW; ZG to Miss Truckenbrodt, 24 March 1925, ZG papers, box 2, folder 1, SHSW. Gale must have been asked so often about how to get a start in journalism that she used her response beginning, “There is virtually never an ‘opening’ in journalism” in an article for The Writer in October 1929. See Zona Gale, “Three Letters From Zona Gale,” The Writer, October 1929, 237-238.
tried to explain how LaFollette won the loyalty and devotion from the people of his state, painting a picture of the Wisconsin progressive that could well have been staged as a scene in a play. She recounted how, early in his political career, LaFollette had gone to LaCrosse to speak and was greeted by a committee, the chairman of which was a livery-stable owner. Years later he spoke again in La Crosse and was met by a new committee which, this time arrived in automobiles:

These men were ushering him to a limousine when he saw standing on the platform that livery-stable host of other days. And the Senator said: “Now, will you gentlemen go on ahead of us, and let me follow with my old friend here?” and, uninvited, he joined the devoted livery-stable keeper.

“It was thus,” mournfully said a brilliant Wisconsin journalist, “that he built up his machine. Such men would do anything for him.”

“It was so,” said one of the humblest of his pupils, “that he overturned conventions for the sake of realities.” Two versions. One man.\(^{38}\)

Conclusion

A number of sobriquets were bestowed upon Zona Gale over the years of her professional life: “that good-looking reporter,” “the prettiest reporter in the city,” “the most ambitious girl reporter in New York,” “novelist,” “playwright,” “Pulitzer Prize winner,” and the “Lady from Portage.” Each one implied different roles, different contexts. By naming, we often create meaning.

Those who wrote about Zona Gale created myths that were sometimes picked up by others and fashioned to change or perpetuate the image. Her contemporaries, naturally impressed by the Pulitzer, usually wrote of her with great admiration and often allowed her to represent herself in her own terms. Sumner Keene, who wrote her profile for \textit{American Magazine} after she won the Pulitzer, was clearly smitten with her and described her in the most positive and glowing terms. August Derleth knew her personally, admitted he had been charmed by her, and after her death in 1938 described her as a gentle and generous spirit who infused her work with a vivid interest in how others experienced the world. Harold P. Simonson studied her fiction two decades after her death and described her as a forgiving artist who saw people for what they were but withheld judgement and found something noble in them, despite their

\(^{38}\) “Americans We Like: The LaFollette Family,” \textit{Nation}, 13 February 1928. Gale was considered an expert on the LaFollettes and when Phil LaFollette won a landslide victory in the 1930 gubernatorial race, she was commissioned by the \textit{New York Times} to write a piece on Wisconsin’s response to the LaFollettes. In 1934, four years before her death, she wrote a piece on the Wisconsin Idea and the LaFollettes for the \textit{New York Times Sunday Magazine}, “In Celebration of 300 Years — And An Idea.”
shortcomings and failures. Dianne Paley twenty-five years later compared Zona Gale the journalist with some of the great women journalists of her time, and concluded that she was a traditionalist who chose to ignore the precedents they had created.

Each of these writers made their conclusions in a different period, with, perhaps, different expectations. Each certainly had a different purpose and a different perspective. Derleth and Simonson, both male, were both creative writers, and perhaps intended a creative approach. Paley, a female graduate student in mass communication writing in a time when tough women journalists were making successful careers for themselves, brought to her study some of the expectations a woman from the post women's liberation movement might be expected to have. This article, instead attempted to describe Gale's professional life, to consider her motivations, and to take into account some of the external forces that influenced it.

Despite their differences, these various accounts of Zona Gale share many elements. Certainly they are based on many of the same documents — bits and pieces of a life that have been preserved in a variety of documents for reasons as varied as the personalities of the people who preserved them. These bits of evidence, even when pieced together, do not represent the whole cloth, however. The researcher must ask, why do these documents remain and others not? Why have some letters been saved and others lost or destroyed? What is missing?

Gale's collected letters pose an interesting point. Because most of the personal letters in her archives are between Gale and her parents, it is from these letters that her most intimate image is created. These letters paint a picture of an enthusiastic, cheerful, optimistic woman determined to get the most out of life. Rarely does she speak of the doubts and disappointments that must have afflicted her, if only on occasion. The reason for this becomes clear if we imagine it was her intention to shelter her parents from some of the storms she was experiencing or even, as daughters often do, to mislead them about what she was doing so as to avoid criticism. If she was trying hard to preserve her independence during a period when such independence was still largely discouraged in the general culture, it is understandable that her letters would dwell on her more positive experiences and pleasant social engagements. The researcher must consider, then, how a document may reflect the motivation of its author as much as the reality of the facts it professes to report. The researcher must be cautious in taking any document at face value, LaCapra would warn.

Going beyond such documents, the researcher can look to historical records of the times — newspapers, for example — to gain a better understanding of the subject's experience. A view of the world Gale lived in might be constructed from a careful reading of the pages of the newspapers she worked for, but here, once again, caution must be exercised. The Evening World published stories about high society, the scandals and crimes of everyday life, the misery of the slums. Gale might have written about these in her news stories and selected lessons from them for her fiction and social activism of later years, but it is doubtful she experienced the same kind of tragedy as Mrs. Barker of
Arlington, for example, or the kind of poverty experienced by the immigrant families of the New York slums.

A new picture of Zona Gale emerges in this study. Here she is a persistent, independent, dedicated professional who went after her dream and didn't give up until she got it. She succeeded in making her way onto the staffs of the biggest newspapers in the cities where she worked and, in the case of the New York Evening World, one of the biggest circulation newspapers in the world. She used her skills, training, and experience to secure work for herself as a writer and journalist and eventually reached a goal many a reporter dreams about — the economic and professional freedom to leave the daily newsroom to work as a freelance. She achieved economic, professional, and personal freedom and then chose to return to her childhood home when that was truly an independent choice that in no way limited the career she had defined for herself.

Gale did not have the investigative genius of an Ida Tarbell, but her views on Prohibition were printed side by side with Tarbell's in the Milwaukee Journal twenty years after Gale left that newspaper. She did not win her Pulitzer for political reporting, but became Wisconsin's writer and journalist in residence, and was frequently called on by national publications to write about and interpret the politics of her home state. History remembers her most for her career as a writer of fiction, but she got her start at newspapers and when she wrote for newspapers she displayed the same style and imagination that distinguished her fiction. In her news stories, she made her subjects living, breathing creatures who experienced real human emotions and shared them with her and, through her, with her readers. In her later articles, she made her points, often deeply held beliefs, through anecdotes that fit in perfectly with the rhythm of her writing.

And beyond her own career, Zona Gale reached out to encourage others who wanted to enter the profession. Through the years, she kept the faith with up-and-coming journalists, serving on the boards of professional journalism organizations such as Theta Sigma Phi and educational institutions such as the University of Wisconsin, and was always generous with her advice and financial support. Historians might remember her most as the Pulitzer Prize winning author of "Miss Lulu Bett" and the creator of Friendship Village. Those aspiring journalists who looked up to her and asked her for advice most likely remembered her as the persistent young reporter who kept going back to the city desk until she got her assignment. That is the image Zona Gale projected about herself in letter after letter and interview after interview, and it is most likely the image that had the most influence on those who sought to follow her.

The author is an assistant professor in the School of Communication, University of Hartford. This article is based on a paper presented at the 1991 convention of the American Journalism Historians Association, where it was honored as one of the three best research papers.
Nothing More, Nothing Less: Case Law Leading To the Freedom of Information Act

By Paul E. Kostyu

The Freedom of Information Act of 1966—an important piece of federal legislation in the open records field—was the climax of an aggressive effort by legislators, journalists, and others. But parts of the law simply reflected decisions on government openness made by the U.S. Supreme Court.

When legislators began work in 1955 on what was to become the Freedom of Information Act in 1966, they could have looked for guidance in the Constitution, common law, statutory law, and federal case law. They received little help from the Constitution; there is nothing in it that specifically addresses the subject of access to government information. Had the Constitution addressed the concept there would have been no need for the FOIA. The debate continues about whether there is an implied right to know within the Constitution.¹

This article will examine the role of the federal judiciary, specifically the Supreme Court before 1966, when the FOIA was passed by Congress, in the development of the concept of access to government information. This examination is important because the federal judiciary created the legal environment in which congressional committees operated. Congress is not, of course, obligated to stay within the confines of court rulings unless its action violates the Constitution.

Judicial precedent is derived in part from the principles of equity in common law. By definition common law is primarily state law developed over time by judicial tradition. There is no federal common law. State statutes recognizing the right of access provide legislative foundation to judicial precedent. Harold Cross, in his landmark 1953 work *The People’s Right To Know*, noted that “avenues to truth by way of right of inspection of records concerning public functionaries must be sought in both statutes and common law.” Long before the federal government addressed the issue of access, states established their own common and statutory laws governing the issue. These laws differed state by state and may have served as templates for federal legislators. Cross found statutes in twenty-three states that provided a general right of inspection of public records. Another fifteen states had statutes applying to specific records.

Before passage of the FOIA, executive secrecy and access to records had been supported by federal statutes. In 1960, the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information found 172 federal statutes permitting non-disclosure of information in specific instances, and seventy-five statutes requiring disclosure.

Federal case law was also in a position to influence the direction Congress took in establishing an access statute. The judiciary often examines a


statute’s legislative history to derive the intent of Congress. Congress occasionally develops legislation in response to court rulings.

Nearly thirty years after passage of the FOIA, analysis of pre-1966 judicial commentary on the ability of the country’s citizens to obtain information gives us an opportunity to see what guidance the courts gave federal legislators as they developed the FOIA. This study looks only at the decisions of the Supreme Court for hints of policymaking by the judiciary. Consistent judicial policy-making, or the lack of it, allowed legislators either to accept or reject the early ideas of access to information; thus, these early decisions could have molded the development of the FOIA.

Methodology

An initial list of pre-FOIA cases was obtained from an extensive compilation of FOIA cases by Adler and through a Lexis search. The analysis is limited to the U.S. Supreme Court because of its importance as the final arbiter in the federal judiciary. Those cases accepted for Supreme Court review have the most impact because a court opinion affects similar situations nationwide.

The bulk of Adler’s compilation is post-FOIA litigation, which was not applicable because the cases occurred after 1966, the cutoff date for this study. The list of pre-FOIA litigation was modified as cases were added or eliminated, depending on their applicability to the subject of access to government information, the focus of this study. This article does not address the issue of whether there is a constitutional right of access to information. Consequently, First Amendment cases were not included in this study. Discussion of the access foundation created by common law and state statutes is also left for separate study.

Thirty-nine cases lend themselves to examination as possible sources for legislators and their staffs as they formulated FOIA policy. The FOIA

7. The Lexis search generated a list of fifty-seven cases which was then narrowed to twenty-five cases appropriate for this study.
8. The cases studied are: Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (1807) (No. 14,692); Buckhannon, Hagan and Co. v. William Tinnin, 43 U.S. 258 (1848); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876); Slidell v. Grandjean, 111 U.S. 412 (1883); Laughlin v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 485 (1886); In re Quares and Butler, 158 U.S. 532 (1895); Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900); De Cambra v. Rogers, 189 U.S. 119 (1903); Virginia v. West Virginia, 209 U.S. 514 (1908); Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission 211 U.S. 407 (1908); Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914); United States v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co., 236 U.S. 318 (1915); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915) and 237 U.S. 678 (1915); United States v. Wildcat, 244 U.S. 111 (1917); St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 264 U.S. 64 (1924); Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924); Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 551 (1928); Norwegian Nitrogen
passed only after much negotiation, particularly dealing with what information should be exempted from disclosure. Congress established nine general exemptions. Many of the post-1966 cases decided by the Court interpret those exemptions. For ease of organization, the pre-1966 cases are grouped by the exemption they would likely fall under had such categories existed. For example, cases dealing generally with information are presented together while cases involving national security (Exemption 1), trade secrets (Exemption 4), inter- and intra-agency memoranda (Exemption 5), and law enforcement investigations (Exemption 7) each form individual groupings for discussion purposes.

Many pre-FOIA cases deal with evidentiary and discovery process problems in civil and criminal trials. These cases are governed by judicial rules of civil and criminal procedure and fall outside the concept of access to government information addressed in this study. These cases were included if they specifically dealt with access to government records.

Before analyzing specific cases, the study first examines judicial policymaking as it applies to access to information issues.

**Judicial Policymaking and Access**

Judicial intervention may be required when there are conflicting requirements between existing legislation, creating a major obstacle to a coherent policy of access to information. Some legislation, like the Privacy Act of 1974, requires agencies to maintain confidentiality of information, whereas legislation like the FOIA requires agencies to permit access to government-held information. As a result, an activist judiciary is almost forced to become involved in policymaking by addressing the piecemeal approach to information practices of Congress, the president and the federal bureaucracy. A restrained judiciary would choose between conflicting policies but avoid making its own.


9. The exemptions are: (1) national security, (2) agency rules and practices, (3) statutory exemption, (4) confidential business information, (5) agency memoranda, (6) personnel, medical and similar files, (7) law enforcement investigations, (8) banking reports, and (9) information about oil, gas, and water wells.
In terms of early access legislation, restraint and activism are reflected in the choice of words the courts use to present their opinions. A judicially-restrained court will examine the intent of Congress in arriving at its definition of access by taking a narrow view that looks favorably upon the status quo. A court reading the purpose of legislation reflects a more global and expansive interpretation and thus reflects a judicially active view. In other words, the courts must answer whether the sponsors of legislation had, in their minds, specifically and consciously resolved questions one way or the other. The courts also decide if those questions resulted because either the legislators did not focus on the specific questions or because they could not agree on an answer. Outside of the cases relating specifically to legislative issues, the courts must decide between parties seeking to withhold or get access to information. By ruling in favor of one over the other, the courts embedded into case law judicial concepts about access to information.

Information in General

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch 137) 137 (1803) is primarily known for Chief Justice John Marshall’s adept handling of a potential constitutional crisis; all but ignored in his opinion is perhaps the Supreme Court’s first handling of an access to information issue.

Reasonable information has been denied at the office of the department of state. Although a respectful memorial had been made to the senate praying them to suffer their secretary to give extracts from their executive journals respecting the nomination of the applicants to the senate, and of their advice and consent to the appointments, yet their request has been denied. 10

Marshall used the Housekeeping Act of 1789, which, in part, provided for the safekeeping of records, in addressing the issue of access.11 The act required that bills, orders, resolutions, and votes of the Senate and House of Representatives be published, the originals be preserved and that fees be established for copies, though it does not address the issue of access. “Surely it cannot be contended that although the laws are to be recorded yet no access is to be had to the records, and no benefit to result from.”12

Marshall addressed the issue of access between government officials — i.e., between the executive and legislative branches. Where a cabinet member is: “Directed by law to do a certain act affecting the absolute rights of individuals...as for example, to record a commission, or a patent for land, which

has received all the legal solemnities; or to give a copy of such records," then there is no alternative but to grant access to that information.\textsuperscript{13}

One hundred and forty years later, Justice William O. Douglas defined records by saying they are material produced in the: "Regular course of the business .... Regularity of preparation would become the test rather than the character of the records and their earmarks of reliability acquired from their source and origin and the nature of their compilation."\textsuperscript{14} Douglas took his definition from the Act of 20 June 1936, where a record was defined as "any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or records of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event ...."\textsuperscript{15}

Whether records should be provided, requires a balancing test. "It is not with reasons that various safeguards have been established to preclude unwarranted excursions into the privacy of a man's work. At the same time, public policy supports reasonable and necessary inquiries."\textsuperscript{16}

Another approach to the access issue is the question of whether the government should have access to information. Material obtained by the government has the potential of becoming public because it becomes a government record to which the public may have access. Several cases in this study demonstrate that people and companies did not want their records in the hands of the government. The Supreme Court has been consistent in ruling that government through statutes has access to information when it is requested.\textsuperscript{17} The Constitution provides no protection from such governmental requests.\textsuperscript{18} Even newspapers must provide access to records for determining if they abide by federal law.\textsuperscript{19} Refusal to produce records can result in a contempt citation.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid. at 170-171.
\textsuperscript{15} Sec. 1561, U.S. Code, vol. 28 sec. 695 (1936).
\textsuperscript{16} Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 497 (1947).
\textsuperscript{18} See Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300, 306 (1937). "We can find in the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment no basis for saying that any person is immune from giving information appropriate to a legislative or judicial inquiry." See also United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 726 (1944). "The Fifth Amendment does not protect a corporation against self-incrimination through compulsory production of its papers."
\textsuperscript{20} Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385 (1957).
National Security (Exemption 1)

The subject of military secrets developed when a Civil War case reached the Supreme Court. William A. Lloyd was hired by Abraham Lincoln to spy in the South during the war. The hiring was not recorded, although Lincoln apparently promised Lloyd a monthly pay plus expenses. Following the death of both Lincoln and Lloyd, the executor of Lloyd's estate, Enoch Totten, sought to recover Lloyd's salary which he claimed was never paid. Lloyd had received only his expenses. This case could easily be used as a basis for the national security exemption of the FOIA.

Both employer and agent must have understood that the lips of the other were to be forever sealed respecting the relation of either to the matter. This condition of the engagement was implied from the nature of the employment, and is implied in all secret employments of the Government in time of war, or upon matters affecting our foreign relations, where disclosure of the service might compromise or embarrass our Government in its public duties, or endanger the person or injure the character of the agent.21

The Court held that as a general principle public policy forbids a trial that would "inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated."22

Government withholding of military secrets, especially in time of war, has been an accepted, though not unchallenged, action. When a claim of privilege against revealing military secrets is involved, courts must decide whether invoking the privilege is appropriate and whether revealing the information would jeopardize the security the privilege was meant to protect.23 The privilege against revealing military secrets is well established in the law, and "the privilege belongs to the government .... It can neither be claimed nor waived by a private party. It is not to be lightly invoked."24

Though United States v. Reynolds, a leading case on the subject of access to military secrets, shows a willingness of the Court to hold military information secret, Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson was not willing to give the government unlimited control over what to withhold. The Court was not to be taken out of the decision-making process, a hallmark of judicial activism.

There must be a formal chain of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer. The court itself

22. Ibid. at 107.
24. Ibid. at 7.
must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege.25

Even William O. Douglas, considered a liberal and activist jurist, acknowledged a need for a national security exemption regarding access to information. He also acknowledged that the president and Congress should decide what is best for the nation’s security. In a concurring opinion, Douglas wrote, “There is no doubt in my mind of the need for the Chief Executive and the Congress to take strong measures against any Fifth Column worming its way into government — a Fifth Column that has access to vital information.”26 But Douglas also recognized the limits of claiming national security as a means of withholding information.

The problems of security are real. So are the problems of freedom. The paramount issue of the age is to reconcile the two. In days of great tension when feelings run high, it is a temptation to take short-cuts by borrowing from the totalitarian techniques of our opponents. But when we do, we set in motion a subversive influence of our own design that destroys us from within.27

Trade Secrets (Exemption 4)

In a case that clearly encourages the protection of trade secrets and investigative materials, later established as exemptions under the FOIA, the Supreme Court showed a deference to Congress and government agencies in determining information policy, a hallmark of judicial restraint. Noting that the Constitution gives Congress power to make all laws necessary to conduct the business of government, the Court said that power extends over “any department or officer” and that power was properly exerted when Congress “authorized the Secretary of Treasury to provide by regulations ... for custody, use and preservation of the records, papers, and property appertaining to it.”28

In addressing the release of those records, the Court held that:

Reasons of public policy may well have suggested the necessity, in the interest of the government, of not allowing access to the records ... except as ... directed by the Secretary of Treasury. The interests of a person compelled, under the revenue laws, to furnish information as to their private business affairs would often be seriously affected if the disclosures ... were not properly guarded.29

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25. Ibid. at 8.
27. Ibid.
29. Ibid. at 469.
In obvious deference to the government, the Court held that "the Secretary deemed the regulation in question a wise and proper one, and we cannot perceive that his action was beyond the authority conferred upon him by Congress."\(^{30}\)

The Supreme Court continued to uphold the sanctity of trade secrets even when the government sought information from companies. It took a restrained view, saying legislation did not allow the government to obtain the correspondence of parties it was investigating.

It is true that correspondence may contain a record, and it may be the only record of business transactions, but that fact does not authorize a judicial interpretation ... which shall include the right to inspection which Congress did not intend to authorize.\(^{31}\)

The opinion was unusual in that the Court restrained the power of the courts to read access to information into statutes where the text fails to include a right to know.

In an early trade secrets case involving the federal tariff commission, the Court upheld rules adopted by the commission that restrict examination of records, which 1916 legislation forbade the commission to divulge.\(^{32}\) The Court said there is no right to examine information about a producer's costs when that information is submitted in confidence. Even a public hearing "does not include a privilege to ransack the records of the [Tariff] Commission."\(^{33}\)

The Court was not willing to give sweeping powers to the government in gaining access to information. In *Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co.*, the Court contended that the "right of access given by the [Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914] is to documentary evidence — not all documents."\(^{34}\) The government "could not interrupt business, reveal trade secrets and require expensive wholesale responses for demands for information."\(^{35}\)

**Agency Deliberations (Exemption 5)**

Exemption 5 of the FOIA allows material involving the decision-making process and interoffice and intraoffice memoranda to be exempt from disclosure. A related Exemption 2 allows withholding of internal agency personnel rules. Both exemptions have a basis in early case law.

30. Ibid. at 470.
33. Ibid. at 295.
35. Ibid. at 305.
In *Marbury*, two witnesses refused to testify because they said they were only clerks in the state department and were not bound to disclose anything relating to the business of the office. The Court allowed the clerks to remain silent about “foreign correspondence and confidential communication between the head of the department and the President.” Chief Justice Marshall also held that a citizen should not be privy to discussion between members of the cabinet.

Where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the executives, merely to execute the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than their acts are only politically examinable.37

A restrained Court refused to allow access to information regarding the decision-making process of cabinet officials in *De Cambra v. Rogers*.

It is hardly necessary to say that when a decision has been made by the Secretary of the Interior, courts will not entertain an inquiry as to the extent of this investigation and knowledge of the points decided, or as to the methods by which he reached his determination.38

The Court showed deference to existing legislation and the government in its opinion in *St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission*. Noting that the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, as amended in 1913 and 1920, provided that “unless otherwise ordered by the Commission ... the records and data of the Commission should be open to the inspection and examination of the public.” Here, the Interstate Commerce Commission ordered information withheld from public inspection “and the order puts an end to the claim to examine the data on the naked ground that they are public documents.”40

The Court sought a compromise. While accepting the ICC’s argument that allowing a general examination of the Commission’s records would be disruptive, it suggested that the ICC establish a practical policy that would allow the railroad to examine information relevant to its case. Post-FOIA cases have held much the same. Government agencies have the power to set time, manner, and place restrictions on access to those files that are open to public inspection.

The Court, in reaffirming *Boske*, held in *Touhy v. Ragen* that department heads have the right to establish policy regarding access to

37. Ibid. at 166.
40. Ibid.
information. "When one considers the variety of information contained in the files of any government department and the possibilities of harm from unrestricted disclosure," it is both useful and necessary that there be a centralized method of determining what should be made available for inspection.41

Law Enforcement (Exemption 7)

The law enforcement and investigation exemption of the FOIA can be traced to the beginning of the nineteenth century in United States v. Burr, where the defense sought records, held by an executive department, that dealt with information provided to law enforcement officials by an informant. Chief Justice Marshall allowed the release of the information saying:

There is certainly nothing before the court which shows that the letter in question contains any matter the disclosure of which would endanger the public safety. If it does contain any matter which it would be imprudent to disclose, such matter, if it be not immediately and essentially applicable to the point, will, of course, be suppressed.42

The idea of "public safety" is the bulwark of the law enforcement exemption of the FOIA. Marshall added that: "Had [the letter's] contents been orally communicated the person to whom the communications were made could not have excused himself from detailing them ....Their being in writing gives no additional sanctity."43 While apparently recognizing the need to keep some information confidential, Marshall was not willing to go as far as to allow law enforcement agencies to be wholly responsible for making those kinds of decisions.

Ninety years later, the Court sought to encourage public cooperation with law enforcement agencies by protecting informers. Noting that everyone has a duty to report the breaking of the law, "such information, given by a private citizen, is a privileged and confidential communication . . . and the disclosure of which cannot be compelled without the assent of the government."44

The Warren Court established some rules regarding release of information. In Roviaro v. United States, the Court held: "What is usually referred to as the informer's privilege is in reality the Government's privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law."45 Yet,

43. Ibid.
44. In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S. 532, 535 (1895).
“where the disclosure of the contents of a communication will not tend to reveal the identity of an informant the contents are not privileged.”

The problem is, the Warren Court said:

One that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case....

Traditionally, testimony in grand jury proceedings has also been confidential, yet Justice William Brennan has argued that there may be times when that secrecy does not fall within an exemption. In dissent in *Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States*, Brennan argued that:

Grand Jury secrecy is maintained to serve particular ends. But when secrecy will not serve those ends or when the advantages gained by secrecy are outweighed by a countervailing interest in disclosure, secrecy may and should be lifted, for to do so in such circumstances would further the fair administration of criminal justice.

**Conclusions**

While decisions of the courts vary in the degree of access to information, the predominant message of the pre-1966 cases studied has been a deference to Congress and its legislative powers, a deference to government agencies, and an adherence to precedent. That deference may be best summed up in Justice Frank Murphy’s 1947 opinion in *Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp.*, where he wrote that agency policies are:

The product of administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the problem, realization of the statutory policies, and responsible treatment of the uncontested facts. It is the type of judgment which administrative agencies are best equipped to make and which justifies the use of the administrative process. Whether we agree or disagree with the result reached, it is an allowable judgment which we cannot disturb.

46. Ibid. at 60.
47. Ibid. at 62.
The acceptance of a policy of deference to Congress and government agencies on matters of information policy appears not to be based on either judicial or political philosophies. One would expect deference from judicially restrained judges but we also see similar opinions formed by judicial activists. Even a liberal, activist Chief Justice Earl Warren, in a 1965 decision on the constitutional right to know, pointed out that it is absurd to construe broadly that right.

There are few restrictions on action that could not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow. For example, the prohibition on unauthorized entry into the White House diminishes the citizen's opportunities to gather information he might find relevant to his opinion of the way the country is being run, but that does not make entry into the White House a First Amendment right. The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.50

Because a constitutional mandate for access to government remains undeveloped, we would expect judges to defer to the other branches and agencies of government to set their rules for the release of information. Constitutional scholar David O'Brien concludes that there is no basis in the text or historical background of either the Constitution or the First Amendment to support directly the public’s right to know. He also contends that developing law under the First Amendment neither supports nor justifies claims to an independently enforceable right to know against the government. The Supreme Court steadfastly has refused to take up the role of policymaker by adhering to the constitutional redundancy of the speech and press clauses and has declined to extend further the First Amendment by mandating affirmative rights to compel government openness.51

The question becomes, why haven’t judicial activists expanded the rights of information seekers? Why have they left the rights of information seekers in the hands of Congress? The answer could very well lie in the constitutional and legislative history of the FOIA, an area needing further study. Judicial activists may have read the Constitution as clearly not granting a right to know and may have viewed the legislative history as clear, specific and binding about the intent of Congress. Thus judicial activists and restraintists alike see no need for judicial policymaking in this area.

Just as O’Brien found that the Supreme Court refused to become a Constitutional policymaker, this study shows that when given the opportunity, the Court declined to become case law policymakers in the area of access to government information. That disinclination also includes an unwillingness by

50. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965).
the Court to incorporate the First Amendment into cases where constitutional values were not initiated by the litigants. The Court did not distance itself entirely from the decision-making process, as indicated in Reynolds, where in camera inspection of sensitive documents was held to be one method the court could use to decide if material should be released.

This study, however, does not go far enough because many cases do not reach the Supreme Court. More study about judicial policymaking regarding access to information is needed, particularly at the appellate court level.\(^{52}\) Cases decided at the appellate level, while binding only to the circuit, have the potential to be the force of law beyond a specific circuit’s boundaries. “Reviewing agency behavior puts Courts of Appeals in the forefront of policy formation and implementation in the modern regulatory state,” according to legal researcher J. Woodford Howard.\(^{53}\)

As far as information case law is concerned, there is little evidence to contradict a finding that political and judicial philosophies do not clash. The opinions suggest that justices will show deference to Congress and government agencies over information seekers. The findings of this study suggest, first, that judicial philosophy has no bearing on freedom of government information and that, second, before the passage of the FOIA, there was a bias in the existing law against seekers of information and favoring government agencies.

It does appear that in their consistent deference to legislation and precedent, the courts provided FOIA legislators with guidance about what was acceptable information policy. The result is FOIA legislation that follows closely the early information cases. In a U.S. Senate debate in 1958 regarding a freedom of information proposal, Senator Roman Hruska of Nebraska was concerned that bill S. 921, which called for prohibiting government agencies from withholding nonsecurity information from the public and Congress, would affect the Supreme Court’s decisions in Boske and Touhy.\(^{54}\)

Decisions in many of the above cases did not deter Harold Cross in his suggestion that there needed to be a new information law.

There is no need of occasion to accept the present adverse state of the law as the last word. Barriers of judicial precedent are not sacred, everlasting, or insurmountable. They would not be that even if, as is not commonly the case, the federal decisions in express terms or by direct application barred public and press inspection. Most of the existing rights to inspect state and municipal records, imperfect as such rights are in the absolute sense but strikingly superior as they are in

\(^{52}\) A Lexis search yielded 351 potential access to information and records cases at the federal appellate level.


\(^{54}\) Congress, Senate, Senator Hruska of Nebraska speaking in regard to the authority of federal officers to withhold information and limit the availability of records, 85th Cong., 2d sess., *Congressional Record*, 31 July 1958, 104, pt. 12: 15,690.
relation to the federal scene, were won by assaults upon barriers consisting mainly of judicial precedents. Implemented discontent, not passive acceptance, added scope and force to those rights of the people to know.\textsuperscript{55}

The decisions did not deter Jacob Scher, former chief counsel to the House Special Subcommittee on Government Information in the mid-1950s, from calling for strong legislation. "An access bill must have teeth in it, such as a mandatory injunction and criminal sanctions."\textsuperscript{56}

Pre-FOIA cases did not address all the subjects that became exemptions in the Act and, so, the courts were not the only source of guidance FOIA legislators found. Legislators sought and received guidance from many other quarters including prior legislation, the media, lobbying groups, congressional staffs, administration officials, public officials, and private citizens. Legislators also had their own ideas about access to information.

This study demonstrates that the judicial branch participated in access to information policymaking by deferring to early legislation, agency policy, and precedent. The Supreme Court did not actively pursue policymaking from the bench. In other words, parts of the FOIA were no more than a restatement of what was already accepted policy.

\textit{The author is an assistant professor in the Department of Journalism, Ohio Wesleyan University.}

\textsuperscript{55} Cross, \textit{The People's Right To Know}, 218.
\textsuperscript{56} Jacob Scher, letter to Sam Archibald, 12 January 1960. Moss Collection, University Archives, California State University at Sacramento.
‘Our Single Remedy for All Iills’: The History of the Idea of a National Press Council

By Roger Simpson

In 1947, the Commission on Freedom of the Press proposed a national press council to measure media performance and lobby for the public interest. This article traces the idea of a press council from its birth in a session of the Commission in 1944 to its death in 1955 at the hands of newspaper executives. The account examines the roles of foundations, communication scholars and the media industries in the ultimate rejection of the idea.

In the depths of World War II, a group of American academicians hit upon a way to inspire media corporations to improve their service to the public. That idea was a national press council. The press council would give the public a stream of reports about what the media contained and how they did their work; in turn, the scholars reasoned, the managers of the press would respond to both the reports and the public reaction to them by changing content and ways of reporting. The goal was a democratic society in which the press played an integrated, functional role, rather than being a diversion or obstacle to effective response.

The press council idea was born of a reform impulse not unlike the turn-of-the-century Progressive attack on corporate excess, but it also was shaped by a new confidence among social scientists. Academics, whose expertise had been tested and found valuable in the war effort, believed that they could both describe the social ills of the postwar world and find their remedies. The originators of the press council idea subsequently became its advocates, trying
until 1955 to persuade foundations, newspapers and television networks of its merit. In that year, the national press council campaign died. Despite the failure of that campaign, it prepared the way for the lone experiment with a press council on a national scale, the National News Council, which operated from 1973 to 1984.

This article recounts the history of the idea of a national press council, showing the diverse forms proposed for it, the tactics of its advocates, and the reactions of the institutions most challenged by the concept. It seeks to answer questions about postwar mass communication raised by the national press council concept: Why were the American media unwilling to tolerate independent assessment of their performance? If social scientists set out to reshape the rapidly hardening concrete of the postwar media world, why would their tool be a national press council?

The Origin of the Idea

Since 1916, when Sweden's press council was formed, more than a dozen countries have organized national press councils, nearly all depending on the voluntary cooperation of journalists and publishers. The British Press Council, established in 1953, illustrates the work of the councils: Its members, a majority of whom represent the industry, hear complaints against journalists and newspapers, review threats to freedom of information, and report periodically to the British public. Established on a modest scale, the Council has gradually won the respect, if not the affection, of the British press.1 Councils modeled after the British experience operate in one state, Minnesota, and in a few cities.

The National News Council, the United States counterpart to the British Press Council, looked into criticisms of the national media from 1973 to 1984, but failed to find effective ways to tell the public or the media of its decisions or to win the respect of the companies reviewed. The privately funded body suffered from inadequate funding, grandiose goals, and remote leadership in its early years, but its death came, as well, from the unwillingness of the big media companies to support a public review of their performance.2

The ill-fated National News Council was not the vehicle of press improvement conceived in the crucible of World War II, however. That concept, herein consistently called "national press council" despite its varying labels, was first born in the World War II work of the Commission on Freedom of the

Press. The commission chair, Robert Maynard Hutchins, then chancellor of the University of Chicago, and eleven other prominent scholars and executives had been assembled in 1943 by Henry Luce, founder and editor-in-chief of Time, Inc., the magazine-publishing company. Their assignment was to prescribe the relationship of the mass media and the government after the war.\(^3\)

For nearly three years, the commissioners tried to agree on what they expected of the nation, then emerging as the world military and economic leader, the press, powerful but blatantly preoccupied with entertainment and commerce, and a government newly canny in the arts of intelligence-gathering and propaganda. They talked in quiet hotels and private clubs, secure from news industry scrutiny of their thinking until the 1947 publication of their general report, *A Free and Responsible Press*.\(^4\)

As the war news enveloped them, the commissioners wrestled with a vision of the postwar era: America would face desperate trials abroad and at home with a profit-hungry press that lacked the courage to do more than entertain and distract the public. Their fears resonated with attacks on the press in the 1930s or early war years from many prominent figures, including Harold Ickes, George Seldes and the bombastic president of the American Newspaper Guild, Heywood Broun.\(^5\) The commissioners saw in the crisis the failure of the press to act consistently in support of democratic ideals. Without some form of accountability, the well of democracy would remain poisoned, they concluded.

[The press] must be accountable to society for meeting the public need and for maintaining the rights of citizens and the almost forgotten rights of speakers who have no press . . . . Freedom of the press for the coming period can only continue as an accountable freedom. Its moral right will be conditioned on its acceptance of this accountability. Its legal right will stand unaltered as its moral duty is performed.\(^6\)

Protection from government interference should promote corporate responsibility, not purely self-interested acts, the commissioners argued. The view was naive, of course, and rather tame, compared with some of the ideas in the wind. In 1941, J.B.S. Hardman, an official of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, had proposed a governmental “Free Press Authority” to license newspapers and regulate access for opinions. The purpose, he wrote, was

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3. The author has relied on nearly complete transcripts of commission meetings at Columbia University, the University of Chicago, Brown University, Harvard Law School, and the University of Washington.


to assure space for ideas that differ from those of the publishers. And Llewellyn White, coauthor of the Commission’s report dealing with international communication opportunities, had suggested at one session of the commission that the government be urged to create a “pure food and drug” agency to evaluate the quality of news reaching Americans.

Although its rhetoric blamed the mass media failures on matters that were part and parcel of capitalism — profits, maximized audiences, and vulnerability to special interests, the commission had no interest in challenging or changing any aspect of capitalism. These men were products and proponents of capitalism; they rejected the idea that government might require the press to do some things in the interest of informing the public. Their loyalty to capitalism, however, left them no easy answer to the questions that haunted their meetings: What could be done to provide accountability? The press could not be answerable for its abuses unless the nation recognized some institution that would ask the right questions.

The Lasswell Model

The idea of a national press council first emerged in a meeting at the Shoreland Hotel in Chicago on 20 November 1944. Charles E. Merriam, then emeritus professor of political science at the University of Chicago, was the first that day to mention the need for an agency to review the press. Moments later, Harold D. Lasswell, Merriam’s protege, gave the idea full form, drawing on his studies of communication effects in the political process. By 1944, Lasswell had published numerous books and articles related to communication, political science, and public opinion. He was director of war communications research at the Library of Congress. At the end of the war, he would fill a prestigious position on the faculty of the Yale Law School.

8. White to Robert D. Leigh, 3 December 1946, Chafee Papers, Brown University Library, Providence, R.I.
11. Harold D. Lasswell Papers, Yale University.
Lasswell promoted the idea of a national press council from the beginning of the Commission's work. For its first meeting in December, 1943, he posed the question: "Should a continuing civic agency be set up to issue periodic reports on the state of freedom of the press?" In February 1944, he lectured his colleagues about the need to build public policy around "goal values" and then to use the media to foster such values as respect and individual freedom. The evidence of media impact would be found in surveys "... of the total flow of communication in representative communities," Lasswell wrote.

In November 1944, Lasswell unveiled a model of a national press council that had two distinct branches. This was the ideal model that Lasswell advocated throughout his life to serve an ethical, effective check on the press. One branch would report on the state of freedom of the press and "on the performance record" of the mass media. "Performance" would be measured against the standards that he assumed would be proposed by the Commission on Freedom of the Press. He called the first branch a "research organization" and "a cold, factual objective reporting organization."

The second branch would see that the research findings were made known to the media. Lasswell said the second branch should be capable of lobbying and fighting with government and the industry to change press behavior. The research branch had to be kept clear of the controversies that would result from the pressures exerted by the "fighting" branch. The research branch would be above reproach and accepted by the public for its integrity, Lasswell said. Useful public and industry debate could result, but not without what he later called "this constant back and forth between the general and the particular."

...if the research agency discovers that there are two metropolitan districts in the country where the free flow of ideas is obstructed, the second agency would try to do something about it. It might induce private money to start new Sun... or persuade the Federal Communications Commission to permit the establishment of a new radio station.

Lasswell's conception of a press council was distinctly different from any that has existed in this country. The roots of his idea probably lie in his attempts to understand the systemic nature of politics and public activity.

12. 2 December 1943, Box 26, Folder, Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1943, Harold Lasswell Papers, Yale University, cited in McIntyre, "Repositioning a Landmark."
Lasswell "was a systems analyst long before the term came into vogue," a colleague has written.\textsuperscript{17} He envisioned both the secretive Hutchins Commission and, later, an independent press council setting the standards for the media industries. "We can assume that we shall be able to clarify standards and goals," he said.\textsuperscript{18} Lasswell framed the standards in various ways for the Commission; one version mentioned three kinds of standards: Those related to presenting factual information (disclosure of sources, for example), those related to balancing opinions (such as giving opportunity for adequate reply to attacks), and those related to promoting such community values as public discussion and inclusive (rather than special or narrow) interests.\textsuperscript{19}

The origins of Lasswell's design for a national press council may have been his work in wartime propaganda analysis for the government and the Committee for Economic Development, an independent group of business leaders organized in 1942 by the U. S. Department of Commerce.\textsuperscript{20} In 1950, he alluded to his wartime studies of propaganda in terms of complementary functions of research and policy. "Extensive efforts were also made by private and public agencies to analyze foreign broadcasts, newspapers, magazines, and other channels of communication for intelligence purposes."\textsuperscript{21}

The CED investigated postwar private investment opportunities. Lasswell had been recruited early as an advisor for the CED research division and another Hutchins Commission member, Beardsley Ruml, chair of R. H. Macy & Co., was named to a panel that supervised the research division. The CED influenced economic policy through both lobbying and research, which it commissioned from university-based economists and other social scientists. At one point, Ruml suggested a national press council should imitate the CED in holding its research budget at a modest share of total expenditures; that larger budget, earmarked for a "single general purpose," would attract funds needed for research.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{17} Morris Janowitz, "Content Analysis and the Study of the 'Symbolic Environment,'" in Arnold A. Rogow, ed., \textit{Politics, Personality, and Social Science in the Twentieth Century} (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1969), 163. n The book's several authors appraise Lasswell's work.

\textsuperscript{18} Document 26, commission, 6.

\textsuperscript{19} Document 51, Commission.

\textsuperscript{20} In a 1967 interview, Lasswell volunteered that the CED structure was similar to that envisioned for his council. Interview with Bill F. Chamberlin, 12.


\textsuperscript{22} Document 36, "Meeting, February 26-27, 1945," Commission, 58; Sidney Hyman, \textit{The Lives of William Benton} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), ch.15. Benton, a public relations aide to Hutchins at the university of Chicago, was the first vice-chair of CED, serving under Paul Hoffman, who later as president of the Ford Foundation would oversee Hutchins' efforts to keep the press council idea alive. Another contemporary model for Lasswell's press council can be found in the Department of Agriculture on whose separation of "dissemination of information"
Although Lasswell's zeal for research never faded, it was not an idea that excited the other commissioners, including Hutchins. Early on, Hutchins urged the Commission to concentrate on the moral and intellectual basis for defining freedom of the press; talk about research could only be a distraction. "[O]ur "Intellectual job must not be swamped by the fact-finding job," he said. He wanted the astute minds of researchers dedicated to the moral issues of press service in a democracy. Impatient with Lasswell's reverence for measurement, Hutchins remarked, "Isn't the hindrance of the free flow of ideas self-evidently bad?"

The difference in thinking between Lasswell and Hutchins was characterized several years later by John Howe, who had worked with Hutchins at the University of Chicago:

One of the objections RMH has had to Harold over the years is that Harold — like many other social "scientists" — has been so preoccupied with describing what goes on in society that he has, in effect, neglected ethical questions, standards, goals, norms; in fact, I'm sure RMH believes that Harold and many of his fellow workers deny the intellectual validity of most of the ethical standards which have prevailed in society from time to time.

The appraisal of Lasswell was harsh; goals played a large part in his vision for steering the postwar American society. But Lasswell believed that social knowledge depended on objective and scientific investigation, a stance distinct from that of Hutchins, who, as Edward A. Purcell, Jr., has written, "asserted the reality of absolute truths, existing independent of man, which conferred an ethical sanction on human actions."

The Research Branch Breaks Off

The commission endorsed an investigative purpose for the proposed press council in February, 1945, but roundly criticized a lobbying role. Pressure groups had demeaned politics, it was argued, and were on the way to inordinate power in communication. Even research, one member said, should be limited to that needed to specify standards for press performance, and not be used to fuel policy initiatives of the council. The comment was a slap at Lasswell's idea for

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and "persuasive outlining of the case for its own policies: Lasswell later commented favorably. Lasswell, National Security and individual Freedom, 95-96.
a two-pronged agency that not only would set standards, but also would use them
to test the realities of media operations.26

Despite the criticism, the two-pronged council remained on the agenda. In April 1945, the Commission was shown the draft of a proposal for a council that would engage in both research and lobbying:

That a continuing citizens' commission be created, to aid the professional groups in the mass communications industries in the maintenance and improvement of standards of good performance, to join in resistance to governmental interference with freedom of the press, and to assist communities in appraising the adequacy of their mass media, especially where there seems to be inadequate opportunity for balanced presentation of views on controversial issues.27

For two years, the Commission had searched for a way to create a tool of accountability. The press council was the commission's invention of a way to guide the press toward performance of its moral duty. The transcripts suggest, however, that the council concept took on the character of a symbol for their desire for accountability, rather than that of a workable instrument of accountability. Members substituted the symbolic council for the reality of their failure to produce a practical plan for the council. Hutchins remarked sarcastically at one meeting that the press council was "our single remedy for all ills." When the commission met in September 1945, members talked about how to finance the agency, even how to "wash" money that might be raised from the media, but remained unwilling to clarify their conception of the council. Reinhold Niebuhr, the theologian, said to his colleagues: "We have never passed on it and it has never been elaborated."28

Indeed, the idea of the council had become so vague that it was more like a kitchen sink, filled to overflowing, than a sharp-edged kitchen knife. In October 1945, Robert D. Leigh, the staff director, wrote a recommendation that made its way, after modest changes, into the final report of the commission. A Free and Responsible Press proposed a council independent of government and the press, funded by gifts and allowed to run for a trial period of at least ten years. It would define press standards, point out inadequate press service, look for exclusion of minorities from the media, study how the nation is projected abroad through the media, investigate lying, and appraise the "tendencies" of the communication industries. It also would promote research and study at

universities, plan programs for special audiences, and widely disseminate information about all of these objectives.29

Leigh had liked the idea of a periodic audit of the press backed by a lobbying effort to give some clout to the findings. However, his later proposal assigned the council such a grocery-list of duties that there could be little hope for implementation and little likelihood that the purpose of the council as an instrument of accountability would be understood. The report provided no coherent rationale for any council, much less the simple two-pronged plan advocated by Lasswell.

Apparently written by Zechariah Chafee Jr., the Harvard constitutional scholar, the paragraphs that followed the press-council proposal conveyed no hint of the rationale for systematic evaluation of media performance that Lasswell had urged on the Commission early in its work. Indeed, Chafee, from the outset, had opposed a research mission for either the commission or its brain-child, a press council. Chafee placed his limited faith in minimal legal restrictions on the press, rather than in the hope that studies would lead to better behavior on its part. It seemed foolish to Chafee to play with ideal models of society in which the press would respond to systematic monitoring. The press council proposal should be “the most incidental of our recommendations,” Chafee had told his colleagues in 1944.30 “Some of this bigness is inevitable,” he said early in 1946.

Then there is another thing that is inevitable, that men are animals, that this entertainment feature to some extent is inevitable, that the public will never live up to the kind of newspaper which this Commission would like to have: there is no doubt of that.31

Newspaper editors and publishers, denied any hint of the commission's views until publication of the report, condemned the entire enterprise. Some screamed in anger, others ridiculed the commissioners. The commission's patron, Henry Luce, found the report's description of the press principal “elementary, naive, superficial, uncritical, and obsolete.”32 The press council idea won some favor — from the Washington Post and the Christian Science Monitor, as well as the International News Service and the otherwise critical

32. Henry Luce, letter to Robert M. Hutchins, 29 November 1945, Robert M. Hutchins Papers, University of Chicago.
trade magazine, *Editor and Publisher*, for example — but generally the press rejected the scheme along with the rest of the commission's work.\(^{33}\)

Hutchins closed down the Commission with a blast at the news media for condemning the report. In particular, he responded to attacks on the press-council idea, saying it was “probably the most important recommendation.” Since Hutchins expressed no enthusiasm for the Lasswell concept of a press council at any of the commission sessions, one concludes that the national press council became for Hutchins a symbol of the commission's work just as many of the publishers found it a symbolic target for their resentment at being closed out of the commission's deliberations. That explanation would fit Hutchins' fervent defense of the idea after 1947. Indeed, he quickly became a missionary for a national press council.\(^{34}\)

**The Ford Puzzle**

For the next four years, Hutchins was preoccupied with his work as chancellor of the University of Chicago and made little effort to implement commission ideas. On the first day of 1951, however, he moved to a position that allowed him to test the idea of a press council. Paul Hoffman, former Economic Cooperation Administrator in the Truman administration, had been named president of the Ford Foundation, which was bulging with bequests from Henry and Edsel Ford of Ford Motor Company stock valued at more than $400 million. Hoffman and the trustees agreed that the first associate director appointed would be Hutchins.\(^{35}\)

Hutchins aimed to pursue the goal of media accountability by promoting the press council to the electronic media; by 1951, the dazzling technology of television had stolen the spotlight from the good, gray newspaper industry. Some of the groundwork had been laid in early 1950 by Lasswell, who promoted his idea of a two-pronged press council to the foundation. He provided an elaborate plan for the Foundation's oversight of the press, which included a national, or international, press council to survey “adequacy of service” for selected cities and groups. Lasswell failed, however, to grasp the potential of television, and proposed that film should shoulder the burden of recording the values and goals of the nation. He reminded the Ford executives of the Hutchins

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Commission's prime recommendation, an agency that would provide "continuous reports upon the adequacy of performance of the press." 36

William Benton, U.S. senator from Connecticut, a former assistant secretary of state and longtime public-relations aide to Hutchins at the University of Chicago, outlined Lasswell's plan to Henry Ford II. He sensed Ford's wariness, and decided on caution. "He seemed deeply interested and greatly impressed," Benton wrote to Lasswell. "Henry is going to wait. We can well wait." 37

In early 1952, the Foundation staff developed a program to try to keep network television from freezing into a commercial pattern "as unfortunate, perhaps, as that of radio." 38 On 10 April, the trustees appropriated $50,000 for early examination of the need for a national council on television, on condition that the final proposal for a council originate outside the foundation and that it be welcomed by the television industry. 39 The council would find ways to manage the medium to produce "the best possible programs." 40 The foundation had embraced program improvement with a $1.2 million grant that funded "Omnibus," a Sunday afternoon culture showcase that mixed fine presentations with appallingly simplified classics. 41

Henry Ford's courteous audience for Harold Lasswell's council idea did not imply that he shared Lasswell's enthusiasm for studies of the mass media. He opposed the television council plan. Although his reasons are not explicit in the available documents, Hutchins believed that Ford feared that broadcasters would view a television council as unwarranted meddling. Hutchins later told an interviewer, "The objection that he stated was that he didn't want anybody coming in and telling him how to run his business and he didn't want to be telling the television people how to run their business." 42

The full explanation is more complex. Television-network executives, though voicing support for a council, realized that many of the policy issues on their agenda were rapidly being resolved. A council would be of little use to them, and likely would be something of an annoyance. The Federal Communications Commission ended its long freeze on allocation of television licenses early in 1952, and the pattern of commercial dominance of the medium was clear even at that point. No doubt Ford recognized the extraordinary

38. Excerpt from staff meeting, 26 February 1952, Ford Foundation Archives, PA53-16, New York City.
39. Excerpts from Review of Progress, October 1952, PA53-16, Ford Foundation Archives; Frank A. Lindsay, memo to Program Committee, 15 October 1953, PA53-16, Ford Foundation Archives.
42. Robert M. Hutchins Oral History Transcript, Ford Foundation Archives, 46.
economic marriage of television and the automobile industry, which was rapidly moving its advertising away from mass-circulation magazines into the new medium. But it also is possible that Ford’s opposition was shaped by his inability to accept the style and ideological agenda of Hutchins. The men had sharply contrasting visions for the foundation, but it was Hutchins who gained the early approval of the trustees for his favorite projects while Ford appeared to be losing control of the foundation that carried his family name. Their antagonism was no secret. Ford was uncomfortable with public criticism of the foundation, while Hutchins kept attracting attention through an articulate, provocative public presence.

Although Ford spoke against the television council as early as May 1952, Hutchins proceeded in August of that year to assemble a citizen group to draft a plan. The sixteen members were pared to a nine-member implementation committee, and the foundation was asked for additional money. The foundation eventually spent $82,000 on the proposal.

Hutchins reminded Ford that the latter had agreed to support the plan if it originated with parties outside the foundation and if the industry approved it. “I am not sure,” he wrote, “whether you said this because you were beaten down and did not want to argue about it any more, or because you thought that a group organized on these terms would be a good thing.” The proposed council reflected neither the Lasswell two-branch blueprint for systematic monitoring of the industry, nor Hutchins’ desire for moral reformation in the industry. It would neither criticize nor appraise the industry, but would serve as a forum for issues affecting television, such as pay television. The note asked for Ford’s approval to proceed with a study; he agreed to a $20,000 appropriation.

Even the feasibility study for the television council was a delicate matter. It was entrusted to a committee headed by a social scientist, one who had courted and won favor in the broadcasting industry. Paul F. Lazarsfeld had built his career on cooperation with broadcasters. In a memoir, he quoted a speech in which he had shown the importance of the relationship:

Those of us social scientists who are especially interested in communications research depend upon the industry for much of our data. Actually most publishers and broadcasters have been very generous and cooperative in this recent period during which communications research has developed as a kind of

44. Reeves, ch.1; Macdonald, 152-154.
joint enterprise between industries and universities. But we academic people always have a certain sense of tightrope walking: At what point will the commercial partners find some necessary conclusion too hard to take and at what point will they shut us off from the indispensable sources of funds and data? Lazarsfeld's forte, then, was mediating or negotiating among the major entities in the broadcast picture, rather than attacking them head-on as Hutchins did frequently.

Lazarsfeld directed the Columbia University Bureau of Applied Social Research, a platform from which he had proven the value of empirical research to the commercial radio industry, first at Princeton in the late 1930s and after 1945 at Columbia University. Financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, Lazarsfeld's research appealed to and attracted the attention of such industry leaders as Frank Stanton, president of the Columbia Broadcasting System and, in his own right, an early leader in audience research methods. Theodor W. Adorno, a fellow immigrant who worked with Lasswell on popular culture studies at Princeton, wrote of the Rockefeller support for the project:

Its charter, which came from the Rockefeller Foundation, expressly stipulated that the investigations must be performed within the limits of the commercial radio system prevailing in the United States. It was thereby implied that the system itself, its cultural and sociological consequences and its social and economic presuppositions, were not to be analyzed.

Lazarsfeld had made one plea for universalizing criticism of institutions, including the press. In 1948, while the newspaper critics of the Commission on Freedom of the Press still were castigating its final report, Lazarsfeld urged the press to make criticism an integral part of systematic management. Cultural standards must be part of public discourse, he wrote, particularly since there was no tradition in America for evaluating mass culture. "We don't as yet know how to proceed," he said, "but we can at least note the confusion which results if the problem is completely overlooked." Lazarsfeld's idea of criticism clearly was a


limited one; nothing he said implies a moralistic stance. If criticism was to serve the needs of management, it clearly would be circumscribed.50

In a novel variation on the press council idea, Lazarsfeld proposed citizen press boards in each of the Federal Reserve Bank districts to study the media and publish findings.

Once such data were available, the whole picture would change. The media could use the data for self-improvement as well as for defense against "undeserved" criticism. The critic would be forced to separate clearly fact and judgment. The student would have magnificent material from which he could derive trends, make predictions, highlight areas of deficiency, and relate the content of the media to other pertinent social data.51

Although Lazarsfeld's brief commentary on criticism deviated greatly from the outline for a press council that Lasswell had provided the Commission on Freedom of the Press in 1944, it retained the critical dimension of two functions, research and policy promotion. Both men assumed the goals served by the council would be provided by some elite agency: Lasswell wanted a body of intellectuals to draw up the goals; Lazarsfeld, it can be inferred, accepted the goals of the corporate society. He proposed only to sample the content of the major media and report the findings; the news industries and the public would use the information any way they desired. Indeed, Lazarsfeld, unlike Lasswell, appreciated that such information might be used defensively, rather than constructively, by the media.

The Television Development Center — the television council outlined by Lazarsfeld — would have the tasks of research, review and analysis, and service. The "review and analysis" branch was to promote change through policy conferences and other means.52 That was the last moment at which Lasswell's concept of a press council remained viable.

Frank Stanton endorsed the work of his friend Lazarsfeld. He was in touch with both Ford and Lazarsfeld's committee and joined in the vote that sent the final report to the foundation. In October 1953 he assured a foundation officer that the report would be acceptable to broadcasters. He even suggested a matter for the research agenda; the gadgetry of television news needed attention: "[W]ith rare exceptions, form is getting more attention than substance."53

51. Ibid., 126.
52. Report to the Citizens' Group Regarding Plan for a Television Development Center to be Supported by the Ford Foundation, PA 53-16, Ford Foundation Archives; Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Plan for Commission," 7 October 1953, Lazarsfeld Papers.
Throughout 1953, as the committee polished its report to the foundation, officers of the foundation pointedly distanced themselves from the project.\textsuperscript{54} Documents reveal little about the reasons for the Foundation’s nervousness; they do, however, show a determination to scuttle the project. After the Lazarsfeld report arrived at the foundation in June 1954, no further action was taken by the foundation. The basis of funding provided an excuse for killing the report. Foundation officers decided to insist on sponsorship by a coalition of industry, education, and citizen groups, an impossible goal given the reluctance of broadcasters to embark on programs that threatened the increasingly comfortable status quo. Lazarsfeld and the report’s authors wanted the foundation to finance the commission, at least for the first few years.\textsuperscript{55} Hutchins, who had left the foundation only a month before to become president of the Fund for the Republic, could do little to help.

Lazarsfeld complained that the foundation was ignoring the report. Archly, he wrote to a foundation officer that he was having to lie to his friends about the project by saying the report had been lost in the turmoil surrounding a congressional investigation of tax-exempt foundations. “This formulation saved me much embarrassment with my colleagues who had worked so hard on this assignment and I thought it also saved the Foundation from the reproach of being discourteous to this distinguished group of men.”\textsuperscript{56} The officer chose not to notice the scholar’s sarcasm; in November 1955 he replied simply that “other things seem to get a higher priority than television for the forthcoming future at least.”\textsuperscript{57} The Ford Foundation— and perhaps Henry Ford II— had laid to rest the idea of both Lazarsfeld and Lasswell for a national press council.

The Fund Carries On

The Ford Foundation created the Fund for the Republic in 1952 with a $15 million grant and a challenge to spend its funds preserving the Bill of Rights. Hutchins was offered the presidency in May 1954. The new job freed Hutchins from conflict with Ford and provided for an expansive study of both communism and the right wing reaction to it. Hutchins was concerned about the American institutions that communism was said to threaten, and from the beginning he informed the trustees of the fund that he would apply some of its resources to studies of the press.\textsuperscript{58}

True to his word, seven months after taking office, Hutchins asked the fund’s board for $50,000 to plan a continuing agency to appraise the performance

\textsuperscript{54} Various memos, Ford Foundation Archives.
\textsuperscript{55} Frank A. Lindsay, memo to Program Committee, 15 October 1953, PA53-16, Ford Foundation Archives.
\textsuperscript{56} Paul F. Lazarsfeld, letter to William McPeak, 16 August 1955, PA53-16, Ford Foundation Archives.
\textsuperscript{57} William McPeak, letter to Paul F. Lazarsfeld, 11 November 1955, PA53-16, Ford Foundation Archives.
\textsuperscript{58} Reeves, 78.
of the mass media. Hutchins optimistically told Benton: "We are tending toward a fullscale continuing commission to appraise the performance of all the media of mass communication." 59 The board deferred the request until May 1955, when it approved $25,000 for a working committee after hearing Hutchins' dubious assertion that "many editors would welcome" an appraisal agency. 60 However, the cautious first step was taken as the Fund was facing extraordinary external criticism; pressing ahead with a survey of the press appeared patently foolhardy to all but Hutchins.

When the board met in September, it blocked Hutchins' request for funds for the press council and trimmed spending for other Hutchins projects. 61 The board had finally put a leash on Hutchins, after months of attacks by such commentators and columnists as Fulton Lewis and Westbrook Pegler, the threat of an Internal Revenue Service investigation of the fund's tax exemption, and steady pressure from the House Un-American Activities Committee and a House committee headed by Congressman B.C. Reece. It was Reece who had contended that socialism, subversion, and "moral relativity" were rampant in American foundations. 62

The board vote against the national press council appears to have been assured by a meeting of fund officials and six lords of the newspaper industry at the fund's Manhattan office on 12 September 1955. The newspaper delegation included Barry Bingham, editor and publisher of the Louisville Courier-Journal; Robert W. Brown, editor of the Columbus (Georgia) Ledger; Orvil D. Dryfoos, vice-president of the New York Times; Roscoe Drummond, Washington bureau chief of the New York Herald-Tribune; Philip Graham, publisher of the Washington Post and Times Herald; and Joseph Pulitzer Jr., editor and publisher of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. The consensus was that no further steps should be taken toward a national press council. 63

The panel urged Hutchins and the fund to begin their press studies instead with a proposal by Sigma Delta Chi, a journalists' organization, for a $650,000 study of press coverage of the 1956 presidential campaign. Hutchins, lacking board support, yielded to the publishers. 64 Soon after the Manhattan meeting, however, the Sigma Delta Chi project was cancelled after a "jury" of seventy-six newspaper publishers and editors and two magazine publishers rejected it, fifty-nine to seventeen. Four of the news executives decreeing the death of Hutchins' press council project — Bingham, Brown, Graham, and Pulitzer — had endorsed the presidential campaign study, giving as reasons the need for objective standards for the measurement of newspaper performance and

59. Reeves, 93; penciled notation on letter from Benton to Hutchins, 22 October 1954, Benton Papers, University of Chicago.
60. Reeves, 116.
61. Ashmore, 352.
64. Robert M. Hutchins to William Benton, 8 March 1957, Benton Papers, University of Chicago.
the research competence of the social scientists who would carry out the study. Critics, on the other hand, listed an array of objections, ranging from a fear that the study would provide a forum for left-wing groups to a concern that the costly study would yield few results not already known by publishers. At least a few publishers said they were opposed to yet another scheme of Hutchins to investigate the press.65

In the 1950s and 1960s, newspaper publishers and their editors consistently rejected overtures for studies of the industry. Norman Isaacs, then president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, used an unusual 1969 London meeting of the society, hosted by the British Press Council, to push for a grievance committee to hear public complaints about the press. Isaacs found determined resistance from publishers and from several former presidents of the society, including such “elder statesmen” as Turner Catledge, executive editor of the New York Times. “... [T]his was an issue a majority of publishers of the country had decided against,” Isaacs wrote.66

Early in 1959, Hutchins spoke to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, a forum he had not been invited to use since 1930. He reminded the editors of the “principal recommendation” of the Commission on Freedom of the Press and urged them to support the idea, particularly in light of the industry’s failure to form any kind of critical mechanism. In a bombastic litany, Hutchins said journalists had duties as educators to give citizens information about disarmament, the garrison state, the erosion of freedom, the “fat cats on the Right.” It was one of many speeches by Hutchins attacking the fund’s assailants, and it was marked by the kind of sarcasm that had alienated such associates as Ford. The editors had “gallantly led the troops from the rear” in a belated attack on Senator Joseph McCarthy, Hutchins said. The speech ended predictably with a call for a press council: “Enlightenment means telling the people where they are in time and space. It means engaging in systematic criticism. The criticism of current affairs has to be made in the light of some standard.”67

For at least the next four years, Hutchins’ friend, William Benton, nursed the idea along, first prodding Hutchins to return to the field and then offering a carrot of $40,000 or more from Benton’s personal foundation.68 Hutchins, Benton, and such friends as Adlai Stevenson, Chester Bowles, and Edward R. Murrow continued to share thoughts about the press council but without the enthusiasm that had marked earlier discussions. John Tebbel, New

York University, and Wilbur Schramm, Stanford University, were mentioned as likely directors. Murrow promoted Louis Seltzer; Hutchins said that the idea of a newspaperman in charge of a television industry study was “even worse than proposing a university president.”

Dialogue tapered off during 1957; the idea of a press council drifted away on breezes of change. The hostility to the Fund for the Republic had faded, and Hutchins began to lay the groundwork for a new vision — a center where thinkers could study and talk together about critical issues of humankind. The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions was to come closest among Hutchins’ post-Chicago projects to his ideal of a place where the best minds could draw from the rich knowledge of civilization to solve human problems. Benton scolded Hutchins for dropping the press council project: “This is one of the most important ventures of your life, and I don’t believe you’ve put any more time and effort into trying to get it implemented, in the last five years, than I have.” Benton from time to time revived the idea of a press council but as late as 1959 a consultant warned him away from spending money on the idea because newspaper editors still opposed it. It appeared that with or without Hutchins, the newspaper industry did not want a press council.

In 1957, Hutchins wrote about the futility of pursuing the national press council: “Any administrative officer has to determine how many times he wants to butt his head against a stone wall. Do you do the things that you can do or do you keep trying to do the things that have proved impossible?”

Conclusions

The Commission on Freedom of the Press hoped to reconstruct what the scholars saw as a damaged relationship between citizen and government. They spoke caustically of the press of their day yet held high, and unrealistic, hopes that the press could be used by communication experts in government and industry to enrich the democratic dialogue.

Harold Lasswell’s design for a national press council that would enhance the functional relationships among press, government, and the public was a creative response to the crisis of the day, but the social scientist failed to persuade his colleagues on the Commission in their private meetings in 1944

70. See Reeves, Freedom and the Foundation, especially chs. 13, 14.
and 1945. The council's novel feature would have been a stream of information about press performance that would allow people to see in aggregate terms how they were reflected in the news media.

The error of the Commission lay in investing heavily in the symbol of press appraisal without taking the necessary pains to justify either its need or its workings. Accountable to no one in its exploration of the press, the Commission was startled by the hostile reaction of the industries it had largely left out of its deliberations. Robert Hutchins' subsequent efforts to advance the idea of a national press council took little or no account of the fears of newspaper and television executives about public examination of their efforts. The costs of that academic arrogance were compounded in a political climate in which foundations, including the two in which Hutchins worked, were identified as the enemies of American culture.

The newspaper and television industries, acting largely out of self-interest and enjoying the benefits of rapid concentration and rising profitability, found no persuasive force behind the idea of press appraisal. Lasswell alone seemed to speak with the authority of one who knew he had invented a tool that was needed. Robert Hutchins' scolding, unsupported by intellectual commitment to the idea of a press council, alienated the industries. Paul Lazarsfeld was so accustomed to working for industry that he posed no real threat of reform. Even so, the communications industries apparently saw a great danger in independent appraisal; they fought the foe as though their lives depended on it, a degree of commitment the advocates of a national press council failed to emulate.

*The author is an associate professor in the School of Communications, University of Washington.*
Call for Papers
American Journalism Historians Association
Annual Convention, 3-5 October 1996
University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada

The AJHA invites paper entries, panel proposals, and abstracts of work in progress having to do with any facet of media history, including electronic media and film, advertising, and public relations. Because the AJHA aims to present original material at its convention that has not already appeared or been presented elsewhere, research papers and panels submitted to the convention should not have been submitted to or accepted by any other local, regional, or national conference, convention, or publication.

Research paper entries should be completed papers not exceeding twenty-five typewritten double-spaced pages, excluding footnotes. Four copies of each paper should be submitted as well a stamped, self-addressed postcard for notification of receipt. Each paper should include a cover sheet indicating the paper’s title, the author’s name and address, and the author’s institutional affiliation as well as the author’s position at that institution, and a single-page abstract. Only the title should appear on the paper and the abstract; the author’s name should appear only on the cover page.

Authors of accepted papers are expected to attend the convention and must register for the convention to present their research. Authors should bring twenty-five copies of their paper to distribute at the conference. Awards for outstanding research include: the Robert Lance Award for the best student paper; the William Snorgrass Award for the best research paper on minority journalism; the best Research Paper; and awards for the top three research papers.

Panel proposals should include a brief description of the topic, the names of the moderator and participants, and a brief summary of each participant’s presentation. The topic of the panels as well as the content of the individual presentations should not have been submitted or presented elsewhere. Panel participants are expected to attend the conference and must register to make their presentations.

Research in progress should be submitted in abstract form (no more than 350 words, two copies) and should focus on significant research under way. Oral presentations of research in progress will be limited to five minutes and will be accompanied by a paper three to five pages in length, excluding bibliography, for distribution at the meeting.

Send RESEARCH PAPERS to: Professor Elizabeth V. Burt, School of Communication, University of Hartford, West Hartford, Conn. 06117. Send PANEL PROPOSALS to Professor Jan Whitt, School of Journalism, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colo. 80309. Send RESEARCH IN PROGRESS to Professor James D. Startt, History Department, Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, Ind. 46383.

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Research Essay

Edna Ferber's Journalistic Roots

By John Stevens

Ferber, a successful novelist and dramatist, learned independence as well as writing during her five years on Midwestern newspapers. She always considered herself a journalist.

Few literary figures have so readily acknowledged, even boasted, about their journalistic background as much as Edna Ferber. Although she abandoned newspaper work before she was 25, she always thought of herself as a journalist and in her two autobiographies credited her writing skills to what she learned at the Appleton (Wisconsin) Daily Crescent and the Milwaukee Journal.¹

During her long writing career she produced twelve novels (seven of them best sellers), nine plays and twelve collections of short stories. Motion picture companies filmed thirteen of her properties, several more than once.

Ferber's heroines were independent and self-motivated, neither victims nor devourers. They did not rely on men anymore than Ferber did herself. She no more apologized for her unmarried status than she did for her Jewish faith.

Growing up in small towns in Michigan and Wisconsin, she felt the stings of anti-semitism. Her father was an inept storekeeper who was nearly blind. Her mother held the business and family together.

A few days after completing high school, Edna was hired as the first female reporter in the history of the Appleton Daily Crescent. The editor, impressed by her triumph in the recent state rhetorical contest and a few items she had written for the school paper, agreed to pay her three dollars a week.

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¹ Much of this article is based on her two memoirs, A Peculiar Treasure (New York: Doubleday, Dorrance, 1939) and A Kind of Magic (New York: Doubleday, 1963).
In a *Peculiar Treasure*, her first published memoir, she wrote:

Well, there I was a girl reporter. I didn’t want to be a writer. I never had wanted to be a writer. I couldn’t even use a typewriter, never having tried. The stage was my love...At any rate, then, at seventeen my writing career accidentally began. It was brewed in a storm. I don’t remember a day since then when I haven’t been writing, in all sorts of circumstances, happy and wretched, ill or well, traveling or at home.

The editor insisted she write a chatty weekly social column, but she was no special or woman’s writer; she covered a regular courthouse beat. “I often was embarrassed, sometimes frightened, frequently offended and offensive,” she wrote nearly forty years later, “but I enjoyed it, and knowing what I know today, I wouldn’t swap that year-and-a-half of small-town newspaper experience for any four years of college education.” Edna learned to write quickly, while storing scenes and characters who later would appear in her fiction. The newspaper office she described in *Cimarron* was exactly the way she remembered the *Crescent* office. Like all reporters, she learned to see and remember. Even for her books she took relatively few notes.

She believed her eighteen months on the small daily were just enough:

It always has been my contention that when a newspaper man or woman has written that Christmas story three times for the same paper he should leave his job or reconcile himself to being a hack reporter forever...The profession of reporter does not make for erudition, but through it one acquires a storehouse of practical and psychological knowledge, and a ghastly gift of telling the sham from the real, of being able to read and classify the human face, on or off guard.

She didn’t leave voluntarily, however. Why the new city editor fired her is unclear, but Ferber was sure it was because of her gender. In any case it was all to the good, because she immediately got a $15 a week offer from the *Milwaukee Journal*, for whom she had done some stringing. She honed her skills there for the next three-and-a-half years. The pace was much faster, the competition keener.

“You learned to make one word do for ten,” she wrote. “You began to search your very vitals for the right first word for your first paragraph.” Later she relied on condensation, insisting the short stories in her first collection, *Buttered Side Down*, “could only have been written by an ex-newspaper reporter.” Certainly they exhibit a spare prose style.

In covering morning police court, Edna certainly saw the raw underbelly of urban life—the wife beaters, tavern brawlers, whores, pimps, and thugs. Its scenes of pathos had fascinated American newspapers since the Penny Press days of the 1830s. The British papers covered the Bow Street courts much earlier. One
of the first women assigned to such a beat, Ferber did not shrink from its horrors. Ben Hecht said such experiences provided a reporter a glimpse into the “undaunted moments that are the soul of human history.”

Ferber also emulated Joseph Pulitzer’s Nelly Bly, spending a couple of nights in the Refuge for Girls, and then recounting the deplorable conditions. She also exposed a theater that was advertising educational films but was screening stag films. Her story closed the peep show. Such exposes were heady experiences for a young woman, as were interviews with luminaries such as Robert LaFollette.

She did not know at the time how much her career would be changed by a visit to the Journal office by one of its famous alumnae. Novelist Zona Gale came in one day to visit her former colleagues and suggested they try their hands at stories for the magazines. Someone asked for the name of her agent and she obliged. Ferber filed the name away.

She wrote in her second autobiography that her experiences in Milwaukee strengthened her natural gift of observation. The shutter on her mind’s eye clicked away, storing away thousands of pictures. She captured the colorful sports editor, transforming him into Blackie in Dawn O’Hara, her first novel.

She was working long and irregular hours, often partying with her fellow reporters into the wee hours, until finally the pace took its toll. After becoming ill she went to Appleton to recuperate. After a few months, she moved with her newly widowed mother to Chicago. She applied to the Tribune, but the editor barely glanced at her clippings before telling her the paper already had a woman reporter and it certainly did not need a second. At his suggestion she sent the paper some freelance features. Insulted by the payment, she switched to fiction, and her agent was the same one Zona Gale had suggested. Her newspaper days were behind her.

Her first sale was to Everybody’s, followed quickly by American. Then in 1911 Dawn O’Hara sold. Not surprisingly, the novel’s heroine was a reporter from a small town who set New York on its ear. The book, which Ferber later derided for its sentimentality, sold more than 10,000 copies, a respectable figure for a first novel, even today. The reviews were not bad either.

In terms of her career, however, the publication in December 1911 of her first Emma McChesney story in American was more significant. Emma was one of popular fiction’s earliest liberated women. Working as a traveling saleswoman in a field totally dominated by men, Emma was often taunted but never outsmarted. The stories were immensely popular and eventually collected into three volumes. Ethel Barrymore played Emma in a Broadway adaptation in 1915.

With William Allen White, she covered the 1912 political conventions for a news syndicate. When she came down with tonsillitis the Emporia editor wrote her column for her, the beginning of a long and fruitful friendship.

She returned from Europe only weeks before World War I erupted in 1914. By the time the United States entered the war in 1917 she had finished
**Fanny Herself.** Set against a critique of ruthless monopolistic businesses, her second novel was based on her mother’s difficulties in operating the family store.

After a rest in Hawaii, Ferber wrote and spoke on behalf of various war causes. In 1920 she again covered the party conventions and then tried her hand at Hollywood. As it was for many novelists, it was not a happy experience and she returned home to complete her war-based novel, *The Girls.* Because the heroine bore an illegitimate child, she anticipated trouble selling it; however, after *Woman’s Home Companion* serialized it, book publishers were waiting in line.

The Europe she returned to in 1922 was beleaguered by hard times. She was appalled by the contrast with the giddy life among the American upper classes, so even as she traveled she worked on her next novel which contrasted the heroine’s true success running a family farm with the false success of materialistic “beautiful people.” It was published in 1924 as *So Big,* a title she could never explain. It outsold every novel published that year, with sales reaching one-third of a million. This was in the days before book clubs. Thanks in part to its championing by White, who was one of the jurors, *So Big* won the Pulitzer Prize. It was eventually turned into three movies, none of them very good.

In December 1929, only weeks after the Wall Street crash, Edna Ferber reached her height in the drama field. Two of her plays opened on Broadway, and both were to become classics, revived to this day. With George S. Kaufman, she wrote *The Royal Family,* a lightly veiled portrait of the Barrymore family. Although a serious play, it was at heart an ode to the theatrical life. Ferber collaborated with the famed dramatist two more times. While *The Royal Family* enjoyed a long and profitable run, it paled beside *Show Boat,* based on her own best-selling novel of 1926. Jerome Kern and Oscar Hammerstein turned that saga of life on the Mississippi into one of the world’s most beloved (and performed) musicals.

While *Show Boat* touched on miscegenation, she thought of it primarily as a romantic portrait of a by-gone era. She prepared herself by spending four days on one of the last floating theaters.

As if these successes had not assured Ferber’s financial comfort, she then published *Cimarron,* another blockbuster. The subject, which White had suggested to her, was the settlement of Oklahoma. The central characters were Yancy and Sabra Cravat, who published a newspaper. Throughout most of the book, Sabra actually ran the paper while her husband chased adventure around the globe. The only working woman in town, Sabra turned the paper into a great success. Hollywood bought the rights for a record $10,000 and the first version won the Oscar for best picture. Ferber considered this the best film adaptation of any of her works. No one realized that, with a few respites, the rest of her career would be all downhill.

She was rich enough to abandon writing forever—but for her that was unthinkable. “Writing is what I do,” she would explain to interviewers. “I can’t forget that at heart I am a newspaper reporter.”
There were six more novels and four more plays to come. Two of the novels (Saratoga Trunk, 1941, and Giant, 1952) won acclaim and became films. With Kaufman she coauthored two hit plays, Dinner at Eight in 1932 and Stage Door in 1936. Most of her other output is best forgotten.

Immediately after World War II she spoke to thousands of American soldiers waiting in Europe for their discharges. Many of them barely knew her name. She was a literary has-been. Her final novel, Ice Palace, did little to restore her reputation. Nor, presumably, would the novel about Native Americans that Ferber was working on almost until the day cancer silenced her in 1968.2

Edna Ferber would have been an ideal candidate for today’s feminist critics to champion—except that she was too popular.3 She was not abused or ignored by male editors and critics. She succeeded on her own terms, proud to the end of her journalistic background.

The author is a professor in the Department of Communication Studies, University of Michigan.

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American Journalism Book Reviews
Thomas Connery, University of St. Thomas, Editor

503 CLARK, RANDALL. At a Theater or Drive-In Near You: The History, Culture, and Politics of the American Exploitation Film

504 DYER, CAROLYN STEWART AND NANCY TILLMAN ROMALOV., eds. Rediscovering Nancy Drew

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519 SHORT TAKES. The Best of Granta Reportage...Talking Politics: Choosing the President in the Television Age...The Power of News... and more

This book only partly fulfills the grandiose claims of its subtitle, and the main reason is that it lacks a sophisticated theoretical framework. Although based on the author’s 1990 doctoral dissertation at Bowling Green State University, the book seems curiously behind the times, particularly in terms of film theory. It is totally untouched by the methodologies that have radically reshaped film scholarship since 1970. Clark writes as if news of poststructuralism, semiotics, and psychoanalytic feminism somehow hasn’t reached Ohio yet.

The guiding theoretical lights of the book are Siegfried Kraceur, Bela Belazs, and Hugo Munsterberg, old fossils all. Clark enlists the aid of Munsterberg, whose *PhotoPlay: A Psychology Study* was published in 1916, to explain the process of audience interaction with film. His reliance on Munsterberg is puzzling when there are so many more recent and progressive works on film spectatorship available, including Jane Staiger’s *Interpreting Films* (1992) and Judith Mayne’s *Cinema and Spectorship* (1993). Both Staiger and Mayne emphasize that viewer response is conditioned by the historical, social, and psychological situation of the viewer and by parallel cultural practices ranging from journalism and advertising to popular fiction. Clark, on the other hand, treats spectatorship as essentially one-dimensional, with the meaning of what is happening on the screen fixed and uniform for the entire audience.

What happens on the screen in “exploitation films”— the term was coined by *Variety* in 1946— tends to be lurid. In fact, Clark asserts that one of the defining characteristics of exploitation films is that they deliberately include elements that might be considered improper in mainstream films: sex, drugs, violence, gore, and, in the 1950s, rock’n’roll.

Clark is at his best in the early chapters of the book, where he describes with relish the origins and conventions of the genre. He humorously recounts how Samuel Z. Arkoff and James Nicholson, who founded American International Pictures in the mid-1950s, established production practices that became standard in the exploitation-film industry. First, a catchy title was created— say, *Teenage Devil Dolls*— then a garish poster was made from the title. The poster was then shown to theater owners, who were asked if they would book such a film. If the answer was yes, then and only then was the film produced. The film, of course, was rarely as good as the poster and usually much worse.

Later chapters survey various subgenres of the exploitation film: teenage films, sexploitation films, lawbreaker films, martial arts films, and blaxploitation films. Here again, Clark displays a certain antiquatedness. His approach seems closely modeled on that of genre studies from the late 1960s and the 1970s— George N. Fenin and William K. Everson’s *The Western* (1973), John Tuska’s *The Detective in Hollywood* (1978), and so on — in which the kind of trivia beloved by the film buff overwhelmed serious analysis. While
groundbreaking in their time, these studies actually are little more than annotated filmographies.

Clark does sometimes offer useful insights amid the welter of film titles and release dates. He notes, for example, the gradual “whitening” of martial arts films, which were originally imported from China and Hong Kong and marketed to nonwhite audiences. When American filmmakers began to produce martial arts films themselves, they infused the subgenre with “traditional, conservative, middle-class values” in an effort to broaden its appeal. They also replaced Asian actors with Caucasian as the karate-chopping heroes. Remember Chuck Norris in Breaker! Breaker! (1977)?

There is nothing inherent in exploitation films that disqualifies them from being a legitimate subject of scholarly inquiry. As Clark writes, the films are “lowbrow products, perhaps, but cultural products all the same.” The problem is that Clark never adequately explains their function as cultural products. He suggests at one point that exploitation films are “a sort of barometer of public concerns,” citing the fact that when juvenile delinquency became a hot issue in the the years following World War II, a large number of low-budget films about teenage hoodlums appeared. In other words, he relegates film to merely a passive mirror-like role. This is to misunderstand or ignore just how subtle, just how duplicitous, just how ideologically charged are our interactions with film. If we ought to recognize anything by now, it is that there is no escape from complexity, not even in the dark.

Howard Good, The State University of New York at New Palz


Nancy Drew, Journalist? Those familiar with the spunky girl detective will not be surprised that she chose this honorable profession as she goes off to college — finally. Written by various authors under the pseudonym of Carolyn Keene, juvenile mystery books featuring Nancy Drew have been around since the early 1930s. More recently, building on the highly recognizable Nancy Drew character, Simon & Schuster added a romance series in 1986, the Nancy Drew Files; a series for younger girls in 1994, the Nancy Drew Notebooks; and, in 1995 they have sent Nancy off to college to study journalism, Nancy Drew on Campus.

A collection of papers and presentations from the Nancy Drew Conference at the University of Iowa, 16-18 April 1993, Rediscovering Nancy Drew is an interesting read for her fans and a valuable resource for students of popular culture. The conference, and this book, were the result of a series of events that began with the discovery that Mildred Wirt Benson, the first Carolyn Keene, was an alumnus of the University of Iowa journalism program.
Although there have been many academic and popular writings on Nancy Drew, as demonstrated by this book's extensive bibliography, few have offered the breadth of information. In addition, the book presents a model for studying cultural phenomena, a guide for research, and a reflective history on an important childhood encounter for many. College professors, students, journalists and writers, librarians, collectors, publishers, artists, and the public are all given voice here.

The book opens with the conference remarks of Carolyn Heilbrun, academician and mystery writer, who places the study of Nancy Drew within feminist thought and literary criticism. Organized around four themes -- "Creating and Publishing Nancy Drew," "Reading Nancy Drew, Reading Stereotypes," "Collecting and Studying Nancy Drew," "Transforming Nancy Drew" -- the book examines the Nancy Drew mysteries in the broader context of juvenile literature. Each section brings together academic presentations, children's compositions, oral histories and memoirs, and essays. As with a Nancy Drew mystery, you never know what will be around the next corner. The first section traces the writing and publishing history of Nancy Drew and series books through articles by Mildred Wirt Benson and a current Carolyn Keene, the present series editor, and others involved in the publishing industry. Section two is structured around Nancy Drew as role model and a more general discussion of juvenile literature in libraries. Section three examines the process of collecting and researching series books. Lastly, Nancy Drew is considered as she translates into film, art, and the lives of contemporary mystery writers.

But the strength of Rediscovering Nancy Drew is in the critical analysis of what is too often regarded as "silly nostalgia" (p. xii). The book contributes to our understanding of growing up as "other," the shaping of adulthood, and the importance of libraries and juvenile writings as cultural arbitrators. The spunky Nancy Drew, first defined by Mildred Wirt Benson, touched many of our lives, often as someone to aspire to but also, as one author wrote, as a reinforcement of stereotypes. All too often the cultural significance of childhood stories are ignored; Rediscovering Nancy Drew reminds us of their importance.

Norma Pecora, Ohio University


John Hohenberg has lived a fortunate life in the twentieth century. His autobiography, published in his eighty-ninth year, reveals that he has been blessed by astonishingly good health and a series of successful careers: first as a journalist, principally a foreign correspondent and foreign affairs writer, then a quarter century on the faculty at the Columbia School of Journalism, later migratory visiting professorships in postretirement at a number of major
universities. While he did not start to work on books until he was, by my
calculation, fifty-four, he has somehow managed to write or edit fifteen with
more in the planning stage. Along the way he met or covered many of the
significant figures of the century and has traveled extensively, largely supported
by someone else: the State and Defense Departments, Columbia, and various
foundations and professional associations. Most notably, he was born to a happy
family and privileged with a forty-nine year marriage to a college sweetheart.
Upon her death, a lingering and difficult one which he bore with great fortitude,
Hohenberg had the great fortune to fall into a second happy marriage and acquired
a family that has brought him much pleasure. And, despite an early bad patch or
two, he has enjoyed financial security. Who could ask for anything more?

His subtitle, the pursuit of excellence, derives from a gracious
acceptance of a Pulitzer Prize by William Faulkner, a prize given guiltily and
belatedly for a minor work, A Fable. Faulkner said he valued recognition for “at
least it was the best he was able to do at that moment.” Hohenberg has also
given his best in all his callings, though perhaps discretion demands more
modesty.

The major drama of his life, on this telling, and the centerpiece of the
book, is the twenty-two years he spent as administrator of the Pulitzer Prizes.
He details the conflicts within the board and between the board and the university
trustees which principally centered, not around the journalism prizes, but around
those for history, biography, and drama where the Pulitzer record is, to say the
least, less distinguished. His principal meditation about the nature of journalism
and the First Amendment is called forth by the prizes awarded for reporting on
Vietnam, Watergate, and the Pentagon Papers, prizes which were not particularly
controversial, though they earned some enmity from the White House. The
Pulitzers also elicit his one recommendation, namely that they be extended
beyond journalism to include public service prizes in education, civil rights, and
public health.

This is a journalist’s autobiography written in effective, interesting but
flatfooted and, largely, unemotional prose. He writes of great events and issues
he covered, such as the founding of Israel, but reveals more of himself in
examining his unhappy relations with the United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization. Hohenberg’s life has had sadness as well as
triumph but he doesn’t quite allow us to feel it. For example, when it comes
time to sell his house on the eastern tip of Long Island, a house that had been in
his first wife’s family for more than three generations, he tells us little of the
trauma of departure it must have involved if only because architecture is the
shelter of memory. He says more in the book about his physical regimen of
daily swimming than the emotional regimens of relations with colleagues. Nor
does he allow us to feel the moral ambiguity and drama that was involved in the
student revolts at Columbia from 1968 forward which so shaped the School of
Journalism or in his role as State Department debater opposing the New World
Information Order or as consultant to the Air Force and Defense Department. The
emphasis here is on a life well and successfully lived
"An essential book for anyone interested in the structural impact of advertising on American newspapers in particular and the American media in general."
—Financial Times

Advertising and a Democratic Press
C. Edwin Baker

In this provocative book, C. Edwin Baker argues that print advertising seriously distorts the flow of news by creating a powerfully corrupting incentive: the more newspapers depend financially on advertising, the more they favor the interests of advertisers over those of readers. Advertising induces newspapers to compete for a maximum audience with blandly "objective" information, resulting in reduced differentiation among papers and the eventual collapse of competition among dailies.

"Newspapers, Baker insists, operate mainly as businesses, secondarily as businesses, and occasionally—when they're sounding patriotic and devoted to the public interest—as businesses. . . . The main problem . . . is that advertising now accounts for some 65 percent of the average daily newspaper's revenue. In such a fix, he believes, advertisers replace readers and editors in determining editorial content."—Carlin Romano, The Philadelphia Inquirer


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and for that we can only have admiration and, here and there, when we cave in to moral weakness, envy.

James W. Carey, Columbia University


As the study of collective memory has begun its spread to nearly every significant moment of the past, those who favor its treatments have tended to overlook the figure of Richard Milhous Nixon. Thomas J. Johnson's new book, The Rehabilitation of Richard Nixon: The Media's Effect on Collective Memory, comes as an antidote. Johnson offers a thorough examination of our recollection about one of the most troubled public figures in contemporary American history. With the assistance of graphs, tables, and other aids that help him visually represent the making — and unmaking — of Richard Nixon past and present, he argues that the former President has been rehabilitated in memory; by the time of his death, he had evolved from an unscrupulous figure who brought us Watergate into a noted expert on foreign policy and elder statesman of the Republican Party. And, says Johnson, he did so by carefully choreographing the public's recollection of the events that molded our images of him.

Unlike Watergate in American Memory, the renowned, broadly-defined treatment of Watergate and collective memory by Michael Schudson, The Rehabilitation of Richard Nixon tracks the ground-level of memories about the former President. It combines the perspective of memory studies with the study of generations, which posits that different generations view a subject in conjunction with the world view set in place at the age at which one reaches political maturity. Indeed, given the longstanding interest — and, in the author's view, change — of attitudes about Nixon by generation, the choice is an apt one for analysis. More than most figures in contemporary history, Nixon produced a career with so many political comebacks that he seemed to land on the front page just when one thought he had actively retired. The book's careful foray into memories of what the author calls the "Nixon events" offers a valuable means for empirically evaluating the switchbacks of public opinion about the former President. Culled from the author's work with Kurt and Gladys Lang, and utilizing their studies as a starting point for his own, the author surveys alumni at the University of Washington to ascertain how they came to remember Nixon and how that memory persists today. Although the survey data dates back to the late 1980s, it nonetheless provides a portrayal of the complicated dynamics of memory about Nixon.
For instance, the author links attitudes about the phases of Nixon's political life — his early years, the period of high statesmanship through 1972, and the Watergate era — and the ways in which each phase was remembered. Not surprisingly, he found that memories of events influenced like attitudes — memories of Watergate influenced attitudes about Watergate — but they did not necessarily affect the more general memory of Nixon's Presidency. Other complications were introduced by the onset of political maturity among Johnson's respondents, with different political generations having different collective memories. Again, not surprisingly, those who came of political age during Watergate were most likely to resist Nixon's rehabilitation.

Oddly, the book's strongest feature — its cautious tracking of detail — also generates its most central failing. The book reads too carefully, perhaps because it still contains the features of "dissertationese" that should have been edited out. The book's first three chapters, as suggested by most good dissertation manuals, are titled, aptly, "Theory," "Background," and "Method," and it is only after plodding through this curious delineation of data that the reader is treated to some of the book's findings.

A more problematic point concerns the author's distinction between personal memory of Nixon and those who were introduced to him through later media recollections. This, I find, is one of the study's more bothersome premises, in that even those who experienced Nixon and Watergate at the time of their unfolding did so through the media. In that few of us experienced Nixon without some media intervention, the assumption of a later turn toward mediated memories constitutes a problematic comparison. The distinction, it seems, appears to be one of levels of media intervention rather than a mark of its absence.

Perhaps for that reason the book's main premise leaves its reader somewhat unsatisfied. Was Nixon truly rehabilitated? As the author notes, public disapproval of Nixon was never fully eliminated. As one member of the Watergate generation, this reader cannot forget the tarnished image of a fumbling, teary President, despite extensive efforts at laundering that recollection. Perhaps this is further evidence for Johnson's thesis. Or perhaps it simply underscores the persistence of face-saving strategies rather than their success. The idea of Nixon's rehabilitation, in such a view, takes on something of a hollow ring.

Barbie Zelizer, Temple University


When journalist Brooke Kroeger set out to examine the life of Nellie Bly, her goal was to discover the details left out of the scanty biographical sketches published in the near century since Bly had achieved fame as the
premiere stunt reporter for the New York World. Using research techniques of both the journalist and historian, Kroeger tracked down far-flung and hard-to-find documents and produced this exhaustive work which provides far more than a mere description of Bly's life. It also offers an intimate description of middle-class life in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a glimpse of some of the professional and economic changes occurring within the newspaper industry, and a testament to the social and economic struggles of working middle class women during that period.

Kroeger's biography goes far beyond the standard sketch given in most journalism histories which pays deference to Bly as the jaunty girl reporter who in 1889 traveled around the world in just seventy-two days for the sensationalistic New York World. These sketches often refer to Bly's difficult childhood, her start as a reporter in Pittsburgh, and her highly publicized stunt reporting for the World. Some mention her marriage at the age of thirty-one to millionaire septuagenarian Robert Seaman, her own attempt in industry after his death, and her subsequent bankruptcy, but few refer to her continued work as a journalist. Kroeger, instead, follows Bly into middle age and describes her later career as a war correspondent in Austria during World War I as well as her last years as a columnist for the New York Journal.

Drawing on a wealth of financial and court documents, Kroeger fleshes out the details of Bly's personal life, revealing the personal and financial conflicts that caused her to make many of the decisions that shaped both her personal and professional life. What emerges is not always a pretty picture, but the subject is startlingly human. Bly is revealed as vain, ambitious, and calculating. By this account, she was drawn to journalism not because of any burning desire to write, educate others, or reform the world (attributes often mistakenly assigned to "great journalists"), but rather because it seemed to be the one profession in which she might become financially and socially independent and in which she might compensate for her lack of education and connections with her good looks, innate charm, and perseverance.

Bly put these last attributes to good use during her first years as a reporter and invariably charmed her sources, got the story, and made the front page. No matter what the topic, she always reported it as if it were of monumental significance and her somewhat breathless, highly personal, readable style was apparently very attractive to readers and guaranteed a demand for her work.

In later years, after her waist had thickened and her girlish charms had dulled a bit, Bly relied heavily on both the connections she had made earlier as well as the reputation she had built in those few years of derring do. Arthur Brisbane, the managing editor of the New York Journal, became her personal champion. Other editors who still believed in her name's reader appeal continued to give her front-page bylines and her own column.

In Kroeger's account, Bly emerges not as a great reporter (as typically defined in textbooks), but as one who used her columns to promote her own personal agenda, be it her own fame and success as a "girl reporter," her naive and often misinformed pro-Austrian views during World War I, or her campaign
to find homes for orphans and foundlings during the 1920s. It also becomes clear that Bly was not always a success. Despite her determination and hard work, many of her actions were impetuous, ill-informed, and poorly executed. Her marriage to Seaman was a near disaster, her attempt to keep his business going after his death resulted in bankruptcy, her championing of Austria during and after the war nearly led to her expatriation, and she was clearly manipulated by her sources in many of the stories she reported.

This is not a biography of the "heroic" vein, but rather one that paints its subject in all the glowing detail of real life — warts and all. The reader has to, however, question the necessity for some of the detail. At 631 pages, this is an exceedingly long read. True to her goal, Kroeger supplies the details to fill in the areas of Bly's life that were previously left blank, but some of these details, such as the background of the newspapermen, businessmen, and political figures with whom Bly came in contact as well as that of their respective relatives and associates, seem gratuitous. While reveling in much of the evidence provided, the reader can only sigh at times and wish this book's editor had been a bit more stringent.

Elizabeth Burt, University of Hartford


Much of the current research on the cultural impact of American advertising argues that national advertising contributed to the creation of a consumer culture by duping the working class into gluttonous consumption of corporate America's cornucopia of often unnecessary products. Jackson Lears, as one of the leading cultural historians of the United States, substantially contributed to that body of research. In Fables of Advertising in America, Lears offers a better-researched and more refined argument and sets a new standard for cultural histories of advertising.

Positioning the history of American advertising within broader cultural developments, Lears shows how advertising "collaborated with other institutions in promoting what became the dominant aspirations, anxieties, even notions of personal identity, in the modern United States." Offering an impressive array of evidence, Lears argues that American advertising not only contributed to, but also reflected cultural tensions, usually giving voice and influence to the dominant corporate, managerial culture.

With the coming of the industrial age, the concept of abundance changed. No longer was it associated with nature and bountiful harvests from the earth. No longer did it come from humans toiling in the soil. Wealth came in the industrial age from manufactured products, and prosperity became disembodied. Advertising, mixing the images of the preindustrial culture with those of the new industrial age, eased this cultural transition by communicating
the new corporate, managerial concepts within the context of older cultural understandings, Lears argues. As the industrial age developed, advertising reflected emerging sociological understandings of mass society and helped to reconstruct the notion of individuality. To modern Americans confronted with a seeming loss of identity in a mass society, advertising became therapeutic, teaching that selfhood could be preserved through the consumption of mass produced products. The notion that people are what they wear and drive and own certainly benefited corporate bottom-lines, but it also was perpetuated within a wider cultural conversation in a not always cynical attempt to offer meaning to lives devalued by routinized labor, monotonous suburbs, and standardized entertainment.

A significant contribution of Lears’ work is the connection he makes between advertising’s style and message and the Protestant, Anglo-American culture of those who staffed the major advertising agencies. He shows how the character of modern American advertising owes much to the advertising copywriter’s and artist’s self-perceptions as agents of progress and democracy. Lears also significantly situates advertising’s style within the modern American art world and shows how advertising art merged the American avant-garde with kitsch and linked “formalist modernism with bureaucratic rationality.”

As other writers have shown, American corporate advertising has been an agent of social control, which Lears acknowledges. Yet, Lears sees more. Going beyond the simplistic criticism of advertising as seducer of a hapless and helpless audience, Lears’ work argues a more complicated understanding of advertising. While its message is destructive of individuality on one level, on another it has been a liberating force by infusing the culture with a subversive “reaffirmation of the possibility of mystery in the cosmos, a hint of animistic alternatives to the dualisms [self-release vs. self-control] of the dominant culture.” American cultural history has been characterized by dueling tendencies: our attraction to the confidence man and our admiration for the plain-speaking self-made man; our desire of freedom and our insistence on conformity; our embracing of the freewheeling marketplace, and our appreciation of the corporate managerial drive for predictability and control.

Lears agrees with previous researchers who have found that advertising usually has carried the corporate managerial message. But by looking past the utilitarian message of the advertisements and seeing them instead as cultural symbols and icons, Lears recognizes other layers of meanings. “Gradually,” Lears writes, “I began to realize that modern advertising could be seen less as an agent of materialism than as one of the cultural forces working to disconnect human beings from the material world.” Advertising’s frequent concurrent message was “a vision of transcendence, however fleeting,” offering alternative ways of being in the world. As copywriter John Starr Hewitt wrote in 1925, “No one ever in his life bought a mere piece of merchandise — per se. What he buys is the satisfaction of a physical need or appetite, or the gratification of some dream about his life.” Advertising, to Lears, speaks to those ethereal qualities and, hence, takes on symbolic meaning.
By placing advertising within larger cultural traditions and by seeing advertising as icons of a consumer age, Lears has produced a provocative and challenging history that enriches our understanding of mass communication in general and advertising in particular.

_James Aucoin, University of South Alabama_


In *Bits, Bytes, and Big Brother: Federal Information Control in the Technological Age*, Shannon E. Martin covers a great deal of historical, legal and ethical territory. Using three contemporary U.S. government information-control actions as a framework for her study, Martin examines the historical roots of the concept of information as it applies to government, categorizes the information-flow models present in government freedom of information policies, discerns the moral principles underlying the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, and then compares the ethical and legal principles at work in the contemporary and historical government statements on information control.

This is an ambitious agenda for a fairly slim book, and fulfilling that agenda is the only problem the book has: It leaves the reader wanting more depth. Too many authors isolate ideas, particularly legal and ethical ones, as though they operate in a vacuum, when in reality, legal developments typically occur in tandem with — not independent of — ethical values. Martin has not made the mistake of isolating these ideas, and because her combination of historical, legal, and ethical developments is sound, it would be delightful to see her examine the combination at greater length.

Martin, an assistant professor in the department of journalism and mass media at Rutgers University, thoroughly covers the history and legality of three government information-control actions (the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the Computer Security Act of 1987, and the Pentagon Rules for Media Access to the Persian Gulf War). Her legal research in particular is solid; she uses a broad variety of documentary sources to present the development and implementation of these three policies.

Also solid is Martin’s discussion of the information-flow models present in these three government actions (information moved or carried into the United States by outsiders, information moved by insiders within the United States, and information moved into the United States by insiders). These models provide thought-provoking implications for further development of government information policy, particularly in light of the increasing ease with which information may be moved, thanks to ever-improving technology.

The book’s look at the historical roots of the concept of information and its discussion of the moral principles at work in both contemporary and
historical government stances on information control are too brief. When covering the history of the concept of information, Martin notes that the concept can be traced to both Plato and Aristotle, then to Augustine and Aquinas. Given that she later discusses the moral philosophies embedded in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, it would have been interesting had she spent more time discussing these philosophers' ideas about information and how they may have informed the ideas of the Constitution's framers.

Martin's discussion of the moral principles in contemporary and historical information-control policies is also too brief. She sorts ethics into just two categories — deontology and teleology — and touches only on the theorists Kant and Mill. A fuller discussion of a wider range of ethical theory would have been appropriate and would have prevented the sort of "either-or" trap into which her discussion of the ethical principles embedded in the Constitution falls.

The final place where the book would benefit from more depth is its conclusion. Having connected, however briefly, the historical, legal, and ethical developments in information-control policies, Martin spends just one quick section proposing solutions to the three tensions ("information content versus carrier, natural rights versus utility, and executive branch versus legislature") she has found in these policies. She proposes that legislators take "proactive steps toward shaping an information policy that suits a technological age." Given that she has demonstrated mastery of a number of issues relating to the development of such policy, it would have been helpful had Martin outlined a policy.

Kristie Bunton, University of St. Thomas


The saga of Life magazine's heady rise and sad fall may be one of the more oft-told tales in journalism history. Although a number of scholarly works have carefully considered both the magazine and its milieu — notably, James Baughman's insightful Henry R. Luce and the Rise of the Modern American News Media — much of what we know about Life and its progress comes from the reflections of the publication's former staffers. Among the more interesting, Loudon Wainwright's The Great American Magazine, a bitter memoir entitled The Sin of Henry R. Luce by David Cort, and William Brinkley's humorous novel, The Fun House.

With A Love Affair with Life and Smithsonian by Edward K. Thompson, we now have yet another and, in some ways, definitive insider's view. The author joined the magazine in 1937 and, except for a brief leave during World War II, worked there for the next thirty years. More important, Thompson served for a dozen of the weekly magazine's most successful years as its chief (or in the Luce lexicon, managing) editor. And whatever else one might say about Life, two claims can certainly be made for Thompson's editorial reign from the
late 1940s to the early 1960s: It was during this period that the publication (a) redefined photojournalism as a contemporary art form, and (b) seemed perfectly to both shape and reflect the consensual, conformist middle-brow tenor of the times.

How that happened forms the core narrative of the book. It is also a story of the ever-ascending career of what one admirer called a "make-believe rube from North Dakota" to the one of the summits of postwar American journalism. Included in the latter portion of the book is another tale: Thompson's central role in the creation of one of the signal magazine successes of the 1970s, Smithsonian. But even though he was its founding editor and publisher, the Smithsonian story is, unfortunately, compressed into the last thirty pages.

An easy read, the work relies on a comfortably uncomplicated tone, occasionally leavened by seriocomic bursts of gruffness. Despite his pivotal contributions to both Life and Smithsonian, the author is generous in his credit to colleagues. In particular, it is apparent he had a special interest in photography and rapport with his photographers. As a consequence, many of the magazine's lesser-known photojournalists are given their deserved due here for the first time. Moreover, Thompson even writes with a certain fondness, at least in retrospect, about many of his adversaries, corporate and otherwise. The result, while certainly entertaining, is more celebratory than cerebral.

So Love Affair is exactly that. Even though its perspective may be wider than it is deep, it will certainly claim its rightful position near the top of the stack of important sources about Life and its place in the postwar magazine industry. At last count, that stack contained almost three dozen books, many the work of former employees. As one might expect, their subsequent writings suggest that some, quite happy about their working experiences, considered themselves professionally fortunate. Others, also as one might expect, did not. During his four long and exceedingly fruitful decades as a magazine editor, Thompson was, most certainly, a happy man.

David Abrahamson, Northwestern University


In studying presidential decision-making, it has become commonplace to examine, or at the very least to consider, how the personality traits of presidents may have influenced their behavior in the White House. Indeed, in recent years, several scholars including James David Barber and Doris Kearns Goodwin have constructed personality profiles of a number of presidents to evaluate their performance in office. By identifying specific events or moments in leaders' lives that may have shaped their core values and beliefs, scholars can and often do provide interesting theories about presidential conduct.
Following in this tradition, Stephen Vaughn attempts to cast light on President Reagan's positions on communism, national security, racism, civil rights, and a multiplicity of other social, economic, and political issues by focusing on the fortieth president's earlier career as a Hollywood actor and former president of the Screen Actors Guild. Although Vaughn admits that it is difficult to establish a "direct line between [Reagan's Hollywood] years and the positions later taken by Reagan as governor and president," he maintains that by examining this period in Reagan's life, readers will be able to "gain greater insight into Reagan's development as a political leader and into Hollywood's place in the American political system." (p.xi)

In his study, Vaughn offers a painstakingly detailed account of Hollywood in the early 1940s and 1950s as well as an illuminating discussion of the often stormy relationship that emerged between actors, unions, producers, directors, heads of motion picture studios, and Congress. His analysis of the efforts of the House Committee on Un-American Activities to cleanse Hollywood of Communist sympathizers and the reaction of key actors including Reagan to McCarthyism, is particularly revealing. However, Vaughn provides little more than anecdotal evidence to support his contention that Reagan's rollercoaster career in Hollywood significantly influenced the values and beliefs he brought to Washington.

Vaughn goes to great lengths to describe the various roles Reagan played throughout his career, including that of Notre Dame's legendary football star George Gipp in Knute Rockne-All American. Moreover, on several occasions, he argues that Reagan seemed to embrace many of the values and goals espoused by the characters he played. Yet, surprisingly, Vaughn devotes little attention to explaining how Reagan's policies in office reflected the views he expressed as an actor. For instance, there is no mention in this lengthy study about how the values and beliefs Reagan formed during this particular period directly or indirectly influenced his foreign policy toward Cuba, Grenada, and Nicaragua — countries often condemned by President Reagan as satellite states of the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, there is no reference to why President Reagan was committed to reducing or eliminating specific social welfare programs, policy positions inconsistent with many of the liberal views regarding government assistance he expressed in the 1930s and 1940s. Did President Reagan adopt these particular positions because he was reminded of what one of the characters he played in a Hollywood B movie believed or is it possible that his policies were influenced by a multitude of domestic and external factors? Ronald Reagan the president may very well have had a great deal in common with Ronald Reagan the actor but Vaughn falls short in making this connection. In short, this study concentrates a great deal on the roles Ronald Reagan played, but offers little information on how these parts influenced President Reagan's views on domestic and foreign policy.

For film historians and media scholars interested in the relationship between Hollywood and Washington during the first half of the twentieth century, this book offers some worthwhile material. Vaughn's analysis of the efforts of Warner Brothers and other major motion picture studios to produce war
In *Broadcasting the Local News*, Lynn Boyd Hinds, a former Pittsburgh broadcaster, introduces us to one station—KDKA-TV—which literally invented television news in Pittsburgh.

Drawing on interviews with Pittsburgh broadcasting veterans such as Bill Burns, Paul Long, Florence Sando, and Eleanor Schano, Hinds shows how the men and women of early television borrowed liberally from newspapers, radio, motion picture newsreels, theater, and even magazines to create, by trial and error, suitable ways to present the news. Rather than instantly replacing radio, television news moved slowly from the “rip and read” radio-style format, which simply duplicated what came over the wire services and was in the newspapers, to the conventions of local newscasts we take for granted today—live remotes, lead and feature stories, sports and weather, all brought together by an in-studio anchor.

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films, often in cooperation with the Department of Defense, to encourage America’s entry into World War II is extremely informative. As Vaughn points out, Harry and Jack Warner purposely cast handsome and charismatic actors like Ronald Reagan and Errol Flynn as fighter pilots to persuade the American public that it was an honor for brave young Americans to die for their country. However, as Vaughn demonstrates, while the Warner brothers truly believed that America’s domestic and global interests could best be served by fighting Nazi Germany, they relied on their films as a form of war propaganda to satisfy other personal and professional goals. What is interesting about this section in Vaughn’s book is how actors were frequently selected by studio executives to advance the political, social, and at times moral beliefs of their employers. This material alone should generate considerable interest among media scholars.

Donald Abelson, University of Western Ontario


While Peter Williams’ book offers some valuable insights into the exalted position thrust upon some athletes in twentieth century America, it ultimately proves to be a disappointment to media historians. Williams applies the theory of mythical archetypes to American sports to show that “characters, plots, and other elements...continue to recur both regularly and universally.” In this he succeeds. The questions that remain unanswered are how and why these elements recur and how they may be inextricably connected with the cultural production of sports gods by sportswriters and sportscasters.

The book starts on a promising note with Williams using a comment by Red Smith in which he reacts to editor Stanley Woodward’s injunction to stop “Godding up those ball players.” Williams’ “Preface” suggests that the “Godding up” of America’s athletic heroes is done primarily by sportswriters, even first-rate ones such as Red Smith. The problem is that as the book evolves, the deifying agents become confused and the role of the sports media becomes minimalized, a puzzling turn of events given the topic.

While it is true that Williams promises a “brief look at the role of the press” in the mythologizing process, his look is too brief — two pages in Chapter 13, followed by summary plot lines that the careers of athletes follow. Moreover, Williams falls into the trap of treating the sports media as a homogeneous entity, not allowing for differences in the “gee whiz” hero-making approach and the “aw nuts” debunking approach of the 1920s, or the differences between print and television media more recently.

At times, Williams trips over his application of mythical theory to the history of games. Dealing with Babe Ruth’s last memorable appearance at bat on 25 May 1935, a game in which he hit his final three home runs, including a
A tape-measure shot out of Forbes Field in Pittsburgh, Williams questions why a *New York Times* story takes a straight, hard-news approach rather than deifying the athlete and his feat. Williams concludes that Ruth's archetypal role as a Dionysiac, the embodiment of savage energy who is expected to perform wonders, accounts for the story's just-the-facts approach.

A journalism historian would infer that the story came from a wire-service rather than a staff reporter, which a look at the *Times'* lead sports page reveals. In addition, an early-season game between the Boston Braves (Ruth was winding down his career with the National League team) and the Pirates would have little significance for New York readers. The paper was also a Sunday edition, a busy sports-news day. Only two wire-service stories, as opposed to staff stories, ran on the *Times'* lead sports page that day. The other, played higher than Ruth's three homers, covered the three world records set by Jesse Owens in the Big Ten track championship, still the most heroic single-day effort in track history. The AP did not "God up" Owens, either.

Significantly, the Braves' hometown paper, the *Boston Globe*, deified the Dionysiac Ruth. The lead read: "The great man Ruth took Pittsburgh to his massive bosom today and sent 10,000 gabbing fans out of the ballpark convinced...he was the greatest home run king of them all." The differences in approach have everything to do with journalism practice and little to do with archetype.

Williams often cites Michael Oriard's work of mythic criticism of sports literature, *Dreaming of Heroes*. He would be better served by using Oriard's most recent work, *Reading Football*, in which Oriard abandons myth and reads as a cultural historian the varied texts of newspaper accounts of football.

*Dennis Gildea, Springfield College*

*Short Takes*


This collection contains thirteen strongly written in-depth selections of personal reportage that closely look at people and politics in various places around the world. They were published in Granta, the British literary and cultural magazine, between 1983 and 1992. The book opens with Ryszard Kapuscinski's "The Soccer War," a look at Central American soccer and a war between Honduras and El Salvador published in 1990. It ends with "Los Angeles," Richard Rayner's account of the Los Angeles riots that followed the Rodney King verdict. Included are Germaine Greer's 1985 article "Women and Power in Cuba," Martha Gellhorn's "The Invasion of Panama" (1990), and John le Carre's "The Unbearable Peace" (1991), which is a look at the Swiss military.

Cunningham, a freelance writer and founder of Choosing the President Forums, interviewed ten broadcasters/commentators to learn more about the relationship between candidates and journalists. She interviewed Robert MacNeil, Linda Ellerbee, Larry King, Pierre Salinger, Dave Sirulnick, Jeff Greenfield, Geraldine Ferraro, Bernard Shaw, Tom Brokaw, and Roger Rosenblatt. Cunningham provides some background on each person and a question-and-answer follows. The questions are wide-ranging and change from person to person, moving from the personal (i.e., to Larry King: “When you're doing an interview, what's going on inside?”) to professional (to Larry King: “Do you think talk-show formats are much more susceptible to manipulation by some sort of demagogue?”).

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This book was originally published in hard-cover in 1994 by Villard Books. For this paperback edition, Diamond has added a seven-page epilogue to cover events that have occurred at the *Times* over the past two years, primarily focusing on the significance of various changes in editors. The epilogue is titled “Epilogue, 1995: ‘The White Guys Had a Great Run’ (And It's Still Not Over).” Diamond says the appointments of various editors and writers since the hard-cover edition do nothing to change his original conclusion: that the *Times* is slowly moving away from serious journalism.

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The editor says this reference is “about the nexus of oratory and politics” as practiced by twenty U.S. presidents, including Bill Clinton. Each entry attempts to provide the historical and political context for the president considered, and then assesses the quality of the presidential rhetoric on various issues. The assessment or critique is not based on “fitting speeches to theories or theories to speeches,” but on oratorical and rhetorical criteria that, Ryan says, is “as serviceable today as they were two thousand years ago.” Each entry contains a bibliography broken down into categories: Archival Materials, Rhetorical Studies, Rhetorical Monographs, and Chronology of Significant Presidential Persuasions (addresses and talks).

Most media scholars will already be familiar with many of this collection's essays, all of which were published in journals, books, or magazines between 1983 and 1994. They broadly deal with Schudson's contention that news needs to be examined as a cultural form. The essays are not in chronological order, but are grouped under three thematic headings: The News in Historical Perspective (consisting of “Three Hundred Years of the American Newspaper,” “The Politics of Narrative Form,” “Question Authority: A History of the News Interview,” and “What Is a Reporter?”), Myths of Media Power, and Citizenship and Its Discontents. Schudson's thirty-three-page introduction, “News as Public Knowledge,” clarifies Schudson’s ideas and further binds the essays.


A comprehensive guide to available literature on how to manage the publishing process, including citations and annotations for more than 1,200 works relating to publishing. After listing and annotating comprehensive sources, such as John P. Dessauer's *Book Publishing: A Basic Introduction*, for example, Speck provides entries arranged by topics, such as Acquiring/Starting, Marketing, Hiring, Training, Style Guides, to name only a few. The works cited were published from 1960 through the early 1990s, and include trade, journal, and scholarly publications. The entries provide detailed summaries of the original works.
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